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ABSTRACT
The s tru c tu ra l scheme of th is  study may be b r ie f ly  explained as fo llo w s:
Part I :  Foundations of Personal L ib e rty :
This p a rt contains the In tro d u ctio n  and Chapter 1 . The spec ia l 
fea tu res  of the  methodology of th is  study -  the in tro d u c tio n  of whet 
we have c a lled  "Value ju risprudence1' -  has been explained with 
necessary p a rtic u la rs  in  the In troduction  to  lay  the "foundations" 
of personal l ib e r t y .  In  Chapter 1 are revealed the several aspects 
of the "foundations" -  the s o c ia l and p o l i t ic a l  aims and a tt itu d e s , 
ancient and modern, Western, Asian and A frican , and the  embryonic, 
as w e ll as the f u l ly  developed forms of Human Rights jurisprudence  
m anifested resp ec tive ly  in  some im portant c o n s titu tio n a l landmarks 
of the Western p o l i t ic a l  system end in  the In te rn a tio n a l Legal System.
P art I I :  Invasions of Personal L ib e rty : "S o c ia l-S e c u rity " :
Chapter 2 covers th is  p a rt and i t  deals with the norms of " re s tra in ts "  
and "pro tection ^ 1 associated with the concept o f "S o c ia l S ecu rity" , 
namely the  p ro tection  of so c ie ty . Section I  deals w ith the "Power 
o f A rrest" (Common Law as w e ll as S ta tu to ry ): Section I I  with "Preventive  
J u s tic e " , which includes powers to  bind over and a n t i - r e c id iv is t  
measures.
Part I I I :  Invasions of Personal L ib e rty : "S ta te -S e c u rity " :
This Part embraces Chapters 3 to  8 , a l l  dealing with "emergency 
provisions" -  the norms o f " re s tra in ts "  and "pro tections" associated  
with the concept o f "S tate S ec u rity " . Chapter 3 deals with the Common 
Law provisions fo r  "Necessity" and "M a rtia l Law". In  Chapter 4 are 
discussed the emergency le g is la t io n  re la t in g  to the "Defence o f the  
Realm" in  the United Kingdom and also the re le v an t le g is la t io n  dealing  
with the "Northern Ire la n d  problem". In  Chapters 5 to 8 the treatm ent 
of the to p ic  is  extended to im portant areas of New Commonwealth. In  
a l l  cases re le v an t case-law is  discussed in  separate sections and in
i / i
the New Commonwealth context, the relev/ant c o n s titu tio n a l  
provisions are also discussed in  add ition  to  s ta tu to ry  provis ions.
Part IV : Prospects fo r  Personal L ib e rty : Conclusions:
In  Chapter 9 which forms th is  P art the prospects fo r  personal l ib e r ty  
are assessed with reference to  the tu in  aspects o f the concepts -  
"value" and " le g a l"  -  to  emphasize the operation  of the "Value 
ju risprudence", and a p lea is  made fo r  the in tro d u c tio n  in  a l l  
n a tio n a l le g a l systems of an element o f "humanitarianism" to  lin k  
the tw in concepts to  improve the prospects fo r  personal l ib e r t y .
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1PART I
INTRODUCTION
I . General
1.1 The ev/er growing contemporary concern fo r  p ro tec tion  o f personal
l ib e r ty  is  undoubtedly a g lobal phenomenon. But i t  i s  also true th a t the  
incidence o f "invasions” of personal l ib e r ty  is  the h ighest in  the "Third  
World" (th e  developing countries) and th a t i t  is  the form o r nature o f the 
"invasion" ra th e r than i t s  exten t or expanse which has accentuated and 
in te rn a tio n a lis e d  the  concern. Today "prisoners o f conscience" are held  
in  great number in  d if fe re n t  parts  of the 'T h ird  World" but in  the  New 
Commonwealth the disease has appeared in  many s ta tes  in  an endemic form . 
This phenomenon has in s p ire d  th is  research o r , in  le g a l terms, has 
provided i t s  " ju s t i f ic a t io n " .
I I . Methodology: "Value jurisprudence"
1.2 The departure in  th is  study from the conventional terms of a
le g a l th e s is , by in troducing  the concept o f "V/alue ju risprudence", needs 
some exp lan atio n . I t  is  the re s u lt  of adopting an em p iric a l approach 
normally associated with d is c ip lin e s  other than law, more p a r t ic u la r ly  with  
work c a rried  out in  la b o ra to rie s . We gradually  re a lis e d  in  the course of 
research th a t i t  i s  not only unrewarding to  th in k  of personal l ib e r ty  in  
terms so le ly  o f norms of p o s itive  law but th a t such norms in  fa c t  operate 
in  terms of "values", a lb e it  im p ercep tib ly . We found th a t i t  is  necessary 
to  give recognition  to th is  process. We re a lis e d  th a t i t  is  necessary to  
emphasize the fa c t  th a t ,  i f  the human mind does not work in  a vacuum, i t
also does not work merely through the in s t itu t io n s  th a t i t  has created
such as "law" in  i t s  various m anifestations and th e ir  ra m ific a tio n s :
"law" i s  founded on "reason" but "values" can claim a transcendental 
character. Indeed, the new "Human Rights ju risprudence", evolved under the  
in te rn a t io n a l system of the  new world order, is  based on "values" concerned
2
with the fundamental issue of the very existence of mankind. We have 
merely a r t ic u la te d  th is  premise by in troducing the concept of "Value 
ju risprudence".
T .3  I t  is  tru e  th a t the main body of the study conforms to  what may be
described as a conventional treatm ent o f the su b ject, namely, the  
examination of the in s t itu t io n s  of p o s itive  law concerned d ire c t ly  with the 
"invasions" o f personal l ib e r t y .  But the d e ta ile d  analys is  o f the " le g a l"  
norms o f " re s tra in ts "  and "pro tections" has in  fa c t  been undertaken with a 
view to revea ling  the tru th  -  the tru th  th a t the " le g a l"  in s t itu t io n s  are 
in  fa c t value-actuated  -  the tru th  th a t the various agencies associated  
with the making, the enforcement and the adm in istration  of law , the  
le g is la tu re , the executive and the ju d ic ia ry , in  fa c t operate through a 
"value-process".
1 .4  I t  is  also tru e  th a t in  th is  study the " s o c io -p o lit ic a l"  
in s t itu t io n s , u n like  the " le g a l"  and " le g a l -p o l i t ic a l" ,  have not received  
a s im ila r  exhaustive treatm ent. I t  i s  because th is  is  a le g a l th e s is .
We accept the pos ition  th a t there  is  l i t t l e  doubt th a t the "foundations"
of personal l ib e r ty  l i e  mainly in  the ideas aid in s t itu t io n s  of p o l i t ic a l
thought emanating from such concepts as "socie ty" and " p o lity " ;  "law"
(p o s itiv e  law) a p r io r i  mainly regu lates  personal l ib e r ty  by prescrib ing
the norms of " re s tra in ts "  and "p ro tec tio n s", which is  m anifested in  the
process of "invasion" of personal l ib e r t y .  The basic framework or the
in fra -s tru c tu re  o f th is  study is  thus based upon certa in , concepts and, to*•
l in k  up the " le g a l"  and the "value" concepts, ce rta in  expressions have 
been used in  a tech n ica l sense which w i l l  f i r s t  be defined .
I l l . D e fin itio n s
(1 ) The New Commonwealth
1 .5  S ir  Iv o r Jennings used the term "New Commonwealth" in  1958 in  
re la tio n  to  those countries which wa have, in  th is  study, re fe rre d  to  
compendiously a3  Commonwealth Asia, namely the s ta tes  o f the Ind ian  sub-
3
continent ( In d ia ,  Pakistan and S ri Lanka) and o f South-east Asia (then
only the "Federation of Malaya" had come in to  b e in g ). On the other hand
i t  is  commonly used nowadays in  re la t io n  to  a l l  s ta tes  of the Commonwealth
other than the United Kingdom and th ree  "Dominions" o f Canada, A u s tra lia  
2and New Zealand. Notwithstanding these fa c ts  we have adapted the term 
"New Commonwealth" fo r  the purpose of th is  study fo r  d e f in ite  reasons. Ue 
r e ite ra te  th a t the basic d iffe ren ce  between the  "old" and th e  "new" 
Commonwealth l ie s  in  th e ir  d if fe re n t  indigenous " tra d it io n s " , although 
they have come to share many common "a s p ira tio n s " . The t ra d it io n s  of the 
former are undoubtedly Anglo-Saxon/Norman in  o r ig in  w hile  the dominant 
strands o f "indigenous" tra d it io n s  of the  l a t t e r  are the tra d it io n s  of 
Asia and A fr ic a  which p re v a il even in  areas ly in g  outside the t e r r i t o r i a l  
compass of these two continents; fo r  example, in  the Caribbean (which is  
not included in  th is  study) the large  p a rt o f the population consists of 
persons of A frican and "Ind ian" o r ig in ;  in  sm all is lands l ik e  F i j i  and 
M au ritiu s  a lso , people of "Ind ian" o rig in  form a major p a rt o f the  
population . Pakistan , although i t  has l e f t  the Commonwealth, is  included  
in  th is  study fo r  the same reason, namely, to  a r t ic u la te  the "value"  
aspect and not the t e r r i t o r i a l  aspect in  the  consideration o f " le g a l"  
norms. Indeed, in  Pakistan the operation of the "value-process" has
assumed such a s ig n if ic a n t and, a t the ju d ic ia l  le v e l,  wholesome aspect,
th a t i t s  omission would have required  a mors laboured e f f o r t  to  support the 
theory of "V/alue ju risprudence".
(2 ) Personal l ib e r ty
1 . 6  In  th is  study we have examined the concept o f personal l ib e r ty
in  i t s  tw in aspects -  as a " le g a l"  concept and as a "value" concept. In  
the pure Anglo-Saxon system (which p re v a ils  in  the "old" Commonwealth) 
the d is tin c t io n  is  a t best m anifested in  the recognition  of the d iffe ren ce  
between "'moral" and "p o s itiv e "  or " le g a l"  r ig h ts ;  i t  is  contended th a t a
3
" r ig h t"  not only means " law fu l e n title m e n t"  but also " ju s t e n title m e n t" .
Under the in te rn a t io n a l system, personal l ib e r ty  is  a "human r ig h t"  and 
according to  the " le g a l"  norms of the  system, the "fundamental human
4
r ig h ts "  spring from the re a ffirm a tio n  of the "worth o f the human person".
Indeed, Dudge Kotaro Tanaka has said th a t "the value of a person is  a
ju r id ic a l  concept of an absolute character" and th a t " i t  is  not only a 
5tech n ica l term ". And he r ig h t ly  assets th a t human r ig h ts  have always
ex is ted  with human beings "independently o f ,  and b efo re , the S ta te .
Under the n a tio n a l le g a l systems of the New Commonwealth the r ig h t to
personal l ib e r ty  is  a "fundamental r ig h t"  but the content o f the r ig h t ,  or
the purport of the expression, has been examined at some length only by
7
the Indian ju d ic ia ry :  through a b iz a rre  operation of the  "value-process"
i t  has given the " le g a l"  concept of personal l ib e r ty  a meaning which 
v io la te s  the noims o f the "value ju risprudence". Thus, a case is  made out 
in  th is  study fo r  a proper ap p ra isa l of the tw in aspect o f personal l ib e r ty  
and fo r a proper in te g ra tio n  of the two concepts through the "value-process"
(3 ) "Law" and "Value .jurisprudence"
(A) The Nexus
1.7 In  Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, "law" is  regarded genera lly  as an
in s t i tu t io n  of co n tro l: i t  plays a "regu lato ry" ro le  and only p o s itive  law 
is  "law" whether i t  i s  common law or s ta tu te -la w . In  th is  study we have 
also d e a lt with other m anifestations of "law", such as "N atura l Law" and 
"Humanitarian Law". Indeed they do not have the same "regu lato ry" ro le  
under the n a tio n a l le g a l systems of the common law ju r is d ic t io n .  But 
i t  is  necessary to  remember th a t "N atura l Law" has been absorbed in to  the  
common law in  England ( in  America, in  the c o n s titu tio n a l B i l l  o f R ig h ts ), 
having f i r s t  undergone transform ation in to  p r in c ip le s  of C h ris tian  p ie ty .  
Many p rin c ip le s  o f ad m in is tra tive  law in  both England and America are, 
however, d ire c t ly  traceab le  to  "N atura l Law", namely, the "Rule of Law" in  
i t s  spec ia l aspect and the s o -c a lle d  "p rin c ip le s  of n a tu ra l ju s t ic e " ,  
p a r t ic u la r ly  such p r in c ip le s  as the ru le  of audi alterem partem. Indeed,
as Schwartz and Iliads observe, p rin c ip le s  of adm in is tra tive  law have 
p ro life ra te d  as i t  has to  deal with "problems of keeping the powers of
g
government under proper le g a l c o n tro l" . And i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  conceive 
of a wider um brella than the concept of "N atural Law" under which can 
s h e lte r new ju r id ic a l  concepts. No doubt the same p rin c ip le s  of C h ris tian  
p ie ty  gave b ir th  to  the "Humanitarian Law" under the in te rn a t io n a l system, 
to embrace in  i t s  ambit the C iv i l  Law t r a d it io n .
1 .8  But whence came th is  metamorphosis ? I t  i s  to be a ttr ib u te d
to  "value ju risprudence". In  Asia and A fr ic a , in  the^Jtrad itional
jurisprudence, "duty" was regarded as an in s t itu t io n  of co n tro l, but 
t r a d it io n a l "values" were swamped by Anglo-Saxon in s t i tu t io n s .  The "Value 
jurisprudence" thus assumes an im portant ro le  in  tra c in g  the development 
of new a ttitu d e s  and new in s t itu t io n s  in  the emergent S ta tes .
(B) The key elements o f "Value jurisprudence"
( a) Value jand V,alue-jcojicepj;
1.9 "Value" at common parlance is  the measure o f importance attached
to  a p a r t ic u la r  idea  o r a th in g . In  th is  study the term "value" is  used to  
denote the in a r t ic u la te d  idea of a concept which determines the content of 
the concept, not merely with reference to the norms of p o s itive  law obtain ing  
at any p a r t ic u la r  tim e in  any p a r t ic u la r  te r r i to r y  but with reference to  
innate  human understanding and human c u ltu re . At d if fe re n t  times and under 
d if fe re n t  climes human understanding and human c u ltu re  change, from these 
changes emerge d if fe re n t  "value-concepts"; they cannot be d ire c t ly  re la ta b le  
to  changes in  " le g a l norms", they are independent of them. They operate 
through the "value-process" re g u la tin g  the content of the p a r a l le l  " le g a l"  
concepts. Thus, in  th is  study we contend th a t not only is  "personal 
l ib e r ty "  a " le g a l"  as w e ll as a "value" concept, but there are other 
concepts as w e ll th a t need s im ila r  treatm ent, namely, " l ib e r ty " ,  "s ec u rity " , 
"s ta te " , "society" and "[human] person"; even the more le g a l is t ic  concept
of "Rule of Law" embraces an element of dualism. On th is  premise we have
G
used expressions such as "so c ia l s ec u rity "  and "s ta te  s e c u rity "  fo r  which
9there does not e x is t any u n iversa l te rm in o lo g ica l p a r a l le l .  These two 
concepts, in  th is  study, are meant to  denote the le g a l norms concerned 
with the pro tection  of "socie ty" in  the f i r s t  case and the "s ta te "  in  
the second case, to  form the v a lu e -tr ia n g le  of personal l ib e r t y .
(b ) ^ ja l^ e J1pjro<cejSS  ^ jand JjRublijc opinion"
1.10 The process by which the in a r t ic u la te  idea  of a "value concept"
is  activa ted  and is  used to "reg u la te" the content o f the " le g a l"  concept 
i s  described in  th is  study as the "value-process". The process operates  
at d if fe re n t  le v e ls  through d if fe re n t  means or agencies and i t  is  
constitu ted  with d if fe re n t  in g re d ie n ts , c h ie fly  "public  o p in io n ".
In  a modern p o lity  the process operates through the d if fe re n t  organs of 
the s ta te  such as the executive , the le g is la tu re , the ju d ic ia ry  and the  
bureaucracy and also through d if fe re n t  s o c ia l agencies such as the  
in d iv id u a l, the fa m ily , the group and organisations vario u s ly  constitu ted  
(such as "Pressure groups"). The aims and a ttitu d e s  of the several organs 
and agencies of the s ta te  and the society  resp ective ly  are in fluenced  and 
moulded by "pub lic  o p in ion". The last-m entioned term is  meant not only to 
include the a c t iv i t ie s  o f the various "media" but also to  embrace a l l  
kinds of p u b lic , p r iv a te , parliam entary and ju r is t ic  (in c lu d in g  ju d ic ia l )  
debates. The scale and the scope of the debate and the ex ten t of human 
involvement in  i t  determines i t s  capacity to  m obilise "p u b lic  op in ion".
Such debates ev id en tly  form an e s s e n tia l element o f the v i t a l i t y  of "pub lic  
opin ion". I t  cannot however be ignored th a t although the "value process" 
operates through "p u b lic  opinion" there is  a "constant fa c to r"  which 
forms the keynote of the "value-process" in  so fa r  as i t s  operation in  the  
f ie ld  o f personal l ib e r ty  is  concerned. The keynote is  the tr ia n g le  which 
is  formed by the "value-concepts" o f "human r ig h ts " , "s o c ia l s ec u rity "  and 
"state  s e c u rity " . This w i l l  be revealed in  the course of examination of the
"foundations" and "invasions" of personal l ib e r ty  in  the succeeding pages
I o
of th is  study.
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Chapte r 1
THE FOUNDATIONS OF PERSONAL LIBERTY
I . Western p o l i t i c a l  th o u g h t  and some im p o r ta n t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  landm arks
( 1 )  ft G e ne ra l View
1.1 Law and p o l i t i c s  f i n d  a common m e e t in g  ground i n  th e  search f o r
the  o r i g i n  o f  th e  concept o f  l i b e r t y .  A cco rd ing  t o  Dean Roscoe Pound th e
Common Law, even in  i t s  b e g in n in g s ,  saw th e  prob lem o f ,  "on th e  one hand,
e f f e c t i v e  o r d e r in g  o f  conduct in  a c i v i l i s e d  s o c ie t y ,  and, on th e  other..
hand, such l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  and checks upon th o se  to  whom t h a t  o r d e r in g  i s
com m itted  as to  p re s e rv e  due ba lance  between the  g e n e ra l  s e c u r i t y  and th e
i n d i v i d u a l  l i f e . "  S i r  I s a ia h  B e r l i n  has w r i t t e n  about " tw o  concep ts  o f
l i b e r t y "  and has observed  t h a t  th e re  i s  an "open war t h a t  i s  b e in g  fo u g h t
between two systems o f  id e a s  which r e tu r n  d i f f e r e n t  and c o n f l i c t i n g  answers
to  what has lo n g  been th e  c e n t r a l  q u e s t io n  o f  p o l i t i c s  -  the q u e s t io n  o f
2obedience and c o e r c io n . "  However, P ro fe s s o r  M a u r ic e  C ranston  observes  
t h a t  th e  w es te rn  p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h e rs  had one t h i n g  i n  common in  t h a t  they  
a l l  shared  "a  deep concern  w i th  freedom as a concept and a v a lu e "  a l though
3
they  had d i f f e r e n t  id e a s  about th e  meaning and c o n te n t  o f  th e  c o n c e p t .
Hobbes, Locke and M i l l ,  observes C ra n s to n ,  were i n t e r e s t e d  in  p r e s e r v in g
the  freedom o f  each i n d i v i d u a l  from  i n t e r f e r e n c e  by h i s  n e ig h b o u rs  o r
h i s  r u l e r s  w h i le  A r i s t o t l e ,  Rousseau and Hegel were more i n t e r e s t e d
4
in  th e  " q u a l i t y "  o f  a man’ s freedom .
1 .2  A summary o f  t h i s  g re a t  i s s u e ,  which has been a p re o c c u p a t io n
o f  Western p h i lo s o p h y  f o r  many c e n tu r ie s ,  i s  i n e v i t a b l y  in a d e q u a te .  The 
d i s t i n c t i o n s ,  on th e  one hand, between the  two s c h o o ls  o f  th o u g h t  and,
on th e  o th e r  hand, between the  f o r m u la t io n s  o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  p h i lo s o p h e rs  
were s u b t le  and com plex. Indeed th e  spectrum i s  so b road  t h a t  i n  each 
case th e  f o r m u la t io n s  have been v a r i o u s l y  b randed as " a b s o lu t i s m " ,  
" c o l l e c t i v i s m " ,  " p o s i t i v i s m "  in  one case and " l i b e r a l i s m " ,  " n a t u r a l i s m "
and " ind iv idua lism " in  the other case, to  name but a few of them. We
have d e lib e ra te ly  om itted the im portant and d is t in c t  concept of "communism"
from the f i r s t  group. The modern "western world" does not own i t  as a
"western" p o l i t ic a l  philosophy apparently fo r  the reason th a t i t  is
considered to be an a n tith e s is  of the western concept of " l ib e r a l
democracy". We propose to  discuss Marx, Communism and the Russian
Revolution separate ly  as p a rt of the new world o rder.
1 .3  In  th is  section i t  is  necessary to  discern the in fluence  only
5
of the " l ib e r a l"  currents o f western p o l i t ic a l  philosophy on the
making of such im portant c o n s titu tio n a l documents as Magna Carta and the
B i l l  of Rights in  England and also of the American D eclaration  of
Independence and the French D eclaration  o f the Rights of Man and of the
C it iz e n . However we have to look back to the ancient Greeks and th e ir
"N atural Law" as i t  is  asserted th a t the c o n tin u ity  o f western p o l i t ic a l
thought is  re fle c te d  in  the t r a d it io n a l  concepts of "n a tu ra l r ig h ts "
and the " rig h ts  of man" end the modern concept of "human r ig h ts " .^
E v id en tly , ideas took concrete shape with the march of c iv i l is a t io n .
Indeed, we do not hear the ancient sages speaking in  terms of "personal
l ib e r ty "  or "freedom of movement"; they spoke of " l ib e r ty "  in  general
terms and more of "law ", i t s  content and n a tu re . Gradually the terms
"s ta te"  and "sovereignty" and the concepts of " r ig h ts "  and"power" came to
be discussed. For the f i r s t  time in  Magna C arta , in  chapter 39,
the concept of "due process of law" came to  be embodied through which
personal l ib e r ty  was protected although, as we s h a ll see, the contemporary
p o l i t ic a l  thought did not engender personal l ib e r ty  as a s p e c ific  and 
7
d is t in c t  concept.
(2 )  The Greeks and "N atural Law"
1 .4  The c iv i l is a t io n  of the p o lis  -  the ancient Greek c ity -s ta te s  of 
the f i f t h  century B.C.  -  with i t s  s t r a t i f ie d  so c ia l s e ttin g  o f a r is to c ra ts , 
c it iz e n s  and slaves and the ru le  o f o ligarchy could not obviously be 
expected to  generate what we consider today as t,fl ib e r a l"  views. However, 
the concept of "n a tu ra l law" appears to have been born out of the 
d is tin c tio n  made by a group of philosophers known as the  Sophists between 
phvsis ("n a tu re " ) and I qqos ("d iv in e  law") on the one hand and nomos 
(" la w ") as applied to the human l i f e  of the p o lis  on the o th e r. One
was e te rn a l and wise; the o th e r, being man-made, was a rb it ra ry .  I t  is  
tru e  th a t Socrates and P lato  do not e x p l ic i t ly  re fe r  to  "n a tu ra l law" but 
in  P la to ’ s Republic there is  an in q u iry  in to  the nature of ju s t ic e .  P lato  
sees the p o lis  as "man w r it  la rg e" but the idea  is  open to d ivers  
in te rp re ta t io n s ; Socrates, on the other hand, points out th a t the  
powerful freq u en tly  ru le  in  th e ir  own in te re s t  and are corrupted by power
8 bi t s e l f .  One th ing  i s ,  however, c e r ta in . The two philosophers were
obviously concerned with what has been c a lled  "the harmonious balance or
p r in c ip le  of ju s tic e "  in  the c ity -s ta te  (which is  not to  be understood
in  the modern sense o f the enforcement of pub lic  law) aid the supreme end
of the s ta te  was conceived in  a tta in in g  the moral p e rfec tio n  of i t s  
9c i t i  zen s .
1 .5  liiith the gradual change in  the s o c ia l s e ttin g  tak ing  place during
the tra n s it io n  from p o lis  to cosmopolis. in  the Laws. P lato  becomes more
c a te g o ric a l. He subordinates law to  community in te re s t  ra th e r than to any
10absolute or abstract h igher m o ra lity . Even A r is to t le ,  in  h is  P o lit ic s ,
does not cary the concept o f "the laws" any nearer to  "n a tu ra l law ".
Although he asserts th a t laws ought to  be ra t io n a l and accord with
p o l i t e ia . un just and in e q u ita b le  laws cannot be in v a lid a te d  fo r  there are
11no sanctions against bad laws as "the law" is  not "sovereign"; the
o p p o s i t io n  p a r ty  had t o  o v e r th ro w  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  r a t h e r  than  the  
1 2governm ent. I t  was, i n  f a c t ,  th e  s t o i c  s c h o o l  o f  p h i lo s o p h y  which 
became a c t i v e  tow ards  th e  end o f  th e  f o u r t h  c e n tu ry  B .C . ,  t h a t  came o u t
open ly  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  "Law o f  N a t u r e " .
1 .6  The S to ic s  were in t e r e s t e d  i n  th e  cosmos which le d  them to
b e l ie v e  in  the  u n i v e r s a l  b ro th e rh o o d  o f  man and th e y  came t o  r e l a t e  what
13th e y  c o n s id e re d  t o  be th e  " in n a te  re a s o n "  o f  man t o  th e  cosmic o r d e r .
A new e ra  had begun -  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  from p o l i s  t o  cosm opo lis  was
co m p le te .  Man was r e q u i r e d  to  l i v e  " i n  accord  w i th  n a t u r e " ;  n a tu re  was 
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f u l l  o f  la w s .  In  o th e r  words p r im acy  cams to  be a t ta c h e d  to  " n a t u r a l
re a so n "  o r  " u n i v e r s a l  re a so n "  th rough  w h ich ,  as has been s a id ,  th e  concept
o f  consc ience  e n te re d  i n t o  th e  h i s t o r y  o f  p o l i t i c a l  th o u g h t .  Whether i t
was a case o f  r e s is ta n c e  o r  o f  o bed ie nce , t o  a u t h o r i t y ,  appea l was made
15t o  " c o n s c ie n c e " .
(3 )  The Romans and " j u s  g e n t iu m "  and " j u s  n a t u r a l s "
1.7 The Roman m ind , i t  has been obse rved , was n o t  s p e c u la t iv e  b u t
16" p r a c t i c a l ,  m i l i t a r y  and l e g a l i s t i c " .  C ice ro  has bean c r e d i t e d  w i t h
t r a n s l a t i n g  S to ic  p h i l o s o p h ic a l  id e a s  i n t o  L a t in  l e g a l  te rm s .  The
H e l l e n i s t i c  id e a  o f  "Law o f  N a tu re "  was l i n k e d  up w i th  the  "Law o f  th e
p e o p le "  and as a r e s u l t  " j u s  n a t u r a l e "  became more p r a c t i c a l  and
17".jus g e n t iu m " more g e n e ra l .  The Roman Commonwealth had become a b ig
w o r ld  and " . jus  g e n t iu m " which was d e v ise d  f o r  f o r e ig n e r s  and was, as such,
in  g re a t  need o f  ex tended  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  found  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  such a
course i n  " j u s  n a t u r a l e " .  In  De R e p u b l ic s , C ic e ro  d e f in e d  N a tu r a l  law in
th e  f o l l o w i n g  te rm s :
There i s  i n  f a c t  a t r u e  law , r i g h t  re a s o n , in  accordance w i th  
n a tu r e ;  i t  a p p l ie s  t o  a l l  men, i s  u n a l t e r a b le  and e t e r n a l . . .
There w i l l  n o t  be one law in  Rome, ano th e r  in  A thens, one now,
ano th e r  l a t e r  on, bu t  one law f o r  a l l  peop le  a t  a l l  t im e s ;
one m as te r  and r u l e r  o ve r  us a l l ,  the  in v e n t o r ,  p ro m u lg a to r
and e n f o r c in g  ju d g e .  [em phas is  added]
Thus, th e  t r i b a l  " j u s  c i v i l e "  as w e l l  as th e  " j u s  n a t u r a l e " are e q u a l ly
s u b o rd in a te d  by th e  new norms o f  " j u s  n a t u r a l e " a l th o u g h ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  the
mA
l a t e r  Roman la w y e rs ,  as has been p o in te d  o u t ,  d id  n o t  a lways a l lo w
.jus n a tu r a le  to  p r e v a i l  a g a in s t  ju s  c i v i l e  b u t  th e  r e l a t i o n  between the
19th r e e  systems was n o t  c l e a r l y  d e f in e d .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o
a s s e r t  t h a t  ju s  n a t u r a le  p ro b a b ly  m o d i f ie d  n o t  o n ly  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  b u t  a lso
20th e  c o n te n t  o f  .jus c i v i l e  even i f  i t  co u ld  n o t  supersede th e  l a t t e r ;
th e  in f lu e n c e  o f  N a tu r a l  Law was a ls o  t o  be seen in  th e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  new
c o n c e p ts .
1 .8  C ice ro  c o u ld  i n s i s t  t h a t  th e  s ta te  must p re s e rve  J u s ,  nam e ly , r i g h t
and law , and t h a t  one cou ld  expec t from  th e  s ta te  j u s t i t t a , nam e ly , due
p rocess  o f  la w . B u t ,  as monarchy had come to  s ta y ,  th e  concern f o r  l i b e r t y
and r u le  o f  law l o s t  i t s  p r im acy a l th o u g h  Seneca c o u ld  s t i l l  i n s i s t  t h a t
21monarchs shou ld  n o t  be t y r a n t s .  The in f lu e n c e  o f  N a tu r a l  Law was a ls o  t o  
be found  i n  the  I n s t i t u t e s  o f  Emperor J u s t i n i a n .  J u s t i c e  i s  d e f in e d  as
" th e  c o n s ta n t  and p e r p e tu a l  d e s i r e  o f  g i v i n g  to  every  man what i s  due
to  h im 11 and ju r is p ru d e n c e  as ’’ th e  knowledge o f  t h in g s  d iv in e  and human, and
22th e  exa c t  d isce rnm en t o f  what i s  j u s t  and u n j u s t . ”
(4 )  The Church, N a tu r a l  Law and M ed iaeva l id e a s
1 .9  The p e r io d  between th e  c o l la p s e  o f  th e  Roman Empire and th e  r i s e
23o f  m e d ia e va l c i v i l i s a t i o n  has been c a l l e d  th e  ’’Dark Ages” . W ith  the
d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  th e  Graeco-Roman s o c ie t y ,  the  C h r i s t i a n  Church a lo n e ,  i t
has been p o in te d  o u t ,  had th e  v i t a l i t y  and th e  o r g a n iz a t io n  t o  ta k e  o v e r  th e  
24b a n k ru p t  s o c ie t y .  By the  f i f t h  c e n tu r y ,  S t .  A u g u s t in e ,  in  De C i v i t a t e  D e i ,
fo rm u la te d  a th e o ry  o f  s o c ie t y  w h ich ,  i t  i s  a s s e r te d ,  paved th e  way f o r  th e
25t h e o c r a t i c  c la im s  o f  the  m e d ia e va l c h u rc h .  In  Book XIX he argues t h a t
26’’ t r u e  j u s t i c e ”  cannot e x i s t  i n  a pagan S ta te .  However, he a ls o  observes
t h a t  peace and o rd e r  r a t h e r  than  j u s t i c e  are th e  e s s e n t ia l s  o f  an
" e f f i c a c i o u s  governm ent”  and t h a t  government was a " n e c e s s i t y "  d e s p i te  i t s  
27" i m p u r i t y ” . I t  has been p o in te d  o u t  t h a t  " th e  f o r m u la t i o n  o f  a b s t r a c t  
norms cf j u s t i c e  based on a n a t u r a l  law  a c c e s s ib le  to  t h e  reason o f  a l l  men 
by means o f  l o g i c a l  d e m o n s t ra t io n  d id  n o t  i n t e r e s t  A u g u s t in e ”  and i t  has
a ls o  been suggested t h a t  h i s  rep lacem en t o f  . j u s t i t i a  w i th  c o n c o rd ia
28p a r a l l e l s  th e  modern d i s t i n c t i o n  between l e g a l  and m o ra l  r i g h t s .
1 .10  I t  was l e f t  to  th e  t h i r t e e n t h  c e n tu ry  C h r i s t i a n  p h i lo s o p h e r ,
S t .  Thomas Aquinas, t o  s ta te  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  th o u g h ts  in  te rm s o f  N a tu r a l
Law w i th  g r e a te r  c e r t a i n t y .  U n l ik e  A ugus t ine  he does n o t  see N a tu r a l  Law
s im p ly  as God 's  Law. To h im , i t  i s  "b o th  d e s c r i p t i v e  and n o rm a t iv e ,  bo th
29b i o l o g i c a l  and m o r a l " .  He does n o t  say t h a t  a C h r i s t i a n  i s  o b l ig e d  o n ly
t o  obey th e  e d i c t s  o f  a t r u ^  C h r i s t i a n ,  o r  j u s t  governm ent, b u t  he says
t h a t  an e d i c t  which m a n i f e s t l y  co n tra ve n e s  N a tu r a l  Law can be d isobeyed
f o r  " u n ju s t  laws have no m o ra l  v a l i d i t y " ;  any e d i c t  which was c o n t r a r y  t o
30th e  b a s ic  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  " j u s t i c e "  was n o t  " la w "  a c c o rd in g  t o  h im .  I t  has
been suggested  t h a t  he m ig h t  have been w i l l i n g  t o  concede to  some e x te n t  the
31r i g h t  o f  r e v o l t  a g a in s t  t y ra n n y  and t h a t  a l th o u g h  he d id  n o t  enumerate th e
" n a t u r a l  r i g h t s  o f  man", he b e l ie v e d  i n  the  r i g h t  t o  l i f e  by which he meant
32b o th  th e  du ty  to  l i v e  and th e  r i g h t  to  a decent l i v i n g .  He re g a rd e d
l i b e r t y  r a t h e r  as a fe a tu r e  o f  a j u s t l y  o rd e re d  s o c ie t y  than  as an
33i n a l i e n a b le  r i g h t  o f  the  i n d i v i d u a l .
1.11 We must n o t  f o r g e t  th e  f e u d a l  c h a r a c te r  o f  m e d ia e va l European
s o c ie t y .  In  f a c t  th e  Church i t s e l f  gave r e c o g n i t i o n  t o  th e  f e u d a l
c o n c e p t io n  o f  o w n e rs h ip .  The r i g h t  o f  i n h e r i t a n c e  o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  was
to  depend on bap t ism  and " r e b i r t h "  i n  t h a t  th e  " u n i v e r s a l  dom in ium" ve s te d
34i t s e l f  i n  the  C hurch . Even k in g s h ip  was h e ld  i n  t r u s t :  th e  K in g  was
35u nder God and N a tu r a l  Law. Aquinas r e f e r r e d  t o  th e  "common good" as
36p r o v id in g  th e  t e s t  f o r  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  any law . I n  a
sense i t  m ig h t  have been an appea l t o  N a tu r a l  Law. B e fo re  th e  i n d i v i d u a l
f i n a l l y  emerged as a f u l l y - f l e d g e d  c i t i z e n  in  th e  l a t e  t h i r t e e n t h  c e n tu ry ,
th e  a f f a i r s  o f  s o c ie ty  were a c t u a l l y  managed in  England by th e  "commonwealth"
37o f  t h e  v i l l a g e  governm ent. Under t h e  fe u d a l  system even th e  K in g  was
s u b je c t  to  th e  " f e u d a l  c o n t r a c t "  which promoted th e  concept o f  law  as a
v e h i c l e  o f  government by " c o u n s e l  and c o n s e n t"  t o  c o u n te ra c t  th e  u n fe t t e r e d
38powers o f  th e  K in g  e nv isage d  by h i s  t h e o c r a t i c  r o l e .
1 .1 2  The doub le  r o le  o f  th e  K in g  -  as a f e u d a l  l o r d  and as a t h e o c r a t i c
monarch -  had an im p o r ta n t  b e a r in g ,  i t  i s  p o in te d  o u t ,  i n  th e  making o f
Magna C a r ta .  The g r ie v a n c e s  which le d  t o  i t s  making were th e  r e s u l t  o f
39■’o v e ru s e "  o f  th e  m o n a rc h ic a l  pow ers . The C h a r te r  was n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a
r e v o lu t i o n a r y  document. I t  m e re ly  r e s to r e d  th e  ba lance  a l th o u g h ,  i n  th e
p ro c e s s ,  l e g a l  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e  came to  be accorded to  th e
40r i g h t s  o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  th e  renowned c h a p te r  39 o f  th e  C h a r te r .
Indeed , as has been sugges ted , the  fe u d a l  law and th e  f e u d a l  p r a c t i c e  had
b ro u g h t  f o r t h  the  "aw areness”  o f  c e r t a in  " fu n d a m e n ta l  r i g h t s "  o f  th e  
41i n d i v i d u a l .  The common la w , i t  has been a s s e r te d ,  was an o f f s p r i n g  o f  
th e  f e u d a l  law  and th e  C h a r te r  r e i t e r a t e d  the p r im acy  o f  common law  by 
r e f e r r i n g  re p e a te d ly  t o  th e  " u n w r i t t e n  a n c ie n t  l i b e r t i e s " .
(5 )  New I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ;  From Renaissance t o  French R e v o lu t io n
1 .13  M a c h ia v e l l i  1 s The P r in c e  ( w r i t t e n  i n  1513 a f t e r  h i s  ban ishm ent 
from  th e  s e r v ic e  o f  th e  F lo r e n t i n e  s t a t e )  i s  s t i l l  c o n s id e re d  t o  be a work 
o f  c o n s id e ra b le  m e r i t .  He e x t o l l e d  th e  v i r t u e s  o f  a r e p u b l ic a n  form
o f  government whose c h ie f  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  h im , was l i b e r t y  b u t
he s a id  t h a t  i t  was dangerous to  g ive  l i b e r t y  sudden ly  t o  th o s e  peop le  who
42were n o t  used to  i t .  N e v e r th e le s s  he was n o t  opposed to  r e v o lu t i o n a r y
43m ethods. Indeed , he b e l ie v e d  t h a t  th e  S ta te  r e s te d  on v io l e n c e .  He i s ,
however, renowned p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  h i s  th e o ry  o f  d u a l i t y  i n  m o r a l i t y  -
p o l i t i c a l  and p r i v a t e .  T h is  has been seen as a r a d i c a l  b re a k  w i th  the
44C h r i s t i a n  and H e l l e n i s t i c  t r a d i t i o n .  However, as we s h a l l  see, h i s  
th e o ry  was a n t i c ip a t e d  by th e  g re a t  In d o -A ry a n  p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h e r ,  
K a u t i l y a ,  who was a con tem pora ry  o f  th e  a n c ie n t  Greek p h i lo s o p h e r s .
1 .1 4  The s i x te e n th  and seven tee n th  c e n tu ry  p roduced such o th e r
em inen t p o l i t i c a l  t h i n k e r s  as Jean Bod in  in  F rance , Hugo G r o t iu s  in  
H o l la n d ,  and Hooker, Hobbes and Locke in  E ng land . I t  may be u s e f u l l y  
no te d  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  t h a t  i n  the  b e g in n in g  o f  the  s i x t e e n t h  c e n tu ry  
th e  F rench , Dutch end E n g l is h  were y e t  to  commence t h e i r  " i n t r u s i v e
voyages” , w h i le  th e  Portuguese had a lre a d y  made jo u rn e y s  t o  th e  e a s t ,  to
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I n d ia ,  and th e  Span ia rds  to  the  w es t,  to  Mexico and P e ru .  In  the  succeed ing
c e n tu r y ,  however, each o f  t h e  n a t io n s  had s e t  up p la n t a t i o n s  and c o lo n ie s
and were engaged in  th e  g row ing  overseas t r a d e .  These deve lopments cave
r i s e  to  many l e g a l  and p o l i t i c a l  p ro b le m s , such as o w n e rsh ip ,  s o v e r e ig n ty ,
45j u r i s d i c t i o n  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s .  I t  has a ls o  t o  be no ted  t h a t  
the  f e u d a l  a r i s t o c r a c y  was f e e in g  g ra d u a l  decay, w i th  the r i s e  o f  a 
c a p i t a l i s t  m id d le  c la s s ,  and t h a t  th e re  were such e ven ts  ta k in g  p lace  as 
th e  e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  n a t i o n - s t a t e s ,  th e  growth o f  s t ro n g  m onarch ies  and 
th e  r e p u d ia t io n  o f  th e  "c o s m o p o l i ta n  a u t h o r i t y ”  o f  bo th  Pope and Emperor, 
which had been the  b a s is  o f  the  concept o f  th e  s in g le  s o c ie t y  o f  
m ed iaeva l C h r is tendom . I t  was a g a in s t  such a background t h a t  the 
p o l i t i c a l  t h in k e r s  expounded t h e i r  v ie w s .
1 .15  The p o l i t i c a l  th o u g h t  o f  Bod in  i s  r e f l e c t e d  in  h i s  th e o ry  o f
s o v e re ig n ty  b u t ,  as has been sugges ted , i t  was perhaps c o n s id e re d  by him
,46as ’’th e  o n ly  r a d i c a l  remedy f o r  th e  d is o r d e r s  o f  h i s  own F ra n c e . "
A cco rd ing  to  him in  a democracy th e re  i s  a lways a c h ro n ic  d is o r d e r  and
th e r e fo r e  th e re  i s  le s s  r e a l  l i b e r t y ,  which he c a l l s  " t r u e  p o p u la r  
47l i b e r t y " .  However, he a s s e r te d  th e  e x is te n c e  in  a l l  " r e p u b l i c s "  o f  an
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u n l im i t e d  l e g a l  a u t h o r i t y  to  which a l l  owe obedience as a d u ty .
A cco rd ing  to  h im , s o v e re ig n ty  was man’ s c r e a t io n  and i t  arose from the
49n a tu re  o f  man and from  human need and a s p i r a t i o n .  He a ls o  spoke o f
50leges  i m p e r i i  as fu n d a m e n ta l laws which l i m i t e d  s o v e re ig n ty ,  b u t  e xcep t
f o r  h i s  " c o n s c ie n c e " ,  th e re  was no le g a l  o b l i g a t i o n  on th e  s o v e re ig n  to  
51obey N a tu r a l  Law. Even so, he appears t o  suggest t h a t  a M a g is t ra te
ought t o  d is re g a r d  th e  s o v e r e ig n 's  o rd e r  which was v i o l a t i v e  o f  N a tu r a l
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Law even i f  he had to  fa ce  the  consequences t h e r e a f t e r .  U ndoub ted ly  
Bod in  r a is e d  many i n t e r e s t i n g  and im p o r ta n t  q u e s t io n s  b u t  he l e f t  them
unanswered and p o s s ib ly  i t  i s  f o r  t h i s  reason t h a t  h i s  th e o ry  has been
53d e s c r ib e d  as b e in g  b u i l t  upon " d i s j o i n t e d  f o u n d a t io n s . "
1 .16 Hooker, whose p h i lo s o p h y  i s  d e s c r ib e d  as "p a r  e x c e l le n c e  a 
p h i lo s o p h y  o f  la w " ,  a ls o  advocates  t h a t  p o s i t i v e  laws which are
54dem ons trab ly  c o n t r a r y  t o  D iv in e  o r  N a tu r a l  Law may be d is o b e y e d .
55S o c ie ty ,  government and la w , a l l  r e s t  on and im p ly  c o n s e n t .  Hooker was 
e s s e n t i a l l y  a man o f  God b u t  he s a id  t h a t  reason supp lem ented d i r e c t
r e v e la t i o n  and t h a t  N a tu r a l  Law, found  o u t  by reason , supp lem ented  D iv in e
56 57Law. He was a g a in s t  th e  b l i n d  acceptance o f  a u t h o r i t y .  The power
o f  m aking laws he re s e rv e s  f o r  th e  peop le  and conceded t o  th e  so v e re ig n
58th e  r i g h t  o f  v e to  on th e  ground t h a t  th e  s o v e re ig n  has to  e n fo rc e  th e  la w .
I t  i s  observed  t h a t  as Hooker was c o n sc io u s  o f  th e  need to  s u p p o r t  h i s  own
59Queen's governm ent, he combined s o v e re ig n ty  w i th  the  r u l e  o f  la w .  He 
a t t r i b u t e s  d iv in e  r i g h t  t o  t h e  laws r a t h e r  than  t o  r u l e r s . 88
1.17 The Dutch j u r i s t  G r o t iu s  and th e  E n g l is h  p h i lo s o p h e r  Hobbes were
a lm ost con tem po ra ry .  G r o t iu s ,  however, concerned h im s e l f  more w i th
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law . Even so , h i s  c o n c e p t io n  o f  " th e  s t a t e "  and " la w "
c o n s t i t u t e  a d i s t i n c t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  th e  p o l i t i c a l  th o u g h t  o f  h i s  t im e .
I t  i s  observed  t h a t  h i s  concept o f  s ta te  in v o lv e s  a p e r c e p t io n  o f  u t i l i t y
and a ls o  an e lem ent o f  consent and t h a t  i t  i s  n e a re r  t o  th e  S o c ia l  C o n t ra c t
61o f  Hobbes and Rousseau than  th e  Governm enta l C o n t ra c t  o f  Hooker and Locke.
L ik e  Hobbes, he a ls o  d e n ied  peop le  the  r i g h t  t o  r e b e l  b u t  f o l l o w i n g  Bod in
he d i s t i n g u is h e d  between a K in g  and a t y r a n t ;  th e  l a t t e r  c o u ld  even be
s l a i n .  A lthough  s o v e r e ig n ty  was some s o r t  o f  " d o m in io n "  i t  was to  be
6 ?h e ld  under Law, e s p e c ia l l y  Law o f  N a tu re .  ‘ Ho re g a rd s  ju s  n a tu r a le  as the
d i c t a t e  o f  r i g h t  reason and s a id  t h a t  i t  was so im m utab le  t h a t  i t  c o u ld  n o t
5 3be changed by God H im s e l f .  He i s  c a t e g o r i c a l  t h a t  p o s i t i v e  law  i s
64s u b o rd in a te  to  N a tu r a l  Law.
1 .18  Hobbes, i n  w r i t i n g  the  L e v ia th a n , i t  i s  c la im e d ,  p ro v id e d  a
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"wondrous c o n f i r m a t io n "  o f  the  c irc u m s ta n c e s  o f  th e  E n g l is h  c i v i l  w ar.
I t  can be s a id  t h a t  h i s  renowned s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  th e o ry  was e p i to m is e d
in  h i s  s ta te m e n t -  " L i b e r t y  and N e c e s s i ty  are C o n s i s t e n t " I t  has been
p o in te d  ou t t h a t  he d i s t i n g u is h e d  between the  R ig h t  o f  N a tu re  and the  Law o f
67N a tu re ,  between ju s  and l e x ; Laws o f  N ature  are " th o se  r e s t r a i n t s  by 
which we agree m u tu a l ly  t o  a b r id g e  one a n o th e r 's  l i b e r t y . " ^ 8 The
"SOVERAIGN", th e  " g r e a t  LEVIATHAN", th e  " m o r ta l  God", was t o  be i n s t i t u t e d
69by th e  common consen t o f  a l l  men f o r  t h e i r  "peace and d e fe n c e " .  Men
choose th e  s o v e re ig n  " f o r  f e a r  o f  one a n o th e r ,  and n o t  o f  him whom they  
70i n s t i t u t e " .  In  L e v ia th a n  he propounds th e  th e o ry  o f  obed ience t o
" C i v i l l  Power" under which th e  s u r re n d e r  o f  men to  c e r t a in  c o n s t r a in t s
i s  con tem p la te d  b u t ,  as obed ience  i s  grounded on th e  r i g h t  t o  p e rs o n a l
71p r o t e c t i o n ,  th e  r i g h t  o f  s e l f - d e fe n c e  i s  e x p re s s ly  re s e rv e d .  Hobbes
b e l ie v e d  in  what has been c a l l e d  a " s i n g l e ,  u n l im i t e d "  so v e re ig n  a u t h o r i t y .
The c o n f l i c t i n g  v o ic e s  o f  th e  K ing  and P a r l ia m e n t  le d  t o  th e  E n g l is h  c i v i l
72war, a c c o rd in g  to  Hobbes. I t  has been suggested  t h a t  a l th o u g h  th e  c e n t r a l
id e a  o f  h i s  th e o ry  was t h a t  th e  s ta te  was " a l l - p o w e r f u l  and beyond m o ra l
c r i t i c i s m "  i t  was s u b je c t  t o  a few im p o r ta n t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ;  the  s o v e re ig n
was to  s a t i s f y  th e  needs o f  h i s  s u b je c ts  and he was to  c o n f in e  h i s  a t t e n t i o n
to  t h e i r  ou tw ard  b e h a v io u r  and n o t  to  t r y  t o  judge  t h e i r  p r i v a t e  th o u g h ts .
73Thus, he r u le d  o u t  " i n q u i s i t i o n s  and e x t r a c te d  c o n fe s s io n s " .  H is
o u t lo o k  has been r i g h t l y  d e s c r ib e d  as " u t i l i t a r i a n " ,  a n t i c i p a t i n g  one
aspect o f  "Benthamism" and h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  Law o f  N a tu re  as
74"an i n s t i n c t  f o r  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n " .
751.19 Indeed , i n  p o l i t i c a l  th e o ry  the  c o n t i n u i t y  was neve r  b ro ke n .
A f t e r  the  " G lo r io u s  R e v o lu t io n "  England w i th  i t s  w iden ing  i n f l u e n c e  in  the
w o r ld  tu rn e d  to  th e  Whig i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n  o f  m e d ia e va l
7 6freedom -  d i s c i p l i n e d  power and r u l e  o f  la w .  I t  i s  t h e r e fo r e  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  
to  see t h a t  some o f  th e  o ld  v a lu e s  which found  e x p re s s io n  in  Magna C a r ta  
were reassessed  and r e i t e r a t e d  in  th e  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts ,  which d e c la re d  
" th e  R ig h ts  and L i b e r t i e s  o f  th e  S u b je c t "  a f t e r  d e p lo r in g  the  f a c t  t h a t  
K in g  Barnes I I  had endeavoured t o  " e x t i r p a t e "  th e  " la w s  and l i b e r t i e s "  o f  
th e  kingdom by h i s  v a r io u s  a c ts  which th e  s t a tu te  i t s e l f  l i s t e d .
1 .20  f l f  the  two g re a t  p rom o te rs  o f  the  Whig t r a d i t i o n  we have a lre a d y
b r i e f l y  r e f e r r e d  t o  Hooker and h i s  id e a s .  L o c k e 's  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  have been
77d e s c r ib e d  as "more b u s in e s s l i k e  and even more i n f l u e n t i a l . "  I t  has a lso  
been a s s e r te d  t h a t  " I t  was from  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s p e c u la t io n  o f  Locke and th e
A
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a c tu a l  w o rk in g  ou t i n  England o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t o l e r a t i o n  and l i m i t e d
monarchy t h a t  th e  French t h in k e r s  o f  th e  E n l ig h te n m e n t drew t h e i r  
7 8i n s p i r a t i o n ” . In  Two T r e a t i s e s  o f  Government, Locke w r i t e s  i n  the
p re fa ce  o f  th e  R e s to ra t io n  as h a v in g  been founded upon th e  ’’ consent o f  the
p e o p le ”  and o f  th e  r e s o l u t i o n  o f  th e  peop le  to  p re s e rv e  t h e i r  ’’ j u s t  and
n a t u r a l  r i g h t s ” . H is  concept o f  th e  ’’Law o f  N a tu re ”  d i f f e r s  from  t h a t  o f
Hobbes in  t h a t  he r e l a t e s  i t  t o  ’’d e c la re d  and reasoned la w s ”  a l thoug h  he
i s  p repa red  t o  concede t h a t  th e  concept i s  founded  on the  i n s t i n c t  o f  s e l f
79p r e s e r v a t io n  which d r i v e s  men i n t o  s o c ie t y .
1.21 Indeed , as has been obse rved , Hobbes and Locke bo th  conducted
t h e i r  t h e o r i s i n g  from  a common base, t h a t  o f  th e  s t a te  o f  n a tu re  and th e
80s o c ia l  c o n t r a c t ,  b u t  they  a r r i v e  a t two r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  c o n c lu s io n s .
Hobbes, who l i v e d  th ro u g h  th e  u n c e r ta in  t i e s  o f  th e  C i v i l  War, was more
concerned w i th  ’’ s e c u r i t y ”  w h i le  Locke was d e te rm ined  t o  sa fegua rd  l i b e r t y
he co n s id e re d  lo s s  o f  l i b e r t y  to  be the  w o rs t  o f  e v i l s  -  " t o  be s u b je c t
81to  the  in c o n s t a n t ,  u n c e r t a in ,  unknown, a r b i t r a r y  w i l l  o f  ano the r  man” .
I t  i s  suggested t h a t  i t  was in  the  c o n te x t  o f  th e  t a x  on sh ip-money and o f
th e  a r b i t r a r y  a r r e s t s  o f  th e  S tu a r t  reg im e t h a t  Locke demanded t h a t
" c e r t a in  spheres o f  p r i v a t e  i n t e r e s t  shou ld  n o t  o n ly  be regarded  as
i n v i o l a b l e  b u t  a ls o  t h a t  th e  law  s h ou ld  sa fe g u a rd  th e  s u b je c t ' s  r i g h t s  in  
82these s p h e re s . ”  The r i g h t  o f  a man to  l i f e ,  l i b e r t y  and p r o p e r t y ,  he
a s s e r te d ,  were " n a t u r a l  r i g h t s ”  and t h a t  these  were " s e l f - e v i d e n t l y  t r u e
l i k e  axioms o f  g e o m e try " .  He s tood  f o r  s e p a ra t io n  o f  powers and
c a t e g o r i c a l l y  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  l e g i s l a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  ough t n o t  to  be
83d e le g a te d  so as t o  make laws "c o n fo rm a b le  t o  th e  law o f  n a tu r e ” .
A cco rd ing  to  C ra n s to n ,  L o cke ’ s main t h e s i s  t h a t  " m o r a l i t y ,  as a system o f
r u l e s ”  was s u p e r io r  t o  bo th  customary and enac ted  law  i s  o f  e n d u r in g
im po rtance  d e s p i te  th e  f a c t  t h a t  h i s  c o n c e p tu a l  scheme o f  " n a t u r a l  r i g h t s ”
84and " n a t u r a l  la w s ”  was n o t  f r e e  from  i n f i r m i t y .  S i m i l a r l y ,  h i s  concept 
o f  " c o n s e n t ”  was c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  theme o f  " l e g i t im a c y "  o f  a government b u t
i t  has been p o in te d  ou t  t h a t  excep t f o r  t h e  r i g h t  t o  r e s i s t  ( r e v o l u t i o n ) ,
th e re  was no i n d i c a t i o n  o f  any o th e r  s a n c t io n  and th e  concept m e re ly
a t tem p ted  to  "m o ra l is e  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the  i n d i v i d u a l  and 
85g o v e rn m e n t" .
1 .22  I t  has been c la im ed  t h a t  L o c k e 's  v ie w s  were "deve loped  and
86broadened o u t "  in  France and Am erica . Indeed , as we s h a l l  see, i n  th e
two im p o r ta n t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  documents r e s u l t i n g  r e s p e c t i v e l y  from the
American War o f  Independence and th e  French R e v o lu t io n  t h e r e  i s  t o  be
found  a d i s t i n c t  im p ress  o f  th e  concep ts  evo lved  by h im . B u t i t  i s  a lso
necessary  t o  r e f e r  b r i e f l y  t o  th e  v ie w s  o f  th re e  g re a t  French p h i lo s o p h e rs
who f l o u r i s h e d  a f t e r  him and who were n e a re r  in  p o in t  o f  t im e  to  th e s e  two
g re a t  p o l i t i c a l  e v e n ts .  I t  i s  observed  t h a t  M o n te s q u ie u 's  a n a ly s is  o f  the
B r i t i s h  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  the  e le v e n th  book o f  E s p r i t  des L o is  deep ly
87a f f e c te d  the  th o u g h ts  o f  the  American and French r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s .
Indeed , th e  d o c t r in e  o f  s e p a ra t io n  o f  powers advocated by him fo rm s  th e
c o rn e rs to n e  o f  th e  American C o n s t i t u t i o n .  He d e te s te d  th e  despo tism  o f
th e  French Government and saw r e a l  hope f o r  l i b e r t y  i n  th e  s o lu t i o n  o f  th e
8 8problem o f  " c o n t r o l  o f  p o w e rs " .  He p a s s io n a te ly  b e l ie v e d  i n  what i s
89c a l le d  " th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  N a tu r a l  Reason o r  th e  U n iv e r s a l  Law o f  Reason". 
V o l t a i r e ,  on the  o th e r  hand, i t  i s  s a id ,  was p o w e r fu l  because as a 
p ro p a g a n d is t  he was n o t  com m itted  to  s p e c i f i c  p o l i t i c a l  d o c t r in e s  b u t ,  
l i k e  M on tesqu ieu , he was a lso  a g re a t  a d m ire r  o f  E n g l is h  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m .
1 .23  Rousseau, i t  i s  s t a t e d ,  " fo r m u la te d  th e  m id d lB -c la s s  r e v o l t
91a g a in s t  th e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  a rrogance  o f  th e  age o f  r e a s o n . "  He i s
92c r e d i t e d  w i th  the  c o n c e p t io n  o f  " p o p u la r  s o v e r e ig n t y " .  In
Du C o n t ra t  S o c ia l  ( B k . I ,  v i i i )  he a s s e r ts  t h a t  men are n a t u r a l l y  unequa l
b u t  as a r e s u l t  o f  th e  s o c i a l  c o n t r a c t  th e y  are made "e q u a l  by co n ve n t io n
and l e g a l  r i g h t " .  He p o s i t s  s o v e re ig n ty  i n  the  l e g i s l a t i v e  power w h ich ,
93a c c o rd in g  t o  h im , i s  re s e rv e d  to  th e  peop le  and cannot be d e le g a te d .
In  o th e r  words, " th o  i n d i v i d u a l s  who are c i t i z e n s  e x e rc is e  t h e i r
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s o v e re ig n ty  c o l l e c t i v e l y  when th e y  meet i n  th e  g e n e ra l  assem bly11 and i t
94i s  the  g e n e ra l  assembly which can o n ly  enact la w s .  L o c k e 's  id e a s  had 
immense in f lu e n c e  on Rousseau 's  f o r m u la t i o n s .  Rousseau d id  n o t  l i v e  lo n g  
enough to  see th e  a c tu a l  r e v o l u t i o n ,  a l th o u g h  he was an u n s p a r in g  c r i t i c  
o f  th e  e x i s t i n g  reg im e and p ro v id e d ,  i t  must be s a id ,  the  im m edia te  
i n s p i r a t i o n  f o r  i t .
1 .2 4  However, i t  was th e  g re a t  B r i t i s h  p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n  Edmund Burke
who re a c te d  s t r o n g ly  t o  th e  con tem pora ry  e ve n ts  i n  France and b ro u g h t
o u t  h i s  " R e f le c t io n s  on th e  R e v o lu t io n  in  F ra n c e " .  Burke th o u g h t  t h a t  th e
r e v o lu t i o n  was " s a c r i l e g o u s "  i n  t h a t  i t  snapped th e  l i n k  t h a t  e x is t e d
95between the  s t a t e ,  th e  w o r ld  o f  n a tu re  and God. As has been sugges ted , 
in  th e  R e f l e c t i o n s , he d i s t i n g u is h e d  between " r o o t - a n d - b r a n c h "  change as
happened in  France and the  "p ie c e m e a l"  change o f  th e  " G lo r io u s  R e v o lu t io n "
95o f  England and o f  th e  American War o f  Independence which he had de fended . 
Indeed , Burke has been d e s c r ib e d  as th e  " g r e a te s t  p ro p h e t  o f  E n g l is h  
c o n s e rv a t iv e  t r a d i t i o n "  who had a l l  h i s  l i f e  a t ta c k e d  th e  "nakedness
97and s o l i t u d e  o f  m e ta p h y s ic a l  a b s t r a c t i o n "  in  which Rousseau r e v e l l e d .
H is  own concept o f  " N a tu r a l  Reason" im p l ie d  th e  " s o c i a l  i n s t i n c t  o f  th e
98whole man" and no t the  " o ld - fa s h io n e d  a b s t r a c t  r a t i o n a l i t y " .  There was
"one g re a t  im mutable p r e - e x i s t e n t  la w "  and th e re  cou ld  be no a r b i t r a r y
powers f o r ,  t h a t  would be, a c c o rd in g  t o  B u rke , a g a in s t  th e  "R ig h ts  o f  
99H u m a n i ty " .
1 .25  However, th e  p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h y  o f  B u rke ,  as w e l l  as t h a t  o f
Rousseau, has been term ed a " r o m a n t ic  r e a c t i o n "  to  th e  p o l i t i c a l  concepts
fo rm u la te d  in  the  "Age o f  R e a s o n " . T h e  B r i t i s h  p h i lo s o p h e r  Hume, who
was a con tem pora ry  o f  b o th  Rousseau and B u rke , had ch a l le n g e d  th e
1 0 1t r a d i t i o n s  o f  " n a t u r a l  re a so n "  o f  pagan a n t i q u i t y ,  a l thoug h  he
accepted " n a t u r a l  la w "  as th e  law o f  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n  and a lso  the
102concept o f  r u l e  o f  law based on th e  "consen t o f  th e  g o v e rn e d " .  The 
German p h i lo s o p h e r ,  K a n t ,  who was a lso  a con tem pora ry  o f  B u rke ,  a t te m p te d ,
however, t o  g iv e  a new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t o  Hume's id e a s .  He a s s e r te d  th e
103freedom o f  " g o o d w i l l "  t o  r e a f f i r m  th e  "m o ra l l i b e r t y "  o f  man. W hile
Burke l a i d  emphasis on " d u t y "  to  oppose th e  a r b i t r a r y  e x e rc is e  o f  power,
Kant d i s t i n g u is h e d  between " j u r i d i c a l "  and "m o ra l "  d u t i e s .  A cco rd ing
to  K a n t ,  reason demands t h a t  i n  o rd e r  t o  assure  th e  freedom o f  o th e rs
each i n d i v i d u a l  has t o  impose c e r t a in  r e s t r a i n t s  upon h i s  own freedom
and as a r e s u l t  th e re  w i l l  then  be a system o f  laws under which th e  " w i l l "
o f  a l l  i s  b ro u g h t  i n t o  a harmony. He was conv inced  t h a t  th e re  cou ld  be
no " i d e a l l y  p e r f e c t "  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a l thoug h  he had "sym pa thy"  w i th  th e
104C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  th e  U n i te d  S ta te s  o f  Am erica .
(6 )  The American and French " D e c la r a t io n s "
(A) The American D e c la r a t io n  o f  Independence. 1775
1 .26  R e levan t e x t r a c t s  from  the  D e c la r a t io n  are quoted be low :
When i n  th e  course o f  human e ven ts  i t  becomes necessary  
f o r  one peop le  t o  d is s o lv e  the  p o l i t i c a l  bonds . . . and 
to  assume among th e  Powers o f  th e  e a r th  th e  sepa ra te  and 
e q u a l  s t a t i o n  t o  which th e  Laws o f  N a tu re  and o f  N a tu r e 's  
God e n t i t l e  them. . . th e y  shou ld  d e c la re  th e  causes which 
im p e l  them to  th e  s e p a r a t io n ............
We h o ld  these  t r u t h s  to  be s e l f - e v i d e n t , t h a t  a l l  men are 
c re a te d  e q u a l ,  t h a t  th e y  are endowed by t h e i r  C re a to r  w i th  
c e r t a in  u n a l ie n a b le  R ig h t s , t h a t  among these  are L i f e ,
L ib e r t y  and th e  p u r s u i t  o f  H app iness .  Tha t t o  se-cure these
r i g h t s , Governments are i n s t i t u t e d  among Hen, d e r i v in g
t h e i r  j u s t  powers from  th e  consent o f  th e  governed . . . [em phas is
added]
Among th e  v a r io u s  "ca u se s "  l i s t e d ,  th e  f o l l o w in g  are n o te w o r th y :
( i )  Suspending o f  o p e ra t io n  o f  law s , even when th e y  were enacted 
as o f  " im m ed ia te  and p re s s in g  im p o r ta n c e "  t i l l  the  JSJoyal 
Assent was o b ta in e d ;
( i i )  r e f u s in g  Assent to  "Laws, th e  most wholesome and necessa ry  
f o r  the  p u b l i c  good" and t o  "Laws f o r  e s t a b l i s h in g  J u d ic ia r y  
Pow ers";
( i i i )  making th e  judges  "dependent on h i s  w i l l  a lo n e "  f o r  te n u re  
o f  o f f i c e  and payment o f  s a l a r i e s ;
( i v )  kee p in g  " i n  t im e  o f  peace, S tand ing  Armies w i th o u t  the  
c o n s e n t"  o f  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  o f  th e  c o lo n ie s ;
( v )  r e n d e r in g  " th e  M i l i t a r y  in depe nden t o f  and s u p e r io r  t o  the  
C i v i l  Pow er";
( v i )  d e p r iv in g  i n  many cases " th e  b e n e f i t  o f  T r i a l  by J u r y " ;
( v i i )  t r a n s p o r t i n g  "beyond th e  Seas to  be t r i e d  f o r  p re tende d  o f f e n c e s " .
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1.27 The p o l i t ic a l  philosophy of Locke is  amply re fle c te d  in  the te x t  
of the D eclaration  quoted above, but a t the same tim e i t  is  also easy to  
see why Burke also defended the American War of Independence uhich he did  
not see in  terms of a " re v o lu tio n " . The t i e  had to  be "dissolved" as of 
"necessity" uhich uas re c ite d  in  the document i t s e l f  as so many "causes" 
and each of the causes uhich we have l is te d  above, as ue s h a ll see, uas, 
in  some manner s im ila r  to  the causes of the "G lorious R evolution", and 
amounted to the d en ia l o f the Common Lau r ig h ts  and Rule of Law. The 
D eclaration  uas possibly meant to  be read as a preamble to  the  Federal 
C onstitu tio n  th a t came to  be enacted a f te r  a decade and contained a very  
short preamble uhich s ta ted  the objects of the C o nstitu tio n  to  be, in te r  
a l ia  to  es tab lish  " ju s tic e "  and to secure " l ib e r ty " .  In  defin in g  the 
le g is la t iv e  pousr, p ro h ib itio n  against the enactment of a B i l l  o f A tta inder  
and ex post fa c to  laus and against suspension of habeas corpus was 
expressly stated  in  the C o nstitu tio n  in  A r t . I  (s s .9  & 1 0 ) . The B i l l  of 
Rights, however, came to be enacted la t e r ,  in  1791, and uas contained in  
the f i r s t  ten amendments but i t  could be enforced only against the Federal 
Government. The s itu a tio n  uas remedied uhen the 14th Amendment uas passed 
in  1868, a f te r  the C iv i l  liiar. Both the 5th and 14th Amendment, houever, 
p ro h ib ited  deprivation  of " l i f e ,  l ib e r ty  and property" o f any person 
"without due process of lau " ; the 4th Amendment, houever, in  terms 
provided fo r  pro tection  against "unreasonable" a rre s ts , searches and 
se izu res .
(B) The French D eclaration  of the Riohts o f Han and of the C it iz e n . 1789
1.28  The D eclaration  uas tffirm ed in  the French C o nstitu tio ns  of 1946 
and 1958. E xtracts  from the re levan t a r t ic le s  o f the D eclaration  are 
quoted below;
Hen are born fre e  a id  remain fre e  and equal in  respect of 
r ig h ts . . ."  ( a r t  1)
The purpose of a l l  c iv i l  associations is  the preservation of 
n a tu ra l and im p re s c rip tib le  r ig h ts  o f man. . . l ib e r t y , 
property and resis tance to  oppression ( a r t  2)
The nation is  e s s e n tia lly  the  source of sovereignty* * . ( a r t  3)
L ib e rty  consists in  the pouer of doing whatever does not in ju re  
another. . . [th es e ] l im its  are determ inable only by the law 
( a r t  4)
The lau  is  an expression of the common w i l l .  . . ( a r t  6)
No one s h a ll be accused, arrested  or imprisoned save in  the 
cases determined by lau  and according to  the forms i t  has 
prescribed . . • A l l  uho s o l ic i t .  • . or cause to  be executed, 
a rb itra ry  orders ought to  be punished. . . ( a r t  7)
[emphasis added]
1.29 The French D eclaration  did not set out the NcausesH or 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  th e  r e v o lt .  On the o ther hand i t  uses the phraseology 
of th e  "popular" p o l i t ic a l  philosophy of Rousseau in  abundant measure; the  
d e fin it io n  o f the terms "lau" and " l ib e r ty "  are noteworthy. Such vague 
d e fin it io n s  can only be accepted as m anifestation  of high id e a ls . Even
in  the  im portant a r t ic le  7 the eanction against exercise o f a rb itra ry  powers
is  s ig n if ie d  by the term "ought" although i t  can be said th a t the very
mention o f the s p e c ific  uords "a rre s t"  and "imprisonment" are re fe ra b le  to  
the in flu en ce  of English C onstitu tio nalism  on both V o lta ire  and Montesquieu. 
The other im portant point to  be noted in  the a r t ic le  is  th a t i t  stresses  
the  importance of procedure by using the word "form s". Houever, the o rig in  
of the importance attached to  "procedure" uhich is  also re fle c te d  in  the  
modern European Convention of Human Rights ( a r t .5 ) ,  is  also traceab le  to  
the "English Experience" uhich ue nou proceed to examine in  g reater d e ta i l .
(7 ) The English Experience: Due Process of Lau
(A) A General View
1.30 I t  is  commonplace knouledge th a t the English Common Lau is  judge- 
made la u : i t  has groun up in  courts through the procedures and th e  
in te rp re ta t io n s  of the courts . When a s ta tu te  uas involved in  any cauee 
the ro le  o f in te rp re ta t io n  uas indeed v i t a l  but genera lly  the courts  
regu lated  th e ir  procedure in  such a way th a t they came to  be acclaimed as 
champions of personal l ib e r t y .  In  the "unw ritten" B r it is h  C onstitu tio n
the  r ig h t to personal l ib e r ty  is  p ro tected , even w ithout "w ritte n  guarantees"
l\
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through such provisions of great a n tiq u ity  as a w e ll-d e fin e d  pouer of 
a rre s t, the r ig h t to  b a i l ,  the r ig h t  to  a f a i r  t r i a l  (uhich included the  
r ig h t to  ju ry ) and pro tection  against "unlaw ful" detention by the r ig h t  
to  the w r it  o f habeas corpus. We propose to  deal in  th is  study with some 
of these provisions uhich are o f a fundamental character and of general 
importance in  the context o f the laus of the Neu Commonwealth. The 
provisions of Magna C arta , the B i l l  of Rights and habeas corpus along 
with those o f the P e t it io n  of Rights and the Act o f Settlem ent co n stitu te  
the basic s tru c tu re  of the B r it is h  C onstitu tio n  but in  th is  study ue propose 
to  confine our d e ta ile d  examination to  the  f i r s t  group of p rov is ions .
(B) The "Due Process" and the Rioht to  B a il
( a) Magna Carta
( i )  The Chjartejc janci Common Lau
1.31 Magna Carta uas not a revo lu tionary  document: i t  merely
105recognised p re -e x is tin g  usages and customs. But the manner in  uhich
th is  uas done, and the process by uhich i t  was procured in  1215, were
indeed revo lu tio n ary ; they gave i t  i t s  perenn ia l c o n s titu tio n a l
importance. As observed by Viscount Bryce, i t  declared the supremacy of
' le x  te r r a e 1. on uhich "the fa b r ic  of B r it is h  freedom uas s o lid ly  set
106before a representa tive  Parliam ent had come in to  e x is te n c e ."  The
fo llo w in g  passage from the confirm ation of the Charter by Edward I  in
1279 throus in to  r e l i e f  the importance of the process:
Know ye th a t ue. . . t o  the p r o f i t  of a l l  our realm have 
granted fo r  us . . . th a t Great Charter of L ib e rtie s  and
• . • made by the common assent of a l l  the realm . • . s h a ll
a llow  the  eaid c h a rte r(s ) in  pleas before them and judgment 
in  a l l  th e ir  po in ts ; th a t is  to  say th e  Great Charter of 
L ib e rtie s  as common law . • • [emphasis added]
In the above passage the supremacy of the common law uas apparently
a ttr ib u te d  to  the common assent o f a l l  the realm and the c h a rte r 's
greatness uas founded upon i t  and not on ro ya l assent.
1 .32 The t r a d it io n a lis ts  led by Bishop Stubb hold the view th a t the
Charter and i t s  immediate ancestor, the Coronation Charter o f Henry I f
were confirm ation of the e s s e n tia l p r in c ip le s  of the o ld  laws of A lfred  
107and of Edward. Holds worth endorses th is  view aid observes th a t i t
could be connected with Cnut's Charter o f L ib e rtie s  and the Anglo-Saxon
108w r its . The im portant po in t to  be noted is  th a t the Charter symbolised
a charism atic  event: i t  rehearsed, in  a c o n flic t  s itu a tio n  of an unusual
typ e , the  fa c t th a t the ancient customs of the realm were o f supreme
b ind ing  fo rc e , b inding equally  the  King and h is  su b jects . The King,
Dohn, had changed the normal course of the p o l i t ic a l  l i f e  of the n a tio n .
I t  was the  power o f the Barons against irfiich the Crown and the people had
been united "in  the name o f law and order" but now the King had became the
109law -breaker. The clergy and the merchants jo ined the Barons and made
common cause against the King fo r  th e ir  several grievances a r is in g  out of
ro ya l misadventures, such as the war w ith France th a t he had lo s t .  The
document, as has been sa id , marked the beginnings of a c o n s titu tio n a l 
110government. Also, i t  may be sa id , i t  underlined one of the basic
concepts of common law jurisprudence -  the negation of a rb itra ry  power -  
embraced by the modern ru b rics  o f Rule of Law. Thus, in  a rudimentary way 
i t  la id  the foundations of a new form o f government and also defined the  
powers o f the executive organ using common law norms. Th is  revo lu tionary  
process and manner of treatm ent of common law secured i t  the s ta tus  o f a 
c o n s titu tio n a l document.
1 .33  I t  is  true  th a t by 1645 most of i t s  provisions had become
obsolete but the core provisions have stood the te s t  of tim e, feu  though 
111they may be. We have quoted above from the confirm ation by Edward I ,
uhich found fo r  i t  a place on the s ta tu te  book and conferred on i t  the
h o n o rific  t i t l e ,  "Great C h arte r" . Before th a t i t  had been confirmed many
tim es, 38 times according to  some scholars w hile  others put i t  as high as 
11255 tim es. The process is  im portant fo r  i t  conferred on the C harter the
character o f fundamental law as ue understand i t  today. No doubt, th is
p ra c tic e  of confirm ation has been traced to  e a r l ie r  proclamations of the
K in g 's  peace at the beginning of each reign but the fa c t  th a t i t s
fundamental character uas asserted from tim e to tim e to  te s t  the v a l id ity
113of both executive and le g is la t iv e  acts is  noteworthy. In  1320 the
"award" of the Baronry against Hugh and Hugh le  Despencer were grounded
in te r  a l ia  on v io la tio n s  of c e rta in  provisions o f the C harter, although
e ven tu a lly  i t  uas set aside, but also on the ground th a t i t  was v io la t iv e
114of the C h arte r's  provisions in  chapter 39. In  1330 the impeachment
115of Roger Mortimer uas likew ise  grounded* In  1368 a s ta tu te  of Edward
I I I  declared th a t " i f  there be any s ta tu te  to  the contrary , i t  s h a ll be 
116holden fo r  none". In  1535 S ir  Thomas More grounded on the Charter h is
117challenge to  the s ta tu te  on uhich the Croun had based h is  ind ictm ent.
Many instances abound: ue have quoted a feu examples o n ly .
1 .3 4  Houever, n o tice  has also been taken of the phase during uhich
the a u th o rity  o f the Charter was on the wane and a B i l l  was introduced  
118in  1606 uhich echoed the language of the s ta tu te  o f 1368 o f Edward I I I ,
mentioned above. This phase, we might r e c a l l ,  coincided with the S tuart
regime when the e n t ire  body of common lau  uas eclipsed  by a pronounced
119emphasis on p rerogatives , as we s h a ll have occasion to  see. But the
concept of parliam entary sovereignty not having evolved a t th a t tim e, the
fundamental character of the Charter uas not only restored  but found
fu r th e r  exposition f i r s t  in  the P e tit io n  of Right o f 1628 and then in
the Habeas Corpus Acts o f 1640 and 1679, and the B i l l  of Rights o f 1689,
120as we s h a ll see in  the fo llo w in g  pages of th is  study. With the great
c o n s titu tio n a l settlem ent of 1688-89 the concept o f parliam entary
sovereignty s ta rte d  gaining ground at the cost of th e  theory uhich
propounded th a t common lau  uas immutable. As Lord Scarman observed in
h is  Hamlyn Lectures, "the common lau  is  no longer the strong and independent
1 2 1a l ly ,  but the servant o f P arliam en t."  This notw ithstanding, the C harter,
S' p  
Ut u
w ith i t s  Common Lau o r ig in , re ta in s  i t s  appeal a lb e it  on a subdued note; 
although the challenge grounded on the Charter to the  emergency laus  
enacted during the f i r s t  uorld  war did not succeed, some common lau
122ru les  nevertheless p reva iled  against the Northern Ire la n d  Emergency lau s .
( i i )  Th® JChartejc jand th£  Rule_arf JLauj
1 .35  I t s  prov is ions, uhich ue may nou examine, ju s t i fy  the comment
th a t i t  uas a law yer’ s document: although i t  d e a lt u ith  s p e c ific  grievances
and fo llo u ed  mediaeval c lass d is tin c t io n s , tre a tin g  each class sep a ra te ly ,
n o tice  may be taken of the use of the uord ’’g ran t” in  respect o f
" l ib e r t ie s "  in  re la tio n  to  "freeman" in  chapter 1 . There are some
prov is ions , those dealing u ith  the adm in is tra tion  of lau  and ju s t ic e , uhich
touched the r ig h ts  of a l l  c it iz e n s  a lik e .  They deserve greater a tte n tio n
although they profess to  deal u ith  procedural and not substantive r ig h ts .
The venue o f the court uhich fo llo u ed  the King uas fix e d  to  cut doun
delay and cost, vide chapter 17. In  the next tuo chapters ue f in d
re ite ra t io n  o f a s im ila r  p r in c ip le  th a t lo c a l issues should be t r ie d
lo c a l ly .  In  chapter 20 an in ju n c tio n  against excessive fin e s  (amercements)
uas underw ritten by lay in g  doun the tu in  c r i t e r ia  o f "means0 and
"measure” . I t  has been suggested th a t chapter 24, as also chapters 38,
12339 , 45 and 61, embodied the basic idea  of the Rule of Lau: th is
perhaps p ro jec ts  a narrow v ieu  of the concept. The provisions o f chapter 20,
as also 40, uhich ue quote below, u ith  those of 24, 38 and 45, should be
inducted under the same ru b r ic .
24. No s h e r i f f ,  constable, coroners, or our o ther b a i l i f f s ,  
s h a ll hold the pleas of the croun.
38. No b a i l i f f  s h a ll in  fu tu re  put anyone to t r i a l ,  upon h is  
bare uord, w ithout c red ib le  witness to  support i t .
40. To none w i l l  ue s e l l ,  to  none w i l l  us deny, or delay, 
r ig h t  or ju s t ic e .
45. hie u i l l  not appoint ju s tic e s , constables, s h e r if fs , or  
b a i l i f f s ,  except o f such as know the lau  of the  kingdom 
and are o f a mind to  keep i t  u e l l .
Z 1
I t  is  tru e  th a t in  the contemporary context the emphasis uas on the uord 
" s e ll"  in  chapter 40, uhich purported to  abolish the  prevalen t p ra c tic e ,
but ue are try in g  to see i f  the provisions in d ica te d  above c a rrie d  a
common ethos uhich corresponded to  th a t o f the modern concept of Rule of 
Lau. Ue submit th a t the ansuer ought to  be in  the a ff irm a tiv e .
1.36 Uie nou quote belou the o r ig in a l Latin  version of the renouned 
chapter 39:
N ullus l ib e r  homo c a p ia tu r, v e l im prisonetur, aut
d is s a is ia tu r , aut u t la g e tu r , aut e x le tu r , aut a liquo
modo d e s tru a tu r, nec super eum ibim us, nac super eum 
mittemus, n is i  per leg a le  judicum parium suorum v e l  
per leoem te r r a e . [emphasis addedJ
The English version runs thus -  "No freeman s h a ll be taken, or im prisoned,
or d isse ised , or outlaued, or e x ile d , or in  any uay destroyed, nor u i l l  ue
go upon him, nor u i l l  ue send against him, except by the la u fu l judgment
of h is  peer8 or by the lau  o f the la n d ."  I t  u i l l  be possible to  understand
nou the emphasis supplied in  the L a tin  vers io n . The true import o f the
expressions marked out has been in te n s e ly  debated uhich ue propose to
discuss in  b r ie f .
1.37 I t  has been estab lished  th a t the term " l ib e r  homo" included the  
124v i l l e in .  S ir  Paul V inogradoff observes th a t in  c rim in a l and po lice
m atters the v i l l e in  uas on the same le v e l as the  freeman and a common lau
judge uould have found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  reco n c ile  fre e  b ir th  and unfree
tenure . The uord "ve l"  was the subject m atter o f another controversy.
S ir  Paul c a te g o ric a lly  asserts th a t the second "v e l"  was used in  the
conjunctive sense. The normal meaning in  Latin  o f the term uas "or"
125as Or NcKechnie po ints  out w hile re fe r r in g  to  the f i r s t  " v e l" . Houever, 
he concedes th a t sometimes i t  also meant " e t" , namely "and". Does th is  
show th a t even at th a t d is ta n t period the common lau  judges had evolved 
sophisticated  ru le s  o f in te rp re ta t io n  th a t have come doun to th is  day as 
p art o f common lau  ? The debate has d e f in ite ly  revealed th is  in te re s tin g  
aspect o f common lau  and also supports the proposition  th a t the Charter 
uas a lawyers* document.
O o
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1.38  Professor McKechnie also observes th a t there  uas no peerage
u n t i l  long a f te r  King John's time and th a t judgment by the accused's
equals uas an old English custom app licab le  equally  to  high and lo u . The
term "judicum p a ri urn1' should not th ere fo re  be understood as conferring  a
126spec ia l b e n e fit on the barons* Professor F .H . Pouick on the o ther hand
contends th a t by chapter 39 the Barons intended to  lay  s trees  not so much
on any p a r t ic u la r  form o f t r i a l  (judgment o f peers) as on the necessity
fo r  p ro tectio n  against the a rb itra ry  acts o f imprisonment, disseisin and
127outlawry in  uhich John had indulged . Houever, he concedes th a t i t  met
the desire  o f the freeman fo r  prevention against ad m in is tra tive
proceedings a t the K in g 's  command, such as imprisonment w ithout prospect
128o f a t r i a l  in  the lo c a l c o u rt. I f  th a t uas the purpose, one must say
th a t i t  uas not f u l f i l l e d  as ue s h a ll see when ue discuss the w r it  o f 
129habeas corpus. S ir Paul reads the two expressions together -
judicum p ari urn and legem te r ra e . He concludes th a t emphasis uas on
" le g a lity  a l l  round, both substantive and procedural" and adds th a t
"the form ulation  uas e la s t ic  enough to  stand carry ing  over from the class
130ju s tic e  o f the feu d a l lo rd s  to  the common law ."
1.39 Professor PlcKechnie discusses the import o f the term "legem
te rra e "  in  g reater d e ta i l  and observes th a t the s ta tu te s  a ffirm in g ,
expanding and exp la in in g  the Charter shou th a t the expression uas read
in  the 14th century as eq u iva len t to  "due process o f la u " . He rB fe rs  to
an enactment o f 1352 uhich, a f te r  re c it in g  chapter 39, in s is te d  on
"indictm ent on presentment o f good and la w fu l people o f the same
neighbourhood." The in te rp re ta t io n  placed on th is  chapter aimed a t
p ro h ib itin g  the t r i a l  o f men fo r  th e ir  l iv e s  and limbs before the K in g 's
131Council on mere in fo rm al and irres p o n s ib le  suggestions. But i t  could  
also be said th a t chapter 39 d id  in  fa c t  r e ite r a te  the common law ru le  
th a t the ro y a l p rerogative  uas a p a rt o f common lau  and th a t ,  so fa r  as 
personal l ib e r ty  uas concerned, the common law did  not recognise any
prerogative  r ig h t  to tamper with i t .  G la n v il l  and Bracton had applied the
132term "leges" to  a l l  unw ritten  laws o f England. The term "leoem te r ra e "
th ere fo re  included prerogative  and i f  ue read the two expressions,
judicum parium and leoem te r ra e . c o n ju n c tiv e ly , fo llo w in g  S ir  P au l, we
can c le a r ly  see the l im its  o f prerogative  d e fin ed . I t  i s  th e re fo re  not
d i f f i c u l t  to appreciate the abiding appeal o f chapter 39 in  the modern
context as i t  denies to the Executive the power to  act a r b i t r a r i ly  in
m atters concerning the personal l ib e r ty  of c it iz e n s . I t  an tic ip a te d  the
notion o f "ordinary lau " inherent in  Dicey»s modern theory o f the Rule o f 
133Lau.
1.40 I t  remains nou to  say something about chapter 6 1 . I t  was 
deleted  in  the la t e r  confirm ations so i t  is  now of h is to r ic  importance o n ly . 
Dr McKechnie underrates i t s  im portance, saying th a t i t  only conferred a 
r ig h t  o f " le g a lis ed  re b e llio n "  on the Barons and did not provide a r e a l  
sanction . The King re -a ffirm e d  h is  pledge to  abide by the Charter and to  
redress grievances should there be any v io la t io n  and in  d e fa u lt ,  chapter 61 
provided " . . .  the tw e n ty -fiv e  barons, who with the commonalty o f the  
whole land s h a ll d estra in  and grieve us in  whatsoever way they can. • • 
saving our person and th a t o f our queen and c h ild re n ."  Ue have added 
emphasis to shou th a t the c r it ic is m  is  not f u l ly  ju s t i f ie d .  On the other 
hand ue submit th a t the im portant r ig h t  affirm ed in  chapter 39, w ithout
a corresponding remedy, made i t  e a s ie r  fo r  the Croun to  v io la te  i t .  Th is
d e fe c t, as we s h a ll see, uas f in a l ly  removed by the Habeas Corpus Acts o f
1341640, 1679 and 1816 in  an e f fe c t iv e  manner. No doubt, chapter 36 stated
th a t the "w rit o f in q u is it io n  o f l i f e  or lim b" s h a ll be " fre s ly  granted"
135b u t, as has been pointed o u t, iit  has been erroneously confused u ith  the
w rit  of habeas corpus uhich, in  i t s  present form , had not been evolved t i l l
4-u 136then.
( i i i )  The th ird  fiiine£sion:__ the. Export
1.41 On the whole, i t  muet be said th a t the tru e  importance o f the
Charter l ie s  in  promoting co n stitu tio n a lism  in  the Commonwealth o r , to
be more p rec ise , in  the p ro life ra t io n  of B r it is h  co n stitu tio n a lism  and i t s  
export to  colonies and dependencies. As S ir Iv o r  Jennings points  o u t, 
many concepts not o r ig in a lly  there have been read in to  i t ,  such as t r i a l
in  open co u rt, independence o f judges, t r i a l  by ju ry  and the w r it  o f
137habeas corpus. The "Due Process" d o ctrin e  evolved in  the American
ju r is d ic t io n  also owed a great deal to  the Charter as we fin d  th a t in  a
s ta tu te  o f 1354 (28  Edu I I I ,  c .3 ) ,  uhich professed to  re a ffirm  the
p rin c ip le s  o f the C harter, an e x p l ic i t  reference uas made to the phrase
in  these terms:
No man of what es ta te  or condition th a t he be, s h a ll be 
put out o f land or tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, 
nor d is in h e r ite d , nor put to  death, w ithout being brought 
in  answer bv due process of law . [emphasis added]
Although the Supreme Court in  the U .S .A . developed in  due course a 
comprehensive d o c tr in e , the same was to  be found in  the provisions of the 
4 th , 5th and the 14th Amendments of the Federal C on stitu tio n  uhich con­
t a in e d  them, as we have seen, the p ith  and substance o f the provision
138quoted above.
1 .42 However, I t  i s  to be noted th a t ,  subject to  the operation of the
139d o ctrin e  th a t an Englishman c a rried  h is  law w ith him, the Charter had
a lim ite d  a p p lica tio n  in  the t e r r i t o r ie s  comprising the bulk o f the New
Commonwealth. Even so, the "'apparatus o f law" in  Asia and A fr ic a  was
erected on the concepts emanating from the Charter u ith  such m eticulous
care th a t the courts there could claim to be, as S ir  Iv o r  Jennings has
observed, "h e irs  o f the courts in  Westminster, acting  f re e ly  and f a i r ly
and applying common law remedies even when the wrongs are not common law 
•»,140wrongs.
1 .43 We may nou turn  to examine how the Charter promoted the 
development o f the w r it  o f habeas corpus and the l e t t e r 's  ro le  in  
p ro te c tin g  personal l ib e r t y ,  but i t  i s  worthwhile to r e fe r  to  the 
weak aid subtle  in flu en ce  o f the Charter in  the dependencies. I t  has 
been observed th a t B lackstone's theory of a lleg ian ce  was based on the
f  4
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141C h arte r. During the c o lo n ia l r u le ,  a prisoner in  In d ia  t r ie d
unsuccessfully to  press th is  theory in  support o f h is  a p p lica tio n  fo r
habeas corpus a fte r  he was confronted with the contention o f the Crown
th a t the p ro tection  of the Charter uas not extended to the n ative  
142population .
(b ) The Right to J ta L l and the. Rights
1 .44  The B i l l  of R ights , as we have already seen, was a product
o f the "G lorious R evolution"• I t s  c o n s titu tio n a l importance lay  as much
in  the fa c t  th a t i t  placed succession to  the throne on a s ta tu to ry
143basis , as i s  commonly asserted , as we submit, in  the fa c t  th a t the
document l is te d  the grievances against the deposed King before enumerating
what were described as the " tru e , ancient and in d u b itab le  r ig h ts  and
l ib e r t ie s  o f the people", uhich, the document s ta te d , "s h a ll be f irm ly
and s t r ic t ly  holden and observed". Th is  d ra ft in g  technique, as ue have
seen, provided an immediate precedent to the American re v o lu tio n a rie s  who
lis te d  in  the Independence D eclaration  "causes" s im ila r  to  uhat in  i t s
predecessor were ca lle d  "laus and l ib e r t ie s "  uhich the King "did endeavour
to  subvert". Indeed, the B i l l  o f Rights was, l ik e  i t s  i l lu s t r io u s
144predecessor, Magna C arta , a law yers' document. U nlike  the "D ec la ra tio n ",
i t  was not based on an appeal to  "N atura l Lau" uhich, as Professor de
Smith po in ts  o u t, despite the fa c t th a t in  1765 Blackstone uas paying i t
145" lip -s e rv ic e "  had long sincB ceased to  have le g a l s ig n ific a n c e .
The Right to  B a il
( i )  J^ts jja s ic  j^ M ja c te r  jat_Common JLau and under old S ta tu tes
1.45 Houever, the im portant po in t in  connection u ith  "due process of 
law" to  be noticed in  the B i l l  of Rights is  th a t i t  complained among others  
against "excessive b a i l"  and against "excessive fin e s "  and " i l le g a l  and cru e l 
punishments" and also against " fin e s  and fo r fe itu re s  before any conviction  
and judgment", uhich, among o th ers , were described as " u tte r ly  and 
d ire c t ly  contrary to  the known laus and s ta tu te s  and freedoms" o f the
C* f)
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realm . I t  th ere fo re  guaranteed th a t -  "excessive b a i l  ought not to  be 
requ ired  nor excessive fin e s  imposed nor c ru e l and unusual punishments 
in f l ic t e d " .
1 .45 Uie have to see therefore what were the "known laus and s ta tu te s
and freedoms" concerning b a i l .  According to Stephen, " In  e a r ly  tim es
the form al accusation uas o fte n , perhaps u s u a lly , the f i r s t  step in
procedure and the prisoner uas not arrested  u n t i l  a f te r  he had been 
146in d ic te d " . He also asserts th a t "Right to  be b a ile d  in  c e rta in  cases
is  as o ld  as the lau  o f England i t s e l f " . 147 [emphasis added] The o r ig in  of
the r ig h t  could possibly be traced to  the ancient Common Lau u r i ts  •
De Homine RepieQiando uhich uas rooted in  the ancient process of
148re p lev in  and the u r i t  o f M ainprize . But, as Stephen observes, "the main
foundation of the B a il  Lau" uas to  be found in  the S tatu tes  o f Westminster,
the F ir s t  o f 1275 (3  Edu I  c .1 5 ), uhich s p e c if ic a lly  d e a lt u ith  "uhich
prisoners be mainpernable and uhich not" and u ith  "the penalty fo r  u n la u fu l 
149b a ilm en t".
1.47 The ob ject o f the s ta tu te  uas to  guard against the corrupt
p ractices  o f the S h e riffs  and others uho, i t  was stated  "have taken and kept
in  prison persons detected of fe lo n y , and in co n tin en t have le t  out by
rep lev in  such as uere not re p le v ia b le , and have kept in  prison such as uere
rep lev isab le  because they would gain of the one party  and grieve the
o th e r" . Imprisonment fo r  three years uas provided as penalty fo r  "u n lau fu l
bailm ent" and on the other hand "amerciaments to  the King" uas provided
as penalty fo r  "unjust or corrupt" d e ten tio n . As ue s h a ll see, prov is ions
in  respect of b a i l  uere also to be found in  the Habeas Corpus Act 1679
and even in  th a t Act a sanction against "unduly delaying  the u r i t "  uas 
150provided. As Stephen observes, although the s ta tu te  defined the
b a ila b le  and non-bailab le  o ffences, i t  did not d is t in c t ly  in d ica te  whether
"persons arrested  on suspicion ( e .g .  by hue and cry) uere to be b a ile d  or 
151n o t."  Indeed, the statute d id  not codify the lau  re la t in g  to  b a i l  and
0 0 ) 
O (3
th is  p o s itio n  s t i l l  p re v a ils  despite  the fa c t  th a t a large number of
enactments have since been passed in  respect o f b a i l  inc lu d in g  the la te s t
B a il  Act 1976. The various o ld  s ta tu te s  genera lly  d e a lt u ith  the powers
and procedure in  re la t io n  to  b a i l  o f the subordinate courts and, as
Stephen observes, "the pouer o f superior courts to  b a i l  in  a l l  cases,
even high treason , has no h is to ry "  and th a t i t  has exis ted  unaltered
152from e a r l ie s t  tim es. In  cases o f treason, in  1848 s ta tu te  (11 & 12 V ic .  
c .42 ) provided th a t no b a i l  may be taken except by order o f the Secretary  
of S tate or the High Court.
1 .48 Thus, the r ig h t  to  b a i l  ex is ted  and s t i l l  e x is ts  a t common lau  but 
i t  is  an "entrenched r ig h t"  and i t  i s  th e re fo re  not an ordinary r ig h t  
a va ilab le  under both s ta tu te  and common law . The s ta tu te s  have from
time to tim e q u a lif ie d  the r ig h t ,  by d e fin in g  the ex ten t o f the r ig h t
exercisable  under d if fe r e n t  circumstances through the process o f
re g u la tin g  the pouers and procedure o f the courts where the r ig h t  uas
e ven tu a lly  exerc ised . The sanctions enacted against re fu s a l o f b a i l ,  and the
fa c t th a t thB B i l l  o f Rights recognised th a t "excessive" b a i l  made the
r ig h t  i l lu s o ry  and p ro h ib ited  such e xe rc is e , made i t  incumbent on the
ju d ic ia ry  to  exercise i t s  pouers in  re la t io n  to  b a i l  ju d ic ia l ly .  I t
may be mentioned in  th is  connection th a t ,  apart from the s ta tu to ry
sanctions, a t common la u , on proof o f m alice or improper m otive, fo r
153re fu s a l o f b a i l  the judge could be sued in  damages. Th is  p o s itio n , 
as ue s h a ll p resently  see, has been f o r t i f ie d  in  the la te s t  enactment.
( i i )  The M o d e rn ^ L a u jT h e jB a il _Act 1976
1.49 The o b ject o f the enactment uas e la b o ra te ly  spelled out in  the 
long t i t l e  uhich makes i t  c le a r  th a t i t  i s  not a complete code. Houever, by 
v ir tu e  of 8 .1 (2 )  the common lau  provis ions in  respect of b a i l  uere
superseded to  the ex ten t provided in  the A ct. S im ila r ly , the e x is tin g  
s ta tu to ry  provis ion  re la t in g  to  b a i l  was amended and repealed to  the 
exten t provided fo r  in  schedules 2 -4  by v ir tu e  o f s .1 2 . The im portant 
provisions o f the Act are to be found in  ss.3 to  5 and schedule 1
uhich ue may b r ie f ly  examine to  see the neu cast o f the r ig h t*
1*50 The Act regu lated  the procedure o f a l l  c rim in a l courts in
England and Wales in  b a i l  m atters* 8*4 d e a lt u ith  the "general r ig h t to  
b a i l  o f accused persons and o th e rs " . I t  d e a lt u ith  the procedure when an 
accused person applied to "a court fo r  b a i l"  and also uhen he appeared 
or uas broucfit before "a m ag is tra tes ' court or the Croun Court in  the 
course o f or in  connection u ith  proceedings fo r  the o ffence"; i t  did not 
apply to proceedings "on or a f te r  a person's conviction" or to  
proceedings against a fu g it iv e  o ffen d er. By s u b -s .(5 ) read with schedule 1
the "conditions o f b a i l"  uere d e fin ed . The schedule described "persons 
e n t i t le d  to  b a i l"  and was in  two p a r ts . P art I  d e a lt u ith  cases of
"defendants accused or convicted o f im prisonable offences" and P art I I  u ith
those concerned u ith  "non-imprisonable o ffences". In  both cases 
"exceptions to r ig h t  to  b a i l"  uere set out separate ly  in  d e ta i l  [emphasis 
added]• These must th e re fo re  be considered as c o n tro llin g  the exercise  
of d is c re tio n  of the courts in  the m atter o f granting b a i l  and th ere fo re  
containing the core provisions of the A ct.
1.51 I t  i s  apparent th a t the Act did not d is tu rb  the main elements o f
the e x is tin g  c r i t e r ia .  Paragraph 2 o f P art I  o f the schedule is  quoted 
belous
The defendant need not be granted b a i l  i f  the court is  
s a t is f ie d  th a t there are s u b s tan tia l grounds fo r  b e lie v in g  
th a t the defendant, i f  re leased on b a i l  (whether subject 
to condition or not) would -
(a )  f a i l  to  surrender to  custody, or
(b ) commit an offence w h ile  on b a i l ,  or
(c ) in te r fe re  u ith  witnesses or otherwise obstruct the  
course o f ju s t ic e ,  whether in  re la t io n  to  h im self or  
any other person.
i
We have supplied emphasis in  the e x tra c t to  in d ic a te  the g reater measure of 
co n tro l sought to be exercised on the exercise o f d is c re tio n  of the court, 
possibly in  view o f the need to preserve the "entrenched" character of 
the r ig h t .  Houever, i t  may be pointed out th a t the concept o f "p ro tec tive  
custody" in s ta lle d  in  both p a rts  o f the Schedule ( in  p ara .3  in  each case)
does not receive s im ila r  treatm ents the requirement o f "su b s tan tia l ground" 
has been om itted and the twin c r i t e r ia  also -  "p ro te c tio n " , and in  the 
case of a c h ild  or young person, "w elfare" -  appear to  confer a wide 
d is c re tio n  on the co u rt.
1 .52  However, the last-m entioned flaw  was, to  some e x te n t, removed
by sub—ss 1 (a ) ,  (3 ) and (4 )  o f s .5  uhich required the decisions on b a i l  to  
be recorded by the court and provided th a t uhen a M ag istrates* court or 
the Croun Court w ithholds b a i l  i t  had not only to  give reasons th e re fo r  
but also to  give a copy o f the "note" thereo f to  the person in  re la t io n  to  
whom the decision uas taken . I t  i s  conceded th a t th is  pos ition  can only 
obtain i f  the two paragraphs 3 o f Parts  I  and I I  of Schedule I  uere read 
in  conjunction o r subject to the provisions o f s .5  and thers was no reason 
why i t  should not be done in  v ieu  of the fa c t  th a t Schedule 1 end s .5  
c arrie d  the common caption "supplementary provisions" although in  s .5 ,  
u n lik e  s .4 , the a p p lica tio n  o f the schedule to  i t s  provisions was not 
e x p l ic i t ly  contemplated. N otice may also be taken o f the fa c t th a t ,  in  so 
fa r  as decisions under paragraph 2 o f P art I  uere concerned, paragraph 9 
thereo f i t s e l f  provided fo r  a d d itio n a l guidance to  the courts which uas, 
s ig n if ic a n t ly  sta ted  in  a mandatory form -  "the court s h a ll have regard  
to  such of the fo llo w in g  considerations".
1 .53 Of the "general p rov is ions" d e a lt u ith  in  s .3  no tice  may be taken 
of the fa c t  th a t the old system o f tak in g  recognizances from persons 
granted b a i l  uas abolished and 8 "duty" uas placed on the person b a ile d
to  surrender to custody: breach of th is  duty was made punishable under s .6 .  
The section also accepted and embodied the recommendation of the Working 
Party th a t s u re ties  should not be required as a m atter of course, in  th a t 
s u b -s s .(3 )(b ) and (4 ) provided th a t before re lease  on b a i l  a person "may 
be requ ired" to  provide a surety but s u b -s .(6 ) empowered the court ["o n ly " ]  
to  requ ire  the person to comply, e ith e r  before re lease on b a i l  or la t e r ,  
u ith  such requirements as might "appear to  the court" to  be necessary, 
among other th in g s , to  secure th a t he surrenders to custody. N evertheless,
i t  must be said th a t the Act has, in  many respects , added to  the Nentrenchedn
character to the r ig h t  to b a i l  and the last-m entioned provision does not
d e tra c t from the in h eren t strength of the ancient r ig h t .  Indeed, in  the
recent past the r ig h t  has only been NsuspendedN, in  the Habeas Corpus 
154Suspension Acts and now in  the Northern Ire la n d  (Emergency Provisions)
Act 1973 the r ig h t  has only been ttr e s tr ic te d N in  th a t 8 .3  perm its
155only a High Court judge to  grant b a i l .
(C ) Unlaw ful detention  end the W rit of Habeas Corpus
(a )  XhS sQ.4-th.e_Common, L.au
( i )  to _ th e _ U rit ^  a C o n s titu tio n a l R iqht
1 .5 4  In  our search fo r  "entrenched r ig h ts ” in  the unw ritten  B r it is h
C o n stitu tio n  ue have already found one, namely, the r ig h t  to b a i l  but the
r ig h t  to  the w r it  o f habeas corpus ad subjiciendum had greater importance
in  th a t i t  could procure peremptory anullment by the ju d ic ia ry  o f an
unlaw fu l detention by re s to rin g  the prisoner to  h is  f u l l  and complete
l ib e r t y .  However, as we s h a ll soon d iscover, i t  was in  fa c t  a
procedural r ig h t  -  a remedy Bvolved by common law courts -  which was
recognised and entrenched more deeply in  the le g a l system of the s ta te ,
156by s ta tu te s . Indeed, the remedy o f habeas corpus represented another 
aspect o f "due process of law" which had to  be preserved and f o r t i f ie d  
as was done in  the case of the r ig h t  to b a i l .
1 .55  As observed by D icey, the s ta tu te s  which are popularly  c a lle d
Habeas Corpus Suspension Acts hardly correspond w ith the name they have
157received; they do not even mention the words"habeas corpus" . In  a 
s ta tu te  enacted on February 28, 1800 (39 & 40 Geo.3, c .2 0 ) i t  was re c ite d  
as fo llo w s :
trihereas i t  i s  necessary fo r  the pub lic  s a fe ty . • • th a t any 
person who s h a ll be in  prison w ith in  the United Kingdom of 
Great B r ita in  or a t any time th e re a fte r  by w arran t. • • 
signed by any o f H is  M a jes ty 's  P r in c ip a l S ecre ta ries  of 
S ta te . . . fo r  hioh treason , suspicion o f treason or 
treasonable p ra c tic e s , may be detained in  safs custody without 
B a il  or M a in p rize , u n t i l  February 1 . 1801: and th a t no Oudoe 
or Justice of the Peace s h a ll b a i l  or t r y  any person so 
committed. • • any law or s ta tu te  to the contrary  
notw ithstanding, [emphasis added]
S7
As u»e s h a ll see, although the Parliam ent la te r  adopted a d if fe r e n t  device
to  achieve the same r e s u lt ,  the p o s itio n  did not a lte r  m a te r ia lly ;  the
courts , recognising the changed circumstances, reo rien ted  th e ir  approach
but d id  not ru le  th a t under no circumstances could they e n te rta in  and
158allow  any a p p lica tio n  fo r  the w r it  o f habeas corpus,
1*56 The fundamental character o f the r ig h t  i s  th ere fo re  a ttr ib u ta b le
to i t s  im m u tab ility  but i t s  c o n s titu tio n a l importance fin d s  expression
in  the fa c t  th a t i t  had nurtured and protected fo r  several cen turies
c it iz e n s ' " c iv i l  and p o l i t ic a l  r ig h ts "  as they are now c a lle d , namely,
the r ig h t  to  l ib e r ty  and secu rity  o f person and the r ig h t  to be protected
159against a rb it ra ry  a rres t or d e te n tio n . But these r ig h ts ,  as us have
seen, were e x is tin g  a t common law and were recognised as such in  Magna
C arta  which, in  tu rn , has to  a great exten t contributed  to  the evo lu tion
of the w r it  in  i t s  present form . Holdsworth c a te g o ric a lly  asserts th a t
the judges were in fluenced  by chapter 39 of Plagna C arta in  developing w r its
to safeguard personal l ib e r ty  and th a t in  th is  process they were assisted  
I 6 nby le g is la tu re .  He re fe rs  to  the mediaeval w r its  o f De Homine
RepieQiando. M ainprize and De Odio e t  A tia  (mentioned as the W rit of
In q u is it io n  in  chapter 36 o f Magna C arta ) which, he po in ts  o u t, proved
inadequate in  due course, in  p ro te c tin g  personal l ib e r t y .
1.57 There is  however no dispute on the po in t th a t i t  was not an
" o r ig in a l"  w r it ;  i t  was a p art o f the "mesne process" of common law .
Instances have been c ited  of the uss o f the process dating  back to  1199
and 1214. In  the la t t e r  case, an order in  the Coram Rege R o lls  in  the
162TYREL case has been quoted as the a u th o r ity . I t  i s  estab lished  
th ere fo re  th a t the common law courts could d ire c t any person to  produce 
before them any person they named. ( L i t e r a l ly ,  "habeas corpus" meant -  to  
have the body. So when w rits  in  ancient times were issued in  L a tin , the  
term appears to  have been used in  the l i t e r a l  sense.) However, the  
p ractice  o f g iv ing  d ire c tio n  to  a person having the custody o f another
f! O 
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commanding him to  produce the la t t e r  and to fu rn ish  the cause or a u th o rity
of such custody, which is  the g is t of the modern habeas corpus could, as
163has been suggested, be a ttr ib u te d  to  the w r it  o f "corpus cum causa" .
I t  has been observed th a t evidence e x is ts  o f such w rits  being issued by
Chancery in  1341 and th a t in  the f i f te e n th  century i t  had a widespread
164use in  enforcing " p r iv ile g e " .
1 .58  M aitland observes th a t the prisoner who had not been b a ile d  or 
rep lev ied  by the S h e r iff  or the Justice  o f the Peace could b ring
h is  case by a w r it  o f habeas corpus before the common law co u rts , as the
F ir s t  S ta tu te  o f Westminster (3  Edw 1 , c .15 ) in  1275 had defined the
cases in  which "pledges" were not allow ed. The judges of the K in g 's
Bench did not consider th a t the s ta tu te  had lim ite d  th e ir  power end in  the
exercise o f th e ir  d iscre tio n  they b a iled  persons accused of treason ,
murder and also those committed under the sp ec ia l command of the King o r the
Council although according to  the s ta tu te  "pledges" were not allowed in  
165such cases. There ware precedents, he says, o f such persons having
been b a iled  by the K in g 's  Bench in  1344 and also subsequently during the
re ig n  o f the Tudors and James I  as had been committed by the King o r the  
166Council. Both w r its , the ancient habeas corpus and corpus cum causa.
wsre ju d ic ia l  w r its  and i t  is  possible th a t there was a period when both
forms were used. A ju d ic ia l  w r it  did not req u ire  to  be stamped w ith the
Great Seal out o f Chancery and could be issued by any judge under h is
personal a u th o rity , perhaps by "word o f mouth" i i f  the gaoler were present
167to  hear the command.
1.59 Indeed, as has been suggested, the " q u a lity "  o f the w r it  was 
dependent e n t ire ly  upon the "command" o f the court which was a 
m anifestation  of the "independent existence of Royal a u th o rity  through the 
adm in istra tion  of ro y a l c o u r t."  I t  has been said -  "The stronger the  
K in g 's  judges became in  a r e la t iv e ly  decentra lised  and anarchic s o c ie ty , the 
more could they seek to impose th e ir  w i l l .  And what was more n a tu ra l than
th a t the exercise o f th a t w i l l  should take the form of personal commands
168from those same judges." To th is  we may add M a itlan d 's  observations
th a t during mediaeval tim es England was f u l l  of "p riva te  prisons of
Lords". On the prayer o f the imprisoned subject the King sent h is  w r it
to  the keeper o f the gaol bidding him to  have the p riso n er's  body brought
before the K in g 's  court -  th is  prerogative  o f the K ing, in  due course,
169came to  be regarded as the r ig h t  o f the su b jec t. The fo llo w in g  passage
170from Blackstone exp la ins  more f u l ly  the "prerogative" nature o f the w r it :
. . .  [ i t  i s ]  d irected  to  the persons deta in ing  another, and 
commanding him to  produce the body of the p riso n er, w ith  the  
day and cause o f h is  caption and d eten tio n . • • to  do, submit 
to  and receive whatsoever the ludoe or court awarding the 
w r it  s h a ll consider in  th a t b e h a lf . This is  a high prerogative  
w rit  and th ere fo re  by common law [issu es ] out o f K in g 's  Bench 
. . .  fo r  the King i s  a t a l l  tim es e n t i t le d  to  have an account 
why l ib e r ty  o f any o f h is  subjects is  re s tra in e d . • •
[emphasis added]
The foregoing discussion has an im portant bearing on the extent o f the 
h o tly  debated r ig h t  a t common law of making successive ap p lica tio n s  to  
each of the several judges of the d if fe re n t  courts .
1 .60 Upon a w r it  being issued, observes Coke, "the gaoler must
retourne , by whom he was committed, and the cause of imprisonment" and
th a t i f  the court found th a t the imprisonment was contra leoem te r ra s .
the prisoner had to bs discharged; i f  "doubtfu l and under consideration",
171he had to  be b a ile d ; and i f  " ju s t and la w fu l" , he had to  be remanded.
According to  Blackstone, the English law defined the "tim es, the causes
end the e x te n t, when, wherefor and to  what degree the imprisonment o f the
subject may be la w fu l" . Th is  was manifested by the ru le  th a t upon every
commitment the reason fo r  which i t  is  made has to  be expressed so th a t the
court could, upon an habBas corpus, examine in to  i t s  v a l id i ty  and
according to  the circumstances of the case e ith e r  discharge or b a i l  or
172remand the p riso n er.
1.61 Thus, we see th a t i t  uas n a tu ra l fo r  the ju d ic ia ry  to encounter 
mainly two problems in  e s tab lis h in g  the w r it  as a quick and e ff ic a c io u s
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remedy, namely, the In te rp re ta t io n  of the term "leoem te r ra e " and the scope 
of in q u iry  in to  the ttg a o le rt s re to u rn e". In  solving these problems the  
judges uere confronted with challenges from the executive which they could 
meet e f fe c t iv e ly  only by tak ing  th e ir  stand on the primacy of common law , 
which invested them with the r ig h t  to  s ta te  the law . At the same time i t  
is  d i f f i c u l t  to lose s ig h t o f the nature o f th e ir  o f f ic e .  How secure was 
th e ir  own tenure to  ensure th e ir  independence ? We fin d  th a t i t  i s  only
YY\
a fte r  the Revolution th a t the judges were commissioned -  ouartdiu se 
bene oesserin t -  to  hold o f f ic e  during good behaviour. Th is  was
confirmed by the Act o f Settlem ent in  1700. E a r l ie r  the judges have been
173holding o ff ic e  -  durante beneolacito  -  during the K in g 's  good p leasure.
Pluch depended th ere fo re  on the a tt itu d e  of the execu tive .
1.62 I t  has been observed th a t the conduct o f the judges in  the 1630s
174undermined the p u b lic  prestige  they had enjoyed during the e ra  o f Coke.
I t  has also been observed th a t the judges of E liz a b e th 's  re ign  had returned  
a very obscure, "perhaps designedly obscure answer" to the question,
whether commitment by the sp ec ia l command o f the King was a s u ff ic ie n t
175re tu rn . Reasons are not fa r  to seek. I t  is  a w e ll estab lished fa c t  of 
h is to ry  th a t the ro y a l power s ta rted  gaining ascendancy during the re ign  
o f the la t e r  Tudor monarchs and reached i t s  zen ith  in  S tuart tim es. King 
3ames I ,  in  The Trew Law of Free Monarchies, pronounced th a t the Kings were
"God's v ice -reg en t bn earth " and th a t there were no le g a l l im its  to  th e ir
176 177powers. S t i l l ,  he did not deny the primacy o f common law and we have
noticed e a r l ie r  th a t during h is  re ign  the judges had in  fa c t  b a ile d
178persons committed by the K ing. His successors however s ta rted
in te r fe r in g  w ith the independence o f the ju d ic ia ry  by re so rtin g  to
a rb itra ry  d ism issal o f the judges and th ere fo re  they had become, as has
179been suggested, "s e rv ile  c rea tu res".
1.63 I t  w i l l  not be wrong to suggest th a t the people had begun to
consider the w r it  o f habeas corpus a c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t  before the
"u n co n s titu tio n a l"  phase in  h is to ry  had begun and th a t s ta tu tes  were passed
180to  recognise the c o n s titu tio n a l character of the r ig h t .  Both Jenks
181 182 183and Holdsworth re fe r  to  the cases of SEARCH and HOWELL decided
in  1588 and to the "Resolution in  Anderson" by ths Judges and Barons in
1591 and assert th a t these events had estab lished  habeas corpus as a remedy
which was "substantive" according to Denks and "best" according to
Holdsworth. Jenks c a te g o ric a lly  asserts th a t the  Habeas Corpus Act of
1679 had merely set a t re s t the "doubts" as to "competent tr ib u n a l"
184and about the w r i t 's  n a tu re , namely, "as o f r ig h t" .
1 .64  I t  is  also necessary to  take notice  o f the fa c t  th a t in  both
the E x trad itio n  Act 1870 (v id e  s .11 ) and The F u g itive  Offenders Act 1967 
(v id e  8 .8 (1 ) )  i t  i s  provided th a t the m agistrate committing under those 
Acts must inform  the person committed th a t he has a r ig h t  to  apply fo r  
the w r it  o f habBes corpus. The fa c t  th a t persons other then B r it is h  
subjects are committed under these Acts show th a t the r ig h t  to the w r it  
i s  a p a rt o f the immutable law of the land which is  administered a lik e  
to a l l  persons. In  fa c t  persons detained under the provisions o f the 
Immigration Act, as we s h a ll see, have successfully pursued the remedy 
of habeas corpus.
( i i )  Sprae_lan dmark jsases £f_c£nj3t^tutipna_l importance
1.65 We may now examine genera lly  some of the im portant decisions
which provide the le g is la t iv e  h is to ry  o f the re le v an t s ta tu te s  and also
show how the ju d ic ia l  approach was responsible fo r  securing the w r it  the
185status of " c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t" .  We take up f i r s t  the DARNEL case, 
which is  supposed to have p re c ip ita te d  the f i r s t  c o n s titu tio n a l c r is is  
in  English le g a l h is to ry . King Charles I  having dissolved Parliam ent 
appointed a Commission to  ra is e  "loan money" fo r  the prosecution of war.
The Commissioners were p r iv a te ly  in s tru c ted  as to th e ir  function  and d u tie s . 
Several d e fa u lte rs  were imprisoned but only f iv e  K nights, in c lu d in g  S ir  
Thomas D arnel, applied fo r  habeas corpus. S ir  Nicholas Hyde, C .3 .,  speaking
fo r  the co u rt, he ld  as fo llo w s :
(a )  The court uas "not bound"1 to examine the tru th  o f the 
re tu rn  but the s u ffic ien c y  o f i t .
(b ) The precedents c ite d  do not bear out the p riso n er's  
contention th a t when a man was committed by the K ing 's  
commend and no ju s t cause was shown, upon a general re tu rn  
the party  uas "ipso fa c to " d e live red  i f  the re tu rn  was not 
emended.
(c ) There were precedents to  show th a t a person detained "per 
soecia le  manadaturn domini re o is " was e ith e r  remanded or 
d e live red  by the K in g 's  command. The Resolution by the  
Judges ( in  Anderson) also endorsed th is ,  saying "we know 
not the cause of the commitment".
(d ) I f  no cause o f commitment be expressed, i t  uas to  be 
"presumed to be fo r  m atter o f s ta te "  of which the court 
could not "take n o tic s " .
186The Report c a rr ie d  the fo llo w in g  fo o tn o te :
S ir  Randolf Crew shewing no ze a l fo r  the advancement o f the  
loan was then removed from h is  place of Lord Chief J u s tic e , 
and S ir  N icholas Hyde succeeded in  h is  room: a person who, 
fo r  h is  p a rts  and a b i l i t i e s ,  was thought worthy of th a t
preferm ent: y e t nevertheless came to the same w ith a
p re ju d ic e , coming in  place o f so w ell-beloved and so- 
suddenly removed.
U/e arB also to ld  on the au th o rity  o f Lord Campbell th a t S ir  N icholas Hyde
187was s levated  to the Bench to ensure th a t the prisoner uas remanded.
1.66 The e f fe c t  of the decision in  the DARNEL case was annulled by
the P e t it io n  o f Right but the controversy d id  not end. Nine members of
the House of Commons, in c lu d in g  Seldon, were committed under the K ing 's
command fo r  sed itio u s  words spoken during the "great debate" fo llo w in g
the DARNEL case. Th is  provided the occasion fo r  another habeas corpus
proceeding. In  th is  case the cause was given and, as Cl a i t  land observes,
188the Judges ought to  have b a ile d  the p riso n ers . In s tead , they ordered
189th a t the prisoners should also fin d  s u re ties  fo r  good behaviour.
Therefo re, a f te r  the Long Parliam ent met, in  1640, the f i r s t  Habeas Corpus
Act uas passed. This a c tio n , i t  i s  apparent, uas c a lle d  fo r  by the unusual
approach o f the judges o f the S tu art period which underlined the
190subservience o f the ju d ic ia ry .
1911.67 In  BUSHELL'8 case, in  the re tu rn  to the w r it  o f habeas corpus 
i t  was s tated  th a t:
the p riso n er, being a juryman, among others charged 
at the Sessions Court. • • to  try  the issue between the 
King, and Penn and Mead, upon an in d ic tm en t, fo r  assau lting  
un law fu lly  and tum ultuously, did contra plenem e t manifested  
evidentiem openly given in  co u rt, acquit the prisoners  
in d ic te d , in  contempt o f the King e tc .  • •
The ju ro rs  had, in  fa c t ,  been fin e d  but the app lican t did not pay and uas
im prisoned. The court held th a t the ju ry  could not be fin e d  fo r  th a t
would be "an a t ta in t  upon an a t ta in t " .  Because i t  uas an act o f the
court o f Sessions i t  could not be accepted th a t the commitment was fo r  a
cause " p a r t ic u la r  and s u f f ic ie n t" .  As to i t s  own ju r is d ic t io n , the court
c ited  precedents to  show th a t the Court o f Common Pleas had discharged
persons imprisoned by other courts upon in s u ffic ie n c y  of re turn  and not
merely fo r  " p r iv ile g e " . For a fa ls e  v e rd ic t a ju ro r  could be punished by
a t ta in t  only and th ere fo re  the cause returned being in s u f f ic ie n t ,  the
prisoner was e n t it le d  to  be discharged.
1921.68 The 3ENKES case is  supposed to be the immediate cause fo r  the
1679 Act. The occasion fo r  the detention of Francis Jenkes was a speech 
made by him at the G u ild h a ll in  London suggesting a p e tit io n  to be 
submitted to the King fo r  summoning a new P arliam ent. He was c a lle d  to  
the Council Chamber and there he uas in te rro g a ted  by the K ing, the Lord 
Chancellor and others and then upon a warrant o f the Council he was 
committed to p riso n . In  the warrant the fa c t  o f h is  in te rro g a tio n  was 
stated and he was charged fo r  behaving in  a "sed itio u s  and mutinous 
manner". The Lord Chief Justice  was moved fo r  the w r it  which was denied 
on the ground of vaca tio n . The Lord Chancellor uas then moved, also  
without success, although i t  uas conceded th a t the Court o f Chancery is  
ever open. Eventually the Lord Chief Justice  had to approach ths King 
fo r  advice and i t  i s  stated  th a t ,  "As soon as H is Majesty understood
th a t what uas demanded was the s u b jec t's  r ig h t ,  he immediately commanded 
th a t the laws should have th e ir  due course, which th e ir  Lordships had 
stopped; and accordingly he was b a ile d ."
1.69 Whether or not the courts d e a lt w ith c rim in a l m atters in  a
d if fe re n t  way from the beginning in  dealing with ap p lica tio n s  fo r
193habeas corpus, the judges o f the K in g 's  Bench, as we have seen, 
used to b a i l  prisoners notw ithstanding the S tatu tes  o f Westminster the 
F ir s t  o f 1275 (3  Edu 1, c .1 5 ) .  This ju r is d ic t io n , which they have bsen
exerc is in g  as a long estab lished  tr a d it io n ,  the judges refused to
exercise in  each o f the three cases o f DAffllEL. SELDON and JENKES.
In  the BU5HELL case, on the other hand, the court did in  fa c t ,  in q u ire  
in to  the tru th  o f the re tu rn . I t  i s  th ere fo re  not surpris ing  to fin d  
th a t the 1679 Act la id  pronounced emphasis on the provision fo r  b a i l ,  
as in  3 .2 , and attached no importance to the la t t e r  p o in t. The S tatute  
merely buttressed the e x is tin g  r ig h ts  by sanctions.
1.70 The c lass ic  example of the use of the w r it  in  a non-crim inal
194m atter i s  to be found in  the famous S0MMER5ETT case. The master o f a
deserted negro slave apprehended him end put him on board a ship to be
taken to  Jamaica end sold th e re . In  the re tu rn  to  the w r it  i t  was
pleaded th a t there was a r ig h t  to  deta in  and s e l l  him according to the
laws of Jamaica from where he was brought to England. The celebrated
dictum o f Lord M ansfield is  quoted below a t some len g th :
The only question i s  whether the cause o f the re tu rn  is  
s u f f ic ie n t .  • • the power of a master over h is  slave has 
been extrem ely d if fe re n t  in  d if fe re n t  co u n tries . The s ta te  
o f s lavery i s  o f such a nature th a t i t  i s  incapable o f being 
introduced on any reasons, moral or p o l i t ic a l ,  but only by 
p o s itiv e  law . • . i t  is  so odious nothing can be suffered  to 
support i t ,  but the p o s itiv e  law . • • I  cannot say th a t th is  
case i s  allowed or approved by the law of England; and 
th ere fo re  the black must be discharged.
1951.71 In  the HOBHOUSE case, the p ris o n e r's  commitment was under the
warrant o f the Speaker o f the House o f Commons. In  the ap p lica tio n  fo r  
habeas corpus i t  was held th a t because i t  was a "w rit o f r ig h t"  i t  did
not mean th a t i t  should be issued w ithout a probable cause. The w r it  ought
not to issue as o f course but on a probable cause v e r if ie d  by a f f id a v i t .
The w r it  was, in  th is  case, granted on the submission th a t proper time fo r
po in ting  out the d e fec t o f the warrant would be upon the re tu rn .
1961.72  In  Ex p . BESSET i t  uas h e ld , on an a p p lic a tio n  by a French
n a tio n a l, th a t a habeas corpus uas cla im able a t common la u . I t  uas found
th a t the u arran t o f commitment uas not in  accordance u ith  the provisions
of the enactment uhich uas o f the nature o f an E x tra d itio n  Act*
Subsequently, the 1870 Act, as ue have seen, d id , in  f a c t ,  recognise
197th is  r ig h t*
( i i i )  The £aj£8^ 1j|u_qn the, jg n c illa rx , r ig !r t8__e_t Common Lau
1*73 Ue propose to examine some decisions nou to shou hou the
"c o n s titu tio n a l"  character o f the u r i t  uas buttressed by the a n c illa ry
r ig h ts  th a t came to be recognised a t Common Lau* In  COX v HAKES* Lord
198Halsbury observed as fo llo w s:
I f  re lease uas re fused , a person detained m ight* • • make 
a fresh ap p lica tio n  to every judge or every court in  tu rn , 
and each court or iudoe uas bound to consider the question  
independently* and not to be in fluenced  by the previous  
decisions re fus ing  discharge. I f  discharge fo llo w ed , the  
le g a l i ty  o f th a t discharge could never be brought in  
Question. I emphasis added 1
Uhere did the common lau  judges f in d  ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  evo lv ing  such a
procedure 7 This question i s  also answered by Lord Halsbury: "The
e s s e n tia l and lead ing  theory of the uhole procedure i s  the immediate
determ ination of the r ig h t  to  the a p p lic a n t's  freedom•"  [emphasis added]
I t  i s  apparent th a t the theory was rooted in  the common lau  ethos o f l ib e r ty
although, as ue s h a ll see, the correctness o f tuo of the severa l d ic ta  o f
h is  Lordship has been challenged* The three a n c illa ry  r ig h ts  in d ica ted  by
h is  lo rdship  are genera lly  re fe rre d  to , in  s h o rt, as -  (1 )  the r ig h t  of
successive a p p lic a tio n s ; (2 ) the r ig h t  o f appeal; and (3 )  the r ig h t  of
precedence over o ther business of the c o u rt. In  the in s ta n t case the
court held th a t there  was no r ig h t  o f appeal a t Common Lau against an
order o f discharge* In a subsequent d ec is io n , as ue s h a ll p resently
see, the same court fo lloued  the decision in  the in s ta n t case and uent
fu r th e r  to recognise the p o s itiv e  r ig h t  o f appeal im p to the h ig h e s t
tr ib u n a l in  the case of re fu s a l o f d ischarge.
1991 .7 4 . In  SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOWE AFFAIRS v QyBRIEN the House
o f Lords was c a lle d  to pronounce upon the ul% g a lity  of dischargeN of a
prisoner detained under an order passed under the Defence of the Realm
Regulations, as applied to Ire la n d  in  accordance w ith the provisions of
the Restoration o f Order in  Ire la n d  Act 1920. The prisoner was arrested
and deported under the order to  Dublin where he was detained by the
Government o f the I r is h  Free S ta te . The Court o f Appeal having allowed the
ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus holding the detention to  be i l l e g a l ,  the
Home Secretary had come up in  appeal. I t  was held th a t the order was
to be ju s t i f ie d  by the M in is te r responsible and th a t he had no power to
order a person to be in tern ed  in  the I r is h  Free S ta te . T h e ir Lordships
dismissed the appeal as incompetent. The E arl of Birkenhead observed
[the  w r i t ]  i s  o f immemorial a n t iq u ity . • . I t  has through 
the ages been jea lo u s ly  m aintained by the courts o f law as 
a check upon the i l l e g a l  usurpation o f power by the
Executive a t the cost o f the l ie g e .  . . In  the course o f
time c e rta in  ru le s  and p r in c ip le s  have been evolved. • • 
i f  the w r it  i s  once d irected  to issue and discharge is  
ordered by a competent co u rt, no appeal l i e s .  C o rre la tiv e  
with th is  r u le ,  and markedly in d ic a tiv e  o f the s p i r i t  o f 
law is  th a t other which es tab lish es  th a t he who app lies  
unsuccessfully fo r  the issue o f the w r it  may appeal from 
court to court u n t i l  he reaches the h ighest tr ib u n a l in  the  
land.
I t  may be p ro fita b ly  re c a lle d  here th a t in  the COX case the Court o f Appeal
had reversed the decision o f the D iv ie io n a l Court which had, u n like  th is
case, granted the w r it  and the question whether an appeal lay  against the
201re fu s a l o f the w r it  was expressly l e f t  open. Viscount F in lay  in  th is
case re fe rre d  to o ld  p rac tice  and said th a t the m atter was then disposed
202of a t once on exparte a p p lic a tio n . Lord Dunedin expressly approved
203Lord H alsbury 's  dictum which has now become c o n tro v e rs ia l.
1.75 A few years la t e r  the P rivy Council a lso , in  the ELEKO case
204( in f r a ) ,  fo llow ed the decision in  the COX case end upheld the r ig h t
of successive a p p lic a tio n s . The decision in  the ELEKO case was examined
205by Lord Parker, C .3 . in ,  In  re  HASTINGS (No.2 ) .  H is Lordship observed
206th a t the decision has remained unquestioned, except by an I r is h  case
and th a t there were also p a r a l le l  decisions of the Canadian and 
A ustra lian  courts . The correctness of the decision was, th e re fo re , l e f t  
open fo r  fu tu re  consideration . On the fa c ts  o f the case, h is  Lordship 
held th a t the second ap p lica tio n  before another D iv is io n a l Court o f the 
Queen's Bench D iv is io n  uas incompetent. Me must confess th a t i t  i s  not 
easy to  fo llo w  the reasons given in  the decision but the le g is la tu re  was 
quick to  see the d i f f ic u l t y  experienced by h is  Lordship and, as ue s h a ll  
see, the law was amended to term inate the r ig h t  of successive a p p lic a tio n s . 
Nevertheless, the question is  res in te q ra  in  so fa r  as other ju r is d ic t io n s  
of the Commonwealth are concerned. I t  i s  necessary, th e re fo re , to  
examine, even in  b r ie f ,  the controversy surrounding the decision in  the 
COX case about the r ig h t  o f successive a p p lic a tio n .
1.76 The main plank of the argument which has termed Lord H alsbury 's
208opinion as an “in ad verten t dictum" appears to  be based on the suggestion
th a t h is  Lordship might have overlooked the fa c t th a t the common law
209courts , in  olden tim es, sat in  banco. The fa c t th a t some of the other
judges in  th e ir  separate opinions in  the COX case d id  not use the word
210"judge" but "court" and in  Ex p . PARTINGTON there was a s im ila r
d iffe re n ce  between Park B. end Pollock C .B ., does n o t, ue submit, suggest
th a t Lord Halsbury had used the word "judge" in a d v e rte n tly , o b liv io u s  of
the ancient procedure. I t  must be remembered th a t in  the COX case the
main p o in t fo r  decision uas concerned with procedure, namely, whether
the provision of appeal in  a c rim in a l m atter introduced by the Judicature
Act 1873 was also app licab le  to habeas corpus proceedings. H is Lordship
211d e a lt w ith the p o in t w ith m eticulous care, as fo llo w s :
I  have in s is te d  a t some length upon the p e c u lia r it ie s  o f 
the procedure. • • one cannot suppose th a t the L eg is la tu re  
intended to a lte r  a l l  the procedure by mere general words, 
w ithout any s p e c ific  provision as to the p ractice  under the 
w r it  o f habeas corpus, or the s ta tu te s  which from time to  
time have regulated  both i t s  issue and consequences.
The decis ion , we submit, stated the lau  c o rre c tly  and was r ig h t ly  fo llow ed
in  la te r  cases.
1.77 Lord Goddard does not dispute th a t the r ig h t  to  successive
ap p lica tio n s  and the negative r ig h t  p ro h ib itin g  an appeal against
discharge did in  fa c t  grow up but u n like  Lord Halsbury who speaks of
ancient procedure he traces the o r ig in  o f the r ig h t  to the period
212fo llo w in g  the enactment o f the 1679 Act. On the other hand, Heuston,
re ly in g  m ainly on an I r is h  decis ion , ST ATE (Dowling) v KINGSTON (n o .2 )
appears to  suggest th a t the r ig h t  o f successive ap p lic a tio n s  was lim ite d
to d if fe r e n t  courts and did not extend to several judges. Apparently
agreeing w ith Lord Goddard he tends to suggest th a t the r a t io  in  the ELEKO
case was based not on the COX case but on the r ig h t  accruing from the 1679 
213Act. He observes th a t the e f fe c t  of the Judicature Act weighed 
h eav ily  with the P rivy  Council but th is  was p re c is e ly  the reason, as ue 
have seen, which also weighed w ith the Court in  the COX case and as such 
ue submit th a t i t  i s  not co rrect to say th a t the decision in  the ELEKO
case uas not based on the COX case. Professor de Smith, re ly in g  on the
214three decisions in ,  In  re  HASTINGS. suggested th a t "possibly successive
ap p lica tio n s  to in d iv id u a l judges could be
215made in  vacation" [emphasis added]. But i t  is  to be noted th a t Lord 
Parker, in  d e liv e r in g  the unanimous judgment o f the court in  the second 
of the three decis ions, had made i t  c le a r the decision should be read as 
lim ite d  to the fa c ts  o f the case. Without examining the d ivergent views 
in  d e ta i l  we might a t once suggest th a t s u ff ic ie n t  importance ought to be 
attached to the fa c t  th a t being a "high prerogative w r it"  dependent on 
the "personal command" o f the judge, there was, a p r io r i , co -ord inate  
ju r is d ic t io n  in  each judge to  issue the w r i t .  Th is  aspect o f the m atter  
appears to  have been overlooked by the protagonists  of the d if fe r e n t  view s. 
( b) Jhe Writ_and__the_Statutes
( i )  The Jiebeas^C^rgus Acts
1.78 W8 propose to  examine b r ie f ly  somB o f the s ta tu te s  enacted
between the years 1640 and 1816, each one w ith the common t i t l e  "Habeas 
Corpus A ct". The f i r s t  enactment o f 1640 (16 C ar. 1 c .10 ) expressly
re fe rre d  to  the "Great Charter" (Magna C arta) and to the various
s ta tu te s  a ffirm in g  the C harter, and also to the "common law of the land"
by way of asserting  th e ir  primacy* I t  abolished the Court o f S tar
Chamber and regulated  the power of the P rivy C ouncil, having branded
both these in s t itu t io n s  as a "means to introduce an a rb it ra ry  power and
government". By s*7 i t  was provided th a t the Act was to extend only to
the Court o f S tar Chamber and "courts of l ik e  ju r is d ic t io n  h e re a fte r
erected and to commitments, re s tra in ts  and imprisonments o f person or
persons commanded or awarded by the King* • • or the P r iv ie  C ouncell."
The im portant provision was contained in  s*6 which, in  m a te r ia l p a rts ,
ran as fo llo w s :
Every person committed contrary to  th is  Act s h a ll have an 
habeas corpus fo r  the ordinary fees* • • unto the court 
o f the K in g 's  Bench or the Common Pleas in  open court s h a ll 
w ithout delay upon any pretence. * . have fo rth w ith  granted  
to him a w r it  o f habeas corpus. • • upon re tu rn  made the  
court s h a ll examine and determine whether the cause o f 
commitment be ju s t  or le g a l and s h a ll thereupon. • • 
e ith e r  d e liv e r in g , b a ilin g  or remanding. • • [emphasis added]
1.79 In  the preamble o f the 1679 Act (31 C ar. c .2 ) i t  was stated th a t
"great delays" had been made in  making re tu rn  to the w r it  "contrary to thB
known law of the land" in  the cases of persons committed to custody fo r
"c rim in a l or supposed c rim in a l m atters" and in  s .s .2  and 6 the Act la id  down
provisions as regards b a i l .  O r ig in a lly  s.1 excepted the cases o f both
treason and fe lony but in  1967 the word "fe lony" was deleted  by the C rim inal
Law Act. I t  f ix e d  a time l im it  fo r  the re tu rn , three days in  a usual case.
Other sanctions are to  be found in  s s .4 , 5 , 8 , 9 and 11. To "neglect"
e ith e r  to make the re tu rn  or to produce the body was made an o ffen ce . To
re -a r re s t  a person enlarged on habeas corpus was also an o ffen ce . Transfer
of custody of the prisoner could only be e ffe c te d  by habeas corpus or
other le g a l w r i t .  Perhaps s .9 embodied a sanction of an extreme n atu re :
i t  was d irec ted  against the ju d ic ia ry  i t s e l f ;  i t  contemplated a penalty  fo r
"unduly denying the w r i t " .  Sending prisoners beyond the seas was proh ib ited
216by s .1 1 , perhaps as a re s u lt  o f the CLARENDON case. In  s .9  the  
"competent tr ib u n a ls "  were mentioned -  the courts o f Chancery, Exchequer,
K ing 's  Bench and Common P leas . Contrary to the contention re fe rre d  to  
217e a r l ie r  i t  contained no in d ic a tio n  of any r ig h t  o f successive app lica tio n
to these courts; nor uas i t  in d ica ted  th a t the ju r is d ic t io n  uas "conferred11 
these courts fo r  the f i r s t  tim e.
1.80 The tuo enactments th a t fo llow ed in  1803 (43 Geo 3 c .140)
and 1804 (4 4  Geo 3 c .102) made more e ffe c t iv e  the w rits  o f habeas corpus 
ad te s tif ic a n d u m, by uhich a prisoner could bB brought to give evidence.
But ue are not concerned in  th is  study u ith  th is  u r i t  or w ith the o ther  
forms o f the w r it  o f habeas corpus except th a t o f habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum.
1.81 Next came the 1816 Act (56 Geo 3 c .1 0 0 ) . By s .6  the general
provisions of the Act uere extended to the 1679 A ct. In  s.1 i t  uas 
provided th a t a Judge could issue the w r it  in  vacation and in  cases other 
than fo r  c rim in a l m a tte r, o r fo r  debt, or on c iv i l  process. These tuo  
provisions had to be read u ith  the preamble uhich contained a r e c i t a l  to  
the e f fe c t  th a t the w r it  having proved to  be "an expeditious and e ffe c tu a l  
method o f re s to rin g  any person to h is  l ib e r ty "  i t  would be conducive to  
^public advantage" to extend the remedy o f such u r i t ,  to  enforce  
obedience thereunto and to  prevent delays in  ths execution th e re o f. I t  
uas also noted in  the r e c i t a l  th a t the 1679 Act had a lim ite d  scope as i t  
extended to only "c rim in a l o r supposed c rim in a l"  m a tte r. By s .2  non­
obedience to the u r i t  uas made contempt o f c o u rt. The common lau  power
of the judges uas supposed to  be enlarged by s .3  uhich is  set out below,
in  m a te ria l p a rts :
. . .  in  a l l  cases provided by th is  Act, although the re tu rn  
. . .  s h a ll be qood and s u ff ic ie n t  in  la u . i t  s h a ll be law fu l 
fo r  the Justice  or Baron. • • to proceed to examine in to  the  
tru th  o f the fa c ts  set fo r th  in  such re tu rn . • • and i f .  • •
i t  s h a ll appear doubtfu l to  him. • • whether the m a te ria l
fa c ts  set fo r th  in  the said re tu rn  or any o f them be true or
n o t. . . to  l e t  to b a i l  ths said person. • • [emphasis added]
The section fu r th e r  contemplated examination o f the tru th  o f the fa c ts  
to be continued "by a f f id a v i t  or a ffirm a tio n "  and empowered the judge "to  
order and determine touching the d ischarg ing , b a ilin g  or remanding the 
p a rty ."  Th is  uas supplemented by s .4  which expressly provided th a t the  
tru th  of the re tu rn  could be controverted . In  both the 1679 and 1816 Acts 
the long t i t l e  described them as Acts fo r  "b e tte r securing", in  one case, 
and " e ffe c t iv e ly  securing" in  the other case, "the l ib e r ty  o f the  su b jec t" . 
The d escrip tio n  thus maintained the "high prerogative" nature o f the u r i t  
end in d ica ted  th e ir  Common Lau parentage.
1.82 Mention may now be made o f the recent s ta tu te  uhich has tampered
u ith  some o f the im portant a n c illa ry  r ig h ts  a v a ila b le  a t common law . Me
r e fe r  in  th is  connection to the re le v an t provisions o f the Adm inistration
of Justice Act 1960 (8  & 9 E l iz .2 ,  c .6 5 ) .  s .14  d e a lt w ith procedure on
"ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus" uhich 3 .1 7 (2 ) defined to mean an ap p lica tio n
fo r  the u r i t  whether i t  was a " c iv i l  or c rim in a l"  a p p lic a tio n . S u b -s .(2 )
debarred successive ap p lica tio n s  by providing the twin c r i t e r ia  of the
lim ita t io n  -  "same grounds" and "unless fresh evidence is  adduced". s .1 5 (2 )
provided fo r  appeal in  c i v i l  as w e ll as c rim in a l cases "against order fo r
re lease as w e ll as against order o f re fu s a l" ,  [emphasis added] The r ig h t
o f making successive ap p lica tio n s  has been branded by a contemporary observer
as "an in d e fe n s ib le  s u rv iv a l o f archaic ideas th a t seems to have been
218based on a misapprehension from the f i r s t . "  iiie f in d  ourselves unable to  
agree w ith the suggestion th a t the r ig h t  served no u sefu l purpose in  the 
past but we can safe ly  concede th a t i t  has o u tliv ed  i t s  u t i l i t y  as the r ig h t  
to the w r it  o f habeas corpus has now been firm ly  es tab lish ed . The change in  
the la u  brought about by the 1960 Act does not th ere fo rs  d e tra c t from the  
e ffic a c y  of the remedy by fo rb idd ing  merely successive ap p lica tio n s  in  a 
lim ite d  way (v id e  s .1 4 (2 ) ) ,  but by providing appeals genera lly  against a l l  
orders passed in  habeas corpus proceedings (v id e  s .15 ) the s ta tu te  is  
perhaps a ffe c tin g  the nature o f the r ig h t  in  a serious manner. However, 
the court i s  s t i l l  try in g  to preserve the im portant character o f the r ig h t
by adhering to  c e rta in  s a lu ta ry  ru le s * An a p p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus 
s t i l l  takes precedence over a l l  o ther business of the court*
( i i ) Some im portant cases under wartime le g is la t io n
1.83  The im portant wartime cases have been examined in  d e ta i l  in  an
219appropriate context but i t  may be u s e fu l to  s ta te  the p o s itio n  b r ie f ly *
In  a l l  the three cases220 -  HALLIDAY. LIVERSIDGE and GREENE -  the
prisoners were detained under wartime reg u la tio n s  uhich authorised the
Home Secretary during the two world wars to  pass the orders contemplated
thereunder* The reg u la tio n s  were framed under s ta tu te s  and in  the
HALLIDAY case i t  was the v ire s  of the re le v an t reg u la tio n  th a t was
challenged. I t  was in te r  a l ia  contended by the prisoner th a t the
provision of detention  w ithout t r i a l  was tantamount to an im plied
rep ea l o f the provision  o f habeas corpus. The court construed the
re g u la tio n  against the backdrop of the wartime s itu a tio n  and held  th a t
the prisoner had fa i le d  to es tab lish  th a t i t  uas u l t r a  v ire s : the remedy
was not lo s t but i t  was fo r  the prisoner to  e s tab lis h  th a t he was
221un law fu lly  deta ined . Norm ally, as we have seen, by re q u irin g  the 
cause o f "caption and deten tion" to be returned in  a habeas corpus 
proceeding, the burden was placed on the person who held or authorised  
the d e ten tio n . Apparently, the court had changed i t s  approach but 
found ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  i t  in  the o b ject of the s ta tu te s .
1 .84  The LIWERSIDKE case arose out o f an action  fo r  fa ls e
imprisonment and as such i t  does not have much relevance to our present 
discussions but in  the GREENE case the court d e a lt  with the scope of 
habeas corpus proceedings a t some len g th . Viscount Maugham held th a t the 
case came under as. 3 and 4 o f the Habeas Corpus Act 1816 but the only 
fa c t o f which the court could examine the t r u th ,  under the re g u la tio n , 
was whether the Secretary o f State had reasonable cause to be lieve  the 
prisoner to  be a person o f h o s tile  association and th a t by reason thereof 
i t  was necessary to exercise co n tro l over him . A ff id a v its  were f i le d
on both sides and the D iv is io n a l Court had accepted the statement o f the
222Secretary o f S ta te , But h is  Lordship proceeded fu rth e r  to  hold th a t i t
was not necessary fo r  the Secretary o f State to f i l e  an a f f id a v i t  in  view
223of the provisions o f the re g u la tio n . The burden, again, was s h ifte d  to
the prisoner and the reason fo r  th is  uas a ttr ib u te d  to the lew . The
224pos ition  was explained more lu c id ly  by Lord liirig h t, who observed:
I t  may be objected th a t the d iscre tio n ary  powers thus vested 
in  the Secretary o f S tate are ju s t  those which were upheld 
in  DARNELS  case and condemned in  the P e tit io n  o f R igh t.
But the answer is  th a t they are here law fu l under th is  
reg u la tio n  because they are conferred by the supreme 
au th o rity  of Parliam ent and are thus the law o f the land 
•  •  •
In  one case a t le a s t ,  as ue s h a ll see, the court attempted to observe the
225normal ru le  as to burden. Th is  ind ica ted  th a t the new approach
'X T -6
d ic ta te d  by the changed circumstances was not f irm ly  e s tab lis h ed . This
is  also supported by the fa c t  th a t in  both cases, HALLIDAY and LIV/ERSIDGE.
there were fo rc e fu l d issents uhich, as ue s h a ll see, have come to be
accepted as corrssponding to the modern approach of the ju d ic ia ry  in
227England and even elsewhere in  the Commonwealth.
1 .85  In  R v GOVERNOR OF BRIXTON PRISON ex p . SARNO. 228 another wartime
case, the usual wartime approach preva iled  although the detention  was 
under a d if fe r e n t  re g u la tio n . A Russian n a tio n a l was ordered to be 
deported and he was held in  in te rim  custody authorised by the A liens  
R e s tric tio n  (C onso lidation ) Order 1914, made under the A liens R e s tric tio n  
Act 1914. The ap p lica tio n  fa i le d  on the ground th a t the prisoner had not 
estab lished th a t he was a p o l i t ic a l  refugee from Russia, as contended.
Low, 3 . ,  however made a s ig n if ic a n t remark th a t i f  the Executive had
said th a t the w r it  was to be refused because the custody a t the moment 
uas te c h n ic a lly  le g a l,  th a t would not have ava iled  i f  the court found th a t 
"what was r e a lly  in  contemplation uas the exercise of an abuse o f power1*.
( i i i ) Some im portant cases under the im m igration and e x tra d it io n  law
1.85 We have considered i t  proper to  club together fo r  the purpose of
our study the s ta tu te s  belonging to  two d if fe r e n t  species to examine the
ju d ic ia l  response fo r  the reason th a t both had common between them the
"fo re ig n 11 element -  the s ta te  p ro tec tin g  i t s  n a tio n a l in te re s t  against a
fo re ig n e r in  one case and in  the other case i t  was the r ig h t  o f a fo re ign
government to try  an offender on which the s ta te  ad jud icated .
2291.87 In  R v GOVERNOR OF BRIXTON PRISON ex p . AH SAN the ap p lica tio n
fo r  w r it  was by eleven P ak is tan i c it iz e n s , who claimed r ig h t  to  the w r it  as 
B rit is h  subjects by v ir tu e  o f th e ir  being Commonwealth c it iz e n s . I t  was 
alleged th a t they had landed c lan d estin e ly  End were detained in  p riso n .
They were examined by an Im m igration O ffic e r  who had issued to each of 
them a "notice to re fu s a l o f acfcnission" as contemplated by the Commonwealth 
Immigration Act 1962, The prisoners contended th a t the notices were bad
as they were examined a f te r  24 hours o f th e ir  landing and as such the O ffic e r
had no ju r is d ic t io n  to  d eta in  them. The Crown contended, re ly in g  on the 
230wartime cases u -  HALLIDAY. LIVERSIDGE and GREENE,  th a t the n o tices  were
"good on th e ir  face" and the re tu rn  was s u f f ic ie n t .  Relying on the 1816
Act Lord Parker, C .3 .,  held th a t the v a l id i ty  o f the re tu rn  could be
challenged. H is Lordship also held  th a t the Executive had not discharged
i t e  onus to negative the challenge and prove beyond reasonable doubt th a t
the conditions-precedent fo r  the issue of the n o tices  had been s a t is f ie d .
Reliance was placed on OBRIEN and ELEKO cases (s u p ra ). R eferring
to  the GREENE case, h is  Lordship sa id , "The court was not dealing  w ith the
question th a t a rises  here as to  the p o s ition  f a t the end o f the day*".
2311.88 Ex p . SCHTRAK6 was a case in  respect o f commitment under the
E x tra d itio n  Act 1870, I t  was a second ap p lica tio n  on fresh  evidence as 
contemplated under 8 ,1 4 (2 ) o f the A dm inistration of Justice  Act 1960.
Lord P arker, C .3 .,  observed th a t the provision uas meant to give 
" le g is la t iv e  a u th o rity "  to the three decis ions, In  re HASTINGS (s u p ra ).
I t  was held th a t the proceedings in  habeas corpus were not to be equated 
u ith  appeal. The court could only see i f  the prisoner uas properly  
deta ined . No evidence could be admitted except to  show lack of ju r is d ic t io n
55
in  one way or another -  e ith e r  because the crime was not w ith in  thB Act 
o r there  was no evidence on which the M agistrate  could exercise h is  
ju r is d ic t io n .  Both these grounds, we submit, could also be taken in  
appeal. Therefore, i t  appears th a t where appeal was not provided 
le g a l i ty  o f a decis ion , whether ju d ic ia l ,  as in  th is  case or execu tive , 
as in  the AHSAN case (s u p ra ), could be tested  by habeas corpus.
1.89 In  a la te r  decis ion , in  ARMAH v GOVERNMENT OF GHANA. 232 th is
p o s itio n  was explained and reference was made to Bacon*s Abridgement to  
say th a t the courts used to  issue the w r it  o f c e r t io r a r i  along with th a t o f 
habeas corpus to  bring the record to  see the s u ffic ien c y  of the  re tu rn . 
Courts have thus held themselves e n t i t le d  to  correct the e rro r in  law
of the M a g is tra te . The court could consider, i t  was h e ld , whether 
there  was s u ff ic ie n t  evidence to  s a tis fy  the ''re levan t te s t"  prescribed by 
the law under which the order was passed. The court could see whether 
there  was evidence before the  M ag is tra te , in  th is  case, which ra ised  a
"strong and probable presumption" against the prisoner, who had been
committed under the F u g itive  Offenders Act 1881, th a t he had committed the  
a lleged o ffence.
( c ) The Writ__and_thie—dependencies
1.90 We may now examine the pos ition  of the w r it  in  re la tio n  to  the
dependencies. Before we examine the re levan t case-law we may r e fe r  to
the re levan t s ta tu te . In  s.1 o f the Habeas Corpus Act 1862 (25  & 26 V i e t .
c .20 ) i t  was provided as fo llo w s:
No w r it  o f habeas corpus s h a ll issue out of England, by the  
a u th o rity  of any judge or court o f ju s tic e  th e re in , in to  
any colony or fo re ig n  dominion of the  crown where Her 
Majesty has a la w fu lly  estab lished  court o r court of 
ju s tic e  having a u th o rity  to  grant and issue the w r it ,  
and to  ensure the  due execution th ereo f throughout such 
colony or dominion, [emphasis added]
Commenting on the Act, S ir  Kenneth Roberts-Mray observes th a t " i t  applies
to a colony where there is  a court having a u th o rity  to issue w r it  and
233not to  a case in  uhich a c o lo n ia l court has th a t a u th o r ity ."  [.author's  
emphasis]
He discusses c erta in  decisions and appears to  conclude th a t the common
law lin k  has not been snapped by the Act. He r ig h t ly  p o s its  the ju r is d ic t io n
of the English court in  the "high prerogative" nature o f the  u r i t  (th e
common law l in k )  and observes th a t ,  "The u r i t  can issue from an English
court to a te r r i to r y  under Her M a jes ty 's  p ro te c tio n , ir re s p e c tiv e  o f the
234lo c a l basic la u , provided th a t the Crown has s u ff ic ie n t  ju r is d ic t io n " .
Ue may now examine some of the decisions discussed by him.
2351.91 In  Ex p. ANDERSON a w r it  to  Canada was issued by the co u rt,
ra th e r re lu c ta n t ly , in  view of the "higher degree of c o lo n ia l independence".
That common lau  mandate l e f t  them u ith  no choice is  expressed in  the
fo llo w in g  passage of the judgment o f Cockburn C. 3 . :
. . .  in  e s tab lis h in g  a lo c a l ju d ica tu re  in  Canada, our 
le g is la tu re  has not gone so fa r  as expressly to  abrogate the  
r ig h t  o f superior courts a t Westminster to  issue the u r i t  of 
habeas corpus to  th a t province. • . Lord Coke, Lord M ansfie ld , 
Blackstone and Bacon's Abridgment a l l  agree th a t w rits  of 
habeas corpus have been and may be issued in to  a l l  p arts  of 
the dominions of the crown of England, where a subject o f the  
Crown is  i l l e g a l ly  im prisoned. . . nothing short o f le g is la t iv e  
enactment would ju s t i f y  us in  re fus ing  to exercise the  
ju r is d ic t io n , when c a lle d  upon to  do so fo r  the pro tection  o f 
the personal l ib e r ty  of the  su b jec t. [emphasis addedJ
As we have seen, the 1862 Act sought to provide the answer by try in g  to
f i l l  up the void complained of by th e ir  Lordships.
^  2361.92 In  R v Crewe, ex p. SEKGONE. the a p p lic a n t, irfiose claim to
a t r ib a l  c h ie fta in s h ip  in  the Bechuaneland P ro tecto rate  had aroused a 
heated controversy, was detained on the a u th o rity  of a proclamation issued  
by the High Commissioner fo r  South A fr ic a  s ta tin g  th a t i t  was necessary 
fo r  the preservation  o f p u b lic  peace. The High Commissioner had been 
empowered by an Order in  Council made under the Foreign J u ris d ic tio n  Act 
to exercise in  the P ro tecto ra te  the powers o f Her Majesty to  do a l l  such 
th ings "as are law fu l"  and by proclamation to provide f o r ,  among other 
th ings, the p ro h ib itio n  and punishment of a l l  acts tending to d is tu rb  the 
public  peace. Vaughan W illiam s , L .J . ,  re fe rre d  to  the ANDERSON case (supra) 
and observed th a t the 1862 Act applied only to  the " t e r r i t o r i a l  dominion"
of the  Crown and i t  had no e f fe c t  in  the P ro te c to ra te . The word "foreign
dominion" used in  the 1862 Act did not mean any country out o f Her
M a jes ty 's  dominion which was the sense in  uhich the word "fo re ign" was
used in  the Foreign Dudicature Act. By the word "dominion" the  le g is la tu re
237did  not mean "power" but " t e r r i t o r ia l  dominion". His Lordship however
held  th a t the proclamation being v a lid  and the detention being law fu l i t
was not necessary to  decide the p o in t, Kennedy, L .3 . was however more
c a te g o ric a l and held th a t Her Majesty exercised "power and ju r is d ic t io n  as a
p ro te c tin g  and not as a ru lin g  sovereign" in  a P ro tecto rate  and as such the
238w r it  could not be issued.
1 .93  The Court o f Appeal, in  a case from another P ro te c to ra te ,
Northern Rhodesia, however, he ld  th a t the  ju r is d ic t io n  of an English
court depended upon the extent to which the Crown exercised general
239ju r is d ic t io n  in  th a t country. In  Ex p. MUJENYA. reversing the  decision of
the O iv ie io n a l Court, i t  uas held th a t i t  would be "in  conformity with the
nature o f the w r it"  i f  the in te rn a l Government of Northern Rhodesia was,
in  le g a l e f fe c t ,  in d is tin g u is h a b le  from th a t in  a Colony. In  the D iv is io n a l
Court, Lord Parker, C .3 . had held  th a t "w hile  the w r it  w i l l  issue to any
p art o f th e  t e r r i t o r i a l  dominion of the Crown, i t  w i l l  not issue to
fo re ig n  te r r i t o r ie s  even i f  such t e r r i t o r ie s  belong to  a Prince who succeeds
240to  the throne of England". Reference uas made to  the opinion of
241Kennedy, L .3 . and the fo llo w in g  dictum o f Lord M ansfield  in  R v CQhJLE
was accepted as the "a u th o rity "  fo r  the decis ion:
To fo re ig n  dominions which belong to a Prince who succeeds 
to  the throne of England th is  court has no power to  send 
any u r i t  o f any k in d .
1 .94  Thus, ue see th a t the common lau  l in k  m aintained through the high 
p rerogative  nature o f the u r i t  allowed the  English courts to  exercise  
ju r is d ic t io n  in  c e rta in  cases notw ithstanding the 1862 Act. But a f te r  3 
years, in  1865, came the C o lo n ia l Laws V a lid ity  Act. How th is  enactment 
affec ted  the r ig h t  o f the subject also m erits  consideration . Lie know th a t
53
none of the English Habeas Corpus Acts applied proprio  v ig ors  to  any
"possession abroad". Therefo re , s . 2 of the 1865 Act could not operate
to  in v a lid a te  any c o lo n ia l law enacted to abrogate any r ig h t conferred by
the English Habeas Corpus Acts. Even so, the e f fe c t  of s .3  was do u b tfu l.
Although i t  provided th a t the repugnancy provision (s .2 )  was operative
in  respect o f the  enacted law o n ly , could i t  be said  th a t the  im plied
exclusion of common law also im p lied  th a t the r ig h t  to the w r it  at
common law could be taken away by a c o lo n ia l law ? Roberts-Wray observes,
perhaps r ig h t ly ,  th a t the c o lo n ia l law could abrogate the r ig h t  in  so fa r
as the ju r is d ic t io n  of the c o lo n ia l courts was concerned and not o f the
242English courts, because o f the high prerogative  nature o f the w r i t .
1 .95 In  ESHUGBAYI ELEKO v OFFICER ADMINISTERING GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA. 243
the P rivy  Council applied the p rin c ip le s  enunciated by Lord Halsbury to
the judges o f the Supreme Court o f N ig e r ia , as to  the r ig h t  o f successive
a p p lic a tio n s . Lord Hailsham held  th a t although by the Judicature Acts
the courts were combined, s t i l l  each judge had ju r is d ic t io n  to  hear the
244ap p lica tio n  in  term time and also in  vaca tio n . The appellan t was a 
deposed n a tive  Chief who had applied  to  the Supreme Court fo r  the w r it  
against an order d ire c tin g  h is  "deportation" to  another area. The f i r s t  
ap p lica tio n  having fa i le d  on a te c h n ica l ground, the app licant made 
another a p p lic a tio n » The N igerian  Supreme Court held  th a t although the  
e a r l ie r  ap p lica tio n  was heard and disposed o f by a s in g le  judge i t  was 
nevertheless a decision o f the court a id  a second a p p lica tio n  by the court 
could not be e n te rta in e d . In  the P rivy Council, the  contention of the 
N igerian  Government was th a t the r ig h t o f successive a p p lic a tio n  at 
common law was from court to  court and th e re fo re  a second a p p lica tio n  in  the 
same Supreme Court was incompetent which was, as in d ica te d  above, re je c te d .
On m e rit , the P rivy Council held  th a t the deportation  order was bad as the  
condition-precedent prescribed by law had not been s a t is f ie d .
1 .96 The decision suggests th a t in  ths dependencies the common law r ig h t
to the u r i t  uas exported in  f u l l  measure, u ith  a l l  a n c illa ry  r ig h ts .
From th is  ue may deduce an answer to  the question which the Indian courts
245had l e f t  unanswered. Possib ly, the r ig h t of a B r it is h  subject to apply
to  the English court, in  the r ig h t of successive a p p lic a tio n , was not
a ffec ted  by the  1862 A ct. The Adm inistration of Justice  Act 1960 did not
apparently a l t e r  th is  p o s itio n . In  the modem context th is  question has
lo s t i t s  importance except perhaps in  those cases where the Queen is  the
head of S ta te . But as ue have seen, in  certa in  s itu a tio n s , the r ig h t to
apply to  English courts o f c it iz e n s  of such s ta tes  o f the Commonwealth
246where the  Queen does not enjoy a s im ila r  s ta tu s , has been recognised.
1.97 How and when the c o lo n ia l courts o f the New Commonwealth s ta rted
exerc is ing  ju r is d ic t io n  to  issue the w r it  is  another aspect of the m atter
th a t needs in v e s tig a tio n . This question c m , however, be answered only
genera lly  in  th is  survey, fo r  English law was introduced vario u s ly  in  the
d if fe re n t  t e r r i t o r ie s .  Iiie can however point with some c e rta in ty  to  the
establishm ent o f Supreme Courts in  1774, 1801 and 1823, a t C a lcu tta , Madras
and Bombay re s p e c tiv e ly , when the B r it is h  subjects res id in g  in  those
Presidency Towns secured the r ig h t to apply fo r  th e  u r i t  to  those courts .
The e ffe c t o f the  1862 Act uas considered by Norman, J . o f the C a lcu tta
247High Court in  the AMEER KHAN case, in  a lim ite d  way. I t  uas held th a t  
the English common law uas introduced there long before the  establishm ent 
of the Supreme Court but i t  uas not decided i f  a B r it is h  subject resident 
there could apply to  the English court e ith e r  by passing the Supreme Court 
or having fa i le d  there to obtain the w r it .
1.98 The p o s ition  in  A fr ic a  and South-east Asia uas not much d if fe r e n t .  
The superior courts everywhere in  the dependencies, whether c a lled  
"Supreme Courts" or "High Courts" were modelled a f te r ,  and invested u ith  
powers s im ila r  to  those possessed by, the High Court o f Justice o f England. 
That ap art, as us s h a ll see, the Common Law as w e ll as the English s ta tu te s  
were made app licab le  in  the dependencies. However, in  In d ia , South-east
Asia and in  most of the African t e r r i t o r ie s  as w e ll (except West A frica ) 
ad d itio n a l provision was made in  the respective  Crim inal Procedure
248Codes. This position  w i l l  be examined in  the appropriate context.
I t  w i l l  be s u f f ic ie n t ,  in  the present context, to emphasise the fa c t that
the r ig h t to the w r it  of habeas corpus has not only f irm ly  established
i t s e l f  as an immutable part o f the law of the land in  England b u t, as
we s h a ll see, everywhere in  the New Commonwealth, even in  One Party States
249aid also s ta tes  which are or have been, under m il ita r y  ru le .
I I . A short study o f the p o lity  and society  o f the New Commonwealth:
t r a d it io n a l  ideas and in s t itu t io n s  v is -a -v is  modern aims and a ttitu d e s
(1 ) The Indian sub-continent
( A) The Indo-Arvan c iv i l is a t io n
1.99 The noted Indian h is to r ia n , K . M. Panikkar, in s is ts  th a t the
evolution and development o f s o c ia l and c u ltu ra l forces in  In d ia  ought
to be re la te d  to the movements in  C entra l and South-east Asia in  view of
the fa c t th a t Indo-Aryan c iv i l is a t io n  had spread fa r  and wide and had
1
covered those reg ions. In  th is  study however, we arB p rim a rily  in te res te d  
in  id e n tify in g  the common ideas and in s t itu t io n s  th a t s t i l l  survive or at 
lea s t re ta in  th e ir  appeal in  the modern s ta tes  of In d ia , P akistan , Bangladesh 
end S ri Lanka, bearing in  mind the fa c t th a t the Indo-Aryan in flu e n ce , which 
had spread to M alaysia and Singapore a lso , was more e ffe c t iv e ly  supplanted 
there (p a r t ic u la r ly  in  M alaysia) by the Is lam ic  in fluence and discussion  
in th is  part o f the study should there fo re  be confined to the Indian sub­
continent. Indeed, Is lam ic  in fluence  t r ie d  to assert i t s e l f  in  Northern 
In d ia  as e a rly  as the eleventh century A.D. when some Turkish and Afghan 
chiefs  invaded the region and la t e r  when the D elh i Sultanate founded i t s e l f  
firm ly  in  the th ir te e n th  century. But i t  has been r ig h t ly  pointed out th a t
the potentates of the D elh i Sultanate as w e ll as of i t s  successor, the
2Mughal Empire, ru led  as Indians and not as fo re ig n  sovereigns. Modern 
Pakistan and Bangladesh havs predominantly Muslim populations. S im ila r ly ,
over seventy per cent of the people of modern S ri Lanka are Buddhists but
Prince V ija y a  o f the Lion race, a f te r  whom the is la n d  is  named, came from 
3
In d ia  in  483 B .C . and immigrants from In d ia  s e tt le d  there as e a rly  as
4the th ird  century B .C. S t i l l ,  in  a l l  these s ta tes  the Indo-Aryan 
in s t itu t io n  of v il la g e  assembly re ta in s  i t s  appeal in  some form or o th e r.
In In d ia  and Bangladesh the pan chav at has i t s  popular appeal. In  Pakistan  
thB in s t itu t io n  of .iirqahs possibly insp ired  President Ayub Khan to
5
promote what he ca lled  "basic democracies” . In S ri Lanka, the ancient 
in s t itu t io n  of qamsachavas flo u rish ed  u n t i l  re ce n tly .^
1,100 I t  is  to be noted th a t the Aryan settlem ent in  In d ia  dates
7 A
back about 5,000 years. According to S ir Paul V in o g rao ff, who places  
the Indo-European union of the Aryan fam ily  between 3000 and 2000 B .C ., 
before th e ir  d ispersa l the Aryans possessed a f a i r ly  high standard of
g
p astora l pursu its  and the beginnings of a g r ic u ltu re . He ap tly  points
out th a t on account of d iffe ren ces  in  conquests, m ixture of races, c lim ate ,
geography and other conditions, development among the Ind ians, Teutons,
C elts  e tc . was bound to proceed on divergent lin e s  but hB notes th a t a
g
" tra d it io n a l and d ia le c t ic ” a f f in i t y  continued to e x is t between them.
However, Professor S tuart Piggot observes th a t ,  "The Aryan advent in
In d ia  was, in  fa c t ,  the a r r iv a l  of barbarians in to  a region h ighly
organised in to  an empire based on a long-estab lished tra d it io n  of l i t e r a te  
10urban c u ltu re ,” re fe rr in g  to  the Harappan c iv i l is a t io n  th a t flo u rish ed  in
the North-west region of In d ia  (now in  Pakistan) in  2500 B.C.^ i t  was,
according to him, " la rg e ly  s e l f -s u f f ic ie n t  and e s s e n tia lly  Indian in  
11o r ig in ."  I t  was however the Indo-Aryan c iv i l is a t io n  which, according to
Panikkar, became "one of the major fa c to rs  of world h is to ry  at le a s t from
the s ix th  century B.C. and was recognised as such by her s is te r
12c iv i l is a t io n s  of Greece, P ers ia  and China". And fo r tu n a te ly , h is to r ic a l  
records of th is  " c o lla te ra l branch" of the great Aryan fa m ily , as Professor 
flax M u ller asserts, "have been preserved to us in  such p erfec t and le g ib le
■ . . c
documents th a t uie can le a m  from them lessons'* to supply what he c a lls
"the missing lin k "  in  the " in te l le c tu a l ancestry" of the Anglo-Saxon 
13race .
(B) The Foundations o f the Indo-Aryan P o lity  and Society
(a ) The_ Village_J\ssemblj^ and^tjie_ancient_ socie t^
1.101 There is  copious and unimpeachable evidence to support the
proposition th a t the ro le  of the v il la g e  community in  the succeeding
c o n s titu tio n a l set-up over the centuries as an im portant veh ic le  of
c o n tin u ity  has been recognised and maintained by the successive ru le rs
of In d ia . Professor Max M u lle r t e l l s  us th a t "the p o l i t ic a l  u n it  or the
so c ia l c e l l  in  In d ia  has always been, end in  sp ite  of repeated conquests,
14is  s t i l l  the v il la g e  community." Indeed, S ir  Charles M e tc a lfe , member
15of the Indian Governor G eneral's  Executive Council had also observed:
Dynasty a fte r  dynasty tumble down. Revolution succeeds 
to re v o lu tio n . Hindoo, Pathan, Mogul, Maharatha, Sikh,
English are a l l  masters in  turn but the v il la g e  communities 
remain the sane.
16S ir Henry Maine also spoke in  the same ve in :
The tru th  is  th a t a l l  immigration in to  In d ia  a fte r  the  
o r ig in a l Aryan im m igration, a l l  conquests before the 
English conquest, inc lud ing not only th a t of Alexander, 
but those o f the Mussulman, a ffec ted  the people most 
s u p e r f ic ia lly  than is  assumed in  current opin ion .
1.102 E.B. H a v e ll, also w ritin g  during the golden period of B r it is h  
im peria lism , makes an im portant attempt to  fin d  an English p a r a l le l  
in s t itu t io n  when he says th a t ,  "The descrip tion  of o ld  English v il la g e  
communities in  Sleswick and Jutland given by well-known h is to ria n s
and the c h a ra c te ris tic s  ascribed to  the ancestors of the Anglo-Saxon
race, correspond c losely with what is  known of the Aryan settlem ents
17in  In d ia  from th e ir  l i t e r a r y  records and t r a d it io n a l  evidence." He
18ventures to trace  the development of the Aryan system as fo llo w s:
The freedom and general happiness a tta in ed  by the  
people of Great B r ita in  with the help of Parliam entary  
in s t itu t io n s  and the r ic h e s t revenues of the world can 
hardly be compared with th a t which the Indians w ith in  
the Aryan pale enjoyed before aid a f te r  the f i f t h  century
ts
s
A.D. . . . The Indo-Aryan C o n s titu tio n , b u i l t  up by the  
highest in te llig e n c e  of the people upon the basis of th e ir
v il la g e  communities, and not wrung from u n w illin g  war­
lords and landlords by century-long struggles and c iv i l  
wars, secured to the Indian peasant-proprie tor not only 
the ownership of the  land, but very considerable powers 
of self-governm ent. The powers of the c en tra l government, 
though they might often be abused, were at lea s t delegated  
to i t  by the people themselves, and lim ite d  by unw ritten  
laws which by common consent were given a re lig io u s  
character.
1 .103 This view is  endorsed by the f i r s t  Law Commission of republican
In d ia  who re ite ra te s  th a t the v illa g e  as a t e r r i t o r i a l  u n it  "enjoyed a
considerable measure of autonomy" during the 8 a rly  period and th a t most
of the la te r  Hindu and Muslim ru le rs  were mainly in te res te d  in the
c o lle c tio n  o f revenue and th a t  they favoured re te n tio n  o f thesB
19in s t itu t io n s  which fa c i l i t a te d  th is  purpose.
( b) Th_e X^sti^tjution^a^l ^tjrujctjure of the S ta te  and the Law
( i )  _A GenejraJ  ^ View
1.104 Although the co n stitu tio n  of the State in  the Vedic period
( c . 1500-800 B .C .) was m onarchical, corporate l i f e  was not unknown to the
Aryan and we can say on a high au th o rity  (Jayaswal) th a t the v il la g e  as a
c o lle c tiv e  u n it  was well-known and in  fa c t formed the basis of the
C onstitu tio n  of the S am iti, an in s t itu t io n  which had a l i f e  of over 
201000 years. "Going back to the o ldest l i te r a tu r e  of the ra c e ,"  observes
Professor Dayaswal, "we f in d  from the Vedas th a t the n a tio n a l l i f e
in  the e a r lie s t  times on record was expressed through popular assemblies
and in s t itu t io n s ."  The S am iti, he adds, was the n a tio n a l assembly of the
21whole people and e lec tio n  of the King was one of i t s  ch ief fu n c tio n s .
The other in s t i tu t io n ,  the Sabha, which was a standing body of selected
persons and acted under the au th o rity  of the Sam iti as the n a tio n a l
22ju d ic a tu re , o u tliv ed  the S am iti. S ir  S rin ivasa V aradachariarfs
a llu s io n  to the double parentage o f Sabha, in  the context of h is  e f fo r t
23to  f in d  i t s  p a r a lle l  in  the English Curia Regis, i s ,  perhaps, to  be read 
with reference to the la t e r  in fluence  of strong cen tra l government, and
the fa c t remains th a t while the Saxon Iditenagemot was not the source of 
power of the Curia Regis which was a creature of the Norman Kings, the 
Sabha had i t s  o r ig in  in  the popular assembly.
1.105 Professor U .N . Ghoshal is  more e x p l ic i t  in  saying th a t the power
of the Vedic King was lim ite d  by the w i l l  of the people as expressed in
24the Sam iti and the Sabha. D r. R.C. Majumdar endorses th is  view and
adds th a t ,  " , . . they [th e  people] took p o l i t ic s  s e rio u s ly . . . the
Samiti in  Vedic In d ia  was characterised  by a keen sense of public  l i f e
25and an animated pub lic  a c t iv i t y .  . ."
1.106 Professor A.S. A lte k a r, re ly in g  on Vedic evidence, t e l l s  us th a t
the v il la g e  communities enjoyed a p ra c t ic a l u n lim ited  autonomy and th a t
26"the State was usually  co-termirfus with the v i l la g e ."  Dr. R.K. Mookerji
looks at the re la t io n  between State and society from another angle and say
th a t the two were d is t in c t ,  separate and independent of each o th er, guided
by a po licy  o f n o n -in terfe ren ce; th a t the King was the head of the State
27but not of s o c ie ty . Very r ig h t ly  he draws the  conclusion th a t " th is  
character of lo c a l government in  ancient In d ia  explains the r is e  of few 
empires" and a f o r t i o r i , we submit, absence of a strong c en tra l government 
a ls o .
1.107 Next in  importance to  the v il la g e  community is  the in s t itu t io n  
o f the v il la g e  heacfcien, the Grameni or Gramyevedin of Vedic l i te ra tu r e  who 
according to V aradachariar, had the power to  punish crim inals  except
in  serious cases. He c ite s  the au th o rity  of Professors MacDonnell and
Keith and also the Oataka s to r ie s  ( f i f t h /s ix t h  century B .C .) in  support
of h is  contention. I t  is  said th a t the power may have been exercised
by him e ith e r  personally or in  conjunction with the v il la g e  council and
28th a t the o ff ic e  was probably an e le c tiv e  one in  the beginning. I t  is  
submitted th a t these p ro b a b ilit ie s , read against the backdrop of the  
s p ir i t  o f the Vedic age, make i t  probable th a t the democratic element was 
reta ined and nurtured in  the in s t itu t io n  of the Gramani, and not k i l le d .
• G5
This conjecture can be ventured without fe a r  of con trad iction  as the
Cambridge H istory o f In d ia  also speaks in  s im ila r  vague terms about the
Gramani: "an o f f ic e r  who appears in  Qgveda and who was probably invested
with both m ilita ry  and c iv i l  functions though we have no d e ta ils  of
29h is  duties  or powers."
( i i )  The, vi_llaqa _as_sem_b_li_es_L _law jand jadminist_raj^io n_o£ J u s tic e
1.108 On th is  aspect Jayaswal quotes Manu and Arthasastra end
c a te g o ric a lly  asserts th a t the King was under the law . "Apart from the
operation of coronation oath and checks and l im ita t io n  imposed by
Paura-Jenapada and the council, there was the a ll-p o w e rfu l law, the canon
law of the Hindus, which is  declared again and again above the King and
as King of K ings," says Dayaswal and adds th a t there was separation of
30executive and ju d ic ia ry ; lawyers were appointed judges. (Varadachariar 
31disputes t h i s ) . Other re levan t in form ation co llec ted  from Oayaswal may
32be summarised thus:
The King could hear a case only when he was s it t in g  in  Council.
The law court was ca lle d  Sabha which was made up of the
community who helped thB judge in  the adm in istration  of ju s tic e
acting as the ju ry  o f the co u rt. They were c a lled  "the examiners
of the cause" and were concerned with " fin d in g  the tru th " .
The judge was c a lled  the "President" or the "Speaker".
Punishment imposed by the Court was c a rried  out by the K ing.
1.109 According to  A lte k a r, even during the Mauryan period (fo u rth
century B .C .) ,  when the power of the c en tra l government reached i t s
zen ith , though the v il la g e  assembly lo s t i t s  power de ju re , the position
33did not a lte r  de fa c to . He quotes Brhaspati (c .600  A .D.) who asserted
th a t the King is  to abide by and enforce the decision of the puga, sren i 
34e tc . and contests the claim of S ir  Henry flaine th a t the sanction behind
the decision of v il la g e  assemblies was mere approbation. C entra l power
was used to enforce the decision by physical force o f the State a t i t s
35command, says A lte k a r.
1.110 R eferring  to the residuary powers and re s p o n s ib ilit ie s  of the
K ing, Varadachariar discards the extreme view th a t punishment was the
36prerogative  of the r u le r .  H is to r ic  evidence is  quoted by him to show 
th a t the King could i n f l i c t  punishment only i f  seven successive tr ib u n a ls  
found a person g u i l ty .  However a ttra c t iv e  the argument might sound, i t  is  
submitted th a t the evidence appears to have been misquoted. The evidence 
re la te s  to  the republican ere when the im portant fu n c tio n aries  of the  
State were ca lled  the "upa-ra.ja" and the "ra .ja", l i t e r a l l y  the Viceroy and 
the King re s p e c tiv e ly . The s im ilitu d e  in  the expressions might have 
caused the confusion. Another point to be noted in  th is  connection is  th a t 
the prerogative pleaded did not possess a wide sweep, fo r ,  as Dr. N.C. 
Sengupta observes, "The K ing’ s ju d ic ia l  functions include maintenance of 
peace and s ec u rity , the prevention of sahasa or v io le n t crimes and
3
in f l ic t io n  of punishment. . ."  I t  thus appears th a t the K ing 's  
ju r is d ic t io n  was lim ite d  to  a s p ec ified  category so th a t the power and 
functions of the popular court were not to ta l ly  eclipsed despite the fa c t  
th a t the in s t itu t io n  of Kingship was at i t s  zenith  of in flu e n c e . There 
was at the most a corresponding dimunition in  the power of the v il la g e  
courts with the ascendancy of ro ya l power.
1.111 The Vedic period was follow ed by the republican era which,
according to Jayaswal, began sometime in  1000 B.C. and continued up to 
38600 A.D. I t  is  re fe rre d  to by Megesthanes (fo u rth  century B .C .) and also
in  the Buddhist l i te ra tu r e  of the f i f t h  and s ix th  centuries B.C. In
Ai t  arey a-B r  ahm an a (c .1000 B .C .) i t  is  stated th a t the g reater portion of
39Aryan In d ia  was under republican c o n s titu tio n s . Maximum safeguards fo r  
the l ib e r ty  of the c it iz e n  were provided in the C onstitu tio n  of the Lichchavi 
Republic (c . f i f t h - fo u r t h  century B .C .) .  An accused was adjudged g u ilty  
only i f  he was separately  so held by the Senapati. Ra.ja, Upa-ra.ja e tc . ,
the various fu n c tio n aries  of the S ta te . S im ila r provision fo r  m u ltip le  
enquiry also fig u red  in  the C rim inal Procedure Codes of the other Ganas 
( Republics)
1.112 Before we proceed to examine certa in  spec ia l fea tu res  of the
ancient c rim in a l law, the ro le  of the v il la g e  assemblies in  the
adm in is tra tion  of ju s tic e  may be summarised in  the words of Professor
Sidney liiebb, whose views proceed from a close and comparative study of
some of the ancient in s t itu t io n s  of the Indian and English against the
background of ju r is p ru d e n tia l developments in  England and thus adds a new
41angle to  the perspectives
The Indian v il la g e  o ffe rs  us, l ik e  the Quaker m eeting, a 
possibly higher a lte rn a t iv e , i f  we b e lieve  in government 
by consent, in  the decision by the general sense of the 
community. In England our lawyers and statesmen are s t i l l  
encumbered with the Austinian pedantry o f a century ago, 
which taught them th a t o b lig a tio n s  are but the obverss of 
r ig h ts , and th a t nothing is  a r ig h t which is  not enforceable
by ju d ic ia l  proceedings -  the in ference being th a t there can
be no binding o b lig a tio n  to the pub lic  at la rg e . . . the  
Indian v i l la g e ,  l ik e  the e a rly  English manor, emphasizes 
o b lig a tio n  ra th er than r ig h ts ; and fa r  from confining  
i t s e l f  to  r ig h ts  on which some p a r t ic u la r  person could 
take action fo r  h is  own b e n e f it ,  devotes i t s e l f  la rg e ly  to  
the o b lig a tio n s  to  the p u b lic .
These observations, i t  is  subm itted, explain to a great extent the reason
why a law of c iv i l  in ju r ie s  did not gain importance in  Hindu Common Law
and also tend to suggest th a t in  ancient Indian p o lity  the "higher
a lte rn a tiv e "  of community-consensus ensured the dispensation of even-
handed ju s tic e  and protected the l ib e r ty  of the person w ithout compromising
42the in te re s t of the community.
( i i i )  _Sp_eci_aI. fe_ature_s__oJF _an_cie_n_t _crjLm_inja 1_law__and_p_o l ic e  system
1.113 In the Tagore Law Lectures de livered  in  1909, Dr. P.N. Sen has
said th a t in  Hindu Law punishment of crime occupies a more prominent place
43than compensation fo r  wrong. In the case of in ju ry  to  person, however, th  
v ic tim  could also recover solatium fo r  the pain in f l ic t e d  in  addition  to  
expenses to  which he might be put to as a re s u lt  of the vio lence done to him
T h e  law -g ivers  condemned a crime not so much because i t  involved an 
infringem ent o f p riva te  r ig h t but because i t  im p e rille d  society and 
the t r a n q u i l l i t y  of the people at la r g e ,1* says D r. Sen.
1 .114 Dr. R.B. Pal t e l l s  us in  h is  Tagore Law Lectures of 1930 (on
Hindu Law of the e a rly  period) th a t ,  ’There is  no c le a r in d ic a tio n  of an
organized c rim in a l ju s tic e  e ith e r  in  the King or in  the people. There
s t i l l  seems to have p reva iled  the system of wergeld ( v a ir a ) which in d ica te
th a t c rim in a l ju s tic e  remained in  the hands of those who were wronged. In
44the la t e r  l i te r a tu r e  however the King*s peace is  c le a r ly  recognised.1'
1 .115 S t i l l ,  i t  must be admitted th a t the early  position  of th is  branch
of law is  obscure. Dr. R.C. Najumdar introduces a th ird  element of
u n certa in ty  by p o stu la tin g  th a t the two systems of ju s tic e  were 
45contemporaneous. He speaks of ju s tic e  being administered by the King 
with the help of Purohita  (p r ie s ts )  and probably also advisers and of the 
common punishment which was to  t i e  the c rim in a l to a stake . Then he says; 
'The system of wergeld ( va iradaya) was in  force and we come across the 
ep ith e t satadaya, th a t is ,  one, the p rice  of whose blood was one hundred 
[cows or c o in s ]."
1.116 That a p o s itive  development in  th is  branch of law took place in
46In d ia  in  the early  stages appears from the observations of Dr. P .K . Sen
in  h is Tagore Law Lectures which V/aradachariar had b r ie f ly  summarised thus;
The predominant fea tu re  of crime according to Hindu Law is  
i t s  q u a lity  of causing alarm to the people [ p .124^ 
punishment fo r  wrong-doing fo r  preservation of so c ia l 
order was conceived in  ancient times [ p .89]; 
there was no theory of re tr ib u tio n  or vengeance in  
the Hindu penal system [p .1 1 0 ].
1.117 Whatever might be the e a r l ie r  stage of the law on th is  p o in t, 
one conclusion can be s a fe ly  drawn. While law in  In d ia  was developed 
progressively by the Aryans here so th a t i t  could outgrow i t s  p r im itiv e  
and t r ib a l  o r ig in , in  England the idea  of compensation associated with the 
o rig in  was fro zen . This phenomenon is  re fle c te d  in  the primacy a tta in ed  
by the law of to r t  in  England. The Indian process is  re fle c te d  in  the
C9
early  beginnings of the c la s s if ic a tio n  of disputes which did not correspond
to  c iv i l  and c rim in a l d iv is io n s  according to modern notions o f ju s t ic e .
Varadachariar re fe rs  to the c la s s if ic a tio n  of Gautama (c .600  B .C .) based
on covetousness ( Dhanamula) in  one case and in  the other case on desire
and anger ( Himsamula) and profers  the opinion th a t th is  re f le c ts  the Hindu
48outlook which lays more stress on duty aspect o f each s itu a t io n .
A p r io r i  we may conclude th a t the basic issue in  a l l  types of l i t ig a t io n ,
g e n era lly , in  ancient tim es, must have been -  whether a person has fa i le d
to  perform h is  duty and is  to be compelled to  do so and not whether a
person's r ig h t has been in fr in g e d  and he is  to havs a remedy. I t  is  t r i t e
to say th a t the general concept of ju s tic e  in  England is  founded on the
o ft-quoted  maxim -  ubi ius ib i  remedjem. V inograoff was th e re fo re
not wrong in  saying th a t development in  the d if fe re n t  branches of Aryan
49society was bound to proceed on divergent lin e s .
1.118 Dealing with the concept of c rim in a l ju s tic e  in  ancient In d ia ,
Lingat points out th a t the subject belonged not to the science of Pharma
50 - **but to A rtha . He r e lie s  on the au th o rity  of Yajnavalkya (c .100  A.D.)
who c a lls  i t  ra.j a-dh arm a (a lso  ca lled  prakim aka  in  other dharma sastras)
to  s ig n ify  the d is t in c t  aspect of the ro ya l au th o rity  which was concerned
with the po lice functions of the S ta te , He also re fe rs  to Manu who enjoins
the King to  '’root out the thorns" ( kantaka-sodhana) of h is  realm . Nanu is
quoted as saying -  "The King should take care to  render h im self harmless
of those subjects who are l ia b le  to compromise pub lic  order by th e ir
ac tio n . . ."  [emphasis added] Lingat also quotes Katayana to  suggest th a t
the class of crimes grouped under prakirnaka consisted of the King
51 remploying spies fo r  the purpose of taking preventive measures." [ emPhasi s
added]
1.119 Book IV in  K a u tily a 's  Arthasastra (c .300  B .C .) is  wholly devoted 
to the top ic  of kantaka-sodhana. Professor P .V. Kane observed th a t K au tilya
deals u ith  such a large number of offences th a t "his treatm ent compares
52favourably u ith  such modern c rim in a l codes as the Indian Penal Code."
The fa c t th a t offenders were brought up fo r  punishment by the King*s 
o ff ic e r s ,  says Kane, shows th a t "offences [were] not viewed as mere 
p riva te  m atters but a m atter in  which the State was concerned fo r  the  
erad ication  of crime in  g en era l."
1.120 I t  w i l l  be u sefu l to  note some of the s a lie n t fea tu res  of the
account given in  the A rthasastra . Varadachariar says th a t ,  "Some of the
provisions resemble the secu rity  sections of the Indian Code of C rim inal
53Procedure though the procedure contemplated is  not the same."
Examining the te x t we fin d  th a t in  Chapter IV o f Book IV , i t  is  stated  
t h a t :
There are th ir te e n  kinds of c rim in a ls  who secre tly  
attem pting to l iv e  by fo u l means destroy the peace 
of the country. They s h a ll be e ith e r  banished or 
made to pay an adequate compensation, according as 
the  g u ilt  is  l ig h t  or s e r io u s .^
I t  may be noted th a t in  e arly  English laws on vagrancy, which had some
elements in  common with Indian law, banishment was also one of the
prescribed punishments. Other provisions of the chapter in d ica te  th a t they
were applied to s ta te  o f f ic ia ls  also and th e ir  honesty was tested  by
employing spies and other methods.
1.121 Another sa lu tary  provision d ire c ts  th a t three days a fte r  the
commission of a crime no suspected person s h a ll be arrested  unless there is
55strong evidence to bring  home the charge. No doubt, th is  is  apparently
meant to counterpoise the provision o f to rtu re  to which end some other
provisions are also d irec ted : thus " fa ls e  prosecution" is  made an
offence and production of conclusive evidence is  in s is te d  upon "to exclude
cases of acc identa l presence at the scene of th e f t ,  acc identa l resemblance
55to the th ie f ,  acc identa l presence near the stolen a r t ic le " ;  i t  was 
considered th a t such c ircu m stan tia l evidence may lead to to rtu re  which 
in  turn may lead to confession.
1.122 In M edhatith i*s  commentary on Manu c ited  by Professor U .N .
Ghoshal we fin d  a glimmer of approval of the r ig h t  of p riva te  defence 
extending to preservation of one*s own property and also the " in te re s t of 
others":
The King cannot s tre tch  h is  arms to reach every in d iv id u a l.
There are some wicked persons who obstruct even the ro ya l 
o ff ic e rs  [who are] very valorous and in te n t upon [th e
discharge o f ]  th e ir  d u tie s . But one always fea rs  a person
wearing weapons. Hence using weapons on a l l  occasions 
is  ju s t i f ie d .
1.123 Uhat kind of law-enforcement machinery existed  in  ancient In d ia  ?
Ue may now examine th is  b r ie f ly  to  complete the p ic tu re  of the adm in istration
of crim ina l ju s t ic e . According to  V/aradachariar only a stray reference
58here and there is  found in  the Dharmasastras about the po lice  system.
A te x t of Apastamba (c .450  B .C .) requ ires  a ru le r  to  appoint "pure and 
t ru th fu l"  men of three castes fo r  p ro tection  of the people in  the v illa g e s  
and towns. In Book I I ,  chapter I  of the work, i t  is  provided th a t "the
in te r io r  o f the kingdom s h a ll be watched by trap -keepers , archers, hunters,
chandala and w ild  trib es .11 At the end of Chapter VI o f Book IV i t  is
59 60stated th a t "a Commissioner with h is  re tinue  of Gopas and 5thanikas
s h a ll take steps to fin d  out the e x te rn a l th ieves and the o f f ic e r  in
charge o f a c ity  s h a ll t ry  to detect in te rn a l th ieves ins ide  f o r t i f ie d
towns." More ancient and hallowed a u th o rity , the Atharva Veda (c .1000 B .C .)
is  quoted by D r. R.B. Pal to  show th a t offenders were (most probably)
brought under a rres t by p o lice  o ff ic e rs  before a m agistrate where t r i a l
61took place by o rd ea l.
1.124 On the other hand A ltekar s ta tes  th a t the v il la g e  headman
( Grpmin) was in  charge of the lo c a l p o lice  duty which comprised watch and
ward attended to by watchmen; between 300 B.C. and 1300 A.D. there was
also a cen tra l po lice  o rg a n iza tio n . During the time of the Maurayan, and
also of the other and la te r  Kings, po lice  and detective  o ff ic e rs  were
6 2employed to a rres t and chastise robbers and desperate characters.
I fw
1.125 Dr. S.K. Aiyangar gives an account which is  at once composite,
compact and concise: "The v il la g e  assembly had the re s p o n s ib ility  of
track in g  down crim e. They had th e ir  own v il la g e  o ff ic e rs  whose specia l
duty i t  was; when crim inals  were traced they were brought before the
6 3assembly fo r  punishment. . . ” Although th is  account professedly  
re la te s  to southern In d ia  we know th a t Aryan penetration in to  the south 
took place as e a rly  as 600 B .C.
1.126 D r. Dohn M a tth a i, in  g iv ing  a p ic tu re  of the system of watch 
and ward o f the seventeenth and eighteenth cen tu ries , says th a t:  ’’There
is  evidence th a t th is  p ractice  of employing men p r iv a te ly  fo r  po lice  purpose 
goes back to ancient times -  the A rthasastra mentions w ild  tr ib e s
[aranyacharas] among those who may be used to p ro tec t the in te r io r  of the
kingdom
( c) janjcient _I_n_di_an_tj2eo>r i -e_s of State and the Law
1.127 Ue have so fa r  d ea lt with merely the in s t i tu t io n a l  s tructu re
but not the ancient Indo-Aryan th eo ries  of State and the law. Indeed, a
d e ta ile d  discussion of the complex th eo ries  is  beyond the scope of th is
study. Ule have had, however, occasion to re fe r  e a r l ie r  to  the celebrated
ancient p o l i t ic a l  th inkers  such as flanu, Brhaspati and K a u tily a . But, as
Dr. B .A. S altore  points out, between Manu, the law g iver, whom he places
between c irc a  1900-1800 B .C ., and K a u tily a , the celebrated Nauryan Prime
M in is te r , who is  said to have liv e d  in  the fourth  century B .C ., a number
65of other eminent p o l i t ic a l  philosophers flo u ris h e d . According to
Professor U .N . Ghoshal the Hindu p o l i t ic a l  th eo ries  developed in  the
Dharmasutras are usually  assigned to the period from the s ix th  or seventh
to the th ird  or fourth  centuries B .C .^  In h is  A rthasastra K a u tily a  re fe rs
67to  h is  predecessors but i t  must be remembered th a t the great masters were 
exponents of d if fe re n t  schools of p o l i t ic a l  thought. However, in  these 
discussions we propose to  in d ica te  in  b r ie f  o u tlin e  only the dominant ideas  
of the ancient Indian p o l i t ic a l  thought. I t  is  im portant however to take
notice of the fa c t th a t ,  as Professor Ghoshal points out, w hile the 
Dharmasutras are the product of the  "Vedic th eo lo g ica l schools and are 
in sp ired  by the canonical t r a d it io n " ,  in  the Arthasastra we f in d  the
"Art o f Government in  the widest sense of the  term" d ea lt w ith in  a manner
68which is  marked by a " fe a rle s s  freedom of thought". Indeed, K a u tilya
was, in  a sense, the true  precursor of the Western philosopher
M a c h ia v e lli:  both be lieved  in  v io lence and were equally  c r i t ic a l  of
69th is  aspect of the A ris to te lean  concept o f S ta te .
1.128 The most popular Hindu concept of State is  founded on
matsya nyaya -  the ru le  of the fis h  (th e  big ones eating  up the sm aller) -
70to be found in  the Manusmrti. The State i s ,  as Panikkar exp la ins, the
ru le , the outcome of the desire of man fo r  s e c u rity , fo r  a s o c ia l order
in  which he can l iv e  and enjoy the f r u i t s  of h is  own labour, which
71postu la ted , a p r io r i , n a tu ra l e q u a lity  of man. Proceeding fu rth e r
he observes th a t State represented force both e x te rn a lly  and in te rn a lly
and th a t the Hindu th in kers  re lie d  on the dualism between dharma
(law  or duty) and artha (means of subsistence) to  evolve a purely secular
72theory of State of which the sole basis is  power. According to
Pannikkar, "the conception o f the s ta te  in  In d ia  was not one based on
la is s e z  fa ir e  or the mere maintenance of law and o rder, but one o f d ire c t
7 3a c t iv ity  to fu rth e r  progress."
1.129 According to D r. S a lto re , "The ancient Indian S ta te , even as
described by K a u tily a , did not dare to transgress the l im its  imposed
upon i t  by the dharmasastras and the n i t is a s t r a s ."  He proceeds to  add
th a t ,  "State action in  ancient In d ia  was circumscribed by ancient usage
of the land" and t r ie s  to d is tin g u ish  i t  from the modern s ta te  which, he
r ig h t ly  points out, "imposes i t s  w i l l "  on both the Common Law and the  
74in d iv id u a l. Another p e rtin e n t observation made by S alto re  on another
75comparative aspect deserves to  be quoted:
I f  toe consider the t o t a l i t y  of ancient p o l i t ic a l  
thought, Eastern and Western, in  the fourth  century, 
we may say th a t K a u tily a  began where A r is to tle  ended, 
and completed the h is to ry  of ancient governments by 
adding the descrip tion  of the im p eria l s ta te . . .
I t  may be remembered th a t although the two philosophers were contemporaries
K a u tilya  was the Prime M in is te r  of the great Mauryan Empire whereas
A r is to t le ’ s concept was lim ite d  by h is  experience o f l i f e  in  the
European c ity  s t a te s .^
1.130 The broad concept of law in  the early  Aryan society can be 
gathered from D r. N.C. Sengupta's observation th a t, "Law was in v a ria b ly  
looked upon.as founded on the twin roots of re lig io n  and agreement of
men learned in  sacred lo re '1. This vesting  of au th o rity  in  the ’’assembly", 
according to Dr. Sengupta, d is tingu ishes the p o lity  of the Aryans from 
those of the Semites but in  the Aryan parish ad he fin d s  the p a r a l le l
of the Witans of the Saxons, the Druids o f B r ita in  and the P o n tiffs  of
D 77 Rome.
1.131 However, i t  must be admitted th a t i t  was the o verrid in g  concept o f 
dharma th a t embraced law but the term dh arm a has defied  many attempts at a 
s a tis fa c to ry  d e f in it io n . Indeed, a reputed Western In d o lo g is t, Professor
F. K ie lh o rn , has observed: ”1 f in d  no English word by which I  can fu l ly
express a l l  the meanings of the Sanskrit dharma. ” This view , as has been
7pointed out by S ale to re , is  shared by the reputed Indian scholar, Dr. Kane.
N evertheless, Saletore quotes another Indian scholar, Professor Aiyangar,
to exp la in  the s ig n ifican ce  of the term. According to Professor Aiyangar
’’dharma may connotB such d if fe re n t  things as law proper, v ir tu e , r e lig io n ,
duty, p ie ty , ju s t ic e , innate  property and q u a lity  and th a t i t  was in  th is
general sense th a t i t  was used in  the ancient times when i t  was maintained
79by the lawgivers th a t the State had to m aintain dharma.” This d e fin it io n  
of the term dharma o ffe rs  a p lau s ib le  explanation of the well-known fa c t  
th a t i t  was the concept o f ’’duty” ra th e r than of ’’r ig h ts ” th a t formed the  
basis of Indian jurisprudence.
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1.132 I t  is  necessary however, to re fe r  to  an equally  important
concept of dag da of Indo-Aryan p o l i t ic a l  philosophy. Although the l i t e r a l
meaning of the term was a s ta f f  or a weapon, in course o f tim e, as Saletore
observes, i t  came to be id e n t if ie d  with the science of government as
-  80s ig n if ie d  more p a r t ic u la r ly  by the term d a n d a n iti. Scholars disagree on
the re la t iv e  importance of dharmasastra and d andan iti; Saletore notes th is
but he also deals with the inconclusive debate on the question of whether
81the la t t e r  evolved from the form er. He quotes the statement in  Manusmyti
th a t "the wise declare punishment to be id e n t ic a l with law" to say th a t
82the two were c o -e x is te n t. We support th is  view and add th a t the two 
were complementary in  the sense th a t dagda im plied sanctions as understood 
in modern jurisprudence and Manu considered sanctions as an im portant 
in g red ien t of p o s itive  law.
( C) The Indian society and adm in is tra tion  of ju s tic e  
under Mughal ru le
1.133 I t  is  true th a t the Indo-Aryan p o l i t ic a l  thoughts had no place 
in Is lam ic  jurisprudence yet i t  must be remembered th a t the Mughal ru le rs  
considered In d ia  as th e ir  home and ru led  the country as Indian sovereigns. 
Indeed, Akbar the Great had made a serious attempt to synthesize
Hindu and Is lam ic  c u ltu res . However, we have already brought s u ff ic ie n t  
evidence to l ig h t  to show th a t the people were a ffec ted  most s u p e r f ic ia lly  
by the successive conquests. D r. R.K. M ookerji c a te g o ric a lly  s ta tes  
th a t the a lien  ru le rs  took possession of the p o l i t ic a l  c a p ita ls  only and
83th a t even during the Mohammedan ru le  "the so c ia l l i f e  remained untouched." 
A ltekar quotes S ir Dadunath Sarkar to  t e l l  us th a t v il la g e  communities 
during th is  period enjoyed paroch ia l self-governm ent ra th e r than lo c a l 
autonomy and th a t although the v il la g e  council disappeared from western 
In d ia , the headman continued to be a man of the people and not an o f f ic e r  
of the c en tra l government and th a t he continued to manage the a f fa ir s  of the
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v i l l a g e  by h o ld in g  in f o r m a l  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  w i th  th e  v i l l a g e  e ld e r s .
1 .134  Ue may now r e f e r  to  the  comprehensive account o f  S i r  3adunath
85S a rka r  h i m s e l f .  He t e l l s  us t h a t  th e re  were Q azis  ( ju d g e s )  o n ly  i n  
the  p r o v i n c i a l  c a p i t a l s ,  la rg e  towns and s e a ts  o f  F o u jd a rs  ( d i s t r i c t  
h e a d s ) . At o th e r  p la c e s  d is p u te s  were s e t t l e d  l o c a l l y  by th e  panchavat 
and s a l i s , w h ich ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  h im , were th e  cas te  c o u r ts  and l o c a l  j u r i e s  
in  th e  fo rm e r  case and i m p a r t i a l  u m p ire ,  i n  th e  l a t t e r  case , tile are 
a lso  t o l d  t h a t  th e  Q a z i f s p a r t  was t h a t  o f  a j u r y ,  t o  g iv e  th e  v e r d i c t ;  
the  f l u f t i  expounded th e  la w .  B u t we ough t to  know t h a t  by h i s  te rm s  o f  
appo in tm en t th e  Qazi was f o r m a l l y  th e  ju d g e .  S a rka r  quo tes  B e r n ie r ,  sa y in g
t h a t  th e  l o c a l  G overnor was je a lo u s  o f  th e  Q a z i1s power and d id  n o t
86s u f f i c i e n t l y  su p p o r t  h im .
1 .135  Emperor Aurangzeb in t r o d u c e d  the  most comprehensive re fo rm s  in  
th e  a d m in is t r a t i o n  o f  j u s t i c e .  He caused a d ig e s te d  code o f  I s la m ic  
case - law  t o  be com p iled  which cane to  be known as F u t w a - i - A l a m q i r i .
I t  was meant to  check th e  c a p r i c io u s  and a r b i t r a r y  d is p e n s a t io n  o f
j u s t i c e  by th e  Q a z is . L a te r  i n  1672, he is s u e d  a farman ( r o y a l  w r i t )
c o n ta in in g  h i s  Penal Code i n  a n u t s h e l l .  I t  p ro v id e s ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,  i n
c lause  32, f o r  " i n q u i r y  w i th  a l l  d i l i g e n c e ”  by th e  Subahdar ( P r o v i n c i a l
Head) i n t o  th e  cases o f  c a p t iv e s  se n t  up by th e  F o u jd a r ,  " im m e d ia te ly  on
a r r i v a l . "  I t  a lso  e n jo in s  him t o  in q u i r e  i n t o  th e  cases o f  the  p r is o n e r s
in  " k a c h a r i  and p o l i c e  c h a b u t ra "  (C o u r t  and P o l ic e  S t a t i o n ) ,  t o  re le a s e
87th e  in n o c e n t  and to  a rrange  q u ic k  t r i a l  o f  o t h e r s .  S a rka r  a ls o  quo tes
88M ir a t - i - A h m a d i , which c o n ta in s  th e  f o l l o w in g  s a lu t a r y  p r o v i s i o n :
When a man i s  b ro u g h t  t o  th e  C habu tra  o f  K o tw a l  under 
a r r e s t  by th e  K o t w a ^ s man o r  revenue c o l l e c t o r  on an 
a c c u s a t io n  by a p r i v a t e  c o m p la in a n t ,  th e  K o tw a l  shou ld  
p e r s o n a l l y  i n v e s t i g a t e  th e  charges a g a in s t  h im . . . I f  
a Qazi sends a man f o r  d e te n t io n  ta k e  Qazi *s o rd e r  f o r  
y o u r  a u t h o r i t y .  . . I f  the  Qazi f i x e s  a da te  f o r  h i s  
t r i a l ,  send th e  p r i s o n e r  t o  th e  a d a la t  on t h a t  d a te ;  
o th e rw is e  send him th e re  eve ry  day so t h a t  h i s  case 
may be dec ided  q u i c k l y .
1°* rp
1.136 The above p i c t u r e  c a p tu re s  th e  contem porary  v ie w  o f  th e
a d m in is t r a t i o n  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  government which had m o s t ly  p e r ip h e r a l
a u t h o r i t y .  D r .  A .B . Pandey i n  h i s  S o c ie ty  end Government i n  M ed iaeva l
I n d ia  fo c u s e s  l i g h t  on the  h e a r t  o f  th e  c o u n try  t o  show us t h a t  "Government
o f f i c e r s  u s u a l l y  d id  n o t  come i n  any c lo s e  c o n ta c t  w i th  v i l l a g e  f o l k "
and t h a t  " th e y  o n ly  r e a l i s e d  th e  t a x  and l e f t  th e  peop le  f r e e  t o  manage
89t h e i r  a f f a i r s  th rough  p a n c h a v a ts . "  M.B. Ahmad i n  A d m in is t r a t io n  o f  J u s t i c e
i n  M e d ia e va l I n d ia  a lso  l i s t s  th e  panchayat as th e  o n ly  c o u r t  a t  th e
v i l l a g e  l e v e l  ( p r e s id e d  o ve r  by headman o f  t h e  v i l l a g e )  among th e
d i f f e r e n t  g rades o f  c o u r ts  t h a t  fu n c t io n e d  a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  unde r Mughal 
go
r u l e .  He a s s e r ts  t h a t ,  ’T h e  a d m in is t r a t i o n  o f  j u s t i c e  i n  the  v i l l a g e s
was, as was th e  t r a d i t i o n  from  a n c ie n t  t im e s ,  l e f t  i n  th e  hands o f  the
91v i l l a g e  c o u n c i ls  (panchay a t s ) . "  The p o l i c e  o u tp o s ts  e s ta b l i s h e d  as a
p r e v e n t iv e  measure a g a in s t  t h e f t ,  d a c o i t y  and murder a t  co n v e n ie n t  c e n t re s
were i n s t r u c t e d  to  m o b i l i s e  l o c a l  s u p p o r t  i n  apprehend ing  and ro u n d in g  up
th ie v e s  and d a c o i t s .  A c c o rd in g  to  Ahmad every  Muslim  co u ld  a r r e s t  a
person who had com m itted a " c o g n iz a b le  c r im e "  ( Hadd, T a 1z i r )  in  h i s  s ig h t
92and t h a t  b a i l  o r  s e c u r i t y  was d is c o u ra g e d .  I t  i s  easy t h e r e fo r e  t o
surm ise t h a t  such o u tp o s ts  were few  and f a r  between and n o t  p r o p e r ly
equ ipped e i t h e r .  D r .  Pandey however, c r e d i t s  th e  Mughal r u l e r s  o f
I n d ia  w i th  "k e e p in g  b e fo re  them se lves  th e  i d e a l  o f  making due p r o v is io n
f o r  j u s t i c e "  and e s p e c ia l l y  commends th e  e f f o r t s  o f  Akba r  and Aurangzeb
f o r  t a k in g  s p e c ia l  care  " t o  keep th e  j u d i c i a r y  h o n e s t ,  e f f i c i e n t ,  j u s t
and i n d u s t r i o u s . "  The Mughal em perors, he adds, d id  n o t  p e rm i t  th e
93judges  to  impose the  death p e n a l ty  w i t h o u t  t h e i r  c o n cu rre n c e .
1.137 S i r  Dames F i tz ja m e s  S tephen, i n  g i v in g  a g e n e ra l  account o f
a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  c r im i n a l  j u s t i c e  d u r in g  the  Mughal p e r io d ,  d e s c r ib e s  the
Nawsb Nazim and h i s  deputy  as m a g is t r a te s ,  th e  F o u jd a r  as th e  o f f i c e r  o f
th e  p o l i c e  and judge  o f  m in o r  c r im e s ,  and th e  K o tw a l  was th e  peace o f f i c e r  
94o f  the  n i g h t .  These o f f i c e r s ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  h im , fo rm ed th e  p i v o t  o f
the m ach ine ry  o f  j u s t i c e  i n  the  c a p i t a l .  In  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  c o u n t r y ,  he 
adds, th e  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  j u s t i c e ,  bo th  c i v i l  and c r i m i n a l ,  was i n  th e  
hands o f  th e  Zamindsr who, i t  i s  s a id ,  i n f l i c t e d  a l l  s o r t s  o f  pun ishm ents  
b u t  c h i e f l y  f i n e s  f o r  h i s  own b e n e f i t .  T h is  acco u n t ,  i t  i s  s u b m it te d ,  i s  
to o  g e n e ra l  and i s  perhaps more t y p i c a l  o f  B enga l subah than  any o th e r  
p lace  and t h a t  to o  o f  a l a t e  p e r io d ,  uihen the Mughal r u l e  was i n  i t s  
decadence and the  Subah had become v i r t u a l l y  independen t o f  th e  Empire 
i n  1713.
1 .138 I t  i s  s u b m it te d  t h a t  Stephen appears t o  m in im is e  the r o l e  o f  the  
v i l l a g e  c o u r ts  to  th e  p o in t  o f  t o t a l  e x t i n c t i o n ,  f o r  which th e re  i s  no 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  B es ides  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  c i t e d  above, th e  i n t r i n s i c  ev idence 
a lso  s u p p o r ts  the  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  a m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  peop le  were com pe lled  
t o  r e s o r t  t o  Hcaste  pancha ya t”  f o r  th e  im p o r ta n t  and o b v io u s  reasons t h a t  
Mohammedan Law d id  n o t  adm it th e  ev idence  o f  " i n f i d e l s ”  a g a in s t  " b e l i e v e r s "  
and a lso  p la ce d  g re a t  r e l ia n c e  on c o n fe s s io n s .
1.139 "The r o l e  o f  Z em inda r,"  says O r. N. Majumder, "has been th e  s u b je c t
95o f  some c o n t r o v e r s y . "  She quo tes  Warren H a s t in g s  who says " I  v e n tu re
to  pronounce w i th  co n f id e n ce  t h a t  by t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  Benga l th e
Zemindar n e i t h e r  p re s id e d  i n  th e  c r im in a l  c o u r t  o f  h i s  d i s t r i c t  n o r
96execu ted  sen tence s . . . "  Her own c o n c lu s io n  however i s  t h a t ,
"W hatever m ig h t  have been the  d e f i n i t e  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  Zemindar . . .
[ t h e y  w e re ] de f a c t o  d is p e n s e rs  o f  c i v i l  and c r im in a l  j u s t i c e  on th e
97d i s r u p t i o n  o f  th e  Mughal G ove rnm en t."
1 .140  Both  O r.  Majumdar and O r. B .N . Pandey use th e  same language to
say e m p h a t ic a l ly  t h a t  " j u s t i c e  and th e  p o l i c e  were two weak p o in t s  i n  the  
98Mughal s y s te m ."  The s ta te m e n t ,  we s u b m it ,  i s  n o t  a c c u ra te  i n  so f a r  
as a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  j u s t i c e  i s  concerned . F o r ,  a l th o u g h  th e re  was an 
e lement o f  a r b i t r a r i n e s s  in  the  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  c r im in a l  j u s t i c e ,  i t  
was m a in ly  due to  the  p e c u l i a r  t h e o r ie s  o f  peno logy (such as emphasis
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on d e te r r e n t  m easures, e . g .  m u t i l a t i o n  o f  l im b s )  and o f  th e  r u l e  o f
e v id e n ce  (such as emphasis on c o n fe s s io n  and on e x c lu s io n  o f  ev idence
99o f  non -M us lim s) o f  th e  I s la m ic  J u r is p ru d e n c e .  On th e  o th e r  hand, the  
comment on the  p o l i c e  system i s  in d e e d  j u s t i f i e d  as Ahmad a ls o  sha res  th e  
same v i e w . ^ ^  H ouever, he adds t h a t  sometimes "dangerous p e rs o n s "
101were e i t h e r  se n t  t o  p r is o n  o r  were c a l l e d  upon t o  execute  "b o n d s " .
(D) The aims and a t t i t u d e s  o f  modern In d ia n  p o l i t i c a l  le a d e rs
1.141 The m a jo rity  of the fro n t rank Indian p o l i t ic a l  leaders uho
fo rm ed  th e  vanguard o f  t h e  s t r u g g le  f o r  independence re c e iv e d  h ig h e r
e d u c a t io n  i n  England and were l a s e r s  by t r a i n i n g ,  l i k e  G andh i,  Nehru and
102P a t e l ,  t o  name o n ly  a fe w . B u t  th e re  was a g re a t  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e i r
aims and a t t i t u d e s .  Gandhi was a t r a d i t i o n a l i s t  w h i le  Nehru had a modern
103W estern o u t lo o k .  Gandhi observed  as f o l l o w s :
My id e a  o f  v i l l a g e  swara.i i s  t h a t  i t  i s  a com ple te  r e p u b l i c ,  
in depe nden t o f  i t s  n e ig h b o u rs  f o r  i t s  v i t a l  w an ts , and y e t  
in te r - d e p e n d e n t  f o r  many o th e r s  i n  which dependence i s  a 
n e c e s s i t y .  . . The v i l l a g e  w i l l  m a in ta in  a v i l l a g e  t h e a t r e ,  
s c h o o l  and p u b l i c  h a l l .  I t  w i l l  have i t s  own w a te rw o rk s .  . . 
E duca t ion  w i l l  be com pu lsory  up t o  th e  f i n a l  b a s ic  co u rse .
As f a r  as p o s s ib le  every  a c t i v i t y  w i l l  be conducted on a co­
o p e r a t iv e  b a s is .  There  w i l l  be no ca s te s  such as we have 
today  w i th  t h e i r  graded u n t o u c h a b i l i t y . N o n -v io le n c e  w i th  
i t s  te c h n iq u e  o f  s a ty a q ra h a  and n o n -c o o p e ra t io n  w i l l  be th e  
s a n c t io n  o f  th e  v i l l a g e  com munity . There  w i l l  be a com pulsory 
s e r v ic e  o f  v i l l a g e  guards  who w i l l  be s e le c te d  by r o t a t i o n  
from  th e  r e g i s t e r  m a in ta in e d  by th e  v i l l a g e .  The government o f  
th e  v i l l a g e  w i l l  be conducted  by th e  Panchavat o f  f i v e  p e rso n s ,  
a n n u a l ly  e le c te d  by th e  a d u l t  v i l l a g e r s ,  male and fe m a le ,  
po sse ss in g  minimum p r e s c r ib e d  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  These w i l l  
have a l l  a u t h o r i t y  and j u r i s d i c t i o n  r e q u i r e d .  S ince th e re  
w i l l  be no system o f  pun ishm en ts  i n  th e  accepted  sense, t h i s  
P anch ay a t w i l l  be th e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  j u d i c i a r y  and e x e c u t iv e  
combined. . .
Ind e e d ,  t h e  te c h n iq u e  o f  n o n - v io le n t  n o n -c o o p e ra t io n  movement was t r i e d  
w i th  some success by Gandhi f i r s t  i n  South A f r i c a ( a g a in s t  a p a r th e id ^w h e re  
he had s t a r t e d  h i s  l e g a l  p r a c t i c e .  L a te r ,  when he came to  I n d ia  and became 
th e  le a d in g  f i g u r e  i n  In d ia n  p o l i t i c s  the  In d ia n  N a t io n a l  C ongress, which 
spearheaded th e  freedom movement, adopted G a n d h i 's  te c h n iq u e  which had
earned him w o r ld w id e  a c c la im .  The A f r ic a n  le a d e rs  l i k e  Nyere re  and Kaunda
104were a ls o  g r e a t l y  i n f lu e n c e d  by G andh i.  B u t  we f i n d  t h a t  Gandhi
co n te m p la te d  a system o f  government which conformed s o le l y  t o  th e
t r a d i t i o n a l  p a t t e r n .  H is  denouncement o f  th e  cas te  system and
u n t o u c h a b i l i t y  was, however, s i n g u l a r l y  modern i n  approach .
1 .142  Nehru, on th e  o th e r  hand, was an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t .  He d id  n o t
s u b s c r ib e  to  G a n d h i 's  v ie w  t h a t  im m o b i l i t y  was a v i r t u e .  Gandhi d e p lo re d
th e  f a l l  o f  su c ce s s iv e  Western c i v i l i s a t i o n s  and observed  t h a t  " I n d i a
105rem a ins  immovable and t h a t  i s  h e r  g l o r y . "  Nehru , on th e  o th e r  hand,
d e p lo re d  th e  " c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  i n  B r i t i s h  r u l e "  b u t  e x t o l l e d  th e  v i r t u e s  o f
106Western dynamism. Nehru s a id :
The im pac t o f  wes te rn  c u l t u r e  on I n d i a  was th e  im pac t o f  a 
dynamic s o c ie t y ,  o f  a 'modern* c o nsc iousn ess , on a s t a t i c  
s o c ie t y  wedded to  m e d ie v a l  h a b i t s  o f  th o u g h t  w h ich ,  however 
s o p h is t i c a te d  and advanced i n  i t s  own way, c o u ld  no t  p ro g re s s  
because o f  i t s  i n h e r e n t  l i m i t a t i o n s .  And y e t ,  c u r io u s ly  
enough, t h e  agents  o f  t h i s  h i s t o r i c  p rocess  were no t  o n ly  
w h o l ly  u n consc io us  o f  t h e i r  m is s io n  i n  I n d ia  b u t ,  as a 
c la s s ,  re p re s e n te d  no such p ro c e s s .  . . I f  change ceme i t  
was in  s p i t e  o f  them o r  as an i n c i d e n t a l  o r  unexpected
consequence o f  t h e i r  o th e r  a c t i v i t i e s .  . . They succeeded
in  s lo w in g  down th e  pace o f  t h a t  change to  such an e x te n t
t h a t  even today  th e  t r a n s i t i o n  i s  v e ry  f a r  from com p le te .
Nehru was c r i t i c a l  o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  approach and o f  th e  tendency o f
In d ia n  s o c ie t y  to  " c l i n g "  to  what i t  co n s id e re d  as i t s  s u p e r io r
" p h i l o s o p h i c a l  b a c k g ro u n d " .  He r e a l i s e d  t h a t  th e  " im p a c t  and in f l u e n c e
o f  th e  West were on th e  p r a c t i c a l  s id e  o f  l i f e  which was o b v io u s ly
107s u p e r io r  t o  th e  E a s te rn "  and wanted these  t o  s t a y .  He ana lysed  th e
M arx ian  p h i lo s o p h y  and d e c la re d  t h a t  he "a cce p te d  th e  fundam en ta ls  o f  th e
s o c i a l i s t  t h e o r y "  a l th o u g h  he d id  n o t  l i k e  t o  t r o u b le  h im s e l f  "abou t i t s
108numerous in n e r  c o n t r o v e r s ie s .  He was moved by th e  " s c i e n t i f i c  s p i r i t
t h a t  has been a t  the  back o f  Western c i v i l i s a t i o n  f o r  the  p a s t  150 y e a rs
109o r  s o . "  Indeed , P re s id e n t  Radhakrishnan r i g h t l y  d e s c r ib e d  Nehru as
"a  maker o f  modern I n d i a ,  who t r i e d  t o  p u t  I n d ia  on a p ro g r e s s iv e ,
110s c i e n t i f i c ,  dynamic and non-communal b a s i s " .  Nehru spoke p a r t i c u l a r l y  
o f  " s o c i a l i s t  p a t t e r n s  o f  s o c ie t y "  f o r  I n d i a  w i th  a "d e m o c ra t ic  a p p a ra tu s "
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o f  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  democracy and an indepe nden t s e l f - d e v e lo p in g  economy w i th
111a s t ro n g  p u b l i c  s e c t o r "  f o r  heavy i n d u s t r i e s .
1 .143  E v e n tu a l l y ,  when f r e e  I n d i a ' s  r e p u b l ic a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  was
fram ed N e h ru 's  v ie w s  p r e v a i l e d .  Gandhi was dead b u t  h i s  v ie w s  were
f o r c e f u l l y  p ro je c te d  by R a jend ra  Prasad who advocated ( a l b e i t
u n s u c c e s s fu l l y )  th e  id e a  t h a t  " v i l l a g e  r e p u b l i c s "  ough t to  fo rm  th e
112b a s is  o f  th e  new C o n s t i t u t i o n .  In deed , th e  " c o n s t i t u t i o n - m a k in g "
p rocess  preceded Independence and at each e a r l i e r  s tage  th e  penchayat
had r e t a in e d  a s t ro n g  a p p e a l.  I n  the"Commonwealth o f  I n d ia  B i l l "  which
was d r a f t e d  in  1925 by a c o n v e n t io n  o f  members and ex-members o f  the
In d ia n  l e g i s l a t u r e s  (w h ich  was p re s id e d  o v e r  by S i r  T e j  Bahadur Sapru,
a fo rm e r  Law Member o f  th e  Government o f  I n d i a ) ,  c la u se  37 p ro v id e d  t h a t  the
v i l l a g e  s h o u ld  be one o f  th e  u n i t s  o f  government and t h a t  each v i l l a g e
shou ld  have a panchayat w i th  powers t o  " a d m in is te r  a l l  v i l l a g e  a f f a i r s " .
The B i l l  was in t r o d u c e d  i n  th e  House o f  Commons i n  December 1925 and was
o rd e re d  to  be p u b l is h e d  b u t  w i th  the f a l l  o f  th e  Labour Government i t s  
113f a t e  was s e a le d .  E a r l i e r ,  i n  G o k h a le 's  " P o l i t i c a l  T es tam en t"  is s u e d
in  1914 a demand was v o ic e d  f o r  e x te n s io n  o f  l o c a l  s e l f -g o v e rn m e n t  w i th  the
114" v i l l a g e  p sn ch a y a t"  as i t s  e p i - c e n t r e .  B e fo re  t h a t ,  B a l  Gangadhar T i l a k ' s
" C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  I n d i a  B i l l "  o f  1B95 p ro v id e d  f o r  " v i l l a g e  g ro u p s "  as one
115o f  the  f o u r  u n i t s  o f  th e  P ro v in c e s .
1 .144  In  th e  R epub l ica n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  enac ted  in  1949 a p r o v is io n  was
116e v e n tu a l l y  made w i th o u t  com prom is ing w i th  th e  id e a  o f  a modern fram ew ork .
In  A r t .  40 o f  P a r t  IV ,  which p ro v id e s  f o r  t h e  " D i r e c t i v e  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  
S ta te  P o l i c y "  (an id e a  borrow ed from  I r e l a n d ' s  R epub lican  C o n s t i t u t i o n ) ,  i t  i s  
s ta te d  t h a t :
The S ta te  s h a l l  t a k e  s te p s  to  o rg a n iz e  v i l l a g e  panchava ts  
and endow them w i th  such powers and a u t h o r i t y  as may be 
necessa ry  t o  e n a b le  them to  f u n c t io n  as u n i t s  o f  s e l f -  
governm ent.
P u rsuan t to  t h i s  p r o v i s io n  th e  S ta te  l e g i s l a t u r e s  have enac ted  laws in
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each s ta te  t o  se t  up v i l l a g e  panchav a t s . But th e  g e n e r a l l y  accepted  v ie w
about these  new i n s t i t u t i o n s  has been most a p p r o p r ia t e ly  exp ressed  by a
le a rn e d  commentator who obse rves  t h a t ,  "Under t h e  new Panchayat Raj
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  new P an ch ay a t s are a s t a t u t o r y  c r e a t io n ,  b u t  t h e i r  fo rm  and
s t r u c t u r e  are n o t  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  v i l l a g e  c o u n c i l s
117and th e y  e x i s t  o n ly  i n  name b u t  n o t  i n  u s e . "  A p p a re n t ly  t h e  approach
o f  th e  new r u l e r s  o f  f r e e  I n d ia  to  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  i s  n o t
much d i f f e r e n t  from  t h a t  o f  the  c o l o n i a l  m a s te rs ,  d e s p i te  th e  d i f f e r e n c e
i n  the  r e s p e c t iv e  m o t i v a t i o n .  The Chairman o f  th e  D r a f t i n g  Committee o f
th e  C o n s t i t u e n t  Assembly had r i g h t l y  observed  t h a t  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l
118i n s t i t u t i o n  s u rv iv e d  on a " lo w  and s e l f i s h  l e v e l "  b u t  no e f f o r t  appears 
t o  have been made to  r i d  them o f  cas te  p r e ju d ic e  and o th e r  s i m i l a r  v ic e s
as a r e s u l t  o f  which the  new i n s t i t u t i o n s  have f a i l e d  t o  f u l f i l  t h e i r
. 119r o l e .
1 .145  In  1907 the  R oya l Commission on D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  had recommended
c o n s t i t u t i o n  and development o f  v i l l a g e  panchava ts  by c o n f e r r in g
120j u r i s d i c t i o n  on them in  p e t t y  c i v i l  and c r im in a l  cases . T h is  was
121endorsed by th e  C i v i l  J u s t i c e  Committee o f  1924-25 bu t lo n g  b e fo re  t h a t
122G overnor E lp h in s to n e  had e s ta b l is h e d  panchaya ts  i n  Bombay i n  181B
and i n  1824 the  Madras Governor Munro had expressed  th e  v ie w  t h a t
c r im in a l  t r i a l s  c o u ld  be b e t t e r  conducted  a t  such c o u r ts  as f a c t s  cou ld
123be a s c e r ta in e d  th e re  i n  a b e t t e r  way. Indeed , such c o u r ts  d id  
f u n c t i o n  under th e  Madras V il lage  C o u r ts  Act 1888 and th e  U .P . V i l l a g e  
C o u r ts  Act 1892. G e n e r a l ly ,  these  v i l l a g e  c o u r ts  had j u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  t r y  
m in o r  o f fe n c e s  such as t h e f t ,  a s s a u l t  e t c .  w i th  power t o  i n f l i c t  pun ishm ent 
by f i n e ,  th e  maximum l i m i t  b e in g  Rs 50. The c o u r ts  c o u ld  o n ly  summon th e  
accused; th e y  had no power t o  is s u e  w a r ra n ts  f o r  t h e i r  a r r e s t .  The B r i t i s h  
e x p e r im e n t  o b v io u s ly  aimed a t  u s in g  these  i n s t i t u t i o n s  as la w - e n fo r c in g  
m ach ine ry  and n o t  as a measure f o r  " r u r a l  d e m o c r a t is a t io n "  which th e  new 
r u l e r s  hoped bu t f a i l e d  t o  ach ieve  on account o f  th e  a p a th e t i c  a t t i t u d e .
(2 )  Commonwealth A f r i c a
(A ) Sources o f  a n c ie n t  A f r i c a n  h i s t o r y
1 .146  B e la ted  b u t  i n t e n s iv e  and p a in s ta k in g  resea rch  has indeed
d i s p e l l e d  much o f  th e  da rkness  t h a t  su rrounded  the  "d a rk  c o n t in e n t "  i n
pa s t  c e n t u r ie s .  I t  has been found  t h a t  2000 c e n tu r ie s  ago th e  "ape man"
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appeared i n  Southern  and E as te rn  A f r i c a .  S t i l l ,  th e  s to r y  o f  t h e  r i s e
and f a l l  o f  th e  a n c ie n t  A f r i c a n  c i v i l i s a t i o n s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  th e  sub -
2Saharan r e g io n ,  has n o t  been t o l d  beyond a g e n e ra l  o u t l i n e .  C la im s are
3
l a i d  o f  c o n ta c ts  w i th  C h ina  d a t in g  back f o u r  thousand y e a rs  and, w i th  a
l i t t l e  more p r e c i s i o n ,  o f  t r a d e  c o n n e c t io n s  between I n d ia  and E as te rn  and
4
C e n t r a l  A f r i c a  which has been t r a c e d  back to  th e  e ig h th  c e n tu r y .
1 .147 The h i s t o r i a n ' s  dilemma i s  perhaps b e s t  expressed by Crowder.
He has observed  t h a t  th e  s t o r y  o f  N ig e r ia  goes back two thousand y e a rs  bu t
much o f  th e  e a r l i e r  h i s t o r y  i s  co n ta in e d  in  m yths and legends and t h a t
w r i t t e n  re c o rd s  b e fo re  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu ry  b e in g  s c a n ty ,  b o t a n i c a l  and
a r c h a e o lo g ic a l  ev idence  and o r a l  t r a d i t i o n  has to  be r e s o r te d  t o ;  the
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n o r th e r n  r e g io n ,  which had c o n ta c ts  w i th  the  Arabs was an e x c e p t io n .
H is  v ie w  i s  endorsed by K iwanuka who r i g h t l y  adds t h a t  the  re s e a rc h  i n  
A f r i c a  s t a r t e d  g a th e r in g  momentum o n ly  f i f t y  y e a rs  back when th e  
a n th r o p o lo g is t s ,  s o c i o l o g i s t s  and l i n g u i s t s  s tepped  i n t o  th e  f i e l d . ^
1 .148  I t  appears t h a t  t r a d e  c o n n e c t io n s  w i th  Europe had begun when th e
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French t r a d e r s  e s ta b l i s h e d  a f o r t  on th e  western  coas t i n  1383 b u t  i t
was n o t  u n t i l  1530 t h a t  a r e g u la r  t r a n s - A t l a n t i c  s la v e  t ra d e  had begun
when th e  Spanish government employed Portuguese m erchan ts  t o  t r a n s p o r t
s la v e s  to  work in  th e  p l a n t a t i o n s  and m ines i n  th e  Spanish p o sse ss io n s  in
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the C ar ibbean and South A m erica . However, i t  was o n ly  i n  th e  "sc ram b le  f o r
A f r i c a "  which was r e f l e c t e d  i n  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  con fe rence  i n  B e r l i n  in
1884-85 t h a t  we f i r s t  f i n d  th e  European n a t io n s  t h i n k in g  i n  te rm s o f
g
"conques t end p a r t i t i o n "  and o f  th e  " d u a l  mandate" -  " t o  make th e  t r a d e  
and re s o u rc e s  o f  A f r i c a  a v a i l a b le  to  th e  r e s t  o f  th e  w o r ld "  (pe rhaps  f o r
th e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e i r  own n a t io n s  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ) ;  and " t o  re p la c e  th e
s lave  t ra d e  by the  m o ra l and m a t e r i a l  b e n e f i t s  o f  th e  European c i v i l i s a t i o n . "
T h is  p a r t l y  e x p la in e d  the  b e la te d  re s e a rc h ,
1 .149 In  o u r  s tudy  we are p r i m a r i l y  concerned w i th  such id e a s  and
i n s t i t u t i o n s  as are r e le v a n t  t o  th e  theme o f  p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y  i n  the
a n c ie n t  s o c i e t i e s  and p o l i t i e s  o f  anglophone A f r i c a ,  w i th  the  o b je c t  o f
t r a c i n g  i t s  r o l e  i n  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  ju r is p r u d e n c e  and l e g a l  sys tem . In  the
case o f  I n d ia ,  as i n  Eng land , the  s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and l e g a l  h i s t o r y  o f
th e  a n c ie n t  p e r io d  c o u ld  be g a th e re d  from  th e  e x ta n t  re c o rd s  o f  th e
a n t iq u a r ia n  l e g a l  t e x t s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  b u t  i n  the  case o f  A f r i c a  we have
t o  f o l l o w  m a in ly  th e  a n t h r o p o lo g ic a l  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  a c c e p t in g  p e r fo r c e
B a s i l  D a v id s o n 's  t h e s is  t h a t  " t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  th e  A f r ic a n s  was th e  hand ing
11o f  the  to r c h  from  g e n e ra t io n  to  g e n e r a t io n . "  ’w ha tever may be the so u rc e ,  
e v idence  o r  a u t h o r i t y  t h a t  we s h a l l  r e l y  on, such an i n q u i r y  i s  im p e l le d  by 
th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  exam in ing  the  im pac t o f  some o f  th e  c o l o n i a l  laws and a lso  
o f  th e  " i n d i r e c t  r u l e "  on th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  system and i n s t i t u t i o n s .
(B ) The s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  A f r i c a n  s o c ie t i e s  and p o l i t i e s
( a) _A GenejraJL V iew
1.150  The p i c t u r e ,  u n l i k e  t h a t  o f  a n c ie n t  I n d i a  o f  th e  Aryan c i v i l i s a t i o n  
was n o t  th e  same e ve ryw he re . In  A f r i c a  th e re  were s o c ie t i e s  a id  
c i v i l i s a t i o n s ,  races  and c u l t u r e s ,  o f  d i f f e r e n t  fo rm s and v a r i e t i e s .  I t
has however been r i g h t l y  a s s e r te d  t h a t  th e re  was " th e  s p e c ia l  q u a l i t y  o f
A f r i c a "  t ra n s c e n d in g  such d i v e r s i t y  e x h ib i t e d  in  the  e x is te n c e  o f  850
12 13s o c ie t i e s  and 800 languages which were, t i l l  r e c e n t l y ,  m o s t ly  u n w r i t t e n .
We p ropose , t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  examine those  s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
which bea r th e  s t ro n g  im p r in t  o f  t h i s  q u a l i t y ,  b e a r in g  i n  m ind th e  
f a c t  t h a t  the  s o c i e t i e s  are c l a s s i f i e d  in  b road  and g e n e ra l  te rm s  as 
" c h i e f l y "  ( c e n t r a l i s e d )  and " c h i e f l e s s "  ( d e c e n t r a l i s e d  o r  acephalous).
1.151 T y p ic a l  acepha lous s o c ie t i e s  found  i n  West A f r i c a  were th e  Ibo  
and T iv  o f  e a s te rn  N ig e r i a  and th e  T a l l e n s i  o f  t h e  'n o r th e r n  t e r r i t o r i e s '
o f  Ghana; i n  East A f r i c a ,  such t r i b e s  as N and i,  M asa i,  K ik u y u ,  L o g o l i  and 
Arusha i n h a b i t i n g  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  Kenya and T a n g a n y ika  were acepha lous . 
S i m i l a r l y  i t  may be s a id  t h a t  among c e r t a i n  t r i b e s  i n h a b i t i n g  d i f f e r e n t  
p a r t s  o f  N ig e r ia  and Ghana and some p a r t s  o f  East and C e n t r a l  A f r i c a ,  
t h e r e  was a predominance o f  " c h i e f l y ”  s o c i e t i e s .  " I n d i r e c t  r u l e " ,  as we 
s h a l l  see, e f fa c e d  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  and in  course o f  t im e  " o f f i c i a l "  ( i n  
Kenya) o r  " w a r r a n t "  ( i n  E as te rn  N ig e r ia )  C h ie fs  came t o  be a p p o in te d  
even i n  those  t e r r i t o r i e s  where th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  system d id  n o t  re co g n ise  
such f u n c t i o n a r i e s .  In deed , th e  "s c ra m b le "  had a l re a d y  produced 
a r t i f i c i a l  p o l i t i c a l  b o u n d a r ie s .
(b )  _Age-_se_ts_j_ l i n e a ^ d _ t h e _ p j j l j i t i  c a l  s^sjberns_ojT acepha lous 
s o c ie t i e s
1 .152  Perhaps th e  o n ly  common i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  th e  s o c ie t i e s  o f  t h i s
c la s s  i s  the  a g e -s e ts  o r  age-g rades  which com prise  i n d i v i d u a l s  who
occupy a p a r t i c u l a r  se t  o r  g rade a t a p a r t i c u l a r  t im e  and pe r fo rm  s o c i a l ,
14p o l i t i c a l  and j u d i c i a l  f u n c t i o n s .  Even so , th e  r a c i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
o f  each t r i b e  found  e x p re s s io n  i n  th e  l o c a l  v a r i a t i o n  m a in ly  i n  re s p e c t  
o f  th e  number o f  s e ts  and t h e i r  f u n c t i o n s .  Seligman d is cu ss e s  th e  age- 
s e ts  o f  th e  N i l o - H a m i t i c  race  (N a n d i ,  Masai e t c . )  and observes  t h a t  th e  
o r d in a r y  f u n c t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s  o f  b oys , w a r r io r s  and e ld e r s  n o t  o n ly  
se rved  as a system o f  peace t im e  a d m in is t r a t i o n  b u t  a ls o  as an in s t r u m e n t  
o f  m i l i t a r y  o p e r a t io n .  The "m e d ic in e  man" i s  s a id  t o  be bo th  t h e  s p i r i t u a l  
as w e l l  as te m p o ra l  head o f  th e  t r i b e ,  b u t  n e i t h e r  th e  e x te n t  o f  h i s
a u t h o r i t y  n o r  h i s  f u n c t i o n s  are p r e c i s e l y  s t a t e d ,  e xc e p t  t h a t  th e y  are
15 vr e q u i r e d  f o r  r a in - m a k in g .  Lucy M a i r  speaks o f  a n o th e r  o f f i c e  ( p o i y o t ) ,
w h i le  a s s e r t in g  t h a t  th e re  i s  no ra n k in g  o f  c la s s  o r  l in e a g e  among N a n d is .
When th e  e ld e r s  who have moved o u t  o f  th e  w a r r i o r  grade c o l l e c t  un d e r  a
shade t r e e  f o r  d e c id in g  any m a t te r  th e y  re c o g n is e  one o f  them as t h e i r
le a d e r .  He i s  th e  p o i y o t . He la y s  b e fo re  th e  e ld e r s  th e  m a t t e r  t o  be
d is c u s s e d  and then  a f t e r  t a k in g  th e  sense o f  th e  m e e t ing  he g iv e s  a
. . . . . .  16d e c is io n  i n  i t s  name.
1 .153  In  an o f f i c i a l  s tu d y  o f  th e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s  o f
a number o f  m ino r  t r i b e s  o f  East A f r i c a ,  i t  i s  shown t h a t  th e  a u t h o r i t y  o f
d e c is io n -m a k in g  and d is p u te - s e t t le m e n t  was g e n e r a l ly  v e s te d  i n  the  e ld e r
17members o f  th e  t r i b e .  Among th e  Arusha, i t  has been s t a te d ,  th e  a u t h o r i t y
was n o t  c o n f in e d  to  any group w i th  l i m i t e d  numbers b u t  was d i f f u s e d  among
th e  whole a c c o rd in g  to  a g e n e ra l  v ie w  o f  th e  c a p a c i t ie s  o f  men a t  
18d i f f e r e n t  ages. About th e  Masai i t  has been observed  t h a t  th e  " c e n t r e  o f
p o l i t i c a l  g r a v i t y ”  was n o t  w i th  e ld e r s ,  b u t  w i th  a r e p u b l i c  o f  young 
19men. H a i le y  p o in t s  o u t  an im p o r ta n t  b a s ic  d i s t i n c t i o n  t h a t  marked th e
K ikuyu  a g e -s e ts  i n  t h a t  the  age was n o t  th e  s o le  c r i t e r i o n ,  f o r  "a d m is s io n
i n t o  a d e s i re d  g ra d e ”  c o u ld  w e l l  be a m a t te r  o f  p e rs o n a l  p r e s t ig e  and 
20w e a l th .  K e n y a t ta  d e s c r ib e s  th e  K ikuyu  o rgans  o f  government w i th
p r e c is io n  and speaks o f  a h ie r a r c h y  o f  c o u n c i l s  o f  e ld e r s  a t  the  v i l l a g e ,
d i s t r i c t  and n a t i o n a l  l e v e l s ,  h a v in g  ve s te d  i n  them the  a u t h o r i t y  o f  d e c is io n  
21m aking . Fo r d is p u te  s e t t le m e n t  the  "n o rm a l fo ru m "  appeared t o  be the
22 23" k in s h ip  c o u r t "  o ve r  which the  e ld e r s  p re s id e d .
1 .154  The Ib o  o f  East N ig e r i a ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  H a i le y ,  p re se n te d  " th e  most
o u ts ta n d in g  example i n  th e  B r i t i s h  A f r ic a n  c o lo n ie s "  o f  an in d ig e n o u s
s t r u c t u r e ,  as he found  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  t r a c e  "any d e f i n i t e  sea t o f
24e x e c u t iv e  a u t h o r i t y "  i n  th e  Ib o  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem . He quo tes  Perham
who had i d e n t i f i e d  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  which c a te re d  f o r  th e  b a s ic  needs o f
Ibo  s o c ie t y ,  such as c o l l e c t i v e  f a m i l y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and th e  age-g rades
which se rved  as th e  " p o t e n t i a l  p o l ic e m e n "  and o f  th e  c o u n c i ls  which
25s e t t l e d  fe u d s  between l o c a l  g roups . The chairmen o f  the  "C o u n c i l  o f
26E ld e r s " ,  a c c o rd in g  to  E l i a s ,  were sometimes r e l i g i o u s  f u n c t i o n a r i e s .
C a r ls to n  a t t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  m id d le  age group the  r o l e  o f  " r e g u la t o r y ,  
a d v is o ry  and j u d i c i a l  body o f  th e  v i l l a g e "  and to  th e  j u n i o r  age-
27g ra d e s ,  e x e c u t iv e  f u n c t i o n s  which in c lu d e d  th e  d u t ie s  o f  p o l ice m e n .
Among th e  T iv  o f  N o r th e rn  N ig e r i a  th e  f o c a l  p o in t  o f  s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l
o r g a n iz a t io n  was th e  concept o f  " T a r ”  which r e f e r r e d  t o  bo th  l in e a g e
group and th e  land  i t  occup ied  and meant i n  s o c i a l  te rm s a good w o rk ing
28
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between th e  tw o , a c c o rd in g  to  C a r l s t o n . The o n ly  person
who co u ld  possess " l e g i t im a t e  a u t h o r i t y "  among th e  T iv  was th e  compound
head. I t  has a ls o  been observed t h a t  " e ld e r s  and men o f  a f f lu e n c e ,
p r e s t ig e  and power" pe r fo rm e d , i n  f a c t ,  " p o l i t i c a l  and l e g a l  a c t io n "
29w i t h in  and on b e h a l f  o f  th e  l in e a g e  g roup .
1 .155  In  th e  case o f  th e  T a l l e n s i  and th e  L o g o l i  i t  can be s a id  t h a t  
the  c e n t re  o f  p o l i t i c a l  g r a v i t y  i s  t o  be found  n o t  i n  the  a g e -s e ts  o r  age- 
grades b u t  i n  th e  concept o f  l in e a g e  o r  k i n s h i p .  Each l in e a g e  group has
a c e r t a in  pos t d e s ig n a te d  i n  k i n s h ip  te rm s .  Such f u n c t io n s  among o th e rs
as o f  a p o l i t i c a l  and c o n f l i c t - s o l v i n g  c h a ra c te r  are pe r fo rm ed  by s o c ia l
30s t r u c t u r e s  d e f in e d  by k i n s h ip  t i e s .  I t  has been a s s e r te d  t h a t  the
L o g o l i  have "no p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  as d i s t i n c t  from th e  k in s h ip  and 
31s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e "  and t h a t  " t h e r e  i s  no t r i b a l  j u d i c i a l  a u t h o r i t y  b u t
32j u s t i c e  i s  a d m in is te re d  by those  a f f e c te d  by the  o f fe n c e  i n  q u e s t io n . "
Whether the  d is p u te  i s  i n t e r - c l a n  o r  i n t r a - c l a n  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  i n t e r e s t
i n  th e  d is p u te  i s  n o t  accorded p r im a c y ;  h i s  r o l e  i n  the  p rocess  o f
s e t t le m e n t  i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  I t  i s  th e  group i n  the  fo rm e r  and th e  c la n
i n  th e  l a t t e r  case t h a t  ta k e s  " j u d i c i a l  a c t i o n "  and t h a t  to o  f o r  a
33n e g o t ia te d  s e t t le m e n t .  Need less  t o  say , th e  absence o f  an a d v e r s a r ia l  
c o n te x t  i s  a t y p i c a l  f e a tu r e  o f  a lm os t a l l  fo rm s o f  A f r ic a n  s o c ie t i e s  i n  
g e n e r a l .
1 .156 The p o s i t i o n  among th e  T a l l e n s i  does n o t  appear t o  be much
34d i f f e r e n t .  I t  has been s ta te d  th u s :
Segments b i t t e r l y  opposed o v e r  d iv e r g e n t  i n t e r e s t s  u n i t e  
v ig o r o u s ly  on m a t te r s  o f  common i n t e r e s t .  Co-members o f  
any u n i t  have a common i n t e r e s t  i n  one a n o th e r 's  w e l fa re  
and in  s a fe g u a rd in g  one a n o th e r 's  r i g h t .
D is p u te s  g iv e  r i s e  t o  t e n s io n  i n  th e  s o c ie t y  and what i s  sought i s  the
r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  harmony, peace and o rd e r  th ro u g h  de ju r e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f
c o n f l i c t i n g  c la im s .  And, as has been obse rved , i n t r a - c l a n  d is p u te s  h a v in g
a r is e n  m o s t ly  ou t  o f  r i v a l  c la im s  t o  p r i o r i t y  i n  the  e x e rc is e  o f  a
p o l i t i c o - r i t u a l  r i g h t ,  th e  d i v i n e r  p la y s  th e  r o l e  o f  d e c is io n -m a k e r  in
35th e  absence o f  a j u d i c i a l  sys tem . M en tion  i s  made o f  two o th e r  o f f i c e s  -  
th e  c h i e f ' s  and t h a t  o f  th e  c u s to d ia n  o f  th e  e a r th ;  i n  some cases th e y  are 
merged. No p o l i t i c a l  power, how ever, i s  a t ta c h e d  to  these  o f f i c e s .
Indeed , as has been s a id ,  th e y  m e re ly  c a r r i e d  th e  s ta tu s  o f  "p r im u s  i n t e r
pares  i n  th e  n a t i v e  sys te m " ;  and th e  c o n te s t  f o r  th e  o f f i c e  was a c o n te s t
36o f  segments and n o t  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .
( c) P_aliti_ca_l _sy^stem_o_f _^chi_eflyj^ jso js ie t ie js
( i )  jft G enera l V iew
1.157 I t  has been obse rve d ,  perhaps r i g h t l y ,  t h a t  i n  i t s  p r i m i t i v e  form
A f r ic a n  s o c ie t y  was t y p i c a l l y  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  and t h a t  th e  p rocess  o f
" p o l i t i c a l  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n "  to o k  p la ce  when c u l t u r a l ,  r e l i g i o u s  and
o c c u p a t io n a l  hom ogeneity  was b roken  w i th  the  g ra d u a l  i n f u s i o n  o f
37im m ig ra n ts  h o ld in g  a d i v e r s i t y  o f  id e a s .  Not o n ly  was th e re  an i n t r a -
c o n t in e n t a l  movement o f  th e  in d ig e n o u s  ra c e s ,  b u t  th e  in f l u e n c e  o f  th e
Arabs in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  appear t o  have c o n t r ib u t e d  a g re a t  d e a l  t o  t h i s
p ro c e s s .  The v a r io u s  fo rm s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  came to
f l o u r i s h  a t  d i f f e r e n t  p e r io d s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  th e  c o n t in e n t  has been
f i t t e d  i n t o  a common r u b r i c  o f  " A f r i c a n  d e sp o t ism "  and some o f  th e
s i m i l a r i t i e s  o f  th e  b a s ic  p a t t e r n  have been s ta te d  th u s :  m o n a rc h ic a l
a b s o lu t is m ,  d i v i n e  k in g s h ip ,  e l e c t o r a l  s u c c e s s io n ,  t e r r i t o r i a l
38b u re a u c ra c y ,  d u a l  r o l e  o f  t h e  m in i s t e r s  e t c .
1 .158  West A f r i c a  saw th e  r i s e  and f a l l  o f  a number o f  m a jo r  s t a te s
w i th  c e n t r a l i s e d  a u t h o r i t y  between 300 and 1897 A.D. In  the  t e r r i t o r y
now known as N ig e r i a  th e  Hausas, Y o rubas , F u la n is ,  B i n i s  and o th e r
39m in o r  t r i b e s  had c e n t r a l i s e d  p o l i t i c a l  sys tem s. ThB H a u s a -F u la n i  
s t a t e s  f l o u r i s h e d  between 900 and 1837 A.D. and th e  Yoruba s t a te s  between 
1000 and 1893 A.D. w h i le  th e  kingdom o f  B e n in ,  which was founded in  900 A.D
o
u
40was l a s t  t o  f a l l  t o  th e  B r i t i s h  i n  1897. In  th e  m id d le  re g io n  o f
modern Ghana th e  Akan s t a t e s  appeared i n  1200 A.D. from  which f i r s t
41emerged th e  Asante Union in  1699 and then  th e  s h o r t - l i v e d  F a n t i
C onfederacy  o f  1867-71; th e  fo rm e r  has been d e s c r ib e d  as a " w e l l - o r g a n is e d
42m i l i t a r y  and d e m o c ra t ic  p o l i t i c a l  s y s te m ."  In  C e n t r a l  A f r i c a  th e
e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f  th e  Luba and Lunda k ingdoms i n  1500 and 1600 A.D.
43r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  and o f  th e  L o z i  kingdom i n  1650, i s  n o te w o r th y .  In
East A f r i c a  a la rg e  number o f  c o a s ta l  c i t y  s t a t e s  had sprung up , th e
f i r s t  i n  750 A .D . ,  le a d in g  t o  th e  emergence o f  th e  " S w a h i l i "  c i v i l i s a t i o n
i n  1300 A.D. based on Arab, P e rs ia n  and Bantu c u l t u r e s  and to  th e
44fo u n d in g  o f  Mombasa in  1505 A.D. In  th e  area  o f  modern Uganda, th e
two m a jo r  k ingdoms o f  Buganda and Bunyoro arose a lm ost contem poraneous ly  
45i n  1500 A .D . ;  th e s e ,  w i th  th e  n e ig h b o u r in g  kingdoms o f  Anko le  and T o ro ,
s u r v iv e d  th ro u g h o u t  the  c o l o n i a l  p e r io d  and formed th e  "F e d e ra l  S ta te s "
in  th e  f e d e r a l  independence C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  1962.
( i i )  _E as t__aj2d__C_en_t r a  1_ Af r  i_ca
1 .159 The Ugandan k ingdom s, i t  i s  s a id ,  were r u le d  by " d i v i n e  k in g s "
who governed th ro u g h  an e la b o ra te  h ie r a r c h y  o f  c o u r t  o f f i c i a l s  and 
46p r o v i n c i a l  c h ie f s .  I t  has a ls o  been observed t h a t  th e  t e r r i t o r i a l
u n i t s  o f  government o f  these  s t a t e s ,  which were o f  a f e u d a l  c h a r a c te r ,
47were comparable to  those  o f  f e u d a l  Europe. In  a l l  such s t a t e s  the
j u d i c i a l  system was based on a h ie r a r c h y  o f  c o u r ts  h e ld  by th e  s u b o rd in a te
c h ie f s  and th e  saza ( c o u n ty )  c h ie f s  as w e l l  as t h e  K a t i k i r o , i n  Buganda,
who were a l l  a p p o in te d  and were a ls o  l i a b l e  to  be deposed by th e  K in g .
The o f f i c e  o f  th e  Prime M i n i s t e r  and C h ie f  J u s t i c e  was combined i n  the
K a t i k i r o  who heard  th e  f i n a l  a p p e a ls ,  s u b je c t  to  th e  f i n a l  v e r d i c t  o f  th e  
48K in g .  There  was a body c a l l e d  th e  L u k ik o , which was an assembly o f  th e
K in g ,  th e  K a t i k i r o  and ano the r  ten  c h ie f s  who h e ld  charge o f  the
a d m in is t r a t i o n  o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  d i s t r i c t s  and had to  re n d e r  accoun ts  f o r
49 ,th e  management to  th e  K in g  th ro u g h  the  K a t i k i r o . The k in g  (known as
Kabaka) has been d e s c r ib e d  as a despo t and i t  appears t h a t  th e  Lu k iko
50met a t  h i s  p le a s u re .  I t  i s ,  however, i n t e r e s t i n g  to  no te  t h a t  the
c h ie f s  h e ld  m ee t ings  in  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  d i s t r i c t s ,  i n  co n n e c t io n  w i th
t h e i r  a d m in is t r a t i v e  w ork , which c o u ld  be a t te n d e d  by any man, even a
51r e s id e n t  a l i e n  who d id  n o t ,  o f  co u rse , have th e  v o t in g  r i g h t .
1 .160  I t  m us t,  how ever, be remembered t h a t  i n  Uganda, b e s id e s  Buganda
and o th e r  k ingdoms w i th  h e r e d i t a r y  monarchs, th e re  were ’’m u l t i p l e
52kingdom t r i b e s ”  and a lso  t r i b e s  w i th  acepha lous s o c i e t i e s .  P o l i t i c a l
systems were, t h e r e f o r e ,  d iv e r s e  i n  c h a r a c te r .  A d i s t i n c t i o n  has been
made between th e  t r i b e s  o f  n o r th e rn  and sou th e rn  Uganda r e s p e c t i v e l y
on th e  b a s is  o f  th e  absence o f  a "sense o f  community between the  c h ie f  
53and th e  p e o p le ” . C h ie fs  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  were n o t  t r a d i t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s
in  th e  sane sense th ro u g h o u t  East A f r i c a  as a who le ; however, th e  p a t te r n
o f  th e  c e n t r a l i s e d  p o l i t i c a l  systems o f  T angany ika  was a ln o s t  s i m i l a r  t o  
54t h a t  o f  Uganda. In  some cases t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  was ro o te d  e i t h e r  in
h e r e d i t a r y  r i g h t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a t h ig h e r  l e v e l s ,  o r  i n  r o y a l  
55a p p o in tm e n ts ;  i n  o th e r  cases, as we have seen, i t  depended s o le l y  
on r o y a l  p a t ro n a g e .  However, a t the  lo w e s t  l e v e l ,  even i n  Buganda, i t
has been n o te d  t h a t  c la n  le a d e rs  ac ted  as v i l l a g e  headmen and possessed
. .. . . 56j u d i c i a l  power.
1.161 The p o s i t i o n  i n  N o r th e rn  Rhodesia (now Zambia) does n o t  appear
t o  be d i f f e r e n t .  In  t h s  kingdom o f  Bemba, a l l  d i s t r i c t  c h ie f s  were
57p r in c e s  end th e  c la n  le a d e rs  were p o l i t i c a l l y  u n im p o r ta n t .  The Bemba 
in  e f f e c t  fo rm ed a u n io n  o f  ch ie fdom s w h i le  th e  L o z i ,  a ls o  i n  N o r th e rn  
Rhodes ia , had become a k ingdom in  th e  f u l l e s t  sense, as a u n i t a r y  s t a t e .
I t  i s  s a id  t h a t  th e  L o z i  k in g  was more p o w e r fu l  than  the  F i r s t  C h ie f  o f  
the  Bemba who m e re ly  had a " c e r t a i n  p re -e m in e n ce ”  o ve r  th e  o th e r  c h ie f s .
In  the  L o z i  k ingdom th e  a d n i n i s t r a t i o n  was c a r r i e d  on th ro u g h  the  d i s t r i c t
58o f f i c i a l s .  However, we are t o l d  t h a t  the  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n iz a t io n s  o f  the  
Bantu peo p le s  o f  e a s t  and c e n t r a l  A f r i c a  had c e r t a in  common fe a tu r e s  such
emphasis on k i n s h ip ,  descen t end c o n c e n t ra t io n  o f  e x e c u t iv e ,  r i t u a l
and j u d i c i a l  power i n  the paramount c h i e f ;  d i f f e r e n c e  e x is t e d  i n  th e
59d e t a i l s  o f  th e  m ach ine ry  o f  governm ent.
*1.152 There  have been c o n t in u o u s  m ig r a t io n s  o f  th e  Bantus from  the
n o r th  tow ards  the  south  and i n t o  e a s t  and c e n t r a l  A f r i c a  and beyond,
i n t o  p a r t s  o f  sou the rn  A f r i c a  as w e l l ,  d u r in g  the  course o f  the  l a s t  1500
y e a rs ,  and th e y  occupy today  a lm os t o n e - t h i r d  o f  the  c o n t i n e n t . ^  We are
t o l d  t h a t  the  Bantu i n  th e  s o u th -e a s te rn  a rea  are c u l t u r a l l y  n o t  much
d i f f e r e n t  from those  o f  th e  s o u t h - c e n t r a l  and a ls o  those  o f  f a r t h e r  
61n o r th  and w es t.  We may a c c o r d in g ly ,  a l b e i t  w i th  a no te  o f  c a u t io n ,  g a th e r  
some im p o r ta n t  i n f o r m a t io n  from  S ch a p e ra 's  le a rn e d  s tudy  o f  c e r t a in  t r i b e s ,  
in c lu d in g  those o f  the  Bantu s to c k ,  o f  th e  s o u th e rn  r e g io n .  I t  i s ,  
however, necessa ry  t o  b e a r  i n  m ind t h a t  he i s  d e a l in g  w i th  Bantu 
s o c ie t i e s  i n  which c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  has n o t  been a cce n tu a te d  to  such a h ig h  
degree as i n  th e  "k in g d o m s" .
1 .163 We are t o l d  t h a t  the  C h ie f  i s  the  "sym bo l o f  h i s  t r i b e "  and one
o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c ia t io n  i n  such cases i s  d e s c r ib e d  as
6 2a " p e rs o n a l  a t ta c h m e n t"  t o  h im ; i t  i s  n o t  a lways based on k in s h ip  t i e s .
D is p u t in g  th e  C h ie f ' s  a u t h o r i t y  i s  co n s id e re d  a s e r io u s  c r im e  and
"b a n ish m e n t"  i s  one o f  th e  s a n c t io n s  a p p l ie d  i n  such cases. I t  i s ,
however, based on th e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  o n ly  those  acknowledged as members o f
63th e  community have the  r i g h t  to  l i v e  i n  i t s  la n d ;  th e  p o l i t i c a l
community n o t  o n ly  has i t s  own t e r r i t o r y  b u t  a ls o  has the  r i g h t  t o  occupy
64t h a t  to  th e  e x c lu s io n  o f  o t h e r s .  C h ie f t a i n s h ip  i s  n o rm a l ly  h e r e d i t a r y
from f a t h e r  to  son b u t  t h e r e  can a ls o  be cases o f  " u s u r p a t io n " ,  " s e c e s s io n "
65and " c r e a t i o n "  o f  a new t r i b e .  However, suc ce s s io n  i s  n o t  a u to m a t ic ;  
t h e  s e n io r  r e l a t i v e s  and im p o r ta n t  a d v is e rs  o f  th e  deceased c h ie f  can 
pass ove r an h e i r  appa ren t i f  he i s  " u n s u i t a b l e " . ^
1 .164 A cco rd in g  to  S chape ra 's  a cc oun t,  t h e re  are a lso  " s u b - c h ie f s "  i n  
d i s t r i c t s  and "headmen" in  charge o f  s m a l le r  u n i t s  such as v i l l a g e s ,  b u t
cn
th e  C h ie f ' s  powers bo th  as a l e g i s l a t o r  and a judge  are p le n a r y .
r  9
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He can make l a w s ^  as w e l l  as i n f l i c t  th e  death p e n a l ty  In  h i s
e x e c u t iv e  c a p a c i ty  he can o rg a n iz e  " a g e - re g im e n ts "  which can be used 
70as p o l ice m e n . There i s ,  however, p r o v i s io n  f o r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  between
th e  c h ie f  and some fo rm  o f  p o p u la r  assembly as a p a r t  o f  th e  m ach ine ry  o f
government which a ls o  p ro v id e s  f o r  two grades o f  a d v is o ry  p e rs o n n e l a t
h ig h e r  l e v e l s ,  a w e l l - d e f i n e d  h ie r a r c h y  o f  c o u r ts  as w e l l  as c e n t r a l  and
71r e g io n a l  e x e c u t iv e  o f f i c e r s  b e s id e s  the  s u b - c h ie f s  and th e  headmen w i th
72a d u p l i c a t i o n  a lm os t i n  a l l  re s p e c ts  a t  th e  l e v e l  o f  th e  l o c a l  r u l e r s .
I t  appears t h a t  b e s id e s  th e  n a t u r a l  check to  which the  u n l im i t e d  powers 
o f  the  C h ie f  are s u b je c te d  by the  mechanics o f  a d m in is t r a t i v e  
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n ,  h i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  a u t o c r a t i c  r u l e  i s  r e g u la te d  by some 
o th e r  means as w e l l .  The t r i b a l  c o n c e p t io n s  o f  "good governm ent11 and 
" i d e a l  c h i e f "  are p o s s ib ly  th e  most im p o r ta n t  ones. The C h ie f  i s
73p u b l i c l y  e x h o r te d  to  be j u s t  and j u d i c i o u s  and to  c o n s u l t  h i s  c o u n c i l s .
a i r  7 4
Such adv ise  i s  n o rm a l ly  g iven^some p o in t  i n  h i s  i n s t a l l a t i o n  ceremony
and h i s  t a c i t  acceptance m ig h t  w e l l  have th e  e f f e c t  o f  a c o ro n a t io n  o a th .
Some o f  the  extreme s a n c t io n s  used a g a in s t  an a u t o c r a t i c  c h ie f  are 
75" a s s a s s in a t io n " ,  " e x p u ls io n  and re p la c e m e n t"  o f  th e  c h ie f  and " s e c e s s io n "
7 6from  th e  t r i b e .
( i i i )  Wej=t_Africa
771.165  West A f r i c a  has been c a l l e d  th e  home o f  th e  " t r u e  n e g r o " .
The Bantu  and th e  N i l o - H a m i t i c  t r i b e s  o f  t h e  East and C e n t r a l  p a r t  o f
th e  c o n t in e n t  w i th  which we have d e a l t  w i th  so f a r ,  are s a id  to  have been
7 8" H a m i t ic iz e d  to  a v a r y in g  e x t e n t " .  Of the  Hausa and th e  F u la n i  o f  N o r th e rn
N ig e r ia  i t  i s  s a id  t h a t  th e  fo rm e r  are e s s e n t i a l l y  n e g ro ,  though they  speak
a H a m i t ic  language , and t h a t  th e  F u la n i  are o f  H a m i t ic  o r i g i n  and c u l t u r e
though they  have a ls o ,  excep t perhaps th e  " p a s t o r a l s " ,  g r a d u a l ly  absorbed 
79negro  b lo o d .  However, bo th  t r i b e s  are no lo n g e r  pagan b u t  are adhe ren ts
80o f  Is la m .  The F u la n i  c o n s o l id a te d  t h e i r  conquest o f  th e  Hausa s t a te s  
i n  1810 by e x te n d in g  t h e i r  em pire  o v e r  an area which covered  o n e - t h i r d
f -*3T!>
8 1o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  o f  N o r th e rn  N ig e r i a .
1 .166 In  th e  F u la n i  em pire  e leven  " e m i r a te s ’* o r  ch ie fdom s owed
a l le g ia n c e  to  th e  S u l ta n  o f  S oko to .  C h ie f t a in s h ip  i n  th e  area  has been
d e s c r ib e d  as "a  nexus o f  r e l a t i o n s  o f  c l i e n t a g e " .  The c h ie f s  o f  th e
v a s s a l  s t a t e s  were c l i e n t s  as w e l l  as v a s s a ls  and th e y  a t t a in e d  o f f i c e  and
secured i t s  te n u re  o n ly  by d e m o n s t ra t in g  t h e i r  a l le g ia n c e  to  t h e i r
im m edia te  s u p e r io r  whose c l i e n t s  th e y  w ere . In  the  same way, w i t h i n  the
82community th e  o f f i c i a l s  and " t i t l e - h o l d e r s "  were h i s  c l i e n t s .  The
a d m in is t r a t i v e  s e t -u p  has been d e s c r ib e d  as " h ig h l y  c e n t r a l i s e d "  and th e
c h ie f s  as " a u t o c r a t i c "  and o p e r a t in g  i n  a " f e u d a l  t y p e "  o f  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  
83o r g a n is a t io n .  The ca p tu re  and e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  s la v e s ,  and waging wars
f o r  t h a t  pu rpose , were s i g n i f i c a n t  aspec ts  o f  the  e x e rc is e  by th e  Hausa-
84F u la n i  s t a t e s  o f  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  power i n  th e  n in e te e n th  c e n tu r y .
There was, t h e r e f o r e ,  a r e g u la r  army and, as p a r t s  o f  c i v i l  a d m in is t r a t i o n ,
8 5th e re  were a lso  th e  p o l i c e  and p r is o n s  as w e l l  as c o u r ts  o f  j u s t i c e .
I t  appears t h a t  th e  im pac t o f  Is la m  on Hausa s o c ia l  l i f e ,  though s low and
g ra d u a l ,  was a lm ost t o t a l ,  u n l i k e  I n d i a ,  where the  Moghul r u l e  cou ld
n o t  b reak  down c o m p le te ly  th e  s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r e  so b s  to  b r in g  about
a t o t a l  e f fa ce m e n t o f  th e  in d ig e n o u s  v i l l a g e  assem b lies ,  th e  p a n c h a y a ts . ^
In  N o r th e rn  N ig e r i a  (H ausa land ) many im p o r ta n t  t r i b a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,
87such as l in e a g e ,  c la n  and ex tended f a m i l y ,  became e x t i n c t .  On the
o th e r  hand, i t  has been observed  t h a t  th e  F u la n is  found  i n  Hausaland a
88w 9 l l - o r g a n iz e d  system o f  government which th e y  r e t a in e d .  As th e  c o u r ts  
came t o  a d m in is te r  th e  M a l i k i  s c h o o l  o f  Mohammedan Law, the  in d ig e n o u s  
le g a l  system appears t o  have been superseded.
1.167 A no ther peop le  who were n o t  o r i g i n a l l y  o f  Negro b lo o d  were th e  
Yorubas o f  th e  s o u th -w e s te rn  re g io n  o f  N ig e r i a .  A r r i v i n g  between the 
seventh  and te n th  c e n tu ry  A .D . ,  th e y  are s a id  to  have founded th e  f i r s t  
s e t t le m e n t  a t  I f e  and th e  Oni o f  I f e  became th e  r e l i g i o u s  head. The 
p o l i t i c a l  c a p i t a l  was removed to  Oyo and th e  A la f i n  o f  Oyo became f i r s t
i n  p r a c t i c e ,  and l a t e r  n o m in a l ly  th e  s u z e ra in ,  o f  a l l  th e  Yoruba c h ie f s .
Each c la n  was v i r t u a l l y  in depe nden t and was governed by a k in g  whose
powers were c o n t r o l l e d  by a c o u n c i l  o f  e ld e r s  which had th e  r i g h t  o f
89" e l e c t i n g ”  th e  K in g  and a d v is in g  him i n  a l l  r o u t in e  m a t t e r s .  In  Lagos, 
t h e  k in g  was c a l l e d  Oba; i n  Ib a d a n ,  A la k e , where th e  f o u r  d i v i s i o n a l  
k in g s  unde r him were c a l l e d  Ob a s . The A la f i n  was a s s is te d  by a c o u n c i l  o f  
th e  paramount c h ie f s  ( t h e  k i n g s ) .  I t  has been observed t h a t  th e  h ie r a r c h y
90o f  a d v is e rs  was based upon th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  and o f  mandate.
The A la f i n  must b e lo n g  t o  a r o y a l  f a m i l y  a l th o u g h  he was " s e le c t e d "  by th e
c o u n c i l  ( " c a b i n e t " )  and i t  i s  a ls o  s a id  t h a t  th e re  was a le a d e r  l i k e  th e
91Prime M i n i s t e r  who headed th e  c o u n c i l .
1 .168  A lthough  th e  Oba appeared in  th e  r o l e  o f  a d iv in e  k in g ,  w i th
r i t u a l  as w e l l  as te m p o ra l  a u t h o r i t y ,  th e  Yoruba d id  n o t  t o l e r a t e  the
a r b i t r a r y  e x e rc is e  o f  power by any a u t h o r i t y  a t any l e v e l .  He, as w e l l
as th e  A l a f i n , cou ld  be denounced and had then  e i t h e r  to  leave  th e  c o u n try
92
o r  t o  commit s u ic id e ,  o th e rw is e  he was k i l l e d .  T h is  d id  n o t  perhaps
app ly  t o  the  head o f  a l in e a g e  who w ie ld e d  c o n s id e ra b le  power among i t s
93members by a d ju d g in g  t h e i r  o f fe n c e s  and a r b i t r a t i n g  i n  t h e i r  d is p u te s ;
94he was n o t  deposed b u t  de f a c t o  a u t h o r i t y  passed to  a n o th e r .  There
was one ty p e  o f  " s e c r e t  s o c i e t y " ,  th e  O qbon i, and th e  a g e -s e ts  a ls o  p la ye d
95im p o r ta n t  r o l e s  i n  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s e t - u p .
1 .169 The Obas o f  th e  Edo, to  t h e i r  e a s t ,  were , however, more p o w e r fu l
and c o u ld  n o t  be removed, a l th o u g h  i n  rank  th e y  e q u a l le d  th e  A la f i n s  o f
th e  Y o ruba . They c o u ld  a p p o in t  c h ie f s ,  ig n o r in g  l in e a g e  c la im s .  The
Ben in  Kingdom o f  th e  Edo has been d e s c r ib e d  as a p o w e r fu l  and o rg a n is e d  
96e m p ire .  The kingdom was d iv id e d  i n t o  t r i b u t e  u n i t s  o r  f i e f s  and th e  f i e f -
h o ld e r s  were r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  d a y - to -d a y  a d m in i s t r a t i o n .  The K in g ,  who was
a s s is te d  by seven h e r e d i t a r y  n o b le s  i s  s a id  t o  have had " e x c lu s iv e  r i g h t
97
o v e r  l i f e  and death o f  h i s  s u b je c t s " .  S la v e - t ra d e  and s la v e -w a rs  
appears t o  be a common fe a tu r e  o f  West A f r i c a  and t h e i r  e f f e c t  was r e f l e c t e d
25
i n  th e  economic, s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  Yoruba and th e  Edo
98in  perhaps the same measure as in  the case of H ausa-Fulan i.
1.170 In  Ghana, i t  was m a in ly  t h e  Akan p e op le  who are s a id  to  have th e
’’ a r c h a ic  s ta te  sys tem ”  i n  which the  s ta te  was a s o c i a l  as w e l l  as a
p o l i t ic a l  e n t i ty .  Here also lin eag e , k inship  and age played an important
r o l e  and ’’ s e l e c t i o n ”  o f  c h ie f s  was c o n f in e d  to  one o r  more r o y a l  l i n e a g e s .
The s e le c t io n  was made by th e  ’’Queen M o th e r ” , the  b lo o d  r e l a t i v e s  and th e
99" e l d e r s ”  on b e h a l f  o f  th e  p e o p le .  The " e l d e r s ”  were heads o f  im p o r ta n t  
l in e a g e s  and were c h i e f ’ s c o u n c i l l o r s .  They h e ld  a h e r e d i t a r y  o f f i c e ,  th e  
symbol o f  which was a " s t o o l ” . When an " e l d e r ”  d ie d  h i s  successo r  was 
s e le c te d  by th e  grown-up men and s e n io r  women o f  th e  l in e a g e ,  s u b je c t  t o  th e  
c h i e f ’ s accep tance . There  were o a th s  o f  a l le g ia n c e  by th e  members o f  th e  
l in e a g e  to  th e  e ld e r - d e s ig n a te  and by th e  l a t t e r  t o  the  C h ie f .  The C h i e f ’ s 
s e le c t i o n  i t s e l f ,  we are t o l d ,  had to  be approved a t  a m ee t ing  o f  v i l l a g e  
headmen, e ld e r s ,  commoners and the  spokesman o f  th e  young men. The l a t t e r ' s  
p o s i t i o n  was p o l i t i c a l l y  im p o r ta n t  i n  t h a t  p u b l i c  o p in io n  and c r i t i c i s m  o f  
th e  government was e xp ressed  th ro u g h  h im .^ * ^
1.171 The C h ie f  was bound by oa th  to  c o n s u l t  th e  e ld e r s  and t o  obey
t h e i r  a d v ic e .  He co u ld  be d e -s to o le d  by th e  e ld e r s  i f  he h a b i t u a l l y
r e je c te d  t h e i r  a d v ic e ,  b roke  a ta b o o ,  com m itted a s a c r i le g e  o r  became
p h y s i c a l l y  u n f i t .  The t r i b e  o r  the  d i v i s i o n  was a d m in is te re d  on a p o l i c y  o f
d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  and f o r  p a ss in g  laws th e  d i v i s i o n a l  c o u n c i ls  had to  be
summoned where th e  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  o f  th e  whole p e o p le  m et. The c o u n c i l  had
101to  approve a ls o  m a jo r  e x e c u t iv e  and a d m in is t r a t i v e  p r o p o s a ls .  The
c h ie f  s h ip  was e s s e n t i a l l y  a sacred  o f f i c e .  The C h ie f  had to  pe r fo rm  v a r io u s
102r i t e s  f o r  the  w e l fa re  o f  h i s  peop le  as re s p e c ts  fo o d ,  h e a l t h  and f e c u n d i t y .  
Osai T u tu ,  who was th e  c h ie f  o f  a t r i b a l  d i v i s i o n  a t  Kumasi, succeeded in  
u n i t i n g  the  o th e r  c h ie f s  i n t o  a con fede ra cy  and came to  be known as the  
As ante Hene ( t h e  K ing  o f  A s h a n t i )  and th e  renowned ’’go lden s t o o l ”  became 
the  symbol o f  u n i t y .  However, d e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  remained the  dom inant f e a tu r e
o f  th e  new A sh a n t i  c o n s t i t u t i o n  and the  o ld  f a m i l y ,  c la n  and t r i b a l  o rg a n -
103i z a t i o n  s u rv iv e d  under th e  new re g im e . There was no se p a ra te  j u d i c i a r y .
The d i s t i n c t i o n  between c i v i l  and c r im in a l  l i a b i l i t y  was n o t  sh a rp :
emphasis was on " a r b i t r a t i o n ”  and th e  o n ly  re co g n ise d  fo rm s o f  punishment
104were death and f i n e .  A lthough s la v e ry  appears to  have been i n s t i t u t i o n ­
a l i s e d  th e  s la v e s  were, i t  i s  s a id ,  f o r  a l l  p r a c t i c a l  pu rposes , members 
105o f  t h e  f a m i l y .
1 .172  The F a n t i  who form ed ano th e r  branch o f  th e  Akan peop le  had a s i m i l a r
*10 6p o l i t i c a l  system b u t  t h e i r  a t te m p t t o  c o n fe d e ra te  l i k e  th e  A sh a n t i  was a
f a i l u r e ,  as has been in d i c a t e d  in  th e  b e g in n in g .  A l l  Akans were m a t r i l i n e a l
bu t  th e re  were non-Akan t r i b e s  a ls o  in  Ghana who had c h i e f l y  p o l i t i c a l
systems which have been term ed as " l e s s  d e m o c ra t ic ”  a l th o u g h  th e r e  was a
d i f f e r e n c e  i n t e r  se o f  deg rees . These o th e r  t r i b e s  are s a id  t o  be
p a t r i a r c h a l ,  p a t r i l o c a l  and p a t r i l i n e a l  and though they  had t h e i r  own s t o o l s ,
107t h e i r  c o n ce p t io n  o f  them d id  n o t  c a r ry  t h e  same m y th ic a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
( i v )  Th®. ^sjce j; i_al_qual.iJLy.ll o f  A f r ic a n  c h ie f s h ip
1 .173  A s h o r t  comment on the  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  c h ie f s h ip  i s  c a l l e d  f o r  i n
t h a t  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  t r u l y  d is p la y e d  what has been d e s c r ib e d  as th e  " s p e c ia l
108q u a l i t y ”  o f  A f r i c a .  T h is  s p e c ia l  q u a l i t y  i s  m a n i fe s te d  in  
a pronounced form  i n  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  C h ie fs  a lm os t everywhere were 
h i e r a r c h i c a l l y  graded and i n  most cases the  o f f i c e  was e i t h e r  h e r e d i t a r y  o r  
o th e rw is e  l i n k e d  up w i th  l in e a g e  which gave prominence t o  h i s  r i t u a l  
f u n c t i o n s  and made him a t r a d i t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n  i n  th e  t r u e  sense.
B e s id e s ,  we have a ls o  seen t h a t  th e  s o - c a l le d  " A f r i c a n  d e s p o t is m ”  d id  
n o t  f i g u r e  p ro m in e n t ly  i n  most cases i n  t h a t  th e  C h i e f ' s  powers were 
r e g u la te d  i n  v a r y in g  degrees th ro u g h  v a r io u s  means o f  checks w h ich , 
p o s s ib l y ,  may n o t  have p roved  to  be e q u a l l y  e f f i c a c i o u s  i n  a l l  cases.
I t  i s  a ls o  necessa ry  t o  ta k e  n o te  o f  th e  im pac t o f  Is la m  and
£
C h r i s t i a n i t y  on these  a n c ie n t  A f r ic a n  s o c i e t i e s .  In  th e  second ELEtQ 
109case th e  P r iv y  C o u n c i l  observed  t h a t  " th e  b a rb a ro u s  customs o f  th e  e a r l i e r  
days may unde r th e  in f l u e n c e  o f  c i v i l i s a t i o n  become m i ld e r  w i th o u t  l o s in g
t h e i r  e s s e n t i a l  c h a ra c te r  o f  custom " when i t  was suggested t h a t  th e  a n c ie n t
custom o f  k i l l i n g  a deposed C h ie f  was m oderated i n t o  th e  m i ld e r  custom o f
b a n is h in g  h im . How th e  in d ig e n o u s  s o c i e t i e s  g e n e r a l ly  re a c te d  to  th e
s u p e r im p o s i t io n  o f  th e  c i v i l i s a t i o n s  o f  th e  eas t and west does n o t  appear,
however, t o  have re c e iv e d  th e  a t t e n t i o n  i t  dese rves  a l th o u g h  i t  i s
a d m it te d  t h a t  s o c ia l  s t r u c t u r e  was a " c o n d i t i o n  o f  e q u i l i b r i u m "  w h ich , when
d is tu r b e d ,  undergoes a m o d i f i c a t i o n  and t h a t  th e re  was a need to  s tudy
110A f r ic a n  p o l i t i c a l  systems from  t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e .  How th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
c h ie f s h ip  was m o d i f ie d  by " i n d i r e c t  r u l e "  we s h a l l  be exam in ing  soon.
( d) Jjjome^tjrajjiJtij3nal_ijjeas__arid_ijis_tiJkujti_on_s
( i )  Z*\® Jlsj ! cZ eZ  £ r a c le s  _and d i v i n e r s
1 .174  Some o f  th e  West A f r i c a n  s o c i e t i e s ,  d e s p i te  t h e i r  d i s t i n c t i v e
p o l i t i c a l  sys tem s, shared  c e r t a in  common i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  p o l i t i c a l
s i g n i f i c a n c e  b e s id e s  s la v e r y  and th e  s la v e  t ra d e  as means o f  "a s s o c ia te d
c o n t r o l " :  among th e  Yoruba th e  Oqboni s tood  between the  Oba and h i s  p e o p le .
A " s e c r e t  s o c ie t y "  has been d e s c r ib e d  as "an embodiment o f ,  and a means
112o f  c a n a l i z in g ,  s u p e r n a tu r a l  p o w e r" .  The O qbon i, i t  has been obse rved ,
was an " e a r th  c u l t "  and i t  pe r fo rm ed  p o l i t i c a l  and j u d i c i a l  f u n c t i o n s ,
i n c lu d in g  the  power o f  l i f e  and death o v e r  th e  Oba; i t s  p r i n c i p a l  organ was
113th e  " c o u n c i l  o f  s t a t e "  ( Oyo M i s i ) .  Among the  A s h a n t i  a ls o  i t  i s  sa id
t h a t  a s i m i l a r  e a r th  c u l t  was p r e v a le n t  b u t  w he the r o r  n o t  i t  was
114i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  i n  a s i m i l a r  manner i t  i s  n o t  s t a t e d .  Among the
c h ie f l e s s  s o c i e t i e s ,  i n  Ghana, th e  T a l l e n s i  a ls o  p r a c t i s e d  th e  " e a r th  c u l t "
which appears t o  have been i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  i n  th e  o f f i c e  o f  th e  " c u s to d ia n
o f  the  e a r t h "  and i n  the  "C y c le  o f  th e  G rea t F e s t i v a l s " .  The two
i n s t i t u t i o n s  appear t o  a c t  as i n t e g r a t i n g  fo r c e s  t o  harm onise r e l a t i o n s  and
115r e l i e v e  any te n s io n  t h a t  m ig h t  deve lop  between the  d i f f e r e n t  c la n s .
1 .175  I t  i s  s ta te d  t h a t  th e  " s e c r e t  s o c ie t y "  among th e  Ib o  and th e  T iv
o f  N ig e r ia  was a " t y p i c a l l y  j u d i c i a l  body d e c id in g  the  more i n t r a c t a b l e
116i n t r a - v i l l a g e  d i s p u t e s . "  The Ib o  s o c ie t y  was known as Mmo. I t s
members ac ted  as maskers and wBre rega rded  as a n c e s t r a l  s p i r i t s .  I t
c o u ld  a d m in is te r  o a th s  o f  v a r io u s  ty p e s ,  such as c o m p e l l in g  non-members
t o  obey th e  members, t o  speak th e  t r u t h ,  and c o u ld  a lso  impose and e n fo rce
117s a n c t io n s  a g a in s t  pe rsons  accused o f  c e r t a in  o f fe n c e s .  Among th e
E as te rn  Ib o ,  a c c o rd in g  to  B a s i l  D av idson , th e  Ekpe had l e g i s l a t i v e
as w e l l  as j u d i c i a l  f u n c t i o n s  and i t  a ls o  ac ted  as an e n fo rcem en t 
118agency. O ra c le s  and d i v i n e r s  a ls o  had im p o r ta n t  r o l e s .  Not o n ly
were th e y  c o n s u l te d  in  d e te c t in g  w i t c h c r a f t  o f fe n c e s  b u t  i t  i s  s a id  t h a t
some o f  them a ls o  f u n c t io n e d  i n  c o u r ts  which dec ided  c e r t a in  ty p e s  o f
119d is p u te s  between i n d i v i d u a l s  and a ls o  between v i l l a g e s .  Among the  T i v ,  
th e  Nyambus appears t o  ac t as a s o r t  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  de v ice  i n  t h a t  i t  
promoted th e  T iv  p o l i t i c a l  p h i lo s o p h y  which den ied  a c q u is i t io n  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  power by any p e rs o n .
1 .176 Seligman has r i g h t l y  observed t h a t  th e  s e c re t  s o c ie t i e s  o f  th e
West A f r ic a n  t r i b e s  were a ty p e  o f  m u tu a l  b e n e f i t  c lu b  and t h a t  they
fu n c t io n e d  v a r i o u s l y  as a r i t u a l  o f  i n i t i a t i o n ,  a sym bo lism , a p a r t i c u l a r  
121ceremony, e t c .  b u t  they  a lso  had a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  some 
im po r tance  as i n d ic a t e d  above. The dominant r o l e  o f  such cognate id e a s  as 
k in s h ip  and a n c e s to r -w o rs h ip  and i t s  w id e r  c o n n o ta t io n ,  the  b e l i e f  i n  
s p i r i t ,  which permeated th ro u g h  the  e n t i r e  f a b r i c  o f  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  
A f r ic a n  s o c ie t y ,  p o s s ib l y  c o n t r ib u te d  a g re a t  d e a l  i n  i n v o l v i n g  and 
s u s ta in in g  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  we have d is c u s s e d .  Uhat re le v a n ce  th e y  have 
i n  th e  p o l i t i c a l  s e t -u p  o f  th e  modern age i s ,  however, a d i f f e r e n t  m a t te r  
more a p p ro p r ia te  f o r  s o c i o l o g i c a l  re s e a rc h .
( i i )  The _Exten_ded__FamilX system
1.177 I t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  r e la t e  th e  system to  th e  concep ts  o f  c la n ,
k in s h ip  and l in e a g e  w h ich , as we have seen, formed th e  b a s ic  s o c i a l  and
122p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  A f r i c a n  s o c ie t i e s  g e n e r a l l y .  Indeed , B a s i l
Davidson c a l l s  i t  a "w o rk in g  o r g a n iz a t io n  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i o n "  o u ts id e
1 23p u re ly  f a m i ly  a f f a i r s .  I t  was t h i s  aspect which gave i t  i t s  " s p e c ia l
A f r i c a n  q u a l i t y " .  On th e  o th e r  hand, i t s  economic f u n c t io n  as a " n u c le a r
g ro u p "  which u s u a l l y  c o n s is te d  o f  a f a m i l y  u n i t  o f  t h re e  o r  f o u r  g e n e ra t io n s
and which p ro v id e d  " u l t im a t e  s e c u r i t y "  to  i t s  members, had an In d ia n
p a r a l l e l  i n  the i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  the  M ita k s h a ra  (H in d u )  j o i n t  f a m i l y  sys tem .
On the  o th e r  hand, i n  th e  a n c ie n t  In d ia n  v i l l a g e  assembly o r  th e  v i l l a g e
r e p u b l i c ,  we d id  n o t  f i n d  any p o l i t i c a l  r o le  b e in g  a t t r i b u t e d  to  th e  j o i n t
124f a m i l y .  However, i t  has been observed  t h a t  th e  v i l l a g e ,  i n  A f r i c a ,  was
125g e n e r a l l y  rega rded  as a " s o c i a l "  (and n o t  " p o l i t i c a l " )  u n i t  and t h a t  the
" v i l l a g e  com m unity" was an " e s s e n t i a l  economic u n i t "  and t h a t  a u t h o r i t y  in
th e  v i l l a g e  was v e s te d  in  the  heads o f  f a m i l i e s ,  c o u n c i l  o f  e ld e r s  and th e  
126c h ie f s .  Indeed , the  apparen t absence o f  a w e l l - d e f i n e d  and c le a r
d i s t i n c t i o n  between s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  id e a s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  c o u ld  o n ly
be u n d e rs to o d  in  te rm s o f  what we may c a l l  A f r ic a n  p h i lo s o p h y .
1 .178  The co m p o s i t io n  o f  an ex tended  fa m i l y  d i f f e r e d  a cc o rd in g  t o  th e
127r u l e  o f  re s id e n c e  p r e v a i l i n g  in  any c lan  o r  l i n e a g e ,  b u t  such f a m i l i e s
had c e r t a in  common ’ b a s ic  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s *  such as s h a r in g  th e  sane
compound o r  homestead and a c c e p t in g  th e  le a d e rs h ip  o f  th e  s e n io r  male
1 28member i n  th e  dom inant l i n e  o f  d e s c e n t .  How such a " re s id e n c e  g roup "
129f u n c t io n e d  and how i t  was m o t iv a te d  has been s ta te d  s u c c in c t l y  th u s :
the  p e o p le  have o rd e re d  t h e i r  a f f a i r s  i n s id e  a ’ j u r a l  
community* composed o f  a v a r y in g  number o f  n u c le a r  groups 
i n s i d e ,  t h a t  i s ,  th e  w id e s t  g ro u p in g  w i t h i n  which th e re  
was a m o ra l  o b l i g a t i o n  and a means u l t i m a t e l y  t o  s e t t l e  
d is p u te s  p e a c a b ly .
However, th e  A f r ic a n  s o c i a l  l i f e  has been in f lu e n c e d  n o t  o n ly  by Is lem
and C h r i s t i a n i t y  b u t  a ls o  by c h a l le n g e s  o f  th e  modern age as th e  system
s u i te d  a t im e  when, as has been s a id ,  " a c t i v i t i e s  were pe r fo rm ed  i n  common
130and th e  economy was s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  and based on s u b s is te n c e  a g r i c u l t u r e . 1*
N e v e r th e le s s ,  i t  has been fo u n d  t h a t  th e  system has r e ta in e d  i t s  appea l
1 31f o r  th e  modern to w n - d w e l le r .
1 .179 Ule have to  l o o k ,  how ever, i n  ano the r  d i r e c t i o n  to  a p p re c ia te  
th e  im p o r ta n ce  o f  t h e  concept o f  ex tended  f a m i ly  i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  the
pos t- indep endence  p o l i t i c a l  deve lopm ent i n  some o f  the  A f r ic a n  s t a t e s .
I t  has a p p a re n t ly  p ro v id e d  a s t r o n g  argument t o  r i d i c u l e  th e  c r i t i c i s m
t h a t  th e  O n e -pa r ty  S ta te  mas a n e g a t io n  o f  th e  concep ts  o f  democracy and
s o c ia l i s m .  A s m a l l  q u o ta t io n  from  P r e s id e n t  N y e r e r e 's  w r i t i n g  a p t l y  
132dem ons tra tes  t h i s :
We i n  A f r i c a  have no more need o f  b e in g  * c o n v e r te d 1 to  
s o c ia l i s m  than  we have o f  b e in g  ' t a u g h t 1 democracy.
Both  are ro o te d  i n  o u r  p a s t .  . . Modern A f r i c a n  s o c ia l is m  
can draw from  i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  h e r i t a g e  th e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  
S o c i e t y 1 as an e x te n s io n  o f  the  b a s ic  f a m i ly  u n i t . B u t  i t  
can no lo n g e r  c o n f in e  the  id e a  o f  the  s o c ia l  f a m i l y  w i t h i n  
th e  l i m i t s  o f  t h e  t r i b e , f n o r  indeed  th e  n a t i o n . . . beyond 
. . . even the  c o n t in e n t .  . . t o  m ank ind .)
[em phas is  added]
A lthough  t r i b a l i s m  was n o t  a prob lem o f  any acu teness in  T a n za n ia  as i t
was i n  Zambia o r  even i n  N ig e r i a  and Ghana, P re s id e n t  N y e r e r e 's  w a rn ing
a g a in s t  dangers in h e r e n t  i n  l i m i t i n g  the  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  id e a  to  t r i b e
was indeed  p r o p h e t i c .  Zambia saved h e r s e l f  by a d o p t in g  a o n e -p a r ty  s ta te
C o n s t i t u t i o n  b u t  b o th  Ghana and N ig e r i a ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  th e  l a t t e r ,  succumbed
to  t r i b a l i s m  and l o s t  a d e m o c ra t ic  governm ent. I t  has no d o u b t ,  been
r i g h t l y  a s s e r te d  t h a t  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  A f r ic a n  s t a te  based on k in s h ip  was a
p ro to ty p e  o f  an ex tended  f a m i l y  b u t  i t  has a ls o  t o  be remembered t h a t  th e
b o u n d a r ie s  o f  th e  modern s t a te s  no lo n g e r  co rresponded  w i th  the  t r i b a l  
133b o u n d a r ie s .
( i i i ) auj,_ , iusj:i_ce_and_tIne_tj?adij^ im ja 1 _ le qa 1_sy^s te  ni
1 .180  Any s tudy  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  A f r ic a n  ju r is p r u d e n c e  must ta k e  no te  o f
1 34c e r t a in  c l a s s i c  s tu d ie s  -  e . g .  o f  th e  L o z i  o f  Zambia by Gluckman, o f  th e
y\ 135T iv  o f  N o r th e rn  N ig e r i a  by Bohanjan and o f  th e  A s han t i  o f  Ghana by 
136R a t t r a y ,  as b e in g  t y p i c a l .  However, as we have a lre a d y  seen, and as
H a i le y  obse rves  o f  th e  b a raza  o f  East A f r i c a  and p a la v e r  o f  West A f r i c a ,
emphasis i n  d e c is io n -m a k in g  and d is p u te - s e t t le m e n t  everywhere appears t o
137be p la ce d  on d is c u s s io n  and consensus, even when th e re  was an 
i d e n t i f i a b l e  j u d i c i a l  o rgan such as t h s  '’ c o u r t s ’ ' o f  th e  c h ie f s ,  w i t h  th e  
apparen t e x c e p t io n  o f  th e  I s la m ic  H a u sa -F u la n i  s t a t e s  and perhaps o f  a
few  o th e r  " c h i e f l y "  s t a t e s  h a v in g  an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  j u d i c i a l
o r g a n is a t io n  e n co u ra g in g  some s o r t  o f  a d v e r s e r ia l  fo rm  o f  l i t i g a t i o n ,
138 139such as Buganda and A s h a n t i ,  where th e re  was even a re q u ire m e n t
o f  c o u r t  fe e s .  The A f r i c a n  t r a d i t i o n a l  p rocess  o f  d i s p u te - s e t t le m e n t  was
n o t  a c c u s a to r ia l  e i t h e r ,  even when th e  d is p u te  was o f  a " c r i m i n a l "
c h a r a c te r ,  as Lucy f l a i r  appears t o  suggest i n  d is c u s s in g  the  p rocess  i n
140vogue among the  Arusha o f  T an g a n y ika .  The g e n e ra l  A f r ic a n  p a t te r n  
p o s s ib ly  r e f l e c t e d  th e  c e n t r a l  id e a  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  ju r is p r u d e n c e  w h ich , as
has been p o in te d  o u t ,  p o s tu la te d  l i t i g a t i o n  based on d u t ie s  and n o t
. 141r i g h t s .
1 .181 What Gluckman w r i t e s  o f  th e  L o z i  was t r u e  o f  a lm ost eve ry  A f r ic a n
s o c ie t y ,  nam ely , i r r e m e d ia b le  b re s k in g -u p  o f  r e l a t i o n s h ip s  was
d is a p p ro v e d .  The " c o u r t "  p la y e d  a c o n c i l i a t o r y  r o l e  and th e  " ju d g e s "
co n s id e re d  the  t o t a l  h i s t o r y  o f  r e l a t i o n s  between th e  p a r t i e s  and in  th e
" p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t "  a c i v i l  s u i t  was sometimes c o n v e r te d  i n t o  a c r im in a l
case . The c e n t r a l  f i g u r e  i n  th e  j u d i c i a l  p ro ce ss  i s  t h a t  o f  a " re a s o n a b le
man" -  a s ta n d a rd  by which the  conduct o f  th e  p a r t i e s  i s  ad judged and i t
i s  s a id  t h a t  th e  ju d g e s  are r e l u c t a n t  to  su p p o r t  the  p a r t y  who i s  r i g h t  in
1 42" la w "  b u t  wrong i n  " j u s t i c e " .  I t  i s  s ta te d  t h a t  they  im p o r t  e q u i t y ,
s o c i a l  w e l fa re  and p u b l i c  p o l i c y  i n t o  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  law  and th e  
j u d i c i a l  p rocess  i s  seen as "an a t te m p t to  s p e c i f y  th e  le g a l  concep ts  
w i t h i n  e t h i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s "  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  s o c ie t y "  and 
th u s  d e v e lo p in g  the  law to  cope w i th  s o c ia l  change .143
1 .182  C e r ta in  r u le s  o f  subs tance  as w e l l  as p rocedure  p re s e n t  a c lose
p a r a l l e l  to  Anglo-Saxon ju r i s p r u d e n c e .  A r u l e r  cou ld  " m u lc t  o r  p u n is h "
a person o n ly  a f t e r  t r i a l  i n  c o u r t  and he h im s e l f  was n o t  above law
1 44a l th o u g h  he was n o t  t r i e d  i n  h i s  own c o u r t .  P e n a l t ie s  which a 
c o u r t  c o u ld  impose were d e a th ,  t h r o t t l i n g  and f l o g g in g ;  im p r isonm en t was 
unknown.143 The p resum p tion  o f  innocence was adopted i n  c r im in a l  t r i a l s 143 
and th e  r u le  aud i a l te re m  partem  was n o rm a l ly  observed as a ls o  c e r t a in  r u le s
o f  ev idence  b e a r in g  a s t r i k i n g  resemblance t o  E n g l is h  r u l e s ,  such as th e
n e c e s s i t y  o f  t e s t i n g  ev idence by c ro ss  e x a m in a t io n  w h ich ,  however, th e
147ju d g e s  them se lves  u n d e r to o k .  Indeed , c ro s s  e xa m in a t io n  was one o f  the
th r e e  s ta g e s  i n  which " j u d i c i a l  l o g i c "  o p e ra te d ,  th e  o th e r  two b e in g  th e
t a k in g  o f  a d e c is io n  on th e  ev idence  and th e  e x p o s i t io n  o f  law  i n  s u p p o r t  
148o f  th e  d e c is io n .  N eed less  t o  say th e  f i r s t  and th e  la s t - m e n t io n e d  
fe a tu r e s  c e r t a i n l y  bore  a d i s t i n c t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c .
1 .183  The ju r is p ru d e n c e  o f  th e  T iv  p ro v id e s  a s tudy  i n  c o n t r a s t  as, 
u n l i k e  th e  L o z i ,  t h e i r  s o c ie t y  was " c h i e f l e s s " .  The T i v ,  Bohannan 
o b s e rv e s ,  do n o t  d i s t i n g u i s h  between a s in  and a c r im e and breach  o f  th e
norm which has t o  be c o u n te ra c te d  e i t h e r  by s e l f - h e l p  o r  by r i t u a l  was
143c a l l e d  i f e r . A few o t h e r  concep ts  are a ls o  n o te w o r th y :  . j i r , which
150means a c o u r t  and a lso  a case; kweqhbo, which i n d i c a t e s  the  dangerous
and a n t i - s o c i a l  e lement i n  any human a c t i v i t y  and th e  kwaqhdanq which
1 51i n d i c a t e s  a t h i n g ,  person o r  ac t which i s  m o r a l l y  r e p r e h e n s ib le .
I n c e s t ,  h o m ic id e  and sometimes a d u l t e r y  are s a id  to  r e q u i r e  r i t u a l
r e p a r a t i o n .  However, h o m ic id e ,  as a lso  rape and s la v e - d e a l in g ,  cannot
now be t r i e d  by the  moots which are no t  re c o g n is e d  by government as
c o u r ts  b u t  are c a l l e d  " j i r  a t  home" o r  " j i r  o f  th e  l i n e a g e " ,  and which
s t i l l  h a nd le  th e  i f  e r  o f  w i t c h c r a f t .  T h e f t  and a s s a u l t  are o th e r
n u m e r ic a l l y  im p o r ta n t  i f e r . P e n a l ty  f o r  s t e a l i n g  was e i t h e r  revenge o r
1 52r i d i c u l e  and a lso  r e t u r n  o f  th e  o b je c t  o r  i t s  e q u iv a le n t .
1 .184  A i i r  can be a r b i t r a t e d  by any one b e fo re  whom th e  p a r t i e s  are
w i l l i n g  t o  d is c u s s ,  u s u a l l y  a t a m arke t which i s  i n  th e  charge o f  e i t h e r  a
153headman o r  a group o f  t h r e e  o r  f o u r  e ld e r s .  Among th e  T iv  th e  em phasis
i s  on s e l f - h e l p .  The p a r t i e s  may be a l lo w e d  t o  c a r r y  o u t  th e  d e c is io n  o f
th e  j i r . One may p r o t e c t  o n e ’ s own r i g h t  even u s in g  v io le n c e  and a
1 54r e p r i s a l  by way o f  revenge may a lso  be r e s o r te d  t o .  I t  i s  s ta te d  t h a t
1 55th e  key co n c e p t ,  th e  . j i r , embodied th e  concept o f  law  among the  T i v
1
and, as C a r ls to n  s u g g e s ts ,  t h i s  was r e la t e d  to  th e  concept o f  1t a r 1 as w e l l
so t h a t  e v e n tu a l l y  i t  became a q u e s t io n  o f  r e s t o r i n g  s o c ia l  harmony as in
the  case o f  th e  L o z i .  The same p r i n c i p l e  has been n o t ic e d  i n  the  case o f
ano the r  Zambian t r i b e ,  th e  N g o n i .  I t  has been observed t h a t  th e  judges  who
were a ls o  c o u n c i l l o r s  and v i l l a g e  headmen had an i n t e r e s t  n o t  o n ly  in
good a d m in is t r a t i o n  b u t  a lso  i n  s o c ia l  deve lopm ent, i n  ’ o r d e r 1 and a lso  
1 57' l a y ' .  T h is  was p o s s ib ly  th e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  p r im acy  accorded i n  the  
t r a d i t i o n a l  A f r i c a n  p o l i t y  and s o c ie t y  t o  s o c i a l  r a th e r  than p o l i t i c a l  
norms as th e  s ta te  was g e n e r a l l y  c o - te rm in u s  w i th  s o c ie t y .
1 .185 A d e p a r tu re  from  th e  t r u l y  t r a d i t i o n a l  id e a s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s
was, however, t o  be n o t ic e d  i n  th e  ch ie fdom s and kingdoms e v in c in g  a
s t ro n g  c e n t r i p e t a l  tendency in  te rm s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power and i n s t i t u t i o n s .
As R a t t ra y  o b s e rv e s ,  among th e  A s h a n t i  a ls o ,  b e fo re  the  r i s e  o f  a p o w e r fu l
a r i s t o c r a c y ,  th e  c h ie f  aim o f  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  was t o  see t h a t  th e  p o s s ib le
causes o f  th e  d is p u te  were avo ided  and a c o n c i l i a t i o n  was b ro u g h t  about
158between p a r t i e s  t e m p o r a r i l y  e s t ra n g e d  by l i t i g a t i o n .  L a te r ,  i t  became
th e  r u le  t h a t  th e  o f fe n c e s  com m itted w i t h i n  th e  k in d re d  group had to  be
r e f e r r e d  to  the  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  d e c is io n .  Even the  A s h a n t is ,  i t
appears , made l i t t l e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between a s in  and a c r im e ;  th e  c e n t r a l
a u t h o r i t y  was bound to  pun ish  o n ly  when "an ac t  h a te d  by the  t r i b e ”  was 
159com m it ted . Fo r  such a c ts  as a t h e f t  th e re  was no d i r e c t  r e d re s s ,  n o t  
even s e l f - h e l p .  The i n j u r e d  p a r t y  d e l i b e r a t e l y  com m itted a s in  to  a t t r a c t  
th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  th e  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  when th e  m a t te r  was i n d i r e c t l y  
i n v e s t i g a t e d .  The death p e n a l ty  was p ro b a b ly  unknown b u t  a person cou ld  
be " e x p e l l e d ”  o r  s o ld  as a s la v e  to  a v o id  a l i k e l y  b lo o d  feud  on account 
o f  c o rp o ra te  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  th e  k in d re d  group i f  an o f fe n c e  was 
com m itted w i t h i n  a c l a n . ^ ^
1 .186  I t  i s  s ta te d  t h a t  f o r  c e r t a in  a c ts  co n s id e re d  " h a t e f u l  to  the
t r i b e ”  ( Oman A k y iw a d ie ) an A s h a n t i  was l i a b l e  t o  summary a r r e s t  and t r i a l
161w i th o u t  f u r t h e r  l e g a l  f o r m a l i t y  and t o  s u f f e r  c a p i t a l  pun ishm en t.  A 
murder was a ls o  c o n s id e re d  such an ac t  b u t  i t  i s  observed  t h a t  i t  was
because o f  th e  d read o f  s u p e r n a tu ra l  r e p r i s a l  and t h a t  one c o u ld  no t
162’•buy o n e ’ s head”  i f  he had com m itted a m u rd e r .  Among o th e r  a c ts
p u n is h a b le  w i th  death were a t te m p ted  s u ic id e ,  c e r t a in  k in d s  o f  se xu a l
o f fe n c e s ,  c e r t a in  fo rm s  o f  abuses and a s s a u l t s ,  in v o c a t io n  o f  a curse
163upon a c h ie f  and w i t c h c r a f t  e t c .  Among th e  Baganda o f  East A f r i c a  
who had a p o w e r fu l  kingdom s a n c t io n s  as w e l l  as p rocedu re  were e q u a l ly  
a r b i t r a r y .  Suspected pe rsons  were fo r c e d  t o  subm it  to  a po ison  o r d e a l .
For a c c id e n ta l  h o m ic id e  th e  sentence was a f i n e  b u t  f o r  p e t t y  t h e f t ,  
m u t i l a t i o n .  There were no p r is o n s  and men were pu t i n t o  s to c k s .  Bu t 
even th e re  i t  was th e  dread o f  th e  s u p e r n a tu r a l  r a t h e r  than the  f e a r  o f  
p e n a l  s a n c t io n  e n fo rc e d  by th e  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  t h a t  appeared t o  ac t 
as a d e t e r r e n t ^
1.187 The range o f  s a n c t io n s  i n  the t r a d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  system o f
A f r i c a  was in d e e d  a wide one and co u ld  be c l a s s i f i e d ,  as has been
sugges te d , i n t o  t r a n s i t o r y  and perm anen t. In  a d d i t io n  t o  com pensa tion ,
f i n e s  and c o r p o r a l  pun ishm en t,  a tem pora ry  ban ishm ent c o u ld  a ls o  be
in c lu d e d  i n  the  f i r s t  group b u t  n o t  im p r isonm en t which was a lm ost unknown.
Death and permanent ban ishm en t,  i t  i s  s a id ,  a p p e r ta in e d  to  the  group o f
permanent s a n c t io n s  b u t  how s la v e r y  c o u ld  be c l a s s i f i e d  has n o t  been
s ta te d  a l thoug h  m en t ion  has been made o f  i t s  use a g a in s t  h a b i t u a l  o f f e n d e r s .
Both ban ishm en t and s a le  o f  a person i n t o  s la v e r y  p ro b a b ly  produced a lm ost
s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s  i n  v ie w  o f  th e  im p o r ta n ce  a t ta c h e d  t o  the  concep ts  o f
k in s h ip  and extended f a m i l y  i n  A f r ic a n  s o c ie t i e s  g e n e r a l l y ;  ban ishm ent a ls o
served  as an a l t e r n a t i v e  s a n c t io n  a g a in s t  h a b i t u a l  o f fe n d e rs  l i k e  w i tc h e s  
167and w i tc h  d o c to r s .  I t  th u s  appears t h a t  ban ishm en t,  which l a t e r  
reappeared  as ’’ d e p o r t a t i o n ' ’ i n  th e  c o l o n i a l  l e g a l  system , was a p o w e r fu l  
s a n c t io n  i n  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  system and was used f o r  s e r io u s  o f fe n c e s .  
Ano ther d i s t i n c t i v e  f e a tu r e  o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  system o f  A f r i c a ,  
demands s p e c ia l  em phas is : norms o f  s o c ia l  b e h a v io u r  g e n e r a l ly  c o n s t i t u t e d
th e  law  and the  b reach o f  any norm was lo oked  upon as d i s t u r b in g  th e  s o c ia l
16
e q u i l i b r i u m  which c a l l e d  f o r  measures t o  r e s to r e  i t  th ro u g h  d is c u s s io n ,  
c o n c i l i a t i o n ,  compromise and s e t t le m e n t .
( C) A s h o r t  s tu d y  o f  s e le c t  areas o f  im pact o f  c o l o n i a l  r u l e  on 
t r a d i t i o n a l  id e a s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  
(a )  U ijtch>c^aJPt_^d-_tj ie->lawi_ in > A f r i c a
1 .188 I t  has been observed by P ro fe s s o r  U .S . Read t h a t  th e  A f r i c a n
l e g i s l a t u r e s  as w e l l  as th e  j u d i c i a r y  adopted an a m b iv a le n t  a t t i t u d e  in
d e a l in g  w i th  w i t c h c r a f t  b u t  th e  remark a p p l ie s  more a p p r o p r ia t e l y  t o  th e
168i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  th e  c o l o n i a l  e ra .  There i s  no doubt t h a t  the  B r i t i s h  
r e a l i s e d  e a r l y  t h e  im po rtance  o f  a n th r o p o lo g ic a l  s tudy  o f  s o c i a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  A f r ic a n  s o c ie t i e s  a f t e r  the  g re a t  A sh a n t i  
u p r i s i n g  t h a t  took  p la c e  in  th e  Gold Coast f o l l o w in g  demand f o r  s u r re n d e r  
o f  th e  '’go lden s t o o l ” . Such s tu d ie s  u n f o r t u n a t e l y  d id  n o t  ach ieve  th e  
d e s i re d  r e s u l t .  Perhaps c o l o n i a l  l e g i s l a t o r s  and judges  a l i k e  co n s id e re d  
i t  t o  be t h e i r  d i v i n e  du ty  to  d is c h a rg e  c o n s c ie n t io u s ly  such 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  as appeared to  them to  be v i t a l  to  t h e i r  " c i v i l i z i n g ”  
m is s io n  in  the  " d a r k ”  c o n t in e n t .
1.189 However, th e re  can be no doubt t h a t  re le va n ce  o f  th e  A f r ic a n  
concept o f  w i t c h c r a f t  i n  the  f i e l d  o f  enac tm en t,  en fo rcem en t and in  the  
a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  law  as w e l l  as o f  j u s t i c e  has a doub le  edge. On one 
s id e  s tands  th e  u rg e n t  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  p u t t i n g  an e a r l y  end t o  th e  p r a c t i c e  
and b e l i e f  i n  w i t c h c r a f t .  On th e  o th e r  s id e  s tands  the  e q u a l ly  p re s s in g  
problem o f  p r o t e c t i n g  r i g h t s  re c o g n is e d  under the  t r a d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  
sys tem . A d m i t te d ly  th e  l a t t e r  does n o t  conform to  Western n o t io n s  o f  law  
and j u s t i c e .  A c h o ice  has t h e r e f o r e  t o  be made and i t  appears t h a t  th e  
le a d e rs  o f  f r e e  A f r i c a  have made t h i s  c h o ic e .  The t r a d i t i o n a l  id e a s  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  do n o t  appea l t o  modern A f r ic a n  aims and a t t i t u d e s  and th e  
c o l o n i a l  w i t c h c r a f t  laws t h e r e f o r e  h o ld  th e  f i e l d  unde r the  new s e t -u p  a ls o ,  
d e s p i te  the  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  m o t i v a t i o n .
1 .190 Of th e  Azande peop le  o f  C e n t r a l  A f r i c a ,  P ro fe s s o r  Seligman observes
t h a t :  " .  . . w i t c h c r a f t  i s  a no rm a l even t o f  everyday  l i f e  th ro u g h
169which he may s u f f e r  a t  any hou r o f  day o r  n i g h t . "  In  w r i t i n g  o f  th e
K ik u yu  o f  Kenya, K e n y a t ta  d e s c r ib e s  w i t c h c r a f t  as one type  o f  "m a g ic a l
p r a c t i c e "  and s t a t e s  t h a t  such p r a c t i c e s ,  " l i k e  r e l i g i o n  are i n s p i r e d  by
th 8  d a i l y  economic and s o c i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  p e o p le .  . . th e y  run
th ro u g h  and f e r t i l i s e  these  a c t i v i t i e s  and r e f e r  them to  th e  m y s te r io u s
170fo r c e s  which su r ro u n d  human l i f e . "  R a t t r a y ,  i n  w r i t i n g  o f  th e  A s h a n t is
o f  G hana ,. ob se rve s  t h a t  w i t c h c r a f t  was co n s id e re d  as a " s i n "  a l l  o ve r
A f r i c a  and t h a t  " i t  was rega rded  by th e  community w i th  p a r t i c u l a r
171dread  and a b h o r re n c e . "  [em phas is  added] The custom ary law i n  N ig e r i a ,
a n o th e r  o b s e rv e r  p o in t s  o u t ,  v i s i t e d  th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  w i t c h c r a f t  w i th
s e r io u s  pun ishm en t as "a  w i tc h  was n o t  o n ly  a d i s t u r b in g  e lem ent i n  the
172community b u t  a ls o  a t h r e a t  to  i t s  s u p e r n a tu r a l  g o v e rn a n c e ."  N ade l 
speaks o f  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  the  " a n t i - w i t c h c r a f t  s o c ie t y "  ( ndako"gbpyaT 
end o f  th e  o f f i c s  o f  Le lu  ( l a t e r ,  S a o i) whom he d e s c r ib e s  as th e  
" C o n t r o l l e r  o f  W i t c h c r a f t "  unde r th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  system o f  th e  
C h ie fs  o f  th e  Nupe t r i b e  o f  N o r th e rn  N ig e r ia  and adds t h a t  the
173i n s t i t u t i o n  r e t a in e d  i t s  appea l even unde r th e  Mohammedan F u la n i  E m irs .
1.191 I t  i s  t h e r e fo r e  necessa ry  t o  see how th e  b e l i e f  o f  w i t c h c r a f t
worked i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  A f r i c a n  s o c i e t i e s ,  th e  r a t i o n a l e  o f  these  b e l i e f s  and
th e  s a n c t io n s  a g a in s t  such p r a c t i c e s  in  a l i t t l e  more d e t a i l .  A cc u s a t io n s
o f  w i t c h c r a f t ,  says  P ro fe s s o r  Gluckman, arose o u t  o f  c o m p e t i t io n  between
174k i n s f o l k .  Such a c c u s a t io n s  m a in ta in  the  e g a l i t a r i a n  b a s is  o f  s o c i e t y .
In  a way, w i t c h c r a f t  a c ts  as a means o f  s o c ia l  c o n t r o l .  Even when th e re
i s  acute s h o r ta g e  o f  f o o d s t u f f  and fam ine  c o n d i t io n s  p r e v a i l ,  p r i c e s  do 
17 5n o t  r i s e .  Em otions such as anger, h a t r e d  and je a lo u s y  are a ls o
connec ted  w i th  such b e l i e f s  and as such w i t c h c r a f t  a ls o  a c ts  as a g e n e ra l
code o f  m o r a l i t y .  Les t he p rovokes  ano th e r  to  b e w itc h  h im , such f e e l i n g s
176have to  be c o n t r o l l e d .  He a lso  t e l l s  us t h a t  such b e l i e f s  do n o t
o p e ra te  in  a l l  s o c ia l  r e l a t i o n s h i p :  a commoner does n o t  accuse a n o b le ;
177a man u s u a l l y  accuses h i s  n e ig h b o u r .  As a th e o ry  o f  c a u s a t io n  a ls o
such b e l i e f s  have t h e i r  due im p o r ta n c e .  When an Azande s u f f e r s  a m is fo r tu n e
he c o n s u l t s  o r a c le s  and w i t c h - d o c to r s  t o  i d e n t i f y  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  w i tc h
178which has caused i t .
1 .192  In  a d e t a i l e d  s tu d y  o f  th e  b e l i e f  o f  w i t c h c r a f t  among th e  Azande,
P ro fe s s o r  E v a n s -P r i t c h a rd  has p resen ted  us w i th  c e r t a in  v a lu a b le  i n f o r m a t i o n .
I t  i s  b e l ie v e d  t h a t  c e r t a in  pe rsons  possess w i t c h c r a f t - s u b s ta n c e  i n  t h e i r
body which grows w i th  the  body . O lde r  persons  are t h e r e f o r e  c o n s id e re d  to
179be more p o te n t  w i tc h e s .  W i t c h c r a f t  i s ,  however, n o t  m e re ly  a p h y s ic a l
180t r a i t  b u t  i s  a ls o  i n h e r i t e d .  W itches  are t o  be found  among bo th  men
and women b u t  women are be w itch e d  o n ly  by t h e i r  own sex w h i le  men are 
1 81by e i t h e r  sex . E v a n s -P r i t c h a rd  p o in t s  ou t  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between what
he c a l l s  "good m a g ic "  and s o rc e ry  and a ls o  between a s o r c e r e r  and a w i t c h .
182W i t c h c r a f t ,  o r a c le s  and m ag ic , he says , are th re e  s id e s  o f  a t r i a n g l e .
We m ig h t  say from  what he su g g e s ts ,  a c t io n  o f  th e  o r a c le  i s  a t once
d ia g n o s t i c  and p re v e n t iv e  w h i le  t h a t  o f  m agic  i s  p o s i t i v e ,  i n  com bating
w i t c h c r a f t .  A s o r c e r e r  uses th e  te c h n iq u e  o f  magic and d e r iv e s  h i s  power
from  m e d ic in e  w h i le  a w i tc h  ac ts  w i t h o u t  r i t e s  and s p e l l s ,  in s te a d  u s in g
1 83h e r e d i t a r y  p s y c h o -p s y c h ic a l  powers t o  a t t a i n  h i s  o r  he r  ends .
1 .193  However, good m agic  even, says E v a n s - P r i t c h a r d ,  may be l e t h a l
b u t  i t  s t r i k e s  a t t h a t  person o n ly  who had com mitted the  c r im e ;  good
m e d ic in e s  cannot be used f o r  e v i l  p u rp o se s .  Bad magic i s  used ou t o f
s p i t e  a g a in s t  men who have n o t  b roken any law  o r  m o ra l  c o n v e n t io n .  Good
m agic  i s  open; s o rc e ry  i s  a s e c re t  r i t e .  Sometimes i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o
d i s t i n g u i s h  between th e  tw o : m agic  o f  vengeance i s  most d e s t r u c t i v e  b u t
a t th e  same t im e  i t  i s  a ls o  c o n s id e re d  as "most h o n o u ra b le " .  I t  i s
rega rded  as th e  judge w'ho seeks o u t  th e  person who i s  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  any
184death occas ioned  by m agic and a c t in g  as an e x e c u t io n e r ,  s la y s  h im .
185He a lso  obse rves  t h a t  most m ag ic  i s  male p r e r o g a t iv e  and t h a t  o ld  and
* no  
i u o
1 8 6m id d le -a g e d  men ars  u s u a l l y  owners o f  m e d ic in e s .  S a n c t io n s  a ls o  
d i f f e r e d :  compensation in  o lden  t im e s  c o u ld  be p a id  f o r  death caused by 
w i t c h c r a f t  b u t  a s o r c e r e r  i n  i d e n t i c a l  c i rcu m s ta n ce s  was i n v a r i a b l y  p u t
f  H 4-k 187t o  d e a th .
1 .194  I t  i s  n o t  u n n a tu r a l  t h a t  th e re  shou ld  be some measure o f
d i f f e r e n c e  in  so f a r  as th e  s a n c t io n s  are concerned . D e sp i te  th e  f a c t  t h a t
in  a lm ost a l l  A f r ic a n  s o c ie t i e s  d i s t i n c t i o n  between c r im es  and c i v i l
i n j u r i e s  was I b s s  re c o g n is e d ,  the  o f fe n c e  o f  w i t c h c r a f t  was c o n s id e re d
as a p u b l i c  wrong, which P ro fe s s o r  Alan M i ln e r  c a te g o r is e s  as an o f fe n c e
1 88a g a in s t  s u p e r n a tu r a l  power. He c o n s id e rs  o rd e a l  i t s e l f  a c t in g  as a
s e l f - e x e c u t i n g  s a n c t io n ;  i t s  f u n c t io n  was bo th  p ena l and e v i d e n t i a r y .
K e n y a t ta  g iv e s  a g ra p h ic  d e s c r ip t i o n  o f  the  p ro ce e d in g  a c c o rd in g  to
custom ary law taken  a g a in s t  a w i tc h  from  a c c u s a t io n  u n t i l  h i s  p u b l i c
e x e c u t io n  by b u r n in g  him to  d e a th .  In  s p i t e  o f  such s te p s  as a r r e s t  and
t r i a l  w i th  which the  community as a whole i s  a s s o c ia te d ,  the  f i n a l
judgment says K e n y a t ta ,  i s  passed by the  kinsmen o f  th e  w i tc h  h im s e l f :
i t  i s  some o f  h i s  own n e a r  r e l a t i o n s  who have to  s e t  f i r e  to  h i s  body a f t e r
189a l l  h i s  kinsmen f o r m a l l y  denounce and disown h im . Read a lso  t e l l s
us o f  a " s u s p e c te d "  w i tc h  b e in g  " t r i e d "  a t a la rg e  p u b l i c  g a th e r in g  and
190sentenced to  d e a th .  Ano ther o b s e rv e r  speaks o f  " s e c r e t  t r i a l "  i n  the
f o r e s t  b e fo re  e x e c u t io n  by th e  r e l a t i v e s  o f  th e  w i t c h .  At such t r i a l s
191presum p tion  o f  g u i l t  loomed la r g e ,  he p o in t s  o u t .  Read c o r r e c t l y  p o in t s
o u t  t h a t  i n  s m a l l ,  homogenous, i n t e g r a t e d  s o c ie t i e s  in  A f r i c a  g r e a te r
f'-'emphasis was l a i d  on such s a n c t io n s  as s e l f - h e l p ,  r e s t i t u t i o n  and 
com pensa tion . M i ln e r  a ls o  speaks o f  th e  wide range o f  s a n c t io n s  p r e v a le n t  
under custom ary law f o r  d i f f e r e n t  o f fe n c e s .  I t  i s  n o t  t h e r e fo r e  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  conce ive  o f  cases i n  some s o c ie t i e s  where th e  s a n c t io n  o f  s e l f - h e l p  
even i n  such o f fe n c e s  as w i t c h c r a f t  ga ined  r e c o g n i t i o n  i n  v ie w  o f  th e  
concept o f  p resum p tion  o f  g u i l t  t h a t  p r e v a i le d  when " t r i a l s "  to o k  p la c e .
1 .195 I t  i s  c l e a r l y  n o t  p o s s ib le  to  examine i n  d e t a i l  i n  t h i s  s tu d y  the
w i t c h c r a f t  laws o f  East and C e n t ra l  A f r i c a  and the  p r o v i s io n s  o f  t h e
C r im in a l  Codes o f  Ghana and N ig e r ia  r e l a t i n g  to  w i t c h c r a f t  and a l l i e d
o f fe n c e s .  Even so , we may i d e n t i f y  th e  problem area which la y  around th e
defence in  hom ic ide  cases when p le a s  such as p r o v o c a t io n ,  s e l f - d e f e n c e ,
m is taken  f a c t ,  were pu t fo rw a rd  on b e h a l f  o f  th e  d e fe n d a n t .  The de fence
was based on th e  b e l i e f  i n  w i t c h c r a f t ,  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  th e  c u lp a b le
ac t was e v id e n t l y  sought i n  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  s a n c t io n s ,  such as o f  s e l f - h e l p .
In  t r y i n g  to  g ra p p le  w i th  th e  d i f f i c u l t  problem which was loaded  w i th  a
g re a t  d e a l  o f  s o c i o l o g i c a l  and a n th r o p o lo g ic a l  b ia s ,  C o u r ts  t r i e d  t o
evo lve  c e r t a in  t e s t s .  I t  was h e ld  t h a t  th e  b e l i e f  ought to  be genu ine  and 
192re a s o n a b le .  How f a r  th e  t e s t s  were s a t i s f a c t o r y  was a n o th e r  m a t t e r ,  f o r
th e y  f o l lo w e d  from  Western n o t io n s  o f  law  and j u s t i c e .  What concerns  us
most i s  th e  a p p l i c a t io n  o f  these  t e s t s  and w i th  due re s p e c t  i t  i s  s u b m it te d
193t h a t  th e y  were n o t  c o r r e c t l y  a p p l ie d .  C o u r ts  c o n s id e re d  what was 
genuine and reasonab le  from  th e  v ie w p o in t  o f  an Englishman o f  the  
t w e n t ie t h  c e n tu r y .  I t  w i l l  be a p p o s i te  to  r e c a l l  in  t h i s  c o n te x t  t h a t  
b e l i e f  i n  w i t c h c r a f t  once p r e v a i le d  i n  England to o ,  and t h a t  i t  fa d e d  ou t 
g r a d u a l ly  w i th  th e  advent o f  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  r e v o l u t i o n .  However, i t  may 
a lso  be p o in te d  ou t  t h a t  a l th o u g h  the  c o l o n i a l  r u l e r s  sought t o  t a c k le  th e  
problem in  A f r i c a  th ro u g h  l e g a l  means th e  law enac ted  i n  N ig e r i a  and Ghana 
la ck e d  the  f o r c e ,  v i t a l i t y  and concern t h a t  i s  t o  be found  i n  the
19comprehensive enactm ents  o f  the  f i v e  c o u n t r ie s  o f  East and C e n t r a l  A f r i c a .
1.196 P ro fe s s o r  A.N. A llo tfc  r e f e r s  to  some dec ided  cases, such as those
195 196FABINO and GALIKUWA , o b s e rv in g  t h a t  th e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  E n g l is h  law
in  c r im in a l  m a t te r s  may be " v a r i e d "  t o  take  account o f  A f r i c a n  b e l i e f s  and
197p a t te r n s  o f  b e h a v io u r .  Indeed , in  FABINO th e  c o u r t  accepted  th e  p le a  o f  
p ro v o c a t io n  and a l t e r e d  th e  c o n v ic t io n  from  m urder t o  m a n s la u g h te r  b u t  i n  
th e  o th e r  cases th e  p le a  f a i l e d .  As a lre a d y  s u b m it te d  th e  c o u r ts  d id  n o t  
ac t i n  a u n i fo rm  manner in  a p p ly in g  th e  t e s t s  they  had e v o lv e d .  The 
c o l o n i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e  d id  n o t  f e e l  i n c l i n e d  to  c re a te  a new c a te g o ry  o f
defence in  hom ic ide  cases i n  the  c o n te x t  o f  p e rv a s iv e  b e l i e f  i n  w i t c h c r a f t
b u t  th e  m a t te r  deserves  th e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  independen t l e g i s l a t u r e s .
Whether o r  n o t  such a measure i s  necessa ry  unde r th e  a l t e r e d  c o n d i t io n s
o f  the  independence e ra  can o n ly  be answered a f t e r  i n t e n s iv e  s o c i o l o g i c a l
s tu d ie s  w i th  emphasis on ’' s o c i a l i s a t i o n ’1, " c u l t u r e  p a t t e r n s " ,  "v a lu e
sys tem s" w h ich , as A . I .  R icha rd  p o in t s  o u t ,  B r i t i s h  a n th r o p o lo g is t s
198have so f a r  n e g le c te d .  N a d e l ’ s o b s e r v a t io n ,  made i n  h i s  s tudy  o f  th e
Nupe o f  N o r th e rn  N ig e r i a ,  t h a t  modern law  c o u r ts  have f a i l e d  to  a f f o r d
p r o t e c t i o n  to  th e  s o - c a l l e d  v i c t i m s  o f  w i t c h c r a f t ,  a ls o  deserves  
199a t t e n t i o n .
(b )  ^ In d _ i re c t  _Rule_^
( i )  _A G_eneral V iew
1.197 In  1613 the  "Company o f  A d v e n tu re rs  o f  London t r a d in g  i n t o
p a r t s  o f  A f r i c a "  was g ra n te d  a Royal C h a r te r  which e s ta b l i s h e d  f o r t s  in
Gambia and a lso  in  the  Gold Coast between 1618 and 1631. In  a subsequent
C h a r te r  g ra n te d  by K in g  C h a r le s  I I  i n  1660 th e re  appeared a power t o  use
m a r t i a l  law a lm ost s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  c o n fe r re d  upon th e  East I n d ia  Company.
The r e le v a n t  r e c i t a l  in  the  C h a r te r  ( P a te n t  R o l l s ,  12 Car I I ,  p a r t  x x i ) ,
was as f o l l o w s :
. . . g ra n t  u n to  them f u l l  power, l i c e n s e  and a u t h o r i t y  to  
name and a p p o in t  Governor from  t im e  to  t im e  i n  th e  s a id
p l a n t a t i o n .  . . who s h a l l  have f u l l  power and a u t h o r i t y .  . .
t o  execu te  and is s u e  w i t h in  the  s a id  p la n t a t i o n  the  law  
c a l l e d  th e  m a r t i a l  law f o r  the  defence o f  the  s a id
p la n t a t i o n  a g a in s t  any f o r e ig n  in v a s io n  o r  dom es t ic
i n s u r r e c t i o n  o r  r e b e l l i o n .  . .
202S i m i l a r l y ,  as happened i n  Bombay, when a " c o u r t  o f  j u d i c a t u r e "  was
e s ta b l i s h e d  f o r  " f o r t s " ,  " p l a n t a t i o n s "  and " f a c t o r i e s "  on the  Gold Coast,
by a subsequent C h a r te r  (P a te n t  R o l l s ,  24 Car I I ,  p a r t  i i i )  i t  was
c o n s t i t u t e d  w i th  "one person le a rn e d  in  c i v i l  law  and two m e rch a n ts "  b u t
203i t  was to  d e a l  w i th  m a r i t im e  cases o n ly .
1 .198  However, i t  cannot be s a id  t h a t  th e  two e a r l y  C h a r te rs  r e f e r r e d
to  above i n  any way e s ta b l i s h e d  th e  s o v e re ig n ty  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  Crown in  
A f r i c a .  The i s l a n d  o f  Lagos was ceded to  the  B r i t i s h  by the  n a t i v e  C h ie f
4 A
i  1
in  1861 b u t  even b e fo re  t h a t  we f i n d  th e  ’’u s u r p a t io n ”  o f  j u d i c i a l  as y e l l  
as l e g i s l a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  i n  the  c e le b ra te d  ’’F a n t i  Bond”  o f  1844. ThB 
C h ie fs  acknowledged in  the  Bond t h a t  ’ ’power and j u r i s d i c t i o n ”  were b e in g  
e x e rc is e d  in  p la c e s  n o t  o n ly  w i t h i n ,  b u t  a lso  " a d ja c e n t  t o ” , th e  f o r t s  
and s e t t le m e n ts ,  " f o r  and on b e h a l f  o f ”  th e  B r i t i s h  Crown. In  an im p o r ta n t
c la u s e ,  quoted be low , th e  germ o f  i n d i r e c t  r u l e ,  we s u b m it ,  c o u ld  be
.2 0 4t r a c e d :
. . . m urder, r o b b e r ie s  and o th e r  c r im es  and o f fe n c e s  
w i l l  be t r i e d  and in q u i r e d  o f  b e fo re  th e  Queen's 
j u d i c i a l  o f f i c e r s  and th e  C h ie fs  o f  the  d i s t r i c t  
m ou ld ing  the  custom o f  th e  c o u n t ry  t o  the  g e n e ra l  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  B r i t i s h  law .
[em phas is  added]
U n t i l  independence everywhere i n  B r i t i s h  A f r i c a  th e  m ach ine ry  o f  government 
c o n t in u e d  to  f u n c t io n  a long  two p a r a l l e l  l i n e s  w i th  two s e ts  o f  e x e c u t iv e ,  
l e g i s l a t i v e  and j u d i c i a l  o rg a n s ,  as we s h a l l  see.
1.199 I t  has been observed  t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  i n d i r e c t  r u l e
aimed a t  u s in g  A f r ic a n s  as "a g e n ts ”  as th e y  were cheaper and th e y  a lso
ac ted  as " s h o c k -a b s o rb e rs ”  and t h a t  bo th  the  c o l o n i a l  powers and th e
20 5c h ie f s ,  needed and r e in f o r c e d  each o t h e r .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  th e
h a rd  core o f  th e  p o l i c y  which came to  p r e v a i l  i n  a l l  t e r r i t o r i e s  bore  
s s in g le  c e n t r a l  theme b u t  we cannot agree t h a t  i t  was f i r s t  drawn up by 
Lord  Lugard in  the  N o r th e rn  N ig e r ia  P r o te c to r a te  in  s h a r in g  power w i th  th e  
Em irs  who were g iven  L e t t e r s  P a te n t ,  i t  i s  s t a t e d ,  to  c o n f i rm  t h e i r
p o s i t i o n ,  s u b je c t  to  th e  B r i t i s h  gove rn m e n t 's  r i g h t  t o  impose t a x a t io n
206and c o n t r o l  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  la n d .  However, i t  i s  to  be n o ted  t h a t  the
p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y  th ro u g h o u t  the  whole o f  N o r th e rn  N ig e r ia  d id  n o t
v e s t  in  th e  E m irs  and, as has been s t a te d ,  t h e r e  were as many as 500
t r e a t i e s  which th e  Royal N ig e r  Company had made i n  th e  "N ig e r  t e r r i t o r i e s "
and which were re c o g n is e d  by th re e  Anglo-German agreements between 1885
and 1898 which secured  c o n t r o l  o f  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o v e r  th e  e n t i r e  t e r r i t o r y  
207f o r  the B r i t i s h .  On th e  o th e r  hand, in  s e v e ra l  p a r t s  o f  Southern 
N ig e r ia  p o l i c e  and armed fo r c e s  were used in  " p u n i t i v e  e x p e d i t i o n s ”
■? "*
Jl iu
between th e  ye a rs  1900 and 1913 i n  the  p rocess  o f  e s t a b l i s h in g ,  expand ing
20 8and c o n s o l id a t in g  th e  p r o te c to r a te  a l thoug h  some o f  th e  Yoruba s t a te s
appear t o  have "s u r re n d e re d  power and a u t h o r i t y "  o v e r  c e r t a in  c i v i l  and
209c r im in a l  m a t te rs  by th e  " j u d i c i a l  agreem ents" o f  1904-08 .
1 .200 The above p rocess  i l l u s t r a t e s  hou power, a u t h o r i t y  and j u r i s d i c t i o n
210were a c q u ire d  in  d i f f e r e n t  t e r r i t o r i e s  i n  A f r i c a  by d iv e r s  means.
B e s id e s ,  th e  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e  o f  th e  p e op le  o f  the  d i f f e r e n t  t e r r i t o r i e s
h a r d ly  conformed t o  a s in g le  u n i fo rm  p a t t e r n .  H a i le y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  r i g h t l y
observes  t h a t  " f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  i s  the  o u ts ta n d in g  re q u ire m e n t
211i n  th e  te c h n iq u e  o f  the  n a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  p o l i c y " .  Ano ther o b s e rv e r
appears t o  d e s c r ib e  t h i s  te c h n iq u e  as " p r o g r e s s iv e  a d a p ta t io n  o f  n a t i v e
212i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  modern c o n d i t i o n s . "  A l l o t t  has sugges ted  f o u r  reasons
t h a t  im p e l le d  the  B r i t i s h  r u l e r s  to  r e t a i n  the  customary o r  t r a d i t i o n a l
l e g a l  system -  economy, a ls o  pe rhaps , a d m in is t r a t i v e  exp e d ie n cy ,  e . g .  t o
meet th e  i n s u f f i c i e n c y  ( i n  the  rank and cad re )  o f  t r a i n e d  p e rs o n n e l ,  ready
acceptance o f  B r i t i s h  o v e r - r u l e ,  com pliance  w i th  th e  agreements and t r e a t i e s
under which j u r i s d i c t i o n  was assumed and th e  n a tu re  o f  B r i t i s h  la w ,  which
213was co n s id e re d  to o  s o p h is t i c a te d  f o r  a p r i m i t i v e  p o p u la t io n .
1.201 These reasons  co u ld  e q u a l l y  app ly  t o  th e  system o f  " i n d i r e c t
r u l e "  as a whole b u t  i t  has a lso  been s ta te d  by a n o th e r  o b s e rv e r  t h a t
th e  share o f  European o f f i c i a l s  i n  the  a d m in is t r a t i o n  was l i m i t e d  t o
" p e rs u a s io n "  to  a l lo w  s u f f i c i e n t  " freedom  o f  a c t io n "  t o  th e  n a t i v e  r u l e r s
214to  p re s e rv e  th e  " r e a l i t y "  o f  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  among h i s  p e o p le .  There
c o u ld ,  however, be ano th e r  p o s s ib le  reason , o r  r a t h e r  a m o t i v a t in g  f a c t o r .
Could i t  be t h a t  " i n d i r e c t  r u l e "  was an i n d i r e c t  way t o  a b r id g e  th e  b reach
o f  l e g a l i t y  ? A d m i t te d ly ,  th e  t r e a ty -m a k in g  p rocess  o f  a c q u i r in g
t e r r i t o r i a l  s o v e r e ig n ty  was o f  d o u b t f u l  v a l i d i t y  as had l a t e r  been
215j u d i c i a l l y  n o t i c e d .  The C h ie fs  c o u ld  n o t  g ive  more than  what th e y  
possessed and, as we have seen, in  most cases th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  concep t o f  
th e  C h ie f ' s  a u t h o r i t y  was a c o m b in a t io n  o f  r i t u a l  as w e l l  as te m p o ra l
powers w i th o u t  any p o s i t i v e  aspect o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  s o v e r e ig n t y .  However,
th e  te m p o ra l  powers m a n i fe s te d  them se lves  i n  the j u d i c i a l  and e x e c u t iv e
fu n c t io n s  combined i n  th e  person o f  th e  C h ie f .  Whether o r  n o t  the
" I n d i r e c t  r u l e "  a ttem p ted  to  in fu s e  the  d o c t r in e  o f  s e p a ra t io n  o f  powers
i n t o  th e  re m o d e l le d  p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y  o f  th e  C h ie fs  by d e a l in g  s e p a r a te ly
and a lso  in  se pa ra te  l e g i s l a t i o n s  what may be c a l l e d  t h e i r " n o n - j u d i c i a l "  o r
" p o l i t i c a l "  s ta tu s  and f u n c t io n s  as d is t i n g u is h e d  from " j u d i c i a l " ,  th e
C h ie fs  d e f i n i t e l y  l o s t  t h e i r  paramountcy th rough  t h i s  m e tam orphos is .
Thus, th e  " r e a l i t y "  o f  t h e i r  new a u t h o r i t y  was, i n  f a c t ,  le s s  r e a l  th a n  i t
seemed to  be . On th e  o th e r  hand, by c r e a t in g  " C h ie f s "  where none e x i s t e d ,
th e  " i n d i r e c t  r u l e "  engendered a P a n -A f r ic a n  appea l f o r  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n .
( i i )  The j j p o l i t i c a  _st_atu_s_o_f the_ jjNew_Chi_efs"
1 .202 Lucy H a i r  has r i g h t l y  observed  t h a t  two o p p o s i te  t r e n d s  are
d i s c e r n ib le  in  th e  p o l i c y  u n d e r ly in g  th e  system -  to  im prove  what was
2.16found  and to  make a l l  new. In  H a i l e y ’ s words two ty p e s  o f  " n a t i v e
a u t h o r i t i e s "  were c re a te d  -  agenc ies  d e r i v i n g  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  e n t i r e l y
from s t a t u t o r y  enactm ents  f o r  t h e i r  appo in tm en t and those  w h ich ,  though
217so a p p o in te d ,  d e r iv e d  a u t h o r i t y  from t h e i r  t r a d i t i o n a l  s t a t u s .  A lthough
th e  o b s e rv a t io n s  o f  bo th  Lucy f l a i r  and H a i le y  were made i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f
East and C e n t r a l  A f r i c a ,  the  g e n e ra l  p o s i t i o n  was h a r d ly  much d i f f e r e n t .
Lucy f l a i r ,  however, makes a s i g n i f i c a n t  g e n e ra l  comment when she says t h a t
the  A f r ic a n  c h ie f s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  re p re s e n te d  a s m a l le r  p o l i t i c a l  u n i t  and
had d i f f e r e n t  f u n c t io n s  and, as area and f u n c t io n s  bo th  changed, th e  l i n k  wi
21 8t r a d i t i o n  was snapped. A cco rd ing  to  H a i le y ,  h i s  second t y p e  was
conce ived  as "a  means o f  endea vou r ing  to  g r a f t  ou r  h ig h e r  c i v i l i s a t i o n  upon
th e  s o u n d ly - ro o te d  n a t i v e  s to c k .  . . m ou ld ing  i t  and e s t a b l i s h in g  i t  i n t o
219l i n e s  c o n s is te n t  w i th  modern id e a s  and h ig h e r  s ta n d a r d s . "
1 .203 A f t e r  f o u r  y e a rs  o f  fo rm a l  assumption o f  s o v e re ig n ty  i n  th e  
Gold Coast w i th  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  th e  " c o lo n y " ,  law f o r  " i n d i r e c t  r u l e "  
was enac ted  th e re  i n  the  N a t iv e  J u r i s d i c t i o n  O rd inance , No. 8 o f  1878
4 * h
i .  JL 4
which env isaged  a k in d  o f  ’’ dua l r u l e ” , as r e l a t i o n s  between th e  Akan and
F s n t i  s t a te s  and th e  government were r e g u la te d  by agreem ents. T h is  p o s i t i o n
con t in u e d  u n t i l  the  N a t iv e  A d m in is t r a t io n  (C o lo n y )  Ord inance (No. 18 o f
2201927) in t r o d u c e d  a la r g e r  measure o f  a d m in i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l .  For
A s h a n t i ,  the  N a t iv e  A u th o r i t y  O rd inance , No. 1 o f  1935, was enac ted  and
s i m i l a r l y ,  f o r  th e  N o r th e rn  T e r r i t o r i e s ,  O rd inance No. 2 o f  1932 was
s e p a ra te ly  e n a c te d .  The t r i b e s  i n h a b i t i n g  these  two a reas , as we have
seen, had w id e ly  d iv e rg e n t  ty p e s  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  w i th  the  predominance
o f  " c h i e f l y "  s o c ie t i e s  i n  one case and o f  th e  " c h i e f l e s s "  i n  th e  o t h e r .
UJe s I s d  n o te d  t h a t  th e  F a n t i  Bond o f  1844 f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e  empowered th e
B r i t i s h  and the  C h ie fs  t o  ac t c o n j o i n t l y  i n  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  " j u d i c i a l "
and " l e g i s l a t i v e "  powers as th e  A s h a n t i  T re a ty  o f  1831 m e re ly  re c o g n iz e d
th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  the  B r i t i s h  Governor at Cape Coast as a m e d ia to r  in
221case o f  a c ts  o f  a gg ress ion  a g a in s t  A sh a n t i  o r  th e  s ta te s  i n t e r  s e .
1 .204  The l i n k  w i th  th e  1844 "Bond" was m a in ta in e d  in  th e  N a t iv e
J u r i s d i c t i o n  Ord inance o f  1878, as i t  p u rp o r te d  to  d e a l  w i th  " c e r t a i n
powers and j u r i s d i c t i o n s "  and n o t  the  f u n c t i o n s  s e v e r a l l y  and s e p a r a te ly .
Even so, th e  a t tem p t to  s p l i t  up , and s c a le  down, th e  t r a d i t i o n a l
p e r s o n a l i t y  and a u t h o r i t y  o f  th e  C h ie f  was s u c c e s s fu l l y  made. The te rm s ,
"Hoad C h ie f "  and " C h ie f "  were d e f in e d ;  th e  l a t t e r  in c lu d e d  th e  fo rm e r
and a lso  c e r t a in  named t r a d i t i o n a l  C h ie f s .  The a p p l i c a t io n  o f  the
Ord inance was however, s u b je c t  to  a p ro c la m a t io n  by th e  G overnor made w i th
th e  adv ice  o f  the  E x e cu t iv e  C o u n c i l  ( s . 3 ) .  T h is  p r o v is io n  ua3 e v e n tu a l l y
m o d i f ie d  a f t e r  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  was re -e n a c te d  as O rd inance No. 5 o f  
2221883; th e  o th e r  m a t e r i a l  p r o v is io n s  rem ained s u b s t a n t i a l l y  in  the  
o r i g i n a l  fo rm .  In  i t s  m o d i f ie d  fo rm ,  as i t  s tood  in  1920, s . 3 
p ro v id e d  t h a t  "powers and j u r i s d i c t i o n "  o f  a l l  " n a t i v e  a u t h o r i t i e s "  ( n o t  
d e f in e d ) ,  s h a l l  be e x e rc is e d  a c c o rd in g  to  the  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  O rd inance 
"and n o t  o th e r w is e " .  The t r a d i t i o n a l  h ie r a r c h y  o f  s u b o rd in a te  C h ie fs  
was a lso  tempered w i th  by s . 4 ( c a p .  82) which v e s te d  in  th e  Governor th e
power t o  s u b d iv id e  th e  Head C h i e f ’ s d i v i s i o n  and a p p o in t  C h ie fs  f o r  these  
u n i t s .  Both in  th e  o r i g i n a l  1B78 Ord inance and i t s  1883 re -e n a c tm e n t  
(c a p .  8 2 ) ,  s . 29 v e s te d  in  th e  Governor i n  C o u n c i l  th e  power t o  ’’ suspend” 
and ’’d is m is s ”  any C h ie f  who s h a l l  ’’ appear t o  him to  have abused h i s  power 
o r  be unw orthy  o r  in c a p a b le  o f  e x e r c i s in g  th e  same u n j u s t l y  o r  f o r  o th e r  
s u f f i c i e n t  re a so n s ”  s u b je c t ,  o f  co u rse ,  to  the  r u l e  o f  aud i a l te re m  p a r te m .
1 .205  The p r o v is io n  j u s t  quoted c l e a r l y  made a mockery o f  th e  C h i e f ’ s 
t r a d i t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  i n  t h a t  th e  u l t im a t e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  th e  C h ie f  t o  h i s  
t r i b e ,  c la n  o r  l in e a g e  was now s u b o rd in a te d  to  a new supreme a u t h o r i t y .
T h is  p o s i t i o n  was f u r t h e r  s t re n g th e n e d  by th e  C h ie fs  O rd in a n ce ,  No. 4 o f
223 2241904, and l a t e r  b u t t r e s s e d  by th e  1927 O rd inance , which re p e a le d  and
re p la c e d  bo th  1883 ( c a p .  82) and 1904 (c a p .  80) O rd in a n ce s .  The
d e p o s i t io n  o f  any C h ie f ,  as a ls o  h i s  e le c t i o n  and i n s t a l l a t i o n  made i n
accordance w i th  n a t i v e  custom, was s u b je c te d  to  the  re q u ire m e n t  ( i n  1883 ) ,  o f
’’ c o n f i r m a t io n ”  by the  G ove rno r .  In  1927 th e re  appeared n o t  o n ly  new c la s s e s
o f  n a t i v e  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  such as ’’Paramount C h ie f s ” , " D i v i s i o n a l  C h ie f s ” ,
" C h ie f s ”  and ’’Headmen” , b u t  a ls o  new i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  such as ’’ S ta te  C o u n c i l s ” ,
" P r o v i n c i a l  C o u n c i ls "  and " G u d ic ia l  Com m ittees” , which were e n t r u s te d
w i th  such m a t te rs  as th e  e le c t io n  and d e p o s i t io n ,  as w e l l  as d e p o r ta t io n
f o l l o w in g  d e p o s i t io n ,  o f  th e  new c la s s e s  o f  n a t i v e  a u t h o r i t i e s  ( s s .  2 t o  1 4 ) .
D e p o r ta t io n  c o u ld  bs from the " fo rm e r  p lace  o f  abode to  a n o th e r  p la c e
w i t h in  the  s t a t e ”  ( s . 1 0 ) .  T h is  p r o v i s io n  ( a l b e i t  i n  a m o d i f ie d  fo rm ) was
in c o rp o r a te d  in  th e  enactm ents o f  1932 and 1935 r e l a t i n g  r e s p e c t i v e l y  to
th e  N o r th e rn  T e r r i t o r i e s  and A s h a n t i ,  a l th o u g h  th e  " N a t iv e  A u t h o r i t y ”
env isaged  th e r e  was o f  a d i f f e r e n t  form  in  t h a t  i t  c a r r i e d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y
th e  seme s ta tu s  in  so f a r  as such m a t te r s  as e l e c t i o n ,  a p p o in tm e n t ,
225i n s t a l l a t i o n  and d e p o s i t io n  was conce rned .
1 .206 In  N ig e r i a ,  Lord  L u g a rd 's  p o l i c y ,  i t  has been obse rved , f i r s t  
found e x p re s s io n  in  th e  N a t iv e  A u th o r i t y  P ro c la m a t io n  No. 2 o f  1907 i n  
th e  N o r th e rn  P r o te c to r a te  and in  P ro c la m a t io n  No. 25 o f  1901 in  th e
226Southern P r o t e c t o r a t e .  In  the  Eas te rn  P ro v in c e s  th e  n a t i v e  members
o f  th e  " N a t iv e  C o u n c i ls "  e s ta b l i s h e d  unde r th e  P ro c la m a t io n s  were g iven
" w a r r a n ts "  to  e x e rc is e  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  th e  " c o n s e rv a t io n  o f  peace" i n  t h e i r
re s p e c t iv e  areas f o r  th e y  had no customary o r  h e r e d i t a r y  s t a t u s ,  and came
227to  be known as "W arran t C h ie f s " .  I t  i s  a lso  necessary  t o  r e f e r  t o  two
o th e r  P ro c la m a t io n s  o f  1901 a p p e r ta in in g  to  Southern N ig e r i a  o f  which No.
15 d id  n o t  app ly  to  th e  C e n t r a l  and E as te rn  P ro v in c e s  to  which No. 25
e x c lu s i v e l y  a p p l ie d .  W h ile  th e  fo rm e r  s e t  up " C o u n c i ls "  a t d i f f e r e n t
l e v e l s ,  th e  l a t t e r  p ro v id e d  f o r  a "Head o f  a House". In  1914 the  two
P r o te c to r a te s  were amalgamated and N a t iv e  A u t h o r i t y  O rd inance No. 14 o f  
2281915 was e n a c te d .  In  1943 the  law  on th e  s u b je c t  i n  th e  P r o te c to r a te
and th e  Colony was embodied in  a s in g le  enac tm en t.  The c e n t r a l  theme o f
th e  law o f  N ig e r i a  was th e  same as t h a t  o f  th e  Gold Coast -  th e  power o f
appo in tm en t ( a ls o  c o n te m p la t in g  p l u r a l i t y  o f  C h ie fs )  and pun ishm ent by
th e  C h ie fs ,  and a lso  o f  s p e c i f y in g  t h e i r  f u n c t io n s  and scope o f  a u t h o r i t y
came to  be ve s te d  in  the  government, d e s t r o y in g  co m p le te ly  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
229l i n k .  Indeed , i n  1943, th e  "m o d e rn is a t io n "  was c a r r ie d  a s te p  f u r t h e r
by e n a b l in g  the  " n a t i v e  a u t h o r i t i e s "  to  become " c o rp o r a te  b o d ie s "  ( s  4 5 ) .  The
seme c e n t r a l  theme a lso  in fo rm e d  th e  law  enacted  in  East and C e n t ra l
nr • 230A f r i c a .
1.207 West A f r i c a ,  as we know, had a preponderance o f  " c h i e f l y "  
s o c ie t i e s  end l a t e r  came to  be known as th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  home o f  " i n d i r e c t  
r u l e " .  B u t the t r a d i t i o n a l  C h ie fs  even when in  o th e r  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  wherever 
they  e x is t e d ,  met th e  seme f a t e .  T h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  s ta tu s  was c o m p le te ly  
b la cke d  o u t  and th e y  became n o t  o n ly  " a g e n ts "  b u t  v i r t u a l l y  s e rv a n ts  o f  
th e  c o l o n i a l  r u l e r s .  I t  i s  apparen t t h a t  th e re  was a d e l i b e r a t e  a t tem p t to  
d is c a r d  everywhere th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e .  The paramountcy o f  the  
C h ie f  was now re p la c e d  by a d e r iv e d  a u t h o r i t y  which was sough t to  be 
suppo r ted  by such p r o v is io n  as making i t  an o f fe n c e  to  " i n t r i g u e "  a g a in s t  
h i s  a u t h o r i t y ,  which o b v io u s ly  c a r r ie d  a h o l lo w  r i n g  o f  s a n c t i t y  f o r  the
231o f f i c e .  Such p r o v is io n  c o u ld  n o t  supp ly  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y
which was c o m p le te ly  e f fa c e d  by ta m p e r in g  i n  v a r io u s  manners w i th  the
customary method o f  e l e c t i o n  and d e p o s i t io n  o f  th e  imcumbent and
most m a t e r i a l l y  pe rhaps , by c o n te m p la t in g  p l u r a l i t y  i n  the  o f f i c e  o f  th e
C h ie f .  Lucy H a i r  r i g h t l y  obse rves  t h a t  th e  new C h ie f  became a symbol
232o f  a l ie n  r u l e  to  some s u b je c t s ;  ano the r  o b s e rv e r  p o in t s  o u t  t h a t  th e
233C h ie f  was d r iv e n  o u t  o f  p o l i t i c s  w i th  the  advent o f  independence .
Both however o v e r lo o k  the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  r i t u a l  f u n c t io n s  o f  th e  o f f i c e
o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  C h ie f  p o s s ib ly  r e ta in e d  f o r  th e  o f f i c e  a g re a t  measure
o f  re s p e c t  and appea l,  as r e f l e c t e d  i n  th e  Independence C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f
234Ghana as w e l l  as in  the  p o s i t i o n  in  C e n t ra l  A f r i c a .  I t  may a ls o  be
i n t e r e s t i n g  to  no te  t h a t  i n  the  few  cases t h a t  came b e fo re  th e  c o u r ts  d u r in g
th e  c o l o n i a l  e ra ,  th e  j u d i c i a r y  adopted a c a u t io u s  approach i n  m a t te rs
co n ce rn in g  " e l e c t i o n "  and " d e p o s i t i o n "  o f  th e  C h ie fs  c o n s id e r in g  p o s s ib ly
235the  p o l i t i c a l  aspect o f  th e  m a t t e r .
( i i i )  I h e  j^nonJ l l i L ^ iCJ L i i R J ;  ^ j js  n_s_o_f Jbhe "New C h ie f "
1.208 Under " i n d i r e c t  r u l e "  th e  "New C h ie fs "  ( t h e  N a t iv e  A u t h o r i t i e s )
were e n t r u s te d  w i th  " n o n - j u d i c i a l "  f u n c t i o n s  which were g e n e r a l l y  s i m i l a r
in  a l l  cases eve ryw here , namely e x e c u t iv e  and l e g i s l a t i v e .  I t  was o n ly
in  d e t a i l  and emphasis t h a t  th e  p r o v is io n s  d i f f e r e d .  I t  appears t h a t  th e
l e g i s l a t i v e  f u n c t io n  was deve loped g r a d u a l ly  and found  prom inence where
th e  " n a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y "  was con tem p la te d  in  a p l u r a l  fo rm .  Emphasis a l l
a long , from th e  b e g in n in g ,  i n  a l l  these  enac tm en ts ,  was on th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f
m a in ta in in g  " la w  and o r d e r "  i n  th e  community . The p o l i t i c a l  s ta tu s  o f  the
C h ie f  h a v in g  been reduced , as we have seen, h i s  e x e c u t iv e  f u n c t i o n s  a ls o , to o k
*
th e  form  o f  an agency f o r  law  e n fo rc e m e n t .  The p h raseo lo gy  i s  a ls o  common 
in  a lm ost a l l  enac tm en ts .  He was r e q u i r e d  to  " i n t e r p o s e "  t o  p re v e n t  c r im e  
and a r r e s t  o f f e n d e r s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  he c o u ld  " is s u e  o r d e r s "  f o r  th e  pu rpose , 
i n t e r  a l i a , o f  p r o h i b i t i n g  any conduc t which m ig h t  cause a r i o t  o r  b reach 
o f  th e  peace. In  th e  e a r l y  enac tm en ts  o f  Gold Coast and N ig e r i a ,  he was
even d e s c r ib e d  as " th e  c o n s e rv a to r  o f  peace" and, o f  co u rs e ,  i n  a l l  
cases and a t a l l  t im e s  d iso b e d ie n ce  o f  h i s  " l a w f u l "  o rd e rs  was made an 
o f fe n c e .  I f  he f a i l e d  t o  ac t  i n  any s i t u a t i o n  he c o u ld  be o rd e re d  to  do 
so by th e  a p p ro p r ia te  o f f i c i a l  o f  the  g e n e ra l  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  who co u ld  
even ac t  h im s e l f .
1 .209 The l e g i s l a t i v e  power i n  N ig e r ia  i n  th e  b e g in n in g  appears t o  
have been ve s te d  i n  the  " N a t iv e  C o u n c i ls "  as in  Southern  N ig e r i a  i t  was 
p ro v id e d  in  s . 2 o f  The N a t iv e  House Rule O rd inance t h a t  any " r e g u la t i o n "  
passed by the  C o u n c i l  unde r th e  p r o v is io n  o f  th e  N a t iv e  C o u r ts  O rd inance , 
w i th  th e  consent o f  th e  G ove rno r, was t o  be co n s id e re d  as " N a t iv e  Law and 
cus tom ". In  th e  Gold C oas t,  s . 5 o f  th e  N a t iv e  Z J u r is d ic t io n  Ord inance
1883 p ro v id e d  t h a t  th e  Head C h ie f  o f  a D i v i s i o n ,  w i th  the  concurrence  o f  th e  
C h ie fs ,  c a p ta in s ,  headmen and o th e r s  who were c o u n c i l l o r s  o f  h i s  s t o o l ,  
a c c o rd in g  to  n a t i v e  custom, c o u ld  make "bye law s c o n s is te n t  w i th  the  laws 
o f  th e  C o lo n y "  f o r  "p ro m o t in g  the  peace, good o rd e r  and w e l fa re  o f  th e  
peop le  o f  h i s  d i v i s i o n " .  The bye laws re q u i re d  a p p ro v a l  and were s u b je c t  
to  d is a l lo w a n c e .  In  th e  1927 Ordinance! th e  "Paramount C h ie f "  r e p la c e d  
the  Head C h ie f  b u t  th e re  was ano the r  s i g n i f i c a n t  p r o v is io n  i n  s . 130 
which empowered th e  " S ta te  C o u n c i l "  t o  re c o rd  i t s  o p in io n  on "any s u b je c t "  
o f  customary la w . I f  th e  G overnor i n  C o u n c i l  was s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  i t  was 
agreeab le  to  th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  o th e r  n a t i v e  f u n c t i o n a r i e s ,  i t  co u ld  be 
" p ro c la im e d "  as th e  law on th e  s u b je c t .  In  th e  c o n s o l id a te d  N ig e r ia n  
Ord inance o f  1943 th e  scheme f o l lo w e d  was a lm os t s i m i l a r :  s . 25 d e a l t  w i th  
power t o  make ' r u l e s 1 and s . 30 w i th  th e  'd e c la r a t i o n  and m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  
n a t i v e  law and cus tom *.
1 .210 However, as has been obse rved , " l e g i s l a t i o n  was n o t  a p r im a ry
237is s u e "  i n  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  A f r ic a n  s o c ie t y .  The in n o v a t io n ,  we su b m it ,  
was m o t iv a te d  by a tw in  o b j e c t i v e .  In  the  f i r s t  p lace  th e  power t o  make 
' r u l e s '  and 'b y e la w s '  was n o t  t r u l y  a l e g i s l a t i v e  power b u t  an ' i n c i d e n t a l  
power* t h a t  was g iven  u s u a l l y  to  a body c o rp o ra te  as a measure o f  a d m in is t r a t ­
iv e  convenience to  e n ab le  i t  to  c a r r y  ou t  i t s  f u n c t io n  more e f f e c t i v e l y
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and o r d e r l y .  The o th e r  power was indeed o f  a r a d i c e l  n a tu re  which aimed 
at u s in g  law as a means o f  s o c ia l  chance as was suggested by the  c o n d i t io n  
a t ta ch e d  to  i t ,  nam ely , such " d e c la r e d ”  law  was n o t  to  be "repugnan t 
t o  j u s t i c e ,  e q u i t y  and good co n s c ie n c e "  o r  in c o m p a t ib le  t o  th e  enac ted  
la w . O b v io u s ly ,  th e  aim was to  mould th e  n a t i v e  law a cco rd in g  to  B r i t i s h  
n o t io n s  o f  j u s t i c e ,  as was expressed i n  1844 in  the  F a n t i  Bond.
( i v )  Th£ d_ici_a_l' s_ta_t us jand fjjn_ctions:_th_E_"N_a^i_ve_T_ri_bun_ajLsJ^
1.211 Ue have a lre a d y  seen t h a t  in  most t r a d i t i o n a l  A f r i c a n  s o c ie t i e s
C h ie f t a i n s h ip ,  where i t  e x i s t e d ,  c a r r i e d  w i th  i t  a ls o  j u d i c i a l  power, as
in  o n ly  a few s o c ie t i e s  was th e re  a sep a ra te  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  a j u d i c i a r y ,
f o r  t h e  o b v i o u s  reason , as a l r e a d y  i n d i c a t e d ,  t h a t  t h e r B  was e m phas is  on
d is c u s s io n ,  compromise and s e t t le m e n t ,  due again to  th e  im p o r ta n c e
a t ta ch e d  to  s o c ia l  norms r a th e r  than  le g a l  norms, in  a l l  s o c ie t i e s
g e n e r a l l y .  The B r i t i s h  r u l e r s ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, made s p e c i f i c
p r o v is io n  f o r  d is p e n s in g  " n a t i v e  j u s t i c e " ,  as H a i le y  p r e fe r s  to  c a l l  th e
system . In  Kenya, the  C h ie fs  were n o t  a s s o c ia te d  w i th  a " T r i b u n a l "  and
members o f  the  " T r i b u n a l "  were chosen f o r  t h e i r  p e rs o n a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s
who, a l th o u g h  r e q u i r e d  to  a d m in is te r  customary law  p r i m a r i l y ,  a ls o
238a d m in is te re d  th e  s t a t u t o r y  law o f  a w ide ra n g e .  However, i t  was n o t  a
case o f  a l t e r i n g  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  as " c h i e f l e s s "  s o c ie t i e s
p redom ina ted  in  Kenya bu t what was s i g n i f i c a n t  was t h a t  A r t . 52 o f  th e
East A f r i c a  O rder i n  C o u n c i l  1897 empowered th e  G overnor t o  make "Queens
R e g u la t io n s "  by which he co u ld  n o t  o n ly  make r u le s  f o r  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n
o f  j u s t i c e  i n  " n a t i v e  c o u r t s "  b u t  a ls o  " a l t e r  o r  m o d i f y "  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f
any n a t i v e  law o r  custom " i n  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  hum an ity  o r  j u s t i c e " .  L a te r ,
Ord inance No. 29 o f  1930 p ro v id e d  t h a t  "N a t iv e  T r ib u n a ls "  shou ld  be
c o n s t i t u t e d  " i n  accordance w i th  n a t i v e  law and custom" and, as has been
s ta te d ,  i t  was to w a rd s  the  end o f  th e  c o l o n i a l  p e r io d  t h a t  a g ra d u a l
239p o l i c y  o f  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  th e  d u a l  c o u r t  system cane to  be adopted .
1 .212  In  Uganda, as we have seen, a h ie r a r c h y  o f  c o u r ts  w i th  " a p p o in te d "
p e rs o n n e l e x is te d  in  the  "k ingdom s” . T h is  t r a d i t i o n  appears to  have been 
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c o n t in u e d .  N a t iv e  c o u r ts  were f i r s t  c o n s t i t u t e d  w i th  o n ly  th e  " o f f i c i a l
C h ie fs "  b u t  l a t e r  r e -o rg a n ^ is e d  w i th  h a l f  " o f f i c i a l s "  and h a l f  "commoners"
241w ith  the  " C h ie f s "  as P r e s id e n ts .  In  Tangany ika  a ls o ,  i t  has been
obse rved , no in n o v a t io n  was in t r o d u c e d  by Ord inance No. 5 o f  1929 as i t
d id  n o t  p r e s c r ib e  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  th e  c o u r ts  b u t  by " w a r r a n ts "  the
n a t i v e  a u t h o r i t i e s  were a p p o in ted  as n a t i v e  c o u r t s .  I f  any " C h ie f "
was th e  n a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y  i n  any case he p re s id e d  ove r  th e  "B ench" which
242was c o n s t i t u t e d  a c c o rd in g  to  n a t i v e  custom. The same p a t t e r n  was
243fo l lo w e d  i n  N yasa land . In  N o r th e rn  Rhodesia a lso  Benches were
c o n s t i t u t e d  a c c o rd in g  to  n a t i v e  custom and the  " C h ie f s "  h e ld  c o u r ts  w i th
the  h e lp  o f  two assesso rs  who were s e le c te d  by h im ; i n  B a ro ts e la n d  ru le d
by the  L o z i  th e  h ie r a r c h y  o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  c o u r t s  such as th e  P a ra m o u n t^
c o u r t  and th e  D i s t r i c t  c o u r t  appears t o  have c o n t in u e d  w i th o u t  any m a t e r i a l  
244ch an ge .
1 .213  In  West A f r i c a ,  i n  th e  N a t iv e  J u r i s d i c t i o n  O rd inance 1883 
i t s e l f  p r o v is io n  was made^in P a r t  I I I ,  s s . 1 0 - 2 5 ) f o r  "N a t iv e  T r i b u n a l s "  
which had, as in  eve ry  o th e r  case, a p l u r a l  membership w i th  the  Head 
C h ie f  and a lso  th e  C h ie f  o f  any s u b d iv is io n  o r  v i l l a g e  and t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  
c o u n c i l l o r s  fo rm in g  t r i b u n a l s  t o  t r y  b reaches  o f  bye laws and " t o  e x e rc is e  
c i v i l  and c r im in a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n " .  The c r im in a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  was t o  in c lu d e  
the power o f  p u n is h in g  o f fe n d e rs  by f i n e  o r  by p e rs o n a l  d e te n t io n  o r  
" o th e r  n a t i v e  pun ishm ent n o t  repugnan t w i th  n a t u r a l  j u s t i c e  o r  w i t h  the 
p r i n c i p l e  o f  th e  la w "  ( s . 1 3 ) .  I t s  s u c c e s s o r ,  the  1927 O rd inance , e n la rg e d  
the  powers o f  th e  N a t iv e  T r ib u n a ls  and a lso  p ro v id e d  f o r  a N a t iv e  C ourt o f  
Appea l.  The N a t iv e  C o u r ts  O rd in a n ce ,  No. 2 o f  1935, made f o r  A s h a n t i ,  
a lso  p ro v id e d  f o r  p l u r a l  membership w i th  th e  Ashantehene o r  a Head 
C h ie f  o r  a C h ie f ,  o r  any o th e r  person o r  persons o r  a c o m b in a t io n  t h e r e o f ,  
and in  a d d i t io n  enab led  th e  D i s t r i c t  Commissioner to  s i t  i n  the  c o u r t  as an 
" a d v is e r "  ( s . 4 ) .  The T r i b u n a l  c o u ld  a d m in is te r  such custom ary law  as
UJ3S " n o t  repugnant to  n a t u r a l  j u s t i c e  o r  m o r a l i t y  o r  i n c o n s i s t e n t  u i t h  
any p r o v is io n  o f  any o th e r  O rd inance "  ( s . 8 ) ,  h e r e i n a f t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as 
th e  " A s h a n t i  f o r m u la " .
1 .214  In  N ig e r i a  a d i f f e r e n t  p rocess  uas f o l lo w e d  and a se p a ra te  
s t a t u t e ,  The N a t iv e  C ou r ts  O rd inance , No. 8 o f  1914 was enac ted  which 
was re p la c e d  l a t e r  by C ou rts  O rd inance No. 44 o f  1933. In  th e  N o r th e rn  
P ro v in c e s  an " a l k a l i "  u i t h  o r  w i t h o u t  assessors  c o n s t i t u t e d  the n a t i v e  
c o u r t ;  e lsew here  ( i n c l u d i n g  th e  C o lony) th e  c o u r t  was composed o f  e i t h e r  
a Head C h ie f  o r  a C h ie f  o r  any o th e r  p e rson , in c lu d in g  a n o n - n a t i v e ,  o r  a 
co m b ina t ion  o f  them, w i th  o r  w i th o u t  assessors  ( s . 4 ) .  C o u r ts  wore graded 
as "A " t o  "D" a c c o rd in g  to  power c o n fe r re d  on them and Grade "A "  c o u r t  
was g iven  " f u l l  j u d i c i a l  p o w e r" .  P r o v is io n  uas made f o r  a " F i n a l  N a t iv e  
C ourt o f  A ppea l"  ( s s .  29 and 30) and i n  c e r t a in  cases appea ls  from  i t s  
d e c is io n  cou ld  a lso  l i e  to  the  Supreme C ourt  and from th e re  to  th e  West 
A f r ic a n  C ou rt o f  Appeal ( s s .  32, 3 4 ) .  The a p p e l la te  c o u r ts  a lso  were 
p ro v id e d  w i th  Assessors ( s . 3 9 ) .  Lega l r e p r e s e n ta t io n  a t th e  o r i g i n a l  
s tage was e x p re s s ly  b a r re d  ( s . 24) and th e  p r a c t i c e  and p rocedu re  o f  th e  
c o u r t  was, s u b je c t  to  r u le s  made under th e  O rd inance , re g u la te d  by n a t iv e  
law and custom ( s . 1 4 ) .  The A s h a n t i  fo rm u la  ( s u p ra ) i n  re s p e c t  o f  
custom ary law was rep roduced  and, i n  a d d i t i o n ,  th e  im p o s i t io n  o f  
punishm ent " re pugnan t to  n a t u r a l  j u s t i c e  and h u m a n ity "  and s p e c i f i c a l l y  
m u t i l a t i o n  and t o r t u r e  was e x p re s s ly  fo rb id d e n  ( s . 1 0 ) .
( v )  C onc lus ion
1 .215  I t  i s  n o t  p o s s ib le  t o  suggest the  m o t iv a t io n  beh ind  th e  p o l i c y  
o f  p r o v id in g  everywhere  c o u r ts  w i th  a p l u r a l  forum under " i n d i r e c t  r u l e " .  
No d o u b t ,  i n  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  s o c i e t i e s ,  in  many a re a s ,  " j u d i c i a l  power" 
was ve s te d  i n  th e  " c o u n c i l  o f  e l d e r s " ,  b u t  even in  areas where c e n t r a l  
a u t h o r i t y  was pronounced and th e  j u d i c i a r y  was i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d ,  the  
emphasis uas, as we have seen, on d is c u s s io n  and compromise, and a p l u r a l  
membership uas perhaps b e s t  s u i t e d  f o r  such p u rpose . The members o f  the
"N s t iv e  T r i b u n a l s "  cou ld  no t  p o s s ib ly  be l e g a l l y  t r a i n e d  i n  adequate measure 
and a d e c is io n  by d is c u s s io n  among them c o u ld  a p p a re n t ly  o b v ia te  
a r b i t r a r y  d e c is io n  m ak ing . However, th e  more im p o r ta n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  
th e  N a t iv e  T r ib u n a ls  was p o s s ib ly  r e f l e c t e d  in  i n c i d e n t a l  u n i f i c a t i o n  o f  
the  s u b s ta n t iv e  as w e l l  as p ro c e d u ra l  p r o v i s io n s  o f  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  
sys tem . Need less  t o  say , such u n i f i c a t i o n  which was c a r r ie d  o u t  in  
accordance w i th  th e  " A s h a n t i  fo r m u la "  cou ld  o b v io u s ly  ensure t h a t  th e  
d e le t e r io u s  p r o v i s io n s  o f  the  t r a d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  system r e s p e c t in g  s a n c t io n s  
( i n  many cases h a rs h ,  inhumane and a r b i t r a r y )  and a lso  en fo rcem en t 
p rocedure  ware f i l t e r e d  o u t .  In  o th e r  words, p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y  i n  th e  
s o c i a l  c o n te x t  r e c e iv e d  b e t t e r  p r o t e c t io n  under " i n d i r e c t  r u l e "  th ro u g h  
th e  a d m in is t r a t i o n  o f  j u s t i c e  by th e  "N a t iv e  T r i b u n a l s " .
1 .216 On the o th e r  hand, i t  can be s a id  t h a t  in  the  p o l i t i c a l  c o n te x t  
p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y  was e v id e n t l y  b e t t e r  p r o te c te d  under the  t r a d i t i o n a l  
s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and l e g a l  sys tem s. As we have seen, th e re  were 
e f f e c t i v e  checks a g a in s t  abuse o f  a u t h o r i t y  by th e  C h ie fs  under th e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  sys tem s: " A f r i c a n  d e sp o t ism "  was a m yth . Under c o l o n i a l  r u l e ,
th e  new a t t i t u d e  was p r o je c te d  i n t o  the  s tance  o f  " l e g a l i t y "  and 
" le g a l i s m "  adopted by the  new r u l e r s .  The " c o l o n i a l  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m " ,  
as we s h a l l  see, was, i n  f a c t ,  an a n t i t h e s i s  o f  " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m " ;  
th e  c o l o n i a l  laws them se lves  a u th o r is e d  a r b i t r a r y  e x e c u t iv e  a c t io n s .
Indeed , th e  c o lo n ia l  r u l e  c o u ld  c la im  le g i t im a c y  o n ly  by r e s o r t i n g  to  
" l e g a l i s m "  and " l e g a l i t y "  as t h e  concept o f  government by consent was th e  
a n t i t h e s i s  o f  c o lo n ia l i s m  and th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  system had n o t  a t t a in e d  
s u f f i c i e n t  s t r e n g th  to  c o n ta in  c o lo n ia l i s m .  However, th e  i n d i r e c t  r u l e  
i n c i d e n t a l l y  made a wholesome and s t ro n g  im pac t on " t r i b a l i s m "  as 
c o l o n i a l  r u l e  i t s e l f  b roke  down t r i b a l  b o u n d a r ie s  to  pave th e  way f o r  the  
c r e a t io n  o f  indepe nden t n a t i o n - s t a t e s .
(D) The aims and a t t i t u d e s  o f  modern A f r ic a n  p o l i t i c a l  le a d e rs
1 .217 Ghana uas th e  f i r s t  s ta te  o f  Commonwealth A f r i c a  to  a t t a i n
in d epe ndence , in  1957. I t s  le a d e r ,  Kwame Nkrumah, s p e l le d  ou t  s u c c in c t l y
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th e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  th e  emerg ing n a t io n s  i n  the  f o l l o w in g  te rm s :
. . . the  p h i lo s o p h y  o f  th e  A f r ic a n  r e v o l u t i o n .  . . i s  
d e f in e d  by t h r e e  p o l i t i c a l  components o f  o u r  l i b e r a t i o n  
movement -  nam ely : N a t io n a l is m ,  P a n a fr ic a n is m  and 
S o c ia l i s m .
M a r t in  M inogue, who quo tes  Nkrumah, observes t h a t ,  " th e  la b e ls  s e le c te d  by
Nkrumah remain th e  most c o n v e n ie n t  c a tc h -p h ra s e s  to  summarise the
dom inant s t ra n d s  i n  A f r ic a n  id e o lo g y " .  He proceeds to  add t h a t  th e
Western p h i lo s o p h y  was tu rn e d  to  good e f f e c t  by th e  A f r i c a n  le a d e rs
" a g a in s t  embarrassed im p e r ia l  governments which had c u s to m a r i l y  p re tended
n o t  to  n o t i c e  th e  b l a t a n t  c o n t r a d ic t i o n s  between t h e i r  own e x p l i c i t l y
246d e m o c ra t ic  v a lu e s  and the  c o l o n i a l  a u t o c r a c ie s . "  As we have a lre a d y
seen, in  I n d i a  a ls o ,  th e  le a d e rs  had adopted the  sane s tance  many decades 
247e a r l i e r .
1 .218  The A f r ic a n  le a d e r  s t r i v e s  ha rd  t o  r e t a in  p o p u la r  appea l f o r  
th e  c a l l  to  n a t i o n a l  u n i t y  which had se rved  him w e l l  i n  th e  s t r u g g le
f o r  independence . And as Minogue ob se rve s , n a t i o n a l  u n i t y  i s  seen as th e  
gua ran te e  o f  independence and p o l i t i c a l  c o m p e t i t io n  as s u b v e rs iv e .
Minogue r i g h t l y  p o in t s  o u t  t h a t  t h i s  f a c t  was c e n t r a l  t o  th e  new A f r ic a n  
id e o lo g y  and to  i t s  b e l i e f  i n  the  need to  r e s t r u c t u r e  th e  emergent 
p o l i t i c a l  sys tem : " P o l i t i c a l  o r g a n is a t io n  h e n c e fo r th  i s  to  c e n t re  on
248a s in g le  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  which w i l l  a c t  to  r e f l e c t  the  p o p u la r  w i l l . "
I t  was perhaps n o t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  th e  A f r ic a n  le a d e r  t o  p reach  t h i s
d o c t r i n e  as p a r l ia m e n ta ry  democracy, even in  i t s  b a re s t  fo rm ,  had a
249 250f r a g i l e  e x is te n c e  i n  "ommonwealth A f r i c a ,  u n l i k e  I n d i a .  A lthough
the  " i n d i r e c t  r u l e "  in  A f r i c a  was an a t te m p t a t m o d e rn is a t io n  o f  th e
t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  system i t  was n o t  meant to  p ro v id e  a t r a i n i n g  base
f o r  s e l f - g o v e rn m e n t .  However, th e  e ro s io n  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  v a lu e s  caused by
th e  expe r im en t p o s s ib ly  h e lp e d  the  A f r ic a n  le a d e r  to  promote t h e  A f r ic a n  
b rand o f  s o c ia l is m  which was d e s c r ib e d  as " r e c o n s t r u c te d  t r a d i t i o n a l i s m ” .
I t  made th e  compromise between o ld ,  t r a d i t i o n a l  v a lu e s  and modern v a lu e s  
r e a d i l y  acce p ta b le  t o  th e  p o p u la ce .
1.219 Indeed th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  " t r i b a l i s m "  was tu rn e d  t o  good e f f e c t
by Nkrumah in  th e  new creed o f  P a n -A f r ic a n is m .  The id e a  was n o t  new b u t
Nkrumah became i t s  most v o c a l  exponent to  use i t  n o t  o n ly  as an in s t ru m e n t
t o  has ten  d e c o lo n is a t io n  b u t  a ls o  to  promote th e  economic s a lv a t i o n  o f
A f r i c a n s .  He spoke o f  "common f u n c t i o n a l  o rg a n s "  t o  promote th e  id e a  o f  a
252Common M arke t f o r  A f r i c a .  In  Nkrumah’ s v ie w  th e re  was no d i f f e r e n c e
between what he c a l l e d  "econom ic im p e r ia l i s m "  and " p o l i t i c a l  im p e r ia l i s m "
and th a t  i t  was necessa ry  t o  c re a te  a "Un ion o f  A f r ic a n  S ta te s "  t o  ensure
253what he c a l le d  "m u tu a l  s e c u r i t y  and p r o s p e r i t y  o f  ou r  p e o p le " .  v In
ano the r  c o n te x t ,  Nkrumah m a in ta in e d  t h a t  Ghana s o c ie t y  was "by  i t s  own
254form and t r a d i t i o n  fu n d a m e n ta l ly  d e m o c ra t ic  i n  c h a r a c t e r . "
1 .220 However, i t  i s  to  P re s id e n t  Piyerere o f  T anzan ia  t h a t  we have to
lo o k  f o r  the  most l u c i d  e x p o s i t io n  o f  the  A f r ic a n  b rand  o f  s o c ia l is m  which
found most v o c a l  e x p re s s io n  i n  h i s  concept o f  u.jamaa ( f a n i l y h o o d )  and the
"A rusha D e c la r a t i o n " .  The f o l l o w i n g  q u o ta t io n  p r o je c t s  i n  b o ld  r e l i e f
255what may perhaps be c o n s id e re d  as th e  c e n t r a l  theme o f  h i s  d o c t r i n e :
I t  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  im p o r ta n t  t h a t  we shou ld  now u n d e rs ta n d  
th e  c o n n e c t io n  between freedom , deve lopm ent, and d i s c i p l i n e ,  
because o u r  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  o f  c r e a t in g  s o c i a l i s t  v i l l a g e s  
th ro u g h o u t  th e  r u r a l  areas depends upon i t .  For we have 
known f o r  a lo n g  t im e  t h a t  development had to  go on in  
th e  r u r a l  a reas , and t h a t  t h i s  r e q u i r e d  c o - o p e r a t iv e  
a c t i v i t i e s  by the  p e o p le .  . .
and
The Ujamma v i l l a g e  i s  a new c o n c e p t io n ,  based on th e  p o s t -  
Arusha D e c la ra t io n  u n d e rs ta n d in g  t h a t  we have to  deve lop  
i t s  p e o p le ,  n o t  t h i n g s ,  and t h a t  peop le  can o n ly  deve lop  
th e m s e lv e s .  . . Ujamma v i l l a g e s  are in te n d e d  to  be 
s o c i a l i s t  o r g a n iz a t io n s  c re a te d  by th e  p e o p le ,  and 
governed by those  who l i v e  and work i n  them. . .
Indeed , th e  p i c t u r e  which Nyere re  p a in t s  i s  s i m i l a r  in  many r e s p e c ts  w i th  
th e  one t h a t  Mahatma Gandhi had p a in te d  in  the  p an ch ay a t system o f  
government t h a t  he env isaged f o r  f r e e  I n d ia ,  based on the  t r a d i t i o n a l  
concept o f  v i l l a g e  a s s e m b l ie s .
1.221 The concept o f  "humanism”  o f  P re s id e n t  Kaunda o f  Zambia was a ls o
ro c te d  in  th e  " le g a c y  o f  A f r ic a n  t r a d i t i o n "  w h ich , a cco rd in g  to  h im ,
2 57 258re co g n ise d  a "M a n -c e n t re d "  s o c ie t y .  However, he obse rved :
. . . care  must be taken  t h a t  we do n o t  o v e r - s t r e s s  o r  
ove r-em phes ize  th e  im po r tance  o f  p re s e rv in g  o u r  pas t 
s o c ie ty  a t th e  expense o f  m a t e r i a l  development o f  ou r  
p e o p le .  . . th e  c r u c i a l  p o in t  [ i s  t o ]  p re s e rv e  what i s
good i n  ou r  t r a d i t i o n ,  and a t th e  same t im e  a l lo w  o u r ­
s e lv e s  to  b e n e f i t  from  the s c ie n ce  and the  te c h n o lo g y  o f  
ou r f r i e n d s  from bo th  the Uest and th e  E a s t .  . .
1 .222 The f o l l o w i n g  e x t r a c t  from  an o f f i c i a l  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  Kenya
259Government i s  a lso  r e le v a n t  to  ou r  p re s e n t  d is c u s s io n :
The system adopted in  Kenya i s  A f r ic a n  S o c ia l is m  b u t  the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  system and the economic mechanism 
i t  im p l ie s  have neve r  been s p e l le d  ou t f u l l y  in  an agreed 
fo rm .  . . two A f r ic a n  t r a d i t i o n s  which form an e s s e n t i a l  
b a s is  f o r  A f r ic a n  s o c ia l is m  [ a r e ]  -  p o l i t i c a l  democracy and 
m u tu a l  s o c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  . . A f r ic a n  s o c ia l is m  d i f f e r s  
p o l i t i c a l l y  from communion because i t  p re v e n ts  th e  e x e rc is e  
o f  d i s p r o p o r t io n a te  p o l i t i c a l  in f lu e n c e  by economic power 
g roups . . . M u tu a l  s o c i a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i s  an e x te n s io n  
o f  th e  A f r ic a n  f a m i l y  s p i r i t  to  th e  n a t io n  as a w ho le . . .
1 .223  However, as B a s i l  Davidson p o in t s  o u t ,  i n  A f r i c a  to d a y ,  " p u b l i c
260o p in io n  cou ld  n o t  be ig n o re d ,  and p u b l i c  o p in io n  wanted p r o g r e s s . "
Thus, n o tw i th s ta n d in g  t h e i r  dogmas and p re c e p ts  the  le a d e rs  a re  bound to  
adopt a f l e x i b l e  approach in  a l l  m a t te r s  te n d in g  to  be more p ra g m a t ic  
than  dog m a t ic .  Indeed , th e re  was a t im e  when the  "p rob lem  o f  power" was 
one o f  the  dominant t r e n d s  o f  th e  framework w i t h i n  which p u b l i c  o p in io n
o p e ra ted  b u t  as Davidson ob se rve s ,  these  t re n d s  have been nega ted  by
, 261 e v e n t s .
I I I .  The New W orld  O rd e r :  I n d u s t r i a l i s e d  S o c ie t ie s  and th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l
System
(1 )  F i r s t  phase: Dogmas and even ts
1 .224 The s p i r i t  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  i n q u i r y  which marked th e  b i r t h  o f  th e
I n d u s t r i a l  R e v o lu t io n  in  England in  th e  l a t e  e ig h te e n th  c e n tu r y ,  fo l lo w e d
by what has been c a l le d  the  T e c h n o lo g ic a l  R e v o lu t io n ,  p r o g r e s s iv e ly
permeated the  d i f f e r e n t  spheres  o f  human know ledge and u n d e rs ta n d in g
ove r th e  decades to  e s t a b l i s h  a new w o r ld  o r d e r ,  under which we n o t i c e
n o t  o n ly  a p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  s o c ia l  and p o l i t i c a l  concep ts  b u t  a ls o  a
harm onious c o -e x is te n c e  o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  v a lu e s  and v ie w s ,  bo th  o ld  and new,
With th e  g row th  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  s o c ie t i e s ,  the v a lu e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l
c o -o p e ra t io n  has been accepted w i th  in c r e a s in g  r a p i d i t y  d u r in g  th e  l a s t
few decades s ince  th e  t e r m in a t io n  o f  th e  F i r s t  World War, m a rk ing  the
b e g in n in g  o f  the  second phase o f  th e  development o f  th e  new w o r ld  o r d e r .
The f a c t  t h a t  th e  w o r ld  today s tands  d iv id e d  i n t o  v a r io u s  " b lo c k s "
makes i t  a l l  th e  more necessa ry  t o  i n t e n s i f y  th e  p rocess  o f  c o -o p e ra t io n
which f i n d s  e x p re s s io n  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  in  d i f f e r e n t
f i e l d s  o f  human a c t i v i t y ,  a t d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  and th ro u g h  d i f f e r e n t
a g e n c ie s .  How th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  (human) "p e rs o n 1* i s  de te rm ined  un d e r  the
new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  norms and th ro u g h  the  v a r io u s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agenc ies
has t o  be c o n s id e re d  a t some le n g th  b u t  f i r s t  i t  i s  necessa ry  t o  d e a l
u i t h  th o  f i r s t  phase o f  th e  development o f  th e  new o r d e r ,  i n  o rd e r  t o
unde rs tan d  i t s  t h e o r e t i c a l  base, which can be c o n v e n ie n t ly  s ta te d  in
te rm s o f  th e  im p o r ta n t  dogmas and even ts  o f  th e  c o r re s p o n d in g  p e r io d .
1 .225  In  1778 appeared Adam S m ith ’ s famous w ork, Wealth o f  N a t io n s ,
which l a i d  s e c u re ly  and f i r m l y  th e  fo u n d a t io n s  o f  th e  l a i s s e z - f a i r e
economy i n t o  which Smith had im p o r te d  "an o p t i m i s t i c  v e r s io n  o f  N a tu r a l
Law", b u t  th e  m o ra l  p r i n c i p l e s  which in fo rm e d  h i s  v iew s  were, as has
been obse rved , g r a d u a l ly  abandoned by th e  subsequent exponents  o f  th e  
1
t h e o r y .  However, the  temper o f  th e  new o rd e r  was r e f l e c t e d  more c l e a r l y
i n  th e  German p h i lo s o p h e r  H e g e l ’ s Fundamenta ls o f  the  P h i lo s o p h y  o f  R ig h t ,
p u b l is h e d  i n  1821, i n  which he t r i e d  to  h o ld  a ’ ’p r e c a r io u s  ba lance  between
2
r a t i o n a l i s m  and a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m "  th e re b y  p ropound ing  what has been
3
c a l le d  ’’dynamic, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m " .  I t  has a lso  been observed  t h a t  Marx
to o k  from H ege l th e  id e a  t h a t  th e  p r im e  m o t ive  fo r c e  o f  th e  h i s t o r i c a l
4
p rocess  i s  human la b o u r  o r  th e  p r a c t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  o f  men i n  s o c ie t y .
In  1845 Engels  p u b l is h e d  h i s  C o n d i t io n s  o f  the  D o rk in g  C lass  i n  England 
i n  1844, a n t i c i p a t i n g  i n  fo rm  the  d e s c r i p t i v e  passages o f  th e  f i r s t
5
volume o f  Das K a p i t a l  o f  M arx, p u b l is h e d  i n  1857. The M a rx -E n g e ls
th e o ry  o f  Communism had, o f  cou rse , found  e x p o s i t io n  e a r l i e r  i n  th e
M a n i fe s to , p u b l is h e d  in  1843, under t h e i r  j o i n t  a u th o r s h ip ,  f o r  th e
German members o f  th e  Communist League in  London, b u t  t h e i r  " c u l t "
a c q u ire d  p r e s t ig e  o n ly  th ro u g h  the  Russian R e v o lu t io n  o f  1 9 1 7 .^
1.226 The M a n i fe s to  opens u i t h  the  s ta te m e n t -  "A s p e c t re  i s  h a u n t in g
Europe, the  s p e c t re  o f  Communism", and p roceeds to  add t h a t  " th e  h i s t o r y
o f  a l l  p re v io u s  s o c ie ty  i s  th e  h i s t o r y  o f  c la s s  s t r u g g l e . "  C o n t in u in g
f u r t h e r  i t  s t a te s  t h a t ,  " C a p i ta l i s m  b reeds  i t s  own d e s t r u c t i o n "  and t h a t ,
"The v a lu e s  which w i l l  be d e s t ro y e d  by a r e v o lu t i o n  which a b o l is h e s  p r i v a t e
p ro p e r ty  i n  th e  means o f  p ro d u c t io n  w i l l  m e re ly  be th e  v a lu e s  o f  
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b o u rg e o is  l i f e . ”  The core  o f  th e  M a r x is t  th e o ry  has been s ta te d  i n  
these  te rm s :^
(1 )  U t i l i t a r i a n  s logan  b lu r s  th e  c o n f l i c t  between c la s s e s ,  
which i s  such t h a t  t o  r e a l i s e  th e  i n t e r e s t  o f  one c la s s  
i s  to  f r u s t r a t e  those  o f  a n o th e r .
(2 )  C a p i ta l is m  h a v in g  p ro g re sse d  t o  the  p o in t  a t which th e  
w orke rs  are c o n c e n tra te d  in  a c t io n ,  th e y  become 
o rg a n is e d  as a r e s u l t  o f  t h e i r  exp e r ie n ce  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l  l i f e ,  h a v in g  l e a r n t  th e  inadequacy o f  
b o u rg e o is  l i b e r a l  p a r l ia m e n ta ry  democracy f o r  rem edying 
t h e i r  c o n d i t i o n s .
(3 )  No p o l i t i c a l  th e o ry  can be u n de rs too d  ou t  o f  i t s  
c o n te x t  i n  the  s t r u g g le  between c la s s e s  -  appea ls  t o  
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  m o r a l i t y  o r  j u s t i c e  are u s e le s s  as th e y  
w i l l  embody p r i n c i p l e s  to  exp ress  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
th e  r u l i n g  c la s s .
The M a n i f e s to t i t  i s  s a id ,  " a t ta c k e d  a l l  concep ts  o f  the  r u l e  o f  Law and
s e l f -g o v e rn m e n t  deve loped i n  answer t o  th e  c e n t r a l  and p e r e n n ia l  problem
g
o f  p o l i t i c s ,  the  c o n t r o l  o f  p o w e r . "
1 .227 On th e  o th e r  hand M i l l  a s s e r te d  t h a t  i t  was n o t  th e  laws b u t  th e
t r a d i t i o n s ,  customs and c o n v e n t io n s  o f  s o c ie t y  t h a t  made men le s s  f r e e  to  
speak and a c t ,  s t a r t i n g  from  the  assumption t h a t  th e  j u d i c i a r y  had e s ta b ­
l i s h e d  i t s  independence from  bo th  e x e c u t iv e  and l e g i s l a t u r e  and t h a t  nobody 
co u ld  be t r i e d  o r  condemned f o r  " re a so n s  o f  s t a t e " .  He agreed t h a t  s e l f -  
government was a p r e - r e q u i s i t e  o f  freedom b u t  a t  th e  sane t im e  he observed 
t h a t  the  r e a l  prob lem  o f  freedom began once s e l f -g o v e rn m e n t  was e s t a b l i s h e d .  
In  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  (1 8 6 3 ) ,  he m o d i f ie d  Bentham 's  id e a s  about " u t i l i t y "  to  
in c lu d e  i n  i t  the  p le a s u re s  o f  th e  im a g in a t io n  and g r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  
h ig h e r  e m o t io n s .
1 .228  In  1789, Bentham had d a f in e d  " u t i l i t y "  to  mean
t h a t  p ro p e r ty  i n  any o b je c t  whereby i t  te n d s  to  produce 
p le a s u re ,  good o r  h a p p in e ss ,  o r  t o  p re v e n t  the happen ing  
o f  m is c h ie f ,  p a in ,  e v i l  o r  unhapp iness  t o  th e  p a r ty  whose 
i n t e r e s t  i s  c o n s id e re d .
Acco rd ing  to  Bentham, mankind was governed by two " s o v e re ig n  n o t io n s "  -
p a in  and p le a s u re  -  and he observed  t h a t  th e  o b je c t  o f  a l l  l e g i s l a t i o n
must be to  ensure  " th e  g r e a te s t  happ iness  o f  th e  g r e a te s t  num ber".  S ince
a l l  pun ishm ent i n v o lv e d  pa in  and was t h e r e fo r e  e v i l ,  i t  ough t t o  be used
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t h e r e fo r e  " t o  exc lude  some g r e a te r  e v i l " .  Bentham i s  known more f o r  h i s
p re o c c u p a t io n  w i th  the  c o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  law , and a ls o  as a c r i t i c  o f  law  and
o f  j u d i c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  r a th e r  than  as a p h i lo s o p h e r .  In
A n a rc h ic a l  F a l l a c ie s  he d is c a rd e d  th e  th e o ry  o f  N a tu r a l  Law and c a l l e d
n a t u r a l  r i g h t s  "n o n se n se " .  P ro fe s s o r  de Smith has c i t e d  h i s  s ta te m e n t as an
a u t h o r i t y  f o r  the  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  th e  "Ang lo -Saxon a t t i t u d e  to w a rd s  a
12com prehensive B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  has been u n i f o r m ly  n e g a t i v e . "  Ind e e d ,  D ice y ,
a B en tham ite  l i k e  M i l l ,  had s t re s s e d  th e  paramount r o l e  o f  " o r d in a r y  la w "  i n  
131885. B u t ,  as has been p o in te d  o u t ,  he was c a r e f u l  enough to  ta ke  no te  o f
the  f a c t  t h a t  what was t r u e  o f  th e  d e m o c ra t ic  system o f  Eng land , need n o t  be
n e c e s s a r i l y  t r u e  o f  a n o th e r  d e m o c ra t ic  system, f o r  democracy v a r ie d
"a c c o rd in g  t o  the
14n a t i o n a l  temperament o f  each S ta te ” . I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  D ic e y 's
con tem pora ry  ’’Lawyers”  l i k e  Maine and Stephen d id  n o t  share  h i s  v ie w s  and
exp ressed  d i s t r u s t  o f  democracy b u t ,  as has been obse rved , ’’ the  h a b i t  o f
m ind ind u ce d  by s e r v ic e  i n  I n d i a ” , in  th e  cases o f  bo th  Maine and S tephen,
15has t o  be taken i n t o  ac co u n t .
1.229 However, i t  i s  to  be no ted  t h a t  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c ia l is m
preached by Marx and Engels  d id  n o t  s t r i k e  deeper r o o ts  in  Eng land , where
’’the  Fab ians  th re w  as ide  th e  o ld e r  th e o ry  o f  v a lu e  as based e n t i r e l y  on
la b o u r ,  and th e  o ld e r  p o l i c y  o f  c la s s - w a r ,  f o r  a th e o ry  o f  m a rg in a l  v a lu e s
based on u t i l i t y ,  and a p o l i c y  o f  th e  g ra d u a l  s o c i a l i z a t i o n  o f  r e n t , ”  j u s t
as ”8entham th re w  a s ide  th e  o ld  c o n c e p t io n  o f  n a t u r a l  r i g h t s  f o r  t h a t  o f  
16u t i l i t y " .  The E n g l is h  s o c ia l i s m  to o k  on new b e a r in g s  i n  1914 in
The G reat S o c ie ty  o f  Graham W a llas  who, a long  w i th  George B e rna rd  Shaw
and o th e r s ,  had b ro u g h t  ou t  th e  Fabian Essays i n  1889. I t  has been
observed t h a t  Graham W a llas  sought to  r e c o n c i le  ’’Fab ian ism  w i th
O c c u p a t io n a l is m  in  much th e  sane way, though w i th  more c l a r i t y  and l o g i c ,
as th e  B r i t i s h  S o c i a l i s t  P a r ty  i n  1912 a t te m p te d  to  r e c o n c i le  Marxism
17w ith  Trade U n io n is m ."  The open approach o f  B r i t i s h  s o c ia l is m  was
expressed more v o c a l l y  two decades l a t e r  ( i n  1931) by H a ro ld  L a s k i ,  i n
18u r i t i n g ” The Dangers o f  O bed ience” , i n  which he observed as f o l l o w s :
For to  suppress  i n d i v i d u a l i t y  i s  to  d im in is h  i t ;  and th e  
outcome o f  c o n t in u o u s  d im u n i t io n  i s  th e  s la v e -m in d .  S ta te s  
have p e r is h e d  i n  h i s t o r y  n o t  because they  cou ld  no t  conce ive  
g re a t  ends, b u t  because t h e i r  pass ion  f o r  u n i f o r m i t y  has 
d e p r iv e d  them o f  th e  in s t r u m e n ts  necessa ry  to  c a r r y  o u t  
those  ends. H igh purposes i n  any community r e q u i r e  c i t i z e n s  
h ig h -m in d e d  enough to  a p p re c ia te  them; and men who have been 
m ode l led  to  a p a t t e r n  are in c a p a b le  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l  s t a t u r e .
Men whose m inds have been p u t  i n  f e t t e r s  cannot e x e r t  t h a t  
energy o f  the  s o u l  which i s  the  m o t iv e  power o f  g re a t  
ach ievem en t.
1 .230  H aving taken  n o te  so f a r  o f  th e  fe u  im p o r ta n t  dogmas t h a t  
ga ined cu r re n cy  under th e  new O rd e r ,  we may now b r i e f l y  re co u n t  th e  
im p o r ta n t  contem porary  e v e n ts  as th e  o b v io u s  c o r r e l a t i o n  between th e  two 
cannot be ig n o re d .  The S ta te  and s o c ie t y  are bound to  re a c t  to  im p o r ta n t
e v e n ts ,  and th e  new v a lu e s  and new v iew s  i n  t u r n  c re a te  new e v e n ts .  I t
cannot be g a in s a id  t h a t  th e  id e a s  o f  democracy and s e l f -g o v e rn m e n t  a c q u ire d
new meanings and c o n te n ts  i n  England a f t e r  th e  American War o f  Independence .
Ule have seen how th e  U t i l i t a r i a n s  responded to  the  new id e a s  o f  democracy
and how H i l l  spoke o f  s e l f - g o v e rn m e n t .  P u b l i c  o p in io n  was bound t o  be
in f lu e n c e d  by th e  con tem pora ry  p o l i t i c a l  th o u g h t  and in  tu r n  t o  i n f l u e n c e
s ta te  p o l i c y ,  b u t  i t  has been r i g h t l y  observed t h a t  th e  B r i t i s h  c o l o n i a l
p o l i c y  has n o t  been c o n s is te n t  and t h a t  i t  "has n o t  run ahead o f  c o l o n i a l
19n a t io n a l i s m ,  b u t  has been a response to  i t s  demands." The In d ia n  Sepoy
M u t in y  o f  1857 r e s u l t e d  in  a change i n  th e  form o f  th e  In d ia n  c o l o n i a l
a d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  w i th  th e  enactment by th e  B r i t i s h  P a r l ia m e n t  o f  th e
20Government o f  I n d ia  Act in  1858. P a r l ia m e n t  a lso  g ra n te d
" C o n s t i t u t i o n s "  t o  the  s e l f - g o v e r n in g  c o lo n ie s  o f  Canada and A u s t r a l i a  i n
1867 and 1900 r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  th e  C o lo n ia l  Laws V a l i d i t y  Act enac ted  i n  1865
uas i n  f a c t  a response to  the  problem o f  an A u s t r a l ia n  c o lo n y .  In  1907
New Zealand uas a lso  g ra n te d  a " C o n s t i t u t i o n " .  W hile  t h i s  p rocess  was
go ing  on and th e  concept o f  th e  Commonwealth uas t a k in g  shape, th e  B r i t i s h
s u r p r i s i n g l y  j o in e d  th e  "s c ra m b le  f o r  A f r i c a " ,  m a n i fe s te d  i n  the  f i r s t
21I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Conference h e ld  i n  B e r l i n  i n  1884-85 .
1.231 B u t th e re  were more im p o r ta n t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  eve n ts  t h a t  
preceded th e  C on fe rence . In  1814, "The T re a ty  o f  P a r i s "  p ro v id e d  f o r  
th e  u n i v e r s a l  p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  th e  s l a v e - t r a d e .  In  1856 th e  Crimean War 
began and in  1861 th e  American C i v i l  War. These even ts  b ro u g h t  an 
im m edia te  response from the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  community in  th e  fo rm  o f  the  
Geneva C onven t io ns  o f  War in  1864, which was th e  f i r s t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r e a t y  to  p ro v id e  f o r  t h e  s i c k  and wounded p r is o n e r s  o f  war b e in g  g iven  
h u m a n i ta r ia n  t r e a tm e n t .  In  1B74 th e re  was an I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C on fe rence  in  
B ru s s e ls  which d e a l t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  u i t h  the  l e g a l  s ta tu s  o f  i n s u r g e n t s .
L a te r ,  th e  Hague C onven tions  o f  1899 and 1907 d e a l t  u i t h  th e  Laws o f  War 
in  g re a te r  d e t a i l .  P o s s ib ly  th e  fo u n d in g ,  f i r s t  o f  th e  League o f  N a t io n s
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i n  1920 and then o f  the  U n i te d  N a t io n s  in  1945 encouraged f u r t h e r  
development o f  the  law i n  t h i s  f i e l d  which found  e xp re ss io n  i n  the  
Geneva C onven tions  o f  1925, 1929 and 1945.
1 .232 I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  the  ’’ i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c ia l i s m ”  o f  d a r x  ga ined
a permanent f o o t h o ld  i n  R uss ia  i n  1917 w i th  the  f a l l  o f  th e  C z a r i s t  reg im e
th e r e ,  b u t  i t  was o n ly  a f t e r  th e  end o f  th e  F i r s t  U o r ld  Uar t h a t  the  id e a
o f  a b road -based  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o -o p e ra t io n  on a la r g e r  s c a le  ca p tu re d
th e  im a g in a t io n  o f  th e  w o r ld ,  which saw th e  League o f  N a t io n s  b e in g
founded i n  1920 w i th  h e a d q u a r te rs  a t Geneva and The Permanent C ou rt  o f
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O us t ice  a t  The Hague. I t  i s  to  be n o ted  t h a t ,  a l th o u g h
America neve r  j o in e d  the  League, i t  was P re s id e n t  W ilson  who f i r s t  mooted
th e  id e a  in  1918, s t r e s s in g  th e  need f o r  " a f f o r d i n g  m u tu a l  gu a ra n te e s  o f
p o l i t i c a l  independence end t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  to  g re a t  and s m a l l  
22n a t io n s  a l i k e . ”
(2 )  Second Phase: I n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  in  th e  f i e l d
o f  human r i g h t s
( A) The Role o f  th e  League o f  N a t io n s
1 ,233 A lthough  th e  League o f  N a t io n s  was f o r m a l l y  d is s o lv e d  in  1945,
Russ ia  had jo in e d  i t  as l a t e  as 1934 o n ly  t o  be e x p e l le d  a few  y e a rs
l a t e r ,  i n  1939. On th e  o th e r  hand, Germany and fo u r te e n  o th e r  S ta te s
had w i t h d r a w n  f r om  i t  b e f o r e  t h e  Second U o r l d  Uar  bEgan.  As we have seen,
th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e f f o r t s  in  the  f i e l d  o f  human r i g h t s  have been c o n f in e d ,
u n t i l  th e  fo rm a t io n  o f  the  League, to  one aspect o n ly ,  nam e ly , v i o l a t i o n s
r e s u l t i n g  from armed c o n f l i c t s ,  i n s o f a r  as th e  r i g h t  to  p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y
was concerned . T h is  p o s i t i o n  rem ained unchanged d u r in g  th e  e ra  o f  the
League excep t p o s s ib ly  i n  one r e s p e c t .  E a r l i e r ,  i n  v a r io u s  b i l a t e r a l
and m u l t i - l a t e r a l  t r e a t i e s  n e g o t ia te d  as e a r l y  as 1555, human r i g h t s
problems were d e a l t  w i t h  m a in ly  i n  te rm s o f  th e  r i g h t s  o f  r e l i g i o u s  
23m i n o r i t i e s .  T h is  aspect was broadened in  A r t .  22 o f  the  Covenant o f  the  
League, under which c e r t a in  "advanced n o t i o n s ”  became "m a n d a to r ie s  on
b e h a l f  o f  th e  League11. They were e n t r u s te d  u i t h  "a  sacred  t r u s t  o f  
c i v i l i s a t i o n ”  i n  g o v e rn in g  "p e o p le  n o t  y e t  ab le  to  s tand  by them se lves  
under th e  s t re n u o u s  c o n d i t io n s  o f  th e  modern w o r ld " .  A Commission was 
se t  up to  m o n i to r  th e  p rocess  and t o  subm it  annua l r e p o r t s  on th e  " w e l l ­
b e in g  and deve lopm ent"  o f  th e  dependent p e o p le .  C l . (5 )  o f  th e  a r t i c l e  
gua ran teed  " freedom  o f  consc ience  and r e l i g i o n "  and p r o h ib i t e d  t r a f f i c k i n g  
in  s la v e s ,  arms and l i q u o r .  I t  i s  p e r t i n e n t  to  no te  t h a t  B r i t a i n  became 
a m andatary in  re s p e c t  o f  P a le s t in e  and T angany ika , among o th e r  
de p e n d e n c ie s .
1 .234  The fo u n d in g  o f  th e  League o f  N a t io n s  d id  n o t ,  i n  v ie w  o f  th e
l i m i t e d  scope o f  A r t .  22, c o n t r ib u te  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g
in  the f i e l d  o f  human r i g h t s ,  a l thoug h  i t  m ig h t  have r e s u l t e d  i n ,  as has
been sugges te d , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n  o f  th e  c o lo n ia l  p ro b le m " ,  o f  which
the  " s e c u r i t y  a s p e c t"  m ig h t  have been th e  prime mover i n  t h a t  i t  m ig h t  have
b ro u g h t  about a r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  the  f a c t  t h a t  c o lo n ia l  r u l e  c re a te d
24i n t e r - s t a t e  r i v a l r y  le a d in g  to  armed c o n f l i c t  in  many cases. Indeed ,
B r i t a i n  uas a m a jo r  c o l o n i a l  power which had n e i t h e r  a w r i t t e n
C o n s t i t u t i o n  n o r  any sympathy f o r  a w r i t t e n  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts ,  whether a t  a
n a t i o n a l  o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  The C o n s t i t u t i o n s  i t  g ra n te d  to  i t s  s e l f -
gove rn in g  c o lo n ie s  l i k e  Canada, A u s t r a l i a  and New Zealand d id  n o t  c o n ta in
any B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts .  The c o l o n i a l  i n t e r e s t s  o f  France p o s s ib ly  swamped
i t s  w id e r  h u m a n i ta r ia n  sy m p a th ie s .  A lthough  P re s id e n t  W ilson  had p leaded
f o r  th e  r i g h t  o f  s e l f - d e t e r m in a t i o n  o f  peop les  in  1918 in  h i s  "F o u r te e n
P o in t s " ,  he co u ld  n o t  persuade th e  American Senate to  r a t i f y  the
25C onvention  to  j o i n  th e  League. A lthough  S o v ie t  R uss ia  had had no 
c o l o n i a l  prob lem i t  adopted a C o n s t i t u t i o n  in  1936 w i th o u t  a B i l l  o f  
R ig h ts ,  to  conform w i th  th e  o r th o d o x  M arx ian  d o c t r in e  unde r which a man 
i s  c o n s id e re d  as a " s p e c is  b e in g "  and a man i s  d isco u ra g e d  t o  t h i n k  o f
h im s e l f  " i n  b o u rg e o is  te rm s  as an i n d i v i d u a l  u i t h  se p a ra te  i n a l i e n a b le
26r i g h t s " .  The fo u n d in g  o f  th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s ta n d a rd -
s e t t i n g  under i t s  e e g is ,  however, in f lu e n c e d  th e  Russian le a d e rs  t o  d e p a r t  
from the  o r th o d o x  d o c t r i n e  in  1965 by amending the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  to  
in c o r p o r a te  t h e r e in  a B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  ( a l b e i t  n o n - j u s t i c i a b l e )  i n ,  among 
o th e r s ,  A r t .  125 which " g u a r a n te e d " , " in  o rd e r  t o  s t re n g th e n  the  s o c i a l i s t  
sys te m " ,  freedom o f  speech, o f  the  p re s s ,  o f  assembly and o f  p ro c e s s io n s  
and d e m o n s t ra t io n s .  A r t .  127 "g u a ra n te e d  i n v i o l a b i l i t y  o f  th e  p e rs o n "  
t o  the  c i t i z e n .
(B ) The Role o f  th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s
( a) JSorcie^j:o^isionj3 of__the__Ch_ar_ter_an d_J: he_n ew__be aring_s
1 .235  The new b e a r in g s  in  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  system were e v id e n t  even 
b e fo re  the  a c tu a l  fo u n d in g  o f  th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s .  For t h i s  one may lo o k  to  
P re s id e n t  R o o s e v e l t 's  d e c la r a t io n  o f  "F ou r Freedoms" o f  3anuary 1941
and a lso  to  th e  " A t l a n t i c  C h a r te r "  o f  th e  sane yea r  and to  th e  "Moscow
D e c la r a t i o n "  o f  1943. h'hen th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  C h a r te r  was s ig n e d  in  1945,
o f  th e  tw e lve  A f ro -A s ia n  " o r i g i n a l  members" ( o u t  o f  a t o t a l  o f  5 1 ) ,  o n ly
I n d i a  ( a l b e i t  a dependency th e n )  be longed  to  the  New Commonwealth b u t  the
A f ro -A s ia n  membership rose r a p i d l y  to  22 in  1960 and 41 in  1970, ou t o f  a
t o t a l  o f  127. D u r in g  t h i s  p e r io d ,  as C h ie f  Adebo, th e  Under S e c re ta r y -
G e ne ra l o f  th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  obse rved , t h i s  h a n d fu l  o f  members "made i t
t h e i r  b u s in e ss  to  see to  i t  t h a t  t h e i r  b re th re n  who were s t i l l  unde r th e
c o l o n i a l  yoke a t t a in e d  t h e i r  freedom and independence as soon as p o s s ib le
and, i n  th e  m eanw h ile , t h a t  they  were t r e a t e d  w i th  decency and f a i r n e s s
27by t h e i r  c o l o n i a l  m a s te r s . "
1 .236  In  th e  p ream ble  o f  th e  C h a r te r  i t  i s  s ta te d  t h a t  th e  o b je c t  o f
the  U n i te d  N a t io n s  i s ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,
to  r e a f f i r m  f a i t h  i n  the  fu n d a m e n ta l  human r i g h t s ,
in  th e  d i g n i t y  and w orth  o f  human p e rsons , i n  the
equa l r i g h t s  o f  men and women and o f  n a t io n s  la rg e  
and s m a l l .
Thus i t  com m itted i t s e l f  t o  th e  ta s k  o f  s t a n d a r d - s e t t i n g  in  th e  f i e l d  o f  
human r i g h t s ,  b u t  n o t i c e  has a lso  to  be taken  o f  some o f  th e  o th e r  p r o v i s io n s  
o f  the  C h a r te r .  A r t .  1 (2 )  i n d i c a t e s  one o f  the  "Purposes o f  th e  U n i te d
N a t io n s ”  as b e in g  ” to  deve lop  f r i e n d l y  r e l a t i o n s  among n a t io n s  based on 
re s p e c t  f o r  th e  peop le  t o  e q u a l r i g h t s  and s e l f - d e t e r m in a t io n  o f  p e o p le s ” . 
A r t .  2 (7 )  p ro v id e s  t h a t  the  U n i te d  N a t io n s  s h a l l  no t  " in te r v e n e  in  m a t te r s  
which are e s s e n t i a l l y  w i t h i n  the d om es t ic  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  any S t a t e ” .
1.237 C hap te r XI c o n ta in e d  " D e c la r a t io n s  r e g a rd in g  n o n - s e l f  g o v e rn in g
t e r r i t o r i e s ” , which th e  A f ro -A s ia n  b lo c  used w i th  g re a t  d e te rm in a t io n  to
28c u r t a i l  th e  scope o f  A r t .  2 ( 7 ) .  A r t .  73 in  t h i s  C hap te r ,  adopted some, 
though n o t  a l l ,  o f  the  concep ts  o f  A r t .  22 o f  the  C onvention  o f  th e  League 
o f  N a t io n s .  I t  a lso  speaks o f  "sa c re d  t r u s t "  and th e  " w e l l  b e in g "  o f  the  
i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  n o n - s e l f  g o v e rn in g  t e r r i t o r i e s  and r e q u i r e s  th e  "members o f  
the  U n i te d  N a t io n s  which have o r  assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  th e  
a d m in i s t r a t i o n "  o f  these  t e r r i t o r i e s  to  do such t h in g s  as ensure " t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, s o c i a l ,  and e d u c a t io n a l  advancement, t h e i r  j u s t  
t r e a tm e n t  and t h e i r  p r o t e c t io n  a g a in s t  abuses" and, in  d e v e lo p in g  s e l f -  
governm ent, " ta k e  due account o f  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  the  p e o p le " .  
Chapter X I I  p ro v id e s  f o r  th a  " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T ru s te e s h ip  System" which 
re p la c e s  th e  "H anda te "  system o f  th e  League o f  N a t io n s .  A r t .  76 i n  t h i s  
Chapter i n d i c a t e s  the  " b a s ic  o b je c t i v e s  o f  th e  t r u s te e s h ip  sys te m ",  such as 
" t o  Encourage re s p e c t  f o r  human r i g h t s  and f o r  fu ndam en ta l freedom s f o r  
a l l "  and " r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  th e  in te rd e p e n d e n ce  o f  th e  peop les  o f  the  w o r ld * "
1 .238 C hap te rs  IX and X are concerned u i t h  " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic and 
S o c ia l  C o - o p e ra t io n "  and c o n ta in  im p o r ta n t  p r o v is io n s  on human r i g h t s  
( A r t s .  55, 60, 62 and 6 8 ) .  A r t .  55 deserves  s p e c ia l  n o t i c e  i n  t h a t  i t  
r e i t e r a t e s  " re s p e c t  f o r  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u a l  r i g h t s  and s e l f -  
d e te rm in a t io n  o f  p e o p le s "  and t h a t  th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  s h a l l  "p rom ote  
u n i v e r s a l  re s p e c t  f o r ,  and observance o f ,  human r i g h t s  and fu n d a m e n ta l  
freedoms f o r  a l l " ,  b u t  i t  i s  to  be no ted  t h a t  thB u n d e r l in e d  e x p re s s io n s  
are no t  d e f in e d .  A r t .  62 empowers th e  C o u n c i l  to  p repare  and subm it 
a p p ro p r ia te  " d r a f t  c o n v e n t io n s "  to  th e  G e ne ra l Assembly and a ls o  " t o  make 
recommendations f o r  th e  purpose o f  p ro m o t in g  re s p e c t  f o r ,  and observance o f
human r i g h t s  and fu n d a m e n ta l freedom s f o r  a l l " .  A r t .  68 s p e c i f i c a l l y  
empowers the  C o u n c i l  t o  s e t  up "Com m iss ions" f o r  such p u rp o se .
1.239 I t  i s  to  be n o te d  t h a t  the  n o n -a l ig n e d  n a t io n s  p r e f e r  an 
approach o f  " e f f e c t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n "  o f  th e  C h a r te r ,  which i s  to  be 
i n s p i r e d  by i t s  g e n e ra l  p h i lo s o p h y  and u n d e r ly in g  b a s is  and to  be d i r e c te d  
to w a rd s  th e  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  i t s  fu n d a m e n ta l purposes and s ta te d  o b je c t i v e s .  
T h is  has re p la c e d  the  f ra g m e n ta ry  and m ere ly  p r o h i b i t i v e  r u le  o f
29i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law by an i n t e g r a t e d  system o f  more p o s i t i v e  s ta n d a rd s .
Indeed , Faw ce tt  p o in t s  ou t  t h a t  A r t . 2 (7 ) has n o t  a f fo rd e d  the  p r o t e c t io n
t h a t  the  d r a f t e r s  c o n te m p la te d . ^  He observes  t h a t  " i t  has come to  be
accepted  t h a t  where th e  p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t  o f  s e l f - d e t e r m in a t i o n  o f  a p e op le
i s  in  is s u e  o r  where th e re  i s  a t  l e a s t  a s y s te m a t ic  d e n ia l  o f  human r i g h t s ,
31the  U n i te d  N a t io n s  does n o t  re g a rd  A r t .  2 (7 )  as a b a r r i e r . "  There i s  no
doubt t h a t  n o t  o n ly  th e  A f ro -A s ia n  group has b ro u g h t  a new emphasis to  bear
upon th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  C h a r te r ,  as both  T w i t c h e t t  and Goodwin
ob se rve , b u t  t h a t  th e re  i s  a ls o  much t r u t h  i n  T w i t c h e t t f s c o n te n t io n  t h a t
the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  drama i s  now b e in g  p la ye d  ou t i n  a new s e t t i n g ,  which
32th e  fo u n d in g  f a t h e r s  c o u ld  n o t  have a n t i c i p a t e d .  There i s  a lso  th e
pressu re  from the  Communist g roup , b e s id e s  th e  p re ssu re  o f  r a p id
deve lopm ents  t h a t  are t a k in g  p la c e  in  t o d a y ’ s w o r ld  as a r e s u l t  o f
" t e c h n o lo g ic a l  r e v o l u t i o n "  and "conques t o f  space " ,  w i th  a l u r k i n g  danger
o f  d e s t r u c t io n  and p o l l u t i o n  o f  n a t u r a l  e n v iro n m e n t .  T w i t c h e t t  i s  r i g h t
in  a s s e r t in g  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  aspec ts  o f  human r i g h t s  and r a c i a l
33q u e s t io n s  have assumed "a  new, more p o te n t  g u is e " .  Goodwin i s  perhaps
more candid when he says t h a t  the  p re s su re  from the  A f ro -A s ia n  group i s
d i r e c te d  tow ards  d e c la r in g  " th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  human r i g h t s  a lm ost
34e x c lu s i v e l y  i n  te rm s o f  th e  r i g h t  to  n a t i o n a l  s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . "  On 
the  o th e r  hand, P ro fe s s o r  F e l i x  Ermacora p r e fe r s  t o  ta k e  an o r th o d o x  v iew  
o f  A r t . 22(7) by r e f e r r i n g  t o  i t s  p r e c u r s o r ,  A r t . 15 (8 )  o f  the  Covenant o f  
the  League o f  N a t io n s ,  d e s p i te  the  f a c t  t h a t  the  two "d o m e s t ic  j u r i s d i c t i o n "
c la u se s  are d i f f e r e n t l y  worded. A cco rd in g  t o  Ermacora bo th  th e  League
and the  U n i te d  N a t io n s  have c h a ra c te rs  s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  o f  a ’’u n io n ”  i n  a
35c o n fe d e ra t io n  and they  bo th  have ’’ l i m i t e d  competence” . However, even
Ermacora concedes a ’’ c o n c u r re n t  j u r i s d i c t i o n ”  i n  m a t te rs  o f  ’’ g ross  v i o l a t i o n ”
and ’’ c o n s is te n t  p a t t e r n s  o f  v i o l a t i o n s "  o f  human r i g h t s ,  e s p e c ia l l y  in
re s p e c t  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a in s t  d i s c r im in a t i o n  and o f  th e  r i g h t  to  s e l f -  
35d e t e r m in a t io n .
1 .240 I t  i s  to  be n o te d  t h a t  d is c u s s io n s  had taken p lace  in  th e  v e ry
f i r s t  se ss io n  o f  th e  G ene ra l Assembly in  1945 on a " D e c la r a t io n  on the
37R ig h ts  and D u t ie s  o f  S ta te s ” . In  th e  d r a f t  i t  was proposed t h a t  the
d e c la r a t io n  shou ld  d e a l ,  i n t e r  a l i a , w i th  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  the  r i g h t s  o f  the  
s t a t e ,  d is c h a rg e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n s ,  and th e  n a t i o n a l  and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  scope o f  th e  law o f  n a t io n s ,  b u t  the  S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l  
observed t h a t  i t  was no t a p u r e ly  j u r i d i c a l  q u e s t io n  and t h a t  i t  was 
necessary  t o  ta k e  i n t o  account " v a r y in g  g e o g ra p h ic a l  and p o l i t i c a l
c o n d i t io n s  and to  s y n th e s iz e  them to  re p re s e n t  th e  u n i t e d  j u r i d i c a l
38t h i n k i n g  o f  the  whole w o r l d . ”  I t  was r e s o lv e d  t h a t  the  v iew s o f  no t
o n ly  th e  member s ta te s  b u t  a ls o  o f  n a t i o n a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b o d ies
concerned w i th  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law be i n v i t e d ,  and t h a t  f u r t h e r  s tu d ie s  be
39conducted i n t o  the  m a t te r  by th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law Commission.
U n fo r t u n a t e l y ,  th e  l a t t e r  dec ided  in  1949 t h a t  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
"d o m e s t ic  j u r i s d i c t i o n "  was n o t  a t o p i c  s u i t a b l e  f o r  c o d i f i c a t i o n .  Some 
members expressed th e  v iew  t h a t  w h i le  th e  Covenant o f  th e  League 
empowered th e  " C o u n c i l ”  to  do so, th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s  C h a r te r ,  on the
40o th e r  hand, l e f t  i t  to  th e  member s ta te s  t o  d e f in e  th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n .
1.241 However, i n  a U n i te d  N a t io n s  sem inar i n  Dar-es-Sa laam (T a n za n ia )
in  1973 the  s u b je c t  again came up f o r  d is c u s s io n .  The sem inar was
d is c u s s in g  ways and means f o r  p rom o t ing  human r i g h t s  w i th  s p e c ia l  a t t e n t i o n
41to  th e  p rob lem s and needs o f  A f r i c a .  There  were v iew s  expressed to
the e f f e c t  t h a t  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  human r i g h t s  m ig h t  in  some cases be "p u t
as ide  t e m p o r a r i l y "  u n t i l  th e  m a j o r i t y  o f  th e  A f r ic a n  p e o p le  had been
educa ted  and t h e i r  c o n d i t io n s  o f  l i v i n g  im p roved . I t  was a ls o  s a id  t h a t
i t  was u s e le s s  t o  d is c u s s  human r i g h t s  e xc e p t  in  the  c o n te x t  o f
t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  o f  a s t a t e ;  t h a t  th e  "p r im a ry  a im " o f  any
government was to  promote th e  hap p in e ss  o f  the  peop le  o f  the  c o u n t r y  and
t h a t  c i v i l  and p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  were u s e f u l  o n ly  i f  th e y  c o n t r i b u te d  to
42th e  a t ta in m e n t  o f  t h i s  g o a l .  The v iew s  a p p a re n t ly  c o n f i rm  th e  p o s i t i o n ,
as has been obse rved , t h a t  "Many A f ro -A s ia n  s ta te s  v ie w  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law
as a group o f  l e g a l  norms d e v is e d  by t h e i r  fo rm e r  c o l o n i a l  m a s te rs  to
.. 43m a in ta in  and p r o t e c t  th e  s ta tu s  q u o " .  S i m i l a r l y ,  th e  East European
n a t io n s ,  le d  by R uss ia ,  were a ls o  expec ted  to  th w a r t  any a t te m p t to
encroach on "d o m e s t ic  j u r i s d i c t i o n "  as th e y  were apt t o  c o n s id e r
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  law as r e f l e c t i n g  the  v a lu e s  o f  the  c a p i t a l i s t  economic 
44system .
(b )  T_he U_nJ_ve.r_sel J^ej^ljsrjBtjuDn Jin__Hjjn_an__Right_s
1.242 The D e c la r a t io n  was adopted unan im ous ly  by th e  G enera l Assembly
o f  the  U n i te d  N a t io n s ,  in  December 1948, a l th o u g h  e i g h t  c o u n t r ie s  a b s ta in e d
in c lu d in g  R uss ia  and f i v e  o th e r  East European c o u n t r ie s  as w e l l  as South
45A f r i c a  and Saudi A ra b ia .  P ro fe s s o r  D .E .S . Faw ce tt  p r e fe r s  t o  re g a rd
th e  document as " i n t e r p r e t i n g  and d e f i n i n g "  th e  r e le v a n t  human r i g h t s
46p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  C h a r te r .  P ro fe s s o r  L . B . Sohn, however, accords  i t  a 
ve ry  h ig h  s t a tu s  and observes  t h a t  i t  has become "a  p a r t  o f  th e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  law Gf th e  w o r ld  community ; and, t o g e th e r  w i th  the  C h a r te r  
o f  th e  U n i te d  N a t io n s ,  i t  has ach ieved  th e  c h a ra c te r  o f  a w o r ld  law
47s u p e r io r  t o  a l l  o th e r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  in s t r u m e n ts  and to  d o m e s t ic  la w s " .
The two v iew s r e f l e c t  the  d i f f e r e n c e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  in  the B r i t i s h  and 
American approach to  th e  c h a r a c te r  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  in s t r u m e n ts  a r i s i n g  
from th e  d i f f e r e n c e  in  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n  in  th e  two s t a t e s .
There i s  a p p a re n t ly  ano the r  reason f o r  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  in  approach in  t h a t  
B r i t a i n  and o th e r  Western European n a t io n s  o b v io u s ly  a t ta c h  g r e a te r
im p o r ta n c e  to  the  European C onvention  on Human R ig h ts  adopted in  1950. 
However, i t  i s  to  be no ted  t h a t  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  "M o n t re a l  S ta te m e n t"  
o f  the  Assembly f o r  Human R ig h ts ,  th e  d e c la r a t i o n  has "become a p a r t  
o f  th e  customary i n t e r n a t i o n a l  la w " .  In  the  "P ro c la m a t io n  o f  T ehe ran "
( a l s o  o f  1968) i t  i s  s ta te d  t h a t  the  D e c la ra t io n  " c o n s t i t u t e s  an
48o b l i g a t i o n  f o r  th e  members o f  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  com m unity " .
1 .243  In  t h i s  v ie w  o f  th e  m a t te r ,  and in  v ie w  o f  th e  f u r t h e r  f a c t  t h a t  
th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Covenant on Human R ig h ts  o f  1966 has come i n t o  fo r c e  in  
1976, i t  can be l e g i t i m a t e l y  c la im ed  t h a t  in  p r i n c i p l e  th e  p o s i t i o n  in  
re s p e c t  o f  " l e g a l "  p r o t e c t io n  o f  human r i g h t s  i n  many p a r ts  o f  th e  w o r ld  
has come v e ry  c lo s e  to  t h a t  o f  Western Europe and B r i t a i n .  Ind e e d ,  as
we s h a l l  see, Khanna, 3 . ,  o f  th e  In d ia n  Supreme C o u r t ,  a t ta c h e d  im p o r ta n ce
t o  th e  d isch a rg e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  r e l y i n g  m e re ly  on the
D e c la r a t io n  and the  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  In d ia n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  in  th e  famous
49HABEAS CORPUS case. D e s p i te  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r o v i s i o n s ,  c o u r ts  e lsew here  i n  the  r e p u b l ic a n  s ta te s  o f  th e  New 
Commonwealth g e n e r a l ly  (more p a r t i c u l a r l y  the  A f r ic a n  s t a te s  w i th
50
somewhat s i m i l a r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s io n s )  were l i k e l y  t o  f a l l o w  
I n d i a ’ s example, as th e y  were n o t  l i k e l y  to  f e e l  burdened by the  th e o ry
o f  p r e r o g a t iv e  fo l lo w e d  i n  England in  m a t te r s  r e l a t i n g  to  d is c h a rg e  o f
51" t r e a t y "  o b l i g a t i o n s .
1 .244  I t  i s  necessa ry  t o  no te  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  t h a t  a change i n  the  
p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r  i n  many A f r ic a n  s t a te s  o f  the  Commonwealth has n o t  been 
accompanied by a change in  th e  l e g a l  o r d e r ;  i n  any case none has f u l l y  
accepted th e  M a r x is t  i d e o lo g y .  B u t ,  as i n d i c a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  R uss ia  had 
i t s e l f  amended i t s  own C o n s t i t u t i o n  in  1965. The change had, however, 
come much e a r l i e r  i n  the  "E a s te rn  B lo c "  i n  t h a t  in  th e  1958 Warsaw 
C o l loqu ium  i t  was f i r s t  observed  t h a t  i t  was necessa ry  to  in c lu d e  th e
concept o f  r i g h t s  and freedom s o f  th e  c i t i z e n s  i n  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f
52" s o c i a l i s t  l e g a l i t y " .  A c c o rd in g ly ,  i n  1958 th e  new c r i m i n a l  law in
R ussia  gave a l a r g e r  measure o f  p r o t e c t i o n  to  c i v i l  r i g h t s  and, when a
new b ia s  was im p a r te d  to  th e  1961 "Programme o f  CPSU" e n v is a g in g
" p e a c e fu l  c o m p e t i t io n  between s o c ia l i s m  and c a p i t a l i s m  on an i n t e r n a t i o n a l
s c a le " ,  i t  became e a s ie r  f o r  Y u g o s la v ia  and Rumania to  d is p la y  an emphasis
on human r i g h t s  i n  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  enac ted  th e re  in  1963 and 1965 
53r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I t  i s  a lso  to  be n o ted  t h a t  d e s p i te  th e  " c o ld  war" 
c o n t in u in g  f o r  a lo n g  t im e  th e  p re s e n t  p o l i t i c a l  c l im a te  i s  in fu s e d  
w i th  a s p i r i t  o f  d e te n te  which found  e x p re s s io n  in  the  " F i n a l  A c t "  o f  
H e l s i n k i . E v e n  the  m i l i t a r y  r u l e r s  in  Commonwealth A f r i c a  cou ld  n o t  
f a i l  t o  ta k e  n o t i c e  o f  th e  new c l im a te  and no ted  t h a t  t h e i r  c la im  to  
l e g i t im a c y  co u ld  be b e s t  s u s ta in e d  by p ro c la im in g  t h e i r  re s p e c t  f o r  and
55awareness o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  concern f o r  th e  human r i g h t s  s i t u a t i o n  t h e r e .
1 .245 The U n iv e r s a l  D e c la r a t io n  c o n ta in s  a fo rm id a b le  pream ble  which 
in v o ke s  th e  C h a r te r ,  r e c a l l s  th e  " p le d g e "  o f  th e  members r e g a rd in g  th e  
"p ro m o t io n  o f  u n i v e r s a l  re s p e c t  f o r  and observance o f  human r i g h t s  and 
fundam en ta l f reedom s" and s ta te s  t h a t  i t  has t o  serve as a "common 
s ta n d a rd  o f  ach ievem ent f o r  a l l  peop les  and n a t i o n s " ,  no t  o n ly  t o  
"prom ote r e s p e c t "  t h e r e f o r  b u t  a ls o  " t o  secure ( i n t e r  a l i a ) t h e i r  
e f f e c t i v e  o b s e rv a n c e " .  A r t .  5 p r o h i b i t s  " t o r t u r e " ,  as a lso  " c r u e l ,  
inhuman o r  de g ra d in g  t re a tm e n t  o r  p u n is h m e n t" .  A r t .  9 f o r b id s  
" a r b i t r a r y  a r r e s t ,  d e te n t io n  o r  e x i l e " .  A r t s .  10 and 11 r e a f f i r m  common 
law p r o t e c t io n  as re s p e c ts  c r im in a l  t r i a l s  by i n s i s t i n g  on " f a i r  and p u b l i c  
h e a r in g  by an indepe nden t and i m p a r t i a l  t r i b u n a l "  and on the p resum ption  
o f  inn o ce n ce , b e s id e s  r e i t e r a t i n g  the  r u l e  embodied in  the  maxim 
n u l l a  poena s in e  le g e . A r t .  14 n e g a t i v e ly  re c o g n is e s  th e  concept o f  
" p o l i t i c a l  c r im e "  and c re a te s  th e  r i g h t  o f  asylum, w h i le  A r t .  13 speaks 
somewhat vague ly  ( i n  te rm s o f  "e v e ry o n e "  and n o t  c i t i z e n s )  o f  th e  " r i g h t  
to  freedom o f  movement and re s id e n c e " .  The concept o f  democracy i s  
s p e l le d  o u t  in  th e  f o l l o w in g  te rm s :
(1 )  Everyone has th e  r i g h t  to  ta k e  p a r t  i n  th e  government o f  
h i s  c o u n t r y ,  d i r e c t l y  o r  th ro u g h  f r e e l y  chosen 
r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s .
(3 )  The w i l l  o f  th e  peop le  s h a l l  be th e  b a s is  o f  th e  a u t h o r i t y  
o f  governm ent; t h i s  s h a l l  be expressed in  p e r i o d i c  and 
genu ine e le c t i o n s  which s h a l l  be by u n i v e r s a l  and e q u a l  
s u f f r a g e  and s h a l l  be h e ld  by s e c r e t  vo te  o r  by e q u iv a le n t  
f r e e  v o t i n g  p ro c e d u re .  ( A r t .  21)
A r t .  22 speaks o f  th e  " r i g h t  to  s o c ia l  s e c u r i t y "  ( f o r  "e v e ry o n e " )  which
i s  n o t  d e f in e d  b u t  i s  r e l a t e d  to  h i s  b e in g  "a  member o f  s o c i e t y " .  On the
o th e r  hand, A r t .  28 speaks o f  "a  s o c i a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rd e r  i n  which
th e  r i g h t s  and freedom s s e t  f o r t h  in  [ t h e ]  D e c la r a t io n  can be f u l l y
r e a l i s e d . "  A r t .  30 i s  r e le v a n t  to  th e  concept o f  " s t a t e  s e c u r i t y "  and
deserves to  be quo ted :
N o th in g  i n  t h i s  D e c la r a t io n  may be in t e r p r e t e d  as im p ly in g  
f o r  any S ta te ,  g roup o r  person any r i g h t  to  engage in  any 
a c t i v i t y  o r  t o  pe r fo rm  any ac t aimed a t  th e  d e s t r u c t io n  o f  
any o f  the  r i g h t s  and freedoms se t  f o r t h  h e r o i n .
[em phas is  added]
1.246 I t  i s  to  be n o te d  t h a t ,  a l th o u g h  the  C h a r te r  as w e l l  as th e
D e c la ra t io n  f a i l s  to  d e f in e  th e  te rm s "human r i g h t s "  and " fu n d a m e n ta l  
f re e d o m s" ,  A r t .  30 p o s s ib ly  f u l f i l l e d  the  purpose as in d i c a t e d  by the  
e x p re s s io n s  u n d e r l in e d  above. The p r o v is io n  o f  A r t .  30 can a lso  be so 
co n s tru e d  as to  supp ly  meaning to  th e  term " s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y "  used in  
A r t .  22. I t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  con tend  t h a t  A r t .  30 con te m p la te s  t h a t  as a 
member o f  s o c ie t y ,  an i n d i v i d u a l  i s  e n t i t l e d  to  be p ro te c te d  n o t  o n ly  from  
th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the  S ta te  b u t  a lso  from  th o se  o f  ano th e r  i n d i v i d u a l .
I t  i s  a lso  p o s s ib le  to  c o n s tru e  A r t .  30 to  p r o t e c t  the  S ta te  a lso  from 
such a c t i v i t i e s  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  as would make i t  im p o s s ib le  f o r  th e  S ta te  
to  p ro v id e  an i n d i v i d u a l  w i th  " s o t d a l  s e c u r i t y "  ( i n  the  sense j u s t  
e x p la in e d ) ,  i n  the  d is c h a rg e  o f  what may be co n s id e re d  as one o f  i t s  
im p o r ta n t  f u n c t i o n s .  However, the  a r t i c l e  has t o  be read i n  c o n ju n c t io n
w ith  e l s .  (1 )  and ( 2 ) ,  o f  A r t .  29:
(1 )  Everyone has d u t ie s  to  th e  community i n  which a lone  the
f r e e  and f u l l  deve lopm ent o f  h i s  p e r s o n a l i t y  i s  p a s s ib le .
i  M
(2 )  In  the  e x e rc is e  o f  h i s  r i g h t s  end freedom s, everyone 
s h a l l  be s u b je c t  o n ly  t o  such l i m i t a t i o n s  as are
de te rm ined  by lauj s o le l y  f o r .  . , m e e t ing  the  j u s t
re q u ire m e n ts  o f  m o r a l i t y ,  p u b l i c  o rd e r  and th e  g e n e ra l  
w e l fa re  i n  a d e m o c ra t ic  s o c ie t y .
The D e c la r a t io n  th u s  a t tem p ted  to  harm onise th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  r i g h t s  and
d u t ie s  o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  th e  S ta te  and s o c ie t y ,  embodying what may be
c a l le d  the t r i l o g y  o f  concep ts  o f  human r i g h t s ,  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  and s ta te
s e c u r i t y .  However, i t  i s  to  be n o te d  t h a t  o f  l a t e  th e  term  " s o c i a l
s e c u r i t y "  has a cq u ire d  a t e c h n i c a l  meaning i n  the  w e l fa re  l e g i s l a t i o n
o f  th e  U n i te d  Kingdom, b u t  i t  must be remembered t h a t  the  D e c la r a t io n
d a te s  back t o  1948. In d e e d ,  Lord  Denning has a lso  d e f in e d  th e  term as
56ws have suggested  h e re ,  b u t  he has n o t  in vo ke d  the  D e c la r a t io n  as we have.
( c) The in j te rn _ a t io j2a l  _Co_ven_ant_on_ _Civ_i_l _and _Po_li_ti_ca_l R ig h ts
1.247 The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Covenant was adopted i n  1966 by th e  G enera l
57Assembly un a n im o u s ly ,  b u t  i t  has e n te re d  i n t o  fo r c e  o n ly  i n  1976. H a t te r s  
co n ce rn in g  v i o l a t i o n  o f  human r i g h t s  used to  be b ro u g h t  b e fo r e ,  and 
d iscu sse d  i n ,  th e  G enera l Assembly and, among members o f  th e  IMew 
Commonwealth, I n d ia  v ig o r o u s ly  pursued i t s  c o m p la in t  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n
a g a in s t  South A f r i c a ,  in  s p i t e  o f  o b je c t i o n s  grounded on th e  "d o m e s t ic
58j u r i s d i c t i o n "  c lause  ( A r t .  2 (7 )  o f  th e  C h a r t e r ) .  The Covenant p u ts
i n t o  " b in d in g  l e g a l  fo rm , and in  many cases a m p l i f i e s  th e  p r o v i s io n s
59o f  th e  D e c la r a t io n .  A r t .  1 o f  th e  Covenant d e a ls  w i th  the  " r i g h t  o f
s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n " ,  which i s  n o t  found  in  th e  D e c la r a t io n .  The preamble
r e f e r s  n o t  o n ly  t o  the  o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  th e  m e m ber-s ta tes  unde r the  C h a r te r ,
b u t  a lso  to  th e  D e c la r a t io n  and i t  a m p l i f i e s  i n  th e  f o l l o w i n g  te rm s  th e
concep ts  embodied i n  A r t s .  29 and 30 t h e r e o f :
. . . th e  i n d i v i d u a l ,  h a v in g  d u t ie s  to  o t h e r  i n d i v i d u a l s  
and to  th e  community t o  which he b e lo n g s ,  i s  unde r  a 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  s t r i v e  f o r  th e  p rom o tion  and observance 
o f  th e  r i g h t s .  . .
The s u b s ta n t iv e  p r o v is io n s  i n  A r t .  5 (1 ) re p ro d u ce d  a lm ost v e rb a t im  A r t .  30 
o f  the  D e c la r a t i o n .  The p r o v is io n s  o f  A r t .  29 o f  th e  D e c la r a t io n  i s  
a m p l i f i e d  in  A r t .  4 ( 1 ) ,  as f o l l o w s :
4 *
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In  t im e  o f  p u b l i c  emergency which th re a te n s  th e  l i f e  
o f  th e  n a t io n  and the  e x is te n c e  o f  which i s  o f f i c i a l l y  
p ro c la im e d ,  th e  S ta te .  . . may ta k e  measures d e r o g a t in g  
from t h e i r  o b l i g a t i o n s .  . . t o  th e  e x te n t  s t r i c t l y  
r e q u i r e d  by th e  e x ig e n c ie s  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n  . . .
However, c l .  (2 )  f u r t h e r  c i r c u m s c r ib e d  th e  ambit o f  t h e  d e ro g a t io n  by
m aking th e  p r o v is io n  o f  A r t .  4 i n a p p l i c a b le  among o th e r s ,  to  A r t s .  6 ,  7 ,
8 (p a ra s  1 and 2) and 15.
1 .248 A cco rd ing  t o  A r t .  6 , ’’Every human b e in g  has th e  i n h e r e n t  r i g h t  to  
l i f e . ”  A r t .  7 re p ro d u ce s  w i th  e m b e l l is h m e n t A r t .  5 o f  th e  D e c la r a t i o n .
A r t .  9 a s s e r ts  t h a t ,  ’’Everyone has th e  r i g h t  to  l i b e r t y  and s e c u r i t y  o f  
p e rso n ”  and t h a t  "No one s h a l l  be s u b je c te d  to  a r b i t r a r y  a r r e s t  o r  
d e t e n t i o n . ”  I t  a ls o  emphasises t h a t  th e re  can be no d e p r i v a t io n  o f  
l i b e r t y  ’’e xcep t on such grounds and in  accordance w i th  such p rocedu re  
as are e s ta b l is h e d  by la w . ”  Clause (2 )  to  (5 )  r e a f f i r m  c e r t a in  common 
law p r o t e c t i o n s :  every person s h a l l  be in fo rm e d ,  ” a t  the  t im e  o f
a r r e s t ” , o f  th e  reasons t h e r e f o r ;  r i g h t  o f  b a i l  ( " r e le a s e  may be s u b je c t  
to  gua ran tees  to  appear f o r  t r i a l ” ) ;  r i g h t  o f  habeas corpus  ( " c o u r t  
may de c id e  w i th o u t  de lay  on th e  la w fu ln e s s  o f  h i s  d e te n t io n  and o rd e r  
h i s  re le a s e  i f  th e  d e te n t io n  i s  n o t  l a w f u l ” ) ;  r i g h t  t o  sue f o r  f a l s e  
im pr isonm en t ( ’’v i c t i m  o f  u n la w fu l  a r r e s t  o r  d e te n t io n  s h a l l  have an 
e n fo rc e a b le  r i g h t  to  c o m p e n s a t io n " ) .  A r t  10 a d d i t i o n a l l y  r e q u i r e s  such 
person to  be t r e a te d  w i th  " h u m a n i ty ” . A r t .  8 , e l s .  ( 1 )  and (2 )  dea l 
w i th  and p r o h i b i t  " s l a v e r y ” , ’’ s l a v e - t r a d e "  and " s e r v i t u d e " .  A r t .  15 
embodies the r u le  s i g n i f i e d  by th e  maxim n u l l a  poena s ing  le g e . Thus, 
th e  remark made in  re s p e c t  o f  th e  D e c la r a t io n  -  "an i n c i o i e n t  common law 
o f  m ank ind”  more a p p r o p r ia t e l y  a p p l ie s  to  the  Covenant, i n  t h a t  i t  
embodies more com prehen s ive ly  th e  sa fe g u a rd s  p ro v id e d  in  the  E n g l ish  
common law as re s p e c ts  th e  r i g h t  t o  p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y ,  which f i n d  p lace  
in  th e  le g a l  systems o f  t h i r t y - s e v e n  Commonwealth S ta te s  co m p r is in g  over 
a q u a r te r  o f  th e  w o r ld ’ s t o t a l  p o p u la t io n  and a lso  in  those o f  th e  U n i te d  
S ta te s  o f  Am erica .
4 *
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1.249 I t  i s  to  be n o te d  t h a t ,  w h i le  A r t .  9 does n o t  s p e c i f y  any 
c i rcu m s ta n ce s  p e r m i t t i n g  d e r o g a t io n ,  A r t .  12 -  w h ich  p ro v id e s  ( s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
u n l i k e  th e  D e c la r a t io n ,  f o r  "e ve ryone  w i t h i n  th e  t e r r i t o r y  o f  a S ta te ” )
f o r  th e  freedom o f  movement and re s id e n c e  -  p e r m i t t e d  " r e s t r i c t i o n s ”  t o  be 
imposed by law ” to  p r o t e c t  ( i n t e r  a l i a ) n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y ,  p u b l i c  o r d e r ,  
p u b l i c  h e a l t h  o r  m o r a ls . ”  A r t .  14 (1 )  adopts  th e  sane c r i t e r i a  i n  p e r m i t t i n g  
d e ro g a t io n  from  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  " p u b l i c  h e a r in g ”  i n  the  d e te rm in a t io n  o f  
any c r im in a l  charge o r  o f  th e  r i g h t o  and o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  any person in  a 
s u i t  a t law ; in  th e  o th e r  c la u se s  are t o  be found  c e r t a in  o th e r  common 
law sa fegua rd s  a p p l ic a b le  in  esse o f  c r im in a l  t r i a l s ,  such a s , the 
p resum ption  o f  innocen ce , th e  r u le  a g a in s t  doub le  je o p a rd y ,  p r o t e c t io n  
a g a in s t  s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n  and r i g h t  o f  appea l e t c .  The Covenant a ls o  
guaran tees  such p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  es freedom o f  e x p re s s io n ,  assembly and 
a s s o c ia t io n  ( i n  A r t s .  19, 21 and 2 2 ) ,  s u b je c t  o f  course  to  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
t h a t  may be imposed by law on grounds s p e c i f i e d  in  each case, con fo rm ing  
b ro a d ly  t o  th e  c r i t e r i a  adopted in  A r t .  12 . E q u a l i t y  b e fo re  th e  law 
and equa l p r o t e c t io n  o f  th e  law  are p ro v id e d  in  A r t .  26 b u t ,  u n l i k e  i t s  
p r e c u r s o r ,  A r t .  7 o f  th e  D e c la r a t io n ,  the  new p r o v is io n  i n  p o s i t i v e  
te rm s p r o v id e s  t h a t ,  " th e  law s h a l l  p r o h i b i t  any d i s c r im in a t i o n  and 
guar antes to  a l l  persons  e q u a l and e f f e c t i v e  p r o t e c t io n  a g a in s t  
d i s c r im in a t i o n  on any ground such as ra c e ,  c o lo u r ,  language , p o l i t i c a l  
o r  o th e r  o p in io n ”  e t c .  A r t .  27 r e i t e r a t e s  a s i m i l a r  p r o t e c t io n  in  
re s p e c t  o f  e t h n i c ,  r e l i g i o u s  and m in o r i t y  groups in  S ta te s .
1 .250 Under A r t .  2 (3 ) each S ta te - P a r ty  u n d e r ta k e s  to  ensure t h a t  
" e f f e c t i v e  remedy”  i s  p ro v id e d  in  the  r e s p e c t iv e  n a t i o n a l  l o g o i  systems 
and th a t  t h e r e ^ s h a l l  a lso  be p r o v is io n s  f o r  th e  en fo rcem en t o f  such 
rem ed ies . P a r t  IV o f  th e  Covenant, i n  a d d i t i o n ,  p r o v id e s  a "Human R ig h ts  
Com mittee”  to  c o n s id e r  measures taken to  im plem ent th e  Covenant and a lso
a c o n c i l i a t i o n  p rocedure  to  d e a l  w i th  a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  v i o l a t i o n s .  The 
O o t io n a l  P r o to c o l  to  the C ovenant, a lso  adopted in  1966 b u t  no t  ye t  in
fo rc e , provides the r ig h t o f in d iv id u a l a p p lic a tio n s , w ith e labora te  
procedure th e re fo r . A d e ta ile d  discussion of these provisions is  
beyond the scope o f th is  study.
(C ) The ro le  o f re g io n a l organisations
(a ) The Jiujro£ean—Convention on_HumJ^_Ri.9hts
1.251 The European Convention has been seen as "the f i r s t  essay in
g iv ing  s p e c if ic  le g a l content to human r ig h ts  in  an in te rn a t io n a l
agreement, and combining th is  uiith the establishm ent of machinery fo r
61supervision and enforcem ent.11 The Convention uas signed in  1950 and 
entered in to  force in  1953. The purpose o f the Convention has been set 
out in  d e ta il  in  the preamble. I t  is  s ta ted  th a t ,  "Government of 
countries uihich are like-m inded and have a common h eritag e  of p o l i t ic a l  
t ra d it io n s , id e a ls , freedom and the ru le  o f laui" subscribe to  the  
Covenant " fo r  the c o lle c tiv e  enforcement o f c e rta in  o f the Rights s ta ted  
in  the U n iversa l D e c la ra tio n " . A r t . 1 requ ires  th a t the r ig h ts  and 
freedoms defined in  Section I  o f the Convention s h a ll  be secured "to  
everyone u ith in  th e ir  ju r is d ic t io n "  by the p a r t ie s . The "N igerian"  
and the "Neo-N igerian" B i l ls  o f Rights o f Commonusalth A fr ic a  ous th e ir
o rig in  to  the European Convention (apparently  by virtuB of A rt. 1
62th ereo f) and came to be accordingly modelled on i t .
1 .252 The scheme o f P art I I I  o f the In te rn a t io n a l Covenant of 1966
aid the re le v an t provisions th e re o f, uihich we have already examined,
corresponds broadly to Section I  and the provisions thereo f o f the
63European Convention. I t  also provides fo r  s im ila r  safeguards as 
the r ig h t of being informed o f the reasons fo r  a r re s t, the r ig h t  to  b a i l ,  
the r ig h t o f habeas corpus and the r ig h t to  compensation against fa ls e  
imprisonment which are almost s im ila r ly  worded. A r t . 6 corresponds 
broadly to  A rt. 14 o f the 1966 Covenant w ith s im ila r ly  worded c r i t e r ia  
in  respect of a s im ila r  derogation . A rt. 7 corresponds to  A rt. 25 o f 
the 1966 Covenant but u n lik e  the la t t e r  the European Convention does
not speak of the freedom o f movement and residence although i t  also  
provides fo r  the freedoms of expression in  A rt. 10 and freedoms of 
assembly and association in  A rt. 11. The derogation provision in  
both a r t ic le s  also used the expression "necessary in  a democratic s o c ie ty " , 
along with the o ther c r i t e r ia  used in  A rts . 19, 21 and 22 o f the 1966 
Covenant. The expression "democratic socie ty" is  not defined in  the  
Convention, or even in  the Covenant and guidance in  both cases may 
th e re fo re  be sought from A rt. 21 o f the U n iversa l D e c la ra tio n .
1.253 A rt. 15 perm its derogation "in  time of war or other public  
emergency th reaten ing  the l i f e  o f the  n a tio n " c o n d itio n a lly  in  th a t i t  
does not do away w ith "other o b lig a tio n s  under in te rn a t io n a l law" and also  
l im its  the measures "to the  exten t s t r ic t ly  requ ired  by the exigencies  
of the s itu a t io n " . Besides, in  c e rta in  cases in  respect o f A rts . 2 a id  4 
and exc lus ive ly  as respects A rts . 3 and 7 no derogation a t a l l  is  p erm itted . 
The provision o f A rt. 17 corresponds to  those of A r t .  5 (1 ) of the 1966 
Covenant. To ensure "the observance of the engagements undertaken" by the  
p a rtie s  A r t . 19 (o f  Section I I )  sets up two in s t i tu t io n s ,  "the Commission" 
and "the C ourt". A r t. 26 (o f  Section I I I  which deals with the powers and 
procedure of the Commission) provides a s ix  months l im ita t io n  period in  
addition  to  the condition th a t " a l l  domestic remedies" must be exhausted 
before invoking the ju r is d ic t io n  of the Commission. The provisions o f 
Section IV re la te  to  powers and procedure of the C ourt. However, a l l  
p e tit io n s  (whether by a S tate  or by an in d iv id u a l)  f i r s t  go to  the 
"Commission" which decides the question of " a d m is s ib ility "  and also makes 
" in v e s tig a tio n "  with the o b ject mainly o f e f fe c tin g  a " fr ie n d ly  
settlem ent", i f  necessary through the "Committee o f M in is te rs " . The 
"Court" can e n te rta in  the case only on "the fa i lu r e  o f e f fo r ts  fo r  a 
fr ie n d ly  settlem ent" and w ith in  th ree  months th e reo f but the " r ig h t to  
bring a case before the Court" vests only in  the S tates and the  
"Commission", subject to  the fu r th e r  condition th a t the States concerned
have accepted "compulsory ju r is d ic t io n "  of the C ourt.
1 .254 Thus, the enforcement provisions of the Convention p ro v id in g , 
u n lik e  the 1966 Covenant, a ju d ic ia l  forum, and conferring  th e  r ig h t of 
" in d iv id u a l a p p lic a tio n "  (which is  not provided in  the Covenant but in  
the O ptional P ro toco l, which has not y e t entered fo rc e ) ,  are apparently  
b e tte r  poised in  securing the r ig h t  to  personal l ib e r t y ,  but i t  is  doubtfu l 
i f  the European Court (which can, under A rt. 50 o f the Convention, " i f  
necessary, a ffo rd  ju s t s a tis fa c tio n  to  the in ju re d  p a r ty " ) , can order 
release from unlaw fu l d e ten tio n . A rt. 5(4) envisages such a remedy but
to  be ava iled  apparently at the n a tio n a l forum, in  view of the provisions
of A rt. 1 . However, the term " ju s t s a tis fa c tio n "  has s t i l l  to  receive
c a re fu l consideration of the  European Court. According to  a recent
study the European Court is  l ik e ly  to give the " in te rp re ta t io n  th a t i s
most appropriate in  order to re a lis e  the aim and achieve the ob ject o f the  
65tr e a ty ."  Professor Roger P in to 's  observation th a t the combined e f fe c t
of A rts . 1 and 60 requ ires  m unicipal law to  be so construed as not to
derogate from the r ig h ts  conferred by the Convention, appears to  have
66been v in d ica ted  by the recent decisions of English courts . I t  may not
be c o rrec t, as has been claim ed, th a t the demand fo r  a B i l l  o f Rights
in  the United Kingdom has lo s t much o f i t s  force a f te r  adoption of the  
67Convention, but i t  cannot be disputed th a t English courts have shown 
a remarkable a d a p ta b ility  in  so fa r  as th e  e ffe c t  o f the Convention, and 
even o f the 1948 D ec la ra tio n , on the n a tio n a l le g a l system is  concerned.
1.255 In  £  v MIAH.^^ Lord Reid re fe rre d  to  A rt. 11(2) o f the
D eclaration  and A rt. 7 of the Convention and held th a t i t  was "hardly
c red ib le  th a t any government department would promote or th a t Parliam ent
69would pass a re tro sp ec tive  c rim in a l le g is la t io n "  although in  the
in s ta n t case h is  Lordship re je c te d  the p lea th a t s .34(1) o f the
Immigration Act 1971 was in  fa c t  re tro s p e c tiv e . In  the BHA3AN SINGH 
70case in  the Court o f Appeal, Lord Uidgery, C .3 .,  not only re fe rre d  to
A rt. 12 o f the Convention and to the  c o u rt's  unreported decision in  the 
71BIRDI case but also re fe rre d  to  the decision of the European Court in  
72the GOLDER case. An i l le g a l  immigrant in  detention pending deportation
had applied fo r  a mandamus to be issued to  the Home Secretary fo r
f a c i l i t i e s  to  be afforded to  him to  marry in  the exercise o f the r ig h t
conferred by A rt. 12. H is Lordship held th a t A rt. 12 mas to  be read
subject to  A r t . 5 ( l ) ( f )  and th a t A r t. 12 did not contemplate a r ig h t  to
marry s im p lic itB r but w ith the in te n tio n  to  found a fa m ily , which was
n e ith e r pleaded by the app licant nor made out on the fa c ts  of the case.
In fa c t ,  Lord Denning had set the tone e a r l ie r  when he observed in  1969
73in  the COROCRAFT case th a t " i t  is  the duty of these courts to  construe
our le g is la t io n  so as to  be in  conformity with in te rn a t io n a l law and not
in  c o n flic t  w ith i t . "  In  th is  connection i t  has been noted th a t
"although the United Kingdom's observance of the European Convention is
so fa r  only a m atter o f in te rn a t io n a l o b lig a tio n , the Convention has begun
to  be recognised by our courts as a fa c to r  to  be considered in  the
74in te rp re ta t io n  o f our own law s." But we submit th a t in  BHA3AN SINGH
Lord Uidgery had gone even fu r th e r  and was w ill in g  to enforce the
o b lig a tio n s  under the Convention against the executive .
1.256 In  so fa r  as the r ig h t  to  personal l ib e r ty  is  concerned the
Convention has d e f in ite ly  brought a d ire c t change in  a ttitu d e s  as
respects the Northern Ire la n d  s itu a t io n , with which we propose to  deal 
75in  g reater d e t a i l .  The in te rn a t io n a l dimension of th e  Northern Ire la n d
problem found a p o s itive  expression when the Republic o f Ire la n d  ra ised
the m atter in  the U nited Nations Security  Council in  August 1969 a lle g in g
a th re a t to  in te rn a t io n a l peace and secu rity  as a re s u lt  o f the
s itu a tio n  obta in ing  there on account o f system atic d e n ia l of human
76rig h ts  to  a section of the population of th a t area. Indeed, emergency 
measures taken there to  deal w ith "te rro rism " and "s ec u rity "  problems fu rth e r  
aggravated the s itu a t io n , n ecess ita tin g  the appointment o f a number o f
"Commissions" end "Committees" between 1969 and 1975 in  the search fo r
ways and means of reco n c ilin g  c o n flic t in g  p r in c ip le s  in  the complicated  
77problem. In  August 1977 the Standing Advisory Commission on Human
Rights submitted i t s  Report on the question of a B i l l  o f Rights fo r  
7 8Northern Ire la n d , in  which the m a jo rity  suggested th a t "comprehensive 
le g is la t iv e  pro tection  fo r  human r ig h ts  in  Northern Ire la n d  could best be 
achieved in  the context o f le g is la t io n  fo r  the United Kingdom as a whole." 
On the other hand, in  a lone dissent i t  was most appropriate ly  observed 
th a t ,  " fo r centuries Great B r ita in  has been in  the fo rtu n a te  p o s ition  of 
having a system o f government which has had the consent of a l l  i t s  
c it iz e n s  [b u t j  th is  has not been the case in  Northern Ire la n d ."
(b ) The. ^r£anisation__of J \fricen  U riit^
1.257 In  Hay 1963 th ir ty  African nations met at Addis Ababa to  form 
the O rgan isation . In  the preamble o f i t s  "Charter" i t  is  s ta ted  th a t i t s  
members re a ffirm  th e ir  adherence to  the p r in c ip le s  o f the U nited Nations  
Charter and the U n iversa l D eclaration  which "provide a s o lid  foundation  
fo r  peaceful and p o s itiv e  co-operation among S ta te s ."  A rt. 2 defines the 
"purposes" and in  c l . ( 1 ) ( e )  i t  speaks of " in te rn a tio n a l co-operation  
having due regard" to  the United Nations Charter and the D e c la ra tio n .
A rt. 3 defines seven "fundamental p r in c ip le s " , such as n on-in terference  
in  the in te rn a l a f fa ir s  of other s ta tes  and respect fo r  sovereignty and 
t e r r i t o r i a l  in te g r i ty  o f each s ta te . By v ir tu e  o f A rt. 19 the member- 
sta te  8 are committed to  s e t t le  " a l l  disputes" by peaceful means through 
the "Commission o f M ediation , C o n c ilia tio n  and A rb itra t io n " . The 
ju r is d ic t io n  of the Commission is  defined in  A r t . 12 which speaks of 
"disputes between s ta tes  o n ly " . The term "d ispute", however, has not 
been defined in  the Charter but the p r in c ip le  o f n o n -in terferen ce  in  A rt. 3 
is  l ik e ly  to  exclude consideration of disputes concerning v io la t io n  of 
human r ig h ts , notw ithstanding the U n iversa l D eclaration  being invoked in
general terms not only in  the Preamble but also in  A rt. 2 ( 1 ) ( e ) .  I t  is  
no wonder th e re fo re  th a t though many A frican s ta te s , p a r t ic u la r ly  o f the  
Commonwealth, are c r i t ic a l  of the Amin regime in  Uganda, m atters  concerning 
alleged v io la t io n s  o f human r ig h ts  there have not been brought before the  
Commission.
1.258 Indeed, President Amin has not "abrogated" the C o n stitu tio n  
uihich contains a "Neo-Nigerian" B i l l  o f Rights modelled on the European 
Convention, as happens to  be the case w ith the C onstitu tio ns of most 
other A frican  s ta te s  of the  Commonuiealth. That a p art, o ther European 
co lo n ia l powers which form erly ru led  other African s ta te s , having  
acceded to  the Convention, i t  could be reasonably expected th a t the  
Organisation as a body would take a p o s itive  stand on the e n fo rc e a b ility  
of human r ig h ts  on the basis of a common c o lo n ia l background founded
in  the Convention. There is  of course no doubt th a t in  Commonuiealth A fric a
th is  background had a f r a g i le  existence -  too short a l i f e  to  create any
impact on aims and a ttitu d e s  o f the ru le rs  and the people o f the emergent 
79African n a tio n s .
( c) The in te rn a t io n a l ^Ofnm_is_sion_ojr J u r is ts
1.259 The Geneva-based Commission has a"consu lta tive  s ta tu s" w ith the
United N ations. I t  has done a great deal of work in  the f i e ld  o f human
rig h ts , with p a r t ic u la r  reference to  Rule of Law. The fa c t  th a t Khanna, 3 .
80of the Indian Supreme Court, has re fe rre d  with approval in  a recent case 
to  the "m ate ria l content" given to the concept of Rule of Law by the  
Commission is  s ig n if ic a n t in  th a t con tribu tion  o f the Commission to  le g a l 
thought as respects personal l ib e r ty  appears to  be gaining re c o g n itio n .
In 1955 "free  ju r is ts "  from 48 countries agreed on what was described as 
the "Act of Athens". The d eclaration  r e ite r a te s , in te r  a l i a , th a t the 
State is  subject to  the law and th a t governments have to  "respect the  
r ig h ts  of the in d iv id u a l under the Rule o f Law and provide e ffe c t iv e  means 
fo r  th e ir  enforcem ent." I t  i s  fu r th e r  s ta ted  th a t -  "Judges should be
guided by the Rule of Law, p ro tect and enforce i t  w ithout fe a r  or favour
and re s is t  any encroachments by governments or p o l i t ic a l  p a rtie s  on
81th e ir  independence as judges."
1.260 In  1959, 185 judges, p ra c tis in g  lawyers and teachers of law from
53 countries assembled under the aegis of the  Commission in  New D elh i and
agreed on what is  described as the D eclaration  of Delhi in  which i t  is
82s ta ted , in te r  a l i a , as fo llo w s:
. . . the  Rule o f Law is  a dynamic concept fo r  the expansion
and fu lf i lm e n t of which ju r is t s  are p rim a rily  responsible  
and which should be employed not only to  safeguard and advance
the c iv i l  and p o l i t ic a l  r ig h ts  of the in d iv id u a l in  a free
so c ie ty , but also to  es tab lish  s o c ia l, economic, educational 
and c u ltu ra l conditions under which h is  le g itim a te  
asp ira tio n s  and d ig n ity  may be re a lis e d . . .
In  the A frican Conference on the Rule of Law consisting of 194 judges,
p ra c tis in g  lawyers and teachers o f law from 23 African nations as w e ll as
9 countries of other continents , held in  1961 under the aegis o f the
Commission, the Conference agreed on what is  described as the Law of Lagos
83in  which i t  is  in te r  a l ia  sta ted  as fo llo w s:
1 . . . .  the Rule o f Law cannot be fu l ly  re a lis e d  unless
le g is la t iv e  bodies have been estab lished  in  accordance 
with the w i l l  o f the people urino have adopted th e ir  
C o n stitu tio n  f re e ly ;
3. . . .  fundamental human r ig h ts , esp ec ia lly  the r ig h t to
personal l ib e r t y ,  should be w ritte n  and entrenched in  
the C o n stitu tio n s  o f a l l  countries and th a t such personal 
l ib e r ty  should not in  peacetime be re s tr ic te d  without 
t r i a l  in  a Court of Law;• . •
In  1962 the Commission succeeded in  organizing an in te rn a t io n a l gathering
of judges and lawyers from 75 countries to  agree on the "Resolution of
Rio" in  which emphasis was la id  on "the encouragement of the establishment
84of In te rn a t io n a l Courts o f Human Rights on a reg io nal b a s is ."
1.261 In  1966 the Commission conducted a spec ia l study of preventive  
detention laws on a g lo b a l scale by c irc u la tin g  a standard questionnaire to  
a l l  governments to e l i c i t  valuab le  inform ation on a l l  aspects o f the law 
and p ra c t ic a l ap p lica tio n  in  d if fe re n t  countries o f the world. U nfortunate ly
a l l  governments were not equally  co -o p era tive . The questionnaire was 
in  a sense an experiment in  s tan d ard -se ttin g  although i t  is  not possible  
to  say th a t i t  achieved th is  p a r t ic u la r  purpose in  any manner whatsoever, 
except possibly s tim u la tin g  serious thought in  the le g is la t iv e  c irc le s ,  
in  some cases, on the need to  enact wholesome safeguards (as in d ica ted  
in  the document) to minimise the su ffe rin g s  o f the deta inees. Indeed, 
because of i t s  sp ec ia l s ta tus  the Commission cannot be la b e lle d  as a 
pressure group s im p lic ite r . N evertheless, i t  d istinguished i t s e l f  from 
the pressure groups properly  so -c a lle d  by adopting an o b je c tiv e  standard  
in  a l l  cases even when i t  was organising seminars. Mention in  th is  
connection may be made of a recent seminar organised by i t  on "Human 
Rights, th e ir  p ro tection  and the Role o f Law in  a One Party S ta te" at 
Dar-es-Salaam in  September 1976. In  a Paper read at the Seminar on 
"A dm in istrative  Procedures, Acfcninistrative Law and Public  P a rt ic ip a tio n  
in  a One Party S ta te " , Professor 3 .P .U .B . McAuslan has r ig h t ly  observed 
th a t lawyers tra in e d  in  the c o lo n ia l t ra d it io n  are apt to  be c r i t ic a l  of 
the ad m in is tra tive  process in  a One Party State as they often  fo rg e t th a t  
"so c ia l ju s tic e  and the ru le  of law fo r  the m a jo rity  were conspicuous by 
th e ir  absence during the heyday of the economic transform ation of the  U .K . 
from an agrarian to  an in d u s tr ia l  society  from the mid eighteenth to  
the la te  nineteenth cen tu ry ."  Indeed, the process of decision-m aking was 
l ik e ly  to  bear the impress of the s o c ia l and p o l i t ic a l  c lim ate  o f the  
State and the process of s tan d ard -se ttin g  ought to  take no tice  o f i t ,  
discarding a dogmatic approach.
(d ) Amnesty JnJ^eirnjatjLanaJ.
1.262 The Amnesty is  undoubtedly a London-based pressure group, but 
i t s  a c t iv i t ie s  in  the  f i e ld  o f human r ig h ts  since i t s  founding in  1961 
cannot be underrated in  sp ite  of the fa c t  th a t such a c t iv i t ie s  may not 
have contributed in  any p o s itive  manner to in te rn a t io n a l s tan d ard -se ttin g
in  th is  f i e ld ,  fo r  i t s  avowed ob ject was "to work fo r  the re lease of 
and provide assistance to "persons who are imprisoned, detained or 
re s tr ic te d  or otherwise subjected to  physical coercion or re s tra in t  by 
reason o f th e ir  p o l i t ic a l ,  re lig io u s  o r o ther conscientiously held  
b e lie f"  in  v io la t io n  of A rts . 5, 9 , 18 and 19 o f the U n iversa l D ec la ra tio n . 
Nevertheless, i t s  large  range of p u b lica tio n s  contain ing mostly fa c tu a l  
in form ation do provide some in s ig h t in to  the p ra c t ic a l ap p lica tio n  of 
preventive detention laws of the d if fe re n t  countries o f the  world.
1.263 However, in  November 1974 Professor A lfred  H e ijd e r  of
Amsterdam U n iv e rs ity  prepared a report on the working o f the  Northern
86Ire la n d  Emergency Provisions Act 1973 fo r  Amnesty In te rn a t io n a l,
d isp lay in g  a h igh ly  o b jective  approach* He r ig h t ly  observes th a t
"The o v errid in g  consideration in  any emergency le g is la t io n  i s ,  of
course, s ecu rity  and re s to ra tio n  of law and order" and th a t ,  "This in
i t s e l f  can only create the conditions under which normal standards of
ju s tic e  and respect fo r  fundamental r ig h ts  may be re s to re d ."  He also
r ig h t ly  adds th a t ,  "At the same tim e, however, I  fe e l  the executive
a u th o ritie s  should themselves respect these fundamental freedoms as fa r
as is  reasonably possib le by in s t i tu t io n a l  means, le s t  the  experience
of Northern Ire la n d  become a fr ig h te n in g  f i r s t  step in  the destruction
of human r ig h ts  in  any kind o f p o l i t ic a l  c r is is ."  These observations
ought to  provide the r ig h t  approach fo r  the evolution o f appropriate
norms fo r  s tan d ard -se ttin g  in  acute s itu a tio n s  o f " te rro rism " as
encountered, not only in  Northern Ire la n d , but in  o ther p arts  of the
w orld. Of course, such s itu a tio n  did obtain during the c o lo n ia l era in
the Malayan peninsula and also in  Kenya but they do not obtain  anywhere
87now in  the Commonwealth.
(3 )  Terrorism , s e lf-d e te rm in a tio n  and hum anitarian law
1.264 I t  may be disputed th a t " te rro rism " has roots  th a t transcend
the new world o rd er, having i t s  o r ig in  not in  the American Uar of Independen
(which has been termed modem g u e r i lla  w arfare) but in  the mediaeval and 
88ancient p e rio d . There is  no doubt, however, th a t m otivations as w e ll
as s tra teg y and methods have changed. Mao's Chinese model and Che Guevara's
Cuban models are some o f the examples of the large number o f modem models
of g u e r i l la  w arfare . In  the Commonwealth context, the B r it is h  had to
f ig h t  two "jungle wars" in  the fo r t ie s  and f i f t i e s  in  th is  century in
Malaya end Kenya, and are s t i l l  f ig h tin g  urban g u e r illa s  or " te r ro r is ts "
in  Northern Ire la n d . S im ila r ly , there are "freedom fig h te rs "  s t i l l
engaged in  "n a tio n a l l ib e ra tio n  movements" in  A fr ic a . These are indeed
a l l  s itu a tio n s  of armed c o n flic ts  but in  a l l  cases the th re a t to  the
status  quo is  based mainly on the r ig h t  of s e lf-d e te rm in a tio n  in  the
broadest sense of the term . Professor L .C . Green r ig h t ly  asserts
th a t the statements in  the Charters of the U nited Nations and Organisation
of A frican U n ity  make i t  d i f f i c u l t  to secure a s a tis fa c to ry  d e f in it io n  of
89"te rro rism " and an e ffe c t iv e  agreement on means to co n tro l i t .
However, Robert Moss seeks to derive s a tis fa c tio n  from a simple d e fin it io n
saying th a t a "system atic use of in tim id a tio n  fo r  p o l i t ic a l  purposes"
may be c a lle d  " te rro ris m ". Proceeding fu rth e r  he makes an attempt to
c la s s ify  " te rro r"  as "repress ive", "defensive" and "oppressive" of which
the last-m entioned class is  meant to  cover th a t used against a regime or a 
90p o l i t ic a l  system.
1.265 In  th is  connection i t  may be noted th a t ,  as Professor Yoram
O instein observes, In te rn a tio n a l Law does not encourage c i v i l  wars but
i t  does not p ro h ib it them e ith e r .  He also r ig h t ly  suggests th a t such a
c o n flic t  is  perm itted in  a negative way by s t r ic t ly  fo rb id d in g  e x te rn a l
91in te rve n tio n  in  in te rn a l c o n f lic ts . Indeed, under In te rn a t io n a l Law 
two p a r a l le l  systems o f r ig h ts  have grown up: "human r ig h ts "  fo r  
in d iv id u a ls  and " c o lle c tiv e  r ig h ts "  fo r  a community o f human beings such 
as a m in o rity . Thus the r ig h t  of s e lf-d e te rm in a tio n , which is  a 
c o lle c tiv e  r ig h t ,  recognised not only in  the United Nations Charter
and the 1966 Covenant but also In  customary In te rn a tio n a l Law, gives
r is e  to  the r ig h t  to  secede, as O instein  points o u t, when accorded to
people not under c o lo n ia l domination but l iv in g  in  independent co u n tries .
1.266 In  the above premises i t  i s  not possib le to agree with Professor
Green th a t there  is  no basis to  " in te rn a tio n a lis e ” the  s itu a tio n  in  
92Northern Ire la n d . The issue o f " te rro ris m ”, in  so f a r  as i t  is
connected with the r ig h t  o f s e lf-d e te rm in a tio n , is  no longer a m atter
93pure and simple o f "emotional a c t iv a tio n ” as suggested by h im . An act
of v io lence by a person uho may be described by some as a freedom f ig h te r
and by others as a t r a i t o r  or te r r o r is t  or b a n d it, according as one is
ac tiva ted  by h is  emotion, is  to be tes ted  with reference to  h is  m otive.
I t  i s  in te re s tin g  to note th a t In te rn a t io n a l Law thus makes a d is t in c t io n ,
houiever vague and insecure , between what is  being c a lle d  " in te rn a tio n a l
te rro rism " and "domestic te rro rism " but against the la t t e r  a ju s t i f ic a t io n
is  advanced in  what has been c a lle d  "s ta te  te rro ris m ". I t  has been
recognised th a t h ijac k in g  and such other a c t iv i t ie s  c o n s titu tin g
in te rn a t io n a l te rro rism  are i l le g i t im a te  and measures have to  be taken
94at in te rn a t io n a l le v e l to  f ig h t  them. Dn the other hand there  also
appears to  be a growing recognition  of what Arab delegates c a lle d  "s ta te
te rro rism " in  describing the measures taken by s ta tes  (such as Is r a e l)
against persons involved in  what they described as le g it im a te  struggle  
9 5
fo r  l ib e r a t io n .
1 .267 In  th is  connection i t  is  to  be noted th a t the U nited  Nations
is  cognisant o f th e  pos ition  th a t on account of th e ir  p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t ie s
the m in o rity  are more exposed to  to r tu re  and other c ru e l, inhuman and
96degrading treatm ent or punishment. Indeed, in  1975 appeared the
'U n ited  Nations D eclaration  on the Pro tection  of a l l  Persons from
97being subjected to  Tortu re  e tc ."  A rt. 1 of the D ec lara tion  defines  
to rtu re  and other p ro h ib ited  acts but A r t .  3 s ig n if ic a n t ly  s ta te s  th a t 
"exceptional circumstances such as a s ta te  o f war, or a th re a t o f war,
in te rn a l p o l i t ic a l  in s ta b i l i t y  or any other p u b lic  emergency may not be 
invoked as a ju s t i f ic a t io n  of to r tu re  or other c ru e l, inhuman or 
degrading treatm ent or punishment” w hile fo rb idd ing  s ta tes  from indulg ing  
in  such acts .
1.268 I t  is  to  be noted th a t the Council o f Europe adopted (w ith
Ire la n d  absta in ing) the European Convention on Suppression o f Terrorism
in  November 1976; i t  has entered force in  A p r il 1978. The Convention
aims at f a c i l i t a t in g  the e x tra d itio n  and prosecution of p e rp e tra to rs  of
98te r r o r is t  acts , whether or not such acts were p o l i t ic a l ly  m otivated .
A rt. 1 o f the Convention provides th a t the acts described th e re in  s h a ll  
not be regarded as " p o l i t ic a l  o ffences” fo r  the purpose of e x tra d it io n .  
Clauses (a ) to  (d ) describe acts which may w e ll be described as acts 
of " in te rn a tio n a l te rro ris m ” but clause (e )  s ig n if ic a n t ly  speaks of 
"an offence in vo lv in g  the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic  
firearm  or le t t e r  or p arce l bomb i f  th is  use endangers persons.” Ire la n d  
r ig h t ly  pointed out th a t the Convention could only be regarded as a 
"reg ional law” and, in  provid ing fo r  e x tra d it io n  fo r  a " p o l i t ic a l  o ffence” , 
i t  was contravening the customary In te rn a t io n a l Law.
1.269 Indeed, the Convention e ffaces  the category o f " p o l i t ic a l  crime” 
and the s ta tus  of "insurgent” recognised a t In te rn a tio n a l Law. An 
insurgent, under c erta in  circumstances, is  e n t it le d  to  be tre a te d  as a 
p riso n er-o f-w ar and not as an ordinary c rim in a l and he cannot be t r ie d  
under ord inary c rim in a l law . The "Humanitarian Law” la id  down in  the 
Geneva Conventions of 1899, 1925, 1929 and 1949 and The Hague Convention 
of 1907 are app licab le  in  h is  case. However, u n t i l  recen tly  the  scope of 
the 1949 Convention in  regards to s tatus o f an insurgent was open to doubt. 
In  A p ril 1977 the D iplom atic Conference on the Humanitarian Laws of War 
c la r i f ie d  the scope of the T h ird  Convention of 1949 and voted  
overwhelmingly fo r  a proposal to  give g u e r illa s  the sta tus  of p riso n ers -
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99of war.
Conclusion
1.270 I t  cannot be gainsaid th a t under the new world order
d iscrim inatory  trea tm ent, whether on grounds o f race, re lig io n  or colour,
poses a greater th re a t to human r ig h ts  than d iffe ren ces  based on p o l i t ic a l
b e lie f  (although President Nyerere does not consider re lig io n  as a source
of p o te n tia l th r e a t ) .  Speaking on the tw e n ty fifth  anniversary o f the
United Nations he saids^0^
A man can change h is  re lig io n  i f  he wishes; he can accept a 
d if fe re n t  p o l i t ic a l  b e l ie f .  . • But no man can change h is  
colour o r ra ce . And i f  he s u ffe rs  because o f i t ,  he must 
e ith e r  become less than a man, o r he must f ig h t .  . . mankind 
has been so created th a t many. • . w i l l  destroy peace 
ra th e r than s u ffe r under i t .  . .
The B r it is h  Prime M in is te r , Harold U ilso n , speaking in  1975 a t the
H e ls in k i Conference, re fe rre d  to the "new Code of p o l i t ic a l  and human
re la t io n s ” re s u lt in g  from the p a r tic ip a tio n  of Russia which was re fle c te d
101in  what he c a lled  ”detente” -  ”the  s p i r i t  o f l iv e  end le t  l i v e . ”
This  was appropria te ly  pro jected  in to  the F in a l Act o f the Conference 
with the preamble speaking of "co-operating in  the in te re s t  o f mankind” 
despite the in d iv id u a l i t y  and d iv e rs ity ” of the pos ition  o f thB 
p a r t ic ip a n ts .* *^
1.271 I t  is  tru e  th a t the F in a l Act o f H e ls in k i does not speak in  
express terms of the r ig h t  to  personal l ib e r ty  but i t  is  n o t, and was 
not meant to be, a law yer's  document. The importance of the document 
l ie s  in  the fa c t  th a t i t  has t r ie d  to develop a u n iversa l "value  
concept” by recognising the worth o f a human person, which is  bound to  
secure f irm ly  the foundations o f personal l ib e r ty  in  the in te rn a t io n a l  
society  despite severa l aspects of unavoidable d iv e rs ity . With the 
decolonisation process coming to  a successful conclusion, the old  
c o lo n ia l values are bound to y ie ld  place to  progressive ideas of so c ia l 
and economic interdependence; the " th ird  world” concept may also lose
i t s  relevance in  due course, leading to  the founding o f a "world
community" which, according to Judge Kotaro Tanaka, has already come 
103in to  being . However, i t  is  ye t to  be seen i f  the "world community"
accepts h is  th es is  -  "The seat o f human r ig h ts  is  not in  any p o s itiv e
law, not in  the pub lic  a u th o r it ie s , but in  the conscience o f mankind and
104'moral law ' which are nothing but n a tu ra l law ."
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PART I I
INVASIONS OF PERSONAL LIBERTY: "SOCIAL-SECURITY"
Chapter 2
I. "Social-Security*
2.1 In  d e liv e rin g  the f i r s t  series  of the Hamlyn Lectures Lord
Denning observed th a t "personal freedom" must be matched with "so c ia l
s e c u rity "  which he explained as meaning "peace and good order of the
community" and proceeding fu r th e r  he m aintained th a t "to  p ro tec t i t s e l f
from marauders" the society  must have powers to  a rre s t, to  search and
1
to imprison those who break the laws. Thus, the  concept o f "s o c ia l 
s ec u rity "  can be understood as s ig n ify in g  measures adopted fo r  the 
p ro tection  of the society against such acts of in d iv id u a ls  as are 
p re ju d ic ia l to  i t s  in te r e s t .  However, law recognises the p o s itio n  th at 
in  c erta in  circumstances preventive measures can also serve "s o c ia l 
sec u rity "  without unduly re s t r ic t in g  the l ib e r ty  of the in d iv id u a l.
Indeed, "preventive ju s tic e "  is  an o ld  and ancient concept re f le c t in g  the 
perenn ia l anxiety o f the s o c ia l end le g a l philosophers to  appreciate and 
to  f u l f i l  the need of harmonising the c o n flic t in g  values -  the need to  
s tr ik e  a ju s t and proper balance between the in te re s ts  o f the society  and 
the in d iv id u a l and also the need to  bridge the gap between law and 
m o ra lity . In  a sense, the "power of a rre s t"  and "preventive ju s tic e "  can 
be said to  represent the two ends of the  wide spectrum of the le g a l  
re s tra in ts  imposed on the l ib e r ty  of the person at d if fe re n t  times at 
d if fe re n t  places in  the common law ju r is d ic t io n . Apparently, the former 
deserves g reater a tte n tio n  but we propose to  deal with the la t t e r  a lso , 
a lb e it  in  lesser d e ta i l .
2 .2 .
I I . The Power of Arrest 
I t  cannot be gainsaid th a t as a weapon of threshold re s tra in t
on the l ib e r ty  o f the person the power of a rres t exem plifies  a serious
invasion of personal l ib e r t y .  An a r re s t , as Lord Simmonds has observed,
2
" is  the beginning of imprisonment” . On the  o ther hand, i t  was ju d ic ia l ly
recognised as early  as 1612 th a t the power to  a rres t any person must e x is t
in  law: "The King cannot a rres t any man fo r  the party cannot have any
3
remedy against the K in g .” In  h is  " In s titu tes"C o te  is  more c le a r  and 
c a te g o ric a l. He asserts th a t the King cannot detain the meanest of h is  
subjects at h is  mere w i l l  and pleasure but only by indictm ent and presentment 
(as provided by Magna Carta) or by a w r it  from a court or by a law fu l 
warrant
2 .3 . I t  would be proper to  c la s s ify  the power of a rre s t broadly under 
two main heads: power of a rre s t at common law and s ta tu to ry  powers of 
a rre s t, re s p e c tiv e ly . However, powers of a rres t exercised under emergency 
laws, a lb e it  derived from s ta tu te s , deserve separate treatm ent; th is  is  
because, during war and s im ila r  s itu a tio n s  threaten ing  the even tenor of 
l i f e  of the  community, the re s tra in ts  on the l ib e r ty  of the person acquire  
various forms and in  addition  th e ir  nature acquire a d is t in c t  character 
and ju s t i f ic a t io n  which, as we s h a ll see, are to  be found in  the concept of
5
"s ta te  s e c u rity " , which such laws are supposed to embody.
62 .4 .  Notice has also to  be taken of the fa c t th a t recent le g is la t io n  
has b lu rred  the d is tin c tio n  between the common law power of a rre s t and 
s ta tu to ry  powers to  some exten t; i t  w i l l  th e re fo re  be p ro f ita b le  to study 
the innovations introduced by the law but such a study requ ires  the le g a l 
in c id en ts  o f the common law power o f a rre s t to be analysed f i r s t .  J u d ic ia l 
in te rp re ta t io n  has not yet been p r o l i f ic  on th is  aspect, and so the use of 
the  expression "b lurred" may be open to  question. An attempt to  ju s t i fy  i t
7
w i l l  be made in  the proper context but we turn now to  survey the re levan t 
h is to ry  of English law .
(1 ) The Evolution of the Common Law Power of Arrest 
2 5. P ro f. P lucknett supports the theory th a t the law of crime has
grown out o f the law o f to r t  w ith admirable c la r i ty  of reasoning and 
expression: on the one hand, the aggrieved party recovered damages even
0
fo r  such causes as k i l l i n g ,  mayhem, robbery e tc . in  Anglo-Saxon proceedings;
on the o ther hand, the concept of "the K ing’ s Peace" appears to  have acquired
g
a g reater s ig n ifican ce  during the same period . C ertain  offences werB
considered grave and contrary to  pub lic  po licy  end fo r  these the King could
e x tra c t p en a lty . I t  was considered th a t such offences amounted to
10breaking the K ing’ s peace. In fa c t the concept has a hoary past: i t
may be traced to Teutonic o r ig in s ; the ancient German p o lity  was founded
on the concept of ’peace*. Any person who had broken the ’peace*
fo r fe ite d  h is  r ig h t  to  the pro tection  of law and vengeance against him
11was not regarded as crim e. Thus we already see the beginnings of the
c la s s if ic a tio n  o f crime and also the power of the in d iv id u a l tak ing  shape 
when the State has ye t to  step in to  the f i e ld .
2 .6 . Uhat type of law-enforcement machinery the State provided,
and what were the ancient laws th a t tackled  th is  problem, we may now see.
"The o ldest of our in s t itu t io n s  intended fo r  th is  purpose," says S ir  James
Stephen, "was frankpledge, by which a jo in t  re s p o n s ib ility  was established
amongst a c erta in  number of persons fo r  a l l  the offences which any of them
might commit. . . the  whole population was formed in to  an in s t i tu t io n ,
12upon which was incumbent duty of preventing and detecting  crim e."
2 .7 . A s im ila r  general account, but more graphic, comes from another
celebrated a u th o rity , S ir  Francis Palgrave: "There was no d is tin c tio n
between the s o ld ie r  end the c it iz e n ;  and the country was defended from 
rapine and s p o il by guards who, whether c a lled  out to  p ro tec t the lieg es  
against the fo re ign  enemy or to  pursue the domestic robber and marauder, 
were equally  arrayed as a m il ita ry  body. . . under the command of the
wardreve, who, in  consideration of th is  serv ice , held h is  own land fre e
from ta x a tio n , l ik e  the Thannadars, the ancient peace o f f ic e rs  of the  
13Hindoo v i l la g e s .”
2 .8 .  C ritc h ley  penetrates to g reater depth to explore the misty
14o rig in  of thB English po lice  system. I t  is  to be found in  the t r ib a l  
laws and customs of the Danish and the Anglo-Saxon invaders, the nearest 
eq u iva len t to the modern policeman being the Saxon tythinqm an. Above him 
was a hundredman and then the S h ire-reve or S h e r if f .
2 .9 # In  Pollock and M aitlan d  we get a u sefu l account of th e  • le g a l*
15process fo r  the apprehension and punishment of the fe lo n . I t  is  s tated
th a t the main ru le  was: fe lons ought to  be summarily arrested  and put in
gaol; every man must take part in  th is  process, one who neglects  to do so
faces punishment. S im ila r ly , one who omits to ra ise  ”hus and c ry” when
a fe lony is  committed, was held g u ilty  of an amerciable o ffen ce . While
s ta tin g  the general ru le , the authors, however, made an im portant point
when they wrote th a t i t  was doubtfu l whether a charge of fa ls e  imprisonment
could have been met by an a lle g a tio n  th a t there was reasonable cause fo r
suspic ion . However, the supposed ju s t i f ic a t io n  which the S h e r if f  and h is
o ff ic e rs  could plead did not extend to an ordinary man. The la s t  mentioned
underlined phrase thus c a rr ie s , i t  may be noted, an accumulated burden of
many centuries and many e f fo r ts  by the le g is la tu re , as w e ll as by the
ju d ic ia ry  have u n fo rtu n ate ly  been d irec ted  to augment i t .  Commentators
have been c r i t ic a l  o f th is  curious e d if ic a t io n  and the m atter w i l l  be
16examined in  the proper context.
2 .1 0 . When we come to the ancient laws, the Assize of Clarendon of
171166 may be taken as the s ta r tin g  p o in t. Bishop Stubbs c a lls  i t  ”a
18document of the g reatest importance to our le g a l h is to ry ” . He comments 
th a t i t  introduced f a r  reaching changes in to  the system of adm in is tra tion  
of ju s t ic e .  To the commission of i t in e r a n t  ju s tic e s  and the S h e r if fs , the
several ju r ie s  of the sh ires end the hundred were to present notorious
and reputed o ffenders . This trend d e f in ite ly  in d ica tes  the early  concern
to adm inister preventive ju s t ic e , although i t  speaks of the a rres t of the
in d ic te d . Then there  were Ordnances of 1195, 1233 and 1253 expressly
conferring the power of a rre s t and at times making i t  o b lig a to ry  fo r
19a l l  men to  a rres t outlaws, robbers, th ieves e tc .
2 .1 1 . Changes of considerable importance were, however, brought about
by the S tatu te  of Winchester 1285, which is  described by C ritch ley  as
"the only general pu b lic  measure of any consequence enacted to regulate
the p o lic in g  of the country between the Norman conquest and the M etropo litan  
20P olice Act 1829." From Stubbs’ tra n s la tio n  we learn th a t i t s  avowed
21object was 'to  abate the power of fe lo n s ’ . S a lie n t fea tu res  of some 
of i t s  provisions may be thus s ta ted : with the le g a l o b lig a tio n  to  keep
the K ing ’ s peace, came the power to  a rres t fe lo n s , granted to  every person 
in  e x p l ic it  terms; b a i l i f f s  of towns were required to make in q u iry  every 
f i f te e n  days to fin d  'suspicious persons': unpaid p a rt-tim e  watchmen were 
duty bound to  a rres t such persons and when they lev ie d  hue and cry upon 
them "such as keep the watch s h a ll fo llo w . . . with a l l  the town and towns 
near, and so hue and cry s h a ll be made from town to  town, u n t i l  th a t  
they be taken. . . and fo r  the arrestments of such strangers none s h a ll 
be punished."
2 .1 2 . I t  has been appropriate ly  said th a t the S tatute  embodied a
fusion of Anglo-Saxon and Norman ideas: a lo c a l man with reg a l au th o rity
inhering  the Saxon p r in c ip le  o f personal serv ice to the community
22exercis ing  powers of a rres t under the common law.
2 .1 3 . The Justice  of the Peace Act 1360-61 (34  Edw. 3, c .1 ) may w e ll
be termed the la s t ancient s ta tu te  th a t throws some l ig h t  on the common law 
power o f a r re s t. Justices of the peace were required  to  'keep the peace' 
and given powers "to re s tra in  the o ffenders , r io te rs  and a l l  other barators  
and to pursue, a r re s t, take and chastise them. . . according to the law and
1A.&.0
custom o f the realm . .
2 .1 4 . The course of development can be summed up by adopting S ir  Dames
Stephen's conclusion th a t the co n stitu tio n  of courts and the law
re la t in g  to  detection  and prosecution of offenders together formed
a comprehensive system fo r  in q u irin g  in to  offences and apprehending
23and punishing c rim in a ls . In  another work he says th a t a d is c ip lin e d
force in  the nature of a standing army fo r  the suppression of crime end
apprehension of offenders was provided to cover the whole of England in  
24successive steps. In the sane work he also comments th a t common law
as to  a rres t remained unaltered  s u b s ta n tia lly  fo r  a great length of time
and is  s t i l l  in  fo rc e , with some m od ifications e ffe c te d  by the changes
25made in  the position  of the o ff ic e rs  enforcing the same.
2 .1 5 . W riting  in  1863 on the 'modern law of a r r e s t ' ,  S ir  Dames 
Fitzjam es Stephen asserts th a t in  the case of summary power of a rres t there  
was very l i t t l e  d iffe ren ce  between the r ig h ts  of a peace o f f ic e r  and a 
p riva te  person except th a t in some cases the la t t e r  had a g reater p ro te c tio n . 
The law on th is  subject is  fo r  the most part modern and consolidated by 
s ta tu te , 11 & 12 V ic . c. 42. " I t  has no other ob ject than th a t of insuring  
the appearance of the person suspected of crime to take th e ir  t r i a ls  and
i t  is  remarkable th a t the f a c i l i t i e s  which are afforded fo r  th is  purpose in  
crim in a l cases are l i t t l e  g reater than the f a c i l i t i e s  which, t i l l  yery la te ly ,  
were afforded to every one who wished to recover a debt by a rres t o r mense
ti 26process".
( 2) The Legal Inc iden ts  of the Common Law Power of A rrest
(A ) A General Views
2 .1 6 . B lackstone's views on th is  to p ic  are too sim ple: "a rres t is
apprehending or re s tra in in g  of one's person, in  order to  be forthcoming to
27answer an alleged or suspected crim e." He s ta tes  th a t i t  can be e ffec ted
in  four d if fe re n t  wayss by w arrant, by an o f f ic e r  without a w arrant, by a
p riva te  person also w ithout a warrant and by a hue and cry .
2 .1 7 . The learned authors of the Dioest of the Law of C rim inal Procedure
draw up a form idable l i s t  with an e laborate c la s s if ic a t io n , p lacing  re lia n c e
whenever necessary, on ancient a u th o ritie s  l ik e  H ale, Hawkins and Foster,
28and also on some decided cases. To combine a u th e n tic ity  with b re v ity ,
re levan t passages from the D igest are quoted to provide a lead to a
29purposeful discussion:
A rt. 96 -  Arrest w ithout warrant
Any person, b le th e r a peace o f f ic e r  or n o t, may a r re s t .  . . 
any one, who commits a fe lony in  h is  presence, or
who gives a dangerous wound in  h is  presence, or
whom he reasonably suspects of having committed a fe lo n y ,
i f  a fe lony has in  fa c t been committed, o r. . .
A rt. 98 -  A rrest w ithout warrant by Police o ff ic e rs  
A peace o f f ic e r  may a rre s t. . . in  addition  to  the persons 
mentioned in  the la s t a r t ic le s ,  ( in t e r  a l ia )
(a ) any person whom he suspects upon reasonable grounds o f 
having committed a fe lo n y , whether a fe lony has in  fa c t been 
committed or not;
(b ) any person committing a breach of the peace in  h is  presence;
the peace o f f ic e r  may detain any such person w hile the breach of
the peace continues or there is  any danger of i t s  renewal.
2 .1 8 . S ir  Matthew Hale supplies, in  some d e ta i l ,  the ra tio n a le  of these 
30ru le s :
(a ) A p riv a te  person who knows th a t a fe lony has been committed is  
l ia b le  to  be punished i f  the fe lon  escapes fo r  h is  fa i lu r e  to apprehend 
him; to c a l l  others to  h is  assistance and to ra ise  hue and cry are parts  
of h is  duty.
(b ) In  an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment i t  is  a good ju s t i f ic a t io n
as he can show what fe lony has been committed and th a t he discharged h is
duty in  apprehending the p la in t i f f  and d e liv e rin g  him to the 'c o n s ta b le '.
(c ) Magna Carta does not at a l l  concern such 'preparato ry  imprisonment'
of a fe lo n  and as such h is  action in  e ffe c tin g  the a rres t w i l l  not be i l l e g a l .
(d ) I f  a fe lony has been committed, i t  is  'la w fu l and ju s t i f ia b le *  
fo r  a p riva te  person to  a rres t one against whom he had 'probable cause of 
suspicion' "because i f  a person would be punished by an action of trespass
1C5
or fa ls e  imprisonment. . . m alefactors would escape to  the common detrim ent 
of the peoplew. Conditions fo r  a v a l id  a rres t in  such a case ares
( i )  there would be no ground fo r  suspicion i f  a fe lony in  fa c t  had not 
been committed, ( i i )  suspicion must be th a t of the person a rre s tin g  said
( i i i )  he must have reasonable cause fo r  i t ,  which is  to  be a lleged  and
^ 32 proved.
(e ) "Probable causes are very many, e .g . ,  common fame. . . hue and
33cry le v ie d . . . hath taken part of the goods found upon him. .
( f )  A rrest on suspicion of fe lony by a p riv a te  person is  perm itted by 
law and is  there fo re  ju s t i f ia b le  but i t  is  not commanded by law and the
party is  not punishable i f  he om its. . . " fo r  no man is  judge of a man’ s
34suspicion but h im s e lf."
G iving reasons fo r  the g reater p ro tection  provided by law in  the case 
of a rres ts  ’v ir tu te  o f f i c i i ’ , Hale says th a t ,  f i r s t l y ,  "they are more 
eminently tru s te d  by law as in  many other acts in c id en ts  to  th e ir  o f f ic e " ,  
secondly, they are punishable by law i f  they neglect th e ir  duty -  th e ir  
actions are not a rb itra ry  but necessary d u ties , not perm issions. He goes 
fu r th e r  and says th a t " i t  is  no fe lony in  these o ff ic e rs  or those who 
ass is t them, th a t upon in e v ita b le  necessity [th e y ] k i l l  [some one], though
possibly the party k i l le d  be innocent, because of resistance against the
35au th o rity  of the K ing ."
2 .1 9 . Of a rres ts  made by po lice  o f f ic e rs ,  at the instance of p riva te
persons, Hale says: I f  A suspects B, upon probable grounds, and desires
the ’ constab le ’ to  a rres t B, the constable ought to in q u ire  and examine
the circumstances and causes of A's suspicion. Though i t  cannot be done
upon oath, "yet such inform ation may carry over the suspicion even to
the constable" whereby i t  becomes h is  suspicion as w e ll as A 's . I f  th is
be not allowed, fe lons  may escape and on the other hand B is  not
36prejudiced as he may get discharge on b a i l  or at t r i a l .  This passage 
brings out the ancient a tt itu d e  to  law enforcement problems, balancing,
ICS
ra th er unevenly, the in d iv id u a l's  r ig h t to personal l ib e r ty  against the
in te re s t  o f the so c ie ty , which is  put a t a premium.
2 .2 0 . As to  the preventive aspect of the law enforcement problem, Hale
says: In  case of sudden a ffra y  through passion or excess of drink the
'co n stab le1 may put the person in  stocks or prison t i l l  the heat of h is
passion or intemperance is  over. . . He may break open doors and prevent
37danger to keep the peace i f  there  be an a ffra y  ins ide  the house. So,
an Englishman's home is  not always a c as tle  !
2 .2 1 . Of a rres ts  of fe lons 'v ir tu te  p ra ec e p ti' (by w arra n t), Hale
also gives valuab le  in fo rm ation : A ll  persons or courts having ju d ic ia l
power at common law or by v ir tu e  of Acts of Parliam ent fo r  the conservation
of peace, can grant warrants fo r  a rres t of fe lo n s . Among those named by
him, Judges of the K ing 's  Bench, the S h e r iff  and also the Justices of the
Peace, are empowered to  issue warrants by the 'law  of the la n d '.  He
questions Coke's opinion th a t the J.Ps did not have power to  issue warrants
38before 'in d ic tm e n t'.
2 .2 2 . The party praying fo r  a warrant should be examined on oath as to
39the cause or causes of h is  suspicion. The warrant ought not to be in
general terms to answer such m atters as s h a ll be objected against him. The
party arrested  may be admitted to b a i l  or even get a discharge by obta in ing
40a w r it  of Habeas Corpus i f  the warrant be in  general term s.
2 .2 3 . I f  issued to a p riva te  person, he is  bound to show i t  when
demanded but the S h e r iff  or the 'co n stab le ' need n o t. I t  is  enough fo r
him to say, " I a rres t you fo r  fe lony in  the K ing 's  name." But i t  is
reasonable and also safe fo r  the o f f ic e r  to acquaint the person arrested
of the cause. I t  is  great secu rity  fo r  him th a t a rres ts  and ju s t fo r  him 
41who is  a rres ted .
2 .2 4 . Me w i l l  now examine some of the leading decisions to  see how the  
d if fe re n t  aspects of the le g a l in c id en ts  of common law power of a rre s t have 
been expounded and developed to  cope with the growing v a r ie ty  of the law
enforcement problems. The study w i l l  i l lu s t r a te  th a t common law fe t te r s  
were d i f f i c u l t  to  break. The ju d ic ia ry  was absolved of th is  re s p o n s ib ility  
by the le g is la tu re  as the changing s itu a tio n  demanded.
(B) J u d ic ia l in te rp re ta t io n  of the scope and extent of the power
2 .2 5 . P ro f. G la n v ille  W illiam s has given a short and e x c e lle n t account
42of the common law powers of a rres t fo r  fe lony and another fo r  breach of 
43the  peace and in  them they provide an authentic  statement o f law based 
on a study of leading cases. The o b ject of our study being d if fe r e n t ,  
reference to some decis ions, both new and o ld , w i l l  be necessary in  g reater 
d e ta i l ,  to  trace  the trend of the ju d ic ia l  approach to the problem of law 
enforcement v is -a -v is  the question of personal l ib e r t y .
2 .2 6 . The omnipotent and pervasive in fluence of the  general p rin c ip le s  
of common law has always been the basis fo r  a p ro life ra t io n  o f the  
in d iv id u a l's  r ig h ts , c o rre la tiv e  to the r ig h t to freedom from unlaw ful 
a rre s t*  Law enforcement problems have thus been complicated and the 
ju d ic ia ry  was ca lled  upon to make such exposition of the various le g a l 
in c id en ts  of the power o f a rres t as could match the growing challenge. The 
ju d ic ia l  response th ere fo re  shows a dichotomy of approach. Some of the  
challenges, c r y s ta l l iz in g  in to  im portant r ig h ts , evoking ju d ic ia l  response 
are:
( i )  the r ig h t  to  p ro tection  against a rb itra ry  exercise of the power;
( i i )  the r ig h t o f not being subjected to unreasonable use of force in  the
law fu l exercise o f the power;
( i i i ) t h e  r ig h t o f res is tan ce ;
( iv )  the r ig h t o f rescue;
(v ) the r ig h t  o f refuge;
( v i )  the r ig h t to know the true reasons fo r  a rre s t;
( v i i ) t h e  r ig h t  not to be detained under any 'p re ten ce ' of a rre s t;
( v i i i )  the r ig h t not to be detained pending enquiry or fo r  in te rro g a tio n ;
( ix )  the r ig h t to  be taken to  the po lice  s ta tio n /N a g is tra te  with
reasonable dispatch;
(x ) the r ig h t to an action of fa ls e  imprisonment;
( x i )  the r ig h t to have the v e rd ic t of ju ry  on reasonable cause of
suspicion .
2 .2 7 .  Right to a w r it  of Habeas Corpus is  a d e lib e ra te  omission from
the above l i s t  because i t  has come to be regarded as a c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t
which has received a comprehensive treatm ent in  th is  study b e f i t t in g  i t s
m e rit . The present discussion of the decisions, in  groups, w i l l  cover the
above class as a whole, except the la s t mentioned r ig h t  which is  connected
with the im portant and complicated question of 'reasonable su sp ic io n ',
n ecess ita tin g  separate treatm ent. S im ila r ly , the in c id en ts  o f the power in
re la tio n  to breach o f the peace have to be d ea lt with sep ara te ly .
442 .2 8 .  As e a rly  as 1611, in  the renowned HACK ALLEY'S case, p rin c ip le s  
of enduring value were la id  down. The appellant k i l le d  an o f f ic e r  who was 
o ra lly  d irec ted  by the court to  a rres t a debtor, on the complaint of the  
c re d ito r , to  prevent the a rre s t. On a spec ia l v e rd ic t of ju ry , ' a l l  
judges of England' met under K ing 's  command and held in t e r a l ia  as fo llo w s :-
( i )  " . . . the a rres t is  to no other in te n t than to  bring the party  
to ju s t ic e .  . .
( i i )  " . . .  the o f f ic e r .  . . ought to a rre s t him when he can fin d  
him. . . o therw ise. . . p la in t i f f  w i l l  have an action upon him and recover 
a l l  h is  loss in  damages. . . although he [defendant] can not see the 
o ff ic e r  when he hears him say I  a rres t you in  the K ing 's  name e t c . ,  he 
ought to obey him. . . i f  the o f f ic e r  has not a law fu l warrant he s h a ll 
have h is  action of fa ls e  imprisonment. But great inconvenience w i l l  ensue 
on the o ther side i f  those who are indebted go at th e ir  pleasure a t n igh t
without danger o f a r re s t, they turn a day in to  n ig h t. . . fo r  fe lony and
46other crime a rres t a t n igh t by a warrant may be d ire c te d . . ."
( i i i ) ,fThe o f f ic e r  ought to show, at whose s u it ,  out o f what Court
and fo r  what cause the a rres t was made when the party submits h im se lf,
but not when he r e s is ts . The crime is  murder i f  the o f f ic e r  is  k i l le d
before he could make the a r re s t . The prisoner s h a ll not take advantage
of h is  own wrong. The o f f ic e r  had no opportunity to give reasons. The
argument was th a t he would have paid the money and 'bought1 h is  freedom
47i f  the reason had been g iven ."
( i v )  " I t  is  tru e  th a t l i f e  of a man is  much favoured in  law, but the
l i f e  o f the law i t s e l f  (which p ro tects  a l l  in  peace and sa fe ty ) ought to
be more favoured and the execution of the process of law and the o ff ic e s
of the conservators o f peace, is  the soul and l i f e  of the law, and the
means by which ju s tic e  is  administered and peace of the realm kep t. . .
the o f f ic e r .  . . in  the execution of h is  o f f ic e ,  i f  he is  re s is te d  or
48assaulted is  not bound to f l y  to  the w a ll.  . ."
492 .2 9 . TQOLEV's case (1709) is  another leading decision in  which the  
m ajo rity  (seven judges) held the crime to be manslaughter while the 
m inority  ( f iv e  judges) held i t  to be a murder. Besides dealing  with the 
r ig h t o f  rescue, the case also d ea lt with the question of 'reasonable  
su sp ic ion '; the la t t e r  aspect w i l l  be considered in  the appropriate context. 
The defendants in  th is  case in s is te d  on the discharge of a woman whom the 
constable had taken in to  custody fo r  d iso rd erly  conduct. The stranger 
who hed come to the constab le 's  assistance was k i l le d .  The m a jo rity  held  
" i f  one be imprisoned upon en unlaw ful a u th o rity , i t  is  s u ff ic ie n t  
provocation to  a l l  people out of compassion . . . more so when i t  was 
done under a colour o f ju s t ic e . . . when the l ib e r ty  of the subject is  
invaded, i t  is  a provocation to  a l l  subjects of England. . ."  The 
m ajo rity  also held (re p e ll in g  the view of the m inority  th a t the woman 
being a stranger to  the prisoners, there could be no provocation ), th a t 
i f  any one, against the law, imprison a man, he is  an offender against the 
Magna C arta . The constable acted as a 'common oppressor'.
2 .3 0 . S ir  M ichael Foster observes th a t the doctrine in  the above case 
carrie d  the law "in  favour of p riva te  persons o ff ic io u s ly  in terpos ing
50fa r th e r  than sound reason founded in  the p rin c ip le s  o f true  p o lic y . . ."
In te rp o s itio n  by a p riva te  person fo r  preserving the peace end preventing
blood-shed stands on a d if fe re n t  fo o tin g . He fu r th e r  observes th a t the
imprisonment of the woman was c e rta in ly  u n ju s t if ia b le :  the constable was
out o f h is  p rec inct and had no spec ia l w arrant; nor had the woman
misbehaved. His ass istan t was not there fo re  under spec ia l p ro tection
of law. Hale is  s i le n t ,  he says, as to the r ig h t  accruing from an act
of oppression in  the HUGET case which was re lie d  upon in  the TOQLEY case.
The m a jo rity  in  the HUGET case held the offence to  be manslaughter and
Foster says th a t he does not disagree w ith the view th a t an act of oppression
may be presumed to give to every man, fr ie n d  and stranger, out of mere
51compassion. "an endeavour to rescue" was perm itted by law.
2 .3 1 . U n fo rtu n ate ly , F o s te r's  opinion has not been construed in  the 
proper perspective in  some of the la te r  decisions and courts seem to  
express the view th a t T00LEY's  case had been o ver-ru led  by him. I t  is  
submitted th a t the new dimension added to the r ig h t of rescue in  T00LEY *s 
case is  not c a te g o ric a lly  re jec ted  by Foster. Decisions fo llo w in g  a
52somewhat mistaken view of F o s te r's  opinion are the cases of MARY ADEY.
53 54WARNER and DAVIS but no opinion appears to have been p u b lic ly  given in  
the f i r s t  mentioned of these cases, which was re-argued on th is  point in  
the Exchequer Chamber. In the second case, the prosecution conceded th a t 
the game-keepers had no r ig h t to  apprehend the prisoners but the ju ry  found 
a concert between the prisoners and also th e ir  purpose to be i l l e g a l  and 
m alic io u s. In  the th ird  case i t  was contended th a t the scope of the  
doctrine in  MACK ALLEY's  case was only lim ite d  in  TOOLEY's  case and th a t 
i t  was not to t a l ly  o v e r-ru le d . The Court re je c te d  the p riso n er's  twin  
p le a , th a t he could re s is t  a rres t and assault the s u b -b a i l i f f  of the 
county court as mere production of the warrant was not s u ff ic ie n t
ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  the a rre s t, and th a t in  cases where personal l ib e r ty  was 
in te r fe re d  w ith , 'ju r is d ic t io n *  to  do so must be shown,
2 .3 2 . In  LEDUITH v CATCHPOLE55 (1 7 8 6 ), Lord N ansfie ld  expresses serious  
concern fo r  law enforcement problems when he says, "Many an innocent man 
has and may be taken up upon such suspicion; but the m ischief and 
inconvenience to  the pu b lic  in  th is  po in t of view is  com paratively n o th in g .” 
I t  is  of great consequence to the p o lice  of the country. I t  was an action  
fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment and the question of 'reasonable suspicion ' being the
main issue, th a t aspect of the case w i l l  be discussed in  the proper context.
562 .3 3 . In LAURENCE v HEDGER (1 8 1 0 ), i t  was held th a t watchroen and 
beadles have au th o rity  at common law to  a rre s t and detain fo r  examination a 
person walking in  the s tre e t a t n ig h t, on suspicion, w ithout proof of a 
fe lony having been committed. Chembre, 3 . , ,  held th a t, "At n ig h t, when the 
town is  asleep, i t  is  the espec ia l duty of the watchmen and other o ff ic e rs  to  
guard against m alefactors . I t  i9  h igh ly  necessary th a t they should have 
such a power of d e te c t io n .” Lawrence, 3 . ,  re lie d  on an e a r l ie r  decision in  
which there  was an indictm ent against a constable fo r  s u ffe rin g  a n ig h t-  
walker to  escape. I t  was also an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment. As in  
LEDUITH's  case, here also the p la in t i f f  lo s t .  The C ourt's  holding on 
'reasonable suspicion ' does not carry much co n vic tion .
572 .3 4 . In another action fo r  fa ls e  a rre s t, in  the case of McARDLE v EGAN, 
Lord liiright is  more vocal on the point when he says (d ism issing the a c tio n ),
” . . . i t  i s  to  be remembered th a t in  the pub lic  in te re s t i t  is  im portant 
th a t po lice  o ff ic e rs  should be protected in  the reasonable and proper 
execution of th e ir  du ty . They should not be hampered or t e r r i f i e d  by being 
unduly c r it ic is e d  i f  they act on reasonable suspicion. • . th e ir  functions  
are not ju d ic ia l  but m in is te r ia l and i t  may w e ll be th a t i f  they h e s ita te  
too long when they have a proper ground o f suspicion against an in d iv id u a l,  
they may lose an o p p o rtu n ity . . . in many cases steps have to  be taken to  
preserve evidence. . . ”
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582 .3 5 . In an e a r l ie r  case, HOBBS v BRAN5CDMB. the ancient ru le  sta ted
in  WILLIW1S v DAWSON (1788) was re ite ra te d , namely th a t i f  the po lice
o f f ic e r  received a person in to  custody on a charge p re ferred  by another
of fe lony or breach of the peace, he is  to  be considered as a mere conduit
and the person who p re fe rred  i t  is  answerable i f  i t  turned out th a t there
was no fe lony or breach of the peace. Lord Ellenborough added th a t the
ru le  was reasonable: “very in ju rio u s  consequences might fo llo w  to the
p o lic e ” [o th e rw is e ]. The p l a in t i f f 's  action fa i le d .
592 .3 6 . In WRIGHT v CPURTS, the fa c ts  were ugly and the p la in t i f f
succeeded. He was assaulted, a rres ted , confined fo r  three days before he 
was produced in  court, in  hand-cuffs , and again detained there fo r  another 
twelve hours. Bayley, 3 . ,  held th a t the period of confinement was 
unreasonable and the purpose was i l l e g a l .  " I t  was the duty of every person 
who arres ts  another of fe lony to  take him before a M ag istrate  as soon as he
c an .” Even a M agistrate  is  not authorized by law to detain a person, much
less a constable, except fo r  a reasonable tim e, and only fo r  the  purpose of 
h is  being examined. The handcuffing was also held u n ju s t if ia b le  as i t  was 
not averred th a t the p la in t i f f  attempted to escape. "Such degree of vio lence  
and r e s t ra in t ,  even by a constable, could be ju s t i f ie d  only on 'good and
speci a l re asons' .
2 .3 7 . WALTERS v W.H. SMITH & SONS^ was a case of an a rre s t by a p riva te  
person who faced an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment and m alic ious prosecution.
The a c q u itta l was on ju ry 's  upholding p l a in t i f f 's  p lea th a t he had no 
fe lo n io u s  in te n t and the defendant having admitted th a t p l a in t i f f  had
not 's to le n ' the book. Numerous contentions were ra ised  as the point did
not appear to  have been decided e a r l ie r .  S ir  Rufus Isaacs, C .3 .,  had
occasion to  re c a ll  ancient a u th o ritie s  and re s ta te  the law: " . . .  in te rfe ren ce
with the l ib e r ty  of the subject and esp e c ia lly  in te rfe ren c e  by a p riv a te  
person has ever been most jea lo u s ly  guarded by the common law of the land . . .
I  am convinced th a t the dominant in te n tio n  in  the minds of the defendants,
as shown by the fa c t of the a rre s t, was to  give p la in t i f f  in  custody fo r  
having stolen the book and not merely fo r  the purpose of in i t ia t in g  a 
ju d ic ia l  in q u iry ."  The decision la id  down th a t i t  is  only by means of 
ju d ic ia l  process th a t the a rre s t can otherwise be ju s t i f ie d ;  a rres t fo r
merely deta in ing  a person and not in i t i a t in g  a ju d ic ia l  in q u iry  can not be
ju s t i f ie d .  I t  was also held th a t i t  is  only by reference to the e a r l ie r  
works on common law, which has never been a lte re d , th a t one must ascertain  
the law of the land . The defendants, in  th is  case, had used a ' t r a p 1 to 
detect th e f t  o f books from th e ir  shop in  which the p la in t i f f  was employed.
A p riv a te  d etective  f i r s t  took the p la in t i f f  in to  custody and in te rro g ated  
him before tak ing  him to  the po lice  s ta t io n .
612 .3 8 . In  the celebrated casB of CHRISTIE v LEACH IN SKY, abandoning the
o r ig in a l p lea of law fu l exercise of s ta tu to ry  power, p o lice  adopted the
common law p lea of ju s t i f ic a t io n  in  the action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment.
2 .3 9 . Viscount Simon la id  down the fo llo w in g  general propositions which
have come to stay as valuab le  guides to every one concerned with the law
62enforcement problems (quoted in  extenso, ad verbatim ) .
1 . I f  a policeman a rres ts  without warrant on reasonable suspicion
of fe lo n y , or of other crime of a sort which does not requ ire  a
w arrant, he must in  the ordinary circumstances inform the person 
arrested  of h is  true  ground of h is  a rre s t.
H* is  not e n t i t le d  to keep the reason to h im self or to  give 
a reason which is  not the true  reason. In  other words, a 
c it iz e n  is  e n t it le d  to  know on what charge or on suspicion of 
what crime he is  se ized .
2. I f  the c it iz e n  is  not so informed but is  nevertheless seized ,
the policeman, apart from c erta in  exceptions, is  l ia b le  fo r
fa ls e  imprisonment.
3. The requirement th a t person arrested  should be informed of the  
reason why he is  seized n a tu ra lly  does not e x is t i f  the  
circumstances are such th a t he must know the general nature of 
the alleged offence fo r  which he is  detained.
4. The requirement th a t he should be so informed does not mean th a t 
tech n ica l or precise language need be used. The m atter is  of 
substance, and turns on the elementary proposition th a t in
th is  country a person is ,  prima fa c ie ,  e n t it le d  to freedom and 
is  only required to submit to  re s tra in ts  on h is  freedom i f  he 
knows in  substance why i t  is  claimed th a t th is  re s tra in t  
should be imposed.
5. The person arrested  can not complain th a t he has not been
supplied with the above inform ation as aid when he should be, 
i f  he h im self produces the s itu a tio n  which makes i t  p ra c t ic a lly  
im possible to  inform him, e .g . ,  by immediate counter attack  or 
by running away. There may w e ll be other exceptions to  the 
general ru le  in  addition  to  those I  have in d ica te d , and the  
above propositions are not intended to co n stitu te  a form al 
or complete code, but to in d ica te  the general p r in c ip le s  of 
our law on a very im portant m a tte r.
6 32 .4 0 . Lord Simmonds, however, sounds a note of caution . His lordship
h e ld , " I f ,  then, the appellan ts  reasonably suspected th a t the respondent 
had committed a fe lo n y , was i t  not th e ir  r ig h t  to a rres t him w ithout 
warrant ? And i f  they did so a rres t him, how is  i t  th a t the a rre s t can be 
branded as i l le g a l  and an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment l i e  against them ?
My Lords, i t  is  here th a t the crux of the m atter l ie s  and i t  is  not so 
easy to  s ta te  the law as not on the one hand to impinge upon the l ib e r ty  of 
the subject or on the o ther hand to make more d i f f i c u l t  the duty of every 
subject o f the King to preserve the K ing 's  peace." His lordship  suggests a 
simple a lte rn a tiv e  te s t :  " i t  is  a condition of law fu l a rres t th a t the man
arrested should be e n t it le d  to know why he is  a rres ted , and then, since the 
a f fa ir s  o f l i f e  seldom admit an absolute standard or an u n q u a lified  
proposition , see whether any q u a lif ic a t io n  is  of necessity imposed upon i t . "  
Two reasons are given to support th is  te s t :  (a ) in  the case of a rres t
under a w arrant, the charge is  stated  th e re in , (b ) an analogous procedure 
obtained in  the olden days in  c iv i l  proceedings re la t in g  to imprisonment 
fo r  d e b t .^
2 .4 1 . Lord du Parcq takes great pains in  trac in g  in  d e ta il  the evolution
65of the law and s ta tes  the 'governing r u le ' of common law: " . . . a  man is
e n t it le d  to  h is  l ib e r ty  and may, i f  necessary, defend h is  own freedom by 
fo rc e . I f  another man has a la w fu l reason fo r  seeking to  deprive him of 
th a t l ib e r t y ,  th a t person must, as a general ru le , t e l l  him what the reason 
is ,  fo r  unless he is  to ld , he can not be expected to submit to  a rre s t, or 
blamed fo r  re s is ta n ce . The r ig h t to a rres t and the duty to submit are co­
r e la t iv e .  . ."
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2 .4 2 . In  try in g  to  evaluate the consequences of th is  decision and i t s  
impact on law enforcement problems one contemporary observer laments th a t 
the p rin c ip le s  enunciated in  the above decision by the House of Lords are 
not scrupulously fo llo w e d .66 He discusses some of the recent cases in  th is  
context, KEN LIN v GARDINER,67 R v CONNOLLY68 and R v INLjQOD.69 He concludes 
th a t M ag istrates  may regard i t  as being in  the pub lic  in te re s t to  support the  
p o lic e . A c it iz e n  has a b e tte r  chance i f  he can take the case to the judge 
end the ju ry . I f  s ta t is t ic s  uere taken, i t  is  subm itted, th is  is  the 
course which c it iz e n s  have p re fe rre d . H is suggestions fo r  ta c k lin g  the 
problem are at once bold and n o vel. The use of m in iature  cassette records, 
the passing of radio messages to the s ta tio n  o f f ic e r  may perhaps breed more 
problems but the making of "a rres t documents" on the spot is  perhaps an
easy and simple s o lu tio n . Human in g en u ity , i t  is  submitted, has many edges. 
An absolute method to avoid any chances of fa b r ic a tio n  is  an im p o s s ib ility .
2 .4 3 . How the doctrine la id  down in  CHRISTIES  case has been expanded
70in  two subsequent cases, we may now see. In JOHN LEWIS & CO v TIMS, a
mother and daughter were accosted by a p riva te  detective  of the appellant
firm  fo r  having stolen some calendars from th e ir  shop. The mother was deaf.
71In the Court of Appeal, Asquith, L .J . ,  held th a t the a rres to r could not 
be expected to do more than was reasonable to  inform the person arrested  of 
th a t with which he or she was charged. Lord P o rter approved th is  dictum 
in  the House of Lords, saying, "Respondent denied knowledge, but she was 
deaf; on the o ther hand the detective  had no reason to  suspect th a t she
72could not hear. She could not be at fa u l t  i f  the respondent did not h e ar."
2 .4 4 . This case has, however, another im portant aspect uhich deserves
a tte n tio n . I t  was an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment. A rrest took place at
3.30 p.m. The po lice  on being summoned a rrived  at 4 .10 p.m. and the
p la in t i f f  wss then taken to  the po lice  s ta tio n  a t 4.30 p.m. Lord Porter
held th a t i t  was in  the in te re s t  of the person arrested th a t he should have
7 3the opportunity of avoiding the p u b lic ity  of a pub lic  t r i a l .  The ob ject
of tak ing  the accused to the p o lice  early  was not th a t he might be b a iled
at once. Under the old law, there were three a lte rn a tiv e  destin ations -
gaol, constable or ju s t ic e .  The Court appears to  have la id  down a nqw ru le
s ta tin g  th a t ,  "The question throughout should be -  has the a rre s to r brought
the arrested  person to  a place where h is  a lleged offence can be d ea lt with
74as speedily as is  reasonably possib le ?"
752 .4 5 . The recent decision in  WHEATLEY v LODGE fo llow s the t r a i l .  I t
7 6expressly holds th a t the JOHN LEWIS case recognised a fu r th e r  exception to
the general ru le  stated in  CHRISTIES  case, namely, th a t when a po lice
77o f f ic e r  a rres ts  a person who is  deaf or who can not speak English what
he is  to do is  th a t which a reasonable person would do in  the circumstances.
7 82 .4 6 . We may now b r ie f ly  discuss the three cases adverted to  e a r l ie r .
79In  KENLIN *s case two young schoolboys were held to  have acted in  s e lf
defence in  assaulting two p la in -c lo th e s  p o lice  o ff ic e rs  who t r ie d  to re s tra in
th e ir  movements to question them, with what were regarded as 'te s t  questions'
to  h e lp  th e  p o lic e  to  make up t h e i r  mind uhether o r not to  a rrB s t them. I t
was held th a t the work of the p o lice  o ff ic e rs  did not co n stitu te  an
in te g ra l step in  the process of a rres t but amounted to a "tech n ica l assau lt" . 
80In  CONNOLLY *s case the p la in t i f f  was arrested  fo r  obstructing  po lice  
o ff ic e rs  in  the law fu l exercise of th e ir  duty . He gave h is  name and address 
but refused to answer other questions. Lord Parker, C .J .,  observed: " . . .  
though every c it iz e n  has a moral duty or a so c ia l duty to ass is t the p o lic e , 
there is  no le g a l duty to  th a t e f fe c t  and indeed the whole basis of the  
common law is  th a t r ig h t of the in d iv id u a l to  refuse to answer questions 
put to him by persons in  a u th o rity  aid a re fu s a l to  accompany thosB in  
au th o rity  to any p a r t ic u la r  p lace, sh o rt, of course, of a r re s t . . . there  
is  a l l  the d iffe re n c e . . . between te l l in g  d e lib e ra te ly  a fa ls e  s to ry , 
something which on no view a c it iz e n  has a r ig h t to do, and preserving  
silence . . . which he has every r ig h t to do. • ."  (Emphasis added).
However, in  another passage h is  Lordship observed th a t M. • . i t  is  part 
of the o b lig a tio n s  and duties of a po lice  constable to  take a l l  steps 
which appear to  him necessary fo r  keeping the peace, fo r  preventing crime 
or fo r  p ro tecting  property from crim in a l in ju r y ."  (Emphasis added).
2 .4 7 . Relying on the above observations a d if fe re n t  re s u lt  was obtained
81in DQNNELY v 3ACKS0N which has provoked a contemporary observer to comment
th a t i f  the word " law fu l"  had been used in  the expression underlined i t
82would have represented the English law c o rre c tly . I t  has been noticed , 
however, th a t the po lice  o f f ic e r  w i l l  hot have any defence in  t o r t ,  whether 
te c h n ica l or s u b s ta n tia l, even fo r  ajctg done bona f id e , fo r  track in g  down 
crim ina ls  or c o lle c tin g  evidence when he w i l l  be n a tu ra lly  acting  in  the 
course o f h is  duty . This double standard is  sought to  be ju s t i f ie d  by the  
de minimis p rin c ip le s  of the c rim in a l law, but the danger inherent in  th is  
ju s t i f ic a t io n  is  also recognized, (lore appropriate, however, is  the  
reference made in  the a r t ic le  to s . 3 of C rim inal Law Act 1967 but the  
p ro v is io n , i t  is  submitted, may not cover such s itu a tio n s ; i t  is  a ttra c te d , 
ex fa c ie , to the re a l a id  in te g ra l steps of the process of a r re s t, not to  
any step which is  a mere pretence.
832 .4 8 . The next case is  JNUOOD's, in  which the Court of Appeal quashed
the conviction fo r  assaulting  a p o lice  constable in  the execution of h is
duty, proceeding on a concession ‘properly  made1 th a t there was an
o b lig a tio n  on the p o lice  to make i t  c lea r to  the defendant th a t he was
under r e s t r a in t .  Although the a u th o r it ie s  were not reviewed, the reason
given is  th a t no s ing le  or set form ula w i l l  s u it every case. I t  w i l l  be
u s e fu l, however, to  re fe r  to  an o ld  au th o rity  on th is  p o in t; in  PEERING
84v GRAHAME-WHITE AVIATION CO. .  Duke, L .3 . ,  adverted to an ancient common 
law a u th o rity , Termes de la  la y , to  fin d  'imprisonment' being defined as 
"no other th ing  but re s tra in t  of a man's l ib e r t y ,  whether i t  beain the open 
f ie ld  or in  stocks or in  cage in  the s tre e ts  or in  a man's owne home. . . 
and in a l l  the places the party res tra in ed  is  said to be a prisoner so long
as he hath not h is  l ib e r ty  fre e  to goe at a l l  times to a l l  p laces. . ."
85 86A tk in , L .3 . ,  agreed but re fe rre d  to BIRD v JONES and WARNER v BURFORD.
His Lordship enlarged the concept fu r th e r , s ta tin g  th a t a person could be
imprisoned without b is  knowing i t ,  as in  s leep, or in  a s ta te  of drunkenness
or lunacy. "A persen might complain i f  he were imprisoned, though the
imprisonment began and ceased while he was in  th a t s ta te ."
872 .4 9 . In  the case of R v FRANCIS the Court of Appeal upheld the
co nvic tion , fo r  assaulting a po lice  o f f ic e r ,  of the person who had given 
refuge to a suspect who was follow ed by the po lice  on a hot p u rs u it. The
p o lice  o ff ic e rs  wbtb assaulted when they attempted to make a fo rc ib le  entry
to e ffe c t  an a rre s t. The defence appears to have been the r ig h t  of re fuge, 
founded in  the contention of unlaw ful a rres t and based on the in a p p lic a b il i ty  
of Ss. 2 (1 ) and (6 ) o f the C rim inal Law Act 1967. I t  was re je c te d . On
fa c ts , the Court held th a t the po lice  o ff ic e rs  had the r ig h t of entry
under S. 2 (6 ) and were assaulted in  the execution of th e ir  duty.
(C) The reasonable cause o f suspicion:
We now come to a t ic k l is h  question which has ( in  the views of some 
88c r it ic s )  apparently d efied  a s a tis fa c to ry  s o lu tio n .
2 .5 0 . In  order to  grapple with th is  complicated problem a synthesis
of the general p rin c ip le s  discussed so fa r  may prove h e lp fu l.  For th is  we 
may draw equally  from the process of evo lu tio n , from Coke, H a le , Stephen, 
Pollock and M aitland and P ro f. P lu ckn ett, besides the ju d ic ia l  exp o s itio n .
The te n ta tiv e  propositions th a t emerge may be summed up f i r s t  and then tested  
with reference to ju d ic ia l  pronouncement. Some of these may be thus sta ted  -
( i )  L ib erty  of the person cane to be regarded as in tr io la b le , to  y ie ld  
only to  a 'la w fu l1 re s t ra in t ;  actions of trespass to persons embrace 
th is  p r in c ip le .
( i i )  Lest the  re s tra in t  becomes to t a l  and amounts to complete negation of 
l ib e r ty ,  the large measure of d iscre tio n  th a t the summary power o f a rres t
carrie d  with i t ,  ca lled  fo r  a l im it  to be set on i t .
( i i i )  The power having f i r s t  come to be vested in  a p riv a te  person who was 
vu lnerab le  to  actions of trespass to  person, a corresponding pro tection  
had to  be provided; i t  resu lted  in  the p lea of ' ju s t i f i c a t io n 1.
( i v )  The power m anifested i t s e l f  as an exercise of 'la w fu l a u th o r ity ' which 
had attached to i t  certa in  in c id en ts ; any v io la t io n  of the  au th o rity  was 
v is ite d  with a penalty and the elements of the c rim in a l a c t iv ity  could be 
tes ted  with reference to these le g a l in c id e n ts .
(v ) Summary powers under common law being lim ite d  to cases of fe lo n y , and 
fresh  problems of law enforcement having arisen from tim e to tim e with the 
change in  the s o c ia l cond itions, s im ila r  powers created by s ta tu tes  were 
provided with lim ita t io n s , which were not always e x p l ic i t .
( v i )  The concept has re ta in ed  a wholesome f l e x i b i l i t y  w ith v a ria b le  fac to rs  
co n trib u tin g  to i t s  u n fa ilin g  e ffic a c y  notw ithstanding the apparent 
inadequacies, uhich are a ttr ib u te d  to the ju d ic ia ry 's  h e s ita tio n  to  freeze  
the concept.
2 .5 1 . However, the wisdom of the le g is la tu re  in  denying i t s e l f  the
opportunity to opt fo r  a change can s t i l l  be questioned at an appropriate
forum. Whether the ju d ic ia ry  attempted to answer the question we may
89now examine. In  the case of DALLISON v CAFFERY Lord Denning said  th a t the
'time-honoured* question of ' honest b e l ie f  in  q u i l t ' had been asked o f the
ju r ie s  fo r  over 150 years and i t  has caused a 'c a rt - lo a d  of tro u b le s '.
However, i t  is  in  the opinion of D iplock, L .J . ,  th a t we have to  seek the
90exposition  of the law . We quote h im | at some length .
2 .5 2 . I t  is  in  the pub lic  in te re s t  th a t fe lons should be caught 
and punished. At common law a person who acts honestly and 
reasonably commits no actionable wrong. What is  honesty in  
th is  connection does not changes what is  reasonable, changes 
as society and the organization  fo r  the enforcement of the 
crim in a l law evolves. . . 18th and 19th century a u th o ritie s
are i l lu s t r a t iv e  o f what was reasonable in the s o c ia l conditions  
then e x is t in g . . . [th e  ru le ]  applies a lik e  to p r iv a te  persons 
and po lice  o ff ic e rs  but what is  reasonable conduct in  the 
circumstances may d i f f e r  according to^whether the a rres to r  
is  a p riva te  person or a p o lice  o f f ic e r .  . . Where a felony  
has been committed a person acts reasonably. . . i f  fa c ts
which he h im self knows or of which he has been cred ib ly  
informed at the time of the a rre s t make i t  probable th a t  
the person arrested committed the fe lo n y . This is  what 
con stitu tes  in  law reasonable and probable cause fo r  the 
a rre s t. Since a rres t involves trespass to the person and 
any trespass to the person is  prima fa c ie  to r t io u s , the 
onus l ie s  on the a rres to r to ju s t i f y  the trespass by 
e s tab lis h in g  reasonable and probable cause fo r  the a r re s t . . . 
[emphasis added]
Am plifying fu r th e r , h is  Lordship adds:
. . . the te s t is  an o b jec tive  one, namely, whether a 
reasonable man, assumed to know the law and possessed of 
the inform ation  which in  fa c t  was possessed by the  
defendant, would be lieve  th a t there  was reasonable and 
probable cause.
912 .5 3 . In Halsbury the meaning given to the expression in  the
HICKS1 case has been adopted:
. . . [ i t ]  has been said to  be an honest b e l ie f  in  the  
g u ilt  of the accused based on a f u l l  co n vic tio n , founded 
upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a s ta te  of 
circumstances, uhich, assuming them to  be tru e , would 
reasonably lead any o rd in ary , prudent and cautious men, 
placed in  the position  of an accuser, to  the conclusion 
th a t the person charged was probably g u ilty  of the crime 
committed.
A d is tin c tio n  is ,  however, drawn in  Halsbury between the two types of
action and i t  has been stated th a t in  the case of m alic ious prosecution the
onus is  throughout on the p la in t i f f  whereas in  an action of fa ls e  a rres t
92the defendant has to prove ju s t i f ic a t io n .  This view fin d s  echo in  Lord
93D ip lock 's  speech in  D a llis o n 's  case. Even in  some of the old cases we
fin d  th is  arduously developed.
942 .54  In  SAWILE v ROBERTS , H o lt , C .3 .,  held th a t . . though th is
action w i l l  l i e ,  ye t i t  ought not to be favoured, but managed with great 
caution . For i f  the indictm ent be found, the defendant in  such action  
w i l l  not be bound to shew a probable cause, but the p la in t i f f  w i l l  be 
constrained to  shew express m alice . . ."  I t  was an action fo r  m alic ious  
prosecution but the Court held th a t damages may be o f three kinds:
" . . . such as are done to the person; where a man is  put in  danger to  
lose h is  l i f e  or limb or l ib e r t y , which has always been allowed a good 
foundation of such an a c tio n . . ."  This decision was fo llow ed in  GOLDING
95v CRQWLE in  which i t  was held th a t defendant had proved more than was 
necessary as he was not required to  prove probable cause. I t  was also 
an action fo r  m alicious prosecution. This d is t in c t io n , anciently  made, 
shows th a t the a rres to r was expected to exercise h is  d iscre tio n
ju d ic io u s ly  which acted as a sort of second lim ita t io n . M alice is  more
patent and apparent and is  easy to prove which makes the prosecutor's  
burden l ig h te r  than th a t o f the a r re s to r 's .
2.55 However, the c la s s ic a l d e fin it io n  of the term came from
96T in d a l, C .3 .,  in  BROAD v HAM in  which he held th a t "there  must be a 
reasonable cause as would operate on the mind of a d iscreet man; and 
also a probable cause as would operate on the mind of a reasonable man; 
at a l l  events such as would operate on the mind of the party making the  
charge; otherwise there is  no probable cause fo r  h im ." In  an equally  
eloquent exp o s itio n , Coltman, 3 . ,  said , "As the prosecutor would be 
ju s t i f ie d  by a probable cause, there should be an in q u iry  in to  the  bona-
fid e s  of i t .  . ."
972.56 liie may now have a second look a t LEDWITH *s case and also i t s
9 8precursor, SAMUEL v PAYNE in  which the ru le  was ra th e r widely s tated  
in  these terms: i f  a man charges another with felony and requ ires  an 
o ff ic e r  to take him in to  custody end carry him before a M ag is tra te , i t  
should be most mischievous th a t the o f f ic e r  should be bound f i r s t  to try  
and at h is  p e r i l  exercise h is  judgment on the tru th  of the charge. . . 
The o f f ic e r  does h is  duty in  carrying the accused before the M agistrate  
who is  authorised to examine, commit or discharge the accused. This  
ru le  was lim ite d  by B u lle r ,  3 . ,  in  LEDWITH1s case by ho ld ing , " i f  he 
acts on suspicion. . . to make i t  a ju s t i f ic a t io n ,  there  has to be 
reasonable ground of i t  in  h is  own mind and knowledge, not merely upon 
inform ation of o th ers ; i f  i t  is  not so, he becomes the judge of the  
evidence, which is  not h is  fu n c tio n . . ."  [ emphasis added]. Lord 
M ansfield makes a d is tin c tio n  and holds th a t i f  fe lony was not committed
in  fa c t  the question turns upon, "was the a rre s t bonafide; was the
act done f a i r ly  and in  p u rsu it of an offender or by design or malice  
or i l l - w i l l  ?"
2.57 In McARDLE v EGAN99 Lord Wright he ld :
The in q u iry  is  as to the s ta te  of mind of the constable 
at the time when he ordered the a rres t and the in q u iry  
involved th a t i t  must be ascertained what in form ation he 
had at the tim e even though th a t inform ation came from 
others , o f course i t  must come in  a way th a t ju s t i f ie s  
him in  g iv ing  c re d it  to i t .  . . th e ir  functions are not 
ju d ic ia l  but m in is te r ia l  and i t  may w e ll be th a t i f  they 
h e s ita te  too long when they have a proper and s u ff ic ie n t  
ground of suspicion against an in d iv id u a l, they may lose 
an opportunity  o f a rres tin g  him because in  many cases 
steps have to be taken a t once to preserve evidence. . . 
once there  appears to be reasonable suspicion. . . the  
police  o f f ic e r  is  not bound to make fu r th e r  in q u ir ie s  
. . .  to  make assurance doubly sure.
The importance of th is  decision l ie s  in  g iv ing  the p o lice  a p o s itive
guidance to avoid 'second s ig h t* .
2.58  TOOLEY's case^*^ is  one of the e a r l ie s t  cases end i t  has been 
shown th a t the notion th a t i t  has been o ver-ru led  is  misconceived.
Despite the d iv is io n , a l l  the  twelve judges agreed to say, " i t  is  not a 
co n stab le '* suspecting th a t w i l l  ju s t i fy  h is  tak ing  up a person but i t  
must be ju s t ground of suspicion, fo r  th a t is  tra v e rs a b le . . . i t  would 
be hard th a t l ib e r ty  of the subject s h a ll depend on the w i l l  of the 
constable, and s h a ll h is  not l ik in g  a woman's look be any cause of 
suspicion ?" [emphasis added].
1012.59 In  a recent case from M alays ia, HUSSEIN v CHONG FQQK KAM,
the P rivy Council approved the decision of the Court of Appeal in  DUMB ELL
102v ROBERTS. In  both cases reasonableness of suspicion in  re la t io n  to
s ta tu to ry  power came up fo r  considera tion . In  an illu m in a tin g  passage,
. n i • 103Lord Delvin says:
Suspicion in  i t s  ord inary meaning is  a s ta te  of conjecture
or surmise where proof is  lac k in g . . • i t  a rises  at or near
the s ta r t in g  p o in t of in v e s tig a tio n  o f which the obta in ing  
of prima fa c ie  proof is  the end. . . to  give power of a rres t 
on reasonable suspicion does not mean th a t i t  is  always or 
even o rd in a r ily  to  be exercised . I t  means th a t there  is  
an executive d is c re tio n . In  the exercise of i t  many
fa c to rs  have to be considered besides the strength  
of the case. The p o s s ib il ity  of escape, the prevention  
of fu r th e r  crime and obstruction of po lice  in q u ir ie s  are 
examples of these fa c to rs . . . there is  no serious danger 
in  a large  measure o f executive d iscre tio n  in  the f i r s t  
instance because in  countries where common law p rin c ip le s  
p re v a il the d iscre tio n  is  subject in d ire c t ly  to  ju d ic ia l  
c o n tro l. * •
2.60 The appeal arose out of an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment and
i t  would th e re fo re  be p e rtin en t to po in t out th a t the ru le  la id  down by
Lord Delvin accords with the ru le  of 'second lim ita t io n *  th a t we deduced
from the d iffe ren ce  in  p r in c ip le s  re la t in g  to onus of proof in  such 
104proceedings. Lord D e Iv in 's  dictum also f u l f i l s  a void uhich Professor 
G la n v ille  W illiam s discovered when he sa id , "There is  no ju d ic ia l  
au th o rity  to say th a t such a rres ts  are i l le g a l " ,  re fe rr in g  to the 'general 
p ra c tic e * according to which po lice  make a rres ts  without warrant where 
they have power to do s o .^ ^
2.61 In  dealing  with the question in  re la t io n  to the s ta tu to ry  power
of a r re s t, Professor G la n v ille  W illiam s aptly  suggests th a t what
in q u ir ie s  should reasonably be made in  these cases may depend upon the
106s itu a tio n  contemplated by the s ta tu te  concerned. While examining 
ju d ic ia l  a u th o ritie s  on the question of ‘ reasonable b e l i e f  in  re la tio n
to  power under d if fe re n t  s ta tu te s , he ha s discovered three  d if fe re n t
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trends . In the two cases of HAN WAY v BQULTBEE and PARRINGTQN v MOORE
i t  was held th a t the offence must a c tu a lly  have been committed with the
re q u is ite  "m alice". A contrary view was expressed in  the cases of
109 110DOWNING v CAPEL and ERIFFIN v TAYLOR by holding th a t a reasonable
b e lie f  of the offence having been committed cams w ith in  the pro tection
of the s ta tu te . In  both groups the power was re la te d  to the words "found
committing"; both were actions in  t o r t .
2.62 Commenting on these decisions Professor W illiam s makes an 
im portant point when he says th a t although m istake is  generally  no 
defence in  to r t ,  i t  is  so in  c rim in a l prosecution as i t  excludes mens re a 
and as such reasonable b e l ie f  would a ffo rd  p ro tec tion  in  the la t t e r  case.
2.63 In the th ird  group he discusses four cases: TREBECK v CRQUDACE,
112 113 114LEDbJITH v ROBERTS, . BARNARD v GORTCAN and ISAACS v KEECH and is
apparently unhappy with the reasoning in  the BARNARP case. I t  is
submitted th a t in  the BARNARD case Lord Wright held th a t i t  was the duty
of the Court to balance the two c o n flic t in g p rin c ip li|—safeguarding l ib e r ty
of the subject and to give e ffe c t to the expressed in te n tio n  of the
le g is la tu re  to give power of a rres t beyond those e x is tin g  at common law.
Lord P o rte r was more ca teo o rica l in  savina th a t both TREBECK's aidI
I.EDWITH1 s case only la id  down the general proposition th a t in  construing  
Acts o f Parliam ent i t  was proper to  have regard fo r  the general purposes 
of the Act. I t  is  submitted th a t the law was co rrec tly  stated and the 
reasoning Was fla w le s s .
2 .64 Dr Leigh succinctly  points out th a t p o lice  l im ita t io n , l ik e
executive d is c re tio n , must operate w ith in  the c o n s titu tio n a l l im ita t io n
imposed by the s ta tu tes  and Courts end adds th a t Courts have grappled
with the problem at two le v e ls : enforcement of a p a r t ic u la r  law and
115use of d is c re tio n  in  a p a r t ic u la r  case. I t  is  tru e , as we f in d  from
our study, th a t the inexorab le  ru le  la id  down in  a l l  decisions, has at
i t s  h eart the requirement of an ob jective  standard but i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to
ignore the fa c t th a t the d if fe re n t  forms of the power cannot answer to
the same measure of te s t .  The use of d iscre tio n  is  bound to d i f f e r  not
only in  p a r t ic u la r  cases but also in  cases of p a r t ic u la r  s ta tu te s . I f
one is  anxious to trace  a s in g le  u n iversa l ru le , w ithout doubt i t  is  the
requirement of o b jective  standard. In  other respects, the approach of
the Courts have been f le x ib le .  Whether th is  has re a lly  handicapped law
116enforcement machinery, as Lanbert contends, we may now examine.
2.65 The c r it ic is m  is  based on the premises th a t the measure of 
f l e x i b i l i t y  allowed to the po lice  in  the exercise of d iscre tio n  is  
unwarranted and th a t Courts have found d i f f ic u l t y  in  p rescrib ing  a 
generalised requirement due to which the concept has not been invested  
with a p o s itive  content. I t  has been asserted th a t the American concept
imbibed th is  v ir tu e  as the te s t prescribed was purely o b je c tiv e , 
namely, whether the fa c ts  and circumstances before th e  po lice  o f f ic e r  
are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in  b e lie v in g  th at 
the offence has been committed; th is  was la te r  expanded to include  
•'trustw orthy inform ation" and fa c ts  and circumstances "w ith in  th e ir  
knowledge". I t  is  submitted th a t the English a u th o r it ie s , which wo 
have scanned at some length p u rp o sefu lly , do not lay  down a much d if fe re n t  
te s t .  The f l e x i b i l i t y  of approach does not make the English o b jective  
te s t 'im pure*.
2.66 I t  is  not proposed to examine the American p o s ition  in  d e ta il
but we would look a t few leading decisions and po in t out th a t i t  is  h igh ly  
d es irab le  th a t certa in  basic d iffe ren ces  between B r it is h  end American 
p o lity  should always be borne in  mind. I t  is  submitted th a t fa c to rs  such 
as the s ta tu to ry  nature of the power of a rres t and other powers of the  
p o lic e , fed era lism , the w ritte n  co n s titu tio n  and the power of ju d ic ia l  
review have contributed to the evo lution  of the s o -c a lle d  'p u re ly*  
o b jec tive  te s t in  the U .S .A . How fa r  the d iffe ren ces  in  the s o c ia l, 
economic and p o l i t ic a l  s itu a tio n  obta in ing  there have in fluenced  the  
decisions of the courts is  an open question and i t  is  not proposed to  
hazard a conclusion on such a premise.
2.67 We may f i r s t  examine some of the s tr ik in g  fea tu res  of a few
s ta te  laws which w i l l  provide a su rpris ing  contrast w ith the common law 
p o s itio n :
s.18Q-a A po lice  o f f ic e r  may stop any person abroad in  a
New York Code o f) pub lic  place whom he reasonably suspects is
C rim inal Proced-) committing. . . and may demand of him h is  name,
ure [emphasis ) address and an explanation of h is  ac tio n ,
added]
Texas C r.P .C . Where i t  has been shown by s a tis fa c to ry  proof to  a
( A r t .14.04) peace o f f ic e r ,  upon representation  of a c red ib le  person
[emphasis added] . . . th a t the o ffender is  about to  escape so th a t
there is  no tim e to  procure a w arrant, such peace 
o ff ic e r  may, w ithout w arrant, pursue and a rre s t. . .
2.68 The provisions of the fourth  amendment providing pro tection
against a rb itra ry  search, seizure and a rres t and of the fourteenth
amendment with i t s  renowned fdue process' clause of the fe d e ra l
C onstitu tio n  are two well-known to  be quoted. But i t  may be usefu l to
point out th a t the most sen s itive  area o f the problem zone in  the States
is  cu rren tly  provided by the an ti-d ru g  laws. The courts have applied
the same standard fo r  'probable cause' in  search, seizure and a rre s t.
1172.69 In  a recent case, UHITELEY v WARDEN i t  was held th a t the
standards app licab le  to  the fa c tu a l basis supporting an o f f ic e r 's  
"probable cause" assessment a t the time of a w arrantless a rres t are at 
le a s t as s trin g en t as the standards applied with respect to  a M a g is tra te 's  
assessment as a prelude to  issuing a warrant fo r  a rres t and search. I t
was a case of an a rres t under a warrant follow ed up by a rad io  b u lle t in
by the S h e r if f .  I t  was held th a t the M a g is tra te 's  fin d in g s  were v it ia te d
as they contained nothing more than the S h e r if f 's  conclusion, which
i t s e l f  was based on an in fo rm er's  t ip  but th is  la t t e r  fa c t as w e ll as other
operative fa c ts  were om itted in  the S h e r if f 's  com plaint. The a rres t was
held v io la t iv e  of the fourth  and fourteenth  amendment. In  h is  d issen t,
however, B lack, 3 . ,  with whom Burger, C .3 .,  agreed, held th a t:  "In
deciding th is  question th is  should always be remembered th a t the fourth
anendment i t s e l f  does not expressly command th a t evidence obtained by
i t s  in fra c t io n  should always be excluded from p roof", a f te r  holding th a t
i t  would be a d is to rtio n  of the fo u rth  amendment's meaning i f  the a rres t
and the seizure were held "unreasonable" in  the in s tan t case. To th is  a
s ig n if ic a n t remark was added; "My disagreement with the m a jo rity  concerning
the wisdom and c o n s titu tio n a l necessity of a ' l i t t l e  t r i a l '  before a
M agistrate  or 3 .P. p r io r  to the issue of a search or a rres t warrant is  a
m atter o f reco rd ."  Does i t  not accord with the English disapproval of the
"second s ig h t" ru le  ? Does not the exclusionary ru le  fin d  a p a r a l le l  in
118the series of decisions of English Courts fo llo w in g  SCOTT v BAKER ?
IS?
1192.70 In  BRINEGAR v U .5 . we can trace  an echo o f the Privy
Council decision in  HU 5SEIN fs casej i t  h e ld : " . . .  probable cause
such as may ju s t i fy  an a rres t or a search or a se izu re , w ithout warrant
is  a reasonable ground fo r  the b e lie f  o f the g u i l t ;  and th is  means less
than evidence which would ju s t i fy  condemnation or co n vic tio n . . ."
That f l e x i b i l i t y  o f approach is  not e n t ire ly  ru led  out even in  the
States is  borne out by another passage: "In  dealing with probable cause,
as the very name ap p lies , we deal with p ro b a b ilit ie s . These are not
te c h n ic a l; they are fa c tu a l and p ra c t ic a l considerations of every day l i f e
on which reasonable. . . men, a c t ."
1202.71 KER v CALIFORNIA ty p if ie s  another American problem. I t
was contended th a t although the a rres t might have been based upon 
probable cause, i t  was v it ia te d  by the method o f e n try . R epelling  
h is  argument, the Court held th a t i t  had long been recognised in  cases 
under the fourth  amendment th a t "lawfulness of a rres ts  fo r  fe d e ra l 
offences is  to be determined by reference to s ta te  law in  so fa r  as
i t  is  not v io la t iv e  of the fe d e ra l C o n s titu tio n " . Mention was also 
made of the fa c t  th a t e a rly  common law perm itted breaking open premises 
in  executing an a rres t under c erta in  circumstances.
2 .72 Ub stop here to make a h u rried  re ite ra t io n  of our view th a t
f l e x i b i l i t y  is  wholesome and even in  th is  respect the approach of the  
American Courts is ,  in  the f i r s t  p lace, not fro zen , and n ext, diverges  
from th a t of the English Courts only m a rg in a lly .
(3 )  Breach of the peace aid the power o f a rre s t at Common Law
(A) A General View
2 .73  Uie have so fa r  discussed in  some d e ta il  the d if fe re n t  aspects
of the law concerning power o f a rres t fo r  fe lony a t common law and only
b r ie f ly  in d ica ted  th a t there  also exis ted  a t common law summary power of
121a rre s t fo r  breach of the peace. I t  has been observed th a t the term 
"breach of the peace" has acquired a tech n ica l content as opposed to the
122K ing 's  peace. Indeed, the concept of "breach of the peace" was exported
to  overseas possessions and even at home i t  uias adapted fo r  the same purpose,
123namely, fo r  dispensing "preventive ju s t ic e " . The Ind ian  C rim inal
Procedure Code, which became a model fo r  p a r a l le l  enactments in  other
t e r r i t o r ie s  re ta ined  the concept in  so fa r  as i t  served the cause o f
"preventive ju s tic e "  but discarded i t  in  so f a r  as i t  re la te d  to  summary
power o f a rre s t; feu countries o f A fr ic a , however, fo llow ed a d if fe re n t  
124scheme •
2 .74  The power o f a rre s t fo r  fe lo n y , as we have seen, was a
procedural and not substantive power. But the power o f a rre s t fo r  breach of
the peace was a substantive power. As Hale says, i t s  o b ject t?as to
"prevent" breach o f the peace; the constable could not a rre s t even on
125inform ation i f  the "danger was p ast" . The statement in  Kenny th a t
the power o f a po lice  o f f ic e r  was wider than th a t of a p riv a te  person in
the sense th a t the a rres t by a constable could follow^ a ^'permanent 
126detention" fin d s  support from Stephen who says th a t "a peace o f f ic e r  may
detain [any person] w hile  the breach continues or there is  danger of i t s  
127renewal".
(A'
2.75 Professor G l^ n v ille  W illiam s q u a lif ie s  the scope of the power of
a rres t o f "any person" by saying th a t the a rres t has to be "promptly made"
but he enlarges i t s  ambit by extending i t  to cases of "reasonable
apprehension" in  addition  to  actua l occurrence (breach of the peace in  the
128presence o f the a r re s to r ) . In  Halsbury the ambit of the power is  fu r th e r  
enlarged. I t  is  s ta ted  th a t ,  " I f  an o ffen d er, a f te r  committing a breach of 
the peace, immediately escapes, he may be arrested by a p r iv a te  person on
129fresh  p u rsu it commencing immediately and being continued w ithout a b reak ."
I t  is  also s ta ted  in  Halsbury th a t a constable may a rre s t anyone who aids
130and abets those who commit a breach of the peace in  h is  presence.
(B) The Problem of D e fin it io n
2.76 According to Professor G le n v ille  W illiam s the term "breach of the
peace" lacks an a u th o rita tiv e  d e f in it io n . He adds th a t i t s  meaning is
capable of being i l lu s t r a te d  by reference to  instances such as, r i o t ,
unlaw ful assembly short of r i o t ,  f ig h t  between two or more persons, when
131both or a l l  may be arrested w ithout deciding the m erit of the a f f a i r .
The im precision and vagueness associated with the concept can only be 
explained by the fa c t th a t e f fo r ts  to is o la te  i t  from the parent concept of
the K ing 's  peace were not wholly successfu l.
1322.77 In  TinOTHY v SIMPSON, (an action in  trespass fo r  assault and
fa ls e  imprisonment) the p la in t i f f  had come to make some purchase in  the
defendant's shop. Some dispute arose between him and the defendant's  salesman
which resu lted  in  a s c u ffle  between the two. On the p l a in t i f f 's  re fu s a l to
leave the premises, the defendant c a lled  the po lice  and gave the p la in t i f f
in to  custody. The court he ld :
The defendant gave the p la in t i f f  in  charge in  order to preserve 
the public  peace but the fa c t  o f an assault on the p la in t i f f  
was not proved and th a t is  the only breach o f the peace which 
in  the p lea appears by necessary im p lica tio n  to  have been 
committed in  the defendant's  presence.
[emphasis added]
1332.78 The fa c ts  of the case, COHEN v HU5KISSON were almost s im ila r .
Lord Abinger, C .B ., held as fo llo w s:
The u tte r in g  o f the abusive words imputed to the p l a in t i f f ,  
abstracted ly  speaking, undoubtedly would not make i t  so, but 
i f  they are so u tte re d  in  such a place as to  a t t r a c t  a crowd 
of a hundred persons. • . nobody can t e l l  whether the passion 
of the crowd may not thereby be inflam ed and whether they 
may not proceed to  execute the vengeance which the party  
him self invokes and th rea ten s . . . the p la in t i f f  and h is  w ife  
made great noise and disturbance in  the p ub lic  s t re e t .  . . 
in  breach o f the K ino 's  peace and caused r io t  and d isturbance. . .
[emphasis added]
1342.79 In  INGLE v BELL the defendant pleaded th a t the p la in t i f f  had
endeavoured to  fo rc ib ly  break in to  h is  business premises and had caused a 
disturbance in  the s tre e t causing a mob to  c o lle c t th e re . Lord Abinger, C .B .,
h e ld  th a t " I question whether th is  p lea does not in  term s ta te  a r i o t ."
Parke, B. held th a t , " I should say there is  enough set fo rth  to plead th a t
there  was an un law fu l assembly."  [emphasis added in  e ith e r  case]
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2 .80  In  PRICE v SEELEY, i t  was held in  the House of Lords as 
fo llo w s :
The party who makes th is  invasion o f the premises where the 
w all was being constructed did not ev id en tly  des is t from 
breach o f the peace in  which i t  is  admitted he was
engaged. But being fo rc ib ly  expe lled  from the premises,
he again comes on them, again does what the word " a ffra y " 
i s  used to represent, threatens to renew the assau lt* . .
a l l  of which acts are in  the p lea d is t in c t ly  a lleged to
be against the peace of the Queen. [^ p ^ a s is  added]
1362.81 However, in  GRANT v MOSER i t  was held th a t the use o f the
expression "Queen's peace" in  the p lea  was mere verba sonantia . The 
court held th a t to  make a good defence there  should be d ire c t a lle g a tio n
e ith e r  o f a breach of the peace being committed a t the tim e of g iv in g  the
p la in t i f f  in to  custody or th a t i t  had been committed or th a t reasonable 
grounds ex is ted  as to  apprehension of i t s  renewal. Apparently the court 
was conscious of the wide sweep of the power of a rre s t and was anxious
to  curb i t .
(C) The nexus between "breach of the peace" and "preventive ju s tic e "
2 .82  In th is  connection, reference may be made to a s ig n if ic a n t remark
of Or. B row nlie . He has said th a t , "On h is to r ic a l  grounds a case fo r
tre a tin g  i t  as a generic crime could be re a d ily  estab lished  and indeed
137breach o f the peace is  an offence in  the c rim in a l law of Scotland".
The decisions discussed above support th is  view . However, i t  is  to  be
noted th a t in  the Justice  o f the Peace Act 1361 the e x is tin g  common law
provision was am plified  as respecting the power of the court to  bind over
any person to  keep the peace and to be of good behaviour. I t  s ig n if ie d ,
according to  Burn, a s h if t  in  emphasis from the concept of the K in g 's
138peace to th a t of deportment of a person. According to  Or. B row nlieMthe  
Act extends to a v a r ie ty  o f s itu a tio n s  in  which a disturbance o f the peace
is  apprehended as a probable consequence of a c t iv ity  which is  planned or
* 139a c t iv i ty  which is  repeated. Indeed, the power to bind over ex is ted
at common law and i t  was associated with the concept o f the K in g 's  Peace
w h ile  there was also a va ilab le  at common law, power of a rres t fo r  breach
of the peace. The Act th ere fo re  m arried the two concepts, recognising
the  necessity of providing f le x ib le  "norms of re s tra in ts "  fo r  c o n tro llin g
140p o te n tia lly  c r im in a l, a id possibly, even mere a n t i-s o c ia l a c t iv i t ie s ,
141fo r  dispensing what has been c a lled  "preventive ju s t ic e " . However, as 
s o c ia l conditions changed, problems of law-enforcement assumed new forms 
req u irin g  new laws embodying new norms to be enacted to  serve the needs of 
preventive ju s t ic e .
2 .83  Among the larg e  body of laws enacted in  th is  f i e l d ,  reference
may be made to Vagrancy Act 1824, C ity  of London Police  Act 1839, The 
M etropo litan  Police Act 1839, The Town P olice Clauses Act 1847, The 
Prevention of Offences Act 1851, The Offences Against the Person Act 1861, 
The Prevention of Crime Act 1871, The Pub lic  Meeting Act 1908 and the Public  
Order Act 1936. Each of these Acts conferred summary power o f a rre s t, in  
some cases on "any person" and inotheison the po lice  o f f ic e rs  e x c lu s iv e ly . 
The l im ita t io n  on, or the c r i t e r ia  fo r ,  exercise of the power was 
expressed in  the use of such terms as "on view ", "committing", "found 
committing" e tc . which were meant to be read in  conjunction w ith the 
offences mentioned in  the enactments concerned. I t  must however be noted 
th a t many of these Acts now e x is t as mere skeletons. The C rim inal Justice  
Act 1948, The P o lice  Act 1964 and the C rim inal Law Act 1967 have 
replaced them in  most p a r t .  As problems connected w ith "s o c ia l secu rity"  
assumed new forms, le g is la t iv e  response fashioned i t s e l f  accord ing ly.
One recent instance is  noteworthy: the term "breach o f the peace" has 
been introduced in  s .5 (b ) of the Public  Order Act 1936 by s .7 o f the Race
R elations Act 1965. I t  s ig n if ie s  the importance of the concept o f "so c ia l
142s ecu rity"  in  the context o f p o l i t ic a l ly  sen s itive  issues.
(4 )  Power of Arrest and C o d ifica tio n  of C rim inal Law in  Enciland. Commonwealth 
A fric a  and Asia
(A ) H is to r ic a l perspective
2.84  There is  no doubt th a t English c rim in a l law as p a rt of the
common law of England was exported to  the dependencies inc lud ing  the
American colonies and th a t i t  has come to p re v a il in  the form of what
Stephen has c a lle d  "70 or 80 versions" in  the d if fe re n t  p arts  of the
143world in c lu d in g  America, besides the Commonwealth. The d if fe re n t  
"versions" apparently resu lted  from the process of c o d ific a tio n , which was 
set in  motion by the B r it is h  Parliam ent when a Commission was appointed in  
1834 (v id e  3 & 4 W i l l . IV ,  c .85 , s . 53) to  d ra ft  laws common 
to a l l  classes of in h ab itan ts  of In d ia . In  1837 Macaulay, who was the  
main a rc h ite c t o f the Indian Penal Code, submitted the d ra ft with the  
opinion th a t ,  "the Penal Code cannot be c le a r and e x p l ic it  w hile th e
144substantive c iv i l  law and the law of procedure are dark and confused."
L a te r, a second Law Commission was appointed in  1853 and a C rim inal 
Procedure Code was also d ra fte d . The two Codes were enacted, one in  1660 
and the other in  1861 and brought in to  force  in  B r it is h  In d ia  in  1862.
Stephen took over in  1869 as the Legal Member o f the V ice ro y 's  Council in  
In d ia . During h is  tenure of o f f ic e ,  extending over three years, he 
added new sections to  the Penal Code and recasted the C rim inal Procedure 
Code. As Professor Radzinowicz has pointed o u t, a f te r  h is  re turn  from 
In d ia  he "began to frame a theory o f c o d ific a tio n  fo r  England. . . [and]
145urged the English in  England to fo llo w  the lead of the English in  In d ia ."
2 .85 In  1878 a Royal Commission was appointed, with Stephen as one of
i t s  members, to  consider the d ra ft  which was given the caption of "law
re la t in g  to  in d ic ta b le  o ffen ces ."  The Commissioners accepted the main
changes proposed by Stephen in  the d ra ft  in c lud ing  a b o lit io n  o f the
146d is tin c tio n  between fe lony and misdemeanour. This apparently corresponded 
with the position  obta in ing  under the Indian Codes. However the attempted
c o d ific a tio n  of English c rim in a l laui in  England fa i le d :  the d ra f t  never
became law . Almost a century la t e r ,  by the C rim inal Lau Act 1967 the
d is tin c t io n  mas f in a l ly  abolished which purported to  codify  p a r t ia l ly
pouer of a rre s t a v a ila b le  under common la u . Admittedly the 1967 Act has
not taken m atters very f a r .  I t  is  conceded th a t the Act aimed "purely to
replace the [e x is t in g ]  lau  o f a rres t on account of fe lo n y M and th a t i t  uas
147not meant to deal u ith  the pouer o f a rres t in  general.
2 .86  Some im portant developments elseuhere in  the Commonuealth may nou
be re fe rre d  to . In 1877 Mr. Justice  Wright prepared a d ra ft  fo r  a C rim inal
Code fo r  Jamaica which uas s e tt le d  by Stephen. I t  has been suggested
148th a t the Gold Coast Code uas based on i t .  The Queensland Code of
1491899, i t  i s  asserted, became the model fo r  the N igerian  Code. But i t  is  
to  be noted th a t Northern N ig e ria  in  1959 and Ghana in  1960 enacted neu 
Codes uhich fo llo u  the Indian Codes in  the use o f " i l lu s t r a t io n s "  which
t
are absent in  the Queensland Code and also in  Stephen's d ra ft  o f the
English Code. The Penal Codes enacted in  1930 in  the East A frican t e r r i t o r ie s ,
150i t  i s  asserted, are also based on the Queensland model. S ie rra  Leone
alone, among the African s ta te s  of the Commonuealth, does not have a
C rim inal Code and the lau  there  is  "very close to English lau  both in  form 
151and co nten t."  In  Gambia a C rim inal Code uas enacted in  1933 uhich,
152according to Read, uas based on the East A frican model. In  Commonwealth
A fric a  the process of c o d ific a tio n  assumed a b iz a rre  form . The most
s ig n if ic a n t aspect o f the process uas the i n i t i a l  reception o f  In d ia n  Codes and
eventual replacement thereof by a more pure English c rim in a l la u . For
th is  the European s e t t le r  community of East A fr ic a  uas wholly responsib le;
the Indian Codes were "genera lly  acceptable" to* a l l  sections of the
people, the bench and the bar in  p a r t ic u la r ;  the s e t t le rs  only considered
them to be " to ta l ly  unsuited fo r  ap p lica tio n  to  a free -b o rn  English  
153community." However, as ue s h a ll see, c erta in  provisions such as 
those re la t in g  to pouer of a rre s t and those la b e lle d  genera lly  everywhere
in  Commonuealth Asia and A fr ic a  as "secu rity  provisions" -  the provisions  
of immediate relevance to th is  study -  assumed a common form based on the 
Ind ian  model.
2.87 In  Ceylon ( la t e r  S ri Lanka) Roman-Dutch lau  uas adm inistered
both in  c iv i l  and c rim in a l cases u n t i l  1799 but uhen a "Supreme Court of 
C rim inal Sustice" uas est^alish ed  th ere  in  1801 under the Proclamation of
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1799, one o f the judges of the said  court "digested a u se fu l c rim in a l code."
Eventually  in  1883 tuo Ordinances, Nos. 2 and 3, enacted resp e c tive ly
the Penal Code and the C rim inal Procedure Codes, both based on the Indian  
155model. In  the Malayan peninsula, in  the S tra its  Settlem ents Colony 
(uhich included Singapore) the experiment to  es tab lish  firm ly  pure English
c rim in a l lau  in  1870 fa i le d  and in  1873 choice uas f in a l ly  made fo r  the
156Indian model. Elseuhere in  the peninsula, the C rim inal Procedure Codes 
of 1902 and 1903 (a lso  modelled on the Indian Codes) applied o r ig in a lly  
only to the Federated Malay S ta tes . The o r ig in a l Codes uere repealed and re ­
enacted in  1926 uhich came to p re v a il in  due course in  the uhole mainland 
157of the peninsula. In  substance, houever, there is  very l i t t l e  d iffe ren ce  
betueen the Singapore and the mainland Code. In  the other tuo s ta tes  
covered by th is  study, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Indian model (Code of 
1898) has continued to apply although in  the neu C rim inal Procedure Code 
enacted in  In d ia  in  1973 there are some uholesome changes.
(B) S tatu tory  pouers of a rres t in  England
( a) _Pquja_r under the ^ rijn i:n-al_Lau_A£ti-1>967i
2.88 The enactment is  adm ittedly a h a lf-h e a rte d  attempt a t
c o d ific a tio n  of pouer of a rre s t in  England: i t  has simply b lu rred  the  
d is tin c tio n  betueen the o ld  and neu pouers. Common lau  did not deal u ith  
pouer o f a rres t fo r  misdemeanours and s p e c ific  provisions th e re fo r  appeared 
in  saveral s p e c ific  enactments. This pos ition  is  not a lte re d  and uhat the  
1967 Act has achieved is  th a t i t  has replaced "fe lony" by "a rres ta b le
offence" uhich is  defined in  s . 2(1 ) o f the Act to mean "offences fo r  uhich
the sentence is  fix e d  by lau  or fo r  uhich a person (not previously  
convicted) may under or by v ir tu e  of my enactment be sentenced to  
imprisonment fo r  a term of f iv e  y ea rs ."  B ut, as under the o ld  la u , a 
d is tin c t io n  is  m aintained betueen the pouer o f "any person" and th a t of "a 
constable" in  sub-ss. (2 ) to ( 5 ) .  In  a l l  cases the requirement of 
"reasonable cause" of suspicion apply fo r  the exercise of summary pouer of 
a rres t by "any person11 when an a rres ta b le  offence is  committed and when 
somebody is  "committing such an offence"; on the other hand, "a constable" 
may a rres t uhen he "u ith  reasonable cause suspects" th a t such an offence  
has been committed and uhen somebody is  "about to  commit" such an o ffence .
2.89 Indeed the Lau Revision Committee uas faced u ith  a great dilemma
as i t  had to decide i f  i t  should abolish the basic d iffe re n ce  betueen
the pouers of a p riva te  person and a po lice  o f f ic e r  uhich uas prominently
158focussed in  WALTERS v . W.H. SMITH. Considering the question as one of
159"major p o licy"  i t  refused to d is tu rb  the r u le .  This re fu s a l has in v ite d
strong c r it ic is m  as the ru le  in  the WALTERS case, i t  is  asserted, lacked
160lo g ic a l foundations. I t  has also been r ig h t ly  pointed out th a t the
pouer of "red-handed" apprehension could have been b e tte r  expressed by the
phrase "in  the course of committing" as the  phrase "in  the act o f
161committing" (used in  s .2 (2 ) )  is  bound to be construed n a rro u ly .
2.90 S ub-s .(7 ) of s . 2 provides th a t the provisions of the section are
not to "prejudice any pouer o f a rres t conferred by lau  apart from th is
sec tio n ", thereby saving among others , the power o f a rres t fo r  breach of
the peace at common la u . One commentator has taken pains to catalogue some
of the s ta tu to ry  pouers th a t are saved by s u b -s .(7 ) and adds th a t common
162lau  pouer o f a rres t to  prevent personal in ju ry  has also been saved.
However, the scope of the sub-s. (7 ) is  fa r  from c le a r and i t  has s t i l l  to  
receive an a u th o rita tiv e  ju d ic ia l  pronouncement. Apart from the question 
of uhat pouers are a c tu a lly  saved, i t  i s  also necessary to  s e t t le  the  
question uhether any or a l l  o f the r ig h ts  evolved q u a lify in g  the pouer
of a rres t at common lau  are also e ith e r  fu l ly  or p a r t ia l ly  saved although
163the sane commentator has l is te d  some of them as having continuing fo rc e .
I t  is  to  be noted in  th is  connection th a t ss. 2 (6 ) and 3 have expressly
d e a lt u ith  some of the a n c illa ry  r ig h ts , a v a ila b le  under common la u . At
common lau  the "power of e n try ” extended to p riv a te  persons also uhen
about to  a rres t a person uho uas "about to commit a fe lony" uhich, under
s .2 (7 ) can only be exercised by a c o n s t a b l e . S u b - s . (2 ) of s .3 expressly
"replaces the ru les  o f common lau" re la t in g  to use of force in  making a rres t
and tampers u ith  the r ig h t  of res is ta n ce . Houever, i t  is  submitted th a t
the provision of s .3 is  l ik e ly  to provide some guidance in  the in te rp re ta t io n
of the scope of s .2 (7 );  the use of the expression "prevention of crime"
in  s u b -s .(1 ) of s .3 i t s e l f  denotes the u ider sweep of the sec tio n .
(b ) .Power jjnder the \/_a_grancy_Ac2_4
2.91 In  the Home O ffic e  Uorking Paper published in  1974 the h is to ry
of the lau  concerning vagrancy since the S tatute  o f Labourers of 1349 has
165been succ inctly  s ta te d . I t  has id e n t if ie d  the tuo main elements of the
e a r l ie r  le g is la t io n  as, ( 1 ) fe a r  th a t a c t iv i t ie s  o f the "vagrant class"
uere a p o te n tia l p o l i t ic a l  th re a t , re c a llin g  the Peasant Revolt o f 1381,
and ( 2 ) anxiety of the s ta te  to  pro tect those uho could not earn th e ir
l iv in g  fo r  no fa u l t  of th e ir  oun. Holdsuorth s ta tes  th a t up to 1539 the
166able-bodied vagrants uere punished by la u . Indeed, as Chambliss 
observes, the contemporary le g is la t io n  a r tic u la te d  the concern fo r  the 
co n tro l of fe lo n s  as a d ire c t reaction  to so c ia l changes fo llo u in g  the  
grouth of trade  and commerce and "vested groups" such as the pouerfu l
16landowners, merchants and trad ers  as being responsible fo r  the le g is la t io n .  
The subsequent development o f the la u , according to  the Uorking Paper, is  
concerned mainly u ith  the c la s s if ic a tio n  of offenders in to  " id le  and 
d iso rd erly  persons", "rogues and vagabonds" and " in c o rr ig ib le  rogues" 
uhich .continues to appear in  the 1824 Act; the 1782 Act brought u ith in  
i t s  pale persons suspected of c rim in a l a c t iv i t ie s  against uhom actu a l
fe lony could not be proved and the Acts of 1800 and 1811 introduced the
concepts o f "suspected persons" and "reputBd th ieves" frequenting  and
168lo i te r in g  in  pu b lic  places u ith  in te n t to commit an o ffence . The genesis
169of these laws is  also traced in  LEDWITH v ROBERTS. However, Sc arm an,
170L .3 . ,  pointed out in  JR v JACKSON th a t the lau  in  i t s  present form (the  
1824 Act) is  not f i t t e d  to  the modern apparatus of the adm in istration  o f 
crim in a l ju s tic e  r e f e r r in g  in  p a r t ic u la r  to uhat he c a lle d  "picturesque  
phrases", namely, "rogue", "vagabond" and " in c o rr ig ib le  rogue". While 
he takes ob jection  to the use of the expression "frequenting andr '
lo i te r in g " ,  Professor G la n v ille  W illiam s r ig h t ly  points out th a t such a
lau  is  "desirab le  as an e s s e n tia l p a rt o f the machinery o f lau  enforcement"
but i t  requires "proper adm in istra tion" and th a t there has to  be "insistence
171upon f u l l  proof of c rim in a l in te n t ."
2.92 The extant provisions of the 1824 Act are ss.3  to  6 , 8  a id  10
of uhich ss.3  aid 4 create offences of d if fe re n t  types and s . 6  provides
the pouer o f a rres t in  re la tio n  to those o ffences. Pouer to "apprehend"
under s . 6  i s  given to  "any person uhatsoever" to be used against a person
"fgund o ffend ing", uho is  described as " id le  and d iso rd erly"  in  s . 3 aid
"rogue and vagabond" in  s .4 . The " in c o rr ig ib le  rogue" is  separately
tre a te d  in  s .10. Of the great v a r ie ty  of the a c t iv i t ie s  o f these classes
uhich acquire a c rim in a l character, tuo are noteuorthy: ( 1 ) "being upon
in  or upon" one of the s p ec ified  places, and ( 2 ) "suspected person and
reputed th ie f  frequenting  and lo ite r in g  about or in "  one of the s p ec ified
places "u ith  in te n t to  commit an a rres tab le  o ffen ce". The ju d ic ia ry  has
been c r it ic is e d  fo r  adopting " a r t i f i c i a l i t y  in  reasoning" in  the
in te rp re ta t io n  of the provisions but i t  is  submitted th a t the phraseology
172(th e  "deemincj'provisions) necessitated such an approach. Indeed, i t  
has been r ig h t ly  pointed out th a t i f  there uas a "general offence o f
173preparation" such le g is la t io n  as the Vagrancy Act, could be repealed .
2.93 Apparently the pouer of a rres t under the Act assumed a double
character: i t  uas b a s ic a lly  procedural but i t  had also a substantive
character in  th a t i t  played a preventive ro le  a lso , depending upon the
fa c ts  of the case. Thus, ju d ic ia l  response uas l ik e ly  to be ambivalent as a
proper balance had to  be struck in  each case betueen the l ib e r ty  o f the
person and pro tection  of society tak ing  note of the fa c t th a t the
la t t e r ,  on a p r io r i  considerations, postulated a ju r is d ic t io n  based on
174suspicion. In  HQRLEY v ROGERS the re fu s a l by the constable to make an
a rres t uas upheld upon holding th a t summary pouers of a rres t uere given
by s ta tu te  uhere the offence uas "apparent" and "in  the course of preparation"
u h ile  in  the in s ta n t case the offence uas not "obvious to the eyes and
senses" o f the constable uhen the charge uas made. On the o ther hand, in  
175
HORAN v JONES i t  uas held th a t the uord "found" should not be "too
s t r ic t ly "  construed. I t  uas held th a t a person may be "found" upon the
premises u ith in  the meaning o f the section although he is  not apprehended
u n t i l  a f te r  he has q u itte d  the premises; i t  is  only necessary th a t the
offender is  discovered upon the premises during the act uhich co n stitu tes
the u n la u fu l purpose. Professor G la n v ille  W illiam s comments th a t the
court confuses in  th is  case the lau  o f a rre s t u ith  the substantive
c rim in a l lau  and observes th a t the court ought to  have noted th a t an
176i l le g a l  a rre s t did not in v a lid a te  subsequent proceeding. Houever, as
ue s h a ll see, th is  general p r in c ip a l has been relaxed by the ju d ic ia ry  in
in te rp re t in g  Road T r a f f ic  Laus in  connection u ith  a rre s t fo r  the offence
177of drunken d r iv in g .
1782.94  In  HARTLEY v ELLNOR i t  uas held th a t the tuo expressions
"suspected person" end "reputed th ie f"  uere not synonymous: ona may be a
"suspected person" on a p a r t ic u la r  day even though he had not b8 en
convicted previously or had bad past records. This decision uas dissented
179from in  LEDWITH v ROBERTS. in  uhich the court considered in  d e ta i l  the 
scheme o f the Act and the  le g is la t iv e  h is to ry . I t  uas held th a t the language 
of s .4 uas not c le a r and th a t the exceptional pouers conferred on the po lice
by the Act were meant to be exercised against such persons, uho by th e ir
previous conduct and antecedent acts , had become "suspected persons"; and
th a t "any other v ieu  would put a respectable person lo ite r in g  in  a s tre e t
fo r  a reasonable cause at the mercy of the constable uho knew nothing about 
180him ." I t  uas fu r th e r  held th a t having regard to the importance of the 
subject m atter in  re la tio n  to the l ib e r ty  of the su b ject, the le g is la tu re  
uould have said in  c le a r terms i f  i t  intended to enlarge the scope of the
common lau  pouer as s . 6  conferred the pouer on "any person" and not merely on
181 182  the constable. The decision in  TREBECK v CROUDACE uas d istinguished
on fa c ts  as the "emergency te s t"  evolved in  th a t case in  the context of a
d if fe r e n t  s ta tu te  uas held in a p p lic a b le  in  th is  case.
2 .95  The pouer o f a rres t under the Vagrancy Act has been used in  many
recent cases in  connection u ith  contemporary problems of motor car th e fts
uhich has generally  met u ith  ju d ic ia l  approval uhich has supplied neu
183content to the expression " 'lo ite r in g  u ith  in te n t to  commit a crim e". I t  
can be reasonably concluded th a t the courts are in c lin e d  to  take the v ieu  
th a t a c t iv i t ie s  uhich are p o te n tia lly  dangerous to  the community a t la rg e , 
s im ila r  to the breach o f the peace, have not only to be punished, but 
e ffe c t iv e ly  prevented. At common lau  there  is  pouer o f a rre s t fo r  breach 
of the peace th a t can be exercised by "any person" but the Act a ls o  p ro v id e s  
pouer; so the courts had to fin d  a neu measure fo r  the amplitude of the  
s ta tu to ry  pouer. They there fo re  evolved such te s ts  as of "emergency" 
and "imminent danger", to solve tr ic k y  lau-enforcem ent problems by 
dispensing "preventive ju s t ic e " .
( c) Pouejc under JRo_ad__T_rajTfi_c_A£t__l97_2
2.96 Concern fo r  the safety  of road-users has, no doubt, acquired
neu dimensions in  the laus framed since 1930 but i t  is  also found expressed 
in  the laus dating back to 1872. ThB Licensing Act passed th a t year made 
i t  an offence fo r  a person uho uas drunk to be "in  charoe o f" a carriage  
on a highway. The underlined expression also appears in  modern s ta tu te s  but
i t  i s  bound to be seen in  a d if fe re n t  colour as fast-m oving motor veh ic les
have replaced "carriages" and s o c ia l h ab its  have also changed. Indeed, i t
has been r ig h t ly  asserted in  the contemporary context th a t the prevention o f
194road accidents caused by drink is  la rg e ly  a s o c ia l problem. In the Acts
of 1960 aid 1962 the g is t of the offence uas "impaired d r iv in g " . The
courts , houever, got no guidance on the degree o f impairment from the
evidence of s c ie n t i f ic  te s t produced before them in  respect o f blood-
alcohol le v e ls  of the o ffenders . The po lice  had to  be given pouer to
detect and apprehend persons uhose d riv in g  capacity uas im paired u ithout
a change in  appearance and outuard behaviour. This uas done in  1967
by the neu Road Safety Act uhich u t i l is e d  the s c ie n t i f ic  discovery of
the "breath te s t"  to give the po lice  the necessary pouers.
2.97 The Road T r a f f ic  Act 1972 consolidated the e a r l ie r  le g is la t io n
185u ithout houever recasting  the lau  in  proper form . I t  has been r ig h t ly
observed th a t the novelty  o f the offence and enforcement procedure and
in fe l ic i t io u s  draftsmanship of the Acts have produced considerable  
186ju d ic ia l  confusion. Under s .5 (1 ) i t  is  an offence fo r  a person uho is
" u n fit"  through drink or drug to drive  o r attempt to d rive  a t a pub lic
place; s u b -s .(2 ) ,  uhich is  supposed to  provide guidance to  the court,
s ta tes  th a t a person is  to be considered " u n fit"  i f  h is  a b i l i t y  to d rive
properly is  im paired fo r  the time being. An a rres t fo llo u s  a "breath te s t"
under s .8 , fo r  a p o s itive  te s t under s u b -s .(4 ) and fo r  fa i lu r e  to provide
a specimen, under s u b -s .(5 ) . I t  is  also contemplated th a t the d r iv e r
then proceeds to a p o lice  s ta tio n  fo r  another breath te s t and there he has
to provide a specimen fo r  lab orato ry  te s t .  Should he refuse to  oblige the
po lice  he r is k s  an uncertain  and in d e f in ite  detention under s . 11  o f uhich
an a u th o rita tiv e  ju d ic ia l  in te rp re ta t io n  is  houever s t i l l  to  come. But
i t  i s  ju d ic ia l ly  confirmed th a t the Act is  s ile n t  as to  such s itu a tio n s  as
uhen the m otoris t v o lu n ta r ily  provides a specimen fo r  lab orato ry  te s t  and
187uhen he takes the breath te s t  not before but a fte r  a r re s t.
2.98 There are also o th er, ra th e r s ig n if ic a n t and more outstanding
aspects of the pouer of a r re s t. Adm ittedly, the a rres t used fo r  preventing
commission of the offence (drunken d riv in g ) and fo r  bring ing  the o ffender to
ju s tic e  are the normal aspects of the pouer. But in  uhat category can
ue place the pouer to c o lle c t evidence against the accused and th a t too by
fo rc in g  him to provide the seme ? The strength o f the pouer at i t s
zenith i s ,  houever, m anifest in  the consequence th a t fo llo u s  the lab orato ry
te s t :  the evidence furnished by him (th e  m o to ris t) becomes conclusive
evidence of h is  g u i l t .  Conviction fo llo u s  m echanically, liie thus f in d  th a t
not only the u ltim a te  re s u lt uhich resemble?suspension of habeas corpus
but the to ta l  e f fe c t  of the pervasive operation of the pouer of a rre s t also
likened the Act to  an emergency le g is la t io n . Some of the im portant pro tections
evolved at common lau  against the use of pouer o f a rres t are suept auay and
the halo of in v io la b i l i t y  b u i l t  up by these pro tections around the r ig h t  to
personal l ib e r ty  vanishes u ithout more ado. Some of the casu a lties  are
noteuorthy: the r ig h t to pro tection  against s e lf- in c r im in a t io n , the r ig h t of
being informed of the true  reasons fo r  a rre s t, the r ig h t not to be held
under pretension of a " la u fu l"  a r re s t, the r ig h t not to  be stopped fo r
questioning or held fo r  in te rro g a tio n  or in v es tig a tio n  (namely, p ro h ib itio n
188against detention pending in v e s tig a tio n ). Hou the "value-concept” of
personal l ib e r ty  is scaled doun in  re la t io n  to  "s o c ia l-s e c u rity "  in  pub lic
opinion in  respect o f the Act is  re fle c te d  in  the fo llo u in g  comment
189appearing in  a lau  jo u rn a l:
I t  is  surely r ig h t th a t .  . . to  reduce the road c a s u a lties , 
the l ib e r ty  of the in d iv id u a l not to  be stopped on the  
road by the police  should be given less prominence by the 
lau  than in  the other areas o f lau  enforcement.
2.99 Indeed, the "value-process" operates through "pub lic  opinion" at
a l l  le v e ls  and thus the ju d ic ia ry  also responded to  i t  even in  1918 uhen
the p la in t i f f  lo s t h is  action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment in  TREBACK v 
190CROUDACE. uhere the a rres t uas upheld as " la u fu l" ,  a lb e it  by employing 
a d if fe re n t  technique. I t  uas held th a t the nature of the offence
s p ec ified  in  the s ta tu te  (th e  Licensing Act 1872) requ ires  such
construction to be given so th a t the subject has a re a l p ro tec tio n  against
undue in te rfe ren c e  u ith  l ib e r ty  in  being able to requ ire  the v e rd ic t o f
a ju ry  to be taken upon the question of "honest b e l ie f"  although the
pouer of a rres t uas not q u a lif ie d  by the requirement of "reasonable  
191suspicion". The ju d ic ia l  in te rp o s it io n  of the ju ry , obviously to
f a c i l i t a t e  operation of "pub lic  opinion" uas the s ig n if ic a n t aspect of
the decis ion . This technique of in d ire c t operation of the "value-process"
uas not applied in  a more recent decision ( in  1965) in  liilLTSHIRE v 
192BARRETT. The te s t of "honest b e lie f  in  g u ilt"  did not f in d  favour
u ith  Lord Oenning uho observed th a t i t  uould be a bad day fo r  a l l  i f  the
police gave up a rres tin g  any m otoris t uho uas drunk fo r  fe a r  o f an action
fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment and th a t the most e ffe c t iv e  uay to ensure the
safety  of road-users uas to  a rres t immediately the person uho appeared to
193the po lice  to be u n f it  to  drive  through d rin k . Davis, 3 . ,  spoke o f the
194"public  in te re s t"  in  the exercise of the pouer.
2.100 A la te r  decision has houever become a subject o f great
195controversy. I t  is  SCOTT v BAKER in  uhich the actual decision turns on
a very small p o in t, namely, the proof of approval of the "A lco test-80"
devise uhich is  used fo r  the co n tro vers ia l "breath te s t"  introduced by the
1967 A ct. The court has houever held th a t the re a l question is  not of
a d m is s ib ility  of evidence but o f construing s.1 of the Act uhich creates  
196the o ffen ce . I t  uas held th a t under the 1960 Act the offence could be
proved u ith o u t a breath te s t but under s.1 of the 1967 Act "before a
person can be convicted i t  must be shoun th a t a specimen has been provided
197as la id  doun in  s .3 ."  One c r i t i c  has said th a t the decision emphasizes
the  unusual fea tu re  of the offence in  th a t i t  provides an exception to the
general ru le  th a t i t  is  no defence in  a c rim in a l charge th a t the prosecutor*
1 98evidence has been obtained in  an ir re g u la r  fash io n . L a te r, in  P .P .P . v
199 200CAREY and WALKER v LQVEL i t  uas urged th a t the decision ought to  be
overruled but the challenge uas re p e lled  by the court a lb e it  u ith  great
re lu c tan ce . Indeed, Or. Leigh has c r it ic is e d  Lord D ip lock 's  v ieu  in
CAREY's case ( supra) in  uhich h is  Lordship t r ie d  to  uphold SCOTT v BAKER
( supra) . Houever, i t  is  in te re s tin g  to note th a t in  UiALKER v LOVEL (supra)
Lord Oiplock contemplated an in fo rm al re s tra in t  before a form al a rres t and
201thus added a neu dimension to the pouer of a rre s t, as fo llo u s :
A ll  th a t the constable uas e n t it le d  to  at th is  stage uas to  
requ ire  the d r iv e r  to  remain at the place uhere the breath  
te s t uas carried  out u n t i l  i t  uas completed by the constab le 's  
looking to  see uhat the device in d ic a te d . added]
2022.101 The decision in  5AKU3A v ALLEN is  im portant fo r  the reason th a t
i t  took a p a r t ic u la r  note of the "loose draftsmanship" of the Act and
app lied , as in  the case of emergency le g is la t io n , ad hoc norms of 
203construction . There should be, i t  uas sa id , "reasonable construction
cf the s ta tu te  in  order to prevent the obvious in te n tio n  of the le g is la tu re
204being la rg e ly  and urongly fru s tra te d ."  This uas a notable departure  
from the usual common lau  ru le  of " s t r ic t  construction" of penal s ta tu te s .
205T h e ir Lordships t r ie d  to explain th e ir  e a r l ie r  decision in  PINNER v EVERETT 
in  uhich they had a rrived  at a d if fe re n t  re s u lt  by trac in g  a close 
re la tio n s h ip  betueen "d riv in g " (by the o ffender) and "suspicion" (o f the
p o lic e ) .  In  the in s ta n t case i t  uas held th a t the uord "d riv in g "  should be
206 207given a "reasonably l ib e r a l  constructio n". In  R u HQLAH the court
in s is te d  on compliance in  the true  sense u ith  the common lau  ru le  s tated  in  
208the CHRISTIE case; although in  the House of Lords the decision met u ith
209disapproval from some of the judges in  WALKER v LOVEL ( supra) .
2.102 Thus ue f in d  th a t as in  the case o f the Vagrancy Act the judges 
construed the Road T r a f f ic  Act u ith  a v ieu  to dispensing "preventive  
ju s tic e "  to ensure " s o c ia l-s e c u r ity " by adopting a f le x ib le  approach even 
u h ile  evolving ad hoc norms uhich uas a m anifestation  o f b iz a rre  operation  
of the "value process" in  the f ie ld  of "preventive ju s t ic e " .
O  A
(C) Pouer of A rrest under the Commonuealth C rim inal Codes (A s ia  and 
A frica )
2.103 I t  is  tru e  th a t in  A fr ic a , as a c o ro lla ry  o f " in d ire c t ru le " ,
there  uere tuo p a r a l le l  le g a l systems, "N ative" and "English" (g e n e ra l) but
the la t t e r ,  in  fa c t ,  uas not purely E nglish . In  A fr ic a , as e lseuhere, the
English C rim inal Lau appeared in  a m odified version uhich in  some
t e r r i t o r ie s  leaned more on English tra d it io n s  and in  o thers , on the
Indian Codes. Houever, in  respect o f the summary pouer o f a r re s t, despite
d iffe ren ces  in te r  se. mostly of a minor n atu re , a l l  A frican and Asian Codes
conformed generally  to the Indian model (In d ia n  C rim inal Procedure Code
1898). In  th is  connection i t  is  im portant to  note th a t in  a l l  cases the
210p riva te  person's common lau  pouer of a rres t uas d e b ilita te d  and
211in  the case of the po lice  o f f ic e r ,  h is  pouer uas u e ll-d e f in e d . I t  is
also to be noted th a t in  a l l  cases the common lau  pouer o f a rres t linked
212p a r t ic u la r ly  to the concept of "hue and cry" uas abandoned. On the other
hand, the common lau  pouer of a rres t fo r  breach o f the peace uas re ta in ed
in  many cases, a lb e it  in  a m odified form (conferred  only on the po lice
213o f f ic e r ) ,  uhereas in  In d ia  i t  uas to t a l ly  abandoned. The in te r  se 
d iffe ren ces  possibly re fle c te d  mainly the in h eren tly  experim ental nature  
of the c o d ific a tio n  process; they cannot obviously be re la te d  to  any 
d is tin c t iv e  fea tu re  of the s o c ia l requirement of any of the co u n tries . For, 
even in  In d ia  in  the Lau Commissioners' d ra ft  of the C rim inal Procedure 
Code there uere some provisions uhich uere not enacted e ith e r  in  the  f i r s t  
Code o f 1861 or in  the subsequent re-enactments u h ile  some of i t s  other 
provisions uhich, though not enacted in  the f i r s t  Code, appeared in  a l l  
subsequent re-enactments (1872* 1882 aid 1898). Although summary pouer o f 
arres t fo r  a p riva te  person uas recommended in  the d ra ft  i t  uas not provided  
in  the 1861 Code, but i t  came in  a l l  subsequent re-enactm ents; pouer of 
arres t fo r  a police o f f ic e r  to  prevent breach of the peace recommended
in  the d ra ft  was not provided e ith e r  in  the f i r s t  enactment or in  any of
214the subsequent re-enactm ents.
2.104 The provision embodying the fo c a l p o in t of the summary power of
a rres t o f the po lice  o f f ic e r  in  the Indian model may be quoted:
f i r s t ,  any person uho has been concerned in  any cognizable
offence or against uhom a reasonable complaint has been
made or c red ib le  in form ation has been received or a 
reasonable suspicion e x is ts  of h is  having been so concerned;
[emphasis added]
The provision quoted above embraces the provisions of only one of the several
sub-clauses of s .54(1) (o f  1882 and 1898 Codes), each of uhich la id  doun
s im ila r ly  the several s p e c ific  circumstances and s itu a tio n s  and also the  
conditions subject to uhich the pouer could be exerc ised . I t  is  to  be 
noted th a t the expression "c red ib le  in form ation" uas absent in  the e a r l ie r  
enactments of 1861 and 1872. On the other hand, the expression "in  the 
sight of such po lice  o f f ic e r  commits a [co gn izab le ] offence" uhich occurred 
in  the tuo e a r l ie r  versions disappeared in  the la te r  vers ions. Thus, 
although the pouer of the p o lice  o f f ic e r  uas progressively increased i t  
uas simultaneously adequately circumscribed to prevent i t s  a rb itra ry  use. 
Indeed, the neu phraseology, "concerned in  any cognizable offence"  
uas a d e f in ite  improvement, im plying a u e ll-d e fin e d  and guided d is c re tio n . 
Among the pouers posited in  the other sub-clauses, most notable uas the one 
providing fo r  the a rre s t of a person" uho obstructs a po lice  o f f ic e r  u h ile  
in  the execution of h is  duty" ( s . 5 4 (1 ) , " f i f t h "  sub-clause) uhich uas a 
d e fin ite  improvement on the common lau  pos ition  obta in ing  in  England.
2.105 In  Asia, the " f i r s t "  sub-clause of s .54(1) of the Ind ian  model 
uas almost verbatim reproduced in  the Crim inal Procedure Codes of Ceylon 
( la t e r  S ri Lanka), Singapore and the Federated Malaya S tates ( l a t e r ,  
M a lays ia ). In  A fr ic a , the expressions "reasonable complaint" and 
"cred ib le  in form ation" uere om itted in  the p a r a l le l  p rovis ions, everywhere 
except Northern N ig e r ia . The expression "cognizable offence"
appeared in  Northern N ig e ria  but in  the southern s ta tes  of N ig e ria  i t  uas
replaced by " in d ic ta b le  offence" and in  Ghana by "felony or misdemeanour".
I t  is  necessary houever to point out th a t in  the Northern N igerian  Code, 
apparently as a re s u lt o f an accidenta l s lip  uhich has s u rp ris in g ly  gone 
unnoticed so fa r ,  the uords "u ithout u arran t" do not occur in  the opening 
paragraph of the section uhich provides th a t a po lice  o f f ic e r  may a rres t 
any person under the d if fe re n t  circumstances and s itu a tio n s  enumerated in  
the sec tio n .
2.106 Although the terms "suspected persons" and "reputed th ieves"
are not used (u n lik e  English Vagrancy Act) in  a l l  Codes, Asian and A frican ,
the po lice  o f f ic e r  (" in  charge of a po lice  s ta tio n "  in  some Codes) has
in  almost a l l  cases summary pouer of a rre s t in  respect of persons belonging
to  a s im ila r  category uho are vario u s ly  described in  the severa l Codes such
as a person uho has e ith e r  no ostensib le  means of liv e lih o o d  or uho cannot
give a s a tis fa c to ry  account of h im self or uho is  taking precautions to
conceal h is  presence u ith  a v ieu  to committing a cognizable offence or uho
215is  by repute a h a b itu a l robber, housebreaker or t h ie f .  Apparently the
embit of the pouer is  re s tr ic te d  in  the Indian model as, u n like  English lau ,
not only the pouer has been denied to a p riv a te  person but i t s  use is
generally  re s tr ic te d  to the senior po lice  o f f ic e r s .  The Indian model has
made another s ig n if ic a n t improvement on the English lau : i t  contemplates
expressly the use of the pouer of uhat is  described as the "preventive
action of the p o lice" by empouering the po lice  o f f ic e r  to a rre s t u ithout
216uarrant in  the case of "design to commit a cognizable o ffen ce". This 
provision is  l ik e ly  to make up to a great exten t the defic iency in  a l l  
ju r is d ic t io n s  of a general offence o f p rep ara tio n . In  the Northern N igerian  
Code there appears a novel provision in  s .27 under uhich a p o lice  o f f ic e r  
can req u ire  any person to accompany him to  the po lice  s ta tio n  uhom he 
suspects, on reasonable grounds, to have committed "an offence of any k in d ".
2.107 In  Tanzania, the "People's M i l i t i a "  is  contemplated as an agency 
of lau-enforcement p a r a l le l  to  the po lice  force m anifesting the d is t in c t iv e  
fea tu res  of in s t itu t io n s  of One-party S ta tes . Every member o f the m i l i t ia
can exercise such pouers of a rres t and search as are exercised by a 
police  o f f ic e r  o f the rank of a constable according to s .3 of Act No* 25 
of 1975 (People*s M i l i t i a  [Pouer o f A rre s t] Act 1975). In  view of the 
provision th a t such pouers may be exercised "subject to the same lim ita t io n s ,  
re s tr ic t io n s  and conditions as apply in  re la tio n  to an a rres t or 
search a ffec ted  by such po lice  o f f ic e r " ,  the provisions of the C rim inal 
Procedure Code are a ttra c te d  in  the case of exercise of the pouer of 
arres t by the m i l i t i a .
2.108 In  the Indian model the summary pouer o f a rre s t of a p riva te
n
person is  constric ted  d ra s t ic a lly :  he may only a rres t a person "uho in
217h is  presence commits a n on-b ailab le  and cognizable o ffen ce". Houever,
in  A fr ic a , there is  also uhat may be ca lle d  an English dimension of pouer
of a rres t of the p riva te  person: ouners of property and th e ir  servants are
expressly invested u ith  the pouer to  be used in  the case of an "offence
218in vo lv in g  in ju ry  to p roperty".
2.109 The common lau pro tections in  the Indian model are spread out in
C-r i -r>~vrv
both p arts  of the Code -  the Penal Code and the^Procedure Code in  almost
C ockl—■
a l l  cases. In  1973, in  In d ia , s . 50 of the neu C rim inal Procedure has
embodied the ru le  in  the CHRISTIE case (to  inform of reasons fo r  a rre s t)
although the Indian B i l l  of R ights, l ik e  o thers, already contained such a
p ro te c tio n . Houever, i t  is  to be noted th a t the Indian model has more
c le a r ly  sta ted  and e f fe c t iv e ly  c u rta ile d  the use of force in  the making
219of a rres t and in  preventing escape. I t  expressly stp tes  th a t there  
is  no " r ig h t to cause death" in  such m atters "of a person uho is  not accused 
of an offence punishable u ith  death or imprisonment fo r  l i f e " .  In  a l l  cases 
the Codes (a lb e i t  the B i l ls  of Rights also) provide an express tim e­
l im it  of 24 hours fo r  detention (fo llo u in g  a rre s t) u ithout ju d ic ia l  
in te rp o s it io n  to accord supreme primacy to the common lau  doctrine  th a t any 
re s tra in t  on the l ib e r ty  of a person uas prima fa c ie  i l l e g a l .  In  the case 
of an a rres t by a p riva te  person he is  required to give the person 
arrested  in to  p o lice  custody "u ithout unnecessary de lay". This express
provision  is  a d e f in ite  improvement on the common lau  p o s itio n . In
the Penal Codes, the r ig h ts  o f resistance and rescue are to be found in
221u e ll-d e fin e d  provisions.
I l l . Preventive Ju s tice : Prevention of Crime
(1 ) Pouer to Bind Over 
( A) Enqlend
2.110 There is  no doubt th a t the pouer to  bind over transcended the  
concept of the K ing 's  peace and th a t i t  had i t s  roots in  Anglo-Saxon 
in s t i tu t io n  of "bark or pledge" (during the period of Edgar to  Cnut) and 
"decennaries or frankpledges" (during A lfre d 's  re ig n ) . U ith  the 
progressive development of the concept of the K ing 's  peace the in s t itu t io n  
of Conservators of the Peace uas firm ly  es tab lish ed , uho had the pouer to  
take recognizance of the peace at Common Lau. O alton, houever, denies th is  
pouer to the King h im self because, he says, "recognizance is  made to
2
h im self" although the King uas the p r in c ip a l Conservator of the Peace. The 
pouer could be exercised, says Oalton, "upon p ra ire r  of the Surety of the 
Peace made to them" uhen process could be issued fo r  the a rre s t of the party  
uho could be committed to prison in  d e fau lt of f in d in g  s u re ty . But he 
adds th a t th is  pouer had fa l le n  in to  disuse and au th o rity  fo r  keeping the
3
peace uas invested by the K ing 's  Commission of the Peace.
2.111 Dalton r ig h t ly  comments th a t under the Commission, the Justices
had " a l l  a n c illa ry  pouer touching the Peace uhich the Conservators of the
Peace had by the Common Lau, as also th a t uhole au th o rity  uhich the
4
s ta tu te s  have since added th e re to ."  For, in  the Justice of the Peace 
Act 1361 ue f in d  them empouered in te r  a l ia  to  "take of a l l  them th a t be not 
of Qood fame . . . s u f f ic ie n t  su re ty . . . of th e ir  Good behaviour touards 
the King and h is  people. . . to  in te n t th a t the people be not by such 
r io te rs  • . . endangered nor the Peace blemished. . ."  [emphasis added].
Thus, ue see th a t the s ta tu te  has a r tic u la te d  the tu o fo ld  ju r is d ic t io n  in  the 
m atter of binding over -  surety of the peace and surety fo r  good behaviour.
The expression "th a t be not of good fame" is  explained by Blackstone in
5terms of contra bonos mores and contra pacem. This in d ica tes  the  
d i f f ic u l t y  the e a rly  ju r is ts  faced in  id e n tify in g  the th in  lin e  betueen 
lau  and m o ra lity  -  the d i f f ic u l t y  o f bridg ing  the h ia tu s  betueen s o c ia l 
and le g a l norms. Indeed, th is  d i f f ic u l t y  is  also manifested in  Burn's  
suggestion th a t i t  uas the language of the Act uhich had brought about a 
s h if t  in  the emphasis, from the concept of the K ing 's  peace to th a t of 
deportment of the person and th a t "the sense of the s ta tu te " , he says, "hath 
been extended not only to  offences immediately re la t in g  to breach of the  
peace but to d ivers  misbehaviours".^
2.112 Archbold and Stone deal u ith  the recent enactments concerning th is
pouer. These are: The M ag is tra tes ' Courts Act 1952 (c .5 5 ) ,  The C rim inal
Lau Act 1967 (c .5 8 ) ,  The Justice of the Peace Act 1968 (c .6 9 ) ,  The
M ag is tra tes ' Courts (Appeals from Binding Over Order) Act 1956 (c .4 4 ) as
anended by the C rim inal Justice Act 1967 (c .8 0 ) and the Courts Act (c .2 3 ) .
To make a d e ta ile d  assessment of the e ffe c t  of these enactments is  beyond
the scope of our study. Archbold has succinctly  summarised an important
7aspect o f the present lau  uhich may be p ro fita b ly  quoted:
A person convicted o f any offence uhich p r io r  to the 
Crim inal Lau Act 1967 uas a misdemeanour, uhether at 
common lau  or by s ta tu te , may, in  addition  to , or in  
su b s titu tio n  fo r ,  any other punishment, be required to  
enter recognizance, u ith  or u ith o u t s u re tie s , to keep 
the peace and to be of good behaviour fo r  a reasonable 
time to be sp ec ified  in  the o rder. . . Where such an order 
is  made i t  usually  prescribes imprisonment u n t i l  
recognizances are entered in to .
I t  has houever to be noted th a t fix e d  periods have been prescribed under
various enactments fo r  the imprisonment in  d e fa u lt; the 1952 Act (c .5 5 )
has fix e d  one year as the maximum period , u ithout f ix in g ,  houever, a
s im ila r  c e ilin g  on the period fo r  uhich a person may be bound over. At
common lau  a person may be bound over fo r  h is  e n tire  l i f e  so the neu
lau  does not a ffe c t any ra d ic a l improvement in  th is  m a tte r. On the other
hand, the provision of a r ig h t of appeal is  indeed a noteuorthy improvement
as such orders could be challenged e a r l ie r  only by a proceeding in  
c e r t io r a r i  uhich uas i t s e l f  d iscre tio n ary  in  na tu re .
2.113 I t  is  too early  to  say hou the r ig h t o f appeal eventually
a ffe c ts  the d iscre tio n ary  nature of the ju r is d ic t io n  of the ju s tic e s  but
i t  cannot be gainsaid th a t there has aluays been, by and la rg e , a ju d ic ia l
exercise of the ju r is d ic t io n  which has imparted to i t  a wholesome
f l e x i b i l i t y  making possible s a tis fa c to ry  so lution  of the ever-grouing
v a r ie ty  of law-enforcement problems. Indeed, the ju r is d ic t io n
exem plified  at once the f e a s ib i l i t y  and the d e s ira b il i ty  of adjustable
norms of " re s tra in ts "  as w e ll as of "protections" in  so fa r  as personal
l ib e r ty  v is -a -v is  " ju r is d ic t io n  of suspicion" uas concerned. Reference
in  th is  connection may be made to some leading decisions. The most
0
notable is  LAN5BURY v RILEY« which uas concerned u ith  the women's
l ib e ra tio n  movement in  England. The appellant uas a supporter, not a
member, of the Women's Social and P o l i t ic a l  Union, whose ob ject uas to
secure voting  r ig h ts  fo r  women by m il ita n t  means, includ ing  destruction
of b u ild ings  by f i r e  and explosives. The court upheld the order binding him
over fo r  good behaviour passed on the inform ation uhich charged him th a t he
in c ite d  others to commit a breach of the peace and th a t he uas l ik e ly  to
persevere in  such unlaw fu l conduct. I t  is  c le a r th a t there uas no
a lle g a tio n  of any d ire c t th re a t of personal danger or bodily  harm and,
in  p a r t ic u la r ,  to any p a r t ic u la r  person, in  uhich case on ly , according to  
9
QUEEN v DUNN the ju r is d ic t io n  could be exercised . Even so, the court
upheld the order to meet a s itu a tio n  uhich resembled some form of
"emergency". In  such s itu a tio n s , in  modern tim es, such persons are usually
held under "preventive detention" in  the Neu Commonuealth but the decision
i l lu s t r a te s  th a t a re s tra in t  of lesser severity  could adequately meet the
requirement of the s itu a tio n  and indeed in  some s ta tes  "emergency
le g is la t io n s "  provide both a lte rn a tiv e s , "detention" and " re s t r ic t io n " .
102.114 In  s im ila r  terms in  an e a r l ie r  case, v WILKINS i t  uas held
th a t by v ir tu e  of the ’’general power" under th e ir  Commission the ju s tic e s
could bind over "any person" i f  the person was g u ilty  of a "v io le n t"
conduct tending to a breach of the peace though there was no proof of
a th re a t to any p a r t ic u la r  person. Justices in  th is  case had bound over
both the complainant aid h is  adversary. This decision was fo llow ed in  a
11recent case, SHELDON v BROMFIELD where Lord Parker, C .J . observed
I t  is  w e ll known th a t the Justices have power pursuant to  
th e ir  Commission or pursuant to  the Justice o f the Peace Act 
1361 to bind over a l l  persons brought before them. I t  is  
very im portant ju r is d ic t io n  and is  in  the nature of 
preventive ju s t ic e . No offence need be proved at a l l .
[emphasis added]
(B) Asian and African s ta tes  of the Commonwealth 
( a) _A _gene_ra_l view
2.115 The power to  bind over under the Asian and African C rim inal Codes
is  also modelled, as in  the case of power o f a rre s t, on the provisions of the
Indian Crim inal Procedure Code, described e a r l ie r  as the Indian model.
Following the English law the Ind ian  model also provides fo r  a twofold
ju r is d ic t io n :  courts are empowered to requ ire  any person to fu rn ish  under
sp ec ified  circumstances "security  fo r  keeping the peace" and "secu rity  fo r  
12good behaviour". The im portant d iffe ren ce  may however be noted. In  
each o f the several provisions contemplating such orders, the maximum period  
fo r  which a person can be bound over is  prescribed in  each case in  the  
Indian model which in  i t s e l f  is  a great improvement on the English law, 
apart from the fa c t th a t wide sweep of the power is  also otherwise  
c u rta ile d  by lay ing  down in  each case the conditions-precedent or the 
ju r is d ic t io n a l requirement fo r  the exercise of the power. The phraseology 
in  respect o f the said requirement is  of course not uniform . Under some 
Codes orders may be made by a M agistrate  when he "receives in form ation"  
w hile in  other cases when he is  "informed on oath", about the o ffens ive  
a c t iv i t ie s  of the person concerned.
2.116 The Indian model provides generally  fo r  the order to bind over to
be made in  four d if fe re n t  types of cases. A person convicted of any of the
s p ec ifie d  offences or of an offence "involv ing  breach of the peace" can be
bound over by the court to  keep the peace uhen sentence is  passed against 
13him. A person can also be bound over to keep the peace i f  he " is  l ik e ly
to commit a breach o f the peace or d is turb  pub lic  t r a n q u i l l i t y  or to da any
14wrongful act th a t may probably occasion a breach o f the peace." The
"suspected person" is  described various ly  in  the d if fe re n t  codes and the
Codes, except the Northern N igerian  Code, provide th a t such persons may be
bound over to be of "good behaviour". The expressions used to  describe such
persons are -  "taking precaution to conceal h is  presence with a view to
committing a cognizable offence"; (persons having) "no ostensib le
means of subsistence"; and (persons who are) "unable to give a s a tis fa c to ry
15account o f themselves". An order binding over a person to be of "good
behaviour" may also be passed against "h ab itu a l offenders" who are
adequately described by specify ing  the re levan t offences, such as th e f t ,
16robbery e tc . In  a l l  Codes the "procedure fo r  in q u iry "  to be followed
in  these proceedings are stated  in  d e ta i l .  In  the new C rim inal Procedure
Code enacted in  In d ia  in  1973 many wholesome changes in  the substantive
provisions have been introduced in  the re levan t chapter fo llo w in g
17recommendations of the Law Commission.
(b ) \/_agrj^jcy_and_somei ,othe_r jasge^cts
2.117 The English concept of vagrancy was not re ta ined  in  the Indian
Code in  express terms fo r  good and v a lid  reasons but the phraseology used to
describe the "suspected person" (quoted above) was in  fa c t borrowed from s.X  
of Bengal Regulation X X II o f 1793 which authorised the daroqah (p o lic e  
o f f ic e r )  to apprehend and send to the M agistrate  "vagrants or suspected
persons" and thB la t t e r  could, a f te r  fin d in g  such persons, on in q u iry , to be
"d iso rd erly  and il l-d is p o s e d "  e ith e r  employ them in  any pub lic  work or 
discharge them on th e ir  fu rn ish in g  secu rity  fo r  good behaviour, ( in  Bombay, 
however, Regulation I I  of 1827 was modelled on the English Vagrancy Act o f
1824 and i t  provided fo r  penal measures). There is  yet another aspect o f the
le g is la t iv e  h is to ry : in  the  f i r s t  and also in  a l l  successive re-enactments
of the Indian Code, in  the m arginal note of the re levan t sec tio n , with the
term "suspected persons" also appeared the term "vagabond". Thus, the
le g is la t iv e  h is to ry  possibly unduly influenced the ju d ic ia l  in te rp re ta t io n
of the re levan t provisions leading to an in d ire c t re -in co rp o ra tio n  of the
18concept o f vagrancy in  the form of " s ta tu s -c r im in a lity " . As a re s u lt  the
enforcement of the provision was found to have given r is e  to  genuine
complaints o f hardship in  many parts  of the country as the concept was
19fo re ig n  to Indian so c ia l manners and h a b its . In  the re-enacted Code of 
1973 however the m ischief has been remedied and the language of the 
re levan t provision ( s . 109) and i t s  m arginal note has been s u itab ly  
amended. Despite the ju d ic ia l  misadventure the fa c t remained th a t in  In d ia  
the process of c o d ific a tio n  did not contemplate penal measures as in  
England.
2.118 In  the African s ta tes  however the approach as respects vagrancy 
was e n t ire ly  d if fe r e n t .  Except in  Northern N ig e ria  where the 1959 Code 
does not have a provision p a r a l le l  to  s .109 of the Indian model, the 
approach in  A fr ic a  is  d is t in c t ly  English and penal measures are provided, 
in  a l l  Codes inc lud ing  th a t of Northern N ig e ria  but excluding th a t of the
new Code of Ghana. The re levan t provisions use the phraseology o f the
English law in  describing and c la s s ify in g  the vagrants in  a l l  cases.
In  Northern N ig e ria  however the Code takes notice  of the s o c ia l h ab its  of 
the Fulani t r ib e  and thus in  the explanation to s . 405(1) i t  is  provided 
th a t a nomad cannot be convicted i f  he gives s a tis fa c to ry  account of 
him self and has apparent means of subsistence, even i f  he has no "s e ttle d  
home". In  Kenya, besides the provisions in  the Code there is  also The 
Vagrancy Act 1968 (cap . 5 8 ), which provides fo r  the "detention of
vagrants and fo r  the care and re h a b il ita t io n  of beggars". The Act however
makes a d is tin c tio n  between a c it iz e n  and a n o n -c itize n  in  the m atter of 
treatm ent in  some respects of the person concerned although the measure
g e n e r a l ly  c a r r ie s  a re fo rm a t iv e  b ia s ;  i t  i s  n o t a pBnal m easure.
2.119 In  the two Codes of N ig e r ia , in  the North , s . 25 and in  the South 
s .300, contain provisions which have no p a r a l le l  in  the Indian model.
The provisions employ in  both cases the same phraseology to  empower the  
courts to ,
bind over the complainant or accused [defendant] or both 
[any of them] with or w ithout surety or su re ties  to  be 
of good behaviour. . . and order any person so bound, in  
d e fa u lt of compliance. . . to  be imprisoned fo r  a term  
not exceeding three months in  addition  to any other 
punishment. . .
Apparently the wide sweep of the power is  re fle c te d  in  the absence of any
conditions-precedent fo r  i t s  exerc ise and of a c e ilin g  on the period fo r
which a person may be bound over which is  traceab le  d ire c t ly  to  common law
o r ig in .  Indeed, the wide sweep of the power and the absence of a p a r a l le l
provision  "in  any enactment of any other country*' [emphasis added] has
21been ju d ic ia l ly  n o ticed .
(2 ) Control o f the R e c id iv is t
(A) Enqland
2.120 The common law has served as a veh ic le  of two p a r a l le l  currents
of thought in  so fa r  as the contro l of the r e c id iv is t  is  concerned. The
"savage" and "uncertain" character of English crim in a l law a p r io r i
22postulated re lian ce  on a d e te rren t penal p o lic y . On the other hand,
the idea of "preventive ju s tic e "  m anifested in  the provision fo r  binding over
postulated use of preventive measures to  pre-empt danger to s o c ie ty .
However, i t  may be said th a t the n ineteenth century marked the watershed. I t
ushered in  an era  of " lib e ra lis m "  and "Reform" and Bentham was i t s  prophet.
A spate o f le g is la t io n  brought in  numerous changes in  the c rim in a l law and
23g re a tly  reduced the number of c a p ita l sentences. This w e ll-in te n tio n e d
and benevolent move perhaps brought to the fo re fro n t the problem of
recid iv ism  by providing opportunity th e re fo r o r, as has been s a id , making
24i t  a " p ra c tic a l p o s s ib il i ty " .  The continuing c o n flic t  between the 
sentencing po licy  and the underlying po licy  of the a n t i - r e c id iv is t  laws
may p o s s ib ly  e x p la in  to  some e x te n t  th e  pa radox o f  th e  p e re n n ia l n a tu re  
o f  th e  p ro b le m .
2.121 The a d m itte d  p o s i t io n  i s  t h a t  th e  th e o ry  o f  re fo rm a t io n  was a
25" re c e n t  a r r i v a l 11 in  E n g lis h  peno logy and in  th e  f i e l d  o f  a n t i - r e c id iv is m .  
L e g is la t iv e  e f f o r t  to  d e a l w ith  r e c id iv is m  was f i r s t  made in  1871 when th e  
P re v e n tio n  o f  C rim e A c t was enac ted  in  t h a t  y e a r .  Then came th e  A ct 
b e a r in g  th e  same t i t l e  in  1908 fo l lo w in g  th e  r e p o r t  o f  th e  G la d s to n e  
Commission on P r is o n s  (1 8 9 5 ) . There was, how ever, a re fe re n c e  to  th e  
p rob lem  in  an e a r l i e r  r e p o r t  o f  a n o th e r Commission w hich  was in q u i r in g  
in  1863 in t o  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f  T ra n s p o r ta t io n  and P ena l S e rv itu d e  Laws.
I t  was suggested  th e n  th a t  th e  r e c id i v i s t s  sh o u ld  be " c o m p u ls o r i ly  
w ith d ra w n  from  t h e i r  accustomed h a u n ts "  as th e y  i n f l i c t e d  " lo s s  upon
26th e  p u b l ic "  by c o n t in u a l r e p e t i t io n  o f  o f fe n c e s  though m in o r in  n a tu re .
A cco rd in g  to  th e  G la d s to n e  Commission a r e c i d i v i s t  was a "n u isa n ce  to  the
com m unity" and f o r  h is  " d e l ib e r a te ly  a c q u ire d  h a b i t  o f  c r im e "  i t  was
u s e le s s  to  pu n ish  him " f o r  th e  p a r t i c u la r  o f fe n c e " ;  he was to  be
"s e g re g a te d "  by which " th e  community w ou ld  g a in "  on th e  one hand and on th e
o th e r  hand " lo s s  o f  l i b e r t y  would to  him p rove  e v e n tu a l ly  th e  c h ie f  
27d e te r r e n t " .  Thus th e  r e c i d i v i s t  was n o t c o n s id e re d  as a " s ic k "  man 
r e q u ir in g  " re fo rm  th e ra p y " .  In  s . 1 0 (1 ) o f  th e  1908 A c t th e re fo re  th e  
remedy came in  th 8  fo rm  o f  " p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n "  f o r  n o t le s s  th a n  f i v e  b u t 
n o t e xce e d in g  te n  y e a rs .  The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  th e  measure was a ls o  s e t 
o u t in  th e  s e c t io n ,  nam e ly , " p r o te c t io n  o f  th e  p u b l ic " ,  from  " h a b i tu a l  
c r im in a ls " .
2 .122  In  1948 th e  C r im in a l J u s t ic e  A ct d e a lt  w ith  th e  p ro b le m . I t  a ls o  
used th e  e x p re s s io n  " p r o te c t io n  o f  th e  p u b l ic "  b u t now i t  was to  be from  th e  
" p e r s is te n t  o f fe n d e r " .  A r e c i d i v i s t  was c la s s i f ie d  a c c o rd in g  to  h is  age 
and th e  sen tence in  one case was, as b e fo re ,  "p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n "  b u t in  
th e  o th e r  case , " c o r r e c t iv e  t r a in in g " ;  th e  fo rm e r , f o r  a p e r io d  o f  n o t
le s s  th a n  f i v e  b u t n o t more than  fo u r te e n  y e a rs  and th e  l a t t e r ,  f o r
not less than two but not more than four years . The Crim inal Oustice Act
1967 has re ta ined  the concept of ’’pro tection  of the p u b lic” but now the court
can impose an "extended term of imprisonment". In  1973 the Crim inal
Courts Act merely re-enacted the 1967 provis ions. Thus, we see th a t the
idea  of deterrence (which o rig in a ted  in  the "d u a l-track" punishment of
penal servitude and preventive detention) a l l  along remained embedded in
a l l  successive provisions despite a great deal of exercise in  semantics.
The treatm ent o f the r e c id iv is t  was n e ith e r preceded by a proper diagnosis
nor was i t  fo llow ed up by a proper prognosis. Indeed, Marc Ancel r ig h t ly
lays  great stress on evolving a "modern penal p o licy "  when defending h is
28"New Theory of S ocia l Defence". As he says, there is  an urgent need of
co -ord inating  the a c t iv i t ie s  of the d if fe re n t  agencies end in s t itu t io n s
connected with the enactment, adm in istration  and enforcement o f the
re le v an t law to im part "fresh strength to the renewal of the preventive
29or re form ative  a c t iv ity " ;  there is  a need to understand crime both as a 
s o c ia l end as an in d iv id u a l phenomenon.^
(B) Commonwealth Asia and A fric a
2.123 As we have already seen, in  Commonwealth Asia and A fr ic a  a 
h a b itu a l offender is  bound over to be of good behaviour under the so- 
ca lle d  "secu rity  provisions" of the several Crim inal Codes. However, in  
B r it is h  In d ia  in  the C rim inal T ribes Act enacted as e a rly  as 1871 provision  
was made not fo r  detention but fo r  es tab lish in g  in d u s tr ia l ,  a g r ic u ltu ra l  
and reform atory settlem ents to achieve at once "segregation" and 
"re fo rm ation". Professor P i l l a i  provides in  the Tagore Law Lecture 
d e livered  in  1920 the genesis of the Act, saying th a t the members of the  
t r ib e  had been reduced to th e ir  present s ta te  "as a re s u lt of economic
31and p o l i t ic a l  v ic is s itu d e  of fortunes during a long period of h is to ry ."  
Indeed, in  ancient In d ia  members of the tr ib e  were employed fo r  watch and 
ward service in  the v il la g e s . The Act has been superseded long ago by 
reg io n al laws in  d if fe re n t  parts  o f In d ia . In  1947 The Bombay H ab itua l 
Offenders R es tric tio n  Act came in to  being. Under th is  Act a M agistrate  can
f*f
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pass an "order of re s tr ic t io n "  e ith e r  in  lie u  or in  addition  to  an order 
binding over the person concerned to be o f good behaviour. The order in te r  
a l ia  contemplates re s tr ic t io n  of the movements of the person concerned to 
a s p ec ified  area but before passing the order the M agistrate  has to  be 
s a t is f ie d  th a t the person concerned has e ith e r  adequate means of earning  
h is  liv e lih o o d  w ith in  the sp ec ifie d  area or he o rd in a r ily  resides th e re .
Thus the order of re s tr ic t io n s  in  conforming to the modern concept of 
"internm ent" and "externment" eschews the hardship inherent in  a "d eten tion". 
A p a r a l le l  provision was enacted in  Madras also f i r s t  in  1943 which was 
replaced by the Madras R e s tric tio n  of H ab itu a l Offenders Act 1948. The 
common fea tu re  of both Bombay and Madras enactments is  the provision re la t in g  
to the establishm ent o f "settlem ents" to  apply "reform therapy".
2.124 In  other provinces ( la t e r ,  s ta te s ) s im ila r  measures were
enacted to deal with qoondaism which has been described as "mainly an
urban phenomenon" embracing the a c t iv i t ie s  of qoondas who are said to be
gamblers, smugglers, bootleggers, pimps, brothel-ow ners, dope-peddlars,
32b lackm ailers , h ired  ru ff ia n s , eve-teasers , b u ll ie s  e tc . The enactments
were c a lled  Goonda Acts and they were enacted, among o thers , in  Bengal in
1923, U .P . in  1932 and C.P. & Berar in  1946. In 1966 a study was conducted
i n t o  th e  prob lem  by thB S ub-com m ittee  on Goondaism c o n s t i tu te d  by th e
Inspectors-G eneral o f P o lice  of the s ta tes  which gave an im portant fin d in g
33which is  noteworthy:
. . . unless a goonda is  uprooted from h is  estab lished  base 
and moorings from amongst h is  c rim in a l associates he w i l l  
pose a constant th re a t to  the community. . .
The Committee suggested enactment of a Federal law on the lin e s  of the
34Bombay Police Act 1951 (which had passed ju d ic ia l  s c ru tin y ), as the  
courts had struck down as u n co n s titu tio n a l (a f te r  the B i l l  of Rights had
come in to  force in  1950) provisions of several such Acts, such as the U .P.
35 36Goonda Act and the C.P. & Berar Goonda Act.
2.125 The problem of recid iv ism  appears to  have been d e a lt with with
a minimum of sophistry in  A fr ic a : p u n itive  measures re f le c t in g  a deterrent
p e n a l p o l ic y  dom ina te  th e  f i e l d  th e re .  In  a lm ost a l l  s ta te s  th e  Codes
a u th o r is e  a s u b o rd in a te  c o u r t  to  commit th e  accused to  a s u p e r io r  c o u r t  f o r
37p a s s in g  a h e a v ie r  sen tence  in  v ie w  o f  h is  " c h a ra c te r  and a n te c e d e n t" .
F o llo w in g  th e  lB ad  o f  th e  E n g lis h  P re v e n tio n  o f  C rim es A ct 1908 in
Uganda th e  H a b itu a l C r im in a ls  (P re v e n t iv e  D e te n t io n )  A c t e n a c te d  s im i la r  
38p r o v is io n s .  Ghana and M a law i p ro v id e ,  a lb e i t  on th e  same l in e s ,  
" p re v e n t iv e  c u s to d y "  in s te a d  o f  " p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n "  which i s  a mere 
v e rb a l change. In  M a law i th e  p r o v is io n  i s  c o n ta in e d  in  s . 11 o f  th e  
C r im in a l Code i t s e l f  (c a p . 8 .0 1 ) ;  in  Ghana i t  i s  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  
Punishm ent o f  H a b itu a l C r im in a ls  A ct 1963. In  a l l  cases , th e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
i s  th e  same as in  E ng land , nam e ly , " p r o te c t io n  o f  th e  p u b l ic " .  However, 
th e  p ro c e d u ra l s a fe g u a rd s  do n o t conform  to  a s in g le  p a t te rn  in  a l l  cases;
Ghana have more wholesome sa fe g u a rd s  than  th e  o th e r  tw o .
IV  . The I n t e r n a t io n a l  System end " S o c ia l - s e c u r i t v "
2 .126  Under the  in t e r n a t io n a l  system  th e  concep t o f  " s o c ia l - s e c u r i t y "  
has a c q u ire d  an im p o r ta n t p la c e  in  th e  " v a lu e - t r ia n g le "  o f  p e rs o n a l l i b e r t y  
th e  deve lopm ent o f  th e  "Human R ig h ts "  ju r is p ru d e n c e  unde r th e  in t e r n a t io n a l  
system has had a p ro fo u n d  e f f e c t  on th e  norms o f  p r o te c t io n s  o f  p e rs o n a l 
l i b e r t y  t h a t  e x is te d  u n d e r th e  c i v i l  law  t r a d i t i o n  in  E urope . Indeed  c i v i l  
la w , which d is t in g u is h e d  i t s e l f  from  common law  (E n g lis h  t r a d i t i o n )  by 
a c c o rd in g  p rim acy  to  i t s  "C odes" and th e  p ro ce ss  o f  c o d i f i c a t io n  w h ile  
a t t r i b u t i n g ,  a t th e  sane t im e , a s u b o rd in a te  r o le  to  th e  j u d ic ia r y ,  fa c e d
a new c h a lle n g e  unde r th e  new w o rld  o rd e r .  The emergence o f  modern n a t io n ­
s ta te s  d e s tro y e d  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  base o f  th e  C i v i l  Law -  th e  Rom an-canonic
ju s  commune: n a t io n a l  le g a l  system s in  th e  new s ta te s  re p la c e d  th e  
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ju s  commune. And, when t h i s  happened th e  th e o ry  o f  c o d i f i c a t io n  u n d e r­
ly in g  th e  Corpus J u r is  C i v i l i s  was n o t accep ted  in  a l l  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  as 
th e  in e x o ra b le  r u le .  S e co n d ly , in  s e v e ra l ju r i s d i c t i o n s  ( e . g .  I t a l y  and 
Germany) w ith  th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  " c o n s t i t u t io n a l  c o u r ts "  th e  ju d ic ia r y  
fo u n d  i t s e l f  in v e s te d  w ith  a r o le  which was s u p e r io r  to  th a t  o f  th e  E n g lis h
j u d i c ia r y .  T hus , urtien th e  common law  norms o f  p r o te c t io n s  o f  p e rs o n a l 
l i b e r t y  came to  be c o d i f ie d  in  th e  U n iv e rs a l D e c la ra t io n ,  th e  I n te r n a t io n a l  
Covenant on C i v i l  and P o l i t i c a l  R ig h ts  and more p a r t i c u la r l y  in  th e  
European C o n ve n tio n , th e se  norms fo u n d  a f e r t i l e  f i e l d  in  Europe to  g row .
Of c o u rs e , th e  re c e p t io n  i t s e l f  o f  th e  new norms was smooth and easy because 
o f  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  d e v ic e s , b o th  o ld  and new. In  many European s ta te s  
t r e a t y  o b l ig a t io n s  o p e ra te  p ro o r io  v io o re  as p a r t  o f  thB  m u n ic ip a l la w . 
B e s id e s , u nde r A r t .  57 o f  th e  European C onven tio n  th e  S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l o f  
th e  C o u n c il o f  Europe can r e q u ir e  each o f  th e  s ta te s  " t o  f u r n is h  an 
e x p la n a t io n  o f  th e  manner in  w h ich  i t s  i n t e r n a l  law  ensu res  th e  e f f e c t iv e  
im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  any o f  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f  [ t h e ]  C o n v e n tio n " . In  1970 t h is  
p r o v is io n  was a p p lie d  in  re s p e c t o f  th e  r i g h t  to  com pensation f o r  u n la w fu l 
d e te n t io n • ^
2.127 At Common Law a t r e a t y  i s  n o t s e l f - e x e c u to r y .  On th e  o th e r  hand th e  
supremacy o f  P a r lia m e n t in  B r i t a in  makes i t  p o s s ib le  f o r  th e  r u le r s  to  
r id e  ro u g h -sh o d  o v e r common law  r ig h t s  (norm s o f  p r o te c t io n )  and in d e e d  in  
th e  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  emergency le g is la t io n  t h i s  p o s i t io n  has been c le a r ly  
e s ta b l is h e d .  Such norms o f  r e s t r a in t s  as th e  "pow er o f  a r r e s t "  and 
"p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n " ,  w h ich are common to  bo th  " s o c ia l - s e c u r i t y "  and 
" s t a t e - s e c u r i t y " ,  have a c q u ire d  new d im e n s io n s  unde r th e  s a id  emergency 
le g is la t io n  and th e  c o rre s p o n d in g  norms o f  p r o te c t io n  have s u f fe re d  seve re  
d e b i l i t a t i o n .  T h is  app a re n t paradox -  " b e t t e r "  p ro te c t io n  o f  p e rs o n a l 
l i b e r t y  in  " C i v i l  Law -E urope" and le s s e r  in  "Common Law -E ng land" -  has 
a t la s t  fo u n d  an answer in  th e  p u b l ic  debate  on th e  n e c e s s ity  o f  a
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B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  f o r  th e  U n ite d  K ingdom . The q u e s tio n  o f  " b e t t e r "  
p r o te c t io n  o f  th e  g e n e ra l and a ls o  p a r t i c u la r  a sp e c ts  o f  th e  r i g h t  to  
p e rs o n a l l i b e r t y  on a g lo b a l b a s is  i s  a ls o  engag ing  th e  a t te n t io n  o f  th e  
U n ite d  N a tio n s  and " a r r e s t "  and " d e te n t io n "  w he ther f o r  th e  p r o te c t io n  
o f  th e  s ta te  o r  o f  s o c ie ty  are sough t to  be c o n ta in e d  by p ro p e r 
" s a fe g u a rd s " .^
j& i &  t l
PART I I I
INVASIONS OF PERSONAL LIBERTY: “ STATE SECURITY”
C hap te r 3
EMERGENCY PROVISIONS UNDER COMMON LAW
J^” 5 ta te  S e c u r i ty ”
3.1 In  t h i s  c h a p te r  as w e l l  as in  th e  succeed in g  f i v e  c h a p te rs  which 
com prise  P a r t I I I  o f  t h i s  s tu d y , we propose to  d is c u s s  p ro v is io n s  o f
law  w hich have , in  th e  U n ite d  Kingdom and o th e r  common law  j u r i s d i c t i o n s ,  
d u r in g  c o lo n ia l  r u le  as w b I I  as in  th e  independence e ra ,  so u g h t to  embody 
th e  concep t o f  “ s ta te ^ s e c u r i t y " ,  in  c o n t r a d is t in c t io n  w ith  th e  concept o f 
“ s o c ia l - s e c u r i t y “  d is c u s s e d  in  the  la s t  c h a p te r  c o m p ris in g  P a rt I I  o f  t h i s  
s tu d y .
3 .2  As we have seen, w ith  th e  r is e  o f  p o w e r fu l n a t io n - s ta te s  and the
c e n t r a l is a t io n  o f  power in  each s ta te ,  th e  concern  f o r  p re s e rv in g  th e  
p o l i t i c a l  fram ew ork o f  th e  community assumed g re a te r  im p o r ta n c e . In d e e d , 
th e  c e n t r a l  theme o f  th e  new w o r ld  o rd e r  i s  i t s e l f  a m a n ife s ta t io n  o f  th e  
d e sp e ra te  a tte m p t o f  th e  w o r ld  community d ir e c te d  to w a rd s  “ h a rm o n iz in g  th e  
a c t io n s  o f  n a t io n s "  in  a c h ie v in g , among o th e r  a im s, f r i e n d ly  r e la t io n s  
among them “ based on re s p e c t f o r  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  e q u a l r ig h t s  and s e lf - ,  
d e te rm in a t io n  o f  p e o p le s ”  in  th e  c o n te x t o f  “ f a i t h  in  fu n d a m e n ta l human 
r i g h t s ”  and th e  "w o rth  o f  th e  human p e rs o n ” . T h is  i s  a re c o g n it io n  o f  
th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  c o n f l i c t  o f  in t e r e s t s  w hich i s  o f  g re a te r  concern  to  
th e  modern w o r ld  i s  fou n d  in  th e  f i r s t  o f  th e  two p e re n n ia l dilemmas
o f  l i b e r t y :  th e  in d iv id u a l  v s .  th e  s ta te  -  a more p re s s in g  is s u e  than  th a t  
o f  th e  in d iv id u a l  v s .  s o c ie ty .
3 .3  I t  w i l l  n o t be d is p u te d  th a t  “ l i b e r t y ”  and " s e c u r i t y ”  a re  b o th ,
in  a sense , " v a lu e -c o n c e p ts " ,  so , a ls o ,  are " s t a t e ”  and "[h u m a n ] p e rs o n s " . 
Ever s in c e  th e  dawn o f  c i v i l i s a t i o n ,  as we have seen, th e se  concep ts  have 
assumed d i f f e r e n t  fo rm s  and have a c q u ire d  d i f f e r e n t  v a lu e s  a c c o rd in g  to
t im e ,  p la c e , c o n d it io n s  and c irc u m s ta n c e s . At one t im e ,  th e  v a lu e  o f  a 
pe rson  was d e te rm in e d  in  te rm s o f  h is  b e in g  e i t h e r  a " fre e m a n " o r  a 
" s la v e "  o r  a " v i l l e i n " .  L a te r ,  a man c o u ld  be co n s id e re d  to  be e i t h e r  a 
" s u b je c t "  o r  " c i t i z e n "  o r  a " n a t iv e  s u b je c t "  o r  an " a l i e n " ;  he c o u ld  be a 
"freedom  f i g h t e r "  o r  a " c r im in a l " ,  -  a " r e p u b l ic a n " ,  a " l o y a l i s t " ,  a 
" t e r r o r i s t " .  S im i la r ly  a " s t a te "  c o u ld  be as th e  r u le r  w ished i t  to  be 
-  w he the r "d e m o c ra t ic "  (w b e th e r m o n a rc h ic a l o r  re p u b lic a n  o r  a o n e -p a r ty  
s ta te ,  in  fo rm ) o r  " t o t a l i t a r i a n "  o r  " d e s p o t ic " .  On th e  o th e r  hand, i t  
was th e  nexus between th e  v a lu e s  o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
re p re s e n t in g  the  two s e ts  o f  concep ts  t h a t  p ro v id e d  th e  measure f o r  th e  
" v a lu e -c o n c e p ts "  o f  " l i b e r t y "  and " s e c u r i t y " .  The nexus was p ro v id e d , as 
we have p o in te d  o u t ,  by such fa c to r s  as t in re ,  p la c e , c o n d it io n s  and 
c irc u m s ta n c e s . I t  was t h i s  nexu3 w hich was o f  th e  u tm o s t im p o rta n ce  and 
g re a t in t e r e s t  to  th e  la w y e rs . The d i f f e r e n t  fa c to r s  c o n s t i tu te d  th e  key 
e le m e n ts  o f  th e  " v a lu e -p ro c e s s " ;  th e y  re g u la te d  th e  measure o f  th e  
concep ts  o f  " l i b e r t y "  and " s e c u r i t y " .
3 .4  At Common Law, t h i s  nexus was te rm ed  " n e c e s s ity "  whereas i t s
p e rv e r te d  v ie w , as we s h a l l  see , fo u n d  m a n ife s ta t io n  in  th e  concep t o f  
" M a r t ia l  Law" used in  th e  c o lo n ie s .  We propose to  exam ine b o th  o f  them 
in  t h i s  c h a p te r .  Under l e g is la t io n  th e  concep t was te rm ed "em ergency", 
which w i l l  be exam ined in  th e  succeed in g  f i v e  c h a p te rs . In  each o f  th s  
s ta te s  o f  th e  New Commonwealth th e  C o n s t i tu t io n s  c o n ta in e d  emergency 
p r o v is io n s  in  some fo rm  o r  o th e r .  D u r in g  th e  c o lo n ia l  r u le  a ls o  
"Emergency R e g u la t io n s "  were made in  those  t e r r i t o r i e s  b u t ,  as we s h a l l  
see , these  p ro v is io n s  in  th e  M alayan p e n in s u la  in  S o u th -E a s t A s ia  were in  
no manner d i f f e r e n t  from  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  "S ta te  S e c u r ity  (D e te n t io n  
o f  P ersons) D ecrees" o f  th e  M i l i t a r y  Government o f  N ig e r ia  passed in  the  
la s t  decade. In d e e d , the  " v a lu e -p ro c e s s "  ranged o v e r a v e ry  w ide sp e c tru m , 
w hich can be a p t ly  d e s c r ib e d  by th e  N ig e r ia n  te rm in o lo g y ,  " S ta te  S e c u r i t y " .  
We proceed now to  exam ine f i r s t  the  common law  p r o v is io n s  f o r  th e  p ro te c t io n  
o f  th e  s ta te ,  f o r  " s t a t e - s e c u r i t y " .
&  fa t*
I I . N e c e s s ity
(1 )  A G e ne ra l V iew
3 .5  In  le g a l  te rm s  " n e c e s s ity ”  has a lw ays been d e s c r ib e d  as a
de fence  and has been a l l o t t e d  th e  c a te g o ry  o f  " j u s t i f i c a t i o n "  w he the r in  
t o r t  o r  c r im in a l  law  as in  b o th  cases th e  q u e s tio n  o f  b reach  o f  a le g a l  
d u ty  i s  in v o lv e d .  B u t th e re  are o th e r  s p e c ie s  o f  " n e c e s s ity "  as w e l l ,  
such as " s ta te  n e c e s s ity "  a id  " m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i ty " ,  based on th e  n o t io n  
o f  e x e rc is e  o f  pow er.
3 .6  I t  has been obse rved  th a t  th e re  i s  no E n g lis h  case in  w h ich  th e
de fence  o f  n e c e s s ity  has been ra is e d  w ith  success a lth o u g h  th e re  may be a
3
v a l id  "e x c u s e " in  th e  case o f  a t r i v i a l  o f fe n c e .  A no the r a u th o r i t y  p o in ts
4
o u t t h a t  th e  term  conveys a v a r ie t y  o f  id e a s  and th a t  th e  E n g lis h  c o u r ts
5
have n o t d e f in e d  i t  in  such te rm s as would la y  down a g e n e ra l p r in c ip le .  
G la n v i l le  W ill ia m s  d is c a rd s  as o b s o le te  B acon*s v ie w  th a t  an a c t done 
unde r n e c e s s ity  was in v o lu n ta r y  and endo rses Hobbes who says t h a t  " i t  i s  
s t i l l  an e x e rc is e  o f  th e  w i l l ;  i t  i s  ha rd n e ss  o f  th e  c h o ic e . " ^  I f  i t  
re p re s e n te d  an im p lie d  e x c e p tio n  to  a p a r t i c u la r  r u le  o f  la w , as G la n v i l le
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W ill ia m s  co n te n d s , th e  de fence  was l i k e l y  to  become, in  th e  words o f
g
Edmund D a v ie s , L . 3 . ,  "a  mask f o r  a n a rch y " which would s u b je c t  j u d i c i a l  
d is c r e t io n  to  g re a t s t r a in .
3 .7  M acaulay and th e  o th e r  In d ia n  Law Com m issioners in  t h e i r  r e p o r t
on th e  In d ia n  P ena l Code s ta te d  th a t  th e y  had co n s id e re d  th e  " d e s i r a b i l i t y "
o f  e x c e p tin g  a c ts  com m itted  in  good f a i t h  and m o tiv a te d  by a d e s ire  f o r
s e l f - p r e s e r v a t io n  b u t had r e je c te d  th e  id e a .  Such a course  w o u ld , th e y
appear to  s u g g e s t, underm ine  th e  b a s ic  assum ption  o f  th e  P ena l Code which
g
re s te d  on p re v e n t io n  th ro u g h  d e te rre n c e  as th e  end o f  p u n ish m e n t. In
r e a l i t y ,  as we have seen, M acaulay a tta c h e d  g re a te r  im p o rta n ce  to
le g is la t i v e  judgm ent end saw no p la c e  f o r  any im p lie d  e x c e p tio n  in  an 
10enacted  Code. On th e  o th e r  hand, any a c t which in v o lv e d  a judgm ent o f  
v a lu e s  so as to  be a d m itte d  as an im p lie d  e x c e p tio n  was, a p r i o r i , l i a b le
to  be s u b je c te d  to  a j u d i c i a l  t e s t .  The " i l l u s t r a t i o n s "  p ro v id e d  in  th e  
Code were meant to  p re -e m p t such an e x e rc is e  by th e  j u d ic ia r y .
3 .8  I r o n i c a l l y ,  n e c e s s ity  as a de fence  has been re c o g n is e d  in  th e
modern c r im in a l  codes o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  and Germany, and a ls o  in  the
S o v ie t C r im in a l Law. The common e lem ent everyw here  i s  to  be fo u n d  in  th e
tw in  c o n c e p tJ o f " im m in e n t and u n a v o id a b le  da n g e r" and "harm caused to  be
11le s s  th a n  th a t  p re v e n te d ."  J u s t ic e  C a rd o zo 's  comment on th e  American 
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case , HOLMES, th a t  " .  . . when two o r  more are o v e rta k e n  by a common
d is a s te r  th e re  i s  no r i g h t  on th e  p a r t  o f  one to  save th e  l i v e s  o f  sane
13by th e  k i l l i n g  o f  a n o th e r. . . "  how ever, su g g e s ts  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a 
c o n t in u in g  d e b a te . N e v e r th e le s s , i t  i s  u s e fu l  to  no te  th a t  th e  concep t o f  
n e c e s s ity  in  c r im in a l  law  may j u s t i f y  th e  c o n je c tu re  t h a t  th e  concep t i s  
open to  f u r t h e r  developm ent and w id e r a cce p ta n ce . In  f a c t ,  A r t . 15 
(d e ro g a t io n  c la u s e ) o f  th e  European C onven tion  on Human R ig h ts  i l l u s t r a t e s  
the  term  " p u b l ic  em ergency" by u s in g  th e  e x p re s s io n  " th re a te n in g  the  l i f e  
o f  th e  n a t io n " .  And, a lth o u g h  Lo rd  M a n s f ie ld 's  concep t o f  " c i v i l  n e c e s s ity "  
in  STRATTON *s case ( i n f r a ) was n o t accep ted  as a defence  to  a c r im in a l  
cha rg e , th e  d ic tu m  was used by th e  P a k is ta n  C o u r t,  as we s h a l l  see , even 
by in t e r p o la t in g  the  words " o r  S ta te " ,  to  a v e r t  a c o n s t i t u t io n a l  c r i s i s .
Ue proceed  now to  exam ine th e  concept o f  " s ta te  n e c e s s i ty " .
(2 )  S ta te  N e c e s s ity
143 .9  The le a d in g  case i s  t h a t  o f  SHIPMONEY between th e  K in g  and John
Hampden who had re fu s e d  to  pay h is  dues o f  20 s h . u nde r th e  " w r i t  o f
sh ipm oney" is s u e d  by K in g  C h a rle s  I .  The K in g  in v i t e d  th e  ju d g e s  to  g ive
t h e i r  o p in io n  in  th e  Exchequer Chamber. The le v y  was sough t to  be
j u s t i f i e d  on th e  ground th a t  th e  E n g lis h  Navy had to  be s tre n g th e n e d
a g a in s t th e  Dutch and th e  F re n ch . I t  was a ls o  suggested  th a t  th e re
were p i r a t i c a l  a t ta c k s  on E n g lis h  s h ip p in g  and th a t  th e  N o rth  Sea
15f is h e r ie s  had to  be p ro te c te d .
3 .10 The ju d g e s  were d iv id e d  and Hampden lo s t  the  cause. In  t h e i r
"answ e r" to  th e  " q u e s t io n "  fo rm u la te d  by thB  K in g  th e  ju d g e s  observed  as
f  o I I o u j s :
. . . when th e  good and s a fe ty  o f  th e  kingdom in  g e n e ra l i s  
conce rned , and th e  w hole kingdom i s  in  d a n g e r, y o u r M a je s ty
may by w r i t .  . . command a l l  th e  s u b je c ts  o f  t h i s  k ingdom ,
a t  t h e i r  ch a rg e , to  p ro v id e .  . . f o r  such tim e  as y o u r M a je s ty
s h a l l  t h in k  f i t ,  f o r  th e  defence  end sa fe g u a rd  o f  th e  kingdom
. . . in  such case , y o u r M a je s ty  i s  th e  s o le  ju d g e , b o th  o f
th e  danger and when and how th e  same i s  to  be p re v e n te d  and
a v o id e d . [e m p h a s is  addedJ
3.11 The law  was th u s  s ta te d  in  such b road  te rm s  th a t  powers e x e rc is a b le
by th e  Crown unde r " n e c e s s ity 11 exceeded even those  th a t  were conceded to  i t
as " r o y a l  p r e r o g a t iv e " .  F o r , in  the  l a t t e r  case when a p re ro g a t iv e  was
d is p u te d  th e  c o u r t  c o u ld  r u le  as to  i t s  e x is te n c e  and o th e rw is e  to o ,
g e n e r a l ly ,  as to  i t s  c o n te n t .  W h ile  th e  P e t i t io n  o f  R ig h t d e p r iv e d  th e
Crown o f  th e  r i g h t  i t  c la im e d  in  th e  use o f  M a r t ia l  Law, in  t h i s  case , as
H o ld sw o rth  o b se rve s , "pow er to  ta x  was l in k e d  up w ith  power to  use M a r t ia l  
17Law ". H o ld sw o rth  f u r t h e r  obse rves  t h a t  th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  ju d g e s  ru le d
in  fa v o u r  o f  th e  p o s i t io n  th a t  in  any case o f  even an "apprehended d a n g e r"
18as d is t in g u is h e d  from  a c tu a l danger th e  Crown c o u ld  a c t "as  i t  p le a s e d " .
The two powers which r e la te d  a p p a re n tly  to  two d i f f e r e n t  s e ts  o f  v a lu e s , 
o f  l i f e  and p ro p e r ty ,  were th u s  p la ce d  by th e  c o u r t  in  th e  same s c a le .  T h is  
e x e rc is e  n e c e s s a r i ly  r e s u lte d  in  j u d i c i a l  a b d ic a t io n  which p ro je c te d  a 
p e rv e r te d  v ie w  o f  th e  t e s t  o f  " n e c e s s i ty " .
3 .12  I t  i s  th e re fo re  n o t s u r p r is in g  th a t  H o ld sw o rth  a s s e rte d  th a t  th e
19d e c is io n  was wrong in  th a t  i t  was v io la t i v e  o f  th e  P e t i t io n  o f  R ig h t .
In d e e d , by m aking th e  Crown th e  " s o le  ju d g e "  o f  th e  "d a n g e r"  in  a l l  i t s  
a sp e c ts  th e  t e s t  was robbed o f  i t s  p r a c t ic a l  u t i l i t y ;  on th e  f a c t s  to o  
no case o f  n e c e s s ity  had been made o u t .  In  g iv in g  h is  o p in io n  in  th e  case 
S ir  George C rooke , a ju d g e  o f  th e  K in g ’ s Bench, had o b s e rv e d : " .  . . f o r  a 
g e n e ra l charge o f  money upon th e  p e o p le  i t  cannot be upon any p re te n c e  o f  
danger o r  n e c e s s ity .  . . no n e c e s s ity  can p ro cu re  a charge w ith o u t  
P a r lia m e n t.  .
3 .13  The m a jo r i t y  in  th e  above case appears to  have in v o k e d  n e c e s s ity
21as a " s u p r a - c o n s t i t u t io n a l  p r in c ip le "  to  p ro v id e  le g a l  w a rra n t f o r  an
u n c o n s t i t u t io n a l  a c t o f  th e  E x e c u tiv e , g iv in g  r is e  to  th e  co n ce p t o f
" s ta te  n e c e s s i ty " .  Commenting on th e  d e c is io n  P ro fe s s o r  G la n v i l le
22W ill ia m s  equa te s  th e  concep t e v o lv e d  w ith  p re ro g a t iv e  and th e  f a c t
23t h a t  i t  was l i k e l y  to  je o p a rd is e  p r iv a te  r ig h t s  and in d iv id u a l  l i b e r t y
le d  him to  h o ld  th e  v ie w  th a t  i t  w ou ld  se rv e  b e s t communist s ta te s  and
t o t a l i t a r i a n  reg im es p ro fe s s in g  "ends j u s t i f y  m eans". The ju d ic ia r y  in
th e  New Commonwealth however su rpassed  h is  e x p e c ta t io n s  by p u t t in g  th e
co n ce p t to  use in  d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t io n s  o f  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  breakdown by
m o d ify in g  i t s  c o n te n t to  s u i t  lo c a l  needs. P ro fe s s o r  de Sm ith ta k e s  n o te
o f th e  p ro ce ss  b u t appears to  o v e r lo o k  th e  r o le  o f  th e  d e c is io n  in
24SHIPHONEY as p re c u rs o r  and in n o v a to r .
3 .1 4  I t  i s ,  how ever, t r u e  th a t  re c o g n is in g  " n e c e s s ity "  as a vague and
e lu s iv e  co n ce p t, l e g i s la t i o n ,  w hich has been c la s s i f ie d  as "em ergency la w s "
in  th e  U n ite d  Kingdom has subsumed th e  concep t in  such te r m in o lo g ic a l
e x p re s s io n s  as " p u b l ic  s a fe t y " ,  "de fence  o f  th e  re a lm " ,  "m a in tenance  o f
p u b l ic  o rd e r "  e t c . ,  t o  re p re s e n t th e  e lem en t o f  "d a n g e r"  in h e re n t  in  the
concep t o f  " n e c e s s i ty " .  Such le g is la t io n  was perhaps c a l le d  f o r  by th e
absence o f  a w r i t t e n  c o n s t i t u t io n  which was l i k e l y  to  encourage f re q u e n t
r e s o r t  to  th e  d o c t r in e  by th e  e x e c u tiv e  in  emergency s i t u a t io n s  r e s u l t in g
in  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  ungu id ed  and u n c a n lis e d  power im p a ir in g  and im p e r i l l i n g
th e  freedom  and l i b e r t i e s  o f  th e  c i t i z e n .  As we have seen, in  th e
SHIPHONEY case th e  c o u r t  conceded th e  use o f  H a r t ia l  Law in  v io la t i o n  o f
25th e  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  P e t i t io n  o f  R ig h t .  I t  was th e r e fo re  c o n s id e re d  
necessa ry  to  f o r t i f y  th e  common law  p r o te c t io n  by le g is la t i o n .
3 .1 5  On th e  o th e r  hand, in  a com parable j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  in  th e  U n ite d  
S ta te s ,  th e  c o u r t u n d e rto o k  th e  ta s k .  The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  grounded on
" n e c e s s ity "  f o r  th e  use o f  " H a r t ia l  Law" was r e je c te d  by th e  Am erican
26Supreme C o u rt in  Ex p a r te  H ILLIG AN. The c i v i l  war was o ve r and th e  
c i v i l  c o u r ts  were fu n c t io n in g .  S t i l l  th e  p e t i t i o n e r  -  a c i v i l i a n  -  was 
t r i e d  by a m i l i t a r y  c o u r t  w h ich  passed th e  death  sen tence  upon h im .
D a v is , 0 . ,  o f  th e  Supreme C ou rt obse rved  as fo l lo w s *
The C o n s t i tu t io n  o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  i s  a law  f o r  r u le r s  and 
p e o p le , e q u a lly  in  war and peace end cove rs  w ith  th e  s h ie ld  
o f  i t s  p r o te c t io n  a l l  c la s s e s  o f  men a t a l l  t im e s  and under 
a l l  c irc u m s ta n c e s . No d o c t r in e ,  in v o lv in g  more p e rn ic io u s  
consequences, was e v e r in v e n te d  by th e  w i t  o f  man th a n  th a t  any 
o f  th e  p ro v is io n s  can be suspended d u r in g  any o f  th e  g re a t 
e x ig e n c ie s  o f  th e  G overnm ent. . . th e  th e o ry  o f  n e c e s s ity  on 
which i t  i s  based i s  f a ls e ;  f o r  th e  Governm ent, w i th in  the  
C o n s t i tu t io n ,  has a l l  th e  powers g ra n te d  to  i t  w h ich are 
n ecessa ry  to  p re s e rv e  i t s  e x is te n c e  as has been h a p p ily  
p ro v e d . . .
3 .16  R eference  may now be made to  a n o th e r d e c is io n  o f  th e  American
27Supreme C ou rt in  HORN v LOCKHART. The c la im  o f  th e  le g a te e s  a g a in s t
th e  E x e cu to r was u p h e ld  in  t h i s  case on th e  ground th a t  th e  l a t t e r  was
n o t e n t i t l e d  to  be d is c h a rg e d  on o f f e r in g  payment in  th e  Bonds o f  th e
C o n fe d e ra te  Government th a t  he had purchased  d u r in g  th e  c i v i l  w a r.
F ie ld ,  3 . ,  h e ld  th a t  th e  Bonds were is s u e d  by th e  C o n fe d e ra te  S ta te s  f o r
r a is in g  fu n d s  to  p ro s e c u te  war a g a in s t th e  Government o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s .
The purchase o f  the  Bonds was an in v a l id  t r a n s a c t io n  as i t  amounted to
g iv in g  a id  and c o m fo rt to  th e  enem ies o f  the  U n ite d  S ta te s .  What was
a p p a re n t ly  an o b i t e r  d ic tu m  came to  be re g a rd e d  as p ro v id in g  th e  b a s is  f o r
th e  modern d o c t r in e  o f  c i v i l / s t a t e  n e c e s s ity .  I t  was as fo l lo w s :
. . . th e  a c ts  o f  th e  s e v e ra l s ta te s  in  t h e i r  in d iv id u a l
c a p a c it ie s  and o f  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  depa rtm en ts  o f  G overnm ent,
e x e c u t iv e ,  j u d i c i a l  and l e g i s l a t i v e ,  d u r in g  th e  w ar, so f a r  
as th e y  d id  n o t im p a ir  o r  te n d  to  im p a ir  th e  supremacy o f  th e  
n a t io n a l  a u th o r i t y  o r  th e  ju s t  r ig h t s  o f  th e  c i t iz e n s  unde r 
th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  a re , in  g e n e ra l,  to  be t r e a te d  as v a l id  and 
b in d in g .  The e x is te n c e  o f  a s ta te  o f  in s u r r e c t io n  and war 
d id  n o t lo o se n  th e  bonds o f  s o c ie ty  o r  do away w ith  th e  c i v i l  
governm ent o r  r e g u la r  a d m in is t r a t io n  o f  th e  la w s . O rde r was 
to  be p re s e rv e d , p o l ic e  r e g u la t io n s  m a in ta in e d , c rim e  
p ro s e c u te d , p ro p e r ty  p ro te c te d ,  c o n t ra c ts  e n fo rc e d . . . as 
in  th e  peace t im e .  . .
We have s u p p lie d  em phasis in  the  above e x t r a c t  to  in d ic a te  th e  q u a l i f i c a t io n
o f th e  r u le  as w e l l  as i t s  r a t io n a le .
3.17 I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  o v e r lo o k  th e  o b v io u s  f a c t  th a t  th e  d o c t r in e
28was in s p ir e d  by th e  maxim, "Quod f i e r i  non d e b u it  fa c tum  v a le t " .
29The o b s e rv a t io n s  o f  th e  Supreme C ourt in  TEXAS v WHITE, th e  f i r s t  o f  the
" C i v i l  U sr cases" f o r t i f i e s  t h i s  c o n c lu s io n . In  th a t  case th e  c o u r t  had 
o b s e rv e d : " i t  i s  an h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t  the  Government o f  Texas th e n  in  f u l l
c o n t r o l  o f  i t s  s ta te  was i t s  o n ly  a c tu a l G overnm ent. . . a d e fa c to  
Government and i t s  a c ts ,  d u r in g  th e  p e r io d  o f  i t s  e x is te n c e  w ou ld  be 
e f f e c t u a l  and in  a lm os t a l l  re s p e c ts  v a l i d . "
3 .1 8  On th e  o th e r  hand th e  d e c is io n  in  JR v STRATTON, w hich was r e l ie d
upon by th e  P a k is ta n  C o u r t,  r e la te d  to  a c r im in a l  c h a rg e . The G overnor o f
Madras ( i n  B r i t i s h  In d ia )  was im p r is o n e d  by th e  members o f  h is  own c o u n c i l .
They were b ro u g h t to  England and were p u t upon t r i a l .  T h e ir  de fence  was
th a t  the  G o ve rn o r, a c t in g  i l l e g a l l y  by ig n o r in g  th e  d e c is io n  o f  th e
m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  c o u n c i l ,  had c re a te d  a s ta le m a te  in  th e  a d m in is t r a t io n .
They were c o n v ic te d  by th e  ju r y  n o tw ith s ta n d in g  th e  charge to  th e  c o n tra ry
by Lord  M a n s f ie ld ,  who observed  as fo l lo w s :
I  cannot be w a rra n te d  to  p u t you any case o f  c i v i l  n e c e s s ity
th a t  j u s t i f i e s  i l l e g a l  a c ts .  . . im a g in a t io n  may sugges t a
case. . . a man o v e r tu rn in g  a M a g is tra te  and b e g in n in g  a new 
G overnm ent. . . in  In d ia ;  in  England i t  canno t happen. # . ;  
b u t in  t h a t  case i t  m ust be im m in e n t, B xtrem e, n e c e s s ity ;  
th e re  m ust be no o th e r  remedy to  a p p ly  f o r  re d re s s .  . . w ith  
a v ie w  to  p re s e rv in q  th e  s o c ie ty  and th e m s e lv e s . . . th e  
in te r v e n t io n  m ust te n d  to  th e  p re s e rv a t io n  o f  i t .
The em phasis s u p p lie d  in  th e  above e x t r a c t  in d ic a te s  th e  common r a t io n a le  o f
th e  r u le  in  th e  Am erican and th e  E n g lis h  case and o f  cou rse  th e  te rm in o lo g y
as w e l l .
303.19 However, th e  P a k is ta n  c o u r t  in  SPECIAL REFERENCE NO. 1 o f  1955
obse rves  th u s :  " . . .  th e  s i t u a t io n  p re se n te d  by th e  R e ference  i s  governed 
by th e  r u le s  which are p a r t  o f  th e  common law  o f  a l l  c i v i l i s e d  s ta te s  and 
which e ve ry  w r i t t e n  c o n s t i t u t io n  o f  a c i v i l i s e d  peop le  ta k e s  f o r  g ra n te d .
T h is  b ranch  o f  law  i s ,  in  th e  words o f  Lord  M a n s f ie ld ,  th e  law  o f c i v i l
o r  s ta te  n e c e s s i t y . "  [em phas is  added] The c o u r t  went on to  say th a t  i t  was
"as much a p a r t  o f  th e  u n w r it te n  law  as th e  law  o f m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s i t y . "
31The R eference was a se q u e l to  U5IF PATEL v CROWN in  w hich th e  sane c o u r t 
had q u e s tio n e d  th e  power o f  th e  G overnor G ene ra l to  v a l id a te  la w s . The 
G overnor G e ne ra l was fu n c t io n in g  unde r th e  Government o f  In d ia  Act 1935.
He u n la w fu l ly  d is s o lv e d  th e  C o n s t itu e n t  Assembly and assumed le g is la t i v e  
pow ers . The o p in io n  o f  th e  c o u r t  was sought in  th e  R e ference  made by th e  
G ove rno r G e ne ra l upon th e  v a l i d i t y  o f h is  a c t io n s  in c lu d in g  th e  c re a t io n  o f 
a new C o n s t itu e n t  Assem bly. The G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra lf s a c t io n s  were u p h e ld .
3 .20  The P a k is ta n  c o u r t ,  e v id e n t ly ,  changed th e  la b e l  from  " c i v i l
n e c e s s ity "  to  " c i v i l  o r  s ta te  n e c e s s ity "  in  i t s  d e te rm in e d  b id  to  s o lv e
a c o n s t i t u t io n a l  ta n g le .  The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  such an e n te r p r is e  i s
p ro v id e d  by th e  common aspec t o f  th e  two cases -  th e  p o l i t i c a l  a sp e c t -
th e  c o n s id e ra t io n s  o f  th e  s a fe ty  and s t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  s ta te .  In  f a c t  the
P a k is ta n  c o u r t  e m p h a t ic a lly  a s s e rte d  t h i s  by e x p re s s ly  a p p ly in g  the  m axim :
"s a lu s  p o p u li  suprema le x " .  The Cyprus C o u r t,  on th e  o th e r  hand, r e l ie d
on th e  C r im in a l Code o f  th e  s ta te  w hich e x p re s s ly  re c o g n is e d  n e c e s s ity
as a de fence in  cases o f  " in e v i t a b le  and i r r e p a r a b le  e v i l " .
323.21 In  A .G . v MUSTAFA IBRAHIM a s im i la r  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  p rob lem
c o n fro n te d  th e  c o u r t .  The Cyprus C o n s t i tu t io n  p ro v id e d  f o r  p o w e r-s h a r in g  
between th e  Greeks and th e  T u rks  a t a l l  le v e ls  and in  a l l  d e p a rtm e n ts  o f  
Government in  an in e x o ra b le  fa s h io n .  The T u rks  h a v in g  c o m p le te ly  w ithd raw n  
t h e i r  p a r t ic ip a t io n  a l l  th e  th re e  w ings o f  Government became p a ra ly s e d . The 
C o u r t,  whose own j u r i s d i c t i o n  had been im p a ire d  as a r e s u l t  o f  non­
p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  th e  T u rk is h  ju d g e , u p h e ld  th e  law  which was c h a lle n g e d  as 
i n v a l id  on account o f  th e  le g is la t u r e  and th e  e x e c u tiv e  b e in g  s im i la r l y  
a f f l i c t e d  a f f e c t in g  r e s p e c t iv e ly  th e  p ro ce ss  o f  le g is la t io n  and p ro m u lg a t io n . 
The impugned law  p u rp o r te d  to  change th e  b a s ic  s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  
C o n s t i tu t io n  by d is p e n s in g  w ith  th e  p a r t ic ip a t io n  o f  th e  T u rk is h  ju d g e .
The d e c is io n  th u s  in v e s te d  th e  concep t o f  n e c e s s ity  w ith  a " s u p ra -  
c o n s t i t u t io n a l "  s ig n i f ic a n c e  tra n s c e n d in g  th e  c h a ra c te r  im p a rte d  to  i t  in  
th e  C r im in a l Code.
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3 .22  In  MADZIMBAMUTQ v LARDNER-BURKE d e te n t io n  u n d e r a R e g u la tio n
made unde r th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  p ro m u lga te d  by th e  re b e l South Rhodesian reg im e 
was c h a lle n g e d . In  th e  H igh  C ourt the  m a jo r i t y  appear to  f o l lo w  th e  l in e  
adopted in  th e  Am erican c i v i l  war cases by h o ld in g  th e  reg im e as "de f a c to "
£ *  k i
and th e  R e g u la tio n  as " la w f u l "  h a v in g  been enac ted  by th e  wo n ly  e f f e c t iv e
g o ve rn m e n t". F ie ld s e n d , A .3 . A. in  a se p a ra te  judgm ent a ls o  u p h e ld  th s  law
by h o ld in g  t h a t  i t  d id  n o t d e fe a t th e  r ig h t s  o f  th e  c i t i z e n  u n d e r th e
a b roga te d  C o n s t i t u t io n .  The d e te n t io n  in  f a c t  o r ig in a te d  u nde r a law
enac ted  unde r th a t  C o n s t i tu t io n  and th e  new R e g u la tio n  m e re ly  c o n tin u e d  i t .
H is  re a s o n in g , th e r e fo r e ,  con form s to  th e  q u a l i f i c a t io n  s ta te d  in  th e
American cases . He does n o t appear to  ta k e  a new l i n e ,  as has been 
34con tend ed , by h o ld in g  th a t  i t  was th e  d u ty  o f  th e  c o u r t  to  p r o te c t  th e  
c i v i l  r ig h t s  o f  th e  c i t i z e n s .
3 .2 3  On appea l to  th e  J u d ic ia l  Com m ittee o f th e  P r iv y  C o u n c il,  Lord
P earce , in  h is  d is s e n t in g  ju d g m e n t, appears to  accep t the  argum ent based 
35on n e c e s s ity .  H is  L o rd s h ip , how ever, appears to  e n g ra f t  one im p o r ta n t 
q u a l i f i c a t io n  upon th o se  fo rm u la te d  in  th e  American case . I t  was l a id  down 
th a t  n o t o n ly  sh o u ld  th e  impugned a c t n o t h e lp  th e  u s u rp a t io n ,  b u t th a t  
a ls o  i t  sh o u ld  n o t run  c o n tra ry  to  th e  p o l ic y  o f th e  la w fu l  S o v e re ig n .
T h is  was perhaps w a rra n te d  by th e  d if fe r e n c e  in  the  n a tu re  o f  th e  two 
p o l i t i e s .  A no ther reason may be th e  d if fe r e n c e  in  th e  f a c t u a l  s i t u a t io n .  
The d e c is io n  in  the  American case d e l iv e re d  a f t e r  te rm in a t io n  o f  th e  c i v i l  
war was n o t re q u ire d  to  be p ro je c te d  in t o  th e  fu tu r e  so as to  in c lu d e  in  
th e  l im i t a t i o n s  c o n fo rm ity  a ls o  w ith  p u b l ic  p o l ic y  o f  th e  le g i t im a te  
G overnm ent.
3 .2 4  In  a s im i la r  o p e ra t io n  th e  Supreme C ourt o f  N ig e r ia  to o k  n o te  o f
th e  f a c tu a l  d if fe r e n c e  in  th e  s i t u a t io n  in  a p p ly in g  th e  d o c t r in e  o f
36n e c e s s ity  in  LAKANMI and OLA v A.G . The c o n te n t io n  advanced by th e  s ta te
( a lb e i t  u n s u c c e s s fu lly )  was founded  upon K e ls c h *s  th e o ry ,  which was
37accep ted  by th e  P a k is ta n  c o u r t  in  ST ATE v DOSSO. The N ig e r ia n  c o u r t  
p re fe r re d  to  p r o je c t  t h e i r  d e c is io n  in t o  th e  fu tu r e  and s a id  t h a t  th e  ta k e ­
ove r by th e  M i l i t a r y  Government was n o t perm anent and th a t  th e  s a id  
Government was an in s tru m e n t o f  n e c e s s ity  as i t s  o p e ra t io n s  depended on th e  
e x is te n c e  o f  c ircu m s ta n ce s  o f  n e c e s s ity .  The "g rundno rm " o r  th e  
C o n s t i tu t io n  was n o t t o t a l l y  o v e rth ro w n ; i t  became a p a r t  o f  th e  new
&) gjl ts
"g ru n d n o rm ". The f a c tu a l  s i t u a t io n  in  th e  two c o u n tr ie s  e v id e n ce d  by th e  
m i l i t a r y  ta k e -o v e r  was so s im i la r  in  i t s  g e n e ra l o u t l in e s  th a t  th e
3 8d is t in c t io n  has been r i g h t l y  te rm ed as " f a r - f e t c h e d ”  by P ro fe s s o r  de S m ith .
In  b o th  c o u n tr ie s  a r e v o lu t io n a r y  change had taken  p la ce  b u t under
d i f f e r e n t  p ro c e s s e s . M o reove r, th e  o v e r th ro w  n e x t day o f  P re s id e n t M irz a
who had a b ro g a te d  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  in  P a k is ta n  and had in v i t e d  th e  m i l i t a r y
ta k e -o v e r  p roved  th a t  K e ls e n *s  th e o ry  was n o t a p p ro p r ia te  f o r  j u d i c i a l
39a p p l ic a t io n  and i t  was r i g h t l y  d is c a rd e d  in  ASMA 3 IL A N I.
3 .2 5  I t  has been r i g h t l y  suggested  th a t  in  3 IL A N I*s case th e  c o u r t
added an " im p o r ta n t  g lo s s "  to  th e  d o c t r in e  by in t r o d u c in g  th e  p r in c ip le  o f
40"c o n d o n a t io n " .  I t  has however to  be borne in  m ind th a t  in  t h i s  case as 
w e l l  as in  th e  American c i v i l  war cases th e  o cca s io n  f o r  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  
arose a f t e r  the  r e v o lu t io n a r y  s i t u a t io n  had d is a p p e a re d . The scope f o r
in te r fe r e n c e  by th e  c o u r t  was f r e e  from  in h ib i t i o n s .  The s i t u a t io n  in  DOSSO
as w e l l  as in  MADZIMBAMUTQ and LAK ANMI d i f f e r e d  m a te r ia l ly  in  t h i s  
re s p e c t .  On the  o th e r  hand, th e  SPECIAL REFERENCE case in  P a k is ta n  and 
MUSTAFA IBRAHIM in  Cyprus s ig n i f ie d  a n o th e r t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t io n .  
B a r r in g  DOSSO. in  a l l  o th e r  cases, th e  concep t o f  n e c e s s ity  was used to  
so lve  d i f f e r e n t  p rob lem s u nde r d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t io n s .  The e x te n t o f
j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  was th e re fo re  bound to  v a r y .  In  a l l  cases th e  d e c is io n s
o f  th e  c o u r ts  appear to  have been based on th e  tw in  c o n s id e ra t io n s  -  how 
f a r  th e  c i v i l  r ig h t s  o f  th e  c i t iz e n s  were to  be p ro te c te d  and how f a r  th e  
p r e - e x is t in g  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  s e t-u p  was to  be m a in ta in e d .
3 .25  I t  has been con tended th a t  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  in  cases o f
c o n s t i t u t io n a l  breakdown has to  be p a r t i a l l y  conceded; the  c o u r t  s h o u ld
o n ly  c o n s id e r  w he ther th e  d o c t r in e  o p e ra te s  and n o t how i t  o p e ra te s  o r  how
41i t  i s  a p p lie d .  At th e  same t im e  i t  i s  a ls o  a s s e rte d  th a t  th e  d o c t r in e
o p e ra te s  from  o u ts id e  a le g a l  o rd e r  in  th e  case o f  a w r i t t e n  c o n s t i t u t io n
42in  p a r t i c u la r .  J u d ic ia l  o p in io n  in  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s ,  as we have seen,
runs  c o u n te r to  these  s ta te m e n ts , w ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  th e  Japanese cases
Q 1
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( i n f r a ) in  c e r ta in  re s p e c ts .  The c o u r ts  in  th e  New Commonwealth have 
a ls o ,  we have seen, g e n e ra lly  fo l lo w e d  th e  l in e  adopted in  th e  American 
ca se s . H is to r y  has p roved  th a t  in  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  c r is e s  the  ju d ic ia r y  
re p re s e n ts  th e  o n ly  s ta b le  i n s t i t u t i o n .  Among th e  o rgans o f  th e  
Governm ent i t  has a t ta in e d  a p o s i t io n  o f  p re -em inence  in  th e  U n ite d  
S ta te s  w hich has e n a b le d  i t  to  re g u la te  th e  fu n c t io n s  o f  th e  o th e r  
o rg a n s . I t s  m a s te r fu l e x p o s it io n  o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  has e nab le d  i t  to  
d isp e n se  w ith  th e  a u x i l ia r y  concep t o f  n e c e s s ity .  E lsew here th e  ju d ic ia r y  
has s t i l l  to  a t t a in  a s im i la r  s ta tu s  end r e l ia n c e  on a u x i l ia r y  le g a l  
co n ce p ts  becomes in e v i t a b le .
(3 )  M i l i t a r y  N e c e s s ity
3 .27 The P a k is ta n  c o u r t  had r e fe r r e d  to  th e  concep t o f  ’’m i l i t a r y
43n e c e s s ity ”  b u t i t  was c a r e fu l  n o t to  equate  th e  two c o n c e p ts . The 
d e c is io n  in  th e  American case, MILLIGAN ( s u p ra ) on th e  o th e r  hand, d e a lt  
w ith  what has come to  be known as th e  ” w a r-p o w e r”  o f  th e  Congress and the  
P re s id e n t ,  unde r th e  C o n s t i t u t io n . .  A lthough  i t  d id  n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y  speak 
o f  " m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s ity ” , th e  m i l i t a r y  j u r i s d i c t i o n  unde r " M a r t ia l  Law”
( in  c o n t ra s t  w ith  " M i l i t a r y  Law”  and " M i l i t a r y  R u le ")  was r e la te d  to  
th e  e x e rc is e  o f  "w a r-p o w e r"  b u t th e  e xp re ss  l im i t a t i o n  on th e  ju r i s d i c t i o n  
p re s c r ib e d  by th e  C ou rt co n te m p la te d  th a t  th e  s i t u a t io n  m ust be such th a t  
" o rd in a r y  law  no lo n g e r  a d e q u a te ly  secu red  p u b l ic  s a fe ty  and p r iv a te  r i g h t s " .  
Lie are e n t i t l e d  to  say t h a t  th e  l im i t a t i o n  embodied th e  t e s t  o f  m i l i t a r y  
n e c e s s i ty .
443 .2 8  The d e c is io n  in  STERLING v CON ST ANTIN i s  a lm ost to  th e  same
e f f e c t .  The G ove rno r o f  Texas had d e c la re d  M a r t ia l  Law and has passed an 
o rd e r  r e g u la t in g  th e  p ro d u c t io n  o f o i l .  I t  was h e ld  t h a t  a t  a t im e  and 
p la c e  where c o u r ts  are open and fu n c t io n in g  th e  e n fo rc in g  o f  an e x e c u tiv e  
o rd e r  by th e  m i l i t a r y  arm o f  th e  S ta te  was n o t "due p rocess  o f  la w " .
The c o u r t  co u ld  c o n t r o l  th e  means o f  e n fo rc in g  M a r t ia l  Law. The n a tu re  o f  
power im p lie d  th a t  th e re  was a p e rm it te d  range o f  hones t judgm ent o f  measures 
to  be ta k e n . The p le a  o f  " m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s ity "  was r e je c te d ,  h o ld in g  th a t
th e re  was no a c tu a l u p r is in g ,  no c lo s u re  o f  c o u r ts  and no f a i l u r e  o f  c i v i l  
a u t h o r i t y .
3 .29  A d is c o rd a n t n o te  was however s t ru c k  in  th e  cases a r is in g  o u t o f
th e  le g is la t io n  a f f e c t in g  th e  l i b e r t y  o f  th e  c i t iz e n s  o f  Japanese o r ig in
d u r in g  th e  second w o r ld  w a r. I t  canno t be suggested  t h a t  th e  Supreme C o u rt
in  the  U n ite d  S ta te s  had changed i t s  v ie w s . We can however say th a t  the
45e n te rp r is e  had a p a r a l l e l  in  the  E n g lis h  w artim e  cases. In  HIRABAY ASH I  
45°^v UJ5 th e  c o u r t  u p h e ld  a c o n v ic t io n  f o r  v io la t io n  o f a cu rfe w  o rd e r
passed unde r an Act o f  Congress by th e  M i l i t a r y  Commander o f  th e  West Coast
d u r in g  th e  second w o rld  w ar, r e q u ir in g  c i t iz e n s  o f  Japanese de sce n t to  s ta y
a t home between c e r ta in  h o u rs . I t  was h e ld  th a t  th e  w ar-pow er ex tended  to
"e v e ry  m a tte r  and a c t i v i t y  which was so r e la te d  to  war as s u b s ta n t ia l ly  to
a f fe c t  i t s  conduct and p ro g re s s  and i s  n o t r e s t r ic t e d  to  w in n in g  o f
v i c t o r ie s  in  the  f i e l d  and re p u ls e  o f  enemy fo r c e s ;  th a t  i t  embraced every
phase o f  n a t io n a l  defence in c lu d in g .  . . danger o f sabotage and esp ionage
. . . "  I t  was a ls o  h e ld  th a t  the  e x e rc is e  o f  th e  d is c r e t io n a r y  power by th
M i l i t a r y  Commander was n o t re v ie w a b le .
463 .30  In  KOREMATSU v US th e  c o u r t  u p h e ld  as a ju s t  e x e rc is e  o f w ar-
power an o rd e r  passed unde r an enactm ent e x c lu d in g  c i t iz e n s  o f  Japanese 
o r ig in  from  c e r ta in  areas o f  th e  West C o a s t. In  a s tro n g  d is s e n t  M urphy, J 
how ever, obse rved  th a t  th e re  m ust be a d e f in i t e  l i m i t  to  m i l i t a r y  
d is c r e t io n .  R e ly in g  on STERLING v CONST ANTIN (s u p ra )  h is  L o rd s h ip  appears 
to  have h e ld  th a t  th e  p le a  o f  m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s ity  was j u s t i c i a b le .  W hether 
th e  d e p r iv a t io n  o f  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  r ig h t s  was re a so n a b ly  r e la te d  to  a p u b l ic  
danger t h a t  was so " im m e d ia te , im m inen t and im p e n d in g " as n o t to  adm it 
d e la y  and n o t to  p e rm it  the  in te r v e n t io n  o f  o rd in a ry  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  p ro ce ss  
to  a l le v ia t e  th e  danger -  th a t  was th e  " j u d i c i a l  t e s t " ,  he s a id .
3.31 In  E ng land , th e  " w a r -p r e ro g a t iv e "  o f  th e  Crown em bodied th e  
American concep t o f  "w a r-p o w e r" . However, i t  must be n o te d  th a t  a s ta n d in g  
army in  England h a v in g  come in t o  e x is te n c e  v e ry  la t e ,  an o rd in a ry  c i t iz e n
w ie ld e d  c o n s id e ra b le  power unde r th e  Common Law in  co n n e c tio n  w ith  defence
o f  th e  re a lm . A lthough  th e  c o rre c tn e s s  o f  th e  d e c is io n  in  th e  SALTPETRE 
47case has been doub te d , we su b m it th a t  i t  was n o t u n u su a l in  th o se  days 
f o r  th e  c o u r t  to  h o ld  th a t  e ve ry  man as w e l l  as th e  K in g  and h is  o f f i c i a l s  
m ig h t,  f o r  th e  defence o f th e  re a lm , e n te r  upon a n o th e r m an 's la n d  and 
make tre n c h e s  o r  b u lw a rk s  th e re ,  b u t a f t e r  th e  danger was o v e r th e se  
ough t to  be rem oved.
483 .3 2  In  a modern case, BURN AH OIL CO v LORD ADVOCATE th e  m a tte r  was 
d is cu sse d  in  c o n s id e ra b le  d e t a i l .  The p l a i n t i f f  had c la im e d  damages on 
account o f  th e  d e s t r u c t io n  in  Burma o f  i t s  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  and s to c k s  o f  
p e tro le u m  by th e  m i l i t a r y  unde r o rd e rs  o f  th e  Home Government in  pursuance 
of what was c a l le d  a "sco rch e d  e a r th  p o l ic y "  d u r in g  th e  second w o r ld  w a r.
For th e  Crown i t  was contended th a t  th e  a c t io n  taken  was l i k e l y  to  conduce 
to  th e  g e n e ra l p ro s e c u tio n  o f  th e  war e f f o r t  and i t  was in  th e  e x e rc is e
o f  th e  r o y a l  p r e r o g a t iv e .  A g re a te r  r ig h t  accrued  to  th e  Crown in  th e  case 
o f  extrem e emergency and i f  the  law  p re ve n te d  o r d is c o u ra g e d  p re p a ra t io n ,  i t  
m ig h t be to o  la te  to  be e f f e c t i v e .
3 .33  The court^w M reh on appea l^ r e fe r r e d  to  th e  SHI PM ON EY case ( su p ra ) 
and c i te d  th e  in s ta n c e s  quoted th e r e in  to  say th a t  even a t th e  z e n ith  o f  
r o y a l p re ro g a t iv e  pow er, p ro p e r ty  c o u ld  n o t be taken  in  t im e s  o f  war 
w ith o u t com pensa tio n . D u rin g  th e  f i r s t  w o r ld  war and th e  N a p o le o n ic  w ar, 
s ta tu te  a u th o r is e d  ta k in g  o f  p ro p e r ty  on payment o f  com pensa tio n . Lord  
Reid observed  th a t  th e  p e c u l ia r i t y  o f  th e  case was th a t  the  a c t was n o t 
done to  hamper th e  advance o f  th e  enemy. Both  s id e s  a d m itte d  th a t  th e  
d e s t r u c t io n  was e x p e d ie n t f o r  th e  de fence  o f  o th e r  t e r r i t o r i e s .  H is  
L o rd s h ip  h e ld  th a t  th e  im m edia te  o cca s io n  f o r  th e  d e s t ru c t io n  was im m a te r ia l,  
th e  n e c e s s ity  m ust a r is e  o u t o f  m i l i t a r y  o p e ra t io n .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  drawn
by M a t te l between a c ts  done d e l ib e r a te ly  and damage caused by in e v i t a b le  
n e c e s s ity  was e n do rsed . The v ie w  exp ressed  in  th e  American cases was 
d is s e n te d  from  on th e  ground th a t  th e re  was l i k e l y  to  be a d i f fe r e n c e
between thB  P re s id e n t 's  w ar-pow er and th e  r o y a l  p r e r o g a t iv e .  The r i g h t  to  
com pensation  cannot depend on w he the r th e  E x e c u tiv e  w a its  u n t i l  th e  la s t  
moment, h is  L o rd s h ip  h e ld .
3 .3 4  Lo rd  R a d c l i f fe  h e ld  t h a t  th e  p re ro g a t iv e  e x c lu d e d  th e  concep t o f
n e c e s s ity .  The a c t was d ir e c te d  by v i r t u e  o f  n e c e s s ity ,  n o t in  th e  e x e rc is e  
o f  p r e ro g a t iv e .  H is  L o rd s h ip  went on to  h o ld  t h a t  " th B  a c ts  o f  n e c e s s ity  
p e rfo rm e d  in  sudden and extrem e em ergency, when th e re  i s ,  in  e f f e c t  o n ly  
one th in g  to  be done f o r  th e  p u b l ic  s a fe ty "  were n o t d is c r e t io n a r y  o r  
a r b i t r a r y  in  any t y p ic a l  sense . H is  L o rd s h ip  fo l lo w e d  th e  Am erican 
d e c is io n s  and h e ld  t h a t  th e re  was no d is t in c t io n  between a c c id e n ta l damage 
and damage th ro u g h  a "sco rch e d  e a r th  p o l i c y " .  Lord  Peapce, on th e  o th e r  
hand , h e ld  t h a t  "when th e  m o tiv e  o f  d e s t r u c t io n  was a lo n g - te rm  s t ra te g y  
th e  s u b je c t  was e n t i t l e d  to  com pensation u n le s s  th e  Crown co u ld  show th a t  
th e  damage had an im p a c t and im p o rta n ce  f o r  th e  purpose o f  th e  b a t t l e . "
3 .3 5  M i l i t a r y  n e c e s s ity  was th u s  ad judged as a j u s t i c ia b le  is s u e .  The
e x te n t  o f  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  went so f a r  as to  im p o r t c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  
re a so n a b le n e ss  by in s i s t i n g  on a p ro x im a te  c o n n e c tio n  between the  a c t and the  
o b je c t  sough t to  be a c h ie v e d . Lo rd  R a d c l i f f e * s  d ic tu m  b e a rs  o u t o u r  
c o n c lu s io n  th a t  th e  d e c is io n  in  SHI PMONEY : saw n e c e s s ity  as a "s u p ra -
c o n s t i t u t io n a l "  p r in c ip le ,  s u rp a s s in g  th e  r o y a l  p r e r o g a t iv e .  No doub t a 
s tro n g  re a c t io n  a g a in s t th e  d e s p o t ic  S tu a r t  re g im e  had p ro c u re d  th e  
impeachment o f  th e  ju d g e s  r u l in g  f o r  th e  Crown in  th a t  case and th e
e f f e c t  o f  th e  judgm ent was a ls o  n e u t r a l is e d  by a s t a t u t e ,  b u t  th e  l i n e  
taken  by those  ju d g e s  does n o t appear to  have lo s t  i t s  appea l f o r  ju d g e s  and 
j u r i s t s  o f  th e  tw e n t ie th  c e n tu ry .
3 .36  R e v e rt in g  to  th e  "Japanese -A m erican  c a s e s ", we have to  say th a t
49th e se  have been ana lysed  in  d e p th . The measures c o n fe r r in g  a u th o r i t y  on
50th e  m i l i t a r y  have been te rm ed as "com parab le  to  c i v i l  war t im e s "  and
51c o n tra s te d  w ith  th e  B r i t i s h  approach to  th e  p ro b le m . I t  has been r i g h t l y  
p o in te d  o u t th a t  power was d e l ib e r a te ly  e n tru s te d  to  th e  m i l i t a r y  " t o  ensure
5 2c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . ”  The change in  approach i s  a t t r ib u te d  to  an undue
53concern  f o r  k e e p in g  up war m o ra le . The c r i t iq u e  goes so f a r  as to  say th a t
even Dackson, 3 . ,  who in  h is  d is s e n t  had observed  th a t  th e  m a jo r i t y  was
" d is t o r t i n g  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  to  approve a l l  t h a t  the  m i l i t a r y  m ig h t deem
e x p e d ie n t"  d id  n o t concede j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  in  the  re q u ire d  m easure . The
c r i t i q u e  r i g h t l y  p o in ts  o u t th a t  th e  m i l i t a r y  e n jo y  g re a te r  im m un ity  than
do th e  c i v i l  a u th o r i t ie s  from  in q u ir y  and p u b l i c i t y  and th e  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w
54was n e ce ssa ry  to  s t im u la te  " s e l f - c o r r e c t io n " . N e v e r th e le s s , th e  su g g e s tio n
s to p s  s h o r t  a t l im i t i n g  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  to  non -com ba tan t a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the  
55m i l i t a r y .
3 .37 I t  may th e re fo re  be u s e fu l  t o  exam ine th e  r o le  o f  n e c e s s ity  in  th e
sphere  o f  combat a c t i v i t i e s .  Oppenheim a d v e r ts  to  th e  German p ro v e rb  -
56n e c e s s ity  in  war o v e r ru le s  th e  manner o f  w a rfa re  -  and obse rves  t h a t  the
modern w a rfa re  i s  no lo n g e r  re g u la te d  by usages o n ly ,  b u t to  a g re a te r  e x te n t
th a n  fo rm e r ly  by law s a ls o .  He goes on to  say th a t  these  " c o n v e n t io n a l and
custom ary r u le s "  ( th e  la w s) cannot be o v e r ru le d  by n e c e s s ity ,  u n le s s  th e y
are fram ed in  such a way as n o t t a  a p p ly  to  a case o f  n e c e s s ity  in  s e l f -
p re s e r v a t io n .  He c i t e s  th e  case o f  th e  PELEU5 , d ec ided  in  1945 by a
B r i t i s h  M i l i t a r y  C o u rt which had r e je c te d  the  p le a  o f  n e c e s s ity .  The
commander o f  a German subm arine in  th a t  case had k i l l e d  by m ach ine-gun
f i v e  s u r v iv o r s  o f  a sunken s h ip ,  c l in g in g  to  a p ie ce  o f  w reckage, in  o rd e r
to  make th e  p u r s u i t  o f  th e  subm arine im p ro b a b le  by rem oving e ve ry  t ra c e  o f 
57the  s in k in g .  In  th e  MILCH case , de c id e d  by th e  American M i l i t a r y  T r ib u n a l
a t Nuremberg in  1947, i t  was h e ld  t h a t  " . . .  th e se  r u le s  and custom s are
58des igned  f o r  a l l  phases o f  w a r. "  [em phas is  added]
3 .38  In  the  Preamble to  The Hague C onven tion  IV i t  i s  s ta te d  t h a t ,
" .  . . th e se  p r o v is io n s .  . . [h a v e ] been in s p ir e d  by th e  d e s ire  to  d im in is h  
th e  e v i l s  o f  war as f a r  as m i l i t a r y  re q u ire m e n ts  p e rm it."  T h is  was meant 
to  p re c lu d e  r e l ia n c e  on m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s ity  as an excuse f o r  v io la t i o n  o f  th e  
p r o v is io n s .  A r t . 22 o f  th e  C onven tio n  s t ip u la t e s  th a t  th e  b e l l ig e r e n t  d id  
n o t have an u n l im ite d  r i g h t  in  a d o p tin g  means o f  i n ju r in g  th e  enemy.
3.39  In  th e  c o n te x t o f  th e  American c i v i l  war D r. F ra n c is  L e ib e r  had
d e fin e d  m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s ity  to  mean ’’measures in d is p e n s a b le  f o r  s e c u r in g
ends o f  w a r” , s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r o h ib i t in g  c r u e l t y ,  t o r t u r e ,  p e r f id y  o r
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"wanton d e v a s ta t io n " .
3 .4 0  The M a rtens  c la u s e  o f  The Hague C onven tio rs  appears to  im b ib e  the
u n d e r ly in g  id e a  o f  th e  d e f in i t i o n  by p ro v id in g  t h a t ,  a lth o u g h  th e  C onven tio ns  
do n o t fo rm  a com ple te  Code o f  War, th e  in h a b i ta n ts  and th e  b e l l ig e r e n t s  
s h a l l  rem ain  unde r th e  p r o te c t io n  and r u le  o f  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  th e  law  o f  
n a tu re  "a s  th e y  r e s u l t  from  th e  usages e s ta b lis h e d  among c i v i l i s e d  p e o p le s , 
from  th e  laws o f  hum an ity  and th e  d ic ta te s  o f  p u b l ic  c o n s c ie n c e . "  [em phas is  
added] S im i la r ly ,  A r t . 43 o f  th e  C onven tio n  re q u ire s  th e  o ccu p y in g  power to  
" re s p e c t th e  law s in  fo rc e  in  th e  c o u n try  u n le s s  a b s o lu te ly  p re v e n te d  from  
d o in g  s o "  in  r e s to r in g  and e n s u r in g  p u b l ic  o rd e r  and s a fe ty ,  [em phas is  added] 
L ik e w is e , A r t .1  o f  each o f  th e  f o u r  C on ve n tio n s  re q u ire s  p a r t ie s  to  re s p e c t 
and ensure  re s p e c t f o r  th e  C on ve n tio n s  " in  a l l  c irc u m s ta n c e s "  to  in d ic a te  
t h a t  m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s ity  as a g e n e ra l excuse was e x c lu d e d .
3.41 The q u e s tio n  w he ther th e  same norms oug h t to  a p p ly  in  case o f
" g u e r r i l l a  f i g h t in g  and th e  use o f  armed fo rc e  by any group s t r u g g l in g  f o r
freedom  from  o p p re s s iv e  governm ent o r  a l ie n  r u le "  has a ls o  been c o n s id e r e d .^
The re p o r t  o f  th e  S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  has been quoted
which says th a t  " a l l  s t ru g g le s  f o r  s e l f - d e te r m in a t io n  and l ib e r a t io n  from
c o lo n ia l  and fo r e ig n  r u le "  ough t to  be c o n s id e re d  " in t e r n a t io n a l "  c o n f l i c t ,
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i f  n o t  " i n t e r s t a t e " .  A c c o rd in g ly  i t  has been c a te g o r ic a l ly  a s s e rte d  th a t
m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s ity  in  case o f  g u e r r i l l a  f i g h t in g  ough t n o t to  fo rm  a 
6 2se p a ra te  c a te g o ry . T h is  p r o p o s it io n  i s  sough t to  be b u t t re s s e d  by 
in v o k in g  A r t . 3 o f  the  C on ve n tio n s  which b in d  e q u a lly  th e  p e op le  and th e  
s ta te
C o n c lu s io n
3 .42  We th u s  f in d  th a t  in  case o f  combat a c t i v i t i e s  a ls o  th e  p o s i t io n  
does n o t a l t e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  W hether th e  q u e s tio n  i s  a g ita te d  b e fo re  th e
ord inary courts adm in istering c iv i l  lew or before the m il ita r y  tr ib u n a ls  
adm in istering m il ita r y  law the p lea of necessity has not only been 
considered ju s t ic ia b le  but has been held  as not debarring humanitarian  
considerations uhich, in  tu rn , im port the concept of reasonableness.
Uie concede th a t the same standard cannot n ecessarily  apply to  a l l  
s itu a tio n s  and circumstances. N ecessity, ue submit, ought to  be 
considered as a s e lf-re g u la tin g  concept u ith  ju d ic ia l  review as one of 
i t s  necessary in c id en ts  uhich doss not lose i t s  standing when questions 
are ag ita ted  durante b e l lo .
l i t  M a r t ia l Lau
(1 ) The o r iq in  and the content of the doctrine
( A) The te rm in o lo g ica l confusion
3 .43  I t  is  a notorious fa c t  th a t le g a l p ro tection  of personal l ib e r ty  
reaches almost a vanishing point uhen " M a rtia l Lau" is  "promulgated".
The crux o f the m atte r, however, is  th a t the lau  in  th is  f ie ld  has been 
misunderstood and as Professor de Smith suggests, "the  te rm in o lo g ica l 
confusion lin g ered  on" despite the e ffo r ts  mads in  the P e tit io n  of Right 
in  1628 to  r e c t ify  the p o s ition  a ris in g  from the use of a perverted  
notion of common lau .^ ^
3 .44  The term " M a rtia l Lau" uas at one time considered to be a part o f
" M ilita ry  Lau" but to guard against any possib le confusion i t  is  d es irab le
to point out the s o -ca lled  "doctrine o f M a r t ia l Lau" has nothing to do u ith  
" M ilita ry  Lau" uhich is  now understood as dealing u ith  the d is c ip lin e  and 
conduct of the  members of the armed fo rc e s . Nor is  i t  concerned u ith  the  
exercise o f pouers by an Army Commander in  an enemy country. In  these 
discussions the term is  used in  re la tio n  to  the pouers o f the army in  
dealing u ith  in te rn a l d isorders uhich assume d if fe re n t  forms and 
proportions under d if fe re n t  conditions and circumstances.
3 .45 I t  is  necessary to  r e c a l l  in  th is  connection the c lass ic  statement 
of Dicey uhich is  almost fo rg o tten  nou re s u ltin g  in  the confusion being
worst confounded. About a hundred years ago the d is tingu ished  ju r is t  
65wrotB as fo llo w s:
" M a rtia l Law" in  the proper sense of th a t term* in  which 
i t  means the suspension of the ordinary law end the  
temporary government o f a country or parts  o f i t  by 
m ilita r y  tr ib u n a ls , is  unknown to  the law of England.
[emphasis added]
3 .46 Indeed, we s h a ll soon see th a t the d o c trin e , as Dicey has te rs e ly
s ta ted  and as i t  is  understood, has no sanction of law in  England. I t
was evolved as w e ll as leg itim a te d  merely by use in  the B r it is h  c o lo n ia l
66possessions in  d if fe re n t  parts  of the world, inc lud ing  Ire la n d .
B r ie f ly  p u t, i t  was a mere exercise of executive power w ithout au th o rity  
o f law . In  other words " M a rtia l Law" was not a law at a l l ;  i t  was at 
once an exercise in  i l l e g a l i t y  end semantics, a euphemism in  le g a l  
term inology. The metamorphosis of th is  exercise o f the executive in to  a 
doctrine of law resu lted  from a fu r th e r  exercise by another organ, the  
ju d ic ia ry , as we w i l l  discover la t e r  in  th is  section .
(B) J u r is t ic  in te rp re ta t io n s  
( a) A  Generval View
3.47 Hargrave appears to  havB traced the o rig in  of the d o ctrin e  to 
Royal P rerogative in  g iv ing  h is  opinion on the contemporary le g is la t iv e
a c t iv i ty  in  England and Ire la n d  in  the wake o f the " Ir is h  D isorders" of
671798 in  the fo llo w in g  terms:
I  see these s ta tu te s  as amounting to  a melancholy change, 
f i r s t  most unhappily generated in  the Code of I r is h  
L eg is la tio n  by th e  heated atmosphere of c iv i l  convulsions 
in  Ire la n d , and then in s en s ib ly , as i t  seems, ins inuated  
in to  a Code of English law . • • not so much as s ta tin g  the  
t e r r ib le  p re ro g ativ e . • . but enqratinq i t .  . .
[emphasis added]
3 .48  Professor de Smith observes th a t "A proclamation purporting  to
introduce a s ta te  o f m a r t ia l law is  o f no le g a l e ffe c t in  i t s e l f ;  m a rtia l
68law is  ju s t i f ie d  only by paramount n e ce s s ity ."  Brownlie is  more 
s p e c if ic . He observes th a t " i f  the m atter is  e ith e r  one o f 'a id  to  
c iv i l  power' o r executive action  done under n ecessity , then the  doctrine
i s  one o f ju s t i f ic a t io n  in  terms of fa c t said law and not o f non-
69ju s t ic ia b i l i t y  to u t c o u rt."  Brownlie was re fe rr in g  to  the  treatm ent
of M a r t ia l Law by Houston, Dicey and K e ir and Lawson who appeared to hold
divergent views. B row n lie 's  views, i t  appears, were an tic ip a te d  by S ir
Frederick Pollock who had defined the term as "an unhappy name fo r  the
ju s t i f ic a t io n  by the Common Law of acts done by necessity when there  is
war w ith in  the realm" but went on to  add th a t "Such acts are not
necessarily  acts o f personal fo rce  or c o n s tra in t. They may be
70p u n itive  as w e ll as p re ve n tiv e ."
3.49 Pollock contemplates Common Law requirements o f good fa i th  and
reasonable and probable cause fo r  the  Common Lew defence of ju s t i f ic a t io n
71with which he equates M a r t ia l Law. He is  s ile n t  on the issue of
ju s t ic ia b i l i t y  while Brownlie uses a guarded expression to  say th a t the
views expressed by Heuston and others did not exhaust the content of
M a r t ia l Law. Brownlie o ffe rs  ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  te lescoping the  enquiry by
saying th a t in  the United Kingdom the "emergency powers" are now based
upon s ta tu to ry  powers. M a r t ia l Law, he says^is employed in  c e rta in
72Commonwealth co u n tries . Thus, we see th a t both Pollock and Brow nlie,
while recognising the common law basis fo r  the  power, stop short o f
answering the  issue of ju s t ic ia b i l i t y .  The connection which Pollock
appears to  es tab lis h  between the content and character o f the  power
does not u n fo rtu n ate ly  o f fe r  a c le a r answer to  the issue of ju s t ic ia b i l i t y .
Professor de Smith, however, makes c e rta in  p o s itiv e  assertions in  th is
73respect re ly in g  on case-law which we s h a ll examine in  due course.
3.50 liie may also .examine the P e t it io n  of R ig h t;s .7  makes grievance
against the issue of commissions under the  Great Seal by which c e rta in
persons were authorised to proceed:
. . • against s o ld ie rs  or mariners or o ther d isso lu te  
persons. . . [according to ]  such summary course and order 
as is  agreeable to  m a r t ia l l  lawe and as is  used in  armies 
in  times of war to  proceed to  t r i a l  and condemnation of 
such o ffen d ers . . .
In  8 .8  an assurance is  sought from the King th a t
. . .  no freeman in  any such manner as is  before
mentioned be imprisoned or deta ined . . . [and th a t ]
. . .  a foresa id  commissions fo r  proceeding by 
m a r t ia l l  la u e . . . be revoked o r annulled . . . le s t  
by colour of them any. . • subject be destroyed. • . 
contrary to  the lauis and franch ise  o f the lan d . • .
A reference to  chapter 29 o f Magna Carta o f 1215 uas im p lic i t  in  the
expressions used fo r ,  as has been r ig h t ly  observed, "the Charter had to
74be vigorously invoked*1 during the S tuart regime.
3.51 In  Magna Carta as w e ll as in  the P e tit io n  of Right the emphasis
is  on the " lau  of the land11. Holdsuorth gives us some idea about the
re le v an t aspect o f the law by saying th a t Common Lau recognised the
ju r is d ic t io n  of the Crown over s o ld ie rs  abroad and over s o ld ie rs  w ith in
the kingdom, in  times of war only; the P e t it io n  of Right was, he asserts ,
75a restatem ent o f the "old  law 11. I t  was a tim e when, he says, "any
c it iz e n  might be c a lled  upon to  serve in  defence of h is  country [and]
ju r is d ic t io n  over s o ld ie rs  might be e a s ily  confused u ith  a ju r is d ic t io n
7 6over a l l  c it iz e n s ."  Stephen holds s im ila r  views and adds th a t ju r is d ic t io n
over troops abroad in  actual service uas exercised by the Constable and the
Marshal which became obsolete f in a l ly  u ith  the enactment in  1879 o f the
77Army D is c ip lin e  Act. The lau  also s a id , observes Holdsuorth, " I f  the
7 8Chancery and Courts o f Uestm inster be shut up. • • i t  i s  tim e of war. . ."
3.52 In  tra c in g  the subsequent development of the law he appears to
use the term " M ilita ry  Lau" to  inc lude M a r t ia l Lau in  dealing u ith  the
phase between 1688 and 1879, when the Army D is c ip lin e  and Regulation Act
came in to  being. During th is  period m il ita r y  lau  rested p a rtly  upon the
au th o rity  of the Mutiny Acts and p a r tly  on the prerogative o f the Croun
79expressed in  the A rtic le s  o f War, says Holdsuorth. He concludes h is  
observation by saying th a t the ju r is d ic t io n  o f the croun over the army 
gradually  increased but over a l l  subjects in  time of re b e llio n  i t  
gradually  decayed. His reference is  perhaps to  g reater re lia n c e  on
le g is la t io n  dealing u ith  r io ts  by abandoning the use of M a r t ia l Lau 
uhich uas not a lau  in  fa c t but a p rac tice  resorted  to  by the despotic  
S tu a rt Kings in  England and la t e r  used as a p a rt o f c o lo n ia l p o licy  
abroad.
3 .53  Stephen c ite s  Coke as saying th a t i t  uas i l l e g a l  on the part of
th e  Croun to  reso rt to  M a r t ia l Lau as a sp ec ia l mode of punishing
80re b e llio n  in  contravention o f chapter 29 o f Magna C arta . Forsyth
quotes Coke's speech made in  the debate on the P e tit io n  of R ight: a
re b e l may be s la in  in  ths re b e llio n  but i f  he is  taken he cannot be put
81to  death by M a r t ia l Lau. Lord Chief Justice R o ll, says Forsyth, added 
to  th is  saying, "He is  to be t r ie d  by Common Lau". I t  has to  be 
remembered th a t the Common Lau ju r is t s  and le g is la to rs  used th e  term 
" m a r t ia ll  laus" in  the sense in  uhich us understand the modern m il ita ry  
la u . Subsequently the i l l e g a l  p ra c tic e  of applying the m il ita r y  lau  to  
c iv i l ia n s  csme to be euphem istically  c a lle d  M a r t ia l Lau, and a search 
s ta rted  fo r  g iv ing  i t  a le g a l character.
(b ) JSpecial jtejDsjaejztive ^  the jdojctrijne^as ja J ^ a rtiq jla r^ ru le  jDf^commcin ^au
3.54  As the search proceeded perforce u ith in  the confines of Common
Lau some found i t  e a s ie r to a ttr ib u te  i t  to the Royal Prerogative and
a llo t  to i t  a category "out o f the ordinary course of the common lau " to
82f i t  in  u ith  the d e f in it io n  of prerogative  given by Blackstone.
[emphasis added] Others alloued i t  to  remain as a part of the ordinary  
course of Common Lau but held divergent vieus as to  choice of ru le s . Ue 
have already seen th a t Pollock and B rounlie expressed th e ir  preference  
fo r  the ru le s  o f ju s t i f ic a t io n  but there uere others uho s ta ted  th a t  
M a rt ia l Lau uas a m anifestation  of the Common Lau ru le  th a t perm itted  
use of fo rce  against fo rc e , uhich ue may nou discuss.
3 .55  Tracing the o rig in  o f the ru le  Stephen observes:
In  the e a r l ie r  stages of our h is to ry  pouer and turbulence  
o f our n o b il i ty  uas so great th a t p riva te  uar uas a l l  but 
continual and preservation  of peace by force o f arms uas
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the f i r s t  duty of a l l  ru le rs . V io lence in  a l l  i t s  forms 
uas so common and suppression of i t  by force  uas so 
simple a m atter th a t sp ec ia l le g is la t io n  d id  not appear 
necessary
The s ta tu te s  o f 1279 and 1304 uere fo llo u e d  by one enacted in  1393 uhich 
d e a lt p a r t ic u la r ly  u ith  the suppression o f r io ts  fo r  the  f i r s t  tim e.
The S tatu te  of Treason (1 & 2 Ph & Mary, c .10 ) uhich expressly excluded 
p riv a te  uar from the d e f in it io n  of treason gave recogn ition  to  the fa c t  
th a t preservation of peace by force o f arms uas the f i r s t  duty o f a l l  
ru le rs . F in a lly ,  the R iot Act of 1704 uhich continued u n t i l  i t s  repeal 
i n . 1967 by the C rim inal Lau Act, provided the M agistrates  and those 
acting  under them to be indem nified i f  any person uas k i l le d ,  maimed or 
h u rt in  d ispers ing , seiz ing  or apprehending r io te r s .  At Common Lau an 
ordinary c it iz e n  uas duty bound to suppress a r io t ,  says Stephen, using  
only reasonable fo rc e . Accordingly, he argues th a t the indemnity ought 
to  be lim ite d  and a s o ld ie r  ought to  be protected fo r  carry ing  out such 
orders " fo r  uhich he might reasonably b e lieve  h is  o f f ic e rs  to  have good 
grounds.”8^
3.56 Oicey also speaks of the " le g a l duty" of every subject to  put
doun breaches of the peace. At the same tim e he speaks of M a r t ia l Lau
as "the r ig h t  or pouer e s s e n tia l to the very existence o f o rderly  
85government." The occasion on uhich force can be used and the kind and
86degree of force is  determined by the "necessity" of the case, adds Dicey. 
Proceeding fu r th e r  he says c a te g o ric a lly  th a t M a r t ia l Lau in  England uas
not equ iva len t to the d ec la ra tio n  o f "s ta te  o f siege" in  France and other
87co u n tries . He also re fe rs  to the case of WOLFE TONE, the Ir is h  re b e l, 
uhose t r i a l  by a Court M a r t ia l uas held to  be i l le g a l  on the ground th a t  
such ju r is d ic t io n  could be exercised by the  Croun over i t s  m il ita ry  
personnel only u ithout a ttach ing  any importance to  the fa c t  th a t the t r i a l  
took place during actu a l d iso rd er, namely, "in  times o f u a r" .
3.57 Heuston quotes M aitland  uho had spoken of M a r t ia l  Lau as "an 
improvised ju s tic e  adm inistered by s o ld ie rs ."  Dealing u ith  the content
of the pouier Houston observes th a t such summary t r i a l  w ithout indictm ent
and ju ry  in  respect o f offences not known to Common Law was ob jectionab le
88and was forbidden by the P e t it io n  of R igh t. Proceeding fu rth e r  he
exp la ins  the s ig n ific a n ce  of the term by saying th a t the power o f the
Crown was l ik e  th a t o f every o ther c it iz e n ,  re f le c t in g  the pos ition  which
arose when ordinary courtsotere "unable" to  fu n c tio n . I t  was derived from
aid  measured by the  "necessity" o f the case. At the same tim e he points
out i t s  " p e c u lia r ity "  th a t acts done durante b e llo  are not ju s t ic ia b le  by
89the ordinary tr ib u n a ls , although reviewable a fterw ards. He re fe rs  to  the
90decision in  EGAN v PI AC READY by the  I r is h  Court and expressly re je c ts  
the theory th a t i t  was a prerogative  r ig h t  and c a lls  i t  an "extension" 
of the Common Law r u le .
3 .58 Lord MacDermott also discusses I r is h  cases and in  re je c tin g  the
prerogative theory he asserts th a t " i t  is  p ra c t ic a l means of discharging  
the common law duty o f re s to rin g  o rd er" . In  describing i t s  ap p lica tio n  he 
observes th a t the m il ita r y  occupies the area, m aintains order under the  
d ire c tio n  of the Commander and estab lishes  courts and procedures as may be
9‘deemed necessary: m a rt ia l law does not e x is t  in  Northern Ire la n d , he adds.
3.59 The fa c tu a l s itu a tio n  envisaged by MacDermott v ir t u a l ly  conforms
in  substance to  one contemplated under a d ec la ratio n  o f a "s ta te  o f siege"
uhich, u n like  M a r t ia l Law, being regulated  by s ta tu te , bore the stamp of
92le g a l i t y ,  in  the language o f Joseph M in n a ttu r. In fa c t the consequences
of "promulgation" o f M a r t ia l Law are more pernicious than i t s  c i v i l  law
counterpart. As ap tly  pointed out by M in n attu r, in  the la t t e r  case, the
ess e n tia ls  of the procedure are abridged but not dispensed u ith  and the
c o n s titu tio n a l guarantee is  also not in fr in g e d . However, we f in d
ourselves in  disagreement with M innattur in  the assessment o f e v i l
consequences ensuing from M a r t ia l Law which, according to  him, are the
93same as th a t of the "s ta te  o f s ieg e". L e g a lity  may also have 
c o n s titu tio n a l and p o l i t ic a l  angles and th e  te s t o f necessity uhich
^  * h
M innattur suggests may hen/e d if fe re n t  aspects -  these fa c to rs , ue submit, 
m e rit more serious consideration in  an accurate assessment.
3 .60 Ue do not b e l i t t l e  the d i f f ic u l t y  of making such assessments.
Professor de Smith has also observed th a t ,  "our c o n s titu tio n a l lau  books
are s ile n t  on i t s  le g a l consequences” w hile  po in tin g  out th a t a s itu a tio n
in v o lv in g  a "proclam ation” o f M a r t ia l Lau has not arisen in  modem times  
94in  B r i ta in .
3.61 More than a century ago, the American Attorney G eneral, Mr.
95Cushing, spoke in  a s im ila r  v e in , a lb e it  in  a comprehensive manner:
I  say ue are u ithout la u  on th e  su b jec t. . . There 
undoubtedly are and have been emergencies o f necessity  
capable o f themselves producing and th ere fo re  ju s t ify in g  
such suspension of a l l  laus and in vo lv in g  fo r  the tim e  
omnipotence of m il ita r y  pouer. But such a necessity is  
not o f the  range or o f mere le g a l questions. Uhen M a r t ia l  
Lau is  proclaimed under circumstances of assumed necessity  
the proclamation must be regarded as the statement o f e x is tin g  
fa c ts  ra th e r than le g a l creation  of th a t f a c t .  . • pouer to  
suspend the laus and to  su b stitu te  the m il ita ry  au th o rity  
in  place o f c iv i l  au th o rity  is  not a pouer w ith in  the le g a l 
a ttr ib u te s  o f a Governor o f one of the t e r r i to r ie s  o f the  
United S ta tes . . . [emphasis added]
3.62 Houever, in  the modern American perspective the  pouer has been
viewed in  the Encyclopaedia of S ocia l Science, as inhering  a p o te n tia l  
96"d ic ta to rs h ip ” . Reference has been made to i t s  absence of use in  labour
97disputes in  England, u n lik e  America. I t  has also been pointed out th a t
the tu rn in g  point touards a c o n s titu tio n a l p a ttern  in  England came u ith
the enactment of the Emergency Pouers Act 1920. This uas n o t, ue submit,
a correct assessment. For the reasons sta ted  e a r l ie r ,  ue re ite r a te  on
the strength of the a u th o ritie s  c ite d  th a t the u n c o n s titu tio n a l phase had
spanned over the period o f the S tu art ru le  and had ceased sh o rtly
afterw ards. The Defence o f the  Realm Acts 1914-15 could not s t r ic t ly  be
ascribed to the u n c o n s titu tio n a l phase as the emergency pouer derived
98thereunder uas based on le g is la t iv e  a u th o rity .
3.63 I t  is  necessary houever to po in t out th a t in  both ju r is d ic t io n s
in  the la t e r  period the same concept o f the  m il ita r y  being c a lle d  in  "aid
of c iv i l  pouer” acquired paramount im portance. As observed e a r l ie r ,
g reater re lia n c e  on s ta tu te s  dealing  u ith  r io ts  perhaps brought about th is
change in  England. Professor Radzinouicz has traced the h is to ry  o f th e
growth of the  concept in  some d e ta il  and has d e a lt u ith  the sequence of
events th a t fo llow ed the Gordon R iots culm inating in  the Queen's Regulations
99being framed fo r  the  guidance of the  m il ita r y  in  such s itu a t io n s . He
discourages the use o f the army in  lie u  o f po lice  in  such s itu a tio n s  by
p o in tin g  to  the necessity  th a t had been occasioned of amending the
Regulations from time to time and observing th a t ”no form ula houever
ingenious would be s a t is fa c to ry .”^00
(C ) The C o lo n ia l Experience: the hard core o f the doctrine
3 .64  I t  may be tru e , as Brownlie contends, th a t s ta tu to r ily -b a s e d
emergency pouers provide in  the United Kingdom the modern s u b s titu te  fo r  
101M a r t ia l Law. I t  is  also tru e  th a t there is  no s ta tu to ry  provision  in
English law to  meet a c r is is  s itu a tio n  s im ila r  to  the d ecla ratio n  of a
102"s ta te  o f s iege” under c iv i l  la u . But these statements can be accepted
only as general p ro p o s itio n s . I t  has been observed th a t emergency laus
enacted during the current decade to deal u ith  the s itu a tio n  in  Northern
103Ire la n d  are only a step short o f M a r t ia l Law. On the o ther hand, ue may
note th a t the Emergency Pouers Act 1920, uhich is  a permanent measure, 
does not provide fo r  pouers sinsilar to  those exercised under M a r t ia l Lau; 
i t  ra th e r negates the doctrine in  th a t the proviso to  s .2 (3 )  o f the Act 
debars both punishment u ithou t t r i a l  and a lte ra t io n  of the usual procedure 
follow ed in  c rim in a l cases and thereby ru les  out t r i a l  by m il ita r y  courts . 
Even the emergency enactments o f the  second uorld uar d id not contemplate 
powers exerc isab le  under M a r t ia l Lau. The 1940 Act (3  & 4 Geo.6, c .45 ) 
provided fo r  making reg u la tio n s  fo r  t r i a l  by "spec ia l courts , not being  
Courts M a r t ia l" , [emphasis added] Broun l i e  apparently overlooked the fa c t  
th a t there is  no record of the use of M a r t ia l Lau in  Great B r ita in  since i t  
uas proscribed by the P e t it io n  of Right in  1628; a l l  recorded in c id en ts
re la te  to the overseas possessions.
3 .65  Turning now to  the c o lo n ia l experience, ue have to  say th a t
although a vague and uncodified  concept o f M a r t ia l Lau passing under the
la b e l o f Common Lau best subserved the c o lo n ia l p o licy  uhich alloued lau
to  be perverted to  meet any exigency, expediency d ic ta ted  a d if fe re n t
approach on c erta in  occasions. I t  uas sometimes considered necessary in
c e rta in  s itu a tio n s  to  provide p r io r  sanctions to  the excesses in  uhich
the  executive uas expected to  indulge in  suppressing any u p ris in g , instead
of passing Indemnity Acts as ex post fa c to  ju s t i f ic a t io n  of the  repressive
measures th a t had already been taken . In  so fa r  as the s ta tes  o f the Neu
Commonwealth are concerned, M a r t ia l Lau had been "promulgated" under
104c o lo n ia l ru le  in  Jamaica, Ceylon and In d ia :  on many occasions
le g is la t iv e  measures uere enacted but uhen th is  uas not done end the
m il ita r y  action uas sought to  be ju s t i f ie d  under Common Lau, Indemnity
Acts had to  be passed. The a tt itu d e  o f the executive is  best expressed
in  the words of S ir  David Dundas uhich exp la in  hou the c o lo n ia l po licy
105uas implemented uhen disturbances took place in  Ceylon:
. . . the lau  of Enoland is  th a t a Governor, l ik e  the Croun 
has vested in  him the r ig h t ,  where necessity a ris e s , of 
judging i t ,  and being responsible fo r  h is  work afterw ards  
so to  deal u ith  the laus as to  supersede them a l l  a id  to  
proclaim M a r t ia l Leu fo r  the safety  of the colony. • •"
The emphasis in d ica te s  the perverted view . Even Stephen, who endorsed the
statement as "s u b s ta n tia lly  co rrec t"  found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to concede such
vast powers as the underlined  expression appears to  exa c t. He observes th a t
the "proclam ation" uas re la ta b le  to  common lau  duty but re fe rs  to the
P e tit io n  o f Right to say th a t  the offenders could not be punished by the
106army. He adds, re ly in g  on URIGHT v FITZGERALD. th a t the army could not 
even use cru e l and excessive means in  the exercise of i t s  le g it im a te  
fu n c tio n .
3.66 Houever, as noted e a r l ie r ,  the I r is h  dimension is  o f spec ia l 
s ig n if ic a n c e . Ue quote a passage from K e ir  and Lauson where the position
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107in  the I r is h  context has been exp la ined:
I t  is  admitted th a t a 's ta te  of u a r' e x is ts  uhen the 
m ilita r y  fin d  themselves compelled to  a c t, not u ith in  
th e ir  le g a l powers but according to  the n ecess ities  of 
the case; and i t  may be th a t the Rsstoration of Order in  
Ire la n d  Act by increasing  the le g a l pouers of the m il ita ry  
postponed the necessity  fo r  recourse to  e x tra - le o a l  
measures. . . and the courts re ta in e d  th e ir  ju r is d ic t io n .
[emphasis added]
3.67 The enactment mentioned in  the above passage uas passed in  1920
to  deal u ith  the s itu a tio n  th a t had developed as a re s u lt  o f the
" g u e r r i l la  uar" th a t the Sinn Fein movement uas carry ing  on in  th e ir
s tru g g le  to  urest independence from B r it is h  ru le  and estab lish  a
un ited  Ir is h  Republic. But the independence movement in  Ire la n d  had
s ta rted  e a r l ie r  and an " Ir is h  Republic" had been proclaimed by the rebels
in  1798. The e ffe c ts  of th is  u p ris in g  and i t s  "bloody suppression" h a v e
108been s ta ted  to  be "deep and la s t in g " . This uas to  provide in s p ira tio n
to  the m il ita r y  uing of the Sinn Fein movement uhich had named i t s e l f
the I r is h  Republican Army. There uere sporadic disorders between 1798
and 1920 n ecess ita tin g  in  some cases enactments o f le g is la t iv e  measures.
Stephen makes a passing reference to the In su rrec tio n  Act of 1833
but s p e c if ic a lly  deals u ith  the e a r l ie r  enactment o f 1799 (39 Geo. 3 , c .11 )
109end observes as fo llo w s:
• • . t h e  words in  the I r is h  Act would only mean th a t the 
Croun has an undoubted prerogative  to  carry on uar against 
an army o f rebels  as i t  would against an invading army and 
to  exercise a l l  pouers as might be necessary to  suppress the 
re b e llio n  and to  resto re  peace and perm it Common Lau to  take  
e f fe c t .  As soon, houever, as the actu a l c o n flic t  uas a t an 
end i t  uould be the duty of the m il ita r y  a u th o r it ie s  to  
hand over the  prisoners to  c iv i l  power. This uas affirm ed  
in  Uolfe Tone's case, [emphasis added]
3.68 In  ss.13 and 14 o f the 1833 Act a s im ila r  pos ition  uas re fle c te d
in  th a t Parliam ent had to confer sp ec ia l au th o rity  on the m il ita r y  courts to  
t ry  c iv i l ia n s  as such pouer did not e x is t  a t Common Lau. The fa c t th a t s .28 
of the Act barred ju d ic ia l  rev ieu  of the actions taken under the Act meant 
th a t i t  uas an in c id en t of th e  new pouer created under the Act and i t  uas not
re la te d  in  any way to the common lau  doctrine  of n ecess ity . For, i t  uas
o  p Qu
meant to  provide an escape from the doctrine inhering  a regu lato ry  ro le  
uhich uas supposed to be monitored by the courts through ju d ic ia l  review .
This is  made fu r th e r  c le a r by s.31 uhich purports to  n e u tra lis e  the r ig h t  
to  secure the w r it  o f habeas corpus.
3 .69 Ue may also see hou the concept uas "insinuated" in to  other 
le g is la t io n  o f general ap p lica tio n  in  the United Kingdom. In  the Emergency 
Powers (D efence)(N o .2) Act 1940 ue no tice  the le g is la tu re  tin k e r in g  u ith  
the concept in  a d if fe re n t  way. In  the 1833 Act the "Court M a r t ia l"  uas 
invested  u ith  "pouer, a u th o r itie s  and ju r is d ic t io n  of any Court M a rt ia l  
and also pouer, r ig h t ,  ju r is d ic t io n  and a u th o rity  o f .  . . any Court of Oyer 
and Term iner, Gaol D e livery  or Sessions of the Peace. . •" but the 1940 Act 
empowered Regulations to  be made fo r  t r i a l  of c iv i l ia n s  and others a lik e
by "such sp ec ia l courts, not being Courts M a r t ia l ."  [emphasis added]
E a r l ie r ,  the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914 (and the  
Restoration of Order in  Ire la n d  Act 192^)had, houever, introduced a 
concept of dual ju r is d ic t io n  o f Courts M a r t ia l and Courts of Summary 
J u ris d ic tio n  regulated by the s ev e rity  of the o ffen ce . The 1920 Act 
em bellished the new concept fu r th e r  by provid ing th a t one of the members of 
the Court M a r t ia l s h a ll bs nominated by the Lord Lieutenant o f Ire la n d  a f te r  
he uas c e r t i f ie d  as a person of " le g a l knowledge and experience" by e ith e r  
the Lord Chancellor o f Ire la n d  or the  Lord Chief Justice  of England.
3.70 N otice may now be taken o f the en te rp rise  carried  on in  some other  
overseas possessions. Reference in  th is  connection may be made to an e a rly  
enactment of B r it is h  In d ia ;  The Bengal Regulation No. X o f 1804 empowered 
the Governor General in  Council to  "declare end estab lish  M a r t ia l Lau. . • 
fo r  the safety  o f B r it is h  possessions and fo r  the secu rity  of the liv e s
and property of the in h a b itan ts  thereo f by the immediate punishment of 
persons. . . who may be taken in  arms in  open h o s t i l i t y .  . . o r in  the  
actual commission of any overt act of re b e ll io n . . • or in  the act of 
aid ing and a b e ttin g . . . ” [emphasis added] The enactment did not contemplate
a s itu a tio n  uhere courts were not fu n c tio n in g . On the other hand s .2
expressly authorised suspension "in  whole or in  p art the functions of
ord inary  c rim in a l courts" and establishm ent o f "M a rtia l Lau" fo r
"immediate t r i a l  by Courts M a r t ia l" ;  sentence uas prescribed by s .3
uhich could be death and fo r fe itu r e  o f p roperty . I t  may be noted th a t
the 1833 Act discussed above also had "prompt and e ffe c tu a l punishment"
as i t s  o b je c t. Subsequent Indian enactments houever enlarged the scope
110of the pouer. In  BUGGA v EMPEROR, the Lahore High Court and on appeal
111the P rivy  Council a lso , held th a t the pouer conferred by the M a r t ia l  
Lau Ordinance of 1919 uas not lim ite d  to operate on persons "taken in  arms". 
This case was in  connection u ith  M a r t ia l Law "estab lished" in  the Punjab but 
in  Sind in  1942 i t  was "proclaimed" w ithout any supporting enactment and 
subsequently the M a r t ia l Lau (Indem nity) Ordinance (\io. X V II I  o f 1943 
uas enacted to give p ro tectio n  fo r  any"act done in  good fa ith  and in  
reasonable b e l ie f"  th a t i t  was necessary fo r  the purpose intended to  be 
secured thereby*
3.71 In  the passage from K e ir and Lawson quoted e a r l ie r ,  the provision
of t r i a l  by Court M a r t ia l has been re fe rre d  to as "increasing  le g a l powers 
of the m il ita r y "  and the expression underlined immediately fo llo w in g  i t  
is  apparently used to  convey the idea  th a t such measures are not sanctioned  
by common law . Ue have also noted a s im ila r  comment by Stephen in  respect 
of the 1799 Act. Besides, i t  has also to  be noted th a t in  the 1633 Act an 
express saving uas made in  respect o f the  action th a t could be taken in  the  
exercise of Royal p rerogative  uhich is  used in  conjunction with the term 
"M a rtia l Lau". A s im ila r  provision  using the two terms in  conjunction  
had provoked Hargrave to remark in  respect of the provisions o f the 1799 
Act th a t they had "insinuated" in to  English lau  the s o -c a lle d  doctrine  o f 
M a rtia l Law. The views o f the American Attorney General have also been 
noted. I t  is  c le a r , ue submit, th a t despite c o n flic t in g  claims and 
apparent confusion, the disputed doctrine  was a creature  of s ta tu te  pure
and simple and i t  o rig in a ted  in  a law enacted to  deal with a c o lo n ia l 
problem, th a t of Ire la n d . I t  has been erroneously confused u ith  the common
law concept o f n ecess ity . I t  was imported from c o lo n ia l Ire la n d ,
rea ffirm ed  in  English s ta tu te s  but leg itim a ted  mainly by user in  other  
overseas possessions where a s im ila r  process o f bu ttress in g  i t ,  o ften  by 
le g is la t io n , was also fo llo w ed . In  fa c t the doctrine formed an im port a i t  
p art of the c o lo n ia l p o licy  uhich sanctioned a l l  measures th a t would 
entrench and perpetuate c o lo n ia l r u le .  U n fo rtu n ate ly , as we s h a ll  soon 
see, th is  "pub lic  p o lic y " , as the ju d ic ia ry  appears to  have accepted i t ,
converted the perverted notion of common lau  in to  a le g a l d o c trin e .
( 2) The doctrine and " ju s t ic ia b i l i t y "
3 .72 The importance of the  issue o f ju s t ic ia b i l i t y  to  the s o -c a lle d
doctrine  is  re fle c te d  in  the fa c t th a t one contemporary observer has been
m isled to say th a t the executive can "declare m a r t ia l lau " in  England but
the power is  co n tro lled  by the courts who determine whether fa c ts  and
112circumstances ju s t ify in g  the d ecla ratio n  e x is t .  He also overlooks,
l ik e  B row nlie, the im portant fa c t  th a t " M a rtia l Lau" uas declared in
overseas t e r r i to r ie s  and the  English courts were c a lle d  upon to  s ta te  the
lau  in  th a t context. N evertheless, ue propose to  examine the decisions
not to  confirm the narrow aspect but to  gain a comprehensive v iew .
1133.73  In  PHILLIPS v EYRE. which was an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment
the Governor o f Jamaica was sued. A re b e llio n  had broken out in  the  
colony which was suppressed by "proclaim ing M a r t ia l Lau". Subsequently 
the  lo c a l le g is la tu re  passed an Act o f Indem nity. The action uas 
dismissed. In the Exchequer Chamber i t  was held  th a t "whether the proper, 
as d is tinguished from the le g a l,  course has been pursued by the Governor
in  so g reat a c r is is ,  i t  is  not w ith in  the province o f a court o f law to  
pronounce. . ."  In  an action of th is  type the onus uas upon the defendant 
to  prove ju s t i f ic a t io n  uhich in  th is  case was provided by the enactment.
I t  uas th ere fo re  incumbent upon the court to adjudge the le g a l i ty  of the
action  complained of by the  standard la id  down in  the lau  but the court, 
a f te r  tra c in g  the pouer to  the common law duty of " a l l  the Queen's 
subjects" o f suppressing a r io t  went on to  hold th a t "To act under such 
circumstances w ith in  the precise l im its  o f the law is  a d i f f i c u l t  and 
may be an impossible ta s k . . ."  The court thus re fra in e d  from applying  
even the usual te s t  o f necessity as a lo g ic a l course to  be fo llow ed and 
blessed the e f fo r ts  o f the executive to  p e rve rt the common law .
3 .7 4  U/e have seen Stephen's views on indemnity and also Pollock and
B ro w n lie 's  views on ju s t i f ic a t io n  and the te s t o f necess ity . The only 
ra t io n a l explanation fo r  th e  observations quoted above could be found
in  the fa c t  th a t the court had u n w ittin g ly  a lte re d  the content o f the  
power w ith the re s u lt  th a t i t  lo s t i t s  o r ig in a l character so th a t the 
connection which the a u th o ritie s  had estab lished between the content and 
character of the pouer was broken. The ju d ic ia ry , by g iv ing  the executive  
a carte  blanche, became a party to the process which led  to  the  
entrenchment o f the  perverted notion o f the pouer a v a ila b le  at common law. 
Also im plied  in  the decision is  the fa in t  h in t  of the confusion between 
the general common lau  character aid the prerogative character o f the  
pouer. This confusion, i t  is  possible to  argue, may have led  the  court to
hold th a t the issue uas completely n o n -ju s tic ia b le . For, although in  the
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case o f PROHIBITION del ROY aid  in  the PROCLAMATION case i t  was held
116th a t prerogative  uas a part of the common la u , in  DARNEL'S case the  
court held th a t the manner and mode of i t s  exercise could not be examined. 
The content being s t i l l  examinable, ju d ic ia l  review in  th is  case a lso , 
we submit, was not completely barred .
3.75 The way in  uhich the common law was a lte re d  by the court in  the
above case has not been taken note of by any a u th o rity  but i t  i s  admitted
117th a t in  the case of Exparte P .P . MARAIS the Privy Council had performed 
such an o peratio n . The case arose out of the Boer War in  the Cape Colony 
of South A fr ic a . A fte r es tab lis h in g  M a r t ia l Law the Array Commander had
promulgated M a r t ia l Law R egulations. Any person "reasonably suspected" 
of having committed any offence against the Regulations uas l ia b le  to  be 
summarily a rrested  end sent out o f the D is t r ic t  to be d e a lt w ith by a
m il ita r y  court which could i n f l i c t  the death p en a lty . Such acts as
being found a c tiv e ly  in  arms against the Croun, in c it in g  others to take 
up arms, a c tiv e ly  a id ing  and ass is tin g  the enemy and committing any overt 
act endangering the safety  of the  armed forces and the subjects of the  
Croun constitu ted  o ffences. The p e t it io n e r , who was arrested  and detained  
pending t r i a l ,  having unsuccessfully pleaded fo r  h is  release in  the Supreme 
Court of Cape Colony, cane up with an ap p lica tio n  fo r  leave to appeal to  
the P rivy C ouncil. The ap p lica tio n  uas re je c te d .
3.76 The court heIds
. . • when actua l war is  raoino acta done by the m il ita ry
a u th o ritie s  are not ju s tic ia b le  by ordinary T rib u n a ls  and
th a t the uar in  th is  case was a c tu a lly  rag ing . . . is  
s u f f ic ie n t ly  evidenced by the fa c te  disclosed by the 
p e t it io n e r 's  own p e t it io n  and the a f f id a v i t .  . . the fa c t  
th a t fo r  some purposes some Tribunals  had been perm itted  
to  pursue th e ir  ord inary course is  not conclusive th a t war 
was not rag in g . . . w [emphasis addedj
3.77 Proceeding fu r th e r  the court observed:
• • . Doubtless cases of d i f f ic u l t y  a rise  uhen the fa c t  o f 
a s ta te  o f re b e llio n  or in su rrec tio n  is  not c le a r ly  
estab lish ed . I t  may often  be a question where a mere r io t  
or disturbance n e ith e r  so serious nor so extensive as re a lly  
to  amount to a war a t a l l ,  has not been tre a te d  w ith an 
excessive s e v e r ity , and whether the  in te rve n tio n  of m il ita ry  
force uas necessary. • . [and] . . . the framers of the
P e tit io n  of Right knew w e ll what they meant uhen they made a
condition of peace the ground of i l l e g a l i t y  of u n c o n s titu tio n a l
procedure. . .
3 .78 The Common Law ru le  th a t when the courts were closed i t  was
"tiroe of war" was apparently a lte re d  by th is  decis ion: the te s t had to lose 
i t s  supposed conclusive ch arac te r. In fa c t ,  houever, the o ld  ru le  uas 
founded on n ecessity : the courts are unable to function  when a war is  
ac tu a lly  rag ing: the ru le  was in d ic a tiv e  of th is  fa c tu a l p o s itio n . The 
conclusive character uas im parted to  i t  la t e r  to  guard against possible  
misuse of " m a r t ia ll  lawe" as i t  uas then understood. For, as Holdsuorth
observes, the e a rly  S tuart Kings extended th e ir  ju r is d ic t io n  by
in te rp re t in g  "tim e of war11 to include a time of apprehended disturbance
8nd using against o ther persons the pouer uhich could be applied only
118against the m il ita ry  personnel (namely, " m a r t ia ll  la u e " ).
3 .79 As ue have seen, a t Common Lau, " m a r t ia ll  lau eN could not be used 
against c iv i l ia n s  uhether in  time of uar or in  peace: use of force against 
fo rce  uas meant to  suppress re b e llio n  and although a reb e l could be s la in  
in  b a t t le  i f  he uas taken in to  custody he had to  be t r ie d  and punished by 
the Common Lau. The court appears to  drau a d is tin c tio n  betueen r io t  and 
disturbance on one hand and uar on the o ther hand end to  concede in  the  
case of uar measures o f "excessive s e v e rity "  uhich uas contrary to  common 
la u . The Court appears to  have sctsd on the assumption th a t the use of 
m a rtia l lau  (" m a r t ia ll  lau e") uas perm itted a t common lau  against any 
person. This basic assumption, in  our submission, uas urong. Acting on 
the same assumption, u n fo rtu n a te ly , the court also appears to  lay doun
the broad proposition th a t any act done by the m il ita ry  a u th o ritie s  uas 
not ju s t ic ia b le  uhen actua l uar uas rag in g . The scope o f ju d ic ia l  revieu  
uhich uas inherent in  the te s t  o f necessity uas thus re s tr ic te d  to  
determ ining uhether or not actua l uar uas rag in g .
3.80 This decision became the fundamental au th o rity  fo r  the long l in e
o f Ir is h  decisions a ris in g  out o f the 1920-21 d iso rd er. Houston's
commendation of these decisions, uhich ue are u n fortunate ly  unable to
endorse, appear to  be based on h is  misconstrued "s im p lic ity  o f the o r ig in a l
119common lau  p o s it io n ."  Ue propose to  demonstrate th is  by examining the
120leading case, J? v ALLEN at some len g th . On December 10 in  1920 the 
Lord Lieutenant o f Ire la n d  proclaimed m a rtia l lau  in  c erta in  counties  
and c i t ie s .  On December 12 the Army Chief there  promulgated Regulations  
uhich in t e r a l ia  provided th a t any unauthorised person found in  possession 
of arms and ammunition on conviction by a m il ita r y  court uas l ia b le  
to s u ffe r  death. On 3anuary 19 in  1921 the p e t it io n e r , a c iv i l ia n ,  uas
arrested  in  possession o f arms in s id e  the proclaimed area. A fte r the  
m ilita ry  court had passed a sentence of death the p e tit io n e r  made an 
ap p lica tio n  on February 9 praying fo r  w rits  o f habeas corpus and 
c e r t io r a r i .
3.81 The court form ulated certa in  questions. In  try in g  to fin d  out
the pouers o f the executive in  dealing u ith  an armed in s u rre c tio n  the 
court took account o f the various in su rrec tio n s  and re b e llio n s  since the  
time o f Richard I I  ending u ith  the I r is h  in su rrec tio n  of 1798 and 
observed th a t " a l l  these uere exh ib itio n s  o f armed forces p u b lic ly  
displayed in  the f i e ld  and fo llo u ed  in  most cases by Indemnity A cts."
I t  uas noticed  th a t in  Ire la n d  th ree  d if fe re n t  kinds of le g is la t io n  uere
used. A fte r re fe rr in g  to  the fa c t  th a t habeas corpus uas tem porarily
suspended and Indemnity Acts uere passsd, the provisions o f the 1799 Act
(39 Geo. 3 , c.11 noticed  by us e a r l ie r )  uere discussed. Uhen the court
said th a t th is  enactment gave s ta tu to ry  e ffe c t to  the "proclam ation"
th a t uas made by the Lord L ieutenant, the erroneous concept of m a rt ia l lau
seems to be operating in  i t s  reasoning. Accordingly, re ly in g  on the HARAIS
case ( supra) the court went on to hold th a t
. . . uhen m a rtia l lau  is  imposed and the necessity  
fo r  i t  e x is ts , o r in  o ther words uar i s  s t i l l  rag ing , 
the court has no ju r is d ic t io n  to  question any act done 
by the m i l i t a r y .  . .
The court took note o f the " g u e r r i l la  character" of the  warfare but
cred ited  the executive u ith  the same power th a t could be otherwise used.
3.82 Reliance uas also placed on the FIARAIS case to  ansuer in  the
a ffirm a tiv e  the question, could the m il ita r y  court act as the ordinary  
courts in  the area uere open, although the court re a lis e d  th a t the language 
employed in  the HARAIS case uas too w ide. Having noted e a r l ie r  th a t  
necessity uas the proper te s t the court s lipped in to  an e rro r  in  not 
applying i t .  I t  uas incumbent on the court to  determine i f  necessity  
warranted the t r i a l  to  be held  by the m il ita r y  court and not by th e  ordinary  
courts th a t uere open. The common lau  ru le  uas misunderstood and the
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executive uas alloued to  p e rvert the lau  as the  S tuart kings had done.
3.83 In  dealing u ith  the la s t question as to  uhether the m il ita r y
court could impose the death sentence the te s t o f necessity  uas thus
construed: w. . . during the continuance of h o s t i l i t ie s ,  and u h ile  m a rt ia l
lau  e x is ts , the n ecess ities  o f the s itu a tio n  are fo r  the decision of the
121m ilita r y  a u th o r it ie s . . ."  The te s t uas thus robbed of i t s  s te r lin g
q u a lity  o f ju d ic ia l  review uhich i t  inhered . The perverse e f fe c t  of the
exercise becomes apparent uhen i t  i s  vieued in  the l ig h t  of the c o u rt's
re fu s a l to  give due consideration to the fa c t  th a t Parliam ent had passed
spec ia l laws such as the  Restoration of Order in  Ire la n d  Act and the
Firearms Act uhich provided sp ec ia l procedure and p e n a ltie s  uhich uere
less onerous. The court gave primacy to the act o f the executive in
proclaim ing m a rtia l lau  end m isconstruing the enactments held  th a t ,  " . • •
the ob jection  is  one ra th e r fo r  the consideration of Parliam ent than fo r  th is
court, uhich cannot, durante b e l lo . co n tro l the  m il ita r y  a u th o ritie s  or
122question any sentence imposed in  the exercise o f m a r t ia l law ."
3 .84  Ue submit th a t the common lau  te s t  o f necessity  a ffirm ed the
p rin c ip le s  inherent in  the Rule o f Law. The "o b jec tio n " appears to  have
been based on the p rin c ip le s  o f equal p ro tec tio n  of the law . The
Restoration o f Order in  Ire la n d  Act became lau  on 9th August 1920. In
s .1 (1 ) i t s  purpose uas s ta ted :
• • . ouing to the  existence of a s ta te  of d isorder in  
Ire la n d , the ordinary lau  is  inadequate fo r  the prevention  
and punishment o f crime o r the maintenance of o rd er, H is  
M ajesty in  Council may issue re g u la tio n s  under the Defence 
of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914. . . fo r  securing the 
re s to ra tio n  and maintenance of order in  Ire la n d , and as to  
the pouers and d u tiss  o f the Lord L ieu tenant. . • and of the
members of His M a jes ty 's  fo rc e s . • .
The subsequent "promulgation" o f M a r t ia l Lau pursuant to  the common lau  duty
of suppressing the re b e llio n  could not be in  derogation of th is  lau  uhich,
s ig n if ic a n t ly ,  d id  not expressly save the pouers o f the executive to  pursue
another course bypassing th is  Act. But the po s itio n  adopted by the court
vested the m il ita r y  a u th o r itie s  w ith the d iscre tio n  e ith e r  to proceed under 
th is  Act which was less onerous, or otherw ise. They could pick and choose 
any person and deal with him more severe ly .
3 .85  The court re fe rre d  to  Stephen's observation th a t nthe m il ita ry
courts uere committees formed fo r  the purpose o f carry ing  in to  execution
123the d iscre tio n ary  pouers assumed by the Government.tt C e rta in ly , a
w r it  o f c e r t io r a r i  would not issue to  such committee but the detention
being in  pursuance o f an i l l e g a l  t r i a l  -  a t r i a l  uhich was a n u l l i t y
in  law being held by persons who had no ju r is d ic t io n  in  law to  do so -  a
w r it  o f habeas corpus could c e rta in ly  issu e . The decis ion , we submit,
cannot be supported on any ground. I t  r e lie d  on a dictum of Lord Hailsbury
124in  the TILONKQ case uhich had arisen out of the Boer War, but stretched
i t  too f a r .  The dictum ran thus:
The proceedings of a m il ita r y  court derive  th e ir  sole  
ju s t i f ic a t io n  and a u th o rity  from the existence of actu a l 
re b e llio n , and the duty of doing whatever may be necessary 
to q u e ll i t . and to restore  peace and o rd er, [emphasis added]
The dictum agreed w ith the common lau  concept and Stephen's explanation
of the duty: the duty to  q u e ll did not necessarily  include the duty to
try  and punish.
1253.86 In  EGAN v HACREADY. O'Connor, M.R. displayed great courage and
independence of judgment in  d issenting  from the above decision although the  
fa c ts  o f th8 case were s im ila r .  I t  was observed th a t the I .R .A . was 
employing the method of ir re g u la r  war and the help of the army was invoked 
to  suppress the re b e llio n  but i t  remained to  be seen "whether i t  deprived  
the lie g e  subjects of the King o f the  pro tection  the common and s ta tu te  
leu  o f the B r it is h  C onstitu tio n  afforded them." The court r ig h t ly  
id e n t i f ie d  the two elements th a t were present in  the case, namely, the 
"court" uhich assumed ju r is d ic t io n  had no le g a l sta tus  whatsoever and
the death penalty fo r  the offence charged (possession of ammunition in  
th is  case) had no le g a l sanction from B r it is h  law .
3.87 The court accepted D icey 's  comment on the PIARAIS case ( supra). that
the law uas widely s ta ted  th e re , but said th a t even i f  the  p rin c ip le s  of 
the  case were held to  be of u n iv e rs a l a p p lic a tio n , in  th is  case there was 
an a d d itio n a l fa c to r .  Powers of the m il ita r y  being derived from the 
Croun, uhether and to  what ex ten t the prerogative uas lim ite d  by 
the Restoration of Order in  Ire la n d  Act, m erited exam ination.
3 .88  The court observed th a t the Act was not merely enabling but
p ro h ib ito ry  too; th a t the claim o f the m il ita r y  a u th o rity  to  override
sp ec ia l le g is la t io n  made fo r  a s ta te  of war would seem to  c a l l  fo r  a new
126B i l l  o f Rights; and th a t the claim was negated by the DE KEYSER case.
3.89 The court r ig h t ly  pointed out th a t Parliam ent did not th ink  th a t
. . .  i f  England i t s e l f  became the th e a tre  o f war, the  
m ilita ry  au th o rity  could. . • d isregard th is  provision  
and t r y  any one in  any way i t  chose.
This observation could be taken to mean th a t the executive was
d e lib e ra te ly  p erverting  the common law in  c o lo n ia l t e r r i t o r ie s ,  as
contended by us.
3.90 The case ue submit presented a correct statement of the law end
Heuston is  not r ig h t in  saying th a t O'Connor M.R. d id  not fo llo w  i t  la te r
128in  R (CHILDERS) v ADJUTANT GENERAL fo r  the decision in  th a t case had to  
take account o f the changed le g a l p o s itio n . He also c r it ic is e s  the decision  
as being based on the less acceptable theory th a t m a rtia l law uas a 
prerogative  r ig h t .  In  fa c t  the debate as to  whether i t  was traceab le  to  
Royal P rerogative  or to common lau  duty to  meet fo rce  with force uas a 
f u t i l e  exerc ise in  semantics; s ta tu to ry  provision would p re v a il equally  
against both and i t  was on th is  fo o tin g  th a t the case was decided. The 
court expressly held th a t Parliam ent could le g is la te  th a t any person not 
k i l le d  in  c o n flic t  should be t r ie d  according to law in  rep ly  to  the 
contention th a t the m il ita r y  had the r ig h t  at common law to  k i l l  any person 
in  meeting force by fo rc e .
3.91 In  the CHILDERS case the court held th a t the Restoration of Order
in  Ire la n d  Act uas not app licab le  as the Ir is h  Pres State u ith  a 
p ro v is io n a l C onstitu tio n  had come in to  being and the Act had to be 
s p e c ia lly  adapted before i t  could be ap p lied . The Act d id  not apply 
proprio  vigors to  the army of the Ir is h  Free S ta te . There is  houever
one d iffe ren ce  in  th is  case. While in  the EGANS case ( supra) the  court
jurisdiction
assumed/without accepting the  proposition la id  down in  the MARAIS case 
( supra) . the proposition is  not questioned here and the l in e  taken in  the  
ALLEN cass ( supra) is  fo llow ed .
3 .92 Molony, C .3 . who had d e livered  judgment in  ALLEN held in
129R (GARDE) v STRICKLAND th a t the only question which arose fo r  the  
decision in  the case uas uhether war uas s t i l l  continuing and a f te r  
discussing the evidence given on a f f id a v its  answered i t  in  the a ff irm a tiv e .  
This approach of the court a r is in g , as we have submitted e a r l ie r ,  from a 
misunderstanding o f the true  rulB  of common lau  la t e r  c ry s ta llis e d
in to  a s t r a it - ja c k e t  formula to  deal with every case.
3 .93 The omnibus te s t evolved by the  court uas challenged in  R (RONAYNE)
130v STRICKLAND. The prerogative theory used in  EGAN appears to  have 
been pressed in to  service by the p e t it io n e r .  The court refused to be 
drawn in to  uhat i t  c a lled  "academic in q u iry "  and observed th a t although the  
King was at the head of a standing army he could declare uar in s id e  h is  
own dominion merely by proclam ation. The court then proceeded on uhat i t  
ca lled  aConcession7to  hold th a t w ithout such proclamation a s ta te  of 
th ings may e x is t uhen the m il ita r y  forces of the Crown may be employed in  
"executing M a r t ia l Law". By accepting the concession and adopting i t  as 
the basis o f the decision the base of the concept uhich allowed c a llin g  
the m il ita r y  in  "a id  o f c iv i l  pouer" uas broadened and equated u ith  
"M a rtia l Law". The decision epitom ised the process o f metamorphosis 
h in ted  at e a r l ie r .
1313 .94  In  CLIFFORD v 0 * SULLIVAN the court accepted a tech n ica l p lea
and dismissed the ap p lica tio n  fo r  a w r it  o f P ro h ib it io n , holding i t  to be
misconceived. The p e t it io n e r  had come up with a prayer in  appeal to  the
House of Lords fo r  a d ire c tio n  to  the m il ita r y  a u th o ritie s  not to  proceed
with h is  t r i a l  a f te r  being unsuccessful in  the I r is h  co u rt. I t  uas held  
by the  House of Lords th a t such a w r it  could only be issued against an 
in fe r io r  court preventing them from usurping a ju r is d ic t io n  uhich was 
not vested in  i t .  The o ff ic e rs  in  th is  case did not act under any 
commission from the Crown but were merely carry ing  out the in s tru c tio n s  
of the Army C h ie f. I t  was n e ith e r  necessary nor d es ira b le , the court h e ld , 
to  discuss as such, im portant questions of c o n s titu tio n a l law .
3.95 The decision of the I r is h  Court o f Appeal in  JOHNSTONE v O'SULLIVAN
can perhaps be supported on i t s  own fa c ts  in  th a t i t  was "s ta tu to ry "  M a r tia l  
Law end not common law , B3 the courts appeared to  hold , in  execution of 
which mother and daughter were being t r ie d .  In  th is  case an armed re b e llio n  
had broken out a f te r  the Government of the I r is h  Free State uas constitu ted  
and Parliam ent had met, which i t  had convened. With the approval of
Parliam ent the Government had sanctioned s e ttin g  up of courts and
committees by the army to in q u ire  in to  and punish c e rta in  offences such as 
possession of arms and ammunition u ith  which the p e tit io n e rs  were charged.
3.96 In  re p e llin g  the contention th a t the r ig h t  to q u e ll the re b e llio n
belonged to the B r it is h  army and th a t the P ro v is io n a l government of the
Ir is h  Free State had no "paper t i t l e "  to  ra is e  or use any army, i t  uas h e ld ,
" I t  is  not o f the essence of the p r in c ip le  o f MARAIS* case th a t the army
uhich invokes the p ro tection  o f th a t p r in c ip le  should be subject to  th is
or th a t Code. I t  i s  s u f f ic ie n t  th a t i t  should be an army properly
133c en tra lised  to undertake th a t ta s k ."
3.97 Proceeding fu r th e r  O'Connor, L .J . observed th a t the p r in c ip le
involved in  the case uas salus populi supreme le x : so long as the re b e llio n  
was raging the courts had no pouer to  in te r fe re  with the action of the army. 
Pirn, J . on the o ther hand, invoked the common law p r in c ip le  th a t i t  uas
the bounden duty o f the government to  defend i t s e l f  uhen attacked "and
in  doing so to  use any force uhich is  necessary and to  c a l l  on a l l  u e l l -
134disposed persons to  ass is t i t . ” Here a lso , as in  HARAIS. the  
proposition  uas broadly s ta te d : n e ith e r  p r in c ip le , in  our submission,
could be extended genera lly  to  confer u n q u a lified  pouer o f t r i a l  and 
punishment of any person by the army. On the o ther hand, pouer in  th is  
case uas derived apparently from the parliam entary approval of the  
measures but th e ir  Lordships un fo rtu n ate ly  overlooked th is  aspect.
3 .98 The decision uas apparently in fluenced by the doctrine evolved
in  the English cases; no e f fo r t  uas made to  evaluate i t .  The fa c t  th a t  
the courts of independent s ta tes  o f common lau  ju r is d ic t io n  uere not bound by 
the English decisions appears to  have been overlooked. I t  uas open to  such 
courts to fin d  out the true  p o s ition  at common la u . Ue have already seen 
th a t the ru le  th a t actions of the executive durante b e llo  uere not 
ju s t ic ia b le  fo llow ed from a u id e ly -s ta te d  and possibly in ad verten t 
dictum in  the FIARAIS case. U n fortunate ly  i t  uas accepted in  the la t e r  
decisions u ith o u t question. Ue have seen th a t the decisions in  HARAI5.
ALLEN and SULLIVAN did not s ta te  the tru e  p o s ition  in  common lau  as respects  
the ru le  uhich perm itted the use o f force against force and uhich 
postulated the army being c a lle d  in  a id  and not in  replacement o f c iv i l  
pouer. On a p r io r i  considerations the acts o f the army uere l ia b le  to  be 
subjected to the te s t of n ecess ity . Ue have also seen th a t the old te s t  
(uhen courts uere closed i t  uas tim e o f uar) uas also founded on 
"necessity” . Although th is  te s t  has been termed r ig id  the neu te s t ,  ue 
submit, uas equally  r ig id  in  th a t the court concerned i t s e l f  in  determ ining  
mainly as the p re lim inary  issue -  uhether "actu a l uar is  rag ing” ; the  
decision on the  issue of ju s t ic ia b i l i t y  durante b e llo  uas to  fo llo u  as a 
necessary c o ro lla ry  although the  in te r - r e la t io n  between the two uas never 
s p e c ifie d . Thus, the English courts d id  not properly ta c k le  the issue
of ju s t ic ia b i l i t y  in  a comprehensive manner -  they lim ite d  " ju s t ic ia b i l i t y "  
to  a narrow compass. This happened, as we hava seen, in  deciding as a 
pre lim inary  issue what, under the old te s t ,  was a conclusive fa c t end 
could not be in  "issue" at a l l .
3.99 The po in t which is  o f paramount consideration in  eva lu a tin g  the  
m erits  o f the doctrine was brought into, focus by O'Connor, M.R. in  EGAN, 
when he sta ted  th a t i f  England had become the " th eatre  o f war" the  p o s itio n  
would have been d if fe r e n t ;  in  other words, the  doctrine which was evolved  
in  the context o f c o lo n ia l s itu a tio n s  would not have, most probably,
seen the l ig h t  of day. I t  is  subm itted, th e re fo re , th a t in  the absence of 
ju d ic ia l  response to  a p a r a l le l  s itu a tio n  ac tu a lly  a r is in g  in  England the  
propositions enunciated in  wide terms in  a few English cases in  the 
c o lo n ia l context do not commend themselves as c o n s titu tin g  a v a lid  d o ctrin e  
of law with a common law b as is .
3.100 I t  is  in te re s tin g  to  note th a t the doctrine  has not been accepted
135in  the United S tates despite a vague claim made to the contrary; we
136submit th a t the law s ta ted  in  MILLIGAN s t i l l  represents the correct
p o s itio n . In  a Hawaiian s ta tu te  o f 1900, the term " M a rtia l Law" is  used.
During the second world war the Governor placed the te r r i to r y  under ' t t a r t ia l
Law" in  exercise o f powers conferred by the Act and m il ita r y  courts were
137also set up th e re . In  DUNCAN v KAHANAMOKU the Supreme Court f in a l ly
dscided in  favour o f the prisoner who had been convicted by such a court and
had applied fo r  habeas corpus. The court evaluated the doctrine and re je c te d
i t  by tra c in g  the le g is la t iv e  h is to ry  of the Act to say th a t the term was not
used to  mean "supplanting" of c iv i l  courts by m il ita r y  tr ib u n a ls . The
138decision in  MOYER v PEABODY did n o t, as contended, weaken the a u th o rity  
of MILLIGAN. In  th a t case an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment against the 
State Governor was dismissed. I t  was not a case of "M a rtia l Law" but o f a 
"state  of in s u rre c tio n "  being declared , as envisaged under the State
C o n s titu tio n . We proceed now to  examine the response to  the doctrine in  
another common law ju r is d ic t io n , the New Commonwealth.
(3 ) The doctrine and the New Commonwealth
(A) _A General View
3.101 In  1947 B r it is h  In d ia  was s p l i t  up in to  two independent s ta te s , 
In d ia  end Pakistan; and in  1949 and 1956 resp ective ly  each o f these 
s ta tes  had i t s  own "autochthonous" C o n s titu tio n . The eastern wing of 
Pakistan "proclaimed" i t s  independence in  (larch 1971; and in  November 
1972 the sovereign s ta te  o f the Peoples Republic o f B&igladesh enacted 
i t s  own C o n s titu tio n . In  the same year Ceylon a lso , which had become 
independent in  1948, enacted i t s  "autochthonous" C o n s titu tio n . We have 
seen th a t there was a c o lo n ia l t ra d it io n  fo r  the use o f "m a rtia l law" in  
the t e r r i t o r ie s  comprising these new s ta tes  but i t  was only in  Pakistan  
at f i r s t  and then in  Bangladesh th a t we n o tice  a p ra c t ic a l ap p lica tio n
of th is  d o c trin e . We propose to  discuss th e re fo re , sep ara te ly , the 
developments there in  the c o n s titu tio n a l context o f the two s ta te s .
3.102 In  the fo llo w in g  two decades we see c o n s titu tio n a l developments 
tak ing  place in  South-east Asia and A fr ic a . In  1957 the fed era tio n  of 
Malaya aid  Ghana, and in  the succeeding years , N ig e r ia , Tanganyika ( la t e r  
renamed Tanzan ia ), Uganda, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia were born. We s h a ll  
have occasion to  tra c e  in  some d e ta i l ,  in  appropriate contexts, the post- 
independence c o n s titu tio n a l developments th a t had taken plac8 in  each of 
these s ta te s . A ll  these s ta te s , as w e ll as Ceylon ( la t e r  renamed S ri Lanka) 
had, however, one point in  common which was re levan t to  the present context: 
n e ith e r  in  the Independence C onstitu tio ns nor in  the successive 
"autochthonous" C onstitu tio ns  was any mention of the term "m a rtia l law" 
made in  any manner. In  th is  respect these C onstitu tions provided a close 
p a r a l le l  to  th a t of the United S ta tes . On the other hand, in  the Indian  
C o n s titu tio n , as w e ll as in  the successive Pakistan C onstitu tio ns  (1956,
1962, and 1972), except the la s t one of 1973, the terra "m a rtia l law" was 
used, although not d e fin ed . The Ind ian  provision which appeared in  P art 
I I I ,  captioned, "Fundamental R ights", may be quoted in  extenso:
A r t .34 -  Notwithstanding anything in  the foregoing provisions of 
th is  P a rt, Parliam ent may by law indemnify any person 
in  the service o f the Union or of a State or any other 
person in  respect o f any act done by him in  connection 
with the maintenance or re s to ra tio n  o f order in  any area  
w ith in  the te r r i to r y  of In d ia  where m a r t ia l law was in  
force or v a lid a te  any sentence passed, punishment 
in f l ic t e d ,  fo r fe i tu r e  ordered or other act done under 
m a rtia l law in  such area.
In  v ir tu e  o f A r t .3 5 (a ) ( i )  power to  make laws re fe rre d  to  in  A r t .34 was
conferred e xc lu s ive ly  on Parliam ent; clause (b ) contemplated continuance
of the "law in  force immediately before the commencement of the
C o n stitu tio n " in  respect o f the m atters re fe rre d  to  in  sub-clause ( a ) ( i ) .
Explanation I  of A r t . 372 defined the term "law in  fo rce" in  an " in c lu s ive
manner although i t  d id  n o t, in  term , re fe r  to  common law .
3.103 However, the  accepted p o s ition  is  th a t the term "law in  force"
included common law but i t  is  also to  be noted a t the  same time th a t the
courts o f Republican In d ia  were not bound to  fo llo w  the  English decisions.
In  other words, we submit they were not bound to  accept "m a rtia l law" as a
doctrine o f common law . Even so, we concede th a t i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to
p re d ic t the course th a t the ju d ic ia l  approach could take in  th is  m atter
should "m a rtia l law" be used at any time in  independent In d ia . The reason
is  tw o fo ld . Although the term was not defined, the reference to "sentence
and "'punishment" in  A r t .34  coupled with the fa c t  th a t the provision was
in  derogation of "fundamental r ig h ts "  guaranteed under a r t ic le s  20 to 22,
in  p a r t ic u la r ,  envisaged the p o s s ib ility  o f the m il ita r y  wing o f the  s ta te
exerc is in g  at times both le g is la t iv e  and ju d ic ia l  functions in  such manner
as to  resemble a s itu a tio n  obta in ing  under "m a rtia l law ". However, i t
can be argued th a t the provision in  terms did not contemplate m il ita ry
in te rve n tio n  and th a t the expression "or any other person" re la te d  to the
"indemnity clause" c o n s titu tin g  the f i r s t  part o f the a r t ic le  and not to  
the "v a lid a tio n "  clause" c o n s titu tin g  the second p a r t .  I t  is  also to be 
noted th a t the "v a lid a tio n  clause" did not in  term re fe r  to  a le g is la t iv e  
action and the two expressions "sentence" and "punishment" could be 
re la te d  re sp ec tive ly  to  the exercise of ju d ic ia l  and executive fu n c tio n s . 
That a p art, the provision contained in  the a r t ic le  merely authorised ex 
post fa c to  le g is la t io n ;  i t  d id  not in  term debar ju d ic ia l  review durante 
b e llo .
3.104 There is  another form idable l in e  of reasoning ra ised  by the
proposition th a t the doctrine has been recognised in  the C onstitu tio n  in  
139A r t .359. The a r t ic le  authorised the President to "suspend" the r ig h t  to
move any court fo r  the enforcement of a l l  or any of the r ig h ts  conferred  
by P art I I I  (fundamental r ig h ts ) when and where the "Proclamation of 
Emergency" (made under a r t . 352) was in  o p era tio n . Th is  indeed c u rta ile d  
the scope of ju s t ic ia b i l i t y  durante b e llo  but th is  fa c t did n o t, we submit, 
per se c o n stitu te  a recogn ition  of the d o c tr in e . The executive power of the  
Union, o r fo r  th a t m atter o f the P res iden t, was, according to  A rt. 7 3 , co­
extensive with the le g is la t iv e  power. A ll  powers ava ilab le  under the  
c o n stitu tio n  were th e re fo re  to  be found in  the le g is la t iv e  l i s t s  contained 
in  the Seventh Schedule; new powers could not accrue during the emergency.
I t  is  noteworthy th a t there is  no mention of "M a rtia l Law" in  any o f the  
e n tr ie s  o f the le g is la t iv e  l i s t s  and although A rt. 248 spoke of 
"residuary powers of le g is la t io n "  o f Parliam ent the provision was 
s p e c if ic a lly  re la te d  to the Concurrent and State L is ts  and i t  did not 
enlarge the ambit of the Union L is t  de hors those two l i s t s .  I t  is  
d o ubtfu l, we submit, i f  the President exerc is in g  the executive power of 
the Union could authorise the m i l i t a r y ,  during the currency of th e  
Proclam ation, to  supersede c i v i l  adm in is tra tion  completely so as to  
issue " M a rtia l Law Regulations" aid  e s tab lish  m il ita r y  tr ib u n a ls  to  try
c iv i l ia n s  s ith e r  fo r  the breach of any reg u la tio n  o r fo r  any o ffence . I t
is  th e re fo re  in c o rre c t to say, we submit, th a t d e c la ra tio n  o f emergency
and suspension o f fundamental r ig h ts  uas "nothing e ls e  than declaratio n  
140of m a rt ia l law ."
3.105 The pos ition  in  §outh-east Asia appears to  be less  ambiguous in
view o f th a  fa c t  th a t although the C o n stitu tio n  of M alaysia  was modelled
on th a t o f In d ia  i t  did not contain any provision s im ila r  to  A rt. 34
of the Ind ian  C o n s titu tio n , as is  also the case in  Singapore. In  th is
respect the  po s itio n  genera lly  in  S ri Lanka as w e ll as in  the African
sta tes  of the Commonwealth was not much d i f fe r e n t .  There was, o f course,
some d iffe ren ce  in  the p o s itio n , in te r  se. Ceylon d id  not have a B i l l  of
Rights but excepting Ghana and Tanganyika, the Independence C onstitu tions
o f other A frican s ta tes  contained ju s t ic ia b le  B i l l s  o f R ights , saddled
141a lb e it  with "sp ec ia l"  derogation clauses fo r  times of emergency. Although
S ri Lanka's autochthonous C onstitu tio n  contained a chapter on "Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms", fo llo w in g  Kenya's example, i t  replaced the concept of
"emergency" by th a t o f "pub lic  sec u rity "  but i t  has to  be noted th a t the
re levan t provisions of the two States were not exac tly  s im ila r .  In  o ther
African s ta te s  also there  were changes, as we s h a ll see, introduced by
142successive "autochthonous" C o n s titu tio n s . N evertheless there  uas at
le a s t one point common to  the "emergency" provisions of the  C onstitu tions
o f a l l  s ta te s , inc lu d in g  those of the Indian sub-continen t, namely, in
each case the d ec la ra tio n  o f emergency was subjected to  parliam entary
c o n tro l. Thus, a l l  measures taken during emergency derived v a l id i ty  from
parliam entary sanction end the doctrine  could have l i t t l e  scope to  operate.
Even in  England, as we s h a ll see, le g is la t iv e  provisions are made to cope
143with "emergency" s itu a tio n s ; in  times of war the w r it  of habeas corpus
was "suspended" by le g is la t io n  in  the past but la t e r  d if fe r e n t  measures were
144adopted with the o b je c t, a lb e i t ,  of c u r ta il in g  ju d ic ia l  review . The
Indian provision ( a r t .  359) which purported to suspend the w rit of 
habeas corpus did not have a p a r a l le l  in  African C o n s titu tio n s . Thus, 
on the question o f ju s t ic ia b i l i t y  durante b e llo  the Indian C onstitu tion  
d e f in ite ly  formed a separate category.
3.106 On the other hand, we submit th a t as in  In d ia , in  o ther s ta tes  
also , the  C onstitu tio ns did not envisage such measures to  be taken during  
emergency as au thoris ing  the m il ita r y  to  "promulgate reg u la tio n s" and to  
t r y  and punish o ffenders . I t  i s  to  be noted th a t although the executive  
power was vested in  the Head of State in  each case, the provision everywhere 
was not exac tly  s im ila r .  The provision of S r i Lanka C onstitu tio n  is  
noteworthy in  th a t s .5 , which described the "supreme instrum ents o f s ta te  
power" contemplated exercise o f the "executive power of the people" through 
the President and the Cabinet M in is te rs . The various functions of the  
President were defined in  d e ta il  in  s . 21 but there was no mention in  i t  of 
"m a rtia l law ". On the other end of the  spectrum stood the Zambian provision  
s.53 contemplated th a t the executive powar s h a ll vest in  the President but 
i t  also stated th a t "unless otherwise provided" he s h a ll act in  h is  own 
d e lib e ra te  judgment and s h a ll not be bound to fo llo w  any advice tendered.
By s .54 the supreme command of the armed forces was also vested in  him and 
he was expressly empowered "to  determine the o p era tio n a l use of the armed 
fo rc e s " . Despite the d iv e rs ity  o f form of the provisions respecting  
executive power, the power did not embrace, we submit, the doctrine of 
m a rtia l law even in  the case o f those C onstitu tions which contained  
"emergency p rov is ions".
3.107 The la s t  po in t to  be noted in  th is  connection is  as respects the  
"e x is tin g  laws". Despite the verb a l d iffe ren ce  in  the re le v an t provisions  
of the d if fe re n t  C o n s titu tio n s , as in  In d ia , in  the other s ta tes  also  
English Common Law was saved, as an "e x is tin g  law ", to  be continued in  
force u n t i l  a lte re d . N evertheless, the courts o f the independent s ta tes  
were not bound to  fo llo w  the English decisions in  which the s o -c a lle d
doctrine  of m a rtia l law uas evolved except in  cases where the appella te
ju r is d ic t io n  of the P rivy  Council was not abolished. I t  i s  in te re s tin g
to note th a t in  not a s in g le  C onstitu tio n  was the  d e f in it io n  of the term
"e x is tin g  law" e x p l ic i t ly  re fe rre d  to  law la id  down by the courts although
reference was made to  w ritte n  or enacted law; in  many cases the d e fin it io n s
145c arrie d  an exhaustive sense -  "means".
3.108 Notice has also to be taken of the d iffe ren ce  in  the fa c tu a l  
po sition  respecting c o lo n ia l t r a d it io n .  In  the A frican s ta te s  covered 
by th is  study as w e ll as in  Southeast Asia the c o lo n ia l ru le rs  did n o t, 
i t  appears, use "m a rtia l law ", as they had done in  B r it is h  In d ia  and 
Ceylon. Perhaps i t  is  due to  th is  reason th a t not only the c i v i l  governments, 
but even the m il ita ry  governments in  A fr ic a  did not use "m a rtia l law" 
during the independence e ra . The s itu a tio n  in  th is  respect d iffe re d  
m a te ria lly  from th a t o f Pakistan and Bangladesh which we proceed to examine 
now.
(B) M a r t ia l Law in  Pakistan and Bangladesh 
( a) jA Genera_l View
3.109 In  Pakistan , the P ro v in c ia l government o f Punjab had f i r s t
proclaimed m a rtia l law in  the c ity  of Lahore in  March 1953. The second
time i t  uas the Federal government who announced on the 21st A p r il 1977 th a t
disturbances ( r io t s  e tc . a r is in g  from p ro tests  against what uas c a lle d
"rigged" general e le c tio n s  in  March) had passed beyond the powers of the
P ro v in c ia l governments to co n tro l them and th a t i t  had th e re fo re  d irec ted
the armed forces to *a id  the c iv i l  power*. " M a rtia l law" uas imposed on
three c i t ie s ,  Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad and the m il ita r y  was empowered
146to set-up courts fo r  t r i a l  and punishment o f offenders in  those c i t ie s .
A few months la t e r ,  in  3 u ly , fo llo w in g  a coup d 'e t a t , the Chief o f Army
S ta ff ,  who assumed the o f f ic e  o f Chief M a r t ia l Law A dm in istrator,
147"proclaimed m a rtia l law" throughout the country. E a r l ie r  a lso , on two
occasions, there  were s im ila r  coups in  P akis tan , in  1958 and 1969, end
each tim e "m a rtia l law" was imposed on the country. Each tim e the m il ita ry  
ru le rs  made " M a rtia l Law Regulations" and also set up m il ita ry  courts to  
t r y  and punish o ffenders .
3.110 In  East Pakistan "m a rtia l law" was declared in  March 1971 and
m il ita r y  ru le  continued there during the Pakistan army's contro l over the
t e r r i to r y  which ceased in  December with th e ir  surrender to  a jo in t  command o f
Indian and Bangladesh fo rc e s . On 15th August 1975 there was a coup d 'e ta t
in  Bangladesh and President M ujibur Rahman uas k i l le d .  I t  was announced
over the Dacca Radio th a t the armed forces had "taken over" and th a t
148"m a rtia l law" had been proclaim ed.
3.111 In  the Bangladesh C o n s titu tio n , P art I I I ,  captioned "Fundamental 
R ights", contained A rt. 46 which corresponded to A r t . 34 of the Indian  
C onstitu tio n  but i t  d iffe re d  m a te r ia lly  in  one respect from i t s  Indian  
counterpart in  th a t the w ords"M artial Law" was om itted from i t .  On the  
other hand, in  Pakistan , A rt. 196 of the f i r s t  C onstitu tio n  of 1956 
reproduced verbatim  the  Indian A rt. 34. L a te r, the C onstitu tions of 1962 
and of 1972 also contained s im ila r  provisions in  A rtic le s  223A and 278 
re s p e c tiv e ly . Although the 1973 C onstitu tio n  did not fo llo w  the  precedent 
i t  provided in  A rt. 24jfH hat "The Armed Forces s h a ll ,  under the d ire c tio n  
of the Federal Government, defend Pakistan against th re a t o f war, and, 
subject to  law, act in  a id of c iv i l  power when ca lle d  upon to  do so ."  
[emphasis added] The a r t ic le  uas amended end the two under-noted, among 
other clauses, were la t e r  added:
(2 )  The v a l id i ty  of any d ire c tio n  issued by the Federal Government 
under clause (1 ) s h a ll  not be ca lle d  in  question in  any co u rt.
(3 ) A High Court s h a ll not exercise any ju r is d ic t io n  under A rt.
199 in  re la tio n  to  any area in  which the Armed Forces of 
Pakistan a re , fo r  the  tim e being acting  in  a id  o f c iv i l  
power in  pursuance of a r t .  245.
I t  may be noted in  th is  connection th a t A rt. 199 ( 1 ) ( b ) ( i )  embodied the
remedy of habeas corpus w ithout naming i t  in  terms and th a t during an
"emergency" the Federal government could make "provisions fo r  suspending
in  whole or in  p a r t , th e  operation of any provisions of the C o n s titu tio n ",
under A r t . 2 3 2 (2 ) (c ) .  In  P art X ("Emergency Provis ions") which contained
the  last-m entioned a r t ic le ,  also appeared A r t .237 as fo llo w s :
Nothing in  the C o nstitu tio n  s h a ll prevent the Parliam ent 
from making any law indem nifying any person in  the serv ice  
of the Federal Government or a P ro v in c ia l Government, or 
any o ther person, in  respect o f any act done in  connection
with the maintenance or re s to ra tio n  of order in  any area
in  P akistan .
(b ) The ,3udi£ijal_Rj3S£oris£
1493.112 In  an e a r ly  case, UMAR KHAN v CROWN the Pakistan court appears
to  have displayed an ambivalent approach to  the doctrine in  th a t although
at one place i t  held  th a t "in  pure Anglo-Saxon law" s e ttin g  up of m il ita ry
150tr ib u n a ls  fo r  exercise o f ju d ic ia l  power was not recognised at a l l ,
at another place in  the judgment i t  was also held th a t "durante b e llo
. . . the w i l l  of the m il ita r y  commander is  as supreme in  the area as i f
151he were in  m il ita r y  occupation of enemy te r r i to r y "  although the court
hastened to add th a t once "m a rtia l law" was l i f t e d ,  the courts functioned
in  the usual way and acts of m il ita r y  involvement could be c a lle d  in to  
152question. In  th is  case the  ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus was f i le d  
a fte r  "m a rtia l law" was l i f t e d ,  which had been "proclaimed in  Lahore by 
the P ro v in c ia l government in  1953. The p riso ner had been convicted and 
sentenced fo r  the breach of a M a r t ia l Law Regulation by a m il ita r y  court.
An Ordinance had been passed v a lid a tin g  such sentences. The v ire s  o f the  
Ordinance was upheld which was the sole question to  be determined in  the 
case, according to the co u rt. Thus the v a l id i t y  of the "proclamation of 
m a rtia l law" uas not in  question but c e rta in  general observations made by 
the court gave r is e  to  some misunderstanding in  a la t e r  case, as we s h a ll  
see.
1533.113 During m il ita r y  ru le  the same High Court in  MIR HASAN v ST ATE.
154which de Smith commends as a "courageous d ecis io n ", s tated  the law more
accurately and p re c is e ly , thus: uin  a country where the army takes over to
suppress r io ts  or d isorder and to  restore  peace and order by the
proclamation of m a rtia l law i t  would be described as the law of necessity
. • . even i f  there is  m il ita r y  ru le  in  the country, such ru le  is  not
a rb it ra ry  or uncontro lled  by p r in c ip le s  nor is  i t  the simple and pure w i l l
155of the  Commander. . ."  In  equally  strong language the court jea lo u s ly  
guarded the r ig h t  of ju d ic ia l  review and sa id , " i t  is  the inherent
156
ju r is d ic t io n  of the superior courts of the country to  in te rp re t  the  law . • ."  
By using i t s  power o f in te rp re ta t io n  the court struck down the  M a r t ia l Law 
Regulation by which the case o f the  p e tit io n e r  was tra n s fe rre d  from the 
ordinary c rim in a l court to  a sp ec ia l m il ita r y  court and thereby shattered
the myth o f n o n - ju s t ic ia b i l i ty ,  durante b e llo . o f the actions of the
156ae xe c u tive .
3 .114 The Supreme Court performed a s im ila r  operation by s tr ik in g  down 
two M a r t ia l Law Instruments in  ASMA 31 LAN I  v GOVERNMENT OF PUNJAB. 157 One 
of the regu lations  authorised detention of any person by the m il ita ry  
a u th o r itie s  and the o ther took away the r ig h t  of ju d ic ia l  review o f the  
courts . The court traced in  some d e ta i l  the use of m a r tia l law in  B r it is h  
In d ia  and also in  Ire la n d  and South A fr ic a  and observed th a t "the te s t of 
in te rfe ren c e  has always been the te s t o f n e ce s s ity ."  Th is  was 
undoubtedly a correct statement of the law but the fa c tu a l s itu a tio n  did not 
correspond to  i t :  the English Courts had, as we have shown, adopted a s t r a i t -  
jac k e t form ula of lim ite d  ju s t ic ia b i l i t y .
3.115 Proceeding fu r th e r  the  court observed th a t the maxim, 
in te r  armes leoes s i le n t , applied in  the m unicipal f i e ld  in  such a 
s itu a tio n  where i t  had become im possible fo r  th e  courts to fu n c tio n . We 
have already seen how the common law ru le  on th is  po in t ("tim e of war") 
uas wrongly s ta ted  in  the MARAI5 case ( su p ra ). The o ld  common law ru le  uas 
adhered to by th e ir  Lordships when they sa id : " . . .  i t  is  a w e ll-e s ta b lis h e d  
p rin c ip le  th a t where c iv i l  courts are s i t t in g  and c iv i l  a u th o ritie s  are
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158fu n c tio n in g , establishm ent of M a r t ia l Law cannot be j u s t i f i e d . ”
1593.116 In  ST ATE v ZI A-UR-RAHMAN the Supreme Court was c a lled  upon 
to  determine the v a l id i ty  of A r t .281 of P ak is tan 's  In te rim  C onstitu tion  
of 1972 which purported to  preclude ju d ic ia l  challenge to  the acts done 
under the m il ita r y  regime th a t the new C onstitu tio n  had rep laced . The 
court upheld the provision but held th a t i t  merely v a lid a te d  the acts 
done, proceedings taken or orders made in  the exercise o f powers derived  
from the measures enacted by the M a r t ia l Law regime but i t  did not oust 
the ju r is d ic t io n  of the  courts to  pronounce upon then .
3.117 The f u l l  bench of Lahore H i^ i Court declared i l le g a l  in  DARVESH 
ARBEV v FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN. 160 the "m a rtia l law" proclaimed in  Lahore 
in  1977 in  pursuance of A r t .245(1) of the 1973 C o n s titu tio n , by the c iv i l  
government. The court unequivocally re jec ted  the doctrine  and observed 
th a t re lia n c e  on Common Law by the Attorney General uas misplaced in  th a t 
in  England there uas no w ritte n  C onstitu tio n  as in  Pakistan and th a t the  
term "m a rtia l law" did not occur in  the 1973 C onstitu tio n  although i t  
occurred in  the previous C onstitu tions and also in  the Indian
C o n s titu tio n . The court also pointed out th a t the new A rt. 237 did not
embody the  o ld  provision as i t  did not have any"va lida tion  c lause". The 
court also re fe rre d  to the decisions in  UMAR KHAN. ASMA 31LANI and
ZIA-UR-RAHMAN ( a l l  supra) and observed th a t "m a rtia l law" uas not 
recognised in  those cases a lso . The newly in serted  clause (3 ) o f A r t .245 
(by the C onstitu tio n  [Seventh Amendment] Act 1977) was read with clause
(1 ) and construed to hold th a t the c o u rt's  ju r is d ic t io n  to  e n te rta in  the  
ap p lica tio n  was not ousted. I t  was held th a t clause (3 )  did not become 
operative inasmuch as the army did not act "in  a id  o f c iv i l  power" in
conformity with clause (1 ) in  th a t the army had to  act "subject to  law"
and the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act 1977 was u l t r a  v ire s  clause (1 )  
i t s e l f .  I t  uas held th a t the amended Act authorised the army to act not in
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aid  but in  derogation of c iv i l  power by sub jecting  c iv i l ia n s  to  the Army 
Act and provid ing th a t they could be t r ie d  by Courts M a r t ia l.
3.118 In  dealing with contemporaneous s itu a tio n  in  Karachi, th e  High
Court there  came to a d if fe re n t  conclusion in  NIAZ AHMED KHAN v PROVINCE OF 
161SIND. The court quoted w ith approval a passage from the UMAR KHAN
case ( supra) which ran thus:
In  the  th ir d  sense in  which i t  is  part of English  
c o n s titu tio n a l law, m a r t ia l law means r ig h ts  and 
o b lig a tio n s  of the m il ita r y  under common and s ta tu te  
law of the country to  re p e l fores by force w hile  
ass is tin g  the  c iv i l  a u th o r itie s  to  suppress r io ts ,  
in su rrec tio n s  o r o ther d isorders in  the land.
162The court then went on to hold as fo llo w s:
I t  may be s ta ted  generally  th a t subject to app licab le  
c o n s titu tio n a l l im ita t io n ,  the M a r t ia l Law A u th o rities  
in  the enforcement o f the  m a rtia l law may do a l l  acts 
which are reasonably necessary fo r  the purpose of 
re s to rin g  and m aintain ing pu b lic  o rd er, [emphasis added]
The court did not express any opinion on the v a l id ity  of the Pakistan Army
(Amencfcnent) Act 1977 but held th a t the amendment o f the C onstitu tio n  (th e
new clauses (2 ) to (4 ) o f A rt. 245) was v a lid  and the hearing of the
p e tit io n  th ere fo re  remained suspended by v ir tu e  o f A rt. 2 4 5 (4 ). In  the
p e tit io n  a d ec la ra tio n  uas sought th a t "the proclamation of m a rt ia l law" and
s e ttin g  up of m il ita r y  courts were i l l e g a l .  One of the judges however
observed th a t although the army can apprehend those who threaten to  d is turb
peace such persons can only be t r ie d  by ordinary c iv i l  courts which
163had adm ittedly not ceased to  fu n c tio n .
3.119 In  respect o f the "m a rtia l law" declared by the Chief o f Army
S ta ff  a few months la t e r ,  the seme High Court, in  SIDDIQUE KHARAV v 
164PAKISTAN. re p e lled  the contention th a t i t  uas declared under A r t .  245 
of the C o n s titu tio n . The court held th a t the Federal Government i t s e l f  
ceased to e x is t  by v ir tu e  o f the Proclamation but refused to  go fu r th e r  in to  
the m atter as n e ith e r uas the Proclamation challenged nor was the Chief 
M a rt ia l Law Adm inistrator made party to the proceedings.
Conclusion
3.120 In  the Absence of any reported decision i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  express
any opinion about the approach of the Bangladesh ju d ic ia ry  to  the so-
c a lle d  doctrine of m a r t ia l laui but i t  can at le a s t be said th a t in  the
usual course the Bangladesh courts are expected to fo llo w  the decision of
the Pakistan courts in  m aintain ing  the co n tin u ity  o f the ju d ic ia l  t ra d it io n
165in  th a t t e r r i to r y  which, u n t i l  re c e n tly , formed a part o f P ak is tan# I t  
is  apparent th a t the Pakistan courts genera lly  refused to  accept the doctrine  
at i t s  face va lu e . In  Bangladesh a lso , i t  appears th a t courts have refused  
to  accept "m a rtia l law" as a norm of "leg itim acy" and in  many cases the
High Court has released " p o l i t ic a l  prisoners" detained by the m il ita ry
166ru le rs . E vidently  the m il ita r y  ru le rs  in  both countries staked
th e ir  claim to " leg itim acy" on the promulgation o f "m a rtia l law" re ly in g
on c o lo n ia l t ra d it io n s . Indeed the  la t t e r  could only be e f fe c t iv e ly
re fu ted  by the constant pressure o f in te l l ig e n t  and vigorous "public
opinion" which could ensure a fu l ly  s a tis fa c to ry  operation of the "value-
process" at a l l  le v e ls . Although such pressure has in  fa c t  b u i l t  up in
Pakistan possibly as a reaction  to  recurrent m il ita r y  in te rve n tio n  i t  had
not reached the desired le v e l .  I t  was perhaps fo r  th is  reason th a t in
some of the Pakistan decisions the re je c tio n  of the doctrine  is  made in  a
feeb le  aid equivocal manner. There is ,  however, no doubt th a t as in
Northern Ire la n d  (a lb e i t  there i t  uas ordinary m il ita r y  in te rve n tio n  and
not "m a rtia l law") the Pakistan courts were bound to  be in fluenced by the
167contemporary environm ental background provided by m il ita r y  "excesses".
Chapter 4
EMERGENCY PROVISIONS UNDER LEGISLATION:
UNITED KINGDOM
I . L eg is la tio n  fo r  the "Defence of the Realm"
(1 ) A General View
4.1 In discussing the decision in  the SHIPMONEY case we have
noticed how the court in s ta lle d  the concept of "necessity" as a supra-
1
c o n s titu tio n a l norm. We also had occasion to point out th a t the relevance
2of the ancient decision is  not lo s t .  In  the law enacted end declared  
during the la s t two world wars we fin d  ample support fo r  th is  p ropos ition . 
We propose to  discuss these now and see how the concept "defence of the  
realm ", born out o f "necessity", developed gradually to  s u it  the chenging 
conditions of the modern age. In  th is  in q u iry  we w i l l  confine ourselves, 
fo r  obvious reasons, mainly to  the provisions respecting detention without 
t r i a l .
4 .2  The English kings had to f ig h t  many b a tt le s  fo r  the defence of
the realm . For the conduct o f war they arrogated to themselves wide powers
which came to  be acknowledged as the "w ar-prerogative" of the Crown. We
have already seen th a t l ik e  other prerogative powers i t s  scope was also
d e lim ite d , a lb e it  g rad u a lly , with the encroachment thereon o f the
parliam entary enactments which had the e ffe c t  of increasing  the power of
3the Crown over the armed fo rc e s . By leaving untouched the common law 
pro tection  of personal l ib e r ty  o f the c it iz e n  which had c ry s ta llis e d  
in  the provisions of Magna C arta , the P e t it io n  of R ight, the B i l l  of 
Rights and in  the r ig h t to the w r it  o f habeas corpus, i t  was expected th a t  
the ju d ic ia ry  would s tr ik e  the r ig h t balance between the in te r e s t  of the  
sta te  and the c it iz e n  by using the a u x ilia ry  concept of "necessity" to 
meet the exigencies o f war. Parliam ent also stepped in  at tim es and 
during the Napoleonic wars i t  passed what came to be popularly  known as 
the Habeas Corpus Suspension Acts.
4 .3  As S ir  Charleton Kemp Allen observes, when war broke out in  1914
the p u b lic  re a lis e d  th a t there was a "n a tio n a l emergency" such as had not
4
ex is ted  fo r  over a hundred years . Three enactments were passed in  quick 
succession in  1914, on the 8th and 25th August and on the 27th November, 
to  be h e re a fte r  ca lle d  c o lle c t iv e ly  as the f i r s t  s e r ie s . The la s t one, 
named The Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914 (h e re a fte r  ca lled  
the Consolidation Act) which amended the law and repealed the  e a r l ie r
4k
enactments, was i t s e l f  amended in  1915. The purpose of the law was spelled  
out in  the preamble o f the f i r s t  Act: "to confer on H is Majesty in  Council
power to  make Regulations during the present war fo r  the Defence of the  
Realm."  The underlined expression also fig u red  in  the short t i t l e  of 
each one of the successive enactments passed in  1914-15.
4 .4  In  co n trast, during the second world war, each one of the three  
enactments passed in  1939-40 c a rried  the short t i t l e ,  Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act, and the preamble of the f i r s t  Act of th is  series  (h e re a fte r  
ca lled  the second s e rie s ) also sta ted  the purpose d if fe r e n t ly ,  as 
fo llo w s:
. . .  to  confer on H is Majesty certa in  powers which i t  
is  expedient th a t H is Majesty should be enabled to  
exercise in  the present emerqencv: and to  make fu r th e r  
provision fo r  purposes connected with the defence of 
the realm , [emphasis added]
4 .5  The gradual change in  the approach of the law-makers is  re fle c te d
in  a few more im portant points of d iffe re n c e . In  1637, the judges in  the 
SHIPMONEY case had "conferred" power on the King to take measures th a t he 
deemed expedient fo r  the "good and safety  of the kingdom" when the "whole 
kingdom was in  danger". In  1914, in  a s im ila r  context, the parliam ent used 
the expression, "the p u b lic  safety  and the defence o f the realm ". In  1939, 
Parliam ent widened the concept fu r th e r  using a chain of expressions running 
thus: "the p ub lic  s a fe ty , the defence of the realm , the maintenance of
pub lic  order, e f f ic ie n t  prosecution of war, m aintain ing  supplies and 
services e s s e n tia l to  the l i f e  of the community."
4 .6  Events attending and fo llo w in g  the f i r s t  world war brought home 
to the Government the r e a l i t ie s  of the "emergency" s itu a tio n s  with a great 
v a r ie ty  of problems of domestic importance which could not be expressed 
adequately by the term "pub lic  sa fe ty"  a lone. I t  is  th ere fo re  not su rp ris in g  
to  fin d  th a t some o f the expressions used in  the 1939 Act mentioned above 
have been borrowed from the Emergency Powers Act 1920 which was enacted
at the end of the f i r s t  world war as a permanent provision " fo r  the  
pro tection  of the Community in  cases of Emergency". The 1920 Act 
contemplated the d ecla ratio n  o f a "s ta te  of emergency" when "there have 
occurred or are about to occur events of such a nature"as are l ik e ly  to  
deprive the community of the e ssen tia ls  of l i f e  as a re s u lt  of d isru p tion  
in  the supply and d is tr ib u tio n  of food, w ater, fu e l ,  l ig h t  e tc . During 
the currency of the Proclamation of Emergency regu lations  could be made 
fo r  securing the e ss e n tia ls  o f l i f e  to the community and fo r  the  
preservation of peace.
4.7 Although the new concept of "emergency" was born in  1920 the 
concept of "w ar-prerogative" was never lo s t s ight o f .  There was, 
neverthe less , a d iffe ren ce  in  the treatm ent o f the o ld  concept in  the two 
series  o f Acts which does not appear to  have been taken note o f anywhere.
In  the second series  of Acts, s . 5 o f the 1939 Act expressly s ta ted  th a t  
"the power conferred by or under the Act s h a ll be in  addition  to , and not 
in  derogation o f, the power exercisable  by v ir tu e  of the prerogative  o f the  
crown." (emphasis added) Although the provision was not fre e  from 
ambiguity there was a c le a r in d ic a tio n  th a t a l l  regu lations  made under
the Act had to  be w ith in  the fo u r com ers o f the au th o rity  delegated under 
the Act. No mention was made of prerogative  in  s.1 of the Act which d ea lt 
with the regulation-m aking power. In  co n trast, i t s  counterparts in  the  
f i r s t  s e r ie s , ss.1 of both the f i r s t  as w e ll as the  Consolidation Act use 
common language to  s ta te  th a t -
H is Majesty in  Council has power during the  continuance
of the present war to issue re g u la tio n s . • . [emphasis added]
£5 W
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4 .8  In  the Consolidation Act there was, no doubt, a change in  the
co llo ca tio n  o f words fo llo w in g  those quoted above. Me s h a ll have to  deal 
with th is  aspect in  g reater d e ta il  but fo r  the  present we submit th a t s.1 
of the f i r s t  series  of Acts was in  two p a rts : the f i r s t  part asserted
the existence of p rerogative power and th e  second part in d ica ted  the power
created and conferred by the s ta tu te . This p o s itio n , we submit, remained
unchanged in  the Consolidation Act. I t  was not a ffec ted  by the ju x tap o s itio n
of words and phrases fo llo w in g  those quoted above. Me concede th a t the
decision of the House o f Lords, to  be discussed p resen tly , was to  the
co n tra ry . The le g is la t iv e  h is to ry  of the f i r s t  series  of Acts stated by
P ro f. G.M. Keeton however, supports our proposition although he does not
5a rr iv e  a t the same conclusion as ours.
4.9  P ro f. Keeton observes th a t the f i r s t  two Acts of the series  only 
declared th a t the Crown had power to  issue reg u la tio n s  concerning the 
e x is tin g  powers and duties o f the Admiralty and the Army Council but the 
Executive in te rp re te d  i t  in  a d if fe re n t  sense and made reg u la tio n s  d ire c tin g  
arres ts  e tc . which were declared u l t r a  v ire s  by the courts leading to  the  
enactment of the th ird  Act, the Consolidation Act. I t  is  c le a r th ere fo re  
th a t the Acts contemplated and regulated  the exercise of the "war- 
prerogative" which, according to  us, was contemplated by the f i r s t  part 
o n ly .
4.10 Indeed, as we have seen, Common Law did not concede to the Crown 
any prerogative  to  in te r fe re  with the personal l ib e r ty  o f the c it iz e n .  The 
use of M a r t ia l Law against c it iz e n s  in  the purported exercise of the war- 
prerogative was forb idden .^  Did the change in  the language in  the 
Consolidation Act, aimed at conferring  th is  power, re a lly  achieve i t s  
object ? The House of Lords said yes. Me hear in  th e ir  Lordships' 
decision an echo o f the SHIPMONEY case. Me submit th a t the law was 
"s tra ined" by th e ir  Lordships and we re ly  on A lle n 's  observations made
in  connection with the e f fe c t  o f the f i r s t  world war. The courts were 
n o t, he says, "averse, on occasions, from s tra in in g  the law in  favour of
0 « 0
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obvious n ecess ities  of a tim e of perj^ il" and th a t "the resis tance to the
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reg u latio n s  was genera lly  unsuccessful". This s ta te  of a f fa ir s  may have, 
perhaps, prompted the observation th a t the "c o n s titu tio n a l phase" in  
England did not s ta r t  u n t i l  the enactment o f the Emergency Powers Act
1920 .8
(2 ) The f i r s t  world war and the provision fo r  internm ent
( A) The Acts and the Regulation
4.11 liie proceed to  examine now the  law enacted in  1914 on detention  
without t r i a l  and the leading decision thereon, of the House of Lords, to  
which we have re fe rre d  above. An e x tra c t from the  re levan t provision
of the Consolidation Act is  quoted below :-
s .1 (1 ) His Majesty in  Council has power during the continuance of the
present war to  issue reg u la tio n s  fo r  securing the pub lic  safety  
and the defence of the realm . AND as to  the powers and duties  
fo r  th a t purpose of the Admiralty and Army Council and of the 
members of His M ajes ty 's  forces and other persons acting  in  
th is  b eh a lf; AND may by such regu lations  authorise the t r i a l  
by c o u rts -m a rt ia l, or in  the case of minor offences by courts  
o f summary ju r is d ic t io n , and punishment of persons committing 
offences against the regu lations  and in  p a r t ic u la r  against 
any of the provisions of such regu lations  designed -
(a ) to  prevent persons communicating with the enemy. . .
(b ) to  secure the safety  of H is M ajes ty 's  fo rc e s . . .
(c ) to  prevent the spread of fa ls e  rep o rts . . .
(d ) to  secure the navigation  of vessels . . .
(e ) otherwise to  prevent assistance being given to the enemy
[emphasis added; the word AND w ritte n  in  c a p ita ls  
at two places in  the f i r s t  para fo r  emphasis]
4 .12 I t  was under th is  provision th a t Reg.14B was framed but before  
we in s crib e  th a t we may quote below the provisions of s.1 of the Defence 
of the Realm Act 1914 (th e  f i r s t  Act) so th a t the change in  the 
co llo ca tio n  of words can be b e tte r  appreciated .
s.1 H is M ajesty . . .has power. . . to  issue reg u latio n s  as to
the powers and d u ties  of the Admiralty and Army C ouncil, and 
of the members of H is M a jes ty 's  fo rces , and other persons 
acting in  h is  behalf fo r  securing the pu b lic  safety  and the 
defence of the realm : AND may, by such reg u la tio n s , authorise  
the t r i a l  by courts m a rt ia l and punishment of persons 
contravening any of the provisions of such regu lations  designed -
(a ) to  prevent persons communicating with the enemy. • .
(b ) to  secure the  safety  of any means of communication. . .
[emphasis added; the word AND w ritte n  in  c a p ita ls  at 
one place in  the f i r s t  para fo r  emphasis]
4.13  We submit th a t the semi-colon in  the f i r s t  paragraph of s.1
in  both the Acts d iv ides the provision in to  p a rts . I t  i s  our contention  
th a t the f i r s t  part was declarato ry  of the w ar-prerogative  and in  th is  
connection i t  is  to be noted th a t the expression "the pub lic  safety  end 
the defence of the realm" s ig n if ie d  th is  power and the  expression, in  
both the Acts, re ta in ed  i t s  place in  the f i r s t  p a r t .  In the la t e r  Act 
there was some ju x tap o s itio n  of words w ith in  the f i r s t  part which 
a ffec ted  the said expression and i t  was on th is  change th a t the House o f 
Lords placed greatest re lia n c e .
4 .14  Lie may now quote the re levan t parts  of Reg.148:
Where on the recommendation of a competent naval or 
m ilita r y  a u th o rity  or of one of the advisory committees 
h e re in a fte r  mentioned, i t  appears to  the Secretary of 
State fo r  securing the pub lic  safety  or the defence o f the  
reaim i t  is  expedient in  view of the h o s tile  o rig in  or 
association of any person th a t he s h a ll be subjected to  
such o b lig a tio n s  end re s tr ic t io n s  as are h e re in a fte r  
mentioned, the Secretary of S tate may by order requ ire  th a t  
person fo rth w ith , or from tim e to  tim e, e ith e r  to  remain in ,  
or to  proceed and reside in ,  such place as may be s p ec ified  
in  the order, and to  comply with such d ire c tio n  as to  
rep o rtin g  to the p o lic e , re s tr ic t io n  of movement and 
otherwise as may be s p ec ified  in  the o rder, or to  be 
in tern ed  in  such place as may be s p e c ifie d  in  the o rd er.
Provided th a t any such order s h a ll ,  in  the case of any 
person who is  not a subject of a s ta te  at war with His  
M ajesty, include express provision fo r  the  due consideration  
by one of such advisory committee of any representation  he 
nr,ay make against the o rd er, [emphasis addedj
4.15 I t  is  necessary to  in d ica te  some other im portant provisions of the
Regulation not covered by the above e x tra c t . Non-compliance with the order 
was made an o ffen ce . In terned  persons were to  be tre a te d  as Prisoners of 
War. The advisory committee was to  be presided over by a person who
held or had held "high ju d ic ia l  o f f ic e " .
(B) The J u d ic ia l Response
4.16 We proceed to examine the in te rp re ta t io n  of the above provisions
th a t appeared in  the decision of the House of Lords in  v HALLIDAY. ex
p. ZADIG.9
4.17 The m atter arose out of an ap p lica tio n  fo r  Habeas Corpus which
uas refused by the Kings Bench. The decision being affirm ed by the  
Courts of Appeal the  m atter cane up in  appeal before the House of Lords.
The short question th a t uas a g ita ted  at each stage uas th a t the reg u latio n
uas u l t r a  v ir e s .
4.18 The appellan t Arthur Zadig uas born in  Germany of German parents
in  1871. He became a n a tu ra lis e d  B r it is h  subject in  1905. In  October
1915 he uas arrested  and in terned  under an order passed by the Home
Secretary under Reg.148 which ran thus:
Whereas on the  recommendation of competent m il ita ry  
a u th o rity  appointed under the Defence of the Realm 
Regulation i t  appears to  me fo r  securing pub lic  safety  
and defence of the realm . . . I  hereby order th a t Arthur 
Zadig. • • be in te rn e d , .[emphasis added]
4.19 I t  is  to  be noted th a t the expressions "pub lic  sa fe ty"  and
"defence of the realm" uere connected by the conjunction "and" in  the 
order uhich uas also the position  in  the Acts but in  the regu lation  
i t s e l f  the conjunction used uas "o r" . This p o s itio n  appears to  hav/e 
been overlooked by the appellant uho challenged the v ire s  of the 
reg u la tio n  on the fo llo u in g  grounds, among others:
(a ) The le g is la t iv e  h is to ry  o f detention u ithout t r i a l  could 
be traced back to 1696 uhen the s ta tu te  (7 & 8 W i l l . 3, c .11 ) did not in  
terms suspend the Habeas Corpus Act. I t  gave d e f in ite  pouers to  s ix  
members of the P rivy Council to  imprison persons suspected of high 
treason and treasonable p ractices  u ithout t r i a l  or m ainprize . I t  uas 
also subject to a t im e - l im it  on the exp iry  of uhich the r ig h t  to  the  
u r i t  of Habeas Corpus uas expressly rev ived .
(b ) Pouer of detention u ith o u t t r i a l  could be conferred by 
express uords only -  the provisions of Magna Carta and habeas corpus 
could not be repealed by im p lic a tio n .
(c ) The s ta tu te  in  th is  case conferred u n lim ited  pouer on the  
executive subject to  only one q u a lif ic a t io n , namely, "during the  
continuance of the present u ar".
(d ) Some lim ita t io n  th ere fo re  ought to be placed upon the  
general uords.
(e ) The Act i t s e l f  provides one l im ita t io n  in  th a t i t  provides  
fo r  the t r i a l  of persons fo r  breach of the reg u la tio n  and does not 
expressly provide fo r  imprisonment u ith o u t t r i a l .
4.20 On behalf of the Croun i t  uas in te r  a l i a , contended th a t the  
pouer to  in te rn  necessarily  floued from the language of sub-s. (1 ) of s.1 
of the Consolidation Act and th a t i t  uas not conferred by vague and 
general uords. Although the Habeas Corpus Act uas not suspended Parliam ent 
has sought to  obtain the same re s u lt by a sim pler and more humane method.
The detentions under the reg u la tio n  ought not to be tre a ted  as p u n itiv e .
As espionage and sabotage uere rampant, there should e x is t in  the execu tive , 
fo r  p ub lic  s a fe ty , a pouer of preventive d e ten tio n . The pouer uas necessary 
to  achieve the objects sp ec ifie d  in  the Act, esp e c ia lly  those enumerated 
in  clauses ( a ) ,  (c ) and (e ) of 8 .1 (1 ) .
4.21 The appeal uas dismissed by the m a jo r ity . The lone d issent uas
entered by Lord Shau. In the leading judgement Lord F in lay  c a te g o ric a lly
10re jec ted  a p p e lla n t's  p le a  to  read an im plied  l im ita t io n  and observed:
. . .  i t  may be necessary in  a tim e of great pub lic  danger 
to en tru s t great pouers to  His majesty in  Council and . . . 
Parliam ent may do so fe e lin g  certa in  th a t such pouers 
u i l l  be reasonably exercised, [emphasis added]
E a r lie r  in  the judgment h is  Lordship re fe rre d  to the provision of the
advisory committee and observed th a t means uere provided " fo r  ascerta in ing
uhether any complaint against the ju s tic e  or necessity of the order is  
11u e ll-fo u n d e d ."  Proceeding fu r th e r  h is  Lordship observed th a t the
measure uas "precautionary" and not "p u n itiv e " . The s ta tu te  uas passed
12at a time of "supreme n a tio n a l danger". The re s tra in t  imposed may be a 
necessary measure of precaution and "in the in te re s t  of the uhole nation"  
i t  may be expedient to pass such order in  s u ita b le  cases. That uas, said  
h is  Lordship, "the meaning of the s ta tu te " . Every reasonable precaution, 
consistent u ith  the ob ject of the re g u la tio n , uas taken.
4 .22  I t  i s  needless to  mention th a t the dominant note of the 
judgment is  in fluenced  by the doctrine  of n ecess ity . In  g iv ing  e ffe c t  
to  the in te n tio n  o f the le g is la tu re  more a tte n tio n  is  paid to  the  
surrounding circumstances than to the language of the s ta tu te . One is  
e n t i t le d  to  ask i f  such in te rp re ta t io n  accorded w e ll with the accepted 
norms. To decide the question of v ire s  o f the reg u la tio n  one would have 
expected the court to examine the provisions of the Act and the reg u la tio n  
more c lo s e ly . No doubt, i t  uas, at bottom, a m atter re la t in g  to  choice
of ru les  of in te rp re ta t io n  end the court had made i t s  choice and la id  doun 
a neu norm. In  in te rp re t in g  emergency laus more importance uas to  be 
attached to the broad ob ject o f the s ta tu te  and uide delegation of pouer 
to  the executive uas to  be upheld on the ground of "necessity". I t  is  
tru e  th a t the doctrine  o f separation of pouer in  a s t r ic t  ssnss did not 
forma l i k es the U .S .A .) the cornerstone of the B r it is h  C o n s titu tio n .
For th is  reason, perhaps, the court found i t  e a s ie r to  discard the theory 
of excessive delegation in  the p a r t ic u la r  context of emergency lau s .
4.23 This aspect of the m atter uas d ea lt u ith  in  another l ig h t  by 
Lord Dunedin, uho said -  " . . . the pouers are d ra s tic  and might be 
ab^suj^j. . . but the fa u l t  l ie s  in  the fa c t th a t the B r it is h  C onstitu tion  
has entrusted to the tuo Houses of P arliam ent, subject to  the assent of
13the King, an absolute pouer untrammelled by any u r it te n  instrum ent. . .
4 .24  Lord Atkinson however d ea lt u ith  the case at g reater length
and brought to bear upon the m atter a d if fe re n t  approach uhich has been,
14urongly, ue submit, dubbed as "curious misconception". I t  is  not 
correct to say, ue submit, th a t the Justice  of the Peace Act 1360 had 
" l i t t l e  re levancy" to the question. H is Lordship r ig h t ly ,  ue submit, 
re fe rre d  to  the Act and observed th a t "preventive ju s tic e "  uas not a 
neu th ing  in  the laus of England. The lau  of preventive detention uas 
r ig h t ly  traced to the genus of "preventive ju s tic e "  fo r ,  the la u , l ik e  
the Justice  of the Peace Act 1360, gave r is e  to a ju r is d ic t io n  based
on suspicion. Th is  ju r is d ic t io n  uas, in  one case, vested in  the ju d ic ia ry
and in  the other case, in  the executive . In  such cases, as h is  Lordship
observed, s u ffe rin g  and inconvenience to  the suspected person uas
in e v ita b le . I t  had only to  be seen whether adequate safeguards uere
15provided "to prevent e rro r  or abuse".
4 .25  In another respect h is  Lordship's opinion had a great
im portance. One of h is  observations as ue s h a ll  see, became the main
16burden of the leading case under the 1939 Act. H is Lordship observed:
"The order sets out upon i t s  face a l l  the requirements necessary fo r  i t s
17v a l id i t y .  . . i t  shous upon i t s  face ju r is d ic t io n  to make i t . "
4.26 H is Lordship took n o tice  of the  change in  the language th a t uas
brought about in  the Consolidation Act. The e a r l ie r  Act uas termed as
18" e n tire ly  p u n itiv e"  and i t  uas observed:
. . . presumably th a t uas found to  be in s u f f ic ie n t  to secure 
the safety  of the p u b lic  and the defence of the realm to
the extent des ired . . . the second s ta tu te  goes much beyond
the scope of the f i r s t  in  the methods. . . i t  provides th a t
the reg u la tio n s  may not only deal u ith  the pouers and duties  
of Admiralty and so fo rth  but to issue reg u latio n  fo r  
securing d ire c t ly  the p ub lic  safety  and the defence of the  
realm . These are uide pouers. They are neu words. Some 
e ffe c t  must be given to them. They obviously cover 
preventive methods. . . as u e l l  as. . . uhich are tru ly  
p u n itiv e . . • [emphasis added]
4.27 Ue have already pointed out th a t the change in  the language did  
not m a te r ia lly  a ffe c t the p o s ition  end achieve the purpose in d ica te d  in  
the above passage by h is  Lordship. The uords uere not neu; th e ir  
position  uas only changed, u ith in  the f i r s t  part of the sub-section .
The uord 'AND' in  the f i r s t  part had to  be read in  the conjunctive sense 
and not d is ju n c tiv e ly  as h is  Lordship had done. The uords, "pouers and 
duties fo r  th a t purpose of the A dm iralty. . ."  uere merely d escrip tive  
of the expression "the p u b lic  safety  and defence of the realm" uhich, ue 
submit, uas a term of a r t  uhich had subsumed the concept o f u a r-p re ro g a tiv e . 
No importance uas attached by h is  Lordship to the uords underlined above.
In fa c t ,  the m a jo rity  opinion as a whole to t a l ly  overlooked the ro le  of
prerogative  to uhich, as ue s h a ll see, Lord Shau, in  h is  d issenting  
judgment had only in c id e n ta lly  re fe rre d  and even he attached no importance 
to the uords "has pouer" fo llo u in g  the opening words, "His Majesty  
in  Council" of 8 .1 (1 ) .
4.28  In  support of th e ir  f in d in g  th a t the pouer to make regu lations fo r  
preventive detention uas duly introduced in  the Consolidation Act the 
m ajo rity  placed re lian ce  e sp e c ia lly  on the provisions of clauses ( a ) ,
(c ) a id  (e ) of s u b -s .(1 ) but i t  may be noted th a t clause (a ) uas not neu.
I t  occurred in  the seme form in  the f i r s t  Act a lso . The uord "prevent" 
recu rrin g  in  clauses ( a ) ,  (c ) and (e ) appears to have caused the confusion. 
These and other sub-clauses uere co n tro lled  by second part of su b -s .(1 )  
uhich provided fo r "punishment" o f persons committing offences against 
the re g u la tio n s . T r ia l  by co u rts -m a rtia l fo r  punishment o f offenders had 
to be "authorised" by the s ta tu te  in  the second p art of the sub-section  
inasmuch as the Crown, in  the exercise of i t s  prerogative  pouer, could 
not authorise such t r i a l s .
4.29 Lord Atkinson however struck a re fresh ing  note when he observed
th a t, " i f  on the face of the  reg u latio n  i t  enforced or required some th ing
to be done uhich could not in  any reasonable way aid in  securing the
pub lic  safety  and the defence of the realm , i t  uould be u l t r a  v ire s  end 
19v o id ."
4.30 The tune uas picked up by Lord liJrenbury who said th a t the
appellan t uas e n t it le d  to be discharged i f  he could estab lish  e ith e r  the
fa c t th a t he uas not of h o s tile  o rig in  or association or th a t the
20reg u latio n  i t s e l f  uas u l t r a  v ir e s .
4.31 Thus, the m a jo rity  did not to t a l ly  ru le  out ju d ic ia l  review in
sp ite  of the uords, "where. . . i t  appears to  the Secretary of S ta te . . ."
occurring in  the re g u la tio n . This aspect of the decis ion , as ue s h a ll
21see, uas overlooked by the courts in  Northern Ire la n d . I t  is  also  
necessary to po in t out th a t the theory o f sub jective s a t is fa c tio n , as 
Lord Atkin observed, uas not born u n t i l  the decision in  the GREENE
o o c
h i U  e *
22case ( in f r a )  uas handed down by the Court of Appeal.
4 .32 Ue may now examine in  some d e ta il  the illu m in a tin g  d issent of
Lord Shau. While Lord Atkinson had held th a t the Consolidation Act and
the order passed thereunder having become lau  of the land the contention
th a t there uas an im plied  repeal of the provisions of the Magna C arta aid
23Habeas Corpus uas u ithout any substance, Lord Shau upheld the contention.
His Lordship observed:24
There is  constructive re p e a l. . . no p a r a l le l  in  our 
annals -  a g e ttin g  behind the Habeas Corpus by an 
im plied  but none the less e ffe c t iv e  repeal of the most 
famous provisions of Magna Carta i t s e l f .
Proceeding fu r th e r  h is  Lordship observed th a t the uords "to issue
reg u la tio n s  fo r  securing. . . realm" ought not to be so construed as to
remove "the tuo main r ig h ts  o f c iv i l  socie ty" or to e fface  "the two most
25d is tin g u ish in g  c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f our C o n s titu tio n ."  Reference uas also
26made to the DARNEL case aid the P e tit io n  of R ight.
4 .33 His Lordship also re fe rre d  to uhat he c a lled  the "practice  o f
C o n stitu tio n " and observed th a t in  the past, in  the "exceptional le g is la t io n "
the mode of dealing u ith  fo re ign  a tta c k , p o l i t ic a l  unrest and c iv i l  war
has been "fran k , fre e  and open", nanely, a temporary suspension o f the  
27Habeas Corpus Act. Reliance uas also placed on Blackstone ( i ,  136) 
to say th a t confinement of a person may be necessary when the s ta te  is  in  
" re a l danger" but detention in  such cases is  not by the executive but by 
P arlian en t uhich suspends the Habeas Corpus Acts. I t  is  noteworthy th a t  
h is  Lordship adopted B lackstone's " re a l danger" te s t uhich made Parliam ent 
the judge of the s itu a tio n  contrary to the decision in  the SHIPMONEY 
case.
4 .34  The argument based on prerogative  uas noted but i t  does n o t,
u n fo rtu n a te ly , get proper treatm ent perhaps fo r  the reason th a t i t  uas
only " in c id e n ta lly  alluded to " . His Lordship observed: "Do not l e t  the
th ing  uhich has been done be associated u ith  ro y a l prerogative  -  i t s
28v a l id i ty  depends on the Act o f P arliam en t."
4 .35  His Lordship re fe rred  to each of the fo u r Acts of the series  and
came very close to re a lis in g  the fa c t th a t the power to issue reg u latio n s
under the Acts was an amalgam of two powers -  p rerogative  and s ta tu to ry  -
when h is  Lordship said th a t the power already ex is ted  but had to be
•'spec ified" or "am p lified ". Proceeding fu r th e r  h is  Lordship observed th a t
the ob ject o f the enactments was tw o -fo ld : to draw up and n o tify  the
c it iz e n s  of "a certa in  l in e  of duty or course of conduct" and to append the
29sanction of punishment to disobedience of the re g u la tio n s . In  e ffe c t
h is  Lordship appears to hold th a t each of the Acts d ea lt with pun itive
provisions only end in  each one of them "the r ig h t o f the subject to t r i a l
30in  accordance with law was guarded and preserved." Reference in  th is  
connection was made to the 1915 Act which conceded to the B r it is h  subjects  
the r ig h t to claim t r i a l  by a c iv i l  court with a ju ry , v id e  s . 1 ( 2 ) .
4.36 D issenting from the m ajority  view h is  Lordship held th a t the
change in  the co llo ca tio n  of words brought about in  the Consolidation Act
31did not introduce the concept of preventive d e ten tio n . This conclusion, 
i t  may be noted, was in  accord with the view which we have put forward but 
h is  Lordship in te rp re ts  the e ffe c t of the change d if fe r e n t ly .  I t  was held  
th a t " . . . now the regu lations  issue d ire c t from the King in  C ouncil."
4.37 How fa r  th is  corresponded to the fa c tu a l p o s ition  we are unable 
to te s t i f y  but we would have expected h is  Lordship to  say th a t the 
"ex is tin g "  power (p re ro g ative ) being incapable o f tampering with the 
l ib e r ty  of the c it iz e n  the change which “ am p lified " or "sp ec ified " th is  
power could not achieve the desired r e s u lt .  No doubt, in  h is  conclusion, 
h is  Lordship did observe th a t the appellan t had been ( i )  in te rn ed , ( i i )  w ith ­
out t r i a l ,  ( i i i )  because he was of h o s tile  o r ig in  or assoc iation , but
32Parliam ent never said in  words any of these th in g s . E a r l ie r  a lso , at
one p lace, i t  was stated th a t Parliam ent would n o t, "under cover of words
33. . . safety and defence," make such "colossal delegation of power".
4.38  The r ig h t of ju d ic ia l  review appears to  have been recognised as
an im plied  lim ita t io n  on wide delegation of power in  th a t the absence of
scope fo r  ju d ic ia l  review in  the in s ta n t case was commented upon in  these
terms: "No court o f law could dare set up i t s  judgment on the m erits  of
34an issue -  a pu b lic  and p o l i t ic a l  issue -  of safe ty  and defence".
4.39 The safeguard of an advisory committee was held to be i l lu s o ry
on two grounds: ( 1 ) power to recommend, and power to  make an order fo r  
detention vested in  the executive i t s e l f ,  a lb e it  in  two departments;
(2 ) the Committee's decisions were not binding on the execu tive .
4 .40 Thus in  the d issenting  judgment a more pa instaking  e f fo r t  was 
made to deal with the question of v ire s  o f the re g u la tio n  conforming c losely  
to  the accepted norms of in te rp re ta t io n  of s ta tu te s , u n lik e  the m a jo rity  
cpinion which la id  down a new norm. U n fo rtu n a te ly , the  la t t e r  norm 
p reva iled  with the m a jo rity  opinion in  the leading case under the 1939
Act which w i l l  soon be discussed. I t  could be said th a t th is  norm was
founded upon the notion th a t -  "because a country is  a t war i t  has the
36r ig h t to commit 'a c ts  o f war' against i t s  own c it iz e n s ."
(3 ) The second world war and the provision fo r  detention
( A) The Acts and the Regulation
4.41 Ide propose to  discuss now the law enacted end declared during  
the second world war with reference to the same series  of Acts, namely: 
the Emergency Powers Defence Acts 1939-40 (chapters 62 -  2 & 3 Geo 6 , and
20 & 45 -  3 & 4 Geo 6 ) .  However, before we quote the re le v a n t provisions of
the f i r s t  Act of the series  we may po in t out th a t the p o l i t ic a l  s tru c tu re
of the world order had undergone tremendous changes since the f i r s t  world
war. The new to ta l i ta r ia n  regimes were making e f fo r ts ,  i t  has been
observed, to i n f i l t r a t e  the democracies with th e ir  doctrines to weaken
resistance to aggression leading to the propagation of what has been
37ca lle d  a "su p ra-n atio n al creed". Fascism of I t a l ia n  o r ig in  acquired a 
fo llo w in g  in  England, making i t  necessary to deal w ith persons of suspected
fa s c is t  sympathies who posed a re a l th re a t to  the secu rity  of the s ta te .  
Such was th e re fo re , the s itu a tio n  th a t p reva iled  in  England during the  
second world war.
4 .42 The m a te ria l p a rt of the  re levan t provision of the Act may
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now be quoted:
s .1 (1 ) Subject to the provisions of th is  sec tio n , His Majesty
may by Order in  Council make such Regulations. . . as
may appear to him to  be necessary or expedient fo r
securing the pu b lic  s a fe ty , the defence of the realm ,
the maintenance of pub lic  order and the e f f ic ie n t  
prosecution of any war . . • and fo r  m aintain ing  
supplies and services e s s e n tia l to the l i f e  of the  
community.
(2 ) Without prejudice to the g en era lity  o f the powers
conferred by the preceding subsection. . .Regulations  
may. . • fo r  any of the purposes mentioned in  th a t 
subsection -
(a )  make provision fo r  the apprehension, t r i a l  and 
punishment of persons offending against the 
Regulations and fo r  the detention of persons
whose detention appears to the Secretary o f State
to  be expedient in  the in te re s ts  o f the pub lic  
safety,, or the defence o f the realm , [ e n p h 8 8 i 8  addBd]
4.43 By sub-clause (d ) the power of emending, suspending and
applying any enactment with or without m od ification  was conferred on the
execu tive . This was perhaps w ithout p a r a l le l  in  the le g is la t iv e  h is to ry
of England. By su b -s .(3 ) the power o f sub-delegation was introduced in
very wide term s. In  s u b -s .(4 ) a non-obstante.clause was in s ta l le d . On
the other hand the concept of t r i a ls  by c o u rts -m a rtia l was expressly
excluded. By s .4 parliam entary contro l was envisaged, a lb e it  by the
process of "negative reso lu tio n " (prayer fo r  annulment). In  s .5, as
38we have e a r l ie r  observed, a dubious e f fo r t  was made to leave untouched 
the p re ro g ativ e .
4 .44  The second Act of the series  conferred more draconian powers.
I t  has been observed th a t i t  acquired the popular name of "Everything &
suance 
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39Everybody Act". In  pursu to s .1 (1 )  of the Act provisions could be
made by reg u la tio n s  fo r  -
req u irin g  persons to  place themselves, th e ir  serv ices , 
and th e ir  property a t the disposal of H is M ajesty, as 
appear to him to be necessary or expedient fo r  securing  
the pub lic  s a fe ty , the defence of the Realm. . .
4.45 By the th ir d  Act power was conferred to make provision by
regu lations  fo r  t r i a l  of offences by sp ec ia l courts ( "notfyisig^ourts
M a r t ia l" )  in  c e rta in  areas. I t  was however circumscribed by a l im ita t io n
inscribed  in  8 . 1 ( 1 ) ,  in  the fo llo w in g  terms:
. . . where by reason of recent or immediately apprehended 
enemy action  the m il ita ry  s itu a tio n  is  such as to requ ire  
th a t c rim in a l ju s tic e  should be adm inistered more speedily  
than would be p ra c tic a b le  by the ordinary courts . .
[emphasis added]
I t  may be noted th a t " m ilita ry  necessity" was made the te s t .
4.46 The reg u la tio n  fo r  preventive detention made under the f i r s t  Act 
had a h is to ry  which has to be s ta te d frn ^ firs t i t  is  necessary to  s ta te  
th a t the provisions made in  the Second Series were d e f in ite ly  constitu ted
an improvement on the e a r l ie r  le g is la t io n .  As we have seen, sub-ss. (1 ) and 
(2 ) of s,1 of the f i r s t  Act removed the d u a lity , in  d e f in ite  terms, 
respecting the source of power. There is  no reference of any kind to  
prerogative  powers. Moreover, sub-clause (a ) provided fo r  a power of 
preventive detention in  d e f in ite  terms but i t  has to be noted th a t th e re  
s t i l l  remained some ambiguity in  respect o f the scope of the power. Could 
i t  also be exercised fo r  such purposes as maintenance of p u b lic  order e tc .  
mentioned in  s u b -s .(1 ) ,  which were expressly excluded from sub-clause (a )?
On the other hand i t  is  also noteworthy th a t u n like  the 1914 Act the two 
expressions, p ub lic  safety  and defence of the realm were jo ined  by the 
conjunction "or", instead  of "a id ". Could i t  be contended th a t the other 
purposes were subsumed by the term "p u b lic  s a fe ty"  which was not to be 
considered any longer as a term of a r t having e.jesdem generis  
s ig n ifican ce  with "defence of the realm" ?
4.47 We now come to the h is to ry . The decision of the House of Lords, 
which we s h a ll sh o rtly  discuss, immediately gave r is e  to a l iv e ly  debate 
among eminent le g a l scholars in  the course of which serious e f f o r t  appears 
to  have been made to unearth the circumstances surrounding the b ir th  of 
Reg.186 which provided fo r  preventive d e te n t io n .^  There has bean a
continuous research on th is  aspect but we propose to re ly  on recent 
accounts to re la te  i t s  h is to ry  in  b r ie f .  The 1939 Act was enacted on 
August 24. The f i r s t  set of regu lations  were made on August 25 but the  
reg u la tio n  providing fo r  preventive detention appeared in  the second set 
made on September 1 (S.R.& 0 No.9 7 8 ). I t  gave power to  the Secretary of 
State to  deta in  "any person. . . i f  s a t is f ie d . . . th a t i t  i s  necessary 
to  do so. . ."  [emphasis added]
4 .48 I t  has been observed th a t the language was found ob jectio n ab le
in  th a t i t  conferred wide powers and the provision was h o tly  debated in
the House of Commons. I t  was eventua lly  decided by the House th a t an
"in form al conference" of the members of the House should consider the
m atte r. As a re s u lt  the e n tire  set of regu lations  was withdrawn and la te r
42re-issued  in  an amended form on November 23 (S.R.& 0 No.1681 ). As to
what transp ired  a t the in fo rm al conference nothing could be d e f in ite ly
said , as the minutes of the conference do not reveal any clue in  respect 
43of the amendment. The in te n tio n  of the amendment was so u g h t to  be
gathered, in  the e a r l ie r  research, from a speech made in  the House of
Commons in  1941 by S ir  Dohn Anderson, who was the Home Secretary a t the  
re levan t tim e. The m a te ria l p art of the statement re lie d  upon was to the 
e ffe c t  th a t the amendment was to emphasize th a t the Home Secretary must
44d ire c t h is  personal a tte n tio n  to making orders of preventive d eten tio n .
4.49 Ue may now set down the amended form o f Reg.18B in  i t s  m a te ria l 
p arts :
(1 )  I f  the Secretary of S tate has reasonable cause to b e lieve
any person to be of h o s tile  o rig in  or association or to  have
been recen tly  concerned in  acts p re ju d ic ia l to  the p ub lic  
safety  or the defence of the realm or in  the preparation  or
in s tig a t io n  of such acts and th a t by reason th ereo f
i t  is  necessary to  exercise co n tro l over him, he may make 
an order against th a t person d ire c tin g  th a t he be deta in ed .
(1A) I f  the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to b e lieve
any person to  have been or to  be a member o f . . . any such 
organization  as is  h e re in a fte r  mentioned, and th a t i t  is  
necessary to exercise contro l over him, he may make an 
o rd er. . . t h a t  he be deta ined.
The o rgan izations hereinbefore re fe rre d  to are any 
organ ization  as respects which the Secretary of State  
is  s a t is f ie d  th a t e ith e r
(a ) the organ ization  is  subject to  fo re ign  in fluence  
or c o n tro l, or
(b ) the persons in  co n tro l of the organ ization  have. . . 
associations. . • or sympathies with the system of 
government o f ,  any Power with which H is Majesty is  
at war, and in  e ith e r  case th a t there  is  danger of 
u t i l is a t io n  of the organ ization  fo r  purposes 
p re ju d ic ia l to  the pu b lic  s a fe ty , the defence of
the, realm . . . (& c .) [emphasis added]
4.50 Paragraph (2 ) of the reg u la tio n  empowered the Secretary of 
State to  suspend the order on s p ec ifie d  cond itions. In  para (3 ) we 
f in d  the im portant provision re la t in g  to an "advisory committee" , I t  
contemplated "objections" by the aggrieved person to  be made to the  
committee against the order and also against re fu s a l to  suspend the order, 
against any condition attached to the suspension order and against 
revocation of the suspension o rd er. More than one advisory committee 
could be constitu ted  with members and Chairman appointed by the  
Secretary o f State who was, u n fo rtu n a te ly , not given any guidance as to  
th e ir  q u a lif ic a t io n s .
4.51 By para (4 ) i t  was made the "duty" of the Secretary of State  
to a ffo rd  the aggrieved person "the e a r l ie s t  p rac ticab le  opportunity"  
of making‘*representation<'to  him in  w ritin g  and to inform such person of 
h is  r ig h t to "ob jection " to  an advisory committee. S im ila r ly  by para (5 )  
i t  was made the "duty" of the Chairman nominated to preside over the 
meeting o f such committee "to inform the ob jecto r of the grounds on 
which the order [had] been made against him and to  fu rn ish  him with such 
p a rtic u la rs  as are in  the opinion of the Chairman s u ff ic ie n t  to  enable 
him to present h is  case", [emphasis added] Nothing was spelled  out in  
respect of the power, function  and procedure o f the committee.
4 .52 However, para ( 6 ) in d ica ted  th a t the Secretary of S tate was not 
bound to  fo llo w  the  advice o f the committee. N evertheless, i t  subjected  
him to parliam entary contro l by req u irin g  him to  report to Parliam ent "at
le a s t once in  every month" on such m atters as number o f persons detained  
and the number o f cases in  which he had re jec ted  thB committee's advice.
4.53 The v io la t io n  of the conditions of the suspension order was 
made an offence by para (7 ) and by para ( 8 ) i t  was provided, apparently to  
fo r e s ta l l  claims of fa ls e  imprisonment, th a t any person detained under the  
reg u la tio n  a t any "authorized" place s h a ll be "deemed to be in  law fu l 
custody".
4 .54  I t  may be noted th a t the power of detention was circumscribed
by two im portant conditions underlined in  paragraphs ( 1 ) and ( 1 A) of
the R egulation, quoted above. I t  has also to  be observed th a t the meaning 
of the governing expression in  the two paragraphs, " i f  the Secretary of 
State has reasonable cause to b e lie v e " , depended to a great exten t on the 
emphasis one placed on the words "has" on one hand and "reasonable cause" 
on the o ther hand. I t  was th is  ambiguity brfiich was the bone of contention  
in  the decision which we w i l l  presently  discuss. I t  may also be noted 
th a t th is  ambiguity was accentuated by use of the word " s a t is f ie d "  th a t  
occurred in  para ( 1 A) and in  some other re g u la tio n s .
4.55 I t  is  worthwhile to  compare and contrast Reg.lBB with Reg.14B
of 1914. By doing away with the p re -re q u is ite  of a "recommendation" fo r
d eten tio n , the power is  only apparently enhanced in  1939 but the professed
ra tio n a le  o f the change has been r ig h t ly  traced  to the increased re lian ce
45on the p r in c ip le  of " M in is te r ia l re s p o n s ib ility " . The express provision  
fo r  parliam entary co n tro l supports th is  premise. The use of the expression 
"reasonable cause to b e lie v e"  brought in  an element o f ambiguity in  the 
power w hile  in  Reg.14B no such d i f f ic u l t y  was presented by the words 
" i t  appears". The base of the power is  broadened by adding a number of 
a lte rn a tiv e  premises to the twin expressions, h o s tile  o r ig in  or 
association , th a t occurred in  Reg.14B. In  para (1A) r e a l i t ie s  of the  
contemporary s itu a tio n  were taken note o f and a new ground fo r  the exercise  
of the power was created but i t  was doubly circum scribed. Membership of
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the organ ization  per se was not o ffe n s iv e . There must be a present danger 
of the organ ization  being u t i l is e d  in  a p a r t ic u la r  manner. The concept of 
"internm ent" being associated with POU status  and such status being not 
conceded to the deta in ee , su b s titu tio n  of the word "detained" fo r  
"in terned" was a happy choice. On the o ther hand, an im portant, a lb e it  
unhappy, change is  introduced in  the new provision re la t in g  to  the 
advisory committee. The "Chairman" is  required to preside over the 
"meeting" and not over the "committee", and he is  not necessarily  to  be a 
" ju d ic ia l"  person. I t  is  needless to  emphasize th a t the weight o f the  
"advice" o f the Committee depended on i t s  co n stitu tio n  end the status of 
i t s  personnel.
(B) The J u d ic ia l Response
4.56 (tie may now proceed to  examine the in te rp re ta t io n  of Reg.lBB in
46the decision of the House o f Lords in  the case of LIVERSIDGE v ANDERSON.
4.57 The appeal arose out of an in te r lo c u ta ry  order in  an action
fo r  a d ec laration  th a t the detention was unlaw ful and in ju n ctio n  against
continued detention and also fo r  damages fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment. The
p la in t i f f  had applied fo r  c e rta in  p a rtic u la rs  to  be furnished to him,
namely, the grounds on which the defendant had reasonable cause to be lieve
th a t the p la in t i f f  was o f h o s tile  association and th a t by reason o f such
association i t  was necessary to  exercise contro l over him. The Kings
Bench re je c te d  the ap p lica tio n  and i t s  decision having been upheld by the
Court o f Appeal the m atter came up before the House of Lords. As Viscount
Maugham observed in  the leading judgment, the re a l ob ject of the
ap p lica tio n  was to  ra ise  at the e a r ly  stage the v i t a l  question, as to
47what onus, i f  any, l ie s  on the defendant.
4.58 The short point th a t th e ir  Lordships were c a lled  upon to  decide
was to in te rp re t  the expression, " I f  the Secretary of S tate has reasonable 
cause to b e lie v e " , th a t occurred in  Reg.lBB. In  the absence of a 
context, Viscount Maugham h e ld , i t  meant th a t i f  there  was "in  fa c t"
reasonable cause fo r  b e lie v in g  but th a t was not the only meaning. In  the
present context, the  meaning was, h is  Lordship observed, "what he th inks is
reasonable cause", acting  in  good f a i t h .  Th is  was because the m atter was
fo r  the exercise of h is  exclusive d iscre tio n  and the fa c ts  were e s s e n tia lly
w ith in  h is  knowledge. I f  the fa c ts  could be brought before the court i t
could only enquire in to  the question of h o s tile  o r ig in  or association but
as to  the  fu lf i lm e n t of the second cond ition , the necessity o f exerc is ing
c o n tro l, there could be no enquiry in  any co u rt. Moreover, the Secretary
of State being competent to  act on hearsay h is  decision could not be
questioned in  any co u rt. In  most cases, the inform ation might be of a
c o n fid e n tia l nature and the Crown could claim p r iv i le g e . The Secretary of
State was answerable to  Parliam ent fo r  discharge o f h is  duties and he was
48net in  the some position  as th a t of a po lice  constable.
4.59 In dealing with the argument bassd on the change of language in
the amended reg u la tio n  and use of the word " s a t is fie d "  in  para ( 1 A) and
49in  some other re g u la tio n s , h is  Lordship held as fo llo w s:
(a ) The same importance was not to be attached to  a lte ra t io n  in  
language in  the case of an Order in  Council as in  the case of
a s ta tu te  as an a lte ra t io n  in  the former case does not receive the  
same "a tte n tio n  and s c ru tin y " .
(b ) Even in  a s ta tu te  a change of word may occur without a change of
meaning being intended.
(c ) The words "to b e lie v e"  in d ica te  th a t the Secretary of State must 
him self consider the m atter as i t  involved deprivation  of l ib e r ty  
o f a person fo r  an uncertain  period whereas the word " s a t is fie d "  
meant th a t he could act on the report o f subordinates.
4.60 Lord Macmillan held th a t the expression could have only one
meaning i f  i t  was expressed in  an impersonal form, namely, " i f  there was
reasonable cause fo r  b e l ie f " .  The wording used introduced a "personal
50request" to  the Secretary of S ta te . The change in  the language was
aimed at g iv ing  g reater p ro tection  against claims fo r  damages by making
51reasonableness of the cause not ju s t ic ia b le .  Echoing the language o f the
HALLIDAY case, h is  Lordship observed th a t production by the Secretary of
State of an order, ex fa c ie  reg u la rly  and duly authenticated , constitu ted  a
peremptory defence in  an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment. The burden l ie s
on the p la in t i f f  to es tab lish  th a t the order was unwarranted, de fective  or 
52otherwise in v a l id .  P ro f. A .L. Goodhart, however, attaches greater
importance to h is  Lordship 's observation th a t i f  the reg u latio n  was so
construed as to make reasonableness ju s t ic ia b le  i t  would not have commended
53i t s e l f  as an "emergency measure". Th is  approach of h is  Lordship, we
submit, conformed to  what we have ca lle d  a new norm of in te rp re ta t io n
54expounded in  the HALLIDAY case.
4.61 Lord U right is  more fo r th r ig h t  in  saying th a t the case was
covered by the p rin c ip le s  enunciated in  the HALLIDAY case despite the
d iffe ren ce  in  the language o f the two enactments. His Lordship also
re fe rre d  to  the le g is la t iv e  p rac tice  of s u b s titu tin g  fo r  the ju r is d ic t io n
of courts, s p e c ia lly  co nstitu ted  tr ib u n a ls . His Lordship also said th a t
reasonable cause was "an element present to [th e  M in is te r fs ] mind"
which determined h is  b e l ie f  and "cause to b e lie v e"  was part of the
"content o f h is  mind". The regu lation  had substitu ted  the Secretary of
State fo r  the court and had also sp ec ifie d  the circumstances under which
he should a c t, namely, b e l ie f  which was a mental s ta te  of h is  mind. At
one point h is  Lordship had observed th a t too much importance should
not be attached to the s in g le  word "reasonable", which was i t s e l f
"ambiguous and in co n clu s ive". D r. C.K. Allen has re fe rre d  to th is  and is
55r ig h t ly  c r i t ic a l  of th is  observation . The word, we submit, was one of 
the most commonly used expressions known to  the Common Law and at le g a l 
parlance i t s  meaning was w e ll-e s ta b lis h e d . Most convincing ground given 
by h is  Lordship was, we submit, h is  observation th a t as the Secretary of 
State being required to act in  h is  own re s p o n s ib ility  i t  im plied  a duty
to act in  the n a tio n a l in te re s t  and the performance of th a t duty could
4
56not be subject to the decision o f a judge.
4.62 Lord Romer attempts to  set a measure to th is  duty by saying th a t ,
"Not only is  the b e l ie f  to be h is . The estim ation of the reasonableness
of the causes th a t have induced such b e l ie f  is  also to  be h is  and h is  
57a lo ne." This attempt to block ju d ic ia l  review completely could perhaps 
be fo i le d  by challenging the fa c t  th a t in  estim ating  the reasonableness 
the M in is te r  had re lie d  on the opinion and b e l ie f  of others by which i t  no 
longer remained h is  b e l ie f .  However, h is  Lordship fu r th e r  observed th a t 
the Act and the reg u la tio n  were enacted to remedy a m isch ie f. A dilemma 
was avoided by making i t  unnecessary to disclose fa c ts  fo r ,  on one hand 
non-disclosure of f u l l  fa c ts  would have e n t it le d  the detainee to  be 
released by the court w h ile  on the other hand the purpose of securing
58p ublic  safety  e tc . was l ik e ly  to  be defeated by disclosure of the fa c ts .
His Lordship also endorsed c a te g o ric a lly  the view th a t the ru le  o f 
l i t e r a l  in te rp re ta t io n  was in a p p lic a b le  in  the in s ta n t case.
4.63 fcfe may now proceed to  examine at some length the memorable and
powerful dissent of Lord A tk in , li/e w i l l  be surprised to f in d  th a t h is
opinion becane the trend s e tte r  fo r  the new course of development of
ad m in is tra tive  law in  England of which due n o tice  is  taken by Professor 
59Heuston. He has re fe rre d  to a number of modern decisions to say th a t
although the LIVERSIDEE case was c ite d  th ere in  the sub jective te s t
la id  down by the m a jo rity  was not applied in  those cases. He also p red ic ts
th a t the court w i l l  now, even in  cases in vo lv in g  personal l ib e r ty  in  times
o f war or c iv i l  commotion, fe e l  disposed to fo llo w  the approach of Lord
A tk in .^  This guess, as we s h a ll see, is  n o t, u n fo rtu n a te ly , f u l ly
ju s t i f ie d  by the divergent approach of English and Northern Ire la n d
61courts in  the context o f the present tu rbu len t s itu a tio n  th e re . On the 
other hand the la s tin g  end immediate in fluence  of h is  Lordship's opinion  
is  to  be found, we submit, in  the provisions of the Indian C onstitu tio n  which
was enacted in  the sane decade. Th is  aspect w i l l  receive our d e ta ile d
62consideration in  appropriate context.
4 .64  The main burden of h is  Lordship 's opinion is  to be found in
63the fo llo w in g  short passage:
The words in  question are not ambiguous. . . they have 
only one p la in  and n a tu ra l meaning. . . used at common 
law and in  numerous s ta tu te s . . . they give r is e  to a 
ju s t ic ia b le  issu e . . . the fran ers  of the Defence 
Regulations themselves were f u l ly  aware of the tru e  
meaning of the words. • .
No doubt, h is  Lordship began h is  judgment by d is c re d itin g  the theory of
sub jective s a tis fa c tio n  by saying th a t although the Court o f Appeal in  the
GREEN case ( in f r a )  f i r s t  propounded the theory i t  was also observed there
64th a t the "simple words" meant a co n d itio n a l a u th o rity .
4.65 H is Lordship brought to bear upon the m atter a le g a l and what
we would p re fe r to  c a l l  a p e rfe c tly  leg itim a te  approach by examining in
65d e ta il  the in c id en ts  o f both common law and s ta tu to ry  power of a rres t 
and appears to  a rr iv e  a t the conclusion th a t in  a m atter concerning the  
l ib e r ty  of the person there  was always involved an "o b jective  issue" to be 
decided by the courts . The "p la in  and n a tu ra l"  meaning of the words, "has 
reasonable cause" imported a fa c t or s ta te  of fa c ts  and not the mere 
b e lie f  by the person challenged th a t the fa c t  o r the s ta te  of fa c ts  
e x is te d . This point was fu r th e r  i l lu s t r a te d  and am plified  by re fe rr in g  
to  the requirement o f e s tab lis h in g  "absence o f reasonable and probable 
cause" in  action fo r  m alic ious prosecution and the  respective ro les  of 
the judge and the ju ry  in  the determ ination of the is s u e .^
4.66 S ir  W illiam  Holdsworth was however c r i t ic a l  of th is  approach. He
observed th a t the re a l question was whether the decision or action did in
fa c t ra ise  a ju s t ic ia b le  issue and not th a t a ju s t ic ia b le  issue was im plied
in  such m atters as held by h is  Lordship. He fu r th e r  observed th a t an issue 
was ju s t ic ia b le  when i t  had to  be determined so le ly  by ap p lica tio n  of law 
and went fu r th e r  to s ta te  th a t a d is tin c tio n  was to  be drawn between a
ju s t ic ia b le  issue and an adm inistrativ/e and p o l i t ic a l  issu e , Holdsworth's
approach, we submit, corresponded to  the new norm evolved in  the HALLIDAY
6 Scase. Whether such a norm was proper and s u ita b le  fo r  a l l  circumstances 
and a l l  conditions and a l l  countries of the new commonwealth is  a question  
th a t we do not propose to  answer u n t i l  the conclusion of th is  study. In  
so fa r  as the in te rp re ta t io n  of the law in  the case under consideration was 
concerned one could agree with Professor Keeton's contention th a t the  
grounds of detention were "ad m in is tra tive"  and the procedure was "not even 
qu a s i-  ju di c i a l " .
4.67 H is Lordship also took great pains to make analysis  on an
elaborate  scale o f the use of the expressions "reasonable cause to  b e lieve"
and " s a t is f ie d "  in  cognate provisions of the reg u latio n s  and also the
70e ffe c t o f the amended form of Reg.188 i t s e l f .  H is Lordship re fe rre d
to the fa c t  th a t the word " s a t is f ie d "  was also used in  the o r ig in a l
reg u latio n  in  question and concluded th a t the use of the new expression
meant a well-known safeguard against a rb itra ry  imprisonment. H is
Lordship also re fe rre d  to  the decision in  the HALLIDAY case to  say
th a t the court there refused to l im it  the n a tu ra l meaning of the expression
71used in  the enactment th e re .
4.68 Having postulated ju d ic ia l  review h is  Lordship proceeded to
define  i t s  scope and observed th a t the judge had a "duty" to  see th a t the
conditions fo r  the exercise o f the power were s a t is f ie d . He had no
" fu rth e r duty" to  decide whether he would have formed the same b e l ie f .
I f ,  on the inform ation before him the M in is te r  decided th a t a p a r t ic u la r
person was of h o s tile  o rig in  a ru lin g  by the court to the contrary was
not possible e ith e r  in  an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment or in  a habeas 
72corpus proceeding. Dealing with the p a r t ic u la r  issue involved in  the
73case, h is  Lordship observed:
I  f in d  myself unable to  comprehend how i t  can be compulsory, 
as i t  i s ,  to fu rn ish  the ob jecto r before the committee with 
the grounds and p a rtic u la rs  and yet impossible in  the public  
in te re s t  to fu rn ish  the ob jecto r with them in  co u rt.
The above passage and the one quoted in  the fo llo w in g  paragraph, as we
74s h a ll see, r e f le c t  s u b s ta n tia lly  the p o s ition  in  Ind ian  law .
4.69 By now we have examined the decision at considerable length and
have also o ffe red  appropriate comments, liie proceed th e re fo re  to  ex&mine
b r ie f ly  a few other cases and take up f i r s t  the decision in  GREEN v
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOME AFFAIRS. 7 5  to  m aintain  c o n tin u ity  of
discussion as Lord Atkin observed in  the LIVERSIDGE case th a t h is  opinion
in  th a t case would cover th is  case. Accordingly we propose to  quote
immediately the short passage in  which h is  Lordship d ea lt s p e c if ic a lly
with the GREEN case, which f i t s  in  w ith the context of the preceding
76paragraph of th is  study. His Lordship observed:
. . . the ••reasons’* given are not s ta ted  in  the order but the 
••p a rtic u la rs ’* are vouched in  a f f id a v i t  by the Home Secretary  
as p a rtic u la rs  o f o r ig in a l reason of ^ h o s tile  association'*
. . . the Home Secretary can w ithhold any inform ation as 
c o n fid e n tia l which cannot be disclosed in  the pub lic  
in te r e s t .  . . [emphasis added]
4.70 I t  is  necessary to  s ta te  the fa c ts  o f the  case to understand the 
im p lica tio n s  of the passage quoted above. The appeal in  th is  case was 
concerned with an ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus. In  the detention order 
passed by the Home Secretary the ground given was "h o s tile  association" but 
the prisoner was informed by the Advisory Committee th a t he was detained  
because he was concerned in  "acts  p re ju d ic ia l  to  p u b lic  safety  aid the  
defence of the realm aid in  the preparation of such a c ts " . The Home 
Secretary made a i a f f id a v i t  in  court and re ite ra te d  the grounds given in  
the detention order and also conceded th a t he could not exp la in  the e rro r  
committed by the advisory committee. By an unanimous opinion the appeal 
was dismissed. I t  was held  th a t the appellan t had not shown th a t he was 
prejudiced by the e r ro r  in  the document sent to him by the advisory  
committee.
4.71 The other contention in  the case was th a t  the Home Secretary  
never had a reasonable or any case fo r  b e lie v in g  th a t the appellan t was a 
person of h o s tile  asso c ia tio n . The ap p e llan t had f i l e d  an a f f id a v i t  to
support h is  contention . There was also an a f f id a v i t  by the Home S ecretary ,
Viscount Maugham observed:
. . .  in  the present case the circumstances th a t the 
Secretary of State is  e n t it le d  to  w ithhold from the  
court the ground or some of the grounds on which he formed 
h is  b e l ie f  co n stitu tes  a fu r th e r  reason why, i f  there had 
been no a f f id a v i t  by the Secretary o f S ta te , the D iv is io n a l 
Court would have acted w isely in  re fusing  the a p p lic a tio n . . .
4 .72 I t  i s  necessary however to  examine b r ie f ly  the judgment of
the Court o f Appeal in  the above case as the sub jective  s a tis fa c tio n
7 8theory was f i r s t  expounded th e re . S cott, L .3 . ,  lays down the premises
by saying th a t the King in  Council, in  p ra c tic e , was the cabinet i t s e l f
and th a t " i t  was to th a t au th o rity  representing the executive government
th a t Parliam ent did during the duration of the emergency entrust an almost
79plenary d is c re tio n ."  H is Lordship then discussed the le g is la t iv e  h is to ry
and also the HALLIDAY case and a rrived  at the fo llo w in g  conclusions:
. . . The whole reg u latio n  deals with a to p ic  which is  
necessarily  of a c o n fid e n tia l ch arac te r. I t  in v ite s  a 
decis ion , at le a s t as a pre lim inary  to  action by an 
executive member o f the crown who occupies a position  o f the  
utmost confidence, who has at h is  disposal much secret 
in form ation which ought not to be made pub lic  -  above a l l ,  
during a war -  who is  under a duty to keep th a t
inform ation and i t s  sources s e c re t. • . nnT " ■ ou
and
. . .  I f  the Secretary of S ta te ’ s inform ation is  c o n fid e n tia l,  
i t s  c o n fid e n tia l ch arac te r. . . n ecessita tes  lo g ic a lly  the 
conclusion th a t the reg u latio n  makes him the f in a l  judge of
the reasonableness of the cause on which he takes a c tio n . . .
th a t condition is  s u b je c tiv e , not o b je c tiv e . ^
4.73 I t  is  apparent, we submit, th a t the b ir th  of the  theory could
be traced to the same new norm of in te rp re ta t io n . O stensib ly, emphasis
is  la id  on reading the reg u la tio n  as a "whole", in  i t s  context, which
conformed to the estab lished canons but a d d itio n a l importance was attached
to the character of the context, the war and the nature of the duty to be 
performed in  the s itu a tio n  o f war.
4 .74 In  the above case, reference was made to  the decision in
82J| v HOME SECRETARY Ex-p . LEES which happened to be the f i r s t  reported
o , a  4
case concerning habeas corpus ap p lica tions  against orders made under R e g .l8B.
The applicant was in  the service of the Crown fo r  23 years . He was detained
fo r  association with the B r it is h  Union which was known to have sympathies
with the fa s c is t cause. The Home Secretary had sworn an a f f id a v i t  th a t he
had studied c o n fid e n tia l reports  and th a t he had reasonable cause to
exercise contro l over the ap p lic a n t. The S o lic ito r  General admitted th a t
the court could in q u ire  in to  the  v a l id i ty  o f the order but contested the
position  th a t i t  could also have before i t  a l l  the m a te ria l on which the 
,  83order was based.
4.75 In upholding the contention the court observed th a t i t  was
"concerned only to in q u ire  in to  the le g a lity  of the detention" [emphasis
added]. Disclosure o f in fo rm atio n , which was necessarily  of c o n fid e n tia l
84nature , would be p re ju d ic ia l to the in te re s t  of the s ta te . In the
Court of Appeal, Mackinnon L .3 . ,  re fe rre d  to the Home S ecre tary ’ s
85a f f id a v it  and observed:
. . .  I  have no reason to  th in k  th a t i t  was otherwise than 
s t r ic t ly  honest and c o rrec t. He has proved to my s a tis fa c tio n  
th a t he had reasonable cause to  b e lieve  and did honestly
b e lie v e , in  terms of the regu lation  and th a t being so the
order was v a lid ly  issued pursuant to the re g u la tio n . . .
[emphasis added]
The scope of ju d ic ia l  review was thus lim ite d  to the element o f "honesty" 
but the onus of es tab lis h in g  i t  was placed, ra th e r s u rp ris in g ly , on the  
Home S ecretary . This was an unusual fea tu re  of the decision which,
equally  s u rp ris in g ly , has not a ttra c te d  the a tte n tio n  i t  deserved.
flfi
4.76 The decision in  ^  v HOME SECRETARY Ex-p  BUDD appears to  be
the only reported decision in  which the applicant had at one stage 
successfully pursued h is  habeas corpus a p p lic a tio n . The decision in  LEES 
case (supra) fig u red  more prominently in  the proceedings on the second 
ap p lica tio n  in  the lone d issent of S tab le , 3 . who observed th a t the 
decision of the Kings Bench having been upheld by the Court of Appeal the
opinion of Humphreys, 3 . o f the  Kings Bench should be considered as b ind ing .
But what Humphreys, 3 . had said was th a t fo r  in q u ir in g  in to  the " v a lid ity "  
of the order (Court of Appeal said " le g a lity " )  the court could ascerta in  
whether the Home Secretary had reasonable cause fo r  the b e l ie f  expressed 
in  the o rder, but no general ru le  could be la id  down as to how th a t had 
to be done. However, h is  Lordship also said th a t the M in is te r ’ s b e l ie f  
in  the in s ta n t case was not a ffec ted  by the fa c t  th a t the grounds th e re fo r  
had been stated  in  the a lte rn a tiv e  as the law did not requ ire  the order
to be expressed in  any p a r t ic u la r  form.
4.77 Budd, l ik e  Lees, was also in  the service of the Crown when the
detention order was passed against him. He held a commission in  the army.
He had also served in  the f i r s t  world war. He was named, along with many
other persons, in  the schedule attached to the o rd er. The ground th a t
appeared in  the document given to him s ta ted  th a t the persons concerned
were of "h o s tile  association" which came under para ( 1 ) but in  the order
th a t was passed by the Home Secretary the ground given came under para (1 A ).
The detention was said to be on account o f th e ir  membership of an
"organ ization" c a lled  the B r it is h  Union of F asc is ts . The pre jud ice  was
re a l and the court held th a t the order "not only did not give the
app licant proper in form ation  to enable him to exercise h is  r ig h t  under
Regulation 168(4) but i t  gave him wrong inform ation and moreover fa i le d
87in  i t s  purpose of provid ing a u th o rity  fo r  the a p p lic a n t’ s d e te n tio n ."
4.78 A fte r h is  release he was almost immediately re -a rre s te d  and
detained on the strength of a new o rder, on the same ground, namely,
membership o f the B r it is h  Union o f F asc is ts . Apparently there  was no
scope fo r  a p lea of double jeopardy on the fa c ts  of the case but S tab le , 3 .
observed th a t the app licant was being deprived o f the b e n e fit o f the
c o u rt's  order in  the f i r s t  case. Adm ittedly, there  was not s u ff ic ie n t
m a te rie l before the court in  the present case to deal with the a p p lic a n t's
contention th a t a re lease by habeas corpus was a bar to fresh detention
88in  c e rta in  circumstances. In  the a f f id a v i t  by the Secretary of State
the "nature" and "existence" o f acts of membership of the app licant
89to the B r it is h  Union were not s ta te d . I t  was not necessary to  disclose
the sources but the m a te rie l fa c ts  th a t constitu ted  the "reasonable b e lie f"
90had to be s tated  according to h is  Lordship. The Secretary o f State  
was to  bring  a d d itio n a l fa c ts  before the court, h is  Lordship h e ld .
4.79 The m a jo rity  urns led  by the Lord Chief Justice  Viscount
Caldecote who item ised the reasons fo r  the success of the f i r s t
ap p lica tio n  -  "the u n satis fac to ry  nature of the document* in  the case
such as the absence of any statement th a t i t  was necessary to exercise
co n tro l over the ap p lic a n t, the inc lus ion  in  one order of a larg e  number
of persons, the mistakes in  the supposed copy of the Home S ec re ta ry 's
order handed over to the app licant and the fa c t  th a t the Home Secretary had
sworn an a f f id a v i t  many months a f te r  the o r ig in a l order and the
91a p p lic a n t's  a rres t had been made." None of those circumstances were
92to  be found in  the present case, his Lordship added. The app lican t
admitted h is  membership of the B r it is h  Union, i t  uas fu r th e r  observed.
A fte r re fe rr in g  to the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1640 and 1679, h is  Lordship
held th a t the f i r s t  order being bad fo r  the reasons mentioned, " i t  uas
la u fu l to make a second o rd er. . • in  such circumstances and in  such
93form as to admit o f a d if fe re n t  r e s u lt ."
4.80 An appeal uas taken but in  the meantime the House o f Lords
had given th e ir  decision in  the LIVER5IDGE and the GREEN cases (s u p ra ).
The Court of Appeal houever explained the term " le g a lity "  of the  detention
order and said th a t the re levan t fa c ts  th a t could be inqu ired  in to  uere
such as the bonafides of the Secretary of S ta te , the genuineness of the
94order and the id e n t ity  of the deta inee.
4.81 The BUDD case, as ue have seen, ra ised  the im portant issue of 
double jeopardy. The decision demonstrates the fa c t th a t the scope of 
such a p lea succeeding in  preventive  detention cases uas, g e n e ra lly , very 
l im ite d . Only on the ground of absence of bonafides, perhaps, could such
Aa p lea  be sustained, bias Lord Mackinnon th ink ing  of such a case uhen he 
placed the onus of proving "honest" b e l ie f  on the Secretary of State ?
4 .82  Uie propose to  re fe r  b r ie f ly  to tuo more cases to shou th a t
the grounds of challenge uhich c o lle c tiv e ly  appealed to Viscount Caldecote
in  the BUDD case proved in e ffe c t iv e  in d iv id u a lly . In  STUART v ANDERSON &
95MORRISON an action in  damages fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment uas dismissed. The 
order uas challenged on the grounds th a t the p l a in t i f f 's  name among others  
uas set out in  a schedule attached to the o rd er. I t  uas held th a t the 
Regulations did not prescribe any form and th ere fo re  the order uas not 
ex fa c ie  bad. The court observed: " . . . production of an order of th is  
k in d , admitted to be signed by the Home Secretary s h if ts  the onus to the  
p l a in t i f f .  . . » 9 6
4.83  In  R v GOVERNOR OF BRIXTON PRISON Ex p. PITT-RIVERS9 7  Humphreys, 3 .
spoke in  the same tune and held th a t i t  uas not necessary to s ta te  the b e lie f
98in  the order in  a " le g a l language". I t  uas only necessary to enable the
detainee to  exercise h is  r ig h t under para ( 4 ) .  The challenge uas based
on the ground th a t the order did not contain the r e c i t a l  th a t i t  uas
necessary to "exercise c o n tro l” over the detainee; i t  f a i le d .  Viscount
Caldecote houever observed th a t the Secretary of State in  h is  a f f id a v i t
s ta ted  th a t , " i t  seemed to him th a t i t  uas im p lic it  in  the making o f the
order and i t  uas unnecessary to  re c ite  i t . "  The statenent uas accepted
and i t  uas held th a t the contention uas a mere te c h n ic a lity , "going only
99to  the form and not to the substance."
4 .84  One is  e n t it le d  to ask uhy a s t r ic t  compliance u ith  a s ta tu te
dealing u ith  l ib e r ty  of the c it iz e n  should not be in s is te d  on ? In  both 
cases, ue submit, the contentions touched the ju r is d ic t io n a l requirement 
prescribed by the la u . I f  the expression "the Secretary of State has 
reasonable cause to b e lie v e ” meant th a t the Secretary had to  personally  
apply h is  mind to each and every in d iv id u a l case, hou could breach of th is  
duty not a ffe c t h is  ju r is d ic t io n  ? Although the Act did not prescribe  any
p a r t ic u la r  form, passing a separate order in  each and every case uas 
im plied  in  the duty of considering each and every case sep ara te ly .
S im ila r ly , the fa c t th a t the Secretary o f S tate  uas s a t is f ie d  th a t i t  
uas necessary to exercise con tro l over the deta inee , being a cond ition- 
precedent fo r  the exercise of pouer, i t  must appear on the face of the  
order to  have been s a t is f ie d .
4.85 There i s ,  th e re fo re , one general ensuer to the question as to
uhy the court held to the contrary in  the above cases. I t  is  because the 
neu norm of in te rp re ta t io n  had by nou struck deep ro o ts . In  each and 
every decision discussed above ue f in d  th a t the  m a jo rity  v ieu  had tr ie d  
to  conform to the approach th a t uas adopted by the court in  the HALLIDAY 
case. The "emergency” provisions uere designed to remedy a m ischief of a 
grave o rder, the defence o f the realm and p u b lic  sa fe ty ; th a t purpose
of the s ta tu te  must be carried  ou t, according to Heydon's r u le . In  
each in d iv id u a l case a challenge uas posed to the purpose of the  
enactment. In  each case i t  had to be met d i f fe r e n t ly .  This task uas to  be 
performed by the ju d ic ia ry .
Conclusion
4.86 hie there fo re  f in d  th a t ju d ic ia l  review in  each case uas c u rta ile d
in  d if fe re n t  degrees but not to ta l ly  negated. The common lau  tra d it io n  of 
f l e x i b i l i t y  of approach could make e f f ic ie n t  performance of th is  task 
possible -  the task o f s tr ik in g  a d e lic a te  balance betueen the in te re s t
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of the c it iz e n  end the s ta te  in  the face of a common "danger", the War.
These cases, th e re fo re , as the courts themselves observed -  a fa c t  uhich ue
have endeavoured to p ro je c t in  bold r e l ie f  -  had to be lim ite d  to  the uar-
time s itu a tio n  of England. U n fo rtu n a te ly , as ue s h a ll see in  some of the
succeeding chapters, in  many ju r is d ic t io n s  of the Neu Commonuealth, courts
have overlooked th is  im portant fa c t .  As a r e s u lt ,  the e d if ic e  o f the
jurisprudence of preventive detention there  has come to  be b u i l t  upon
insecure and unsound le g a l foundations. However, the English courts too, in 
Northern Ireland context, performed a bizarre operation : tJae "value-process
operated unsatisfactorily in tne aesence of an intelligent and effective
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9I I . Law. "D isorder” and "Terrorism " in  Northern Ire la n d
(1 ) The Backdrop; H is to ry . P o l it ic s ,  C iv i l  War. Law.
Legitimacy and the C onstitu tio n  in  Northern Ire la n d
4.87 The problem of Northern Ire la n d  is  of a m u lti-d im ensiona l
form and i t  can be projected only on a matching backdrop. Why the  problem 
has assumed such a form is  not d i f f i c u l t  to answer. The problem is  
e s s e n tia lly  a c o lo n ia l legacy. The is lan d  had never been tre a te d  as 
a p a rt of B r ita in  although as fa r  back as 1171 King Henry I I  of 
England had landed in  Ire la n d  "to estab lish  h is  overlordship" over the 
n a tive  Ir is h  ru le rs  and in  1541 King Henry V I I I  proclaimed h im self 
the King of Ire la n d .
4 .88  In  U ls te r , part of which is  now known as Northern Ire la n d ,
"p la n ta tio n "  under Royal Charter s ta rted  contemporaneously with th a t of
V irg in ia  in  America. As Professor Richard Rose observes, 'The process o f
encouraging P rotestant immigration and d riv in g  the n a tive  I r is h  out of
2
U ls te r  by force of arms continued throughout the cen tury ." The process 
had in  fa c t s ta rted  in  1607 with the f l i g h t ,  a f te r  leading an unsuccessful 
u p ris in g , of the C a th o lic , G aelic  Earls  from U ls te r  which, at the beginning  
of the seventeenth century was the "most conservative" p art of I r e la id  and 
"the la s t  G aelic  area" to  come under the contro l of the English  
adm in istration
4.89 Two great h is to r ic  events which have to th is  day in fluenced  the
thought and action of the people perpetuating  the great d iv id e  in  
Northern Ire la n d  need sp ec ia l mention. The C atho lic  King James I I  of 
England having f le d  the country went to Ire la n d  in  1689. The c ity  of
4
Londonderry was besieged by h is  fo rces . A fte r f i f te e n  weeks of siege
when Governor Lundy was w ill in g  to  negotia te  terms, th ir te e n  Apprentice
Boys of the P ro testant section shut the c ity  gates and eventually  the
5siege was ra ised  on the 12th o f August. The C atho lic  King was f in a l ly  
defeated at the b a tt le  of the Boyne in  July 1690 by W illiam  of Orange
a fte r  whom the powerful "Orange Order" came to be estab lished  as a symbol 
of P ro testant ascendancy in  Northern Ire la n d .
4.90 C atho lic  Ire la n d  had to  pay a heavy p rice  fo r  supporting King
3ames I I .  The penal enactments there fo r  more than a century th e re a fte r  
challenged the " re lig io u s  f a i t h ,  m a te ria l s e c u rity , p ro fessiona l advancement 
and the u n ity  of fam ily  l i f e ,  uhich d e lib e ra te ly  sought to depress the  
Catholics to the lowest le v e l of s o c ie ty ."^  I t  has been observed th a t
the Crown adopted a d e lib e ra te  po licy  o f coercion seeking compliance
from i t s  C atho lic  subjects w hile abandoning hope fo r  th e ir  support by
placing co n tro l of the new Parliam ent estab lished  in  Dublin in  P ro testant
hands. The natives  were tre a te d  as "d is lo y a l and in fe r io r  subjects"
as could be expected in  a c o lo n ia l s itu a tio n  and were debarred from
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holding lands and pub lic  o f f ic e s . The repressive measures, however,
proved counterproductive adding momentum to the independence movement and
£
giv ing  r is e  to what has been described as the "Fenian Terrorism ". As
q
we have seen, the re b e llio n  was fought by the In su rrec tio n  Acts.
4.91 The s trugg le  fo r  freedom in  Ire la n d  is  a saga of a long and
bloody ta le  of the people f ig h tin g  the s ta te  and also C atholics and
Protestants  f ig h tin g  each o th e r, "to ensure compliance with the laws
which they thought r ig h t ,  w ithout regard to  the laws or the o ff ic e rs  of
10the nominal regim e." Although eventually  the is lan d  was p a rtitio n e d  
and Northern Ire la n d  got a separate government under the Government of 
Ire la n d  Act 1920, which was repudiated by Southern Ire la n d , i t  is  th is  
pattern  of re la tio n s h ip  between the people in te r  se of the s ix  counties  
which formed Northern Ire la n d  and between the people and the s ta te , th a t  
has continued unchanged. In  1912 S ir  Edward Carson, in  vo ic ing  the 
opposition of the U n ion ist Party to the Home Rule B i l l  had proclaimed th a t  
they would have a "Protestant Province of U ls te r"  and la te r  the f i r s t  
Prime M in is te r  of Northern Ire la n d  echoed h is  sentim ents, saying th a t  
h is  regime was a "Protestant Government" having a "Protestant Parliam ent
12fo r  a P ro testan t People."
4.92 S im ila r ly , although Southern Ire la n d  f i r s t  a tta in ed  Dominion
Status under the Ir is h  Free State C onstitu tio n  Act and then became a 
Republic in  the autochthonous C o nstitu tio n  th a t i t  enacted le g a l form uas 
given to the fa c t  th a t i t  uas not reconciled  to the p a r t it io n  of the is la n d . 
"The Ir is h  Republican Army" uhich fought the " C iv i l  War" in  the freedom 
struggle betueen 1920 and 1922 continued i t s  a c t iv i t ie s  and on the 12th
of December 1956 i t  issued a form al declaratio n  of uar on the Northern  
Ire la n d  regime modelled a f te r  the proclamation of the " Ir is h  Republic" 
in  1916.
4.93 The 1920 Act uhich gave the Northern Ire la n d  Government i t s  
C onstitu tio n  made no pretence of es tab lis h in g  a fe d e ra l s tructu re  fo r  the  
United Kingdom. The Government a t Stormont in  both executive and le g is la t iv e  
m atters uas, according to  the C o n s titu tio n , subject to the f in a l  veto from 
London but in  p ractice  the au th o rity  a t Stormont uas v ir t u a l ly  "semi­
independent". Without any e ffe c t iv e  provision  to  p ro tect the in te re s ts
of the strong and e ffe c tiv e  C ath o lic  m in o rity  the m o n o lith ica lly  P ro testant 
U nion ist Party  securely saddled in  the seat of pouer at Stormont since  
i t s  inception  uas encouraged to misuse the au th o rity  to the detrim ent 
of the m in o r ity .
4 .94  Professor de Smith expresses surprise th a t s . 8 ( 6 ) of the
C onstitu tio n  uhich contemplated a p ro h ib itio n  against d iscrim in atio n  by
13executive action had not been exten s ive ly  used. In  s .5 also there  uas
a s im ila r  provision on d iscrim in atio n  on re lig io u s  grounds. The ansuer to
th is  paradox l i e ,  in  our op in ion , in  the general d is tru s t u ith  uhich the
m inority  vieued each and every in s t itu t io n  of the Northern Ire la n d  regim e.
Indeed, i t  has been observed th a t the C atho lic  m in o rity  regarded "the use
of the le g a l system to support the U n ion is t regime as uholly  u n ju s t if ia b le " :
leg itim acy of the courts uas questioned and the uhole le g a l system uas
14dubbed as the "puppet" of the U n io n is ts .
4.95 The two provisions mentioned above as w e ll as the other
provisions of the 1920 Act (th e  C o n stitu tio n ) were meant to apply, i t
must be remembered, to the tu/o Governments a t Dublin and Stormont
contemplated under the Act fo r  solving the Ir is h  and the U ls te r  questions.
These questions were so complex th a t ,  as Professor C la ire  P a lley  observes,
they can best be understood and analysed with reference to "im perialism
and co lo n ia lism ". A fte r in troducing the s e t t le rs  in to  Ire la n d  fo r
defensive purposes, England gave "res id u a l support" to them when
withdrawing in  her own in te re s ts . She fu r th e r  adds th a t the stage
is  now reached when the support is  found to  be costly  and p o l i t ic a l ly  
15inexped ien t. I t  is  th is  fe a r  of being abandoned by the Im p eria l power 
leading eventually  to  the dreaded re u n ific a tio n  which, in  our opin ion , 
made the U ltra -P ro te s ta n t Groups more m il ita n t  and m otivated th e ir  action  
in  opposing the peaceful movement which s ta rte d  with the founding o f the  
C iv i l  Rights Association in  1967.
4.96 The movement aimed at focussing a tte n tio n  on the grievances of
the C atho lic  population in  such m atters as d iscrim in a tio n , gerrymandering,
unemployment, partisansh ip  in  the operation of pub lic  serv ices , p o lice  
16oppression e tc . The v io le n t reaction  of the " lo y a lis ts "  embarrassed
the U n ion ist regime and made th e ir  task of m aintain ing law and order
17d i f f i c u l t .  The regime which lacked " leg itim acy" now began to crumble,
being unable to withstand challenge to i t s  au th o rity  from two m utually
opposing fa c tio n s . The s itu a tio n  resembled a c iv i l  war. Both wings of
the I .R .A . ,  the o f f ic i a l  and the p ro v is io n a l, were carry ing  on g u e r r i l la
warfare against the s ta te , the former fo r  es tab lish in g  a un ited  Ire la n d
and the la t t e r  fo r  defending the "C atho lic  Ghettoes" in  Northern Ire la n d
against attacks from the "U ltra s "  as w e ll as the p o lic e . The "U ltra s "  too
were not only f ig h tin g  the C atholics  and the p o lice  but were also engaged
in  subversive a c t iv i t ie s  by blowing up e le c t r ic i t y  and water supply 
18in s ta l la t io n s .  The regime e n lis te d  the aid of the B r it is h  Army to
m aintain i t s  au th o rity  but f a i le d .  Serving under two masters, the Army 
i t s e l f ,  i t  appears, was caught up in  the vortex  o f sectarian  p o l i t ic a l  
controversy. E ven tually , with the im position of d ire c t ru le  from London 
in  March 1972 the regime was form ally  liq u id a te d .
4.97 I t  cannot be gainsaid th a t re b e llio n  against the U n ion is t
19regime was w r it  large in  the use of v io lence as a "conscious e f fo r t "
by the opposing fa c tio n s  which had repudiated various measures of the
regim e. James Callaghan, then Home Secretary in  London, took note o f the
success of the re b e llio n  saying th a t ,  " . . . fo r  two years or more before
1969, parts  of B e lfa s t and Londonderry had remained almost outside the law
20and under th e ir  own s o -ca lled  ju r is d ic t io n ."  From h is  account one can
also conclude th a t the B r it is h  Government was compelled to  suggest the
"reform measures" to the  U n ion ist regime under pressure from world 
21opin ion. The regime however fa i le d  to  pursue honestly and d is c re e tly  the
22 23"two wars s tra te g y " . Th is  fa c t is  borne out by the Cameron Commission
which had brought to  l ig h t  the repressive action o f the regime and the
" u ltra s "  to  which the C iv i l  Rights marches end r a l l ie s  in  Dungannon and
Armagh between August end December 1968 and in  B e lfa s t end Londonderry
in  October 1968 and January 1969 had been subjected.
4.98 There was a lso , i t  appears, growing apprehension of e x te rn a l
in te rfe ren c e  perm issible under In te rn a t io n a l Law in  c i v i l  wars and in te rn a l
c o n flic ts  inasmuch as the le g a l concept o f such c o n flic ts  had been 
24undergoing change. The Ir is h  Government, in  fa c t ,  attempted to  have
the m atter placed on the agenda of the Security  Council a t the United  
25Nations; and the Prime M in is te r  of the Ir is h  Republic spoke of the
necessity o f a United N ations ' Peace-keeping Force being inducted in to  
26Northern Ire la n d . In  a speech made in  the House of Commons the Prime 
M in is te r , Mr. Edward Heath, also acknowledged the in te rn a t io n a l dimension 
of the re s p o n s ib ility  fo r  "law and order" in  Northern Ire la n d  saying th at 
" i t  was not merely domestic -  i t  was a m atter of in te rn a t io n a l concern as
27w e ll."  The 197 2 Green Paper on Northern Ire la n d  also acknowledged
"repercussions at in te rn a t io n a l le v e l"  o f the use of emergency powers
28and the armed fo rces .
4.99 No doubt, under t r a d it io n a l in te rn a t io n a l law recognition  of
insurgents as a b e llig e re n t power required certa in  conditions to be 
29s a t is f ie d . In  some respects the conditions were s u b s ta n tia lly
s a t is f ie d  to o , but the t r a d it io n a lis ts  would h e s ita te  to accord the
c o n flic t  the s tatus of c iv i l  war. On thB other hand i t  may be pointed out
th a t in te rn a t io n a l recognition was given to the B ia fra  War in  N ig e r ia ,
which has been described as a " re b e llio n "  as i t  had as i t s  ob ject
30redress of the wrongs of one group w ith in  the community. The e f fe c t  of 
recognition  would have e n t it le d  p o l i t ic a l  prisoners in  Northern Ire la n d  
to  be tre a te d  as POWs with immunity from crim in a l prosecution. Stormont 
and W hiteha ll n a tu ra lly  t r ie d  to avoid such a course, although the 
in te rn a t io n a l dimension of the problem could not be ignored.
4.100 With th is  background we propose to  examine now the law enacted 
at d if fe re n t  times to meet the unique s itu a tio n  in  Northern Ire la n d  which 
has been, since in c ep tio n , under a continuous s ta te  o f emergency.
(2 ) The Emergency L eg is la tio n
(A) P re-C o n stitu tio n  P osition
4.101 The Ir is h  Parliam ent had enacted, as we have seen, sp ec ia l 
emergency laws to deal with "d isorders" in  the un ited  Ire la n d  using the
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concept of " M a rtia l Law" but the fa c t  th a t the struggle fo r  independence 
was of a v io le n t character and of endemic type perhaps required greater  
re lia n c e  to be placed on s .16 of the Habeas Corpus ( Ire la n d ) Act 1781 
which provided fo r  suspending the Act in  times of re b e llio n  or ac tu a l 
invas ion . However, s .67 o f the C onstitu tio n  of 1920 took away the power 
of suspension of the Governor and the Privy Council provided by s . 16 and 
thereby enlarged the scope of a c o n s titu tio n a l guarantee of personal 
l ib e r ty  in  Northern Ire la n d . Th is , u n fo rtu n a te ly , made l i t t l e  d iffe ren ce
in  p ra c tic e , fo r ,  the Restoration of Order in  Ire la n d  Act 1920, enacted by
the B r it is h  Parliam ent, conferred wide powers on the Executive fo r  making
Regulations fo r  "securing the re s to ra tio n  and maintenance of o rder", under
the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914. P o l i t ic a l  expediency
31having rendered th is  Act in a p p lic a b le , an occasion arose fo r  the Northern  
Ire la n d  Parliam ent to enact in  1922 spec ia l emergency measures to deal with  
the s itu a tio n  created by the re b e llio u s  a c t iv i t ie s  of the " Ir is h  Republican 
Army" operating on both sides of the Border.
(B) The C iv i l  A u th o ritie s  (S p ec ia l Powers) Act 1922 and the Regulations
(a ) A General View
4.102 H e re in a fte r the Act w i l l  be described by i t s  popular name, the
Special Powers Act, SPA, in  sh o rt. I t  was enacted as a temporary measure
and was renewed from year to  year u n t i l  in  1933 i t  was made permanent.
A fter im position o f "d ire c t ru le "  the Act was repealed by the Northern
Ire la n d  (Temporary Provis ion) Act 1973, enacted by the B r it is h  P arliam ent.
Indeed, the draconian powers conferred by i t  on the Executive had made
i t  an instrum ent of oppression in  the p a r t ic u la r  context of Northern
Ire la n d . The U n ion ist regime having monopolised the r ig h t  to govern through
i t s  un in terrup ted  possession of the e n tire  power s tru c tu re  of the
government machinery was in  no mood to allow  any democratic norm to
operate . Events in  Northern Ire la n d  have proved th a t an oppressive
provision enforced in  a p a r t ia l  manner was most l ik e ly  to  prove counter
productive and to be discarded in  the end fo r  i t s  in a b i l i t y  to  deal with the 
32new challenge. The working of the Act was examined in  a study conducted
in 1936 which described the Act as a "permanent machine of d ic ta to rsh ip "
and observed as fo llo w s:
. . . t h e  Northern Ir is h  Government has used Special Powers 
towards securing the domination of one p a r t ic u la r  p o l i t ic a l  
fa c tio n  and, at the same tim e, towards c u r ta il in g  the law fu l 
a c t iv i t ie s  of i t s  opponents. The d riv in g  of leg itim a te  
movements in to  i l l e g a l i t y ,  the in tim id a tin g  or branding as 
lawbreakers th e ir  adherents however innocent of crime, has
3^9JL O
tended to encourage vio lence aid b ig o try  on the part o f 
government supporters as w e ll as to  beget in  i t s  
opponents an in to le ran ce  of "law and order" thus m aintained.
4.103 On the other hand, the enactment has been ju s t i f ie d  as a 
response to the "troub les" o f 1922 when 230 persons were k i l le d  and i t s  
continuation in  the absence o f an E x trad itio n  Treaty  between the United  
Kingdom and the Ir is h  Government has also been considered necessary
34having regard to "constant th re a t to in te rn a l secu rity  o f the s ta te " .
The nature o f the power enjoyed under the Act by the Government were,
•'T'l .
according to  one commentator, " s im ila r  to  those current ijrf time of m a rtia l  
35law". I t  has also been observed th a t the power o f a rres t end detention
under the Act was in  fa c t  used and d irec ted  against "Roman C atho lics  and
36 37
Republicans" p a r t ic u la r ly  in  1938 and 1956 and also in  1971.
4.104 The main provisions of the Act, which we proceed to examine now,
ju s t i fy  ex fa c ie  the c r it ic is m  th a t the Act evidences a ra d ic a l departure
from procedural safeguards " t ra d it io n a lly  and ju s t i f ia b ly  regarded as
38desirab le  fo r  preservation of c iv i l  l ib e r t ie s "  but there was scope fo r  
what we propose to  c a l l  a "hum anitarian" in te rp re ta t io n .
4.105 The power to  make Regulations conferred on the Executive under 
the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914 was expressly lim ite d  to the 
period of "continuance of the present war". The Restoration of Order in  
Ire la n d  Act 1920 provided a d if fe re n t  ju s t i f ic a t io n  s ta tin g  th a t the  
"ordinary law [was] inadequate fo r  prevention and punishment of crime or 
maintenance of o rd er" . Under the Special Powers Act, the Executive was
not only endowed with s im ila r  power, a lb e it  w ithout any express l im ita t io n
or ju s t i f ic a t io n ,  but also w ith power "to take a l l  such steps and issue
a l l  such orders as may be necessary fo r  preserving the peace and m aintain ing
order, according to  and in  the execution of th is  Act and the re g u la tio n ."
However, s u b -s .(1 ) of s .1 , which contained th is  prov is ion , was saddled
with the fo llo w in g  proviso embodying im p lied ly  the concept o f "necessity":
. . . the ordinary course of law and avocations of l i f e  
and the enjoyment o f property s h a ll be in te r fe re d  with  
as l i t t l e  as may be perm itted by the exigencies of the 
steps required  to be taken under th is  Act.
liie f in d  no b as is , in  the language of the proviso, to  support the
proposition th a t " p ra c tic a l r e a l i t ie s "  of the power exerc isab le  under the
Act made i t  "hollow and il lu s o ry "  or th a t i t  contained merely "noble 
39sentim ents". The proviso conferred on the c it iz e n , we submit, the 
r ig h t to  obtain ju d ic ia l  review and i t  was not a mere embodiment of 
d ire c tiv e  p r in c ip le s .
4.106 I t  must be commented th a t s.1 was the core o f the Act and th a t  
i t s  other sub-sections, (2 ) and ( 4 ) ,  apparently unaffected as they were 
by the proviso to  s u b -s .(1 ) ,  succeeded, in  the context of " p ra c t ic a l  
r e a l i t ie s "  of Northern Ire la n d , in  in ves tin g  the Executive with wide 
d iscre tio n ary  powers. However, the  expression "subject to  the provisions  
of the Act" used in  s u b -s .(3 ) could be reasonably construed as sub jecting  
the reg u la tio n  making powsr of the  M in is te r  to  the p ro h ib itio n s  of the  
proviso to s u b -s .(1 ) . Although the Act was a "penal" s ta tu te  in  the 
t r a d it io n a l  sense, ru les  of in te rp re ta t io n  perm itted a harmonious 
construction which, in  the case of s ta tu tes  of th is  n a tu re , with the 
concept of "necessity" expressly engrafted , could be ju s t i f ia b ly  
la b e lle d , in  the modern context, as "humanitarian" in te rp re ta t io n . We 
have already observed th a t the humanitarian aspects o f the Geneva
Convention have infused a new mealing and content in to  the concept o f
it • i. it 40"necessity".
4.107 The Royal U ls te r  Constabulary (h e re a fte r  described as RUC) has
been described, on cogent evidence, as the reposito ry  o f " m ilita ry  power"
in  Northern Ire la n d  passed o f f  as a p o lice  force to overcome c o n s titu tio n a l  
41o b jec tio n s . In  the United S tates the m il ita ry  a u th o r it ie s  were involved  
in  the operation and enforcement o f emergency laws but there  was no 
t ra d it io n  of such an exercise in  the United Kingdom. Delegation of power 
under s u b -s .(2 ) to  "any o f f ic e r "  o f the Constabulary was th e re fo re  
u n ju s tif ie d  generally  as w e ll as on the ground of excessive d e leg a tio n .
4.108 In  fa c t the v ice  of excessive delegation can be said to a f f l i c t  
generally  the Regulation-making power conferred by s u b -s .(3 ) in  th a t
the terms " fu rth e r provision" in  clause (a )  and "varying and revoking
any provision of the reg u la tio n s" in  clause (b ) in  themselves co n stitu te
le g is la t iv e  abd ication . Although a general case on s im ila r  lin e s  has
42been made out challenging the v a l id i ty  of the Act as a whole, we would 
p re fe r to  sustain i t  by lay ing  stress on the expression "subject to the 
provisions of th is  Act" occurring in  the same sub-section and reading  
the same with the proviso to s u b -s .(1 ) ,  as in d ica ted  e a r l ie r .
4.109 However, we support the proposition th a t the Act as a whole
was l ia b le  to  be challenged as u l t r a  v ire s  s .4 (1 ) (3 )  of the C onstitu tio n
43of 1920 being an Act in  respect o f "the defence of the realm ". The 
C o n s titu tio n a l provision is  quoted below: 
para (3 ) of s .4 ( 1)
The navy, the army, the a ir  fo rc e , the t e r r i t o r i a l  army, 
or any other n ava l, m il ita ry  or a ir  fo rc e , or the  
defence of the realm . • .
(S .4 (1 ) defined the le g is la t iv e  competence of the 
Northern Ire la n d  le g is la tu re  and in  para (3 ) i t  
posited one class of excluded subject m a t t e r ) .^
Both s u b -ss .(1 ) and (2 ) o f s.1 of the Act contemplated a p o s itive  ro le
fo r  the " m ilita ry  wing" o f the s ta te  -  fo r  preserving the peace and
m aintain ing order -  and with the excision of su b -s .(1 ) the Act was
l ia b le  to become unworkable and f a l l  as a whole. In  p a r t ic u la r  s.7/
which conferred power of a rres t among others on "any member o f any of
His M a jes ty 's  forces'^ was void on the same ground. How fa r  the le g is la t iv e
h is to ry  connecting i t  w ith the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914
can serve as a u sefu l to o l in  th is  operation is  however doubtfu l inasmuch
as such connection is  not expressly maintained by the Act, u n like  the
Restoration of Order in  Ire la n d  Act 1920.
4.110 Although commentators have not grounded challenge to  the Act on 
paragraph 7 o f s .4(1 ) of the C o n s titu tio n , the a c t iv i t ie s  of the I .R .A . ,  
against whom the Act was m ainly used, partaking  of the nature of "treason,
treason fe lony" a case fo r  such a challenge could also be made o u t.
4.111 Among other provisions of the Actt the punishments of death ( s . 6 )
in  respect of offences under the Explosive Substance Act and of shipping
45( s . 5) fo r  other offences a lso , have been r ig h t ly  ca lled  "barbarous” ,
but the penalty of whipping may w e ll be u l t r a  v ire s  A r t .3 of the European
46Convention as "inhuman or degrading" punishment. The exceptional
47character of s .2 (4 ) ,  described as creating  an "unprecedented offence"
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and as v io la t iv e  of the p rin c ip le s  of n u lla  poena sine leg e , make i t
necessary to be quoted:
I f  any person does any act of such a nature as to be 
calcu lated  to be p re ju d ic ia l to the preservation o f the 
peace or maintenance of order in  Northern Ire la n d  and 
not s p e c if ic a lly  provided fo r  in  the reg u la tio n s , he 
s h a ll be deemed to be g u ilty  of an offence against the 
re g u la tio n s .
4.112 The provision has perhaps no p a r a l le l  in  the Commonwealth and 
the c r it ic is m  is  w e ll founded. I t  has also to  be noted th a t the expression 
"preservation of the peace or maintenance of order" was not defined and
as such by v ir tu e  of the powers under s .1 (1 ) the Executive could take
"steps" at any time to prosecute any person fo r  "any act" i t  considered to
be " p re ju d ic ia l" . A lb e it , the u ltim a te  say rested with the ju d ic ia ry  but
the i n i t i a l  onslaught on the personal l ib e r ty  could not be avoided.
However, in  the modern context the provision was l ia b le  to be struck
down as offending A r t ic le  7 read with A r tic le  15(2) of the European
49Convention of Human Rights to which the United Kingdom is  a p a rty . j&ven 
otherwise*® submit, enjoying the same status as th a t o f a subordinate  
le g is la tu re , the Northern Ire la n d  Parliam ent could not enact any law 
immune from the operation of the wider import o f the doctrine  o f u l t r a  v ire s  
and the provision was l ia b le  to  be declared void on grounds of vagueness 
and unreasonableness.^
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4.113 Giving power to  the Executive in  tim e9  of emergency was not 
unusual but what was unusual about Northern Ire la n d  was the manner in  
which the power was exerc ised . The scheduled regu lations  were "varied"  
by the Executive in  an e x tra o rd in a r ily  l ib e r a l  manner. Provisions  
respecting search and se izu re , a rre s t, in te rro g a tio n , detention and 
internm ent in  p a r t ic u la r  deserve sp ec ia l mention in  th is  connection.
Although there was a "la rg e  scale revocation" of e x is tin g  reg u la tio n s  
between 1949 and 1951 the reinstatem ent of most of these provisions
in  the succeeding years took a more o ffen s ive  form .
(b ) A rrest. In te rro g a tio n . Detention and Internment
( i )  A composite view of the re s tra in ts
The im portant re s tra in ts  on personal l ib e r ty  contemplated under 
the Act and the Regulations may be examined together at f i r s t ,  under 
respective heads.
A rrest
4.114 We have noticed e a r l ie r  s .7 re la t in g  to power of a rre s t.
Although i t  did not expressly s ta te  the requirement of reasonable grounds 
of suspicion i t  made the power exercisable  as "a t common law". By an 
amendment in  1967 the underlined expression was d e le ted . As a re s u lt  
the po lice  and the army personnel and even any "authorised" person making 
the a rre s t (w ithout warrant) were given an absolute p ro te c tio n . I t  is  
d i f f i c u l t  to conceive of any successful action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment or  
even a prosecution fo r  assault in  the present circumstances.
4.115 While the power under s .7 was exercisable  "in  respect of any 
crime or any offence against the re g u la tio n s", summary power of a rre s t of 
substantive nature was conferred by Regulations 10 and 11. By the former 
any o f f ic e r  of the Royal U ls te r  Constabulary could authorise such a rre s t  
fo r  the "preservation of the peace and maintenance of order" and the  
person so arrested  could be detained fo r  a period of "not more than 48 
hours", fo r  the purpose o f " in te rro g a tio n " . In  1955 the period was 24
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hours; i t  was changed to 48 hours in  1957.
4.116 Under Regulation 11 the b e n e fic ia r ie s  of the power were the  
same as under s .7 but the power could be exercised against any person who 
was suspected of "actin g  or of having acted or being about to act in  a 
manner p re ju d ic ia l to the preservation of the peace and maintenance of 
o rd er". This power, u n lik e  th a t of Reg.10 was circumscribed in  th a t i t  
provided some sort of o b jec tive  c r i t e r ia  by s p e c if ic a lly  s ta tin g  th a t  
fo r  a rre s t on suspicion of possession of any p re ju d ic ia l a r t ic le  the  
a rres to r had to  "give ground fo r  such suspic ion". But the detention th a t  
could fo llo w  such a rres t was of a d if fe re n t  character and w i l l  be d e a lt 
with sep a ra te ly . I t  is  noteworthy however th a t in  1950 the power
could be exercised only by "any p o lice  o f f ic e r  or constable" and th a t the 
change came in  1956 which a ffec ted  the consequential detention a lso . 
J_ntejrrogati_qn Jdith£ut a rres t (power of questioning)
4.117 Another notable departure from Common Law is  evidenced by
Regulation 7 which made i t  the "duty" o f every person to stop and answer
any question "reasonably addressed" to  him by a p o lice  o f f ic e r  or constable.
Refusal or fa i lu r e  to stop or answer was made an offence; the p o s itio n , at
51Common Law, as we have seen, was ju s t the reverse. The supposed 
safeguard apparently did l i t t l e  to contro l the m ischief of random 
questioning perm itted by the re g u la tio n . I t  appears to  have been meant 
as a defence in  the event of prosecution and not as a check on the power.
One could possibly re ly  on the proviso to s .1 (1 ) and contend in  h is  
defence th a t the r ig h t to  s ilence  a v a ila b le  to him in  "the ordinary  
course o f law" could be " in te r fe re d  with as l i t t l e "  as possible and th a t  
he was not obliged to answer s e lf- in c r im in a t in g  questions. The court
ought to  hold such questions as not having been "reasonably addressed"
w ith in  the meaning of the proviso .
4.118 However, i f  the ju d ic ia ry  f e l t  disposed to construe the
expression "the ordinary course of law" to mean common law, and to  hold
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th a t the proviso had, in  e f fe c t ,  saved the common law, i t  was possible  
also to  contend th a t the power to  stop and question ought to be in h ib ite d  
by the requirement of a reasonable suspicion.
4.119 I t  is  in te re s tin g  to note th a t under Regulation 6 , or even
under 5, there  was no "duty" to stop on any person; a p o lice  o f f ic e r  or a
constable was required expressly to  act only when he had "suspicion” . A
veh ic le  used fo r  any " p re ju d ic ia l purpose" under Reg.5 and a person
carry ing  any " p re ju d ic ia l a r t ic le "  (firea rm s  e tc .)  under Reg. 6  could be
stopped and searched. Reg.7 being part of the same scheme, the omission
in  i t  of the requirement o f "suspicion" could, w ithout doing vio lence to
i t s  language, be safe ly  supplied , despite the use of the word "duty"
th e re in . I t  was necessary, i t  is  subm itted, to  read the scheme of the
regu lations  in  the l ig h t  of the proviso . U nfortunate ly  the Executive
appears to have taken the view th a t the law-mekers had created new powers
in  Northern Ire la n d  in  the same manner as they had created "M a rtia l Law"
52in  United Ire la n d . As a re s u lt ,  when the Army came in ,  even an unarmed
53person was sometimes f a t a l ly  shot fo r  h is  fa i lu r e  to  stop. Such power
54is  not to be found in  the "yellow  card". On the contrary, r.17  of the
yellow  card empowered the army to challenge a person who was "acting
suspiciously" and in  r .1 9  there  was a s p e c ific  in ju n c tio n  against 
opening f i r e  a t an unarmed person.
DeJ^errtiojn
4.120 In  1950 i t  was necessary fo r  the  C iv i l  Authority to be " s a tis fie d "
th a t "with a view to preventing him" from acting  in  a p re ju d ic ia l manner
i t  was necessary so to do, before the detention o f the arrested person
could be ordered. Such detention w ithout a charge could not be fo r
more than 7 days, [emphasis added] ,
4.121 In  1956 i t  was provided th a t the person arrested may, "on the order
of the C iv i l  A uthority be deta ined", u n t i l  he was discharged by d irec tio n
of the Attorney-General or was produced before a court. For h is  release on
b a i l  such person had to  apply to  the C iv i l  A uthority who could d ire c t in  
w rit in g  fo r  h is  discharge by the Resident M a g is tra te .
Internment
4.122 Regulation 12 in  i t s  present form was introduced in  1956. I t
provided fo r  in ternm ent, in  the fo llo w in g  term s:
When i t  appears to the  M in is te r o f Home A ffa irs .  . • on the  
recommendation of an O ff ic e r  of the Royal U ls te r  Constabulary 
. . . o r of an advisory committee th a t fo r  securing the  
preservation of the peace and the  maintenance of o rd e r. . .
i t  is  expedient th a t a person who is  suspected of acting  or
having acted or being about to act in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to  
. . . s h a ll be subjected to such o b lig a tio n s  and re s tr ic t io n s  
. . . [he may] . . . require  th a t person fo rth w ith  o r from 
tim e to  tim e, e ith e r  to remain in ,  or to  proceed to  and 
reside  in  such place as may be s p e c ifie d . . . and to  comply 
with such d irec tio n s  as to  reporting  to  the p o lic e . . . 
or to  be in terned  as may be d irec ted  in  the o rd e r.
Provided th a t [ th e j o rd er. . . s h a ll include express 
provision fo r  the due consideration by an advisory committee 
of any rep resen ta tio n s. . . [made] against the o rd er.
[emphasis added]
4.123 I t  was also provided th a t the Advisory Committee s h a ll be
appointed by the M in is te r and th a t such Committee s h a ll be presided over
'•by a person who holds or has held high ju d ic ia l  o ff ic e  or is  a Recorder
or County Court Judge or a p ra c tis in g  B a rr is te r  of at le a s t ten y e a rs 1 
standing,,.
4.124 Removal of the "person in te rn e d 1' to  "any place of internm ent"  
was also contemplated besides provid ing fo r  h is  removal to  and detention  
at "any place where h is  presence is  req u ired . . . in  the in te re s t  of 
ju s tic e  or fo r .  . . any p u b lic  in q u iry ."  A person "'detained" could also 
be likew ise  removed "in  the in te re s t  of ju s t ic e " , [emphasis added]
4.125 With the avowed object of "preventing any tampering with  
evidence or any plans of escape o r fo r  other l ik e  considerations", the  
person detained or in terned  was, by Regulation 13, subjected to fu r th e r  
re s t r ic t io n  in  the m atter of communicating e ith e r  o ra lly  or in  w ritin g  
with other persons. The s trin g en t provisions were also sought to be 
ju s t i f ie d  on grounds o f "prevention of crime, maintenance of order and
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s e c u rity , good order and government of the place of detention or
internm ent1'* In  1971 a d d itio n a l provisions were engrafted on i t .  Such
person had to  be placed "under the supervis ion , co n tro l or d is c ip lin e  of
any person authorised by the M in is try  of Heme A ffa irs " , [emphasis added]
This provision was apparently in  derogation of the Prison Rules and was
perhaps meant to deal with hardened " te r ro r is ts "  but i t  appears to  have
underw ritten a pervasive ro le  fo r  the  Army, which was re fle c te d  in  the
55disturbances th a t took place in  d if fe re n t  prisons.
( i i )  "D etention". " In te rnment" and th e ir  ooBration
4.126 The provisions re la t in g  to  "detention" and "internm ent" quoted 
above at some length deserve to  be examined in  d e ta il  in re la tio n  to  
th e ir  fa c tu a l operation and consequences.
4.127 The Regulations contemplated two stages in  the detention operations  
by the p o lice  ( fo r  in te rro g a tio n ) fo r  a lim ite d  period , up to  48 hours;
and an in d e f in ite  extension under orders o f the C iv i l  A u th o rity . I t  
appears th a t despite the p o s s ib il ity  of the extension acquiring the same 
character by v ir tu e  of the provision of delegation to the po lice  o f any 
function of the C iv i l  A uthority ( s .1 ( 2 ) ) ,  some d is tin c tio n  was sought to be 
m aintained between the two stages u n t i l  the law was changed in  1956. As 
a re s u lt  of the " in te rro g a tio n "  the C iv i l  A uthority could say th a t i t  was 
" s a t is fie d "  th a t the person arrested was expected to indulge in  p re ju d ic ia l  
a c t iv i t ie s  and to "prevent" him from doing so i t  was necessary to  deta in  
him. The fa c t th a t such detention w ithout charge could not extend beyond 
7 days s ig n if ie d  th a t the Executive an tic ip a ted  some imminent danger.
4.128 In  1956, on the o thsr hand, detention being authorised fo r  an 
in d e f in ite  period without the necessity of f u l f i l l i n g  any other requirement 
o b lite ra te d  the d is tin c tio n  and enabled the in te rro g a tio n  process to  be 
continued. I t  had not to end before the passing of the  detention o rd er,
as was req u ired , one may reasonably in te rp re t ,  under the old law . As 
we s h a ll see, in te rro g a tio n  now proceeded in d e f in ite ly ,  perhaps with greater  
zeal and vehemence, accentuated by the in te rp o s itio n  o f the army who,
supposedly, possessed the necessary e x p e rtis e . The change, i t  appears,
was m otivated by the desire  of the Executive to le g a lis e  the i l le g a l
p ra c tic e s , fo r  the po lice  in te rro g a tio n  even under the o ld  law, was also
accompanied by physical v io lence and the motive of such in te rro g a tio n  has
56been r ig h t ly  termed " in tim id a tio n " .
4.129 The perverted use o f the expression "in  the in te re s t of ju s tic e "
is  noteworthy. One can reasonably contend th a t the "detention" operation
in  fa c t commenced a t the point of a rres t in  th a t the Executive appears to
have been acting under the b e l ie f  th a t the common law requirement of
inform ing the person of the reasons fo r  a rres t was done away with by the
Act. Th is  p o s itio n , as we s h a ll see, was noticed by the Jud ic iary  and
57the i l l e g a l i t y  of the  p rac tice  was pointed out in  c le a r term s. In  
the Compton Report n o tice  is  taken of the modus operandi of a rres ts : 
so ld ie rs  who had made mass a rres ts  on August 9 of 1971 were in s tru c ted
r. 5 8to  say as fo llo w s:
I  am a rres tin g  you under the powers conferred by th e . . . (SPA) 
. . .  I  am not required to give any fu rth e r  exp lanation .
I  warn you th a t i f  you re s is t  a rres t you may have committed 
an o ffence.
4.130 The Act was thus so operated th a t from the point of a rres t the
person concerned lo s t a l l  c iv i l  l ib e r t ie s  inc lud ing  the r ig h t  of having
le g a l advice. We w i l l  have more to say about the fa c tu a l pos ition
regarding a rre s ts , detention and internm ent but i t  w i l l  be apposite to
re fe r  here to the complaint made by the N ationa l Council fo r  C iv i l
L ib e rtie s  th a t even re la t iv e s  of the arrested person had to approach
them and other organizations to  ascerta in  fo r  them the whereabouts of
59the arrested  persons.
4.131 I t  is  incomprehensible th a t the expression " in  the in te re s t  of 
ju s tic e "  could be used as a le g a l sanction fo r  such reprehensib le practices  
which, i t  was a lleged , amounted to  to r tu re , through " in te rro g a tio n  in  
depth" a f te r  the arrested person was "removed" to a "place of detention"  
fo llo w in g  the "processing" at the "holding c e n tre " .^
4.132 The provision of "internm ent" however was not as bald as
th a t of detention but in  p ractice  the safeguard proved to  be i l lu s o r y .
The expression " i t  appears" was q u a lif ie d  in  th a t the M in is te r could act
on the recommendation of the sp ec ified  a u th o r it ie s . U n fo rtu n ate ly , the
Royal U ls te r  Constabulary, which fig u red  mostly in  making these
recommendations did not enjoy the confidence of the m inority  and had
61in  fa c t come to be recognised by them as a partisan  force dehors 
i t s  p a ra -m ilita ry  character to which reference has been made in  the 
b e g in n in g .^
4.133 I t  cannot be denied th a t the purpose of the safeguard in  a 
d ra s tic  measure l ik e  detention without t r i a l  (" in ternm ent" was nothing less  
than th a t)  was not only to  provide a check on the possible abuse of
the power but also to  in s p ire  confidence in  such safeguards of the group
of people against whom such measure was proposed to be used to underline
the preventive character of the  measure. The fa c t th a t reso rt to
internment in  August 1971, evoked a v io le n t reaction  from the C atho lic
m inority  fo llow ed by a P rotestant backlash and m il ita r y  repression
63re s u ltin g  in  great loss of l i f e  and property prove the hypothesis th a t
the measure was considered by them as a p u n itive  sanction against a n t i-
government a c t iv i t ie s .  I t  has been observed th a t in  fa c t no attempt was
made to d is tin g u ish  between an "opponent of government" and a " te r r o r is t"
64who was supposed to be the ta rg e t of the measure. The recommending 
a u th o rity , i t  appears, paid scant regard to the le g a l requirement of 
"securing the preservation of the peace and the maintenance of o rd e r."
4.134 The provision o f review of cases of internm ent by the advisory 
committee also s u ffe rs  from more than one in f i r m ity .  In  the f i r s t  place 
the r ig h t  conceded to the in terned  person of making representation  to  
the committee could not be e f fe c t iv e ly  exercised in  the absence of an 
express provision fo r  the grounds of internm ent being furnished
to  him. Secondly, such an order could be made and served on the detainee
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at any time and also reviewed by the committee at any tim e, although i t  
ti/as n a tu ra l to expect such d ra s tic  provision to  be balanced by reg u la tin g  
i t s  operation through a tim e -s c a le . The cumulative e ffe c t  of the twin  
provision of detention and internment was in d e f in ite  in carcera tio n  of a 
c it iz e n  from the moment o f h is  a rre s t. A person who was ’’detained" and 
had not been served with an internment order could apply fo r  h is  release  
on b a i l  not to the court but to the C iv i l  A uthority which, in  e f fe c t ,  would 
mean h is  a rre s to r . The provision did not expressly make i t  incumbent on 
the Executive to provide reasonable opportunity to the arrested  person to  
secure h is  re le a se . A ll  avenues of ju d ic ia l  review were thus s k i l f u l ly  
blocked. The p o s s ib ility  of the use by the ju d ic ia ry  o f the proviso to  
s .1 (1 ) never posed a serious th re a t to the Executive fo r  reasons which we 
s h a ll have occasion to in v e s tig a te .
4.135 I t  is  also noteworthy th a t there was no duty on the Executive
to  make p erio d ic  review of the cases suo motu. N e ith e r was the person
in tern ed  e n t it le d  to  make representation  to the Executive i t s e l f  so th a t
in  cases of mistaken id e n t ity  and other s im ila r  gross mistakes he could
have an immediate redress. In  view of the fa c t  th a t an a rres t could
eventually  turn in to  an internm ent and there were serious a lle g a tio n s
against the po lice  of acting  in  a partisan  manner, i t  was necessary to
exclude the p o s s ib ility  of th is  power being exercised in  a d iscrim inatory
manner. This aspect of the m atter in  fa c t formed an im portant part of the
case of the Republic of Ire la n d  in  which they challenged the v a l id i ty  of
the provisions of in te rro g a tio n , internm ent and detention and th e ir
ap p lica tio n  before the European Commission of Human R ights. The Commission
found no d i f f ic u l t y  in  holding admissible and worth considering the p lea
th a t the d iscrim inatory  enforcement of the Act was v io la t iv e  of A rtic le s
6514 and 5 and 6  read with 15. The European Court at Strasbourg, la t e r ,  
set aside the unanimous fin d in g s  of the Commission and held th a t the  
"sensory d ep riva tio n " in te rro g a tio n  technique did not co n stitu te  an
"ad m in is tra tive  p ra c tic e "  of to r tu re . The m a jo rity  opinion held although 
the object of such practices  was the ex trac tio n  of confession and other 
evidence, and th a t although they were system atica lly  used they did not 
occasion s u ffe rin g  of the p a r t ic u la r  in te n s ity  and c ru e lty  imparted by 
" to r tu re " . Such p ra c tic e s , the court however h e ld , constitu ted  inhuman 
and degrading treatm ent and were v io la t iv e  of A r t .3 o f the Convention.
I t  was also found th a t such practices  were in  fa c t  used against detainees  
in  1971 although, the court h e ld , the a lle g a tio n  of d iscrim in atio n  in  the  
m atter of "internm ent" was not substantiated aid therefore  the complaint 
th a t A r t .14 was also v io la te d , f a i l e d . ^
(C) trTerrorism " aid  L e g is la tiv e  Provisions under D ire c t Rule
( a) The L e g is la tiv e  Measures
The change in  approach to  the problem fo llo w in g  im position of 
d ire c t ru le  from Westminster in  1972 was prominently re fle c te d  in  the very 
f i r s t  measure which made no secret th a t i t  was a f ig h t  against "terro rism "  
and not an ordinary problem of law and order of which the le g a l measures 
must take account. The B r it is h  had the experience of f ig h tin g  " te r ro r is ts "  
in  the Malayan peninsula and also in  Kenya and they had no doubt th a t the 
b a tt le  against " te r ro r is ts "  could not bB fought even in  Northern Ire la n d  
by preventive measures alone. The change in  the c o n s titu tio n a l position  
as a re s u lt of the new o b lig a tio n  of the United Kingdom under the European 
Convention of Human Rights also supported th is  approach. The new 
measures may now be examined.
( i )  The j)ej:ention £ f_T erro jc i£ ts  J^N^I^)_0rder_197 J2
4.136 The order was made on November 1 in  the exercise of powers 
conferred under s .1 (3 ) o f Northern Ire la n d  (Temp.Provn.)  Act 1972.
I t  came in to  operation on November 7 , during the currency of the Special 
Powers Act and pendency of the Application N o.5310/71 before the European 
Commission of Human Rights by the Republic of Ire la n d . I t  may also be 
observed th a t in  the meantime the appointment o f the Diplock Commission 
was announced on October 18, to suggest arrangements "to deal more
e ffe c t iv e ly  with te r r o r is t  o rgan isations, otherwise than by in te rn m en t.”
4.137 I t  was n a tu ra l to expect th ere fo re  th a t the Order was enacted 
with the ob ject of m o llify in g  the rigours  of the Special Powers Act. I t  
provided fo r  passing an “in te rim  custody order” by the Secretary o f State  
when i t  “appeared” to him th a t a person was suspected in te r  a l ia  of 
“having been concerned in  the commission or attempted commission of any 
act of te rro ris m ” (v id e  P r .4 ) .  A person could be detained under the said 
order up to  28 days. I f  h is  case was in  the meantime referredfcy the  
Chief Constable of the R.U.C. to  a Commissioner appointed under the Act 
the detention could continue u n t i l  h is  case was “determ ined” .
4.138 “Terrorism ” was defined in  an in c lu s ive  way to  mean use of
v io lence fo r  p o l i t ic a l  ends and any use of v io lence fo r  p u ttin g  the pub lic  
6 8in  fe a r .  Scope of “ad jud ication  by the Commissioner” was also o u tlin ed
in  d e ta i l .  I t  is  im portant to note th a t the apparently sub jective  
nature of the s a tis fa c tio n  of the  Secretary o f State was to  lose i t s  
force as soon as the m atter came before the Commissioner, who had to  be 
s a t is f ie d  h im self on two grounds before he passed a “detention o rd er".
The f i r s t  ground was common with th a t of " in terim  custody o rd er” . In  
addition  he had to  be s a t is f ie d  th a t the detention was "necessary fo r  the 
protection  o f the p u b lic ” . The detention order had to  contain “a 
statement of the grounds” and was required to be served on the dBtainee.
In co n tras t, i t  may be noted th a t no ground need be sta ted  in  making 
e ith e r  the in te rim  custody order or the reference to the Commissioner.
4.139 An appeal against the detention order could be made to  the  
T rib u n a l appointed under the Act. A Commissioner could also be appointed 
as a member of the T rib u n a l but he was not to  act i f  the appeal was 
against h is  decis ion . Fresh evidence could be tendered at the appeal 
“with the consent of the T rib u n a l” but i t  was arguable i f  the r ig h t
was lim ite d  to  the a p p e lla n t. Copy of the record of the proceedings 
before the Commissioner excluding th a t part which took place in  h is  absence
rj *■*, m 
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could also be obtained by the a p p e lla n t.
4.140 The Secretary o f State could also r e fe r  to the Commissioner, 
fo r  review , a t any tim e, the case of any person detained under a 
"detention o rd er". In  such cases the detainee could be discharged by 
the Commissioner unless the la t t e r  considered th a t h is  "continued  
detention was necessary fo r  the pro tection  o f the p u b lic" . In  the case 
of a person detained under an " in terim  custody order" the Secretary of 
State could d ire c t h is  discharge at any tim e . He could also release  
c o n d itio n a lly  any person detained under a "detention o rd er".
4.141 I t  was also provided th a t a person detained under e ith e r  a 
detention order or an in te rim  custody order could be detained at any place 
approved by the Secretary o f State and when so detained he should be 
deemed to be in  law fu l custody.
4.142 Regulations 11(2) and (4 ) to ( 6 ) ,  12, 13 and 23D of the Special 
Powers Act were revoked, thereby repealing  the most o ffens ive  provisions  
of the Act. Although the power o f detention fo r  48 hours fo r  
in te rro g a tio n  under Reg.10 was not d isturbed, an attempt was made by 
means of the revocations to take out the s tin g .
4.143 On the other hand, power o f a rres t under Reg.11(1) was also 
preserved without m od ification  in  sp ite  of the fa c t  th a t new ground was 
prescribed fo r  the " in te rim  custody order" which replaced the  
"detention order" contemplated under Reg.1 1 (2 ) . By re ta in in g  the  two 
powers under Regs.10 and 11(1) the wholesome e ffe c t  of the new measures 
appears to have been c u r ta ile d , although the " in te rim  custody order" was 
made independent of the fa c t  o f a rre s t. S im ila r ly , although the power of 
the RUC to  make recommendation fo r  internm ent was taken away, the power to  
make reference to the Commissioner by the Chief Constable took i t s  p lace.
4.144 However, s p e c ific  provision on an e laborate  scale was made in  
the Schedule of the Order in  respect of the procedure to be follow ed  
during hearing before the Commissioner and the T rib u n a l. In the case of
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a hearing before the Commissioner the detainee had to be served w ith "a 
statement in  w ritin g  as to the nature of the te r r o r is t  a c t iv i t ie s 11 at 
le a s t three days in  advance. Th is  period was la t e r  ra ised  to seven days 
in  the Northern Ire la n d  (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. Proceedings 
were however contemplated in  camera, although the presence o f the detainee  
was not dispensed with except on the grounds of h is  d iso rd erly  conduct, 
in te re s t  of p u b li^  s e c u rity , safety  of any person. Legal representation  
was allowed subject to the last-m entioned two q u a lif ic a t io n s . Rules of 
evidence were however ra d ic a lly  a lte re d  although the detainee was given 
the r ig h t to adduce evidence and make representations to  the Commissioner. 
The Commissioner could receive even such evidence which was le g a lly  
inadm issib le , and could question any person includ ing the detainee and 
could cause in q u ir ie s  to be made in  re la t io n  to any m atte r. Mention must 
however be made of one im portant safeguard which required the Commissioner 
to inform the detainee and h is  counsel o f the substance of the m atter 
d ea lt with during th e ir  absence.
4.145 I t  was provided th a t the provisions re la t in g  to hearing before  
the Commissioner was-, m utatis  mutandis, to apply to  the proceedings in  
appeal and the T rib u n a l. At each forum, the au th o rity  was vested with  
re s id u a l powers to  regulate  i t s  own procedure; the detainee could not 
however claim attendance before the T rib u n a l as of r ig h t .
4.146 In a w ell-founded double-edged c r it ic is m  le v e lle d  against the
Order, i t  has been pointed out th a t the perio d ic  r ig h t  of review ought not
to be subject to  the d iscre tio n  of the Secretary o f State and at the same
time i t  i s  also sta ted  th a t the detainee ought to be produced before the
69Commissioner so th a t the delay in  hearing could be c o n tro lle d . I t  was 
also necessary, we submit, to  provide some safeguard to change the 
peremptory nature of the " in te rim  custody o rd er". The detainee ought to  
have been provided with a r ig h t  to make representation and a consequent 
duty la id  on the Secretary o f State to dispose o f the same w ith in  a short 
and s p ec ifie d  period .
( i i )  Jhei l^o£th-e£n_Ijce_lan_d_(_Erne>r 3 e£c^ £r£V_isiLo£s_2 _Act_ 1973
4.147 The Act was based on the report of the Diplock Commission, which
70had observed as fo llo w s:
. . .  we regard our ta s k . . . to  consider whether there  are 
any changes in  the procedures fo r  bring ing  crim ina ls  to  t r i a l ,  
in  the conduct of the t r i a l  i t s e l f  or in  the composition of 
the court of t r i a l  which could obviate or reduce the  need to  
reso rt to detention under th is  new Order of in d iv id u a ls  
involved in  te r r o r is t  a c t iv i t ie s ,  [emphasis added]
4.148 The Commission saw the d is tin c tio n  between te r r o r is t  a c t iv i t ie s
and other crimes in vo lv in g  acts or th re a ts  of v io lence but observed th a t
motive did not provide a p ra c t ic a l c r ite r io n  fo r  d e fin ing  the
d if fe re n t  kinds of crimes with which i t  had to deal w ith . I t  also la id
emphasis on the fa c t th a t ordinary crim inals  whose m otivation fo r  any
p a r t ic u la r  act may be p riva te  gain or personal revenge were also a ttra c te d  to
the ranks of t e r r o r is t  organisations whose ob ject was to bring  about a
p o l i t ic a l  change in  Northern Ire la n d  by v io le n t means. I t  was also
observed th a t " e ffe c t [o f  acts committed by such c rim in a ls ] on pu b lic
safety  and on pub lic  fe a r  is  no d if fe re n t  because the motive with which
71they are committed is  more base." S im ila r ly , a f te r  c la s s ify in g  terro rism
as "Republican" end "L o y a lis t" , meaning the a c t iv i t ie s ,  re s p e c tiv e ly , of
the C atholics  and the P ro testan ts , the Commission observed th a t i t  had
to  deal mainly with the former class as inform ation p erta in in g  to  the
la t t e r  class was not made a v a ila b le  to the Commission. The Report, however,
records th a t the e f fe c t  o f the a c t iv i t ie s  of both fac tio n s  on the
72adm in istration  of ju s tic e  was the same.
4.149 The Report takes note of A rtic le s  6  and 15 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and underlines the necessity of ensuring  
compliance with what i t  c a lle d  "minimum requirem ents", meaning perhaps
"a f a i r  and pub lic  hearing w ith in  a reasonable time by an independent and 
im p a rt ia l tr ib u n a l"  envisaged by A rt. 6 . I t  is  doubtfu l however i f  by merely 
in s u la tin g  the witnesses from fe a r  of t e r r o r is t  organ isations, as the Report 
contends, the requirements could be f u l f i l l e d .  U nfortunate ly  th is  appears
73to bB ths main burden of the re p o rt. The fa c t th a t a t r i a l  is  preceded 
usually  by a rres t and in v e s tig a tio n  end th a t they have im portant bearings 
on the t r i a l ,  appear to have been overlooked. The " 'fa ir"  hearing  
contemplated under A r t . 6  could not be ensured, we submit, without taking  
note o f the other provisions of the Conventions, such as A rts . 3, 5, 7 ,
14 and paragraph 2 o f A r t .15 which re s tr ic te d  the r ig h t of derogation.
In view of the fa c t th a t the Commission also suggested changes, p re ju d ic ia l  
to  the defendant, in  the ru les  of evidence, i t  was also necessary, i t  is  
submitted, to in s u la te  not only the witnesses but also the defendant from 
fe a r of the po lice  and army to enable them to give true and voluntary  
evidence.
4.150 I t  is  apparent th a t the Report carried  the s ecu rity  b ias too f a r .
The need fo r  re ta in in g  the detention provision was ju s t i f ie d  on the grounds
th a t witnesses would not be prepared to  te s t i f y  against te r r o r is ts  i f  the
74o p eratio n al c a p a b ility  of the organisations remained unim paired. I t  was
observed th a t deprivation  of l ib e r ty  per se o f persons g u ilty  of what could
properly be c a lled  only a " p o l i t ic a l  crime" did not partake of a pun itive
75character i f  the detainee was id e n t if ie d  with c e r ta in ty . I t  is  however 
d i f f i c u l t  to understand how the threshold  m ischief was to any appreciable
degree remedied by the Detention of T e rro r is ts  Order 1972, as the  Report
7 6contends. Ue have already pointed out the lack of safeguard in  the 
provision re la t in g  to the " in te rim  custody o rd er". In  fa c t th is  aspect 
appears to  have been overlooked fo r  the Report merely examines the  
provisions re la t in g  to proceedings before the Commissioner and the  
T r ib u n a l.
4.151 The Commission examined the powers of a rres t under Regs.10 and
1 1 ( 1 ) and noted with concern the ap p lica tio n  of common law ru les  by
courts in  Northern Ire la n d  re s u ltin g  in  "serious handicap to  the secu rity
77forces in  performing th e ir  d i f f i c u l t  and dangerous d u ty ."  I t  was 
suggested th a t the common law requirement be expressly negated. On the
other hand detention fo r  in te rro g a tio n  was lim ite d  to four hours and the
7 8s p e c ific  purpose of “es tab lish in g  id e n t i ty 1' was spelled  out.
4.152 I t  is  however su rpris ing  to note th a t the im portant changes
suggested in  the ru les  of evidence by making confessions adm issible was
sought to be supported by Art 3 of the Convention. I t  was suggested th a t
"any incu lpatory  admission made by the accused may be given in  evidence
unless i t  is  proved on a balance of p ro b a b ilit ie s  th a t i t  was obtained by
79subjecting  the accused to to rtu re  or to  inhuman or degrading tre a tm en t."
The expressions underlined in d ica te  the d e lic a te  nature o f the exerc ise .
How Art 3 was complied with is  inconceivable inasmuch as the onus of proof
being placed on the accused, though i t  was made l ig h t ,  the p ro tec tion
afforded by i t  was rendered hollow and i l lu s o r y .  The fo llo w in g  ra tio n a le
supplied by the Commission to the in te rro g a tio n  procedure to exact
80confession lends support to our contention;
Only the innocent w i l l  wish to speak at thB s ta r t .  The 
whole technique o f s k i l le d  in te rro g a tio n  is  to b u ild  up 
an atmosphere in  which the i n i t i a l  desire to remain s ile n t  
is  replaced by an urge to confide in  the questioner. This  
does not involve cruel or degrading trea tm ent. . .
4.153 Thus, by suggesting various changes of fa r-re ac h in g  nature in  
respect o f m atters touching the mode of t r i a l ,  a rre s t, b a i l  and conduct 
of the t r i a l ,  the common law procedure of ordinary c rim in a l courts was 
"contaminated" to  a great e x te n t. The ob ject was to ensure successful 
prosecution fo r  t e r r o r is t  offences which were c a lled  "Scheduled Offences" 
so th a t re lia n c e  on detentions under executive order could be reduced.
In  o ther words the provisions aimed at changing as fa r  as possible the  
status of the te r r o r is ts  from th a t of p o l i t ic a l  detainees to ord inary  
crim inals  by making " p o l i t ic a l  crimes" t r ia b le  at ord inary courts . 
Consequently, the Act took the shape of a comprehensive code combining 
pun itive  and preventive measures and la id  down both executive and 
ju d ic ia l  procedure. I t  replaced both the Special Powers Act and the  
Detention of T e rro r is ts  Order.
4.154 P ro f. lii.L. Twining has examined the provisions of the Act at
some length and observed th a t i t  enacted "most draconian measures since
the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939 and may w e ll be the precursor of
81s im ila r  laws to  deal with emergency s itu a tio n s  in  fu tu re " . He has 
enunciated certa in  basic p rin c ip le s  fo r  dealing  with emergency s itu a tio n s  
which, according to him, r e f le c t  problems which are as much p o l i t ic a l  and 
s o c ia l as le g a l.  He has c r it ic is e d  the D iplock Report fo r  i t s  preference  
fo r  "tampering w ith" the ordinary process of c r im in a l procedure and has 
suggested the a lte rn a tiv e  of e s tab lis h in g  "s p ec ia l emergency courts".
This a lte rn a tiv e  has c e rta in ly  much to commend i t  and in  fa c t  th is  
practice  was fo llow ed in  many countries , p a r t ic u la r ly  M alaysia, which had 
almost id e n t ic a l t e r r o r is t  problems.
4.155 I t  is  however d i f f i c u l t  to agree with Professor Twining, fo r  
reasons already s ta ted , th a t the Diplock Report has, in  fa c t ,  in s is te d  on 
s t r ic t  compliance with in te rn a t io n a l law and in te rn a t io n a lly  accepted 
standards of c iv i l is e d  government la id  down in  the U n iversa l D eclaration  
as w ell as the European Convention on Human R ights . Two negative fea tu res  
of the Report in d ica ted  by him, however, m e rit considera tion . I t  is  
d e fic ie n t in  providing what he c a lls  balancing fa c to r  and also e ffe c tiv e  
safeguards against abuse in  respect both o f in tro d u c tio n  of each in d iv id u a l 
power and i t s  e xe rc is e . By balancing fa c to r  he means spec ia l procedure 
and remedies fo r  dealing with complaints and fo r  compensation fo r  
in ju r ie s  suffered  as a re s u lt  o f unreasonable use of power.
4.156 The Act, he r ig h t ly  observes, instead of making a clean break 
with the past which was a p o l i t ic a l  and also a psychological necessity , 
re ta ined  some of the most ob jectionab le  fea tu re s  of Special Powers Act.
How fa r  h is  la s t assertion is  correct we may examine now in  respect 
p a r t ic u la r ly  of a rre s t, detention and in ternm ent.
4.157 ss.10 and 11 confer power of a rre s t on "any constable" but by 
v ir tu e  o f the d e f in it io n  of the term in s .28(1) the power is  also exercisable
by"any member of the Royal Navy, M il i ta r y  or A ir  Force P o lic e " .
Sub. s s .(1 )  and (3 ) o f s .10 authorised summary a rres t of any person 
"suspected of being a te r r o r is t "  and h is  detention "in  the r iq h t of the  
a rre s t" up to  72 hours. The underlined expression c le a r ly  introduced  
a new concept and expended the o ld  power of detention up to 48 hours 
fo r  in te rro g a tio n  a fte r  a rres t contemplated under Reg.10. This was 
not recommended in  the Diplock Report.
4.158 Some l ig h t  may be obtained from sub-sections (4 ) and (5 ) and 
also from the d e fin it io n  of the  tBrm " te r r o r is t"  in  s .28(1) to construe 
the new power. I t  appears th a t the new power combines in  i t  the old power 
under Reg.11(1) in  addition  to th a t of Reg.10. Detention in  the r ig h t of 
a rres t could now fo llo w  a detention under an in te rim  custody order passed 
by v ir tu e  of paragraph 11 read with sub-section (5 ) of s .10. I t  has also  
to  be noted th a t s u b -s .(4 ) conformed to the terms of para (3 ) of Reg.11. 
Thus, not only the o ld  powers were re in s ta te d  but in  the new form the 
scope o f abuse of the power was fu rth e r  increased. The absence of a 
provision p a r a l le l  to  proviso to s .1 (1 ) of the Special Powers Act increased  
th is  r is k .
4.159 The general power of a rres t under s .7 of the Special Powers Act 
was s p l i t  up and posited in  two d if fe re n t  forms in  ss . 1 1  and 1 2  in  the 
1973 Act. The power of the member of the armed forces in  s .12 was 
increased in  th a t a person could be detained by him up to four hours a fte r  
a rre s t. He was also not required to s ta te  the grounds o f a rres t and was 
thus e n t i t le d  to  g reater p ro te c tio n , fo llo w in g  recommendation of the
i
Diplock Report. U n fo rtu n a te ly , the Diplock recommendation th a t 
the purpose of detention ought to be spelled  out as estab lish in g  id e n tity  
was not fo llow ed . Power under both sections could be exercised, u n lik e  
under s .7 of the Special Powers Act, not only in  respect of the offence  
committed by any person but also when he was committing or was about to  
commit any o ffence.
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4.160 s .16 provided fo r  the power to  stop and question. U n like  i t s  
predecessor i t  was much circumscribed although power was also bestowed on 
any member of the armed fo rces . A question could now be d irec ted  only to  
e s tab lis h in g  the id e n t ity  and movement of the person and h is  knowledge 
about any recent explosion or any other in c id e n t endangering l i f e  or 
concerning any person k i l le d  or in ju re d  in  any such explosion or in c id e n t.
4.161 The provisions of the Detention of T e rro r is ts  Order 1972 which
had replaced the provisions of detention and internm ent of the Special
Powers Act were repeated in  the Act with minor changes. The l i f e  of these
provisions as w e ll as some other provisions was however lim ite d  to one
year with provision fo r  extension fo r  another yea r. The cumulative e ffe c t
•kso f the various provisjo^of the Act has been summed up by one keen observer
by s ta tin g  th a t the Army was enabled to  act independently and not in  aid  
82of c iv i l  power. This We submit, was not unprecedented in  th a t the 
perverted notion of "M a rtia l Law", as we have seen, was bom in  Ire la n d  
i t s e l f . 8 3
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4.162 I t  has been observed th a t the purpose of the Act was to revise the
provisions of the 1973 Act " in  the l ig h t  of the Report of the Gardiner 
84Committee". I t  is  th ere fo re  necessary to  examine the report of the
Committee which was expressly requ ired  to consider the provisions of the
e x is tin g  Act in  the l ig h t  of " c iv i l  l ib e r t ie s  and human r ig h ts " . The
Committee was conscious o f what i t  ca lle d  "the d i f f i c u l t  task o f m aintain ing
85a double perspective" and observed as fo llo w s:
While l ib e r ty  of the subject is  a human r ig h t to be preserved  
under a l l  possible cond itions, i t  is  n o t, and cannot be, an 
absolute r ig h t ,  because one men may use h is  l ib e r ty  to  take  
away the l ib e r ty  of another and must be res tra in ed  from doing 
so. Where freedoms c o n f l ic t ,  the s ta te  has a duty to  p ro tect 
those in  need of p ro te c tio n .
4.163 Th is  approach fin d s  fu r th e r  expression in  the Committee*s emphasis 
on A r t .17 and on the words "exigencies of the s itu a tio n "  o f paragraph 1
of the provisions of derogation contained in  A r t .15 of the European
Convention to  hold th a t the 1973 Act was not in  breach of in te rn a t io n a l
86agreement. Non-consideration of paragraph 2 of A r t .15 and also of A rts .
3, 6 , 7 and 14 has, we submit, v it ia te d  th is  f in d in g . In  a s im ila r
manner another attem pt has been made in  the Report to play down the
87in te rn a t io n a l dimension of the problem in  the fo llo w in g  passages
The tragedy o f Northern Ire la n d  is  th a t crime has become 
confused with p o l i t ic a l ly  m otivated acts . The common 
crim in a l can f lo u r is h  in  a s itu a tio n  where there is  a 
convenient p o l i t ic a l  motive to  cover a n t i-s o c ia l acts; 
and the development of a '’p riso ner-o f-w ar*' m en ta lity  among 
prisoners w ith s o c ia l approval and the hope of an amnesty, 
lends t a c i t  support to v io lence and dishonesty.
4.164 The Committee was however cognisant o f the fa c t  th a t emergency
powers must be synchronised with p o l i t ic a l  and so c ia l r e a l i t ie s  of the
s itu a tio n  th a t i t  had to  deal with aid th a t they do not provide a la s tin g
s o lu tio n . I t  recommended an enactment of a B i l l  of Right as a le g a l
88so lu tion  o f the problem but in  th is  Lord MacDermott d issented.
4.165 Accordingly, the Committee brought to bear upon the problem a
d if fe re n t  approach which appears to  proceed p a rtly  from i t s  extensive
study of the working of the e x is tin g  detention procedure in  respect of
which i t  suggested a basic change of a ra d ic a l nature in  Chapter 6  and
Appendix G of the Report. Some o f the reasons fo r  d iscarding the e x is tin g
procedure are indeed persuasive but others are n o t. I t  has been noted
th a t many months may elapse between r e fe r r a l  by the Chief Constable and
89determ ination by the Commissioner. Why the delay occurred has not been
in ves tig a ted  to see whether i t  could be avoided. The fa c t th a t the
"Republican respondents" do not attend hearings may be, as suggested, the
90reason fo r  non-disposal o f th e ir  cases but not fo r  the general d e lay . I t
has however been r ig h t ly  observed th a t the hearings had become ad vers ia l
in  form w hile some of the p ractices  founded not on procedure prescribed by
the Act but d ic ta ted  by secu rity  and other considerations had made such 
91hearings fa r c ic a l .  Th is  may have very w e ll contributed  to  the re fu s a l 
of the "Republican respondents". The use of voice scramblers and
admission of hearsay evidence o f the remotest degree, mainly by paid
inform ers, did in  fa c t  make i t  easy fo r  the Executive to make out i t s
case fo r  detention; the prospective detainee (" th e  respondent") was at a
disadvantage. I t  was conceded th a t the "w e ll-in te n tio n e d , quasi-
92ju d ic ia l  procedure" had fa i le d  to  achieve i t s  o b je c t.
4.166 The Committee came to  the conclusion, a f te r  considering at
length arguments fo r  and against re ta in in g  the provision fo r  deten tion ,
93as fo llo w s:
In short term, i t  may be an e ffe c t iv e  means of containing  
vio lence but the prolonged e ffe c ts  of the use of detention  
are u ltim a te ly  in im ic a l to community l i f e ,  fan a widespread 
sense of grievance and in ju s t ic e .  . . can be to le ra te d  in  a 
democratic society in  the most extreme circumstances; i t  
must be used with the utmost re s tra in t  end re ta ined  only so 
long as i t  is  s t r ic t ly  necessary. . .
Accordingly i t  adopted a basic change in  approach by recommending th a t the
"sole and u ltim a te  re s p o n s ib ility "  fo r  detention should re s t w ith the
Secretary of State who was to  be aided by a "Detention Advisory Board"
94which, un like  th 8 Commissioners, was not to have any executive power.
4.167 I t  is  however re fresh in g  to  note th a t the 1975 Amendment Act
in  fa c t improved upon the recommendations in  certa in  respects. Paragraph 
4(1) of Schedule I  of the Act provided th a t the Secretary of State could 
pass in te rim  custody orders i f  " i t  appeared" to him th a t "there were 
grounds fo r  suspecting" a person to be involved in  the o ffensive  
a c t iv i t ie s .  The expression underlined did not f in d  a place in  para 6 (1 ) 
of Appendix G of the Report; sub-para (2 ) provided fo r  a c e r t i f ic a te  
s e ttin g  out "suspicions and consideration" to  be annexed. I t  is  not 
impossible to  contend, we submit, th a t the expression may provide the 
courts with the power to  review such orders although such power has not 
been conceded in  the e a r l ie r  enactments, and there fo re  an argument to the  
contrary may be pressed w ith  equal fo rc e .
4.168 On the o ther hand, the Act, instead of s e ttin g  up m u lt ip le -  
member Advisory Boards made provision fo r  an Advisor ignoring  the cogent
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reasons fo r  a p lu ra l board given by the Committee. The Committee and 
the le g is la tu re  both attach importance to consideration of a case fo r  
detention so le ly  by le g a lly  tra in e d  minds. I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  understand 
why the opportunity was not ava iled  to te s t  the hypothesis th a t s o c ia l and 
p o l i t ic a l  considerations a lso , in  addition  to le g a l, ought to be weighed 
in  exerc is ing  emergency powers. M ainta in ing  the advisory character o f the  
Board.,a p lu ra l membership representing the re le v an t in te re s ts  from the two 
communities was an experiment worth try in g . In  almost a l l  Commonwealth 
countries a p lu ra l board was provided and in  Northern Ire la n d  i t  was a l l  
the more necessary.
4.169 S im ila r ly , the Act, instead o f re q u irin g  the case to be 
"fo rth w ith "  re fe rre d  allowed 14 days* time w h ile  fo llo w in g  the  
recommendation th a t the re fe rr in g  au th o rity  should be the Secretary o f 
State ra th e r than the po lice  or any other person as was the case in  the 
e a r l ie r  enactments. I t  is  not understood why the service on the detainee  
of the statement of te r r o r is t  a c t iv i t ie s  of which he was suspected could 
not be made contemporaneous with the re fe ren ce . However, fo llo w in g  the 
recommendation, the Act provided fo r  the representation  to be submitted 
to the Secretary of State so th a t he could perhaps consider the case
dehors the reference and grant e a r l ie r  r e l i e f ,  i f  necessary. The tim e-
scale provision fo r  the d if fe re n t  steps preceding hearing by the Advisor, 
as suggested by the Commission, would have made an id e a l p ro v is io n . To 
co u n terva il th is  omission the Act provided fo r  an automatic term ination  of
in te rim  custody at the exp iry  o f 14 days.
4.170 The Committee had suggested th a t one of the c r i t e r ia  provided
fo r passing detention orders ought to be ra ised so th a t the provision
could be sparingly used. I t  had suggested the expression "protection  of
the pub lic" be replaced by " i f  h is  freedom would serious ly  endanger the
96general secu rity  of the p u b lic ."  The words underlined contained the 
meat of the m atter but Lord MacDermott in  h is  "Reservation" observed th a t
the new wording did not accomplish any s ig n if ic a n t change and i t  was
97b e tte r  to  re ta in  the "e x is tin g  and well-known form ". This advice was 
fo llow ed in  the Act. The new wording which was proposed, i t  is  subm itted, 
could be construed to exclude the cases of persons who were involved in  
minor and sporadic in c id en ts  or who by v ir tu e  of th e ir  age or physical 
in f irm ity  or otherwise did not pose a re a l th re a t to s e c u rity .
4.171 Following the recommendation of the Committee the Act expressly
negatived any scope fo r  ad vers ia l p rac tice  or procedure to grow up by
d e le tin g  le g a l representation  and re ta in in g  the provision fo r  p riva te
hearing . In  i t s  anxiety to make the r ig h t  of the detainee to be present
at the hearing of i t s  representation  the Act u n fortunate ly  used equivocal
language which could be construed to vest the option in  the Advisor ra th e r
than the deta inee . In  th is  connection we submit th a t even the e a r l ie r
provision could have been so construed so as to  prevent the m ischief
produced in  the case of the "Republican respondents". Para 14(2) of
Schedule 1 of 1973 Act was as fo llo w s:
The respondent s h a ll ,  subject to paragraph 17 below, be 
present on the hearing . . . unless the Commissioner d ire c t
h is  removal on grounds o f h is  d isorderly  conduct.
The r ig h t  being e q u a lif ie d  r ig h t ,  u n lik e  the r ig h t of an accused in  an
ordinary c rim in a l t r i a l ,  i t  could be contended th a t i t  was not necessary
to read the  word "s h a ll"  in  a mandatory sense. S im ila r ly , the new
provision by provid ing fo r  submission by the detainee of "a w ritte n
request th a t he be seen personally  by the Advisor" made i t  possible fo r
the Advisor to refuse the request in  the absence of any other provision
to  in d ic a te  a contrary in te n tio n .
4.172 From the fa i lu r e  of the experiment in  Northern Ire la n d  one may 
safe ly  conclude th a t le g a l means however m anipulated, such as in tro d u c tio n  
of q u a s i- ju d ic ia l procedure to review cases of p o l i t ic a l  detentions, could 
never provide a s a tis fa c to ry  answer to  a problem which was b a s ic a lly  
p o l i t ic a l  ra th er than s o c ia l in  n a tu re . Law could be used as a to o l to
change s o c ia l norms but p o l i t ic a l  norms could be changed only by the  
consensus of the governed.
4.173 The Commission appeared to  tread  in  a tw il ig h t  zone between 
so c ia l and p o l i t ic a l  f ro n t ie rs  by suggesting a re -se ttlem en t scheme fo r  
detainees in  Appendix H of the re p o rt. I t  did not fin d  favour with the  
le g is la tu re . On the other hand in  paragraph 15 o f Schedule 1 payments
to persons released or about to be released from detention was contemplated 
which was perhaps meant to serve as a s u b stitu te  fo r  the scheme. I t  is  
submitted th a t a provision fo r  supporting the fa m ilie s  of the  detainees  
during the period of th e ir  detention could have served a b e tte r  purpose. 
When the earning member in  the fam ily  was incarcerated  fo r  a long and 
in d e f in ite  period the hardship and consequent b itte rn e s s  which was bound 
to fo llo w  need l i t t l e  emphasis. As we s h a ll see, i t  would not have been 
d i f f i c u l t  to f in d  a p a r a l le l  fo r  such a p ro v is io n .
4.174 I t  has to be sta ted  th a t the Act has d ea lt with some of the 
o b jectionab le  provisions of the 1973 Act regarding b a i l ,  admission of 
hearsay evidence and confessions which we do not propose to  examine but
i t  is  lamentable th a t the Report as w e ll as the Act fa i le d  s ig n a lly  in  not
taking note of the o ffensive  fea tu res  of the powers o f a rres t which wb
have already pointed o u t. In  respect of power to  stop and question the
Act implemented the recommendation th a t the power o f the secu rity  forces
to stop a person merely to  es tab lish  h is  id e n t ity  ought to be c la r i f ie d .
Nothing was done to  check abuse of the power. I t  has been observed th a t
very often  a person has been stopped as many as four times in  the same
98n ight by the same p a tro l.
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4.17 5 So fa r  we have discussed the enactments having lo c a l ap p lica tion
in  Northern Ire la n d . The bomb explosions in  Birmingham in  197 4 appears to  
have struck the B r it is h  Government as adoption by the I .R .A .  of a new
99stra tegy by extending th e ir  a c t iv i t ie s  to Great B r i ta in .  The measures 
enacted in  Part I of the 1974 Act, which were made in ap p licab le  to  Northern 
Ire la n d , accordingly d irec ted  themselves against the a c t iv i t ie s  of the I.R .A .  
in  Greet B r i ta in .  To be a member of the I .R .A . ,  to s o l ic i t  or in v ite  
f in a n c ia l or other support fo r  i t  and to arrange or address any meeting 
in  i t s  support was, according to s . 1 , an o ffence .
4.176 P art I I  of the Act is  said to have been modelled on the Prevention  
of V iolence (Temp.Provision) Act 1939 which had expired in  December 1 9 5 4 .^ ^  
The Secretary of State was empowered by s .3 (3 ) to make orders (c a lle d  
"exclusion orders") p ro h ib itin g  any person "from being in  or en tering  
Great B r ita in "  i f  he was " s a t is f ie d "  th a t such person ("whether in  Great 
B r ita in  or elsewhere") was e ith e r  concerned in  the commission, preparation  
or in s tig a tio n  of acts of te rro rism  or with a view to being so concerned, 
was attem pting to enter Great B r i ta in .  Sub-ss.(2) and (3 )  o u tlin ed  the  
guide lines  fo r  the exercise of the power. The "acts of te rro rism " should
be such as should appear to  the Secretary of State to  be "designed to  
in fluence  pub lic  opinion or government po licy  with respect to  a f fa ir s  in  
Northern Ire la n d " . In the case of a person " o rd in a r ily  res id en t in Great 
B r ita in "  he was required  to consider "th a t person*s connection with any 
t e r r i to r y  outside Great B r i ta in ."
4.177 s .7 d ea lt with the powers of a rres t and detention and is  of greater
importance from the viewpoint o f our study. S u b -s .(1 ) introduced  
reasonableness of suspicion w hile conferring  summary power of a rre s t. I t  
could be exercised against a person who was e ith e r  g u ilty  of an offence  
under s.1 or 3 or who was concerned in  the commission, preparation or 
in s tig a t io n  of acts o f te rro ris m , and also against one who was subject to
an exclusion order passed under s u b -s .(3 ) . S u b -s .(2 ) authorised the
detention of persons a fte r  a rres t up to 48 hours "in the r ig h t  of a rre s t" ,  
and empowered the Secretary o f State to extend the period up to  5 days in  
any p a r t ic u la r  case. S ub-s .(5 ) sp ec ifie d  th a t the power conferred by the
section was in  addition and not in  supersession of the power conferred  
by sections 2 of the C rim inal Law Acts o f England and Northern Ire la n d  of 
1967 and s .10 of the Northern Ire lan d  (E .P .)  Act 1973. %
4.178 The 1976 Act repealed and re-enacted with minor changes the  
provisions o f the 1974 Act which expired in  December 1976. Like i t s  
predecessor i t  was also given a lim ite d  l i f e .  I t  created a new offence  
in  s , 11. Any inform ation which might be o f "m ateria l assistance" in  
preventing a te r r o r is t  act had to be disclosed to  the p o lic e . Any 
person who had such inform ation would be g u ilty  of an offence i f  he fa i le d  
"without reasonable cause" to  disclose the same "as soon as reasonably 
p ra c tic a b le ."
4.179 In  respBct of powers of a rres t and detention there was only one, 
ra th er m a te ria l changes the scope of old s u b -s .(5 ) of s .7 was enlarged
by s u b s titu tin g  the expression "conferred by law" fo r  the three enactments 
which had been e a r l ie r  s p e c ifie d . I t  could thus embrace power not only 
under the common law and also under any fu tu re  enactment but even under 
the unspecified  provisions of any e x is tin g  enactment. A case in  po int is  
the power under s .12 of the Northern Ire la n d  (E .P ) Act 1973. As we have 
observed e a r l ie r  i t  not only empowered a s o ld ie r to make an a rres t but 
expressly dispensed with the common law requirement of the grounds of 
a rres t to be s ta te d . I t s  importance becomes apparent when i t  is  viewed 
in  the context of another change brought in  by the 1976 Act. The new 
Act also introduced power to  exclude any person from Northern Ire la n d  
alone. The fa c t th a t the army played an active  and prominent ro le  there  
presaged grievances of abuse of the power.
4.180 The Acts fo r  the f i r s t  time introduced in  England the concept 
of detention  in  the r ig h t  of a rres t on the lin e s  of the provisions o f the  
emergency laws of Northern Ire lan d  with one m a te ria l change th a t i t  was 
balanced by the  common law requirement of reasonableness of suspicion, but 
the p o s s ib il ity  o f use o f power under Northern Ire la n d  laws being kept
open the wholesome e ffe c t of th is  provision was lim ite d  in  extent
e sp ec ia lly  in  Northern Ire la n d  as we s h a ll see th a t the Court generally
accorded primacy to  the r e a l i t ie s  of the s itu a tio n  there and upheld, in
101many cases, unwarranted exercise of powers by the Army.
4.181 Professor Harry S tree t r ig h t ly  points out th a t the powers
102inhered by s . 8  ( s . 13 under the new Act) are p o te n tia lly  more draconian.
The Secretary o f State could by an order made under the section confer 
powers on "examining o ff ic e rs "  of a rres tin g  and deta in ing  any person 
pending h is  exam ination, and also pending decision o f the Secretary of 
State whether an exclusion order was to  be made in  h is  case. The Act is  
s ile n t  on guidelines and safeguards. I t  cannot be ga insaid , as he 
observes, the need fo r  " ju s tic e  to those in  po lice  custody", e sp ec ia lly  in  
tte Northern Ire la n d  context, is  more acute. I t  was necessary to  provide 
such persons with such r ig h ts  as to  consult a lawyer, to  have tape 
recording o f the statement made, to have d a ily  v is i ts  by M agistrates  
and to an im p a rt ia l review of complaints about treatm ent during deten tion .
4.182 The Prevention of Terrorism  (Supplementary Temporary P rovision) 
Order 1974 made in  the exercise of powers conferred by s . 8  dt^fnot 
un fortunate ly  contain any such p ro v is io n . A r t .4 of the Order provides  
examination of persons a rr iv in g  in  or leaving Great B r i ta in .  A rt. 9 
provides fo r  the detention of persons p liab le  to  examination and removal^
up to  7 days. An instance has been c ited  of a person who had challenged an
exclusion order being held in  custody continuously fo r  th ree  weeks under 
103the A ct. Although no appeal is  provided against such order a 
representation  may be made to the Secretary of State who must re fe r  
the same fo r  advice to one or more persons and reconsider the m atter 
a fte r  he has received the re p o rt.
4.183 The in te rp o s it io n  of an independent advisory body was indeed a 
salu tary  provision but the time fa c to r  also m erited equal consideration  
when the  l ib e r ty  of the c it iz e n  was invo lved . To avoid delay in  decision
in the f i r s t  place i t  was necessary to  make i t  o b lig a to ry  fo r  the 
Secretary of State to consider the representation  h im self so th a t  
in s ta n t r e l ie f  could be granted to the c it iz e n  i f  the suspicion turned  
out to be unfounded. In  the second place the e n tire  procedure ought 
to be tim e-sca led .
4.184 I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  re s is t  the conclusion th a t the power of
"examination" contemplated under the Act appears to  occupy the highest
place in  the h ierarchy o f new powers evolved to  meet the s itu a tio n  in
Northern Ire la n d  such as to  stop and question, to  in te rro g a te  e tc . In
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view of the la te s t  decision of the House of Lords*, discussed there
are good reasons to suppose th a t the ju d ic ia ry  is  u n lik e ly  to in te r fe re  
l ig h t ly  with the e f fo r ts  of the Executive to co n tro l the s itu a tio n  in  
Northern Ire la n d  by exerc is in g  these powers which are apparently out 
of tune with the B r it is h  tra d it io n  and mark a wide departure from the 
accepted notions of ju s tic e  and f a i r  p lay . How fa r  the ju d ic ia ry  can 
make the provisions of s u b .ss .(2 ) and (3 ) of s .3 more purposeful is  
yet to be seen.
(b ) The Balance Sheet: the dividends of the new approach
4.185 The new le g is la t iv e  measures paid r ich  dividends in  so fa r  as 
"detention" and "internm ent" were concerned. U ith the s h i f t  in  emphasis 
greater re lia n c e  came to be placed on "due process of law ": detentions  
without t r i a l  f e l l  sharp ly: there were fewer new cases and even the 
e x is tin g  detainees were progressively re leased . On 5th December 1975 
the Secretary of State fo r  Northern Ire la n d  announced th a t the system of 
detention introduced by the Northern Ire la n d  Government in  1971 ended 
when he signed the release order in  respect of 73 detainees. I t  was 
disclosed th a t during the period of four years and four,months 1,981 
persons were detained and th a t 107 of them were " lo y a lis ts " ; 1 0 4  th a t
170 persons had been in terned tw ice , of whom 97 bad even been in terned
three  t im es . The t o t a l  annual f ig u re s  o f  de ten tio ns  as w e l l  as
p n  105re le a s e s  were as f o l l o w s :
D e te n t io n s  Releases Year
775 129 1971 (D e te n t io n  in t r o d u c e d  i n  August)
559 889 1972 ( D i r e c t  Rule s in c e  March)
512 208 1973
312 361 1974
11 554 1975
4.186 We may now lo o k  a t some o th e r  f i g u r e s  to  see th e  o th e r  aspec ts  
o f  th e  new approach . I t  was d is c lo s e d  i n  a s ta te m e n t made in  the  House 
o f  Commons on th e  14th  Feb rua ry  1973 t h a t  1 ,193  persons were d e ta in e d
106s in c e  August 1971 under SPA and th e  D e te n t io n  o f  T e r r o r i s t s  O rder 1972.
On 31s t O c tobe r 1973 i t  was p u b l is h e d  t h a t  657 persons  were h e ld  under th e
107Emergency P r o v is io n s  Act 1973 o f  whom 75 were " l o y a l i s t s "  and t h a t  by
108August 330 pe rsons  had com ple ted two y e a rs  i n  d e te n t io n .  On 5th A p r i l
1974 the  N o r th e rn  I r e l a n d  S e c re ta ry  t o l d  th e  House o f  Commons t h a t  d u r in g
th e  p re c e d in g  y e a r ,  s in c e  1 s t  A p r i l  1973, 1 ,292  " t e r r o r i s t s "  were charged
109w ith  s e r io u s  c r im in a l  o f f e n c e s .  However, i n  December 1974, t h e re  were
1,501 " R e p u b l ic a n s "  and 627 " L o y a l i s t s "  i n  p r is o n s  in  c o n n e c t io n  w i th
1 1 0" t e r r o r i s t - l i n k e d "  o f fe n c e s .  In  th e  Defence W hite Paper p u b l is h e d
on 17th March 1976 i t  was s ta te d  t h a t  d u r in g  the  y e a r  1975 th e  p o l i c e  had
a r re s te d  and charged 1,197 pe rsons  w i th  " t e r r o r i s t - t y p e "  o f fe n c e s ,  i n c lu d in g
111226 who were charged w i th  murder and a t te m p ted  m u rd e r ;  d u r in g  1976,
o u t  o f  a t o t a l  1 ,276 a r re s te d  and s i m i l a r l y  charged , 241 were charged 
112w ith  m u rd e r .  However, th e re  were, i t  appea rs , some cases o f  grave
f a i l u r e  o f  th e  due p rocess  o f  law -  some persons  h e ld  i n  the  Long Kesh
p r is o n  se rved  long  te rm s w i th o u t  t r i a l  -  7 persons  f o r  5 y e a rs ,  11 f o r  4
113and 57 f o r  3 y e a rs ,  as on 1 s t  A p r i l ,  1975. S i m i l a r l y ,  th e re  were
few  cases i n  which men who were d u ly  sen tenced were h e ld  unde r  " i n t e r i m  
114cus tody  o r d e r s " .
4.137 I t  i s  a lso  necessa ry  to  ta k e  n o te  o f  th e  c a s u a l ty  f i g u r e s  o f  th e  
" c i v i l  w a r " .  I t  appeared i n  the  s ta te m e n t made by th e  N o r th e rn  I r e la n d
Secretary on 2nd September 1975 th a t since 1969 1,300 people were k i l le d
115and another 13,000 in ju re d . In  1976 the death t o l l  rose to 1,600 and
116i t  was s tated  th a t of these 400 belonged to the security  fo rces . Again,
in  1977, during the f i r s t  8 months, 52 c iv i l ia n s  were k i l le d ,  whereas, i t
was claimed, during the corresponding period of 1976, the death t o l l  was 
117187. However, to  appreciate the im p lica tio n s  and the a rith m etic  of
the c iv i l  war casu a lties  as w e ll as of detentions, internments and
prosecutions, notice  has to  be taken of the fa c t th a t the to t a l  population
of Northern Ire la n d  was only 1 .5  m illio n  and th a t 35 percent of the
118population was Roman C a th o lic .
4.188 The ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  the new approach and the measure o f i t s
success is  spelt out in  the statement which the Northern Ire la n d  Secretary
made in  the House of Commons on 23rd February 1977; the re levan t passage 
119is  quoted below:
The great strength of the present po licy  was th a t i t  
rested on law, on punishment fo r  c rim in a l acts proved 
beyond reasonable doubt in open co u rt. Other measures 
may be needed at tim es, but in  the long run th a t was the  
only way th a t law and order had ever been successfully  
achieved in  a democracy.
A few months la t e r ,  in  Ju ly , the po licy  re ite ra te d  in  the statement quoted
above received a major boost when the Northern Ire la n d  (Emergency
P ro v is io n s )( Amendment) Act 1977 was enacted to increase the sentences
in  respect of c e rta in  offences "connected with te rro rism " and the
Northern Ire la n d  (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (Amendment) Order 1977
was made to add to the l i s t  of "scheduled offences" of the parent Act of
1973. However, i t  appears th a t the po licy  has produced an anomalous
s itu a t io n : on the one hand, the replacement of "detention" produced a
wholesome re s u lt in  th a t " in te rro g a tio n " , which gave r is e  to the
p o s s ib il ity  of to r tu re , vanished with "d eten tion", but on the o ther hand
the "contaminated" t r i a l  procedure, with the t r a d it io n a l safeguards
w h ittle d  down, changed the basic concept of "due process of law" which
the new po licy  professed to uphold. The po licy  apparently p re ferred
" le g i t im a c y "  to  " le g a l is m "  and " l e g a l i t y "  o f  th e  o ld  c o lo n ia l  p o l ic y  
w h ich , as we s h a l l  see, p roved  to  be p o te n t weapons in  f i g h t in g  " t e r r o r is m "  
in  A f r ic a  (K e n ya ), and s o u th -e a s t A s ia  (M a laya  and S in g a p o re ) . T h is  
approach was e v id e n t ly  a ttu n e d  to  th e  re q u ire m e n ts  o f  th e  new w o r ld  o rd e r
and th e re fo re  aimed a t com pliance  w ith  the  p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  European
C onven tio n  b u t i t  was d o u b t fu l i f  i t  p ro v id e d  a com ple te  answer to  th e  
is s u e  o f  " c i v i l  w a r" .
4 .189 We quote  b e lo w , in  t h i s  c o n n e c tio n , an o b s e rv a t io n  o f  Lady
W ootton o f  A jg inger:
The I .R .A .  b e lie v e  th em se lves  to  be a t war w ith  th e  U .K . 
and th e y  use th e  language a p p ro p r ia te  to  a s ta te  o f war
. . . We, on th e  o th e r  hand, deny th a t  a s ta te  o f  war
e x is t s .  . . and c o n v ic t  t h e i r  bombers as m u rd e re rs . .
I s  th e  answer th a t  a war i s  o n ly  a war i f  i t  i s  su p p o rte d  
by a so v e re ig n  governm ent ? I f  so , who i s  com petent to  
d e c id e  the  s o v e re ig n ty  ?
W hether th e  GeneY?X C on ve n tio n s  o r  th e  custom ary in t e r n a t io n a l  law
r e la t in g  to  armed c o n f l i c t s  can su p p ly  an answer to  th e  q u e s tio n  posed
is  n o t proposed to  be d is cu sse d  as i t  i s  beyond th e  scope o f  o u r s tu d y .
However, i t  cannot be den ied  th a t  when a s tro n g  r e l ig io u s  o r  e th n ic
m in o r i t y  chooses to  e x e rc is e  " th e  r ig h t  o f  s e l f - d e te r m in a t io n "  in
accordance w ith  th e  norms o f th e  new w o rld  o rd e r ,  th e  is s u e  soon becomes
a m a tte r  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  co n ce rn . Indeed th e  B r i t i s h  Government has
i t s e l f  re c o g n is e d  in  th e  case o f N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  th e  " in t e r n a t io n a l
d im e n s io n " o f  th e  prob lem  w h ile  th e  Ib o s  o f  E as te rn  N ig e r ia  had added
a touch  o f  r e a l i t y  to  t h i s  new d im ens ion  when the  ind e p e n d e n t B ia f r a
s ta te  came to  be p ro c la im e d  th e re  in  1967.
(3 )  The J u d ic ia l  Response
4 .190 We may f i r s t  exam ine th e  d e c is io n  in  R (O fHANLAN) v .  GOVERNOR
121OF BELFAST PRISON which may be a p t ly  d e s c r ib e d  as th e  t r e n d - s e t t e r  f o r  
th e  decades th a t  fo l lo w e d  in  th a t  the  c i t iz e n s  u n t i l  r e c e n t ly  were le d  to  
b e l ie v e  th a t  n e i th e r  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f  the  SPA n o r any e x e c u t iv e  a c t 
pe rfo rm ed  th e re u n d e r co u ld  be c h a lle n g e d  in  c o u r ts .  G e n e ra l d is t r u s t  o f 
c o u r ts  as i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  "u n io n is m "  ( p o l i t i c a l  b e l ie f s  and p r a c t ic e s  o f
th e  r u l i n g  U n io n is t  P a r ty )  by th e  C a th o lic  m in o r i t y  a g a in s t whom, as we 
have seen, th e  Act was m a in ly  used in  p r a c t ic e  was o b v io u s ly  a n o th e r 
reason f o r  sca n ty  c a s e - la w .
4.191 I t  was perhaps th e  e a r l i e s t  case unde r the  Act t h a t  had come
b e fo re  th e  c o u r t  when o p p o r tu n ity  was ta ke n  to  c h a lle n g e  th e  o rd e r  o f
in te rn m e n t and d e te n t io n  and th e  p ro v is io n s  a ls o ,  on more th a n  one g round .
I t  was an a p p l ic a t io n  f o r  habeas c o rp u s . A f te r  a r r e s t  the  M in is te r  passed
th e  d e te n t io n  o rd e r  th e  seme day and fo l lo w e d  i t  up by m aking an
in te rn m e n t o rd e r  a few  weeks la t e r .  The o rd e rs  were passed d u r in g  th e
c u rre n c y  o f  th e  R e g u la tio n s  made unde r th e  Defence o f  th e  Realm
C o n s o lid a t io n  A c t.  The argum ent on b e h a lf  o f  th e  Crown t h a t  th e  d e c is io n  
122in  HALLIDAY's case ough t to  be fo l lo w e d  appea rs , t h e r e fo r e ,  to  have
found  fa v o u r  w ith  th e  c o u r t .  In  a c r y p t ic  judgm ent H e n ry , L .C .3 . ,
obse rved  as fo l lo w s ;
The o rd e r  i s  a m o d i f ic a t io n  -  i t  i s  r e a l l y  n o th in g  new -
o f  o rd e rs  made in  England a lm ost e ve ry  day by th e  Home
S e c re ta ry  th e re  d u r in g  th e  w ar. . . The House o f  Lo rds  
in  H a l l id a y 's  case d ec ided  th a t  th e  Home S e c re ta ry  had 
power to  make such o rd e rs  and th a t  the  c o u r t  was 
p re ve n te d  from  in t e r f e r in g  w ith  them . . . The M in is te r  
f o r  Home A f f a i r s  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  co u ld  make th e
r e g u la t io n s .  . . th e y  are  n o t u l t r a  v i r e s .  . .
I t  i s  u n fo r tu n a te  th a t  a lth o u g h  each and e ve ry  c o n te n t io n  ra is e d  in  th e
case on b e h a lf  o f  th e  p r is o n e r  m e r ite d  s e r io u s  c o n s id e ra t io n ,  th e  c o u r t
d id  n o t examine them . Arguments were advanced on th e  b a s is  o f  s s .4 ,  61
and 67 o f  th e  1920 C o n s t i t u t io n .  R e lia n ce  was a ls o  p la ce d  on BUSHELL's 
123case to  say th a t  th e  r e tu r n  to  th e  w r i t  m ust be s p e c i f ic  whereas th e  
d e te n t io n  was f o r  an " u n s p e c if ie d  o f fe n c e " .  The in te rn m e n t,  i t  was 
con tended , was a ls o  f o r  an "u n s p e c if ie d  o f fe n c e "  on account o f  u n c e r ta in ty  
in d ic a te d  by th e  phrase "a b o u t to  com m it" c o n ta in e d  in  th e  R e g u la t io n .
4 .192  We su b m it t h a t  th e  p r is o n e r 's  c o n te n t io n  sparked  o f f  
c o n s t i t u t io n a l  p o in ts  o f  g re a t im p o rta n c e . In  v ie w  o f  th e  p r o v is io n s  o f  s . 75 the
tru e  n a tu re  o f  th e  supremacy o f  th e  W e s tm in s te r P a r lia m e n t o v e r  th e  a f f a i r s  o f  
N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  had to  be d e te rm in e d . Could th e  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d
z j * ± 0
P a r lia m e n t e n a c t law s d e ro g a tin g  from  common law  -  th e  law  o f  th e  rea lm  ?
What was th e  combined e f f e c t  o f  s s .4  and 61 o f  th e  1920 C o n s t i tu t io n  ?
W hether th e  enactm ent o f  th e  impugned r e g u la t io n s  was ta n ta m o u n t to
suspens ion  o f  th e  w r i t  o f  Habeas Corpus which was s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r o h ib i te d
by s . 67 o f  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  ? These is s u e s  s t i l l  rem ain unanswered by th e
ju d ic ia r y .  The E x e c u tiv e  however contended th a t  the  Habeas Corpus Act was
124"n o t in t e r f e r e d  w ith  in  th e  s l ig h t e s t  w ay". T h is  v ie w  has been
s e r io u s ly  c o n te s te d , r i g h t l y  we s u b m it, by th e  Commission o f  I n q u ir y
a p p o in te d  in  1936 by th e  N a t io n a l C o u n c il o f  C i v i l  L ib e r t ie s ,  a lb e i t
125on d i f f e r e n t  g ro u n d s .
4 .193  The d e c is io n  has however come u nde r s tro n g  c r i t i c i s m  from  a n o th e r 
126q u a r te r ,  on a n o th e r g round , nam e ly , f o r  i t s  r e l ia n c e  on H a l l id a y 's
case (s u p ra )  in  v ie w  o f  th e  d if fe r e n c e  in  th e  language o f th e  two p ro v is io n s
and a ls o  f o r  m is re a d in g  the  judgm ent in  H a l l id a y 's  case . A tk in s o n  and
W renbury, L . 3 . 3 . ,  i t  i s  r i g h t l y  con tended , d id  n o t t o t a l l y  r u le  o u t 
127j u d i c i a l  re v ie w .
4 .1 9 4  For th e  f i r s t  t im e  in  R (HUME & QRS) v LONDONDERRY JUSTICES128
one o f  th e  r e g u la t io n s  made u nde r th e  S p e c ia l Powers A ct was s u c c e s s fu l ly  
c h a lle n g e d  as u l t r a  v i r e s  s .4 ( 1 ) ( 3 )  o f  th e  1920 C o n s t i t u t io n .  The c o u r t  
quashed th e  c o n v ic t io n  unde r R eg .38(1 ) which empowered th e  p o l ic e  (R .U .C .)  
as w e l l  as th e  army to  o rd e r  d is p e rs a l o f  u n la w fu l assem bly and made
f a i l u r e  to  comply w ith  the  o rd e r  an o f fe n c e .
4 .195  Low ry , L .C .3 .  d e a lt  e x te n s iv e ly  w ith  th e  c o n te n t io n s  o f  b o th
s id e s  in  th e  cou rse  o f  h is  e la b o ra te  judgm ent and a ls o  compared th e
p a r a l l e l  p ro v is io n s  in  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n s  o f  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d ,  Canada and
A u s t r a l ia .  H is  lo rd s h ip  r i g h t l y  r e je c te d  th e  p le a  o f  th e  Crown f o r  th e  
a p p l ic a t io n  o f  " in c id e n t a l  e f f e c t "  d o c tr in e  and th e  " p i t h  and s u b s ta n c e " 
t e s t .  In s te a d , h is  lo r d s h ip  a d ve rte d  to  th e  "d u a l re s p e c t io n "  o f  s . 4 (1 ) 
which i s  quo ted  b e lo w ;
s .4 ( 1) sub je c t  to  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  t h i s  A c t. . . th e  P a r lia m e n t 
o f N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  s h a l l .  . . have power to  make law s 
f o r  th e  peace, o rd e r  and good governm ent o f .  . . N o rth e rn  
I r e la n d  w ith  th e  fo l lo w in g  l im i t a t i o n s , nam e ly , t h a t  th e y  
s h a l l  n o t have th e  power to  make laws e x c e p t in  re s p e c t o f 
m a tte rs  e x c lu s iv e ly  r e la t in g  to  th e  p o r t io n  o f  I r e la n d  
w i th in  t h e i r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o r  some p a r t  th e r e o f ,  a id  
w ith o u t p re ju d ic e  to  t h a t  g e n e ra l l im i t a t i o n  t h a t  th e y
s h a l l  n o t  have power to  make law s in  re s p e c t o f  th e
fo l lo w in g  m a tte rs  in  p a r t i c u la r ,  namely -
[em phas is  added]
4.196 H is  L o rd s h ip  re je c te d  th e  C row n 's  p le a  and h e ld  t h a t  th e  words
" in  re s p e c t o f "  had th e  same g e n e ra l meaning th ro u g h o u t s . 4 (1 ) and were
nowhere c o n fin e d  to  th e  im p o s it io n  o f  b u rd e n s , c o n t r o ls  and o b l ig a t io n s ,
as was con tend ed . The impugnad re g u la t io n  was s t ru c k  down upon h o ld in g
th a t  th e  words o f  th e  r e g u la t io n ,  "any com m issioned o f f ic e r / a n y  member
o f H er M a je s ty 's  Fo rces on d u ty "  were d e s c r ip t iv e  o f  th e  s u b je c t  m a tte r
w ith in  th e  fo rb id d e n  f i e l d  com prised  in  s . 4 ( 1 ) ( 3 ) ,  nam e ly , th e  defence 
129o f th e  rea lm  e tc .
1 304.197 The d e c is io n  in  re  McELDUFF i s  in deed  a courageous one in  th a t
th e  le g is la t i v e  amendment o f  s . 7 in  1967 which d e le te d  th e  word "common
la w " was s e t a t n o u g h t. The r ig h t  to  be in fo rm e d  o f  th e  re a so n s  f o r  a r r e s t
131was te rm ed  as a "fu n d a m e n ta l r ig h t  o f any man" in s te a d  o f  common law
132r i g h t .  The d e c is io n  in  CHRISTIE'S case was r e fe r r e d  to  and i t  was
observed  th a t  th e  p r in c ip le  was n o t p e c u l ia r  to  c r im in a l  la w ; i t s
a p p l ic a t io n  was n o t e xc lu d e d  by th e  A c t.  The c le a r e s t  words were
necessa ry  to  h o ld  t h a t  th e  le g is la t u r e  in te n d e d  to  deny th e  r i g h t ;  to  do
so o th e rw is e  would be a "n e g a tio n  o f  j u s t i c e " .  The Act e n v isa g e d  power
o f  a r r e s t  to  be e x e rc is e d  in  th re e  " d i f f e r e n t  and d i s t i n c t  ways, each
133w ith  d i f f e r e n t  and d i s t i n c t  consequences f o l lo w in g . "
4.198 I t  i s  c le a r  t h a t  a lth o u g h  the  c o u r t  d id  n o t e x p re s s ly  s ta te  so , 
i t  was in f lu e n c e d  by in t e r n a t io n a l  o b l ig a t io n s  o f  th e  s ta te  u n d e r th e  
European C onven tion  and th e  U n iv e rs a l D e c la ra t io n  o f  Human R ig h ts  t r a n s ­
cend ing  th e  m u n ic ip a l la w , b o th  w r i t t e n  and u n w r i t te n .  In  o th e r  words th e  
c o u r t appears to  have adopted what we have e a r l i e r  c a l le d  "h u m a n ita r ia n  
i n t e r p r e t a t io n " .  T h is  new approach h a v in g  fo llo w e d  th e  c o m p la in t by th e
R e p u b lic  o f  I r e la n d  to  th e  European Commission o f  Human R ig h ts  c h a lle n g in g  
th e  A c t, o u r p ro p o s it io n  s ta n d s  f o r t i f i e d .  The same r e s u l t  c o u ld  have been 
o th e rw is e  ach ieved  by in v o k in g  th e  p ro v is o  to  s . 1 ( 1 ) .  The p re fe re n c e  f o r  a 
new in t e r p r e t a t io n  i s  th e re fo re  s ig n i f i c a n t .
4 .199 In  t h i s  case a d e te n t io n  o rd e r  was ch a lle n g e d  and th e  c o u r t
was th e r e fo r e  o b lig e d  to  exam ine in  d e t a i l  th e  power o f  a r r e s t  u nde r R eg .11
as i t  was o f  th e  o p in io n  th a t  i f  th e  a r r e s t  was i l l e g a l  th e  d e te n t io n  would
a u to m a t ic a l ly  f a l l .  The A tto rn e y -G e n e ra l h a v in g  equa ted  th e  d e te n t io n  w ith
one made by th e  Home S e c re ta ry  unde r th e  Defence R e g u la tio n s  o f  1939, th e
70d e c is io n  in  th e  LIVERSIDGE case cane to  be c o n s id e re d  a t some le n g th  by 
th e  c o u r t .  I t  was re co g n is e d  th a t  th e  r e g u la t io n  ex fa c ie  c o n fe r re d  
"v e ry  a r b i t r a r y "  power o f  a r r e s t  in  th a t  a person co u ld  be h e ld  f o r  an 
" in d e f in i t e  d u ra t io n  o f  tim e  on fo o t  o f  th e  a r r e s t " .  The im p o r t  o f  th e  
word "s u s p e c t"  on which th e  power was grounded was exam ined to  see i f  i t  
in h e re d  th e  concept o f  " re a s o n a b le n e s s "  o r  o f  th e  "h o n e s t b e l i e f "  o f  
LIVERSIDGE's  case. E v e n tu a lly  th e  c o u r t  came to  th e  c o n c lu s io n  th a t  
"how ever w ide th e  power may be and however a r b i t r a r y  and in  reason
unfounded th e  s u s p ic io n  in  th e  m ind o f  th e  a r r e s to r  may be , i f  th e
s u s p ic io n  i s  an h o n e s t genu ine  s u s p ic io n  i t  i s  s u f f i c ie n t  to  g round th e
P  P U  » , 1 3 5e x e rc is e  o f  th e  p o w e r."
4 .200  The Crown d id  n o t r e ly  on the  o r ig in a l  a r r e s t  un d e r R eg .10 b u t
adduced e v idence  o f  a r r e s t  unde r R eg.11 (1 ) which was as f o l lo w s :
A f te r  h a v in g  found  [ h i s ]  name. . . in  the  s a id  l i s t  w ith
th e  consequence th a t  I suspec ted  h im . . . I a r re s te d  him
a c t in g  unde r R eg.1 1 (1 ) .  . . on th e  b a s is  o f  my s u s p ic io n  
. , . and I t o ld  him th a t  he was b e in g  a r re s te d  un d e r
[s.P.A c t]  b u t I d id  n o t s p e c ify  to  him th e  r e g u la t io n .  . .
The c o u r t  h e ld  th a t  the  words used were n o t such "a s  to  in fo rm  th e  p r is o n e r
o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  he was th e re b y  a r re s te d  o r  r e - a r r e s te d . "  I t  was f u r t h e r
h e ld  t h a t  f a i l u r e  to  in fo rm  him  o f  th e  s p e c i f ic  power which was e x e rc is e d
1 36and o f  th e  grounds o f  s u s p ic io n  in v a l id a te d  th e  p u rp o r te d  a r r e s t .
4.201 The c o u r t ,  we s u b m it, appears to  have re a l is e d  th e  p o t e n t ia l i t y
o f  th e  o r ig in a l  a r r e s t  unde r R eg.10 ta k in g  th e  fo rm  o f  d e te n t io n  and 
a tte m p te d  to  check th e  m is c h ie f  by in s i s t i n g  th a t  a n o m in a l " r e - a r r e s t "  in  
ca s u a l and c a v a l ie r  manner would n o t be s u f f i c ie n t  f o r  a v a l id  d e te n t io n .
4 .202  I t  i s  however necessa ry  to  ta k e  n o te  o f  th e  p ro ce e d in g s  th a t
preceded th e  above d e c is io n .  Two p r is o n e rs  in c lu d in g  th e  p e t i t io n e r  had
f i r s t  c h a lle n g e d  R eg.11 i t s e l f  b e fo re  th e  Queens Bench in  England in  tb 
137KEEN AN. The e x e rc is e  appears to  have been in s p ir e d  by a p a r a l le l
e n te r p r is e  in  HUMEf s case (s u p ra )  b u t was u n s u c c e s s fu l.  In  HUME's  case
th e  c o u r t  e x p re s s ly  h e ld  t h a t  th e  impugned r e g u la t io n  was a law  " in
re s p e c t o f "  th e  fo rb id d e n  s u b je c t  m a tte r  a lth o u g h  i t  was a ls o  a la w " in
138re s p e c t o f  p re s e rv a t io n  o f  th e  peace and m ain tenance o f  o r d e r . "  The
E n g lis h  c o u r t ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, h e ld  t h a t  S .P .A . "was n o t a law  in
re s p e c t o f  any n a v a l,  m i l i t a r y  o r  a i r  fo rc e  m a t te r " ,  ( i . e .  the  fo rb id d e n
s u b je c t  m a t te r ) .  I t  d id  n o t seek to  "im pose o b l ig a t io n  upon H er M a je s ty 's
139fo rc e s  o r  in  any manner seek to  r e s t r a in  o r  re g u la te  th e m ."  The 
E n g lis h  c o u r t ,  we s u b m it, was wrong in  c o n s tru in g  th e  Act as a p ie ce  o f  
mere e n a b lin g  le g is la t io n  and a ls o  r e s t r i c t i n g  th e  o p e ra t io n  o f th e  
c o n s t i t u t io n a l  l im i t a t i o n s  p re s c r ib e d  unde r s . 4 ( 1 ) .
4 .203  I t  i s  a ls o  necessa ry  to  p o in t  o u t th a t  th e  E n g lis h  c o u r t 
re je c te d  a lm os t sum m arily  th e  o b je c t io n  t h a t  th e  p r is o n e rs  were n o t t o ld  
o f  th e  s p e c i f i c  ground o f  t h e i r  a r r e s t  -  th e  p o in t  on which one o f th e  
p r is o n e rs  succeeded l a t e r  in  th e  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  c o u r t .  I t  was observed  
th a t  " th e  M in is te r  was n o t  asked to  s p e c ify  th e  g ro u n d " . No n o t ic e  was 
ta ke n  o f  e i t h e r  th e  p ro v is o  to  s . 1( 1) o r  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  o b l ig a t io n s .
The com p le te  d is re g a rd  d is p la y e d  in  th e  d e c is io n  f o r  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
approach o f  u p h o ld in g  common law  r ig h t s  and th e  d e p a rtu re  th e re fro m  are 
in e x p l ic a b le .
1404 .204  The m a tte r  was taken  in  a p p e a l, b u t w ith o u t  e x p re s s in g  any 
o p in io n  on any o th e r  p o in t ,  th e  C ou rt o f  Appeal h e ld  t h a t  th e  E n g lis h  
c o u r ts  had no ju r i s d i c t i o n  to  is s u e  a w r i t  o f  habeas co rpus  to  any 
a u th o r i t y  in  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d .
1 4 14 .205  In  KELLY v FAULKNER th e  c o u r t  appears to  have taken  n o te  o f 
th e  p ro v is o  to  s . 1( 1) and a llo w e d  damages f o r  a p a r t  o f  th e  c la im  in  an 
a c t io n  f o r  t re s p a s s ,  w ro n g fu l a r r e s t  and w ro n g fu l im p r is o n m e n t. A 
d e te n t io n  o rd e r  was made on th e  fo l lo w in g  da te  o f  th e  a r r e s t  and th e  
in te rn m e n t o rd e r  a f t e r  about a m onth . The p l a i n t i f f  was c o n fin e d  f o r  
n e a r ly  s ix  m on ths . The d e c is io n  in  McELOUFF *3 case (s u p ra )  was fo l lo w e d .
The p l a i n t i f f  was awarded damages f o r  b e in g  h e ld  in  u n la w fu l cus tody 
d u r in g  th e  p e r io d  p re c e d in g  th e  in te rn m e n t o rd e r .
4 .20  6 The d e c is io n  in  CHRISTIEf s case was r e fe r r e d  and i t  was observed
th a t  th e re  was "no o b v io u s  p r a c t ic a l  reason why th e  C i v i l  A u th o r ity  o r  th e
a r r e s t in g  o f f i c e r  sh o u ld  n o t make up h is  m ind under which r e g u la t io n  he
proposed to  a r r e s t  th e  person o r  why when he does so , he sh o u ld  n o t
d is c lo s e  h is  re a s o n s ."  [em phas is  added] R e fe r r in g  to  th e  p ro v is o  to  s . 1 (1 )
th e  c o u r t  o b se rve d : "No such e x ig e n cy  has been p roved  as w ould in v o lv e  the
1 42abandonment o f  th e  ru le  o f  common la w ."
4 .20  7 H av ing  th u s  fou n d  the  a r r e s t  under c l . ( 1 )  o f  R eg.11 to  be in v a l id  
th e  c o u r t  found  no d i f f i c u l t y  in  b ra n d in g  th e  d e te n t io n  s im i la r l y  by 
r e f e r r in g  to  th e  e x p re s s io n  "so  a r re s te d "  o f  c la u se  ( 2) as m eaning v a l i d l y  
a r re s te d .  The e x p re s s io n  was a p p a re n tly  r e fe r a b le  to  th e  c o n d it io n s  la id  
down in  c la u se  ( 1) b u t th e  c o u r t  in s is te d  on f u l f i lm e n t  o f  common law  
re q u ire m e n t a ls o  as a c o n d it io n  o f  v a l i d i t y  o f  a r r e s t  and o f  consequent 
d e te n t io n .
4 .208  The c u s to d ia l  s a n c t io n  was c o n s id e re d  as a necessa ry  in c id e n t  o f 
a r r e s t .  The c o u r t to o k  n o te  o f  th e  t r a n s fe r s  o f cus tody  th a t  had taken
p la ce  and obse rved  th a t  " i t  was necessa ry  to  c o n s id e r  in  d e t a i l  what
r  i  143happened to  him [ th e  p l a i n t i f f J  when u nde r r e s t r a i n t . "  At each t r a n s fe r ,
i t  appea rs , th e  t e s t  had to  be s a t i s f i e d .  The s ta te m e n t in  the  d e te n t io n
o rd e r  se rved  on the  p l a i n t i f f  a t  th e  t im e  o f h is  t r a n s fe r  to  th e  cus tody
o f  p r is o n  s e rv ic e  was exam ined . I t  was to  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  th e  p l a i n t i f f  was
a r re s te d  u nde r SPAf i t  d id  n o t s ta te  th e  ground o f  a r r e s t .  I t  was h e ld
t h a t  th e  o rd e r  d id  n o t f u l f i l  th e  re q u ire m e n t o f  la w . The concep t o f 
" r e - a r r e s t "  in tro d u c e d  in  McELDUFF's  case (s u p ra )  was th u s  f u r t h e r  
e m b e llis h e d  in  th a t  th e  "c u s to d y "  was c o n s id e re d  as a b r id g e  between the  
d i f f e r e n t  s ta g e s  in  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  th e  same pow er, u n d e r R eg.11 , and n o t 
between two d i f f e r e n t  powers unde r R eg.10 and 11.
4 .2  0 9 From t h i s  d e c is io n ,  we s u b m it, an im p o r ta n t consequence fo l lo w e d .  
The d e c is io n  c o u ld  be used f o r  p e n e tra t in g  th e  b a r r ie r  e re c te d  by c lause
(4 )  o f  R eg.11 a g a in s t r e s o r t  to  c o u r t  by th e  d e ta in e e  to  secu re  h is  
l i b e r t y .  A person  i s  " ta k e n  in t o  cus tody  u nde r th e  R e g u la t io n "  ( c f . 
c la u se  (4 )  o f  R eg.11) a f t e r  he i s  " a r r e s te d "  e i t h e r  u n d e r s . 7 o r  unde r 
R e g s .10 o r  11 . I f  th e  c u s to d ia l  s a n c t io n  in h e re d  by th e  power o f  a r r e s t  
e x e rc is e d  u nde r those  p ro v is io n s  la c k e d  le g a l  f o o t in g  in  any case , i t  
w ou ld  n o t be a case o f  b e in g  " ta k e n  in t o  cus tody  unde r th e  R e g u la t io n " .
The b a r  o f  c la u s e  (4 )  ough t to  be h e ld  in a p p l ic a b le  in  such a case .
4 .2 1 C  In  re s p e c t o f  in te rn m e n t i t  was h e ld  t h a t  i t  d id  n o t depend on th e
le g a l i t y  o f  a r r e s t ;  i t  depended on th e  recom m endation o f  th e  s p e c if ie d  
a u th o r i t y  and s u b je c t iv e  s a t is f a c t io n  o f  th e  M in is t e r .  I t  was o v e r lo o k e d  
t h a t  o f  th e  two a u t h o r i t ie s  which had c o n c u rre n t powers one was a ls o  th e  
b e n e f ic ia r y  o f  th e  d iv e r s  powers o f  a r r e s t  co n te m p la te d  u n d e r th e  A c t.
A f te r  m aking an a r r e s t  and s e c u r in g  a d e te n t io n  o rd e r  on th e  b a s is  
th e re o f  th e  same a u th o r i t y  co u ld  recommend in te rn m e n t and th u s  c o n v e rt 
an a r r e s t  in t o  in te rn m e n t.  A d m it te d ly ,  th e  scope f o r  m a la f id e  e x e rc is e  
o f  power c o u ld  n o t be a ground f o r  s t r i k i n g  down th e  p ro v is io n  b u t i t  
o u g h t to  p u t th e  c o u r t  on in q u ir y  in t o  th e  fa c t s  o f  the  case .
4 .2 1 |  W h ile  i t  i s  conceded th a t  th e  argument sugges te d  above does n o t
appear to  have been pu t f o r t h  in  t h i s  case , i t  i s  u n fo r tu n a te  th a t  the  
c o n te n t io n  th a t  th e  r i g h t  to  make re p re s e n ta t io n  to  th e  A d v is o ry  Com m ittee 
was n u l l i f i e d  and re n d e re d  i l l u s o r y  by th e  o rd e r ,  sh o u ld  have been 
r e je c te d  by th e  c o u r t .  I t  was h e ld  t h a t  th e  r e g u la t io n s  d id  n o t 
co n te m p la te  the  e x is te n c e  o f  such a com m ittee on th e  da te  o f th e  
m aking o f  th e  o rd e r .
1 444 .2 1 $ . In  an u n re p o r te d  d e c is io n ,  in  th e  case o f  30HIM GERARD MACKEY, 
th e  c o u r t  had to  c o n s id e r  th e  fu n c t io n  o f  th e  A d v iso ry  Com m ittee and th e  
scope o f  h e a r in g  b e fo re  i t .  In  an a p p l ic a t io n  f o r  a mandamus a g a in s t th e  
Com m ittee th e  p e t i t io n e r  p rayed  f o r  d i r e c t io n s  t h a t  he m ig h t be a llo w e d  
le g a l  re p re s e n ta t io n  and a ls o  s u p p lie d  w ith  a f u l l  s ta te m e n t o f  a l l  
e v id e n ce  and a l le g a t io n s  p r e ju d ic ia l  to  him th a t  had come to  th e  know ledge 
o f  th e  C om m ittee . The p ra y e r  f o r  le g a l  re p re s e n ta t io n  was tu rn e d  down 
upon h o ld in g  th a t  th e  r e fu s a l  d id  n o t amount to  a d e n ia l o f  n a tu r a l  
ju s t ic e  h a v in g  re g a rd  to  th e  " c h a ra c te r  and fu n c t io n "  o f  th e  Com m ittee and 
th e  scope o f  h e a r in g  b e fo re  i t .  The fa c ts  o f  th e  case d id  n o t d is c lo s e  
any u n u s u a l fe a tu re  w a r ra n t in g  such re p re s e n ta t io n ,  th e  C o u rt s a id .  I t  
was however h e ld  t h a t  by v i r t u e  o f  th e  common law  r ig h t  to  a p p o in t an 
a g e n t, a s o l i c i t o r  o r  a co u n se l co u ld  be a p p o in te d  as an a g e n t, n o t qua 
s o l i c i t o r  o r  c o u n s e l.
4 .2 1 J  The o th e r  p ra y e r  was p a r t i a l l y  a llo w e d . S u b je c t to  c e r ta in
q u a l i f i c a t io n s  th e  p e t i t i o n e r  was e n t i t l e d  to  be p ro v id e d  w ith  a w r i t t e n  
summary o f  in fo rm a t io n  re v e a le d  d u r in g  h e a r in g  o r  a lre a d y  in  th e  po sse ss io n  
o f  th e  C h ie f C o n s ta b le  o f  th e  R .U .C . and th e  M in is te r  o f  Home A f f a i r s  
wh ich gave r is e  to  th e  s u s p ic io n  th a t  le d  to  h is  in te rn m e n t.  The fo l lo w in g  
in fo rm a tio n s  c o u ld  however be exce p te d  i f  th e  M in is te r  co n s id e re d  them to  
be p r e ju d ic ia l  to  p u b l ic  s a fe ty :
(a )  in d ic a t in g  th e  sou rce  o f  in fo rm a t io n  and th e  id e n t i t y  o f  th e  
in fo rm a n t because th e  work o f  th e  s e c u r i t y  fo rc e s  m ig h t be 
p re ju d ic e d ;
(b )  e n a b lin g  th e  n a tu re  and e x te n t  o f  know ledge Q f^  s e c u r i t y  fo r c e s ;
( c )  r e v e a l in g  th e  system o f  in te r r o g a t io n  adopted by th e  s e c u r i t y  
f o r c e s .
4 .2 1 j|  P ro fe s s o r  de Sm ith has o f fe re d  th e  fo l lo w in g  comments on th e
. • 145d e c is io n :
( a )  the  d if fe re n c e  between an agent and a le g a l  re p re s e n ta t iv e
146was im m a te r ia l,  as h e ld  in  an E n g lis h  as w e l l  as an 
147A u s tra l ia n  d e c is io n ;
(b )  a lth o u g h  an a d v is o ry  com m ittee  c o u ld  n o t be equa ted  w ith  a 
do m e s tic  t r ib u n a l  th e re  m ust be "an e x p l i c i t  r e c o g n it io n  o f  th e  
l i k e l ih o o d  o f  d e tr im e n t to  an in te rn e e ,  coup led  w ith  an 
acknowledgm ent th a t  fa ir n e s s  to  th e  in te rn e e  may be in c o m p a tib le  
w ith  e x ig e n c ie s  o f  s e c u r i t y  which depends on the  m a in tenance  o f 
a h ig h  le v e l  o f  s e c re c y " ;
( c )  th e  d e c is io n  conform ed to  th e  " f a m i l i a r  fe a tu re  o f  B r i t i s h  
c a s e - la w " which p e rm it te d  " m o d if ic a t io n "  o f  r u le s  o f  n a tu r a l  
ju s t i c e " t o  accommodate th e  re q u ire m e n ts  o f  p u b l ic  s a fe ty " ;
4.216^ I t  appears th a t  th e  c o u r t  and a ls o  P ro fe s s o r  de Sm ith o v e rlo o k e d  
th e  f a c t  t h a t  R eg.12 (1 ) a llo w e d  a person " to  be in te rn e d  as may be d ire c te d  
in  th e  o r d e r " .  The wide sweep o f power conceded to  th e  E x e c u tiv e  
n e c e s s ita te d  an e q u a lly  e f f e c t iv e  check to  be read  in t o  th e  p ro v is io n s  
a g a in s t abuse by in s i s t i n g  on a p ro ce d u re  c h a t w ould make th e  remedy r e a l .  
The r e g u la t io n  b e in g  s i l e n t  on p rocedu re  such an e x e rc is e  was w a rra n te d  
n o t on th e  fa c ts  o f  th e  case b u t a t  common law  g e n e r a l ly .  P ro fe s s o r  de 
Sm ith h im s e lf  posed th e  q u e s tio n  -  "w ou ld  th e  adm iss ion  o f le g a l  re p re s e n t­
a t io n  m a te r ia l ly  in c re a s e  s e c u r i t y  r is k s  ? " -  b u t l e f t  i t  unansw ered. The 
m a te r ia l  is s u e  b e fo re  th e  a d v is o ry  com m ittee  in  a l l  cases would be -  w hether 
th e  in te rn m e n t was a u th o r is e d  by th e  te rm s o f  R eg.1 2 (1 ) which a llo w e d  a 
la rg e  amount o f la t i t u d e  in  th e  e x e rc is e  o f  th e  power by e n v is a g in g  
d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t io n s  o f  s u s p ic io n .  The A d v is o ry  Committee was n o t 
a c t in g  j u d i c i a l l y  and i t  was n o t  exp e c te d  to  a c t on a p re sum p tion  o f 
in n o ce n ce . U n le ss  he was a id e d  by a c o u n s e l, an in te rn e e  was bound to  be 
a t a g re a t d isa d va n ta g e  and on th e  o th e r  hand a r e s t r ic t e d  access to  th e  
m a te r ia ls  as proposed by th e  c o u r t  was l i k e l y  to  keep th e  s e c u r i t y  r i s k  a t 
a m inimum. I f  th e  p ro v is o  to  s . 1 (1 ) was to  have a f u l l  p la y  le g a l
re p re s e n ta t io n  was a n e c e s s ity :  i t  was p o s s ib le  f o r  a le g a l ly  t r a in e d  m ind
o n ly  to  b re a th e  l i f e  in t o  i t .  The g row ing  r o le  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  o b l ig a t io n s
in  the  f i e l d  o f law  co u ld  be a n o th e r reason f o r  s u p p o r t in g  th e  p le a .
4 . 2 l£  The House o f  Lo rds  in  ATTORNEY-GENERAL'5  REFERENCE NO. 1 o f 1975 
1 48(NORTHERN IRELAND) c o n s tru e d  th e  power to  s to p  and q u e s tio n  u nde r s . 16
o f  th e  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  (Emergency P ro v is io n s )  Act 1973 so w id e ly  th a t
even an o rd in a ry  law  came to  a c q u ire  "em ergency"  c h a ra c te r .  The ju d ic ia r y ,
in  t h i s  case , appears to  u p h o ld  th e  c la im  o f  th e  E x e c u tiv e  a d v e rte d  to  
149e a r l i e r .  A s o ld ie r  who had f i r e d  a f a t a l  s h o t a t an unarmed person 
who had run away when c h a lle n g e d  p leaded  th a t  he had ac ted  in  th e  hones t 
and re a s o n a b le  b e l i e f ,  though m is ta k e n , t h a t  th e  deceased was a t e r r o r i s t .
A judge s i t t i n g  w ith o u t  a ju r y  in  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  h e ld  t h a t  th e  k i l l i n g  
was j u s t i f i a b l e  h o m ic id e .
4.21CJ The Crown e xp e c te d , as th e  A tto rn e y  G ene ra l con tended , t h a t  th e
d e c is io n  w ould la y  down "g u id in g  p r in c ip le s  as to  use o f  re a so n a b le  fo r c e "
150b u t Lo rd  R u s s e ll observed  as fo l lo w s :
. . . The c irc u m s ta n c e s  in  which a death  may r e s u l t  from  
a c t io n  by members o f  th e  armed fo rc e s  in  t h e i r  a rduous , 
dangerous and unhappy ta s k  o f  c o n t r o l l in g  i l l e g a l  v io le n c e ,  
from  w ha teve r s o u rce , in  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  are l i k e l y  to  be 
i n f i n i t e l y  v a r ia b le ;  and I  canno t th in k  t h a t  th e  answer to  
th e  p o in t  o f  law  in  the  p re s e n t re fe re n c e  c o u ld  a f fo r d  
gu idance in  o th e r  cases . . .
T ha t was th e  a c tu a l d e c is io n  in  th e  case b u t Lord  D ip lo c k  d e a lt  w ith  th e
m a tte r  a t g re a t le n g th  on m e r its  and i t  i s  n e e d le ss  to  s t re s s  th a t  a l l
o b i t e r  d ic t a  o f t h e i r  L o rd s h ip s  o f  th e  House o f  Lo rds  yme- e n t i t l e d  to
g re a t r e s p e c t .
4 .2 1 g  Lo rd  D ip lo c k  r e fe r r e d  to  s . 3 o f  th e  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  C r im in a l 
Law Act 1967 which was a v e rb a tim  copy o f  s . 3 o f  i t s  E n g lis h  c o u n te rp a r t .
H is  lo r d s h ip  observed  th a t  fo rc e  was used f o r  th e  p re v e n tio n  o f  c rim e  in  
t h i s  case and f o r  th e  source  o f  power h is  lo rd s h ip  tu rn e d  to  s . 16 o f  th e  
N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  (Emergency P ro v is io n s )  Act o f  1973. I t  may be 
observed  h e re  t h a t  in  s p i te  o f  G a rd in e r C o m m itte e 's  recom m endation th e
ci r ry 
iSd (
1 5 11975 Amendment A ct d id  n o t make " te r r o r is m "  an o f fe n c e ,  a lth o u g h  
even in  th e  suggested d e f in i t io n  a n t ic ip a te d  a c ts  o f  v io le n c e  were n o t 
co ve re d . I t  i s  th e re fo re  in t e r e s t in g  to  n o te  h is  lo rd s h ip  o b s e rv in g
- n  152 as fo l lo w s :
. . .  I  p ropose to  d e a l w ith  th e  re fe re n c e  on th e  b a s is  
th a t  th e  a ccu se d 's  h o n e s t end re a so n a b le  b e l i e f  was th a t  
the  deceased was a member o f th e  P r o v is io n a l I .R .A .  who, 
i f  he go t away, was l i k e l y  sooner o r l a t e r  to  p a r t ic ip a te  
in  a c ts  o f  v io le n c e .  [em phasis" add"e"d] ”
4219. In  v ie w  o f  th e  f a c t  th a t  s . 3 was in v o k e d , i t  i s  s u b m itte d  th a t
th e  e x p re s s io n  "p re v e n t io n  o f  c r im e "  ough t n o t to  be so c o n s tru e d  as to
embrace any conduct o r  a c t i v i t y  o f  any person which appeared to  any o th e r
person to  be c r im in a l  f o r ,  i t  has to  be remembered th a t  power to  use fo rc e
to  p re v e n t c rim e  was c o n fe r re d  on "any p e rs o n " by s . 3 . Guidance in  the
c o n s tru c t io n  o f  th e  e x p re s s io n  ough t to  be o b ta in e d  from  th e  p re c e d in g  s . 2,
in  p a r t i c u la r  s u b -s s .(2 )  and (5 )  in  t h i s  case . B e fo re  fo rc e  was used
a g a in s t a person th e re  m ust be re a so n a b le  cause to  suspec t th a t  he was
about to  commit o r  was in  the  a c t o f  c o m m itt in g  some o ffe n c e  known to  la w .
H is  lo rd s h ip  appears to  have ig n o re d  t h i s  re q u ire m e n t in  th a t  " l i k e l ih o o d "
o f " p a r t i c ip a t io n "  in  a c ts  o f  v io le n c e  c o u ld  c o n s t i tu te  an in g r e d ie n t  o f
" t e r r o r is m "  i f  th a t  was made an o ffe n c e  o th e rw is e  such in c h o a te  conduct
c o u ld  n o t amount to  an o ffe n c e  in  la w . H is  lo r d s h ip  co n s id e re d  many m a tte rs
n o t germane to  th e  p o in t  a t is s u e  and obse rved  as fo l lo w s ,  expand ing
im m easurab ly th e  scope o f  th e  n a rro w  is s u e  th a t  had a r is e n  f o r  c o n s id e ra t io n :
. . . Uhere used f o r  such tem po ra ry  pu rposes ( i . e .  c o n t r o l l in g  
r io to u s  assem bly) i t  may n o t be in a c c u ra te  to  d e s c r ib e  th e  le g a l  
r ig h t s  and d u t ie s  o f  a s o ld ie r  as b e in g  no more than  th o se  o f 
an o rd in a ry  c i t i z e n  in  u n ifo rm .  B u t such a d e s c r ip t io n  i s  in  
my v ie w  m is le a d in g  in  the  c irc u m s ta n c e s  in  which th e  army is  
c u r r e n t ly  employed in  a id  o f  c i v i l  power in  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d .
In  some p a r ts  o f  th e  p ro v in c e  th e re  has e x is te d  f o r  some y e a rs  
now a s ta te  o f  armed and c la n d e s t in e ly  o rg a n is e d  in s u r r e c t io n  
a g a in s t th e  la w fu l  governm ent o f  Her M a je s ty  by pe rsons  se ek ing
to  g a in  p o l i t i c a l  ends by v io le n t  means. . . Due to  th e  e f f o r t s
o f  th e  army and th e  p o l ic e  to  supp ress  i t  th e  in s u r r e c t io n  
has been s p o ra d ic .  . . b u t .  . . i f  v ig i la n c e  i s  re la x e d  th e
v io le n c e  e ru p ts  a g a in . In  th e o ry  i t  may be the  d u ty  o f  eve ry
c i t iz e n  when an a r re s ta b le  o ffe n c e  i s  about to  be co m m itte d . . .
o  r  od d O
to  ta k e  w h a te ve r re a so n a b le  measures are a v a i la b le  to  him 
to  p re v e n t th e  com m ission o f  th e  c r im e . . . he i s  [n o t  t o ]  
do a n y th in g  by which he w ould expose h im s e lf  to  r i s k  o f
p e rs o n a l i n j u r y ,  n o r i s  he under any d u ty  to  search  f o r
c r im in a ls  o r  seek o u t c r im e . In  c o n t r a s t .  . . a s o ld ie r .  . . 
i s  unde r a d u ty ,  e n fo rc e a b le  unde r m i l i t a r y  la w , to  
search f o r  c r im in a ls  i f  so o rd e re d  by h is  s u p e r io r  o f f i c e r  
and to  r i s k  h is  own l i f e  sh o u ld  t h i s  be necessa ry  in  
p re v e n t in g  t e r r o r i s t  a c ts . For th e  perfo rm ance  o f  t h i s  
d u ty  he i s  armed w ith  a f i r e a r m .  . . from  which a b u l l e t ,
i f  i t  h i t s  th e  human body, i s  a lm ost c e r ta in  to  cause
s e r io u s  in ju r y  i f  n o t d e a th , [em phas is  added]
4 .2 2 0  I t  i s  c le a r  t h a t  th e  approach d is p la y s  perhaps undue concern  f o r  
th e  p r a c t ic a l  r e a l i t i e s  o f  th e  s i t u a t io n  r e s u l t in g  in  th e  le g a l 
c o n s id e ra t io n s  ( in  h is  lo r d s h ip 's  language " t h e o r e t i c a l " )  to  be 
re le g a te d  to  a secondary p la c e . I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  concede th a t
"se a rch  f o r  c r im in a ls "  c o u ld  be embraced by th e  e x p re s s io n  "p re v e n t io n  
o f c r im e " .  S im i la r ly ,  le g is la t u r e  in  i t s  wisdom h a v in g  r e je c te d  th e  
recom m endation to  make " t e r r o r is m "  a c r im e , how c o u ld  th e  supposed 
" m i l i t a r y  la w " ( i n  f a c t  an a d m in is t r a t iv e  o rd e r )  ga in  p rim acy  ? S t i l l ,  
th e  c o u r t  u n m is ta k a b ly  e n la rg e d  th e  a rm y 's  pow er.
4 .2 2 1  In  exam in ing  th e  re a sonab leness  o f  measures th a t  co u ld  be ta k e n ,
154th e  c o u r t  o b se rve d :
. . .  in  one s c a le  o f  th e  ba lance  th e  harm to  which th e  
deceased would be exposed i f  th e  accused aimed to  h i t  him 
was p re d ic ta b le  and grave  and th e  r i s k  o f  i t s  o c cu rre n ce  
h ig h .  In  th e  o th e r  s c a le  o f  th e  ba lance  i t  would be open 
to  th e  ju r y  to  ta k e  the  v ie w  th a t  i t  would n o t be u n re a so n a b le  
to  assess th e  k in d  o f  harm to  be a v e r te d  by p re v e n t in g  th e  
a ccu se d 's  escape as even g ra v e r  -  th e  k i l l i n g  o r  wounding o f 
members o f  th e  p a t r o l  by th e  t e r r o r i s t s  in  ambush, and th e  
e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  su cce ss . . . in  e n co u ra g in g  th e  co n tin u a n c e  
o f  th e  armed in s u r r e c t io n  and a l l  th e  m is e ry  and d e s t r u c t io n  
o f  l i f e  and p ro p e r ty .  . .
For such a d e l ic a te  ta s k  o f  b a la n c in g  a s ta b le  fu lc ru m  was needed and t h a t ,
we s u b m it, co u ld  be p ro v id e d  by in s i s t i n g  on th e  p ro o f o f  re a so n a b le n e ss
o f s u s p ic io n  o r  b e l i e f  b u t ,  in  t h i s  case , th e  c o u r t  d ispense d  w ith  th e
re q u ire m e n t, c o n tra ry  to  th e  u s u a l p r a c t ic e ,  f o r  reasons  n o t s ta te d .
1554 .22  2 In  DEVLIM v ARMSTRONG re l ia n c e  was p la ce d  on th e  same s . 3 
by a c i v i l i a n  t h i s  tim e  who was t r i e d  on a charge o f  r io to u s  b e h a v io u r  and
o f in c ite m e n t  to  such b e h a v io u r .  In  t h i s  case th e  c o u r t  d id  n o t f a i l
t o  observe  th a t  i t  was n o t suggested  th a t  th e re  had in  f a c t  been any 
u
u n la w fu l conduct on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  p o l ic e  a lth o u g h  th e  a p p e lla n t  contended 
t h a t  she h o n e s t ly  and re a so n a b ly  b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  p o l ic e  were about to  
behave u n la w fu l ly  by a s s a u lt in g  p e o p le  and damaging p ro p e r ty  in  th e  
B o g s id e  a rea  o f  L o n d o n d e rry . The c o u r t  f u r t h e r  obse rved  th a t  th e  fo r c e  
used was so e x c e s s iv e  as to  be u n w a rra n ta b le  by s . 3 . T h ro w in g  o f  p e t r o l  
bombs a t th e  p o l ic e  was h e ld  to  be " u t t e r l y  u n w a rra n te d  and u n la w fu l 
r e a c t io n " .  C c r ^ e J U ^ M m
1564 .2 2 3  The d e c is io n  o f  th e  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  c o u r ts  p ro v id e  a s t ro n g
157c o n t ra s t  to  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  th e  E n g lis h  c o u r ts .  In  f a c t  th e  d e c is io n
in  McELDUFF i s  in  l i n e  w ith  th e  v ie w  o f  th e  E n g lis h  c o u r t  as e xp re sse d  in  
158COROCRAFT in  which th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  in t e r n a t io n a l  o b l ig a t io n s  i s  s tre s s e d .
In d e e d , even in  th e  l a t e r  cases th e  E n g lis h  c o u r ts  adhered to  t h i s  v ie w  in
159cases a r is in g  in  the  do m e s tic  (E n g lis h )  c o n te x t . ,  Why th e  E n g lis h  c o u r ts
adopted  a d i f f e r e n t  approach in  th e  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  c o n te x t i s  n o t easy
to  u n d e rs ta n d . A p p a re n tly  th e y  ex tende d  th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  "ad  hoc norm s"
160o f  in t e r p r e t a t io n  e v o lv e d  in  th e  "w a rtim e  c a s e s " . B u t i s  i t  r i g h t  
to  equate  e x te r n a l a g g re ss io n  w ith  in t e r n a l  d is tu rb a n c e  ? O nly an 
i n t e l l i g e n t  and e f f e c t iv e  " p u b l ic  o p in io n "  can p ro v id e  an a p p ro p r ia te  
answer to  t h i s  q u e s t io n .  The d iv e rg e n c e  in  approach to  th e  q u e s t io n  
e x h ib i te d  by th e  E n g lis h  and N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  c o u r ts  in d ic a te  t h a t  in  
N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  th e  c o u r ts  g o t an answer and in d e e d  th e  r i g h t  answer to  
th e  q u e s tio n  in  th e  i n a r t i c u la t e  " p u b l ic  o p in io n "  p ro v id e d  by th e
con tem po ra ry  e n v iro n m e n ta l background o f  th e  m i l i t a r y  "e x c e s s e s " .
O b v io u s ly  th e  E n g lis h  c o u r ts  d id  n o t have t h i s  advan ta ge . T h u s , i n  
E ng land , th e  " v a lu e -p ro c e s s "  a t th e  j u d i c i a l  le v e l  d id  n o t o p e ra te  
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  in  re s p e c t o f  N o rth e rn  I r e la n d  cases.
4 .2 2 4  In d e e d , as C e d r ic  T h o rn b e rry  p o in ts  o u t ,  th e  law  " r e c o g n is e s "
161th e  d u a l "d a n g e r"  in h e re n t  in  th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  an "e m e rg e n cy ".
I t  i s  t r u e  th a t  an "em ergency" may i n v i t e  m i l i t a r y  in t e r p o s i t io n  and then
i t  may also provide a " ju s t i f ic a t io n "  fo r  the m il ita r y  "excesses" in  the
162claim grounded on the " leg itim acy" o f the declaration  of emergency.
He deals with the in te rn a t io n a l acknowledgment of emergency s itu a tio n s  but 
we may add th a t i t  is  also necessary to  take notice  o f the law yer's  dilemma 
in  dealing with the s itu a tio n  in  Northern Ire la n d . I f  i t  is  conceded th a t 
i t  is  a c iv i l  war, the te r r o r is ts  are e n t i t le d  to POW s ta tu s . On the other 
hand i f  A r t .15 of the  European Convention is  invoked i t  w i l l  s t i l l  be 
necessary to  decide whether the s itu a tio n  is  such th a t i t  "threatens the  
l i f e "  o f the B r it is h  n a tio n .
Chapter 5
EMERGENCY PROVISIONS UNDER LEGISLATION: INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
I .  C o lo n ia l r u le  and p e rs o n a l l i b e r t y  
(1 )  The r o v a l  c h a r te rs  and th e  r u le  o f  th e  E ast In d ia  Company
( A) " U n lim ite d "  governm ent and an e x p e rim e n t in  c o n s t i t u t io n a l ig n
5.1 On the  In d ia n  s u b -c o n t in e n t  n o t  o n ly  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  w h ich now
c o n s t i tu te  the  in d e p e n d e n t s ta te s  o f  I n d ia ,  P a k is ta n  and B angladesh (w h ic h , 
w ith  th e  e x c e p tio n  o f  th e  n a t iv e  s ta te s ,  c o n s t i tu te d  th e  e r s tw h i le  B r i t i s h  
In d ia )  b u t a ls o  th e  is la n d  o f  Ceylon ( S r i  Lanka) w ere , in  th e  b e g in n in g , 
s u b je c t  to  th e  r u le  o f  th e  East In d ia  Company (n o tw ith s ta n d in g  th e  s e p a ra te
" C o n s t i t u t io n "  t h a t  C eylon had re c e iv e d  from  th e  B r i t i s h  Crown in  th e
form  o f  th e  Commission o f  19 th  A p r i l ,  1798, is s u e d  u nde r th e  G re a t S e a l) .
The G overnor was re q u ire d  un d e r th e  " I n s t r u c t io n s "  to  obey o rd e rs  t h a t  he
m ig h t re c e iv e  n o t o n ly  from  th e  C o u rt o f  G overnors  o r  C o u rt o f  D ir e c to r s
o f th e  Company b u t a ls o  from  th e  G o ve rn o r-G e n e ra l o f  F o r t  W ill ia m  a t
C a lc u t ta .  However, Ceylon became a Crown C olony in  1802 when th e  T re a ty  o f
Amiens c o n firm e d  th e  B r i t i s h  o c c u p a tio n  o f  th e  e r s tw h i le  Dutch s e tt le m e n ts  
1
t h e r e .  B r i t i s h  In d ia ,  on th e  o th e r  hand, c o n tin u e d  to  be governed by th e  
East In d ia  Company u n t i l  th e  p a s s in g  o f  th e  Government o f  In d ia  A ct 1858 
by th e  B r i t i s h  P a r l ia m e n t.
5 .2  However, B r i t i s h  in t e r e s t  in  I n d ia ,  u n l ik e  th a t  in  C e y lo n , d id
n o t o r ig in a te  in  co n q u e s t. The f i r s t  C h a r te r  which Queen E liz a b e th  I  had 
g ra n te d  on 3 1 s t December, 1600 (d e s c r ib e d  by I l b e r t  as a P ro te s ta n t  
c o u n te r -c la im  to  Pope A le x a n d e r ’ s B u l l  o f  1493, by w hich th e  w hole  o f  th e  
u n d is c o v e re d  n o n -C h r is t ia n  w o r ld  was d iv id e d  by th e  Pope between S pa in  and 
P o r tu g a l,  aw ard ing  In d ia  to  P o r tu g a l)  m e re ly  c o n fe r re d  r ig h t s  on c e r ta in  
London m e rchan ts  f o r  t r a d in g  in  th e  East I n d ie s .  In  1615 S ir  Thomas Roe 
came as an envoy to  th e  M ughal C o u rt and in  1634 p e rm is s io n  to  t ra d e
throughout In d ia  was obtained from the Mughal Emperor. In  1639 and 1696
resp ec tive ly  Fort George a t Madras and Fort W illiam  at C alcu tta  were b u i l t ,
but the t e r r i t o r i a l  acq u is itio n  in  both cases was against valuable
consideration; Bombay, on the other hand, was tra n s fe rre d  to  the Company
in  1668 by King Charles I I ,  who had acquired the te r r i to r y  in  1661 as
2part of the dowry o f Catherine of Braganza.
5 .3  The f i r s t  English " fa c to ry 11 in  the East was b u i l t  in  1613 at 
Surat, which m aintained i t s  pre-eminence u n t i l  1687 as the seat of c en tra l 
au th o rity  and, as Kaye t e l ls  us, "the w i l l  of the Chief of the fac to ry  was 
absolute" in  c iv i l  cases but in  c rim in a l cases ju s tic e  was administered
by v ir tu e  of the K ingf s Commission granted under the Great Seal "to punish 
and execute offenders by m a rtia l law", the extent o f the au th o rity  being  
obviously lim ite d  to the Company’ s servants. The President and the members
3
of the Council at Surat were a l l  Company’ s servants . The c o lle g ia te  ru le ,
according to K e ith , curbed the P res id en t’ s d is c re tio n  and he could not act
l ik e  the Governor o f a Crown Colony. However, the general p o s itio n  could
4
be best summed up in  K e ith ’ s own words:
>'
The Company had merely trad in g  s ta tio n s  w ithout t e r r i t o r i a l  
sovereignty and i t  was only gradually  th a t wider au th o rity  
came to be exercised at Madras, Bombay and C a lcu tta  under 
varying conditions d ic ta ted  by d if fe re n t  sources of i t s  
power. .The general p r in c ip le  of the co n tro l of the business
of the fa c to r ie s  was the ru le  of the C ouncil, the ch ief
member o f which was s ty led  Governor or P res id en t.
5 .4  The power of a " le g is la t iv e  character" granted to the Company in  
the f i r s t  Charter was, in  K e ith ’ s language "appropriate fo r  m unicipal and
5
commercial corporate bodies". An im portant proviso appeared in  the
Charter granted in  1609:
. . . the said laws, orders, c o n s titu tio n s , ordinances, 
imprisonments, f in e s , amerciaments to be reasonable 
and not contrary or repugnant to the laws, s ta tu tes  or 
customs of th is  our realm .
This was repeated in  the subsequent Charters of 1661 and 1668. Under the
1661 Charter the Company also obtained ju d ic ia l  power (a lb e it  with a 
wider ambit) fo r  the Governors and Councils of i t s  fa c to r ie s  "to judge 
a l l  persons belonging to  the said Company or th a t should l iv e  under them 
in  a l l  causes c iv i l  or c r im in a l."  [emphasis added] The Charter o f 1726 
brought about a lim ite d  separation of the ju d ic ia l  from the executive and 
the le g is la t iv e  powers by vesting  the same in  the Mayors' Courts, which i t  
contemplated fo r  C a lcu tta , Madras and Bombay. Besides, u n like  e a r l ie r  
charters  i t  vested le g is la t iv e  powers in  the lo c a l potentates instead  
of the London-based D ire c to rs .^  The independence of the ju d ic ia ry  was in  
fa c t ensured only when Supreme Courts were established in  these towns in  
1774, 1801 and 1823 re s p e c tiv e ly , but notice  may now be taken of the
experiment made by the B r it is h  Parliam ent in  enacting the Regulating Act
/
in  1772 to  estab lish  the primacy of ju d ic ia l  power.
5 .5  In  1765 C live  obtained the grant o f Diwani (revenue ad m in is tra tio n )
from the decrep it Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam I I ,  of the subah o f Bengal 
(re c o n s titu te d  la t e r  in to  th ree  provinces -  Bengal, B ihar and O rissa, 
by the B r i t is h )  and u n w ittin g ly  set in  motion the process which eventua lly  
resu lted  in  the acq u is itio n  of t e r r i t o r i a l  sovereignty by the B r it is h  in  
In d ia . Before th a t he had established the m il ita ry  supremacy of the 
B r it is h  a t the b a t t le  of Plassey in  1757 which was u n fortunate ly  fo llow ed  
by a re ign  o f te r r o r  and oppression by B r it is h  fa c to rs  and the servants  
of the Company which, in  the words of Macaulay, "resembled the government
7
of e v i l  g en ii ra th er than the government of human ty ra n ts " . A
contemporary account of the adm in istration  of the diwani given by an
English o f f i c i a l  is  quoted by Archbold in  which i t  was sta ted  th a t " th is
f in e  country which flo u ris h ed  under the most despotic and a rb itra ry
0
government is  verging towards i t s  ru in "  and, as Kaye observes,
"Company's servants constitu ted  themselves in to  tr ib u n a ls . . . had power
g
without re s p o n s ib ility  and d ea lt with judgment without law ". I t  has 
been suggested by Cowell th a t the grant o f diwani was in  fa c t obtained to
fo rm a lis e  th e  a u th o r i t y  w hich th e  E n g lis h  possessed in  r e a l i t y  b u t ,  
as n o te d  above, th e  mismanagement d id  n o t cease and e v e n tu a l ly  P a r lia m e n t 
in te rv e n e d  and passed in  1772 th e  le g is la t io n  w hich  came to  be known as 
th e  R e g u la tin g  Act (1 3  G e o . I l l ,  c . 6 3 ) .
5 .6  The A ct had , how ever, w id e r im p o r t .  I t  c o n s t i tu te d  th e  G o v e rn o r-
G enera l *s C o u n c il f o r  th e  governm ent o f  B enga l b u t i t  a ls o  p ro v id e d  t h a t  th e
P re s id e n ts  and C o u n c ils  o f  Madras and Bombay s h a l l  be s u b o rd in a te  to  th e
G overnor G e n e ra l and th e  C o u n c il o f  B e n g a l. By s . 36 th e  "Supreme”  C o u n c il
was empowered ” to  make and is s u e  r u le s ,  o rd in a n c e s  and r e g u la t io n s  f o r  th e
good and c i v i l  governm en t" o f  th e  Company’ s p o s s e s s io n s . T h is  l e g is la t i v e
power was s u b je c te d  e x te r n a l ly  to  th e  c o n t r o l  o f  tw o m a s te rs  and
i n t r i n s i c a l l y  to  th e  p ro v is io n  th a t  th e  law s had to  be " j u s t  and
re a s o n a b le "  and " n o t  rep u g n a n t to  th e  law s o f  th e  re a lm " .  The r e g u la t io n s
c o u ld  n o t be v a l id  u n le s s  th e y  were r e g is te r e d  in  th e  Supreme C o u r t,  w ith
tn e  consen t and a p p ro b a tio n  o f  th e  c o u r t .  B e s id e s  th e  power o f  d is a llo w a n c e
re s e rv e d  to  th e  Crown, an appea l co u ld  a ls o  be made to  th e  K in g  in  C o u n c il
a g a in s t any r e g u la t io n  a f t e r  i t  was approved and r e g is te r e d .  I t  i s
obse rved  th a t  th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  th e  Supreme C o u rt (c o n te m p la te d  by s . 13
o f th e  A c t) was m o tiv a te d  by th e  d e s ire  to  have " g re a te r  in te r v e n t io n  by
th e  E n g lis h  Government and P a r lia m e n t in  In d ia n  a f f a i r s  and g re a te r  c o n t r o l
11o v e r th e  Company’ s p ro c e e d in g s " . S e v e ra l f a c to r s ,  such as p e rs o n a l
r i v a l r i e s ,  lo c a l  p o l i t i c s  and some o th e r  c irc u m s ta n c e s , combined to  make i t
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  th e  Supreme C o u n c il and th e  Supreme C o u rt to  work
h a rm o n io u s ly  unde r th e  A c t and in  1780 th e  p rim acy  o f  j u d i c i a l  power to
12v e to  le g is la t io n  was ta ke n  away ( v id e  21 Geo. I l l ,  c .7 0 ) .
5.7 The 1780 A c t,  i t  i s  s ta te d ,  s e t t le d  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w h ich  had
a r is e n  u n d e r th e  R e g u la t in g  A ct and th e  s e t t le m e n t ,  though  "c ru d e  and
u n s a t is fa c to r y " ,  was co p ie d  in  a l l  o th e r  P re s id e n c ie s  and endured  so lo n g
13as th e  Company and th e  M ughal Em pire e x is te d .  I t  i s  im p o r ta n t  to  n o te
e* U J
t h a t ,  a lth o u g h  the  ju r i s d i c t i o n  o f  th e  Supreme C o u rt was e xc lu d e d  in
r e la t io n  to  "R e g u la t io n s "  a id  a ls o  "any A c t, O rder o r  o th e r  M a tte r  done"
by th e  G overnor G e ne ra l and th e  C o u n c il,  i t  was a ls o  p ro v id e d  t h a t  w ith
re s p e c t to  o rd e rs  e x te n d in g  to  " B r i t i s h  s u b je c ts ,  th e  s a id  c o u r t  s h a l l
r e ta in  f u l l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  as i f  t h i s  A ct had n o t  been m ade". On th e  o th e r
hand, n e i th e r  th e  1772 A ct n o r  th e  17B0 Act d e f in e d  p r e c is e ly  th e  r e la t io n
in  w hich th e  In d ia n  t e r r i t o r i e s  s tood  to  th e  B r i t i s h  Crown and th e  te rm
" B r i t i s h  s u b je c t " ,  as has been o b se rve d , was so used in  b o th  th e  A c ts  as
14to  e xc lu d e  th e  in d ig e n o u s  p o p u la t io n .
5 .8  The A c ts  th u s  d id  n o t im prove  th e  b a s ic  p o s i t io n  as re s p e c ts  th e
le g is la t i v e  power t h a t  o b ta in e d  u nde r th e  C h a r te rs :  " r e g u la t io n s "  
re p u g n a n t to  " la w s , s ta tu te s  and custom s o f  th e  re a lm " c o u ld  be made in  so 
f a r  as th e y  a f fe c te d  th e  in d ig e n o u s  p o p u la t io n .  The o n ly  check appeared
to  l i e  in  th e  power o f  d is a llo w a n c e  (w h ich  c o u ld  n o t be e x e rc is e d  a f t e r  two
y e a rs ) in  t h a t ,  a lth o u g h  th e  A ct e x p re s s ly  p ro v id e d  th a t  any fu n c t io n a ry  o f  th e
Company’ s governm ent c o u ld  be p ro se cu te d  ( a lb e i t  o n ly  in  E ng land ) f o r  "abuse
o f p o w e rs ", r e g u la t io n s  co u ld  be e n a c te d  to  assume w ide powers to  p re c lu d e
th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  u n p le a s a n t consequences. I t  i s  a ls o  to  be n o te d  t h a t
a lth o u g h  in  1784 th e  Crown assumed ( v id e  24 G e o . I l l ,  c .2 5 )  power t o  remove
th e  G o ve rn o r-G e n e ra l o f  B e n g a l, G overnors o f  Madras and Bombay and th e
members o f  th e  s e v e ra l " C o u n c ils " ,  th e y  were a l l  s e rv a n ts  o f  th e  Company
and a l l ,  excep t th e  G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra l, were a p p o in te d  by th e  Company.
T hus, i t  i s  n o t p o s s ib le  to  su g g e s t t h a t  th e  " c o l le g ia t e  r u le "  a c te d  as
an i n t r i n s i c  check on th e  e x e rc is e  o f  le g is la t i v e  powers by th e  Company,
15to  any a p p re c ia b le  e x te n t .
5 .9  I t  i s ,  how ever, suggested  t h a t ,  n o tw ith s ta n d in g  i t s  lo s s  o f
" v e to " ,  th e  Supreme C o u rt "was n o t in  te rm s n o r  in  e f f e c t  bound by any
16R e g u la tio n s  which were n o t d u ly  r e g is te r e d  by i t " .  I t  i s  to  be n o te d  
th a t  th e  re q u ire m e n t o f  " r e g is t r a t i o n "  co n tin u e d  u n t i l  1833 when f o r  t h 8 
f i r s t  t im e  i t  was ren d e re d  unnecessa ry  by a n o th e r A ct (3  & 4 Urn.IV, c .8 5 ) .
I t  i s  a ls o  to  be n o te d  th a t  th e  1772 Act re q u ire d  th a t  th e  ju d g e s  o f  th e
Supreme C o u rt sh o u ld  be p r a c t is in g  E n g lis h  la w ye rs  and th a t  th e y  s h o u ld  be
a p p o in te d  by th e  Crown. A r t . 4 o f  th e  C h a rte r  o f  1774, unde r which th e
f i r s t  Supreme C o u rt ( a t  C a lc u t ta )  was e s ta b l is h e d ,  in v e s te d  th e  ju d g e s  " w ith
such ju r i s d i c t i o n  and a u th o r i t y  as o u r ju s t ic e s  o f  o u r C o u rt o f  K in g ’ s
Bench may la w fu l ly  e x e rc is e  w i th in  th a t  p a r t  o f  G re a t B r i t a in  c a l le d
E n g la n d ". I t  i s  th e re fo re  n o t p o s s ib le  to  agree w ith  C o w e ll t h a t  " th e  p la n
o f c o n t r o l l in g  th e  Company’ s governm ent by th e  K in g ’ s C o u rt e n t i r e l y  
17f a i l e d . "  However, i t  i s  in t e r e s t in g  to  n o te  t h a t  C ow e ll h im s e lf  concedes 
th a t  in  due course the  Supreme C o u rt a c q u ire d  " a u th o r i t y  and renow n" and 
obse rves  th a t  "E n g lis h  la w y e rs  in  In d ia  have la id  th e  fo u n d a t io n  o f  a 
com ple te  system o f  A n g lo - In d ia n  ju r is p ru d e n c e "  and th a t  " th e y  have c a r r ie d  
o u t th e  u l t im a te  end and o b je c t  o f  th e  R e g u la tin g  A c t " .
5 .10  I t  i s  th e re fo re  p o s s ib le  to  sugges t th a t  th e  " u n l im ite d "
governm ent o f  th e  East In d ia  Company was c o n t r o l le d  more e f f e c t i v e ly  by th e
'^ K in g 's  C o u rts v than by P a r l ia m e n t.  I t  i s  obse rved  th a t  the  e x e rc is e  o f  th e
le g is la t i v e  power had in  f a c t  exceeded th e  g ra n t and i t  i s  to  be n o te d
th a t  P a r lia m e n t c o u ld  do n o th in g  b u t e xp re ss  i t s  acqu iescence by e n d o rs in g
in  1797 th e  le g is la t io n  a f t e r  s e v e ra l y e a rs  o f  th e  m aking o f  th e
numerous "R e g u la t io n s "  which were p u b lis h e d  in  1793 in  th e  shape o f  a
1g
"R ev ised  Code" (see  s . 8, 37 G e o . I l l ,  c .1 4 2 ) .  U he ther th e  c o n t in u in g  
s o v e re ig n ty  o f  th e  M ughal Emperor co u ld  e x p la in  th e  r e t i c e n t  mood o f
20P a r lia m e n t i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  say b u t th e  E n g lis h  C o u rt, in  THE INDIAN CHIEF.
dec ided  in  1800, d id  in  f a c t  r e f e r  to  i t  in  the  fo l lo w in g  te rm s :
The s o v e re ig n ty  o f  th e  M ogul i s  o c c a s io n a lly  b ro u g h t 
fo rw a rd  f o r  th e  purpose o f  p o l ic y ,  i t  h a rd ly  e x is t s  
o th e rw is e  than  as a phantom, i t  i s  n o t a p p lie d  f o r  
a c tu a l r e g u la t io n  o f  o u r e s ta b lis h m e n ts .  . .
5.11 N e v e r th e le s s , i t  has to  be conceded th a t  th e  1797 A ct endeavoured
to  l i m i t  to  some e x te n t th e  Company’ s governm ent by r e q u ir in g  t h a t  a l l  
f u tu r e  R e g u la tio n s  o f  th e  C o u n c il ( w i th  "g ro u n d s " p r e f ix e d  t h e r e to ) ,
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a f f e c t in g  th e  r i g h t s ,  p ro p e r ty  and pa rsons o f  th e  n a t iv e s ,  sh o u ld  be 
p r in te d  w ith  t r a n s la t io n s  in  lo c a l  la n g u a g e s . The G overnors  and t h e i r  
C o u n c ils  in  Madras and Bombay w ere , in  1800 and 1807 r e s p e c t iv e ly ,
21in v e s te d  w ith  s im i la r  le g is la t i v e  pow ers, to  be e x e rc is e d  in d e p e n d e n tly .
In  1813 i t  was f u r t h e r  p ro v id e d  th a t  a l l  "R e g u la t io n s "  made by th e  s e v e ra l
governm ents in  In d ia  sh o u ld  be la id  b e fo re  P a r lia m e n t and in  s . 95 i t  was
enacted  th a t  th e  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  A ct sh o u ld  n o t be c o n s tru e d  to  "p re ju d ic e
22o r  a f f e c t  th e  undoubted  s o v e re ig n ty  o f  th e  Crown" o v e r th e  t e r r i t o r i e s .
In  1833, when th e  l e g is la t i v e  power was c e n t r a l is e d  in  th e  G o ve rn o r-
G e ne ra l in  C o u n c il,  i t  was s u b je c te d  to  a s im i la r  l im i t a t i o n  which
e x p re s s ly  p r o h ib i te d  le g is la t io n  in  d e ro g a tio n  o f  any r o y a l  p re ro g a t iv e
o r  th e  a u th o r i t y  o f  P a r lia m e n t o r  o f  th e  u n w r it te n  law s o r  c o n s t i t u t io n
o f  th e  U n ite d  Kingdom "uhereon  may depend in  any degree th e  a lle g ia n c e
23o f any person  to  th e  Crown" o r th e  s o v e re ig n ty  o f  th e  Crown. I t  was a ls o  
p ro v id e d  t h a t  no law  c o u ld  be passed so as to  a b o lis h  th e  c o u r ts  
e s ta b l is h e d  by r o y a l  c h a r te r s .  The o v e r a l l  a u th o r i t y  o f  P a r lia m e n t to  
le g is la t e  f o r  In d ia n  t e r r i t o r i e s  was e x p re s s ly  re s e rv e d .
(B ) Some emergency p r o v is io n s
( a) £ r£V £nM <ve_d>at_ent^i£n_un>d£r_IrTij3e_ri:a_l A c ts
5 .12  As we have seen, th e  R e g u la tin g  Act f o r  th e  f i r s t  t im e  in  1772
endeavoured to  impose d r a s t ic  l im i t a t io n s  on th e  powers o f  th e  " u n l im ite d "  
governm ent o f  th e  Company. W ith  thB  e s ta b lis h m e n t o f  th e  Supreme C o u rt in  
C a lc u t ta  in  1774 any person  d e ta in e d  th e re  un d e r th e  o rd e rs  o f  th e  e x e c u tiv e  
co u ld  ap p ly  to  th e  c o u r t  f o r  a w r i t  o f  habeas co rpus and th e  Supreme C ou rt 
c o u ld  a ls o  v e to  any " r e g u la t io n "  th a t  th e  e x e c u tiv e  m ig h t pass f o r  
d e te n t io n  w ith o u t  t r i a l ,  as such law  w ou ld  have been "re p u g n a n t to  th e  
law s o f  th e  re a lm " .  T h e re fo re  i t  can be s a id  t h a t  th e  1780 Act 
enab led  e x e c u tiv e  as w e l l  as l e g is la t i v e  m easures f o r  " p re v e n t iv e  
d e te n t io n "  to  be taken  in  r e la t io n  to  th e  in d ig e n o u s  p o p u la t io n  by 
c ir c u m s c r ib in g  th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  th e  Supreme C o u r t.  However, th e
a u th o r i t ie s  c o u ld  ta ke  such m easures a t t h e i r  own p e r i l  in  t h a t  such 
law s c o u ld  be d is a llo w e d  by th e  Crown and th e  a u t h o r i t ie s  c o u ld  a ls o  be 
p ro se cu te d  o r  even sued f o r  fa ls e  im p ris o n m e n t, a lb e i t  o n ly  in  E ng land .
5 .13  In  1784, how ever, P a r lia m e n t a u th o r is e d  th e  G o ve rn o r-G e n e ra l 
o f  B e nga l and a ls o  th e  "P re s id e n c ie s "  o f  M adras and Bombay to  is s u e  
"w a r ra n t f o r  s e c u r in g  any person  suspec ted  o f  c a r r y in g  on i l l i c i t  
co rrespondence  dangerous to  the  B r i t i s h  p o sse ss io n s  in  I n d ia ,  w ith  any 
o f  th e  P r in c e s , o r  o th e r  pe rsons  h a v in g  a u th o r i t y  th e re ,  o r  w ith  th e  
Commanders o r  P re s id e n ts  o f  any f a c t o r ie s  e s ta b lis h e d  in  th e  E ast In d ie s
by any European pow er, c o n tra ry  to  th e  o rd e rs  o f  th e  Company o r  o f  the
24 ,
G overnor G e ne ra l and C o u n c il a fo r e s a id " .  A f te r  a r r e s t  w itn e s s e s  (n o t
the  d e ta in e e ) had to  be exam ined in  w r i t in g  and th e re  sh o u ld  appear
"re a s o n a b le  grounds f o r  th e  ch a rg e " b e fo re  th e  person concerned co u ld  be
com m itted  to  "s a fe  c u s to d y " .  W ith in  f i v e  days the  d e ta in e e  had to  be
fu rn is h e d  w ith  th e  "A c c u s a t io n "  on w hich he had been co m m itte d . The
d e ta in e e  was g ive n  th e  r i g h t  to  subm it h is  "D efence in  w r i t i n g "  and a ls o
exam ine w itn e s s e s  in  s u p p o rt o f  h is  "d e fe n c e " .  The w itn e s s e s  were
re q u ire d  to  be exam ined in  th e  d e ta in e e *s  p resence and t h e i r  d e p o s it io n s
had to  be taken  down in  w r i t i n g .  I f  th e re  s t i l l  appeared " re a s o n a b le
grounds f o r  th e  fo rm e r p ro ce e d in g s  [ a r r e s t  ? ]  and f o r  c o n t in u in g  th e
co n fin e m e n t"  th e  d e te n t io n  c o u ld  be c o n tin u e d  u n t i l  h is  t r i a l  e i t h e r  in
In d ia  o r  in  E ng land .
5 .1 4  The p ro v is io n  a p p a re n t ly  aimed a t e n s u r in g  th e  s e c u r i t y  o f  th e  
in s e c u re  B r i t i s h  p o sse ss io n s  in  In d ia  and on th a t  accoun t i t  c o u ld  be 
te rm ed as an "em ergency" measure b u t i t s  c h a ra c te r  c o u ld  h a rd ly  be term ed 
as " p r e v e n t iv e " ,  s im p l i c i t e r : th e  o f fe n s iv e  a c t i v i t y  was supposed to  
c o n s t i t u te  an o ffe n c e  and a t r i a l  th e r e fo r ' was e x p re s s ly  c o n te m p la te d .
I t  m ig h t be r e c a l le d  th a t  r u le s  o f  E n g lis h  c r im in a l  law  were fo l lo w e d  a t th e  
Supreme C o u rt and, u n t i l  th e  p a ss in g  in  1861 o f  th e  In d ia n  H igh C o u rts  A c t, 
th e re  fu n c t io n e d  in  each o f  th e  P re s id e n c ie s  o f  C a lc u t ta ,  Bombay and Madras
a p a r a l l e l  j u d i c i a l  system w ith  Sadar N izam at A d a la t a t th e  apex to
a d m in is te r  c r im in a l  ju s t ic e  in  areas o u ts id e  th e  p re s id e n c y  towns w ith
25se p a ra te  p rocedu re  p re s c r ib e d  by r e g u la t io n s .  I t  was p o s s ib ly  c o n s id e re d  
e x p e d ie n t to  a u th o r is e  a u n ifo rm  p rocedu re  in  s p e c i f i c  te rm s f o r  th e  c la s s  o f  
cases co n te m p la te d  by the  p ro v is io n  on accoun t o f  the  d e p a rtu re  made from  
r u le s  o f  E n g lis h  common law  in  such m a tte rs  as e f f e c t in g  a r r e s t  w ith o u t  
s ta t in g  th e  re asons  and an in d e f in i t e  p r e - t r i a l  d e te n t io n  ( w i th o u t  b a i l ) ,  
and a ls o  pe rhaps f o r  th e  a d d i t io n a l  reason th a t  p ro v is io n  f o r  such cases
c o u ld  n o t be made in  th e  lo c a l  r e g u la t io n s  a t a t im e  when B r i t i s h  r u le  was
. 26 s t i l l  in s e c u re .
(b )  jjome_pro\^isicin_s unde r th e  JRec[ulations
( i )  B e n ^ l_ R e ^ l_ a tio n  J_0_crf 1804
5 .1 5  The c a p tio n e d  R e g u la tio n  was made f o r  " d e c la r in g  th e  power o f
th e  G o ve rn o r-G e n e ra l in  C o u n c il to  p ro v id e  f o r  th e  im m edia te  pun ishm ent o f  
c e r ta in  o ffe n c e s  a g a in s t th e  s ta te  by th e  sentence o f  C o u rts  M a r t ia l " .  By 
s .1  th e  G o ve rn o r-G e n e ra l in  C o u n c il was a u th o r is e d  to  "d e c la re  and 
e s ta b l is h  M a r t ia l  Law" and to  p ro v id e  f o r  th e  " im m e d ia te  p u n ish m e n t" o f  
pe rsons "who may be taken  in  arms in  open h o s t i l i t y "  o r  " in  th e  a c tu a l 
com m ission o f  any o v e r t  a c t o f  r e b e l l i o n "  o r  " in  th e  a c t  o f  a id in g  o r  
a b e t t in g  th e  sam e". The j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  measure was a ls o  in d ic a te d  -  
" f o r  the  s a fe ty  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  p o sse ss io n  and f o r  the  s e c u r i t y  o f  th e  
l i v e s  and p ro p e r ty  o f  th e  in h a b i t a n t s " .  The R e g u la tio n  d id  n o t s p e c ify  
th e  p rocedu re  f o r  t r i a l  b u t  th e  sen tence  w hich th e  m i l i t a r y  c o u r t  co u ld  
impose was p re s c r ib e d  -  dea th  and a ls o  f o r f e i t u r e  o f  p ro p e r ty .
5 .16 The im p o r ta n t p o in t  to  be n o te d  about th e  p ro v is io n  i s  t h a t ,
d e s p ite  th e  use o f  th e  te rm  " M a r t ia l  Law ", i t  conform ed to  th e  common law  
re q u ire m e n ts  as in d ic a te d  b e lo w :
(a )  th e  t r i a l  o f  c i v i l i a n s  by m i l i t a r y  c o u r ts  c o u ld  be f o r  
o n ly  th e  s p e c i f ie d  a c ts  which co rresponded  to  th e  common 
law  concep t o f  m e e tin g  fo rc e  w ith  fo r c e ,  and n o t f o r  any 
o f fe n c e ;
(b )  i t  was e x p re s s ly  p ro v id e d  th a t  m a r t ia l  law  c o u ld  be 
e s ta b lis h e d  o n ly  f o r  th e  p e r io d  d u r in g  which "w a r 
c o n t in u e s "  and th e  fu n c t io n in g  o f  th e  o rd in a ry  c r im in a l  
c o u r ts  was a c tu a l ly  "su sp e n d e d ";
( c )  i f  in  any case t r i a l  by a m i l i t a r y  c o u r t  d id  n o t  "appea r 
to  be in d is p e n s a b ly  n e c e s s a ry "  th e  o f fe n d e r  c o u ld  be 
"b ro u g h t to  t r i a l  a t  any t im e  b e fo re  o rd in a ry  c o u r ts "  
w hich co rresponded  to  th e  common law  concep t o f  " n e c e s s ity " .
A no the r n o te w o rth y  fe a tu re  o f  th e  R e g u la tio n  was th a t  i t  d id  n o t e x p re s s ly
e xc lu d e  th e  ju r i s d i c t i o n  o f  th e  s u p e r io r  c o u r ts ,  which le n d s  s u p p o rt to  o u r
c o n te n t io n  th a t  n o n - j u s t i c i a b i l i t y  d u ra n te  b e l lo  advocated  in  some
27E n g lis h  d e c is io n s  was n o t s a n c tio n e d  by common la w .
( i i )  B_eng_a 1_Rje g u l a t i o 3 _of_1j31j3
5.17 The R e g u la tio n  o f  1818 c o u ld  be te rm ed as th e  t r u e  p re c u rs o r  o f
th e  modern law  o f  p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n  in  I n d ia .  In  1897 th e  R e g u la tio n
was g ive n  th e  s h o r t  t i t l e  "The B enga l S ta te  P r is o n e rs  R e g u la t io n " .  I t  has
to  be n o te d  th a t  s im i la r  R e g u la tio n s  were a ls o  made in  M adras in  1819
(N o . 2) and in  Bombay in  1827 (N o . 2 5 ) .  The R e g u la tio n  was ex tende d  from
tim e  to  t im e  to  o th e r  p a r ts  o f  In d ia  and by 1929 th e  p ro v is io n  was in  fo rc e
in  a lm o s t th e  w ho le  o f  B r i t i s h  In d ia  (see  th e  S ta te  P r is o n e rs  A c ts  o f  1850 
28and 1 8 5 8 ). At independence i t  was made a p p lic a b le  to  th e  "D om in ion  o f  
29In d ia "  and, r a th e r  s u r p r is in g ly ,  i t  was c o n tin u e d  in  fo r c e  in
30R e pub lica n  In d ia  u n t i l  1952 even a f t e r  th e  enactm ent in  1950 o f  th e  
P re v e n tiv e  D e te n tio n  A c t.  The p o in t  which dese rves  s p e c ia l n o t ic e  i s  th a t  
s u b -s . (3 )  o f  s . 491 o f  th e  Code o f  C r im in a l P rocedure  1898 made in a p p l ic a b le  
th e  p r o v is io n  o f  t h a t  s e c t io n  (c o n c e rn in g  w r i t s  in  th e  n a tu re  o f  habeas 
c o rp u s ) to  d e te n t io n s  u nde r th e  R e g u la tio n  and th e  a l l i e d  A c t.
5 .1 8  The R e g u la tio n  was e n a c te d  as a perm anent measure and the  
o b je c t  o f  th e  law  was s ta te d  in  c o n s id e ra b le  d e t a i l  in  th e  e la b o ra te  
p ream b le , th e  r e le v a n t  p o r t io n  o f  which i s  quo ted  belows
whereas reasons o f  s ta te ,  em brac ing  th e  due m a in tenance o f
a l l ia n c e s  form ed by th e  B r i t i s h  governm ent w ith  fo r e ig n
pow ers , th e  p re s e rv a t io n  o f  t r a n q u i l l i t y  in  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s
o f  N a tiv e  P jfin ce s  e n t i t l e d  to  i t s  p r o te c t io n  and th e
s e c u r i t y  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  dom in ions  from  fo r e ig n  h o s t i l i t y
and from  in t e r n a l  commotion re n d e r i t  necessa ry  to  p la ce
unde r p e rs o n a l r e s t r a in t  in d iv id u a ls  a g a in s t whom th e re  may
n o t be s u f f i c ie n t  g round to  i n s t i t u t e  j u d i c i a l  p ro c e e d in g s ,
o r  when such p ro ce e d in g  may n o t be adapted to  th e  n a tu re
o f  th e  case, o r  may f o r  o th e r  reasons be u n a d v is a b le  o r
im p ro p e r; and whereas i t  i s  f i t  t h a t .  . . th e  d e te rm in a t io n
to  be taken  s h o u ld  p roceed im m e d ia te ly  o f  th e  G overnor
G e n e ra l in  C o u n c il;  and whereas th e  ends o f  ju s t ic e  re q u ire
t h a t .  . . th e  g rounds o f  such d e te rm in a t io n  s h o u ld  from
tim e  to  t im e  come unde r r e v is io n .  . . r  . . .[em phas is  addedJ
The re le v a n t  p a r ts  o f  s . 2 which c o n ta in e d  th e  o p e ra t iv e  p ro v is io n  may a ls o  
be q u o te d :
Uhen th e  reasons  s ta te d  in  th e  pream ble  o f  t h i s  R e g u la tio n  
may seem to  th e  G overnor G e ne ra l in  C o u n c il to  re q u ire  t h a t  
an in d iv id u a l  s h o u ld  be p la ce d  u nde r p e rs o n a l r e s t r a in t ,  
w ith o u t  any im m ed ia te  v ie w  to  u l t e r i o r  p ro ce e d in g s  o f  a 
j u d i c i a l  n a tu re  a w a rra n t o f  commitment unde r th e  a u th o r i t y
o f  th e  G overnor G e n e ra l in  C o u n c il,  and under th e  hand o f
th e  C h ie f S e c re ta ry  # . . s h a l l  be is s u e d  to  th e  o f f i c e r  in
whose cus tody  such person  i s  to  be p la c e d .
[em phas is  added]
5 .19 The fo rm  o f  th e  " w a r ra n t"  was a ls o  s e t o u t in  th e  s e c t io n  and
i t  was p ro v id e d  th a t  " th e  w a rra n t o f  commitment s h a l l  be s u f f i c ie n t
a u th o r i t y  f o r  the  d e te n t io n  o f  any s ta te  p r is o n e r  in  any f o r t r e s s ,  j a i l
o r  o th e r  p la c e  w ith in  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  s u b je c t  to  th e  P re s id e n c y . . . "
In  s s .3  and 4 p ro v is io n  was made f o r  th e  subm iss ion  o f  p e r io d ic  r e p o r ts  
to  th e  G overnor G ene ra l in  C o u n c il and f o r  p e r io d ic  v i s i t s  by a Budge 
o r  a M a g is tra te  to  th e  p r is o n e r  to  a s c e r ta in  m a tte rs  c o n c e rn in g  th e  
" t r e a tm e n t"  o f th e  p r is o n e r  and h is  " c o n d u c t" ,  " h e a l th "  and " c o m fo r t " .
A re p o r t  was a ls o  co n te m p la te d , v id e  s . 6 , about th e  "degree  o f  co n fin e m e n t 
a p p ro p r ia te  f o r  th e  p r is o n e r  on grounds o f  h e a lth  and about th e  "a llo w a n c e  
f ix e d  f o r  h is  own and h is  f a m i ly 's  s u p p o r t,  a c c o rd in g  to  t h e i r  ra n k  in  
l i f e .  I t  i s  in t e r e s t in g  to  n o te  t h a t ,  a lth o u g h  th e  pream ble  e x p re s s ly  
co n te m p la te d  a p e r io d ic  " r e v is io n "  o f  th e  d e te n t io n ,  th e  o n ly  s u b s ta n t iv e  
p ro v is io n  d e a lin g  w ith  t h i s  a spec t was to  be found  in  s . 5 , which i s  quo ted
in  e x te n s o :
&  J ■ &
The O f f ic e r  in  whose cus tody  any s ta te  p r is o n e r  may be 
p la ce d  i s  to  fo rw a rd , w ith  such o b s e rv a t io n s  as may appear 
n e c e s s a ry , e ve ry  re p re s e n ta t io n  w hich such S ta te  p r is o n e r  
may from  tim e  to  t im e  be d e s iro u s  o f  s u b m it t in g  to  th e  
G overnor G e n e ra l in  C o u n c il.
5 .20  I t  i s  i d le  to  s p e c u la te  about th e  n a tu re  and e f f e c t  o f  th e
" re p re s e n ta t io n "  b u t th e  p r o v is io n ,  ex f a c ie , d id  n o t p a r ta k e  o f  the  
c h a ra c te r  o f  any fo rm  o f  "s a fe g u a rd "  a g a in s t abuse o f  pow er. T here  was no 
p r o v is io n  f o r  fu r n is h in g  th e  p r is o n e r  w ith  th e  "g ro u n d s " o f  h is  d e te n t io n .  
The d u ra t io n  o f  th e  d e te n t io n  was n o t l im i t e d  b u t s . 3 co n te m p la te d  th a t  
th e  "o rd e r  o f  d e te n t io n "  co u ld  be " m o d if ie d "  by th e  G overnor G e ne ra l in  
C o u n c il on a c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  th e  r e p o r t  s u b m itte d  unde r th e  s e c t io n  on 
th e  " c o n d u c t" ,  " h e a l th "  and " c o m fo r t "  o f  the  p r is o n e r .  I t  i s  p o s s ib le  
th a t  th e  s a id  " r e p re s e n ta t io n "  c o u ld  a ls o  be made on these  m a tte rs  and n o t 
on th e  " m e r i t s "  o f  th e  d e te n t io n .  The R e g u la tio n  d id  n o t e x p re s s ly  b a r  
th e  ju r i s d i c t i o n  o f  c o u r ts  b u t such p ro v is io n  was perhaps unnecessa ry  as 
th e  G o ve rn o r-G e n e ra l end h is  C o u n c il were exempted by th e  17 80 A ct from  
th e  ju r i s d i c t i o n  o f  th e  Supreme C o u rt in  so f a r  as those  pe rsons  who
were n o t B r i t i s h  s u b je c ts  were conce rned . A lthough  th e  p ro v is io n  was
p a te n t ly  repugna n t to  common law  ( " la w s  o f  th e  r e a lm " ) ,  an im p lie d
a u th o r i t y  to  enac t i t  came from  P a r lia m e n t i t s e l f  to  b u t t r e s s  th e  powers
o f th e  " u n l im i te d "  governm ent o f  th e  East In d ia  Company. As we s h a l l  see 
31in  AMEER KHAN no p r is o n e r  c o u ld  s u c c e s s fu l ly  p ro se cu te  a p p l ic a t io n  
f o r  habeas co rpus  a g a in s t h is  d e te n t io n  u nde r th e  R e g u la t io n .
(2 )  The " C o n s t i tu t io n "  A c ts  and D ir e c t  Government 
( A) C o n s t i tu t io n a l  l im i t a t io n s
5.21 The Government o f  In d ia  A ct 1858 p ro v id e d  th a t  th e  governm ent o f
th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  " in  th e  p o sse ss io n  o r u nde r th e  governm ent o f  th e  E as t 
In d ia  Company and a l l  powers in  r e la t io n  to  governm ent v e s te d  in  o r  
e x e rc is e d  by th e  s a id  company in  t r u s t  f o r  Her M a je s ty  s h a l l  cease to  be 
v e s te d  in  o r  e x e rc is e d  by th e  s a id  company" and th a t  " I n d ia  s h a l l  be 
governed by and in  th e  name o f  Her M a je s ty " .  S u b je c t to  the  p ro v is io n s
o f th e  A c t, th e  e x is t in g  law  ( " a l l  A c ts  and P ro v is io n s  now in  fo r c e " )
was to  c o n tin u e  by v i r t u e  o f  s .LX IV  o f  th e  A c t.  The A ct c re a te d  new
o f f i c e s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  end a ls o  p ro v id e d  f o r  new m ethods o f  appo in tm e n t
o f  th e  im p o r ta n t fu n c t io n a r ie s  b u t d id  n o t e x p re s s ly  d e a l w ith  th e  e x te n t ,
scope and a u th o r i t y  o f  th e  le g is la t i v e  pow er. However, i t  i s  to  be
n o te d  t h a t ,  a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  e x p e rim e n t to  c o n t r o l  e f f e c t i v e l y  th e  " u n l im ite d "
governm ent o f  th e  Company in  1853, th e  le g is la t i v e  power o f  th e  Company
was sough t to  be re g u la te d  by th e  B r i t i s h  P a r lia m e n t by a n o th e r m ethod.
The 1853 Act (16  & 17 V i e t . ,  c .9  5) had e n la rg e d  th e  C o u n c il by add ing
" L e g is la t iv e  Members" o f  whom two were E n g lis h  ju d g e s  o f  th e  Supreme
C o u rt a t C a lc u t ta .  There  wore a ls o  some o th e r  changes as a r e s u l t  o f
which th e  le g is la t i v e  b u s in e s s  in  th e  C o u n c il was conducted  in  p u b l ic
32in s te a d  o f  in  s e c re t .  I t  was p o s s ib ly  co n s id e re d  to o  e a r ly  in  1858 
to  in t ro d u c e  any f u r t h e r  change in  t h i s  system .
5.22  T h a t the  assum ption  o f  d i r e c t  governm ent by th e  Crown came as a
r e s u l t  o f  th e  Sepoy M u tin y  o f  1857 i s  an e s ta b lis h e d  f a c t  o f  h i s t o r y .  I t
i s  a ls o  p o s s ib le  to  sugges t t h a t  th e  subsequent c o n s t i t u t io n a l  deve lopm ent
in  B r i t i s h  In d ia  to o k  p la c e  as a response to  th e  g row th  o f  th e  freedom
movement spearheaded by th e  In d ic n  N a t io n a l C ongress, which was founded
in  1883. The Government o f  In d ia  Act 1915 (amended in  1916 and 1919)
33e s ta b lis h e d  a p ro p e r fram ew ork  o f  a C o n s t i tu t io n  f o r  th e  t e r r i t o r y .
The re le v a n t  p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  f i r s t  C o n s t i tu t io n  deserve  to  be n o t ic e d
a lth o u g h  i t  has to  be conceded th a t  th e  In d ia n  C o u n c ils  A c t 1861 p ro v id e d
th e  s te p p in g  s tone  f o r  th e  fo u n d a t io n  o f  p a r lia m e n ta ry  democracy and
34c o n s t i t u t io n a l  governm ent in  I n d ia .  In  t h i s  c o n n e c tio n  i t  i s  im p o r ta n t
to  n o te  t h a t ,  a lth o u g h  th e  1861 A ct p ro v id e d  f o r  the  n o n - o f f i c i a l
members (c o m p r is in g  h a l f  th e  t o t a l  m em bership o f  th e  C o u n c il)  to  be
nom ina ted  by th e  G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra l, th e  m a jo r i t y  o f  such members, r ig h t
35from  th e  s t a r t ,  were In d ia n s .  In  t h i s  re s p e c t th e  p o s i t io n  in  In d ia
36p ro v id e d  a s tro n g  c o n t ra s t  w ith  t h a t  o f  A f r ic a .
4 '
5 .2 3  The 1915-19 C o n s t i tu t io n  A ct e n v isa g e d  a fe d e r a l  s t r u c tu r e  and
i t  d is m a n tle d  th e  o ld  s t r u c tu r e  by re p e a lin g  th e  e a r l i e r  enactm en ts
37in c lu d in g  th e  1861 A c t, to  make a c le a n  s t a r t .  The '•power11 o f  th e
• 'In d ia n  L e g is la tu re "  and th a t  o f  th e  "L o c a l L e g is la tu re s "  was d e f in e d  in
38s s .6 5  and 80A r e s p e c t iv e ly .  The In d ia n  le g is la t u r e  c o u ld  re p e a l o r  a l t e r
"any la w s " f o r  th e  t im e  b e in g  in  fo rc e  and c o u ld  make law s f o r  " a l l
p e rso n s , f o r  a l l  c o u r ts  and f o r  a l l  p la c e s  and th in g s  w ith in  B r i t i s h
I n d ia " .  I t  c o u ld  n o t make any law  " re p e a lin g  o r  a f f e c t in g "  ( w i th o u t  th e
e xp re ss  a u th o r i t y  o f  P a r lia m e n t)  any A ct o f  P a r lia m e n t passed a f t e r  1860
and extended to  In d ia  and any law  " a f f e c t in g  th e  a u th o r i t y  o f  P a r l ia m e n t,
o r  any p a r t  o f  th e  u n w r it te n  law s o r  c o n s t i t u t io n  o f  th e  U n ite d  Kingdom
. . . whereon may depend in  any degree th e  a lle g ia n c e  o f  any person  to  th e
Crown. . . o r  a f f e c t in g  th e  s o v e re ig n ty  o r  dom in ion  o f  th e  Crown o v e r any
39p a r t  o f  B r i t i s h  I n d ia " .  The lo c a l  le g is la t u r e  co u ld  make law s " f o r  th e  
peace a id  good governm ent o f  th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  f o r  the  tim e  b e in g  
c o n s t i t u t in g  th a t  p ro v in c e "  b u t i t  c o u ld  n o t make any law  " a f f e c t in g  any 
Act o f  P a r l ia m e n t" .
5 .2 4  I t  has a ls o  to  be n o te d  th a t  a lth o u g h  th e  p ro v is io n s  o f  th e  
C o lo n ia l Laws V a l id i t y  A ct 1865 d id  n o t a p p ly  to  In d ia ,  s . 84 o f  th e  
1915-19 A ct made p ro v is io n s  f o r  "re m o va l o f  doub ts  as to  v a l i d i t y  o f  
c e r ta in  In d ia n  la w s " .  In  s u b -s . (1 )  i t  was, i n t e r  a l i a , p ro v id e d  th a t  any 
law  made by any a u th o r i t y  in  B r i t i s h  I p d ia  sh o u ld  n o t be in v a l i d  m e re ly  
because i t  a f fe c te d  th e  p re ro g a t iv e  o f  th e  Crown b u t such la w , i f  re p u g n a n t 
to  the  in s ta n t  A c t o r  to  any o th e r  A ct o f  P a r lia m e n t,  sh o u ld  be v o id  to  th e  
e x te n t  o f  t h a t  repugna ncy . The scope o f  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  was c u r t a i le d  by 
s u b -s . (2 )  by p r o v id in g  th a t  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  eny enactm ent s h o u ld  n o t be 
q u e s tio n e d  f o r  t ra n s g re s s in g  le g is la t i v e  competence as re s p e c ts  th e  
a l lo c a te d  f i e l d s .
5 .25  In  P a r t IX  ( s s .1 0 1 -1 1 4 ), c a p tio n e d  "The In d ia n  H igh  C o u r ts " ,  
p ro v is io n  was made f o r  th e  m anning o f  th e  s u p e r io r  c o u r ts  by com petent
p e rso n s , and to  secure  t h e i r  te n u re  o f  o f f i c e  to  ensure  th e  independence 
o f  th e  ju d ic ia r y .  The powers and j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  th e  H igh C o u rts  as 
ve s te d  in  them by re s p e c t iv e  " l e t t e r s  p a te n t"  were c o n firm e d . N o tic e  
may, how ever, be taken  o f  two im p o r ta n t p r o v is io n s .  By s . 110 th e  G o ve rn o r- 
G e n e ra l, th e  G overnors  and th e  members o f  a l l  C o u n c ils  were exem pted from  
th e  " o r ig in a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  any H igh C ourt by reason o f  a n y th in g  
c o u n s e lle d , o rd e re d  o r  done by any o f  them in  h is  p u b l ic  c a p a c i ty " .  By 
s . 111 a w r i t te n  o rd e r  by th e  G overnor G e ne ra l was c o n s t i tu te d  " f u l l  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n "  f o r  any a c t done in  r e la t io n  to  any person  o th e r  than  "any 
European B r i t i s h  s u b je c t " .  T h is  p ro v is io n  d id  n o t p o s s ib ly  e x te n d  
p ro te c t io n  to  the  a c ts  o f  th e  s u b o rd in a te  fu n c t io n a r ie s  in  t h a t  s . 124(1 ) 
p ro v id e d  th a t  i f  "any person  h o ld in g  o f f i c e  un d e r th e  Crown" oppressed  
any B r i t i s h  s u b je c t  he sh o u ld  be g u i l t y  o f  a m isdem eanour.
5 .26  The la s t-m e n tio n e d  p ro v is io n  r e f le c te d  an im p o r ta n t a spec t o f  th e  
p o l ic y  o f  " d i r e c t "  governm ent by th e  Crown, b u t a search  f o r  a " B i l l  o f  
R ig h ts "  f o r  an e f f e c t iv e  r e fu ta t io n  o f  t h e " u n l im ite d "  governm ent o f  th e  
East In d ia  Company was bound to  f a i l .  The new " C o n s t i t u t io n "  a ls o ,  l i k e  
th e  e a r ly  C h a r te rs , m e re ly  e n tre n ch e d  th e  p r o te c t io n s  a f fo rd e d  to  a r a c ia l  
m in o r i t y  -  "European B r i t i s h  S u b je c t " .  I t  may be n o te d  in  t h i s  co n n e c tio n  
th a t  unde r s . 6 5 (3 ) th e  In d ia n  le g is la t u r e  c o u ld  n o t e n a c t any law  
em powering any c o u r t  o th e r  than  a H igh  C ou rt to  impose th e  dea th  p e n a lty
on such s u b je c ts .
5.27 The n e x t im p o r ta n t landm ark in  the  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  deve lopm ent
was to  be seen in  the  Government o f  In d ia  A ct 1935. I t  was preceded by
th e  appo in tm e n t in  1927 o f  the  Simon Commission and in  1930, 1931 and 1932
o f th e  renowned "Round T a b le  C o n fe re n c e s ". The demand f o r  a " B i l l  o f
R ig h ts "  was v o ic e d  by th e  In d ia n  N a t io n a l Congress as e a r ly  as 1918
and was l a t e r  r e i t e r a te d  in  1928 in  th e  r e p o r t  o f  th e  A l l - P a r t ie s  C onference
40in  th e  fo l lo w in g  te rm s :
our f i r s t  care should be to have our fundamental r ig h ts  
guaranteed in a manner which w i l l  not permit th e ir  
withdrawal under any circumstances.
The demend was, however, re jec ted  by the Simon Commission. I t  was
observed th a t , "Abstract declarations are useless unless there e x is t the
41w i l l  and means to meke them e f fe c t iv e " . L a te r, the Ooint Parliam entary  
Committee added th e ir  own observations s ta tin g  th a t , " i ts  le g a l e ffe c t  
w i l l  be to impose an embarrassing re s tr ic t io n  on the powers of the
le g is la tu re  and to create a grave r is k  th a t a large number of laws
42may be declared in v a lid  by the courts".
5.28 The main achievement of the 1935 Act was to complete the process
of s e ttin g  up a fe d e ra l s tructure  fo r  the government which was s ta rted
under the 1915-19 Act. U nfortunate ly  a fu ll- f le d g e d  fed eratio n  never
came in to  being before independence as the p a rtic ip a tio n  of the native
states envisaged under the Act did not m a te r ia lis e . This was a
s ig n if ic a n t fa c t as the n a tive  sta tes  between them constitu ted  roughly
one h a lf  of the area and one th ird  of the population of the geographical
43te r r i to r y  of pre-independence In d ia . The Federal Leg is la ture  
contemplated under the 1935 Act could make laws on subjects enumerated 
in  L is t I  which included an entry on "preventive d e ten tio n ". For the 
f i r s t  time provision was made fo r  a "Federal Court" (v ide  Chapter I  of 
Pert IX ) which had the specia l fea tu re  of an advisory ju r is d ic t io n  on a 
"question of law" ( s . 213). The e x is tin g  powers and ju r is d ic t io n  of the 
several High Courts were continued but the Federal Court in  i t s  o r ig in a l  
ju r is d ic t io n  could n o t, u n like  the High Courts, issue w rits  of habeas corpus 
as i t s  o r ig in a l ju r is d ic t io n  was lim ite d  to pronouncing a "declaratory  
judgment" ( s . 2 0 4 (2 )) .
5.29 Although the demand fo r  a " B i l l  of Rights" was re je c te d , notice  
may be taken o f an im portant provision made in  Chapter I I I  ("w ith  respect 
to  d iscrim in atio n  e tc ." )  in  P art V ("L e g is la tiv e  Powers"). Section 111 
provided, a lb e it  on a re c ip ro c a l basis , fo r  B r it is h  subjects "dom iciled in  
the United Kingdom" to be exempted from any law th a t imposed re s tr ic t io n s
on, among o thers, en try , t ra v e l and residence in  B r it is h  In d ia  on 
grounds of b ir th ,  race, descent, language, re lig io n  e tc . A general 
provision against d iscrim ination  in  m atters of holding property and 
carry ing  on any occupation, tra d e , business or profession in  B r it is h  
In d ia  by B r it is h  subjects domiciled in  In d ia  was however to  be found in  
s .298.
5.30 One of the noteworthy fea tu res  of the 1935 Act was the 
provision made in  s .102 fo r  the declaration  by the Governor General
in  h is  d is c re tio n , by a "Proclam ation", th a t a "grave emergency" ex is ted ,
whereby the "security  of In d ia "  was threatened "whether by war or by
in te rn a l disturbance" or when he was s a t is f ie d  th a t there was "imminent
danger" th e re o f. I t  had to be communicated " fo rth w ith "  to  the Secretary
of S ta te , who was required to lay the same before each House of
Parliam ent and, unless "approved" by the la t t e r ,  i t  ceased to operate
44at the exp ira tio n  of s ix  months. The provision was amended in  1946
so th a t the Federal le g is la tu re  could make law not only on subjects
w ith in  the exclusive competence of the P ro v in c ia l le g is la tu re  but also
in  respect of a m atter not enumerated in  any l i s t .  The previous sanction
of the Governor-General was required fo r  in troducing any B i l l  or
amendment fo r  making provision fo r  the emergency. The scope of ju d ic ia l
review was n o t, whether on grounds of emergency or any other grounds 
/ v 45(as had been done in  the p a s t), tampered with in  any manner.
5.31 Thus we see th a t the c o n s titu tio n a l lim ita t io n s  increased  
progress ively , with the re s u lt  th a t the exercise of a rb itra ry  powers
by the executive became more and more d i f f i c u l t .  Although the le g is la tu re  
continued to function  under the o v e ra ll subordination of the Crown and the  
Im p eria l Parliam ent u n t i l  independence, the e a rly  p a r t ic ip a t io n , and 
rap id  increase in  numerical s trength , of Indians in  the le g is la t iv e  
process under " d ire c t government" must have acted, we suggest, as an 
e ffe c tiv e  check on the exercise o f le g is la t iv e  power as w e ll .  The continued
ap p lica tion  of the ru les  of common law and the early  c o n s titu tio n a l 
p ro h ib itio n  against th e ir  abrogation must also be regarded as an im portant 
c o n s titu tio n a l l im ita t io n  on both the executive and the le g is la tu re  on the  
one hand and, on the other hand, as bu ttress ing  the independence of the  
ju d ic ia ry  and the r ig h t of ju d ic ia l  review .
(B) Some emergency provisions
( a) i^e. ^ n ^ r ^ iLc^l_aj2 d_R£V£luti_on_ajcy_C_rime_s _Act 1919
5.32 The "Rowlatt Act", as the captioned enactment came to be known,
46had earned great n o to r ie ty . A Committee was appointed by the Governor-
General in  December 1917, with S ir  Sidney Rowlatt (a  judge of the King*s
Bench D iv is io n ) as Chairman, to in v es tig a te  and report on the nature and
extent of c rim in a l conspiracies connected with a revo lu tionary  movement
and to advise the government on s u ita b le  le g is la t io n  to  deal with the
problem. The Committee recommended th a t the proposed le g is la t iv e  measures
should be of two types, preventive as w e ll as p u n itiv e , th a t the la t t e r
i t s e l f  should be of two degrees varying in  stringency and th a t the m ilder
measures should be taken f i r s t .  The Committee stressed the necessity fo r
adequate safeguards to be provided in  the proposed le g is la t io n , w hile
tak ing  note of the e x is tin g  provisions o f the Bengal Regulation of 1818
and also of the powers a v a ila b le  under the temporary measures enacted in
the Defence of In d ia  Act 1915 and ru les  made thereunder. Following the
report a B i l l  was drafted  but the Select Committee of the Indian le g is la tu re
found i t s e l f  divided on the measures suggested; a l l  the four Ind ian  members
recorded d issents . The m a jo rity  re fu ted  the suggestion th a t the powers might
be abused to "suppress leg itim a te  p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv ity "  and asserted th a t
the changes proposed by them would s p e ll out the ob ject and scope of the
47B i l l ,  nanely, to  cope with anarch ical and revo lu tionary  crim e. I t  
is  in te re s tin g , however, to note th a t severa l, though not a l l ,  po ints  
made in  the dissents were accepted and incorporated in  the B i l l .  The 
government re jec ted  the suggestion th a t le g a l representation should be
allowed or th a t ru les  of evidence should be follow ed or th a t the inqu iry
contemplated in the B i l l  should not in v a r ia b ly  be in  camera. I t  also
re jec ted  the proposal th a t m ate ria ls  on which the government intended to
act should f i r s t  be placed before a ju d ic ia l  o f f ic e r  not below the rank
48of a Sessions Judge.
5.33 In  the Act the preamble stressed the necessity o f "supplementing"
ordinary c rim in a l law and of conferring  "emergency powers" to deal with
49
"anarchical and revo lu tio n ary  movements". The Act was to  continue in  
force fo r  th ree  years from the date of term ination  of the war. The Act 
contemplated d if fe re n t  types of measures which were embodied in  Parts I ,
I I  and I I I .  Part IV provided th a t provisions of Part I I  could be applied  
to any person in  respect of whom an order under ru le  3 of the Defence of 
In d ia  (C onsolidation) Rules 1915 was in  force immediately before the 
expiry of the Defence of In d ia  (C rim in a l Law Amendment) Act 1915.
Part V of the Act contained certa in  general p rov is ions, of which s .42 
deserves notice  in  th a t i t  precluded ju d ic ia l  review in  the fo llow ing  
terms:
No order under th is  Act s h a ll be c a lled  in  question in  
any Court, and no s u it or prosecution or other le g a l 
proceeding s h a ll l i e  against any person fo r  anything 
which is  in  good fa i th  done or intended to be done under 
th is  Act.
By the underlined expression a purported exercise o f power was sought to  
be protected so th a t no challenge could be grounded even on malice in  fa c t .
5.34 Linder s .3 the Governor-General in Council could make a 
"D eclaration" to bring  in to  force the provisions of Part I  i f  i t  was 
" s a t is fie d "  th a t anarchical or revo lu tionary  movements were being "promoted" 
in  the whole or any part of B r it is h  In d ia  and th a t "scheduled offences"  
were prevalent to such an exten t th a t i t  was "expedient in  the in te re s ts
of the pub lic  sa fe ty"  to provide fo r  the "speedy t r ia ls "  of such offences. 
The provisions of the C rim inal Procedure Code, in  so fa r  as they were not 
m odified by the Act, could apply to  such t r i a ls  but the r ig h t of appeal
<5 r> 
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and of b a i l  and habeas corpus under the Code were expressly excluded and 
i t  was also provided th a t the t r i a l  could be held in  camera. A spec ia l court 
constitu ted  with three o f the judges of the High Court nominated by the  
Chief Justice was contemplated fo r  t r i a l  of offences under the Act. In  
certa in  m atters the court could fo llo w  the ru les  of evidence sp ec ified  in  
the Act in  derogation of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.
5.35 Under s .21 the Governor-General in  Council could make a s im ila r  
"D eclaration" to bring  in to  operation the provisions of Part I I ,  i f  i t  was 
"s a tis fie d "  th a t there was a lik e lih o o d  of the commission of scheduled 
offences on account o f anarch ical or revo lu tionary  movements. In s .22 
various re s tr ic t io n s  to which a person could be subjected were mentioned, 
but i t  was provided th a t , before an order was passed, a l l  m a te ria ls  
appertaining thereto  had to be placed before a ju d ic ia l  o f f ic e r  (q u a lif ie d  
to  be a High Court judge) and h is  opinion taken. An " In v e s tig a tin g  
A uthority" was contemplated under s .30, to  be constitu ted  with two 
ju d ic ia l  o ff ic e rs  (o f the rank of D is t r ic t  and Sessions Judge) and one 
person not in  the service of the Crown in  In d ia . The order under s .22 
could be passed i f  the Local Government had "reasonable grounds fo r  
b e liev in g " th a t any person was concerned in  the o ffensive  movement and 
could be e ffe c tiv e  fo r  one month unless extended fo r  a fu r th e r  period up to  
one y e a r. Before any extension could be made the case had to be re fe rre d  
to the In v e s tig a tin g  A u th o rity . The la t t e r  held an " inqu iry  in  camera" 
in to  the "grounds", although s .23, which contemplated service of the  
re s tr ic t io n  order on the person concerned, did not in  terms also  
contemplate communication of the "grounds" on which the order was passed.
5.36 The provisions of Part I I I  d ea lt w ith preventive detention and
deserve g reater a tte n tio n . Under s .33 also a "D eclaration" was contemplated, 
as in  Parts I  and I I ,  but the s itu a tio n  in  th is  case had to be such "as
to endanger the pub lic  s a fe ty " . In  s .34 the requirement o f s .22 was 
reproduced and i t  was in te r  a l i a , provided th a t the Local Government "may
v i t ' i  
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fu r th e r  by order in  w ritin g  d ire c t"  (a ) a rres t w ithout warrant and 
(b ) confinement "in such place and under such conditions and re s tr ic t io n s  
as i t  may s p ec ify " . I t  was, however, provided th a t confinement should 
not be in  "tha t part of a prison or other place which was used fo r  
confinement of convicted priso ners". Any a rres t made pursuant to such 
an order had to be reported "fo rth w ith "  and, "pending re c e ip t of the orders  
of the Local Government", the arrested  person could be detained up to  
seven days and, i f  the Local Government so d irec te d , up to f i f t e e n  days.
The provision of in q u iry  contemplated in  Part I I  in  case of a re s tr ic t io n  
order was made app licab le  to detention orders fo r  which also the same 
period of one year was f ix e d , a lb e it  r e f e r e n t ia l ly . I t  has to  be noted 
th a t in  e ith e r  case in  the f in a l  order the "conclusions of the in v e s tig a tin g  
a u th o rity "  had to be re c ite d  in  the f in a l  o rder.
5.37 Besides the fa c t the " in q u iry"  contemplated under the Act was
to be in  camera and th a t there was no o b lig a tio n  to  furn ish  the "grounds" 
in  e ith e r  case, the scope of the  in q u iry  was s t r ic t ly  lim ite d  to f in d  
whether "the person whose case is  under in v es tig a tio n  is  or has been 
a c tiv e ly  concerned in  any movement of the nature re fe rre d  to in  s . 2 1 " .
Legal representation at the in q u iry  was expressly barred and the  
in v e s tig a tin g  au th o rity  was s im ila r ly  debarred from d isc los in g  any fa c t  
which might endanger public  safety or the safety  of any in d iv id u a l. I t  
was provided th a t the in q u iry  should be conducted in  a manner "best 
suited to e l i c i t  the fa c ts  of the case" and th a t the A uthority  " s h a ll not 
be bound to observe the ru le  o f the law of evidence". There was no r ig h t  
of "representation" to e ith e r  the Local Government or to the Authority  
but the la t t e r  was requ ired , "unless fo r  reasons to be recorded in  w ritin g  
i t  deems i t  unnecessary so to do", to secure the attendance of any person 
or the production of any document or th ing  requested by the person concerned. 
The Act also provided fo r  the appointment o f " V is it in g  Committees to report 
upon the w elfare and treatm ent" of the persons concerned in  e ith e r  case.
(b ) J5 orne_p_rov_i_si_on_s _of_th_e_l9_39_ DefjBjice o f In d ia  Act and Rules
5.38 We have already noted th a t the "Rowlatt Act" was enacted during
the currency of the 1915 Defence of In d ia  Act and Rules, and the Committee 
presided over by S ir  Sidney Rowlatt had observed th a t adequate safeguards 
should be incorporated in  the Act: however, the provision of preventive  
detention did not give e ffe c t  to the Committeef s recommendations. The 
measures enacted during the Second World War gave r is e  to  a spate of 
l i t ig a t io n  and we s h a ll have occasion to  examine a few leading decisions.
I t  is  necessary there fo re  to examine the re levan t prov is ions. I t  may be 
re c a lle d  in  th is  connection th a t the 1935 Act s p e c if ic a lly  provided fo r
the d ecla ratio n  of emergency and fo r  making laws fo r  "preventive d eten tio n ".
On the other hand i t  is  to be noted th a t the freedom movement in  In d ia
gained ascendancy during the Second World War and the Congress Party
50refused to p a rtic ip a te  in  the war e f f o r t .  I t  has been observed th a t
the power of preventive detention was extensive ly  used and in  1940 about
25,000 people were taken in to  custody in  connection with the " c iv i l
disobedience movement". In  1942, in  early  August, w ith in  a space of three
or four days, about 26,000 persons were rounded up, inc lud ing  top-ranking
51leaders of the Congress P arty .
5.39 The sum to t a l  o f the main provisions and th e ir  operation has been
52succinctly  sta ted  in  the fo llow ing  words:
Both the C entra l and the P ro v in c ia l Governments were given 
the power to a rres t and detain any person i f  s a t is f ie d  th a t  
i t  was necessary to do so in  order to  prevent the said  
person from acting "in  any manner p re ju d ic ia l to the defence 
of B r it is h  In d ia , the pub lic  s a fe ty , the maintenance of 
public  order in  the e f f ic ie n t  prosecution of the war"; 
and having vested with these powers both the C entra l and 
State [s ic ]  Governments were given the r ig h t  to delegate  
th e ir  au th o rity  to "any o f f ic e r  or subordinate". In  
practice  the power was usually  delegated to d is t r ic t  
m agistrates and in  some cases to su b -d iv is io n a l m agistrates  
but in  theory i t  could have been delegated even to a p o lice  
constable. No reasons had to be given fo r  the d e ten tio n .
There was no r ig h t to make a representation and no one 
(except the a u th o r itie s ) knew or could be to ld  where the  
person was detained. No one could see him and he was not 
allowed to have le g a l advice.
5.40 The Defence of In d ia  Act 1939 carried  a r e c i t a l  th a t the
Governor-General had made a declaration  of emergency under s .102 (o f  1935
C o n s titu tio n ) and by s .2 (1 ) i t  empowered the C entra l Government to  make
ru les  fo r  various purposes which were i l lu s t r a te d  in  s u b -s .(2 ) ,  of which
para (x ) is  re le v an t fo r  our purpose and is  quoted below:
the apprehension and detention in  custody of any person 
reasonably suspected o f being of h o s tile  o rig in  or of
having acted, acting or being about to a c t, in  a manner
p re ju d ic ia l to  the pub lic  safety  or in te re s t or to the  
defence of B r it is h  In d ia . . . [emphasis added]
S u b -s .(1 ) s ta ted  th a t the making of the ru les  should appear "necessary or
expedient fo r  securing the defence of B r it is h  In d ia , the public s a fe ty ,
the maintenance of p u b lic  order or the e f f ic ie n t  prosecution of war, or
fo r  m ain ta in ing  supplies and services e s s e n tia l to  the l i f e  of the
community". Another im portant provision of the Act was contained in
s .16(1) which is  also quoted below:
No order made in  the exercise of any power conferred by
or under th is  Act s h a ll be c a lled  in  question in  any
c o u rt.
5.41 N otice  may now be taken of the re levan t ru les  framed under the Act.
Under clause (b ) o f r .2 6 (1 )  e ith e r  the C entra l or a P ro v in c ia l Government
could pass an order fo r  the detention of any person i f  " s a t is fie d "  th a t
i t  was necessary to do so "with a view to preventing him from acting  in  any
manner p re ju d ic ia l to  the defence of B r it is h  In d ia , the pub lic  s a fe ty , the
maintenance of p u b lic  o rder. . . or the e f f ic ie n t  prosecution of w ar." The 
grounds on which a detention order could be passed generally  corresponded
to  the rule-m aking power given under s .2(1 ) of the Act but the ru le  su ffered
from one apparent in f i r m it y .  I t  did not contain the requirement of 
"reasonable suspicion" o f para (x ) o f s . 2 ( 2 ) and the v ire s  of the ru le  
was th e re fo re  open to  challenge. However, fo llo w in g  the decision in
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KESHAV T ALP APE v EMPEROR a new clause was su b stitu ted  fo r  para (x )  of 
s .2 (2 ) by Ordinance No. 14 o f 1943.
5.42 The other clauses o f r .2 6  (1 ) described various other types of
re s tra in ts  to  which a person might be subjected by an order passed under
the ru le  and fu rth e r  provisions in  respect o f those re s tra in ts  were made in
s u b -r .(3 )  and ( 4 ) .  The provisions made in  s u b -rr .(5 A ) to (5C) were as
respects detentions. I t  was in te r  a l i a , provided th a t a person could be
detained "in  such place and under such conditions as to maintenance,
d is c ip lin e  and the punishment of offences and breach o f d is c ip lin e "
as the appropriate government might "from time to time determ ine". The
ru le  apparently contemplated a general order and there fo re  any s p e c ific
order passed in  any p a r t ic u la r  in  breach o f  the ru le  could possibly be
challenged as u l t r a  v ire s  notw ithstanding the bar of s .16(1) in  th a t such
an order could not be an order made "'in exercise of any power conferred by
or under the A ct". I t  was there fo re  open, we submit, to  challenge any
order passed in  any p a r t ic u la r  case denying le g a l advice which could not
be in  any way re la te d  to e ith e r  "maintenance" or "d is c ip lin e "  or
"punishment o f offences fo r  breach o f d is c ip lin e " .
5,~43 We may now quote the m a te ria l parts  of r .  129 (1 ):
Any po lice  o f f ic e r  or any other o f f ic e r  o f government empowered 
in  th is  behalf by general or sp ec ia l order of th e . . . 
government. . . may a rres t w ithout warrant any person whom he 
reasonably suspects of having acted, of acting , or being 
about to  act -
(a ) with in te n t to ass is t any State at war with H is M ajesty, or
in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to  the pub lic  safety  or to the
e f f ic ie n t  prosecution of war;
Clauses (b) and (c ) were concerned resp ec tive ly  with p re ju d ic ia l a c t iv i t ie s
such as were calcu lated  to ass is t or promote re b e llio n  and those th a t were
connected with the safety  of any p lace, area, industry and machinery.
The fa c t o f a rres t had to be communicated "fo rth w ith "  to the government
and the arrested  person could be committed to custody "by an order in
w r it in g " , and detained up to f i f te e n  days "pending the re c e ip t"  of the
orders of the government, but in  no case could the detention under the
ru le  exceed two months. The in d e f in ite  detention contemplated under r .2 6 (1 )
without the requirement of "reasonable suspicion" th ere fo re  stood in  a 
strange contrast to th is  prov is ion , by which the government lim ite d  i t s  
power of detention to two months despite the fa c t th a t the a rres t was 
made on "reasonable suspicion". S u b -r.(4 ) o f r .1 2 9 , however, contemplated 
the government passing, on the rece ip t of the report of the a rres t "a 
f in a l  order as to  detention" e tc . "in addition  to " an order extending  
the duration o f temporary custody up to two months. I t  is  there fo re  
possible to  suggest th a t the courts could have in s is te d  on the government 
s a tis fy in g  them as to the reasonableness of suspicion in  the case of a 
detention order made under r .2 6 (1 ) ,  by reading the same subject to r . 1 2 9 (4 ).  
I t  has also to be noted in  th is  connection th a t s .3 of the 1943 Ordinance,
which had n u l l i f ie d  the e ffe c t of the decision in  KESHAVE T ALP APE (s u p ra ),
54did not deal with th is  issue.
5.44 The measures enacted in  B r it is h  In d ia  during the Second World War
thus invested the executive with draconian powers and were devoid of any
56patent safeguard, u n like  th e ir  English counterpart. There was no r ig h t  
of representation to any au th o rity  at any stage against any order made, 
whether under r .2 6  or under r .1 2 9 . However, the Act and the ru les  did not 
expressly tamper with the r ig h t to habeas corpus. We proceed th e re fo re  to
examine now the law re la t in g  to the w rit of habeas cornus in  the Indian
subcontinent.
I I , Habeas Corpus in  the Indian Sub-Continent 
(1 ) The pre-independence position  in  re la tio n  to B r it is h  In d ia
( A) F ir s t  phase
5.45 The r ig h t to the w r it  of habeas corpus ev id en tly  depended upon the
fa c t of in troduction  of English law in to  In d ia . The position  in  th is
1
respect was not as simple as th a t obta in ing  in  Commonwealth A fric a :  
there was no wholesale in troduction  of English common and s ta tu te  law in  
In d ia  on and from any p a r t ic u la r  da te . That apart, the r ig h t to the w rit  
at common law was, as we have seen, d ire c t ly  re la te d  to the command of the
Of* I*
2
sovereign. In  In d ia  even u n t i l  the year 1800 the court was re lu c ta n t
3
to hold c a te g o ric a lly  in  THE INDIAN CHI FT th a t sovereignty de jure 
vested in  the B r it is h  Crown. The reluctance of the English courts to 
determine the question of sovereignty continued fo r  a long tim e . In  1837 
the P rivy Council in  THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF LYONS v EAST INDIA COUP ANY4 
observed th a t i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to trace "at what precise tim e and by what 
precise process they [the Company] exchanged the character of subjects  
fo r  th a t o f sovereign. . . or acquired with the help of the Crown, and fo r  
the Crown, the r ig h t of sovere ig n ty ." The P rivy  Council again in  1863,
5
was content to hold in  ADVOCATE GENERAL. BENGAL v RANEE SURN0M0YEE DOSEE, 
as fo llo w s:
European C h ris tia n s . . . have usually  been allowed by 
indulgence or weakness of the potentates of those 
countries to  re ta in  th e ir  own laws, and th e ir  fa c to r ie s  
have fo r  many purposes been tre a te d  as part of the te r r i to r y  
of the sovereign from whose dominions they came.
This was indeed a mere re-statem ent in  a negative form of the ancient ru le
la id  down in  16®8 in  the CALVIN case^ th a t the Englishman carried  h is  law
with him when he entered a te r r i to r y  where no c iv i l is e d  law was practised
and yet In d ia  had a r ich  heritage  of a h igh ly  developed le g a l system.
5.46 liie have seen th a t the very fa c t o f t e r r i t o r i a l  acq u is itio n s  in
C a lcu tta  and Madras did not vest in  the B r it is h  Crown sovereignty over 
7
those places but i t  can be said th a t with the establishm ent of the
Supreme Court in  1774 in  C a lcu tta  and la t e r  in  Madras and Bombay, these
courts f i r s t  acquired de jure au th o rity  (under respective C harters) to
issue the w r it  possibly in  respect of only the  B r it is h  European subjects
resident th e re , fo r  the status of the other in h ab itan ts  of those towns
8remained uncertain  fo r  a long tim e. I t  i s ,  however, in te re s tin g  to note
th a t the Supreme Court at C a lcu tta  (possib ly  the courts at Madras and Bombay
also) s ta rte d  issu ing w rits  of habeas corpus from the very beginning even to
places outside the town and th a t too to release persons who were not
g
"B ritis h  sub jects". The 1780 Act confirmed the correct position  in  law
in  so fa r  as the w rit was concerned by s ta tin g  th a t the provisions of the
Act did not a ffe c t the ju r is d ic t io n  which the court possessed in  re la t io n
10to "B ritis h  sub jects".
5.47 In  re JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT, 11 the P rivy  Council was
d ire c t ly  confronted in  1B29 with the question of the le g a lity  of the  w rits
issued by the Supreme Court in  Bombay, p a r t ic u la r ly  in two cases concerning
"n a tives". Although no reasons were recorded, the opinion th a t the Board
tendered in d ica ted  th a t the w rits  were improperly issued. The case arose
out of a p e tit io n  to Her Majesty in  Council by a judge o f the Supreme Court
impugning the conduct o f the Governor and h is  Council fo r  addressing a
p riva te  communication to  the judges challenging th e ir  au th o rity  to  issue
the w r its . The main arguments of the p a rtie s  deserve to be n o ticed . On
behalf of the Justices i t  was contended as fo llo w s:
I t  appears. . . t h a t  at th a t e a r ly  period the reform of 
Indian courts and the superintendence of English law 
over the settlem ent were considered synonymous; and one
great ob ject contemplated by the Company i t s e l f  was the
in tro d u ctio n  of the w r it  of habeas corpus authoris ing  any 
man deprived of h is  personal freedom to compel the other 
party who imprisoned him to show th a t he did so by 
au th o rity  of law .
I t  was also contended th a t the L e tte r M issive by the Governor was
tantamount to repeal of the L e tte rs  Patent by the King es tab lis h in g  the
Supreme Court. On behalf of the Company i t  was contended in  rep ly  th a t
although English law p reva iled  fo r  at le a s t a century in  the presidency
towns i t  did not apply to  a l l  persons. There also resided in  those towns
"persons not subject to the King*s courts [who were] l iv in g  under th e ir
own laws" and th a t they might be "considered fo r  many purposes as a
separate nation under a d if fe re n t  government."
5.48 The submission made in  the above case on behalf of the Company,
which apparently p reva iled  with the Privy Council, indeed embodied the
correct le g a l and fa c tu a l p o s itio n , a lb e it  in  a general fashion o n ly . 
U nfortunate ly  there is  lack of unanimity as respects the date o f in troduction  
of English law as some a u th o ritie s  claim th a t such in troduction  took place
12 13by the f i r s t  Charter o f 1600, others r e fe r  to  the Charter o f 1661 and
some others put the date at 1726, uhidtn is  genera lly  accepted now as correct
In  1927, S ir  George Rankin, speaking ju d ic ia l ly ,  observed th a t , “the
English common law, and s ta tu te  law as i t  ex is ted  in  the year 1726
was applied in C alcu tta  not merely to Europeans in  C a lcu tta  but to  a l l
14persons w ith in  the l im its  of the o r ig in a l J u ris d ic tio n  of th is  Court” .
The position  of C alcutta  in  re la tio n  to habeas corpus was more e x p l ic i t ly
stated in  1842 in  the case of the MAHARANEE OF LAHORE: ^
. . . English law as to  personal l ib e r ty  does p re v a il in  
C alcu tta  as to a l l  i t s  in h a b ita n ts . . . beyond the lo c a l  
l im its  of C a lcu tta , the English law on th is  subject is  
the personal law of a c lass, v i z . ,  B r it is h  subjects which 
they carry with them. The common law of England, which 
gives the r ig h t to th is  w r it ,  has been introduced in  
C alcutta  with the general body o f the English law.
5.49 A general account o f the process of reception is  given by S ir
Frederick P ollock, who lab e ls  h is  own account as a ''summary d e s c rip tio n ”
of the process which according to him was -  " ju d ic ia l  ap p lica tio n
16confirmed and extended by le g is la t io n ” . Th is  corresponds with the
account given by S ir  U h itley  Stokes as respects reception of English 
17s ta tu te s . In  187 4 he had observed th a t the judges of the Supreme
Courts and High Courts "assumed the function  of declaring  what s ta tu te s
s h a ll be deemed in  force w ith in  lo c a l l im its  o f the ordinary o r ig in a l
ju r is d ic t io n ” of the courts, as respects s ta tu te s  enacted in  England up
to 1726; la t e r  s ta tu tes  were extended e ith e r  expressly or by necessary
im p lic a tio n . There was no dispute th a t the English Habeas Corpus Act o f
1679 applied in  the Presidency towns but he in d ica ted  the uncertain
position  of the la t t e r  Act o f 1816 by p o in ting  to an observation of Phear, J
18expressing a negative opinion, in  _R v VAllGHAN .
5.50 The twofold uncerta in ty  could be said to have continued at least 
u n t i l  1858. Although the reservation  in  favour of the Crown in respect of 
sovereignty over the t e r r i t o r i a l  acq u is itio n s  of the Company was made in  
the early  Charter of 1698 in  general terms and then more e x p l ic i t ly  in  the
Acts of 1813 (53 Geo. I l l ,  c .155) and 1833 (3  & 4 Wm.IV, c .8 5 ) ,  i t  was
only in  the 1858 Act th a t provision was made fo r  d ire c t government thereby
extending unequivocally the status of "B ritis h  subjects" to a l l  in h ab itan ts
of B r it is h  In d ia . I t  is  also im portant to note th a t Queen V ic to r ia  had
made a "Proclamation" in  1858 assuring the in h ab itan ts  of In d ia  of the
19"equal and im p a rt ia l p ro tection  of law ". In  th is  connection reference  
may be made to the fa c t  th a t the im portant l im ita t io n  which was imposed on 
the le g is la t iv e  competence of the Company's government in  the 1833 Act 
(v id e  s .4 3 ), ev id en tly  fo r  the pro tection  of the B r it is h  European sub jects , 
was not only continued a f te r  assumption of d ire c t government but was 
reta ined  and reproduced verbatim f i r s t  in  s .22 of the 1861 Act (In d ian  
Councils Act) and then in  s .65 o f the 1915-19 C onstitu tion  Act. I t  has 
to be noted th a t s .43 of the 1833 Act empowered the newly-ordainsd c en tra l 
le g is la tu re  to make laws fo r  " a l l  persons, whether B r it is h  or n a tiv e "  and 
there fo re  i t  was perhaps considered necessary to guard against any probable 
attempt th a t might be made by the new le g is la tu re  to deprive the Englishmen 
in  In d ia  of th e ir  ancient l ib e r t ie s .  Since the provision p r in c ip a lly  aimed 
at u n if ic a t io n  of laws, the Indian in h ab itan ts  also became the b e n e fic ia r ie s  
of the p ro te c tio n . On th is  view i t  can be contended th a t the ap p lica tio n  
of English law as to personal l ib e r ty  was im p lied ly  extended to the 
Indian in h ab itan ts  in  1833 but there can be no doubt th a t when the Indians  
acquired the sta tus  of "B ritis h  subjects" in  1858 there was an end to the 
uncerta in ty  th a t ex is ted  in  th is  respect. The enactment of s .22 in  the 
1861 Act merely confirmed th is  p o s itio n .
5.51 Thus, we submit th a t in  1858, the "phantom" of the sovereignty of
the Mughal having disappeared fo r  good, the impediment (according to the  
cases discussed above) to the ap p lica tio n  o f English law genera lly  to  the  
Indian in h ab itan ts  ceased to e x is t  and by v ir tu e  of the general ap p lica tio n  
of English common and s ta tu te  law as to personal l ib e r ty ,  and also of the  
acqu is ition  of sovereignty by the B r it is h  Crown, the Supreme Courts in  In d ia
acquired de jure ju r is d ic t io n  to issue the w r it  of habeas corpus on the  
app lica tio n  of Indian in h ab itan ts  even beyond the t e r r i t o r i a l  l im its  of the  
Presidency towns -  a power which, as we have seen, the Supreme Courts at 
C a lcu tta , Madras and Bombay had de fac to  exercised long before 1858.
5.52 No doubt, the Companyfs courts, the Sadr Nizamat and Sadr Diwany
Adalats, were not abolished u n t i l  1862 (see s . 8  of the Indian High Courts 
20Act, which also abolished the Supreme Courts and created "High Courts11 
to combine in  one superior court the function of the two superior tr ib u n a ls  
function ing  in  p a r a l le l  u n t i l  then) . However, i t  must be noted th a t s .11 
of the Act continued the app lica tio n  expressly of " a l l  provisions then in  
force in  In d ia "  in  respect o f the "Supreme Courts" to the newly- 
estab lished  "High Courts" and by s .16 the same provision was also made 
applicable to any High Court th a t might be subsequently set up under the 
Act, subject to the provisions of the respective  "L e tte rs  P aten t". In  
1865 clause 45 o f the L e tte rs  Patent of the C a lcu tta  High Court provided 
th a t the provisions of the 1774 Charter which were not "inconsis ten t"  
should not be "vo id". As the L e tte rs  Patent contained no provision on 
habeas corpus, the power and ju r is d ic t io n  under the 1774 Charter in  
respect of the w rit there fo re  continued.
5.53 In  the f i r s t  C rim inal Procedure Code enacted by the Indian
le g is la tu re  and brought in to  force in  1862 there were no provisions
concerning habeas corpus. In  the 1872 Code, s . 81 did not in  terms name the
w r it  but provided th a t any European B r it is h  subject detained in  custody,
whether w ith in  or w ithout the High C ourt's  o r ig in a l ju r is d ic t io n , could
apply fo r  an order d ire c tin g  the applicant to  be produced before the High
Court. The co n tro vers ia l provision of s .82 o f the 1872 Code may now be
quoted in  extenso:
N e ither the High Court nor any Judge of such High Courts s h a ll 
issue any w r it  o f habeas corpus, m ainprise, de homine 
repleq iando, nor any other w r it  of the l ik e  nature beyond the  
Presidency Towns.
5.54  In  GIRINDRANATH v BIRENDRANATH, S ir George Rankin, Chief
Justice of the C a lcu tta  High Court held th a t the p ro h ib itio n  contained
21in  s .82 was v a lid ,  absolute and u n q u a lif ie d . H is Lordship appeared
to  suggest th a t the provisions of ss.81 and 82 were the le g is la t iv e
response to the decision o f Norman, 3 . ,  o f the same court, in  1870, in  
22AMEER KHAN, th a t the court could issue habeas corpus outside i t s
o r ig in a l ju r is d ic t io n  on the ap p lica tio n  of a non-European B r it is h
su b jec t. Although h is  Lordship did not c a te g o ric a lly  disapprove of the
23decision of Norman, 3 . ,  he re fe rre d  to two decisions in  uihich the re lia n c e
24on A r t .4 of the 1774 Charter by Norman, 3 . ,  fo r  the purpose of the
decis ion , was c r it ic is e d .  The decision of Rankin, C .3 .,  uas approved
25by the Privy Council in  the case of 5HIBNATH BANER3I, but th e ir  Lordships 
did not express any opinion about the correctness of the decision of 
Norman, 3 . The f in a l  position  th a t emerges there fo re  is  th a t between 
1858 and 1872 i t  could not be disputed th a t a l l  in h ab itan ts  of In d ia  
equally  enjoyed the r ig h t  to the w r it .
(B ) Second phase
(a ) Th®. th j2 _cornmon_lj3 w_ w_ri_t
5.55 Ue may now take note of s .148 of the High Courts C rim inal 
P rocedure  Act, 1875, which gave r is e  to a spate of l i t ig a t io n  culm inating  
in  the decisions of the Privy Council in  the pre-independence ora ( in  1939)
and of the Supreme Court in  the Republican era ( in  1964 and 1976) th a t in
26In d ia  the common law r ig h t to the w r it  no longBr e x is ts . Under A r t .141 
of the Republican C onstitu tio n  the law declared by the Supreme Court is  
binding on a l l  courts in  In d ia  but what we propose to  suggest is  th a t 
there is  scope fo r  reconsideration  of the p o s itio n . I t  is  to be noted 
th a t s .148 of the 1875 Act is  the precursor of s .491 of the Crim inal 
Procedure Code of 1898, which is  s t i l l  in  force in  Pakistan and Bangladesh 
and was in  force in In d ia  u n t i l  1973. The section , in  i t s  m a te ria l p a rts , 
ran as fo llo w s:
Any of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort W illiam ,
Madras and Bombay may, whenever i t  th inks f i t , d ire c t:
(a ) That a p riso ner, le g a lly  committed and w ith in  the 
lo c a l l im its  of i t s  Ordinary O rig in a l C rim inal J u r is d ic tio n ,  
be brought before i t  to be b a ile d ;
(b) th a t a person w ith in  such l im its  be brought before the  
court to be d ea lt with according to law;
(c ) th a t a person i l le g a l ly  or improperly detained in  a 
pub lic  or p riva te  custody w ith in  such l im its  be set at 
l ib e r ty ;
( d ) . . .  ( e ) . . . ( f )  . . .  (g ) . . .;
and n e ith e r the High Court nor any Judge thereof s h a ll
h e re a fte r issue any w rit of Habeas Corpus fo r  any of the
above purposes. , , . .
(emphasis adaed)
The section also empowered the said High Courts to frame ru les  to regulate  
procedure in the m atter and i t  was fu rth e r  provided th a t the section did 
not apply to  parsons detained under Bengal Regulation 3 of 1818 and other 
a ll ie d  Regulations of Madras and Bombay and the Acts of 1850 and 1858.
5.56 In  the Crim inal Procedure Codes re-enacted in  1882 and 1898
a s im ila r  provision was made in  s . 491, of uhich clauses (a ) and (b ) 
were almost verbatim reproductions of clauses (b ) and (c ) resp ec tive ly
of s .148 of the 1875 Act. The new Codes did n o t, however, contain any
p ro h ib itio n  of the nature embodied in  the las t part of s .148 of the 187 5
Act bu t, according to s .2 of the 1882 Code, the repeal of the 1875 Act
did not re s u lt in the re s to ra tio n  of any " ju r is d ic tio n  or form of 
procedure not e x is tin g  or fo llow ed" on the date of re-enactment of the  
new Code. In 1923 the provision was m a te ria lly  amended in respect of two 
m atters . The power was now conferred on "Any High Court", which expression  
replaced in  the provision the three named High Courts and, in  clause (a )  
(corresponding to c lau se (b ) of s .148), the expression "appella te  c rim in a l 
ju r is d ic t io n "  was substitu ted  fo r  the expression "ordinary c iv i l  
ju r is d ic t io n "  th a t occurred in  the clause in the 1898 Code. I t  is  also
to be noted th a t the chapter containing s. 9^1 was headed "D irection s of 
the nature of a habeas corpus".
5.57 The im portant point to  be considered is  whether or not s .82 
of the 187 2 Code and s .148 o f the 1875 Act were u l t r a  v ir e s , although a
f u l l  bench of the  Madras High Court in  1922 and the Bombay High Court
also in  1926 held th a t , irre s p e c tiv e  of the provisions of s . 491 of the
Code, the courts had ju r is d ic t io n  to  issue w rits  o f habeas corpus under 
27common law . L a te r, in  1939, another f u l l  bench of the Madras High
28
Court h e ld , in DISTRICT MAGISTRATE v M. MAPPILLAI, th a t the e a r l ie r
decision was not good law as the a tte n tio n  of the court in  th a t case
29was not drawn to  the 1872 Code and the subsequent enactments.
However, before th e ir  Lordships the v ire s  o f the 187 5 Act was s p e c if ic a lly
challenged, a lb e it  unsuccessfu lly . The decision was upheld by the Privy
3HCouncil in  MATTHEN v DISTRICT MAGISTRATE. The challenge to  the v ire s
was grounded on one of the lim ita t io n s  prescribed by s . 22 o f the Indian
Councils Act 1861 as to enacting any law in  derogation of the
•'unwritten laws or C onstitu tio n  of the United Kingdom whereon may depend
in  any degree the a lleg iance of any person to  the Crown". The Madras
High Court held th a t the a b o litio n  of the  r ig h t  to the w r it  was not such
31a m atter which a ffec ted  a lle g ia n c e .
325.58 A passage from the judgment of the Privy Council in  BUGGA v EMPEROR
was quoted in  the above decis ion . In the case before the  P rivy  Council
an Ordinance which was enacted on the occasion of promulgation of
m a rtia l law in  the Punjab was challenged as u l t r a  v ire s  s .65 (2 ) of the
331915-19 C onstitu tion  on the grounds th a t i t  deprived the B r it is h  
subjects in  In d ia  o f the r ig h t  to be t r ie d  in  the ord inary  course by the  
estab lished  courts of law aid thereby i t  "a ffec ted  the unw ritten  laws or 
c o n stitu tio n  whereon the a lleg ian ce" of the subjects to the Crown depended. 
The Privy Council held th a t the ordinary Indian courts were themselves of 
s ta tu to ry  o rig in  and as such there was no question of an unw ritten  law or 
c o n stitu tio n  being a ffe c te d . T h e ir Lordships, however, proceeded fu r th e r  to 
observe:
The sub-section does not prevent the Indian Government 
from passing a law which may modify or a ffe c t a ru le  of 
the c o n stitu tio n  or of the common law upon the observance 
of which some person may conceive or a llege th a t h is  
alleg iance depends. I t  re fe rs  only to  laws which d ire c tly
a ffe c t the a lleg iance  of the subject to  the Crown as by a
tra n s fe r or q u a lif ic a t io n  of the a lleg iance or a 
m odification  of the o b lig a tio n s  thereby imposed.
5.59 In  th e ir  decision the Privy Council quoted with approval the
opinion of Phear, 3 . ,  when in te rp re tin g  the p a r a l le l  provisions of
35s .43 o f the 1833 Act. In AMEER KHAN, Phear, 3 . ,  re jec ted  the argument
th a t Bengal Regulation 3 of 1818 was u l t r a  v ire s  because i t  a ffec ted  the
36Queen’ s p re ro g ative . However, h is  Lordship proceeded to construe the
lim ita t io n  prescribed by s .43 and observed as fo llow s (a lso  quoted by the  
37Privy C ouncil)!
. . . in  my judgment the words ’’whereon may depend e tc ."  
do not re fe r  to any assumed conditions precedent to be
performed by or on behalf of the Crown as necessary to
found a lleg iance of the su b jec t.
Phear, 3 . ,  did not say anything about the r ig h t to habeas corpus
but Markby, 3 . ,  observed th a t " I t  is  not in any way necessary in  th is  case
to consider whether an Act which a ffec ted  the r ig h t of a party to a w r it
of habeas corpus would or would not be v a l id .  I  express no opinion th a t
38i t  would not be so. . .
5.60 The Madras High Court also held th a t the decision in  the ELEKQ
39case was in a p p lic a b le  because the common law r ig h t to the w r it  s t i l l
ex is ted  th e re . I t  was also held th a t the penultim ate proviso to s .43 of the
Indian Councils Act did not r e s t r ic t  the power o f the Indian le g is la tu re
so as to  a ffe c t i t s  r ig h t  to abolish the common lau  w r it  and re fe rre d  to
40the decision of the Privy Council in  EMPRESS v BURAH. I t  has to be 
noted th a t the Privy Council in  th a t case had merely held th a t the Act 
challenged there was a piece of cond itional le g is la t io n  and th a t i t  was
not void on the ground th a t i t  purported to delegate le g is la t iv e  powsr.
41I t  was also held as fo llo w s:
o r
ou
The Indian le g is la tu re  has powers expressly lim ite d  by the 
Acts of Im p eria l Parliam ent which created i t .  . . but when 
acting w ith in  these l im its  i t  is  not in  any sense an agent 
or delegate of the Im p eria l P arliam ent, but has, and was 
intended to have, plenary powers o f le g is la t io n , as la rg e , 
and of the seme n a tu re , as those of Parliam ent i t s e l f .
The estab lished courts of ju s tic e , when a question arises  
whether the prescribed l im its  have been exceeded, must o f 
necessity determine th a t question. . . [ emphasis addBd]
5.61 The Madras High Court also re fe rre d  to the  decision of Rankin, C. 3.
42in  GIRINDRA NATH ( supra) . I t  is  true  th a t Rankin, C .3 .,  squarely
faced and c a te g o ric a lly  decided, in  the a ff irm a tiv e , the question whether
the Indian le g is la tu re  could abolish the common law w rit o f habeas corpus.
H is Lordship observed th a t the question had been avoided in  the past but
43the Indian le g is la tu r e ’ s power to do so had been doubted. I t  was held
th a t under s .9 of the Indian High Courts Act 1861 and also under the
L ette rs  Patent o f 1665 (v id e  clauses 44 and 38 in  p a r t ic u la r )  the power
and ju r is d ic t io n  of the High Court was subjected to the le g is la t iv e  powers
of the Governor General in  C ouncil. Rankin, C .3 .,  also re lie d  on the
decision in  BUHAH ( supra) to  hold th a t the p a r t ic u la r  l im ita t io n  of
s .22 o f the Indian Councils Act (n o t to le g is la te  in  derogation of ’’any
provision o f any act passed in  the present P arliam ent”) did not a lte r  the
position  th a t the doubts thrown upon the Indian le g is la tu re 's  power to
modify the exercise by the High Courts of the powers previously possessed by
44the Supreme Courts were unfounded.
5.62 I t  remains now to s ta te  th a t the P rivy Council, w hile a ffirm in g  the
decision of the Madras High Court, merely endorsed the reasons given by the  
Madras High Court and gave in  i t s  decision in MATTHEN ( supra) i t s  ta c i t  
approval to  the dictum of Rankin, C .3 . Even in  i t s  decision in
5HIBNATH BANER3I ( supra) the Privy Council did not re-examine the m atter 
afresh in  a wider context. We suggest the fo llo w in g  reasons fo r  arguing 
th a t the r ig h t  o f a B r it is h  subject to the w r it  of habeas corpus at 
common law was n o t, and could not be, taken away, e ith e r  in  1872 or in
1875, although in  the cases discussed above, i t  had been held to the
c o n tra ry .
(a ) In  a l l  the cases discussed above the m atter has been 
d ea lt with from the viewpoint of "power and ju r is d ic t io n "  
of the courts and no notice  is  taken of the fa c t  th a t 
the r ig h t ,  which o rig in a ted  as a procedural r ig h t at 
common law had, in  fa c t ,  become a " c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t"  
of the sub jec t, l ia b le  only to  "suspension" possibly only 
fo r  the defence of the realm , according to the  
convention and p ractice  of the B r it is h  P arliam ent.
(b ) Except Rankin, C .3 . in  GIRINDRA NATH, in  o ther cases the 
judges do not c a te g o ric a lly  decide th a t the r ig h t  to thB 
w rit  could be abolished by the Ind ian  le g is la tu re .
( c) Reliance on BURAH by both the Madras and C a lcu tta  High 
Courts was unwarranted and misplaced and added nothing  
to th e ir  a u th o rity . On the other hand, in  BURAH i t  was 
held th a t Indian le g is la tu re  must act w ith in  the prescribed  
" lim its "  and th a t i t s  powers were of the  "same nature" and 
not of a d if fe re n t  nature from th a t of the B r it is h  
Parliam ent. The la t t e r ,  by convention aid p ra c tic e ,  
having lim ite d  i t s  power to  mere "suspension" o f the w r it ,  
i t  did not in tend to confer power o f a d if fe r e n t  natu re , 
a lb e it  with a la rg e r ambit, on the Ind ian  le g is la tu re .
(d ) The challenge to  the v ire s  of the re le v a n t provisions of the 
1872 Code and 187 5 Act could be grounded on one or more of 
the other lim ita t io n s  prescribed by s .22 o f the Indian  
Councils Act 1861. We quote below the re le v an t provisions  
aid also propose to  mark them with numbers fo r  convenience 
of trea tm ent.
^Provided always, th a t the said Governor General in  Council 
s h a ll not have the power o f making any laws or regu lations  
which s h a ll repeal or in any way a ffe c t any of the  
provisions of th is  Acts
( i )  . . . [not re le v a n t]
( i i )  o r any of the provisions of the Government of In d ia  Act 
1858. . .
( i i i )  to (v ) . . . [not re le v a n t]
( v i )  or which may a ffe c t the a u th o rity  o f P arliam ent, or . . . 
or any part of the unw ritten laws or co n s titu tio n  of 
the United Kingdom. . . ,  whereon may depend in  any 
degree the a lleg iance of any person to  the Crown of 
the United Kingdom, or the sovereignty or dominion of 
the Crown over any part of the said  t e r r i t o r ie s .  >
[emphasis added]
5.63 Lie have already seen th a t between 1858 and 1872 (before  the
enactment of the 1872 Code) each o f the Supreme Courts in  In d ia  possessed
de ju re  and general au th o rity  to  issue habeas corpus which could be trea ted  
as a part of the e x is tin g  law in  1858. By s .64 of the 1858 Act the 
e x is tin g  law (" A ll  Acts and provisions now in  forcB under Charters or 
otherw ise") were continued; th is  provision could not be "in  any way 
affec ted " by any subsequent law enacted by the Ind ian  le g is la tu re  in  view  
of the lim ita t io n  on i t s  powers marked as ( i i )  above. The in te n tio n  of 
s .64 was not only to  preserve the status quo but also to  extend the 
protection  a v a ila b le  to Englishmen under the e x is tin g  laws generally  to  a l l  
subjects on the assumption of "d ire c t government". Lie have already seen 
th a t there was express p ro h ib itio n  in the e a rly  Charters against the 
making of laws "repugnant to laws, s ta tu tes  and customs of the realm" 
and la te r  a more d ire c t and e ffe c t iv e  contro l was exercised to p ro tect 
the ancient l ib e r t ie s  of Englishmen by req u irin g  th a t a l l  laws made in  
In d ia  should be la id  before Parliam ent a fte r  the scheme of the Regulating  
Act fa i le d  under which the English judges of the K in g 's  Courts in  In d ia  
could perform the task .
5.64 We next submit th a t the f i r s t  two sub-clauses of the lim ita t io n
marked as ( v i )  above (d is jo in e d  by "or") also achieved the same purpose 
to  a great e x te n t. F ir s t  i t  is  necessary to note the wide ambit of the 
f i r s t  sub-clause. I t  is  submitted th a t the common law r ig h t to  the w r it
could be abolished (a lb e i t  d o u b tfu lly ) only by P arliam ent. Any law which
resu lted  in  the a b o litio n  of the w r it  d e f in ite ly  derogated from 
(" a ffe c te d " ) the au th o rity  of P arliam ent. The second sub-clause has been, 
we submit, narrowly construed in  BUGGA and AMEER KHAN. The Privy Council 
had in  fa c t adopted Phear J . 's  opinion and the la t t e r  in  turn had 
arrived  at h is  conclusions by re je c tin g  the theory o f a lleg iance  on the
ground th a t in Forsyth 's  C o n s titu tio n a l Law i t  was not s tated  as a
p r in c ip le  o f domestic law. U n fo rtu n a te ly , i t  appears th a t Blackstone,
who is  generally  cred ited  with i t s  o r ig in , was not c ite d . I t  is
submitted th a t B lackstonef s theory of a lle g ian c e , a lb e it  subsequent to
46the decision in the CALVIN case, was not unknown to the le g is la to rs  in  
England and as such there was no warrant fo r  construing the second sub-clause 
narrowly so as to  exclude the operation of the th eo ry .
5.65 L a s tly , we submit th a t the a b o litio n  of the w rit a lso , in  a way, 
a ffec ted  the "sovereignty11 (penultim ate sub-clause of l im ita t io n )  ( v i )
of the Crown. We have already re fe rre d  e a r l ie r  to  the f a c t 'th a t  the w rit  
at common law was d ire c t ly  re la te d  to the command of the Sovereign:
47i t  was not any ordinary prerogative but "high" prerogative of the Crown.
I t  may also be appropriate ly  pointed out in th is  connection th a t the 
governing expression "in  any way" of the main body of the proviso ought 
to  be given due importance; so also to  the word " a f fe c t" . In  BUGGA the  
P rivy Council did not do so, instead im porting the concept of "d irectness"  
and confining the ap p lica tio n  of the lim ita t io n  "only to  laws which d ire c tly  
a ffe c t the a lle g ian c e " .
(b ) The_ jiaturjs o f the s ta tu to ry  r ig h t
5.66 Thus, we see th a t m ainly as a re s u lt of ju d ic ia l  in te rp re ta t io n ,
the second phase of development of the r ig h t to  the w r it  in  In d ia  during
c o lo n ia l ru le  in  fa c t ended in the v ir t u a l  e x tin c tio n  of the r ig h t  because
of i t s  replacement by a s ta tu to ry  r ig h t  which enabled a person to  apply to
a High Court fo r  "d ire c tio n s  of the nature of a habeas corpus" . At common
48law, habeas corpus was known as a w r it  of r ig h t but under s .491 of the
Crim inal Procedure Code the order was p a ten tly  d iscre tio n ary  -  " I f  th inks
f i t " .  The subject now also lo s t the a n c illa ry  r ig h ts  associated with the
49common law w r it  in respect o f successive ap p lica tio n s  and appeals. The 
High Court could now frame ru les  to  regulate  the procedure fo r  the  
exercise of the r ig h t by the su b jec t.
5.67 The ethos of l ib e r ty  associated with the common law r ig h t was
not re fle c te d  in  the s ta tu to ry  r ig h t .  At Common Law the person who had
the custody of the applicant had to discharge the burden of showing h is
le g a l au thority  fo r  the custody. In  view of the  d iscre tio n ary  nature of
the remedy the applicant was e v id en tly  required now to  make out a prima
fa c ie  case to  invoke the ju r is d ic t io n  of the co u rt. On the other hand,
despite the fa c t th a t the English Habeas Corpus Act 1816 was in ap p licab le  
51in In d ia , the court could apparently in q u ire  in to  the tru th  o f the  
re tu rn  in  view of the fa c t  th a t there was a duty placed on the court to  
determine whether or not a person was " i l le g a l ly  or im properly" deta ined. 
Indeed, in  3ITENDRA NATH v CHIEF SECRETARY^  the court construed the  word 
"im properly" to hold th a t ,  "The courts can and in  a proper case must 
determine the question whether there has been such fraud and abuse" 
re fe rr in g  to "fraud as an Act or an abuse of the powers given by the  
le g is la tu r e " .
(2 ) I_ndege£ d £ n j c e _ d _ H a J^grpu.s_iri ^n_di_a,_P_ak_isjtan jand B.anOiadeJ3h_
5.68 A fter independence the e x is tin g  law was continued in  In d ia  and
Pakistan and also in  Bangladesh when the la t t e r  became an independent sta te
in  1971. The s ta tu to ry  r ig h t under s .491 of the Code of Crim inal Procedure
is  thus ava ilab le  in  Pakistan and Bangladesh and was in  In d ia  u n t i l  1973
when the new Code adopted there did not contain a s im ila r  p rov is ion : i t  was
stated th a t the p a r a l le l  r ig h t a v a ila b le  under the C onstitu tio n  rendered
53unnecessary the incorporation  of a s im ila r  p ro v is io n . In fa c t  in  a l l  
the th ree  successive C onstitu tions of Pakistan and also in  th a t of 
Bangladesh an id e n tic a l provision was made although i t  was not modelled 
always and everywhere on the Indian p ro v is io n .
5.69 In In d ia , A rt. 32(1) provided th a t the r ig h t  to move the  
Supreme Court fo r  the  enforcement o f the fundamental r ig h ts  was "guaranteed" 
and by v ir tu e  of clause (4 ) i t  could "not be suspended except as provided  
otherwise by the C o n s titu tio n " . Clause (2 ) empowered the Supreme Court to
"issue d i re c t io n s  or orders or w r i t s ,  in c lu d in g  w r i t s  in  the nature  of
habeas corpus" and o th e r  named w r i t s .  I t  has, however, been he ld  t h a t  the
54p r in c ip le  of res ju d ic a ta  apply in  w r i t  proceedings. There was th e re fo re
no r ig h t  to make successive a p p l ic a t io n s  as could be done at common law .
The scope of A r t .  32 was c u r t a i le d  in  1975 by the in s e r t io n  o f A r t .3 2 -A
which provided th a t  the  "Supreme Court s h a l l  not consider the c o n s t i tu t io n a l
v a l i d i t y  o f  any s ta te  law in  any proceeding under th a t  a r t i c l e  (32 )
unless the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  v a l i d i t y  o f any C e n tra l  law is  also in  issue in  
55such proceedings".
5 .70  In  Pakistan the f i r s t  C o n s t i tu t io n  of 1956 reproduced verbatim
in  A r t . 22 the Ind ian  p ro v is io n .  In  the C o n s t i tu t io n s  enacted in  1962 and
1973 the Pakistan Supreme Court lo s t  the power to  issue w r i ts  which was
provided by A r t .  22 in  1956. In  Bangladesh, A r t . 44 (1 )  of the C o n s t i tu t io n
(as o r i g i n a l l y  enacted) provided t h a t ,  "The r ig h t  to  move the Supreme
Court [ i n  1976 the  "High C o u rt" ]  in  accordance with clause (1 )  of a r t i c l e
102, f o r  the enforcement o f the r ig h ts  conferred  by t h is  P a r t ,  i s  guaranteed"
I t  i s ,  however, to  be noted th a t  there  were no separate High Courts in
56Bangladesh as in  In d ia  and Pakistan and th a t  u n t i l  1976 the Supreme 
Court i t s e l f  sat in  two d iv is io n s  -  the High Court D iv is io n  and the  
A ppella te  D iv is io n  and under A r t .  102(1 ) the power was conferred  on ths 
High Court D iv is io n  [on the "High Court" in  1 9 7 6 ] ,  There was no express  
p r o h ib i t io n  against "suspension" of the r ig h t  as provided in  In d ia  and 
also in  Pakistan  in  1956.
5.71 In  In d ia ,  under A r t .  226 every High Court could a ls o , a l b e i t  
w ith in  the t e r r i t o r i a l  l i m i t s  o f  i t s  j u r i s d ic t i o n ,  s im i la r ly  issue a w r i t  
" in  the n atu re  of habeas corpus" .  While the Supreme Court could issue  
w r i ts  under A r t .  32 only f o r  the enforcement of fundamental r ig h ts ,  under 
A r t .  226 (1 )  w r i ts  could be issued , o r i g i n a l l y ,  also " fo r  any o th er  purpose". 
In  1976 th e  p ro v is ion  was re -c a s t  and was saddled with a p ro v is ion  s im i la r
to  A r t .3 2 -A .  By A r t .  226-A the  High Court was now forb idden to consider
the " c o n s t i tu t io n a l  v a l i d i t y  of any C e n tra l  la u " .  The neu A r t .  226(1)  
noit) rep laced th e  term " f o r  any o th er  purpose" by sub-clauses (b ) and ( c) 
which are quoted below:
(b ) f o r  th e  redress  of any in ju r y  o f a s u b s ta n t ia l  na tu re  
by reason of the contravention  o f  any o ther p rov is io n  
of t h is  C o n s t i tu t io n  or any pro v is ion  of any enactment 
or Ordinance or any o rd e r ,  r u le ,  r e g u la t io n ,  bye-law  or 
o th er instrum ent made thereunder; or
(c )  f o r  the redress o f any in ju r y  by reason of any i l l e g a l i t y  
in  any proceedings by or before  any a u th o r i ty  under any 
p ro v is ion  r e fe r r e d  to  in  sub-clause (b )  where such 
i l l e g a l i t y  has re s u lte d  in  s u b s ta n t ia l  f a i l u r e  of j u s t i c e .
Under new clause (3 )  no p e t i t i o n  in  respect of cases covered by the above
two sub-clauses could be e n te r ta in e d  i f  "any o th er  remedy" was provided
under "any other law ". There were also re s tr ic t io n s  provided in  new clause
(4 )  on th e  passing of " in te r im  o rd e rs " .  Although i t  was d ou b tfu l i f  the
neu sub-clauses m a t e r ia l ly  a f fe c te d  the scope of th e  r ig h t  under the old
A r t .  226, f o r  a w r i t  o f  habeas corpus would be p a r t i c u la r l y  d ire c te d  towards
enforcement of th e  r ig h t  to  personal l i b e r t y ,  the neu clause (4 )  in  a
somewhat d i r e c t  way r e s t r i c t e d  the  scope of the r i g h t .  I t  may be r e c a l le d
in  t h is  connection t h a t  under English lew b a i l  could be granted by way of
an " in te r im  o rder"  in  a habeas corpus a p p l ic a t io n .  The neu A rt .2 2 6 -A
obviously  c u r ta i le d  th e  scope of the remedy more d i r e c t ly  and m a t e r i a l l y .
5 .72  I t  i s  also necessary to  note th a t  A r t . 226 came to be express ly
subjected to  the  new A r t .1 3 1 -A  (a ls o  in s e r te d  in  1976) besides A r t .2 2 6 -A .
Although "exc lus ive  j u r i s d ic t io n "  was conferred  on the Supreme Court in
" a l l  questions r e la t in g  to  the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  v a l i d i t y  of any C e n tra l  law",
w ithout f i n a l l y  disposing o f  the  case i t s e l f  the Supreme Court could, in
a m a tte r  which was pending e a r l i e r  b e fo re  a High C ourt, re tu rn  the case to
the l a t t e r  with i t s  dec is ion  on the re le v a n t  p o in t ,  f o r  the f i n a l  d isposa l
o f the case. In  the f i n a l  an a lys is  i t  cannot possib ly  be said  th a t  the
conferment o f  exc lu s iv e  j u r i s d i c t io n  in  respect of C e n tra l  laws adversely
a f fe c te d  the r ig h t  to  personal l i b e r t y .  The c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r ig h t  to  the
" w r i t  in  the  nature  of habeas corpus" was in  many respects d i f f e r e n t  from 
th e  common law r ig h t ,  although i t  was d e f i n i t e l y  o f a more secure and 
mandatory charac te r  than the p a te n t ly  d is c re t io n a ry  s ta tu to ry  r ig h t  th a t  
was a v a i la b le  under s . 491 of the C rim ina l Procedure Code. Both r ig h t s ,  
however, in  one respect d i f f e r e d  m a t e r ia l ly  from the common law r i g h t .
U n l ik e  common law, there  could be an appeal in  both cases, against an order  
of d isch arge . The new p ro v is io n s  of A r ts .  226-A and 131-A remedied t h is  
s i t u a t io n  to  a g rea t  e x ten t  by r e s t r i c t i n g  the number and scope o f  such 
appeals . A decis ion in  a s in g le  case by the Supreme Court in  favo u r  of the  
p r is o n e r  would inure  to the b e n e f i t  o f a l l  p r iso n ers  he ld  in  d i f f e r e n t  
s ta te s  under the impugned C e n tra l  law.
5 .73  In another im portant aspect the " c o n s t i tu t io n a l  r ig h t "
d i f f e r e d  in  a very in te r e s t in g  way from the s ta tu to ry  r ig h t  as w e l l  as
the common law r i g h t .  The two las t-m en tio ned  r ig h t s  could not be "suspended"
by an execu tive  order but under A r t . 359 the P res iden t could make an order
to  "suspend" the r ig h t  f o r  the period during which a "Proclamation of
Emergency", also made by him, was in  o p e ra t io n .  I t  may be noted in  t h is
connection th a t  A r t .  226 d id  not contain any p ro v is ion  s im i la r  to  A r t . 3 2 ( 4 ) .
However, t h is  aspect of the m atte r  w i l l  be examined in  g re a te r  d e t a i l  in
d iscussing the l a t e s t  dec is ion  of the Supreme Court in  what i s  p o p u la r ly
57c a l le d  the Habeas Corpus Case.
5.74  In  P ak is tan , A r t .  170 of the F i r s t  C o n s t i tu t io n  of 1956 reproduced
verbatim  the Ind ian  p ro v is io n s  of A r t . 226(1)  as o r i g i n a l l y  enacted in  1949.
E a r l i e r ,  in  1954,  the C o n stitu en t Assembly of P a k is ta n , ac t ing  as th e  
C e n tra l  l e g is la t u r e ,  had emended the Government o f  In d ia  Act 1935 by 
in s e r t in g  th e re in  S.223-A to empower the High Courts to  issue " w r i ts  in
the nature  o f " ,  among o th e rs ,  habeas corpus. There was not and th ere  could  
not be also any re fe ren ce  then to "fundamental r ig h t s " ,  as the 1935 Act 
did not contain  any B i l l  o f R ig h ts . Reference may be made now to  the
re le v a n t  p rov is io ns  o f th e  subsequent C o n s t i tu t io n s .  A r t .  9 8 ( 2 ) ( b ) ( i )
o f  the  1962 C o n s t i tu t io n  and A r t . l 9 9 ( 1 ) ( b ) ( i )  of the 1973 C o n s t itu t io n  were
almost s im i la r ly  worded. The las t-m en tioned  p ro v is ion  is  quoted:
Subject to the C o n s t i tu t io n ,  a High Court may, i f  i t  i s  
s a t is f ie d  th a t  no o th er adequate remedy i s  provided by law -
(b )  on the a p p l ic a t io n  of any person, make an order -
( i )  d i r e c t in g  th a t  a person in  custody w ith in  the  
t e r r i t o r i a l  j u r i s d ic t io n  of the court be brought 
befo re  i t  so th a t  the Court may s a t is f y  i t s e l f  
th a t  he i s  no t being h e ld  in  custody w ithout la w fu l  
a u th o r i ty  or in  an u n law fu l manner:
[emphasis added]
The Pakistan  Courts, as we s h a l l  see, attached g rea t importance to  the
expressions un d er l in ed  in  the above e x t ra c t  and assumed powers wider than
those exercised by the  Ind ian  courts despite  the f a c t  th a t  the Ind ian
C o n s t i tu t io n ,  u n l ik e  P a k is ta n 's ,  expressly  named habeas corpus a lb e i t  in
58q u a l i f i e d  terms ( " in  the nature  o f " ) .  A r t . 199 also provided (v id e  
clause ( 1 ) ( c )  end clause ( 2 ) )  th a t  the  High Court could issue such 
" d ir e c t io n s "  as might be "approp ria te  f o r  the enforcement of eny o f the  
Fundamental R ights" and th a t  the " r ig h t  to  move a High Court" fo r  such 
purpose " s h a l l  not be abridged". By clause (A ) the r ig h t  to  pass an 
" in te r im  ord er"  was r e s t r i c t e d .
5 .75  The a r t i c l e  was amended and i t  i s  necessary to  take  n o t ic e  o f  th e
59new clauses (3A) and (A A ). I t  was provided by clause (3A) th a t  the  
court should not make an order under clause (1 )  p r o h ib i t in g  the  making of  
an order f o r  th e  d e ten tion  of a person and th a t  i t  should not grant b a i l  to  
a person deta ined  under any law made f o r  "p reventive  d e te n t io n " .  By 
clause (AA) the r e s t r i c t io n s  contemplated on " in te r im  orders" were fu r t h e r  
t ig h te n e d  by l im i t in g  the opera t ion  of such orders in  c e r ta in  cases to  
s ix ty  days. P a r t  X of the C o n s t i tu t io n  (1973) contained "Emergency P rov is io ns"  
of which the  main a r t i c l e ,  232, was amended in  1 9 7 5 . ^  Under A r t . 2 3 3 (2 ) ,  
whicn was in  p a r i  m a te r ia  w ith  the In d ian  A r t .  3 5 9 (1 ) ,  the r ig h t  to  move
any court during "emergency" f o r  the  enforcement of fundamental r ig h ts  could
be "suspended" by the P re s id e n t .  I t  may be noted in  t h is  connection th a t
during  the t h i r d  M a r t i a l  Law regime despite  the p rov is ion  t h a t  the
"C o n s t i tu t io n  s h a l l  remain in  abeyance", the Lahore High Court ordered the
re le a s e  of a p r iso n er  under s . 491 of the Code of C r im in a l Procedure by
h o ld in g  th a t  the court had merely lo s t  the power and ju r i s d ic t io n
61" s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e la t a b le "  to A r t . 199. However, u n l ik e  In d ia ,  the question
whether the r ig h t  to personal l i b e r t y  e x is te d  outside the C o n s t i tu t io n ,  i s
6 2res in te q ra  in  P a k is ta n .
5.76 In  Bangladesh A r t .  1 0 2 ( 2 ) ( b ) ( i )  reproduced almost verbatim  the
p ro v is io n  of A r t , 1 9 9 ( 1 ) ( b ) ( i )  o f the Pakistan C o n s t i tu t io n ;  however, th ere
was no p ro v is io n  here p a r a l l e l  to  clause ( 1 ) ( c )  and clause ( 2 )  of A r t . 199.
Clause (4 )  o f  A r t .  102 imposed r e s t r i c t io n s  on passing of " in te r im  orders"
s im i la r  to ,  but not e x a c t ly  th e  same as i t s  P a k is ta n i  c o u n te rp a r t .  By an
amendment in  1973, P a r t  IXA was in s e r te d  in  the  Bangladesh C o n s t i tu t io n ,
6 3which was captioned "Emergency P ro v is io n s " .  A r t .  141-C of t h is  Part
corresponded to the Ind ian  A r t .  359 and empowered the P res id en t to  "suspend"
the  r i g h t  to  move any court f o r  th e  enforcement o f  fundamental r ig h t s .  In
1975 the e x is t in g  p ro v is io n s  of A r ts .  44 and 102 were rep laced  by new 
64p ro v is io n s .  By the new A r t . 44 p ro v is ion  was made f o r  the estab lishm ent
o f a " C o n s t i tu t io n a l  court or t r ib u n a l  or commission" f o r  the enforcement
of fundamental r ig h t s .  The new A r t . 102 e f fe c te d  no change in  so f a r  as
habeas corpus was concerned. The p o s it io n  remained e s s e n t ia l ly  u n a lte re d
65when the C o n s t i tu t io n  was f u r t h e r  amended during the m i l i t a r y  r u le .
(3 )  Habeas Corpus in  Ceylon ( S r i  Lanka)
5.77 U n l ik e  in  In d ia ,  the B r i t i s h  acquired t e r r i t o r i a l  sovere ign ty  in
Ceylon by conquest, d is p la c in g  the Dutch in  1796, and the Company's 
o v e r lo rd s h ip  there  la s te d  f o r  less  than a decade as Ceylon became a Crown 
Colony in  1802. Even so, th e re  was no genera l in tro d u c t io n  of English lau
th e re .  The f i r s t  Governor, F red er ick  N orth , had rece ived  Royal In s t ru c t io n s
as w e l l  as In s t r u c t io n s  from the Court o f D ire c to rs  of th e  East In d ia
Company to  the e f f e c t  th a t  ju s t ic e  should be adm inistered according to
"the laws and i n s t i t u t i o n s  th a t  subsisted under the Dutch government
He had accordingly  made what came to  be p o pu lar ly  c a l le d  "North Proclam ations"
in  1799, and the f i r s t  Royal C harter of Ju s t ic e  issued in  1801 merely
67confirmed the p r in c ip le s  and o b je c ts  s ta ted  in  them. As a r e s u l t  the
6 8"res idu ary  lau"  in  Ceylon today i s  not Common Law but Roman-Dutch Law.
There was a piecemeal in t ro d u c t io n  of English Law, th e  best example of
which i s  to be found in  th e  C i v i l  Law Ordinance enacted "to  in troduce  in to
69Ceylon th e  law of England in  c e r ta in  cases".
5.78 A Supreme Court was e s ta b l is h e d  under the C h arte r  o f 1801, but
under A r t . 82 power was given to  the court to issue "Mandates in  the
nature o f  w r i ts "  of c e r t i o r a r i  and mandamus, but not habeas corpus.
N everth e les s , poss ib ly  fo l lo w in g  the Ind ian  precedent, th e  c o u rt ,  as has
70been observed, in  f a c t  issued w r i ts  of habeas corpus; i t  was fo rm a l ly
empowered to  do so f o r  the f i r s t  t im e in  1830 by an Order in  Council dated
11th November and then in  a d i f f e r e n t  way by the Royal C h arte r  o f Ju s t ice
71of 1833 (v id e  s . 4 9 ) .  The ju r i s d ic t io n  by the  1830 Order was fo rm a l ly  
conferred  at th e  suggestion o f  Colebrooke (one o f H is  M a je s ty 's  
Commissioners of Enquiry) made in  A p r i l  1830. He rep o rted  th a t  the court  
did not have ju r i s d ic t io n  under any of the  C harters  o f 1801, 1810 and 1811 
and th a t  i t  was necessary to  c reate  such ju r is d ic t io n  to  avoid  
co n fro n ta t io n  between the executive  and the  ju d ic ia r y  s im i la r  to one o f  
Bombay. He had recommended th a t  the p ro v is io n  made in  c e r ta in  re g u la t io n s  
promulgated by the Governor to  a r r e s t  and de ta in  any person in  custody 
should be d isa llow ed  which was accepted and in  the 1830 Order i t  was 
f u r th e r  s ta te d  t h a t ,  " i t  s h a l l  be competent to  H is  M a je s ty 's  Supreme Court 
at Ceylon or to  any Judge o f  th a t  court to  issue w r i ts  o f  Habeas Corpus 
or Mandates in  the nature  of such w r i ts  as f u l l y  and e f f e c t u a l l y  and
u n d e r  such and th e  l i k e  c i rc u m s ta n c e s  as by th e  Lau o f  England w r i t s  o f
Habeas Corpus can o r  may be is s u e d  by any one o f  H is  M a je s t y 's  Supreme
72C o u r ts  o f  Records a t  W e s tm in s te r " .  B u t i t  was p ro v id e d  t h a t  "such r u le s  
o f  p r a c t i c e  and p ro ce e d in g  as th e  l o c a l  c i rc u m s ta n ce s  o f  th e  s a id  i s l a n d  
may r e q u i r e "  had to  be framed by th e  Ceylon Supreme C o u r t .  The O rder uas 
t o  remain in  f o r c e  u n t i l  1834 and uas i n  f a c t  superseded in  1833 by the
R oya l C h a r te r  o f  O u s t ic e  i n  which th e  i n c i d e n t a l  p r o v i s io n  o f  the  O rder
was
became a r e g u la r  p r o v i s io n  b u t  i t / d i f f e r e n t l y  s ta te d  i n  th e  f o l l o w in g  
termss^^
And we. . . o rd a in  and a p p o in t  t h a t  th e  s a id  Supreme C ourt  
o r  any judge t h e r e o f .  . . s h a l l  be and i s  he reby a u th o r is e d  
to  g ra n t  and is s u e  mandates in  th e  n a tu re  o f  w r i t s  o f  habeas 
c o rp u s .  . . t o  b r i n g  up th e  body o f  any person who s h a l l  bo 
im p r is o n e d  w i t h i n  any p a r t  o f  th e  s a id  i s l a n d .  . . and t o  
d is c h a r g e .  . . o r  o th e rw is e  d e a l  w i th  such person a c c o rd in g  
to  l a u .
5 .79 Thus i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  i f  th e  common law  r i g h t  to  th e  w r i t  s u r v iv e s
(even i f  i t  was a t  a l l  i n t r o d u c e d )  i n  Ceylon and i t  has been r i g h t l y
observed  t h a t  th e  p re s e n t  law  r e l a t i n g  t o  habeas corpus  in  Ceylon i s  t o  be
fo u n d  i n  s . 45 o f  t h e  C o u r ts  O rd inance , Cap.6 o f  1956 ( o r i g i n a l l y  s . 49 o f  O r a i -
74nance |\lo. 1 o f  1 8 8 9 ) .  In  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  th e  f o l l o w i n g  p o in t s  are 
n o te w o r th y :
(a )  The common law o f  England was n o t  re c e iv e d  i n  Ceylon as 
th e  g e n e ra l  law  and Roman-Dutch law s t i l l  c o n t in u e s  th e re  
as th e  " r e s id u a r y  la w " .
(b )  The ju d g e s  o f  th e  Supreme C ou r t  were n o t  g e n e r a l ly  empowered
to  e x e r c is e  th e  powers and j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  th e  ju d g e s  o f  the
7 5K in g 's  Bench in  Eng land , as uas done in  I n d i a  and A f r i c a .
( c) Even in  th e  C h a r te r  o f  1833, th e  power was c o n fe r re d  to  
is s u e  "mandates i n  the  n a tu re  o f  a w r i t  o f  habeas c o rp u s "  
and as such in  i t s  v e ry  o r i g i n  i t  was a s t a t u t o r y  r i g h t  
which was c o n f i rm e d  in  th e  same te rm s by the  use o f  th e  
same language in  s . 45 o f  th e  C o u r ts  O rd inance , 1889.
( d) The p re s e n t  Supreme C ourt was a p p a re n t ly  n o t  a t r u e  successo r
o f  th e  Supreme C ourt e s ta b l i s h e d  in  1801 o r  t h a t  which
fu n c t io n e d  under th e  C h a r te r  o f  1833 f o r  th e  18B9 O rd inance
appears t o  have a l t e r e d  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  in  so f a r  as i t s  ■
power t o  g ra n t  habeas corpus uas concerned , as th e  seme
Ord inance p u rp o r te d  to  c o d i f y  th e  p r o v is io n  in  s . 49, as has
76been r i g h t l y  h e ld  in  th e  case o f  THOMAS PERERA.
(e )  C r im in a l  law  in  Ceylon uas c o d i f i e d  on the  l i n e s  o f  th e  
In d ia n  Codes b u t  th e  Ceylon C r im in a l  P rocedure  Code d id  n o t  
c o n ta in  any p r o v i s io n  p a r a l l e l  t o  th e  In d ia n  s . 491; 
in s te a d ,  c la u se s  (a )  and (b )  o f  s.491 uere rep roduced  in
s . 49 o f  th e  1889 Ord inance i t s e l f .
8 .80 We may nou quote th e  r e le v a n t  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  s a id  s . 45 o f  Cap.6
The Supreme C ourt o r  any judge th e r e o f  w he ther a t Colombo o r  
e lsew here  s h a l l  be and i s  hereby a u th o r is e d  to  g ra n t  and 
is s u e  mandates in  th e  n a tu re  o f  u r i t s  o f  habeas corpus to  
b r i n g  up b e fo re  such c o u r t  o r  judge -
(a )  th e  body o f  any person to  be d e a l t  u i t h  a c c o rd in g  t o  law ;
(b )  th e  body o f  any person i l l e g a l l y  o r  im p ro p e r ly  d e ta in e d
in  p u b l i c  o r  p r i v a t e  cus tody  end to  d is c h a rg e  o r  remand
any person so b ro u g h t  up o r  o th e rw is e  d e a l  w i th  such
person a c c o rd in g  t o  law . r , , ,h *  [em phas is  addedj
The p ro v is o  to  the  s e c t io n ,  as amended by s . 2 o f  Act No. 3 o f  1964
a u th o r is e d  th e  p r i s o n e r  t o  be b ro u g h t  b e fo re  e i t h e r  a D i s t r i c t  M a g is t r a t e ,
o r  a C ourt o f  Requests o r  a M a g is t r a t e ' s  C ou rt and a f t e r  an i n q u i r y  by th e
C ourt a r e p o r t  t o  be s u b m it te d  on th e  cause o f  th e  d e te n t io n  to  th e
Supreme Court o r  th e  judge t h e r e o f  uho had g iven  d i r e c t i o n  unde r th e
p r o v is o .  The S ta tu te  ( c a p .6) uas s i l e n t  on the  common la u  r i g h t s  o f
appea l and su cce ss ive  a p p l i c a t i o n s  bu t unde r s . 49 r u le s  cou ld  be made in
these  m a t te rs  by th e  Supreme C ourt  on th e  b a s is  t h a t  common la u  r i g h t  to  the
w r i t  ues n o t  in t r o d u c e d  o r  t h a t  i t  uas a b o l is h e d .  However, i t  i s  n o t
c o r r e c t  t o  say t h a t  th e  scope o f  s . 45 uas n o t  w id e r  than E n g l is h  la u  in
77any re s p e c t  a l thoug h  i t  was so h e ld  in  LIYANE ARATCHIE. I t  i s  s u b m it te d
t h a t  due im portance  has t o  be a t ta c h e d  to  th e  word " im p r o p e r l y "  o c c u r r in g  
in  c l .  (b )  o f  s . 45 m a n i fe s t in g  the  new aspect o f  th e  s t a t u t o r y  w r i t  o f  
habeas corpus based a p p a re n t ly  on th e  concept borrow ed from the  In d ia n  
C r im in a l  P rocedure  Code.
5.81 I t  i s  to  be n o te d  t h a t  th e re  was no s p e c i f i c  p r o v is io n  on
hshe as co rpus  in  th e  Ceylon ( C o n s t i t u t i o n )  O rder i n  C o u n c i l  1947 under 
which f u l l  i n t e r n a l  s e l f -g o v e rn m e n t  was in t r o d u c e d  in  C e y lo n .  The p o s i t i o n  
remained u n a l te r e d  unde r  th e  Ceylon ( independence ) O rder i n  C o u n c i l  1947 
and th e  Ceylon Independence A c t .  Even i n  th e  R epub lican  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
S r i  Lanka enac ted  in  1972, s . 121(1) m e re ly  p ro v id e d  t h a t  the  Supreme 
C ourt shou ld  c o n t in u e  to  e x e rc is e  th e  power t o  is s u e  "mandates in  th e  
n a tu re  o f  w r i t s "  a v a i l a b le  "unde r th e  e x i s t i n g  la w " .  Under s . 54 a 
" C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o u r t "  was e s ta b l i s h e d  b u t  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  was s t r i c t l y  
l i m i t e d  to  th e  c o n s id e r a t io n  o n ly  o f  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  v a l i d i t y  o f  any 
B i l l  and f o r  th e  subm iss ion  o f  i t s  d e c is io n  the re o n  to  the  Speaker o f  th e  
N a t io n a l  S ta te  Assembly, ,
I I I . Independence and p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y
(1 )  Some p r o v is io n s  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  th e  In d ia n  s u b -c o n t in e n t
(A ) A G enera l V iew  : B i l l s  o f  R ig k ts  v i s - a - v i s  j u d i c i a l  r e v i ew
5.82 The In d ia n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  (1949) and th e  f o u r  su c ce ss iv e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  P a k is ta n  (1956 , 1962, 1972 and 1973) which were g e n e r a l ly  
m ode l led  on i t ,  as a ls o  th e  Bangladesh C o n s t i t u t i o n  (1 9 7 2 ) ,  as o r i g i n a l l y  
enac ted , conformed t o  one common p a t te r n  i n  so f a r  as th e  b a s ic  f e a tu r e s  
o f  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  s ta te  v i s - a - v i s  p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y  
was concerned . The C o n s t i t u t i o n s  n o t  o n ly  p ro v id e d  f o r  j u s t i c i a b l e  B i l l s  
o f  R ig h ts  b u t  a lso  env isage d  a p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r  w i th  a w e s te rn - ty p e  
( m u l t i - p a r t y )  democracy. The R epub lican  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  S r i  Lanka (197 2) 
on th e  o th e r  hand, d i f f e r s  from  t h i s  group i n  one im p o r ta n t  r e s p e c t :  th e re  
th e  scope o f  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  was c u r t a i l e d  by a t w o - f o l d  l i m i t a t i o n ,  
m a n i fe s te d  on the  one hand in  th e  p r o v is io n  o f  a C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C ou rt  and
on th e  o th e r  hand i n  a n o n - j u s t i c i a b l e  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts .  F u r the rm ore  i t  d id
n o t  p ro v id e  f o r  a " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t "  o f  habeas c o rp u s . As f o r  th e
3
l a t t e r ,  t h e re  were, as we have seen, h i s t o r i c  re a so n s .  On th e  o th e r  hand,
th e  p r o v is io n  f o r  d e b i l i t a t e d  j u d i c i a l  power in  S r i  Lanka p o s s ib ly
r e f l e c t e d  th e  p o p u la r  r e a c t io n  a g a in s t  what appears t o  have been rega rded
as an i n f r a c t i o n  o f  Ceylonese s o v e re ig n ty  v e s te d  in  i t s  l e g i s l a t u r e  as a
4r e s u l t  o f  some o f  th e  d e c is io n s  o f  the  London-based P r iv y  C o u n c i l .
5 .83  U n l i k e  C ey lon , i n  I n d ia  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  au toch thony  d id  n o t
r e s u l t  i n  the  c u r t a i lm e n t  o f  th e  r i g h t  o f  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w .  N e v e r th e le s s  
in  I n d i a  too  th e  fo u n d in g  f a t h e r s  sought t o  im p a r t  a s p e c ia l  b ia s  to  the
t r a d i t i o n a l  id e a s  o f  w es te rn  democracy. In  l a y in g  th e  e d i f i c e  o f  the
proposed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  fram ew ork ,  P a n d i t  d a w a h a r la l  Nehru moved a 
r e s o lu t i o n  on th e  13th  December 1946 in  th e  C o n s t i tu e n t  Assembly on the  
"a im s and o b je c t s "  and observed  t h a t  the  r e s o lu t i o n  was im pregne te d  w i th  th e
5
c o n te n t  n o t  o f  s im p le  democracy b u t  o f  "econom ic dem ocracy". In  paragraph
(5 )  o f  th e  r e s o lu t i o n  i t  was i n t e r  a l i a  s ta te d  t h a t  th e re  shou ld  be 
"g u a ra n te e d  and secured  t o  a l l  peop le  o f  I n d i a ,  j u s t i c e ,  s o c i a l ,  economic, 
D o l i t i c a l ;  e q u a l i t y  o f  s t a t u s ,  o f  o p p o r t u n i t y  and b e fo re  th e  la w " .
5 .84  U n f o r t u n a t e ly ,  th e  j u d i c i a r y  i n  R epub lican  I n d i a  f a i l e d  to  ta ke  
no te  o f  the  s p e c ia l  emphasis on "econom ic j u s t i c e "  which was sought to  be 
in fu s e d  i n t o  th e  p h i lo s o p h y  o f  the  R epub lican  C o n s t i t u t i o n  by th e  fo u n d in g  
f a t h e r s  and, in  u p h o ld in g  the  "R u le  o f  Law" a c c o rd in g  to  th e  w estern  
n o t io n s  o f  democracy, th e  j u d i c i a r y  became e m b ro i le d  in  an unseemly 
c o n t ro v e rs y  w i th  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e  on accoun t o f  the  p r o t e c t io n  i t  a f fo rd e d  
t o  p r o p e r ty  r i g h t s .  As a r e s u l t  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  was amended w i t h i n  a 
ye a r  and, by th e  n e w ly - in s e r t e d  A r t .3 1 -B  and N in th  Schedu le , b la n k e t  
p r o t e c t i o n  was p ro v id e d  a g a in s t  j u d i c i a l  c h a l le n g e  to  the  enactm ents in c lu d e d  
in  th e  S chedu le .^  There  was an apparen t en la rgem e n t o f  th e  p u r p o r t  o f
the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  amendments enac ted  between 1971 and 1976. In  the  N in th  
Schedu le , which was meant to  c o n ta in  laws e x c lu s i v e l y  d e a l in g  w i th  p ro p e r ty
r i g h t s ,  came t o  be in c lu d e d  laws im p in g in g  upon th e  r i g h t  t o  p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y .
g
I t  has , however, t o  be conceded t h a t ,  whether in  1967 in  GOLAKNATH o r  in
g
197 3 in  KESHAVAN ANDA. i t  was th e  v i r e s  o f  an enactm ent connected w ith  
a g ra r ia n  re fo rm  t h a t  th e  c o u r t  was d i r e c t l y  concerned w i t h ,  b u t  i n  the 
end th e  Supreme C ou r t  i n  bo th  d e c is io n s  made im p o r ta n t  pronouncements on 
th e  scope o f  th e  p r o v i s io n s  r e l a t i n g  t o  th e  amendment o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
As a r e s u l t ,  P a r l ia m e n t  was provoked to  a s s e r t  i t s  supremacy and by add ing 
c lause  (A) to  A r t . 368 o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  th e  c o u r t ' s  power t o  ad judge
10th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  any amendment o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  was taken  away in  1976.
Whether t h i s  s te p  s e r io u s ly  im p a ire d  the  powers o f  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  en joyed
11by In d ia n  c o u r ts  we s h a l l  have o ccas ion  to  exam ine.
5 .85  In  P a k is ta n  th e  fo u n d in g  f a t h e r s  e x p re s s ly  s ta te d  t h a t  " th e
independence o f  j u d i c i a r y  s h a l l  be f u l l y  s e c u re d " .  I t  was so p ro v id e d
in  exp re ss  te rm s in  th e  " O b je c t iv e  R e s o lu t io n "  which th e  P a k is ta n
12C o n s t i t u e n t  Assembly had passed on 7 th  March 19A9. I t  was s ta te d  in  the
open ing  paragraph t h a t  s o v e re ig n ty  ve s te d  in  "God A lm ig h ty " ,  which He had
" d e le g a te d  to  th e  S ta te  o f  P a k is ta n  th ro u g h  i t s  p e o p le "  to  be h e ld  and
e x e rc is e d  i n  " s a c re d  t r u s t " .  The " O b je c t iv e  R e s o lu t io n "  was in c o r p o r a te d
i n t o  th e  preamble o f  th e  f i r s t  C o n s t i t u t i o n  enac ted  i n  March 1956 and
rep roduce d  in  th©  1962 C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a l b e i t  i n  a d im in is h e d  fo rm ,  b u t  in  th e
1973 C o n s t i t u t i o n  i t  reappeared  i n  i t s  extended  v e r s io n .  The P a k is ta n
j u d i c i a r y  took  th e  " O b je c t iv e  R e s o lu t io n "  s e r io u s ly  and d e s c r ib e d  i t  in
such te rm s  as "a  s u p r a - c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  docum ent", " t r a n s c e n d e n ta l  p a r t  o f
13the  C o n s t i t u t i o n "  in  A5MA JILAIMI a l th o u g h  C h ie f  J u s t ic e  Hamoodoor
1ARahman i n  7.1A-LIR-RAHMAN was n o t  p repa red  t o  p la c e  i t  "on a h ig h e r  p e d e s ta l  
than  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i t s e l f " .  The In d ia n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a ls o  c o n ta in s  a 
preamble b u t  i t  speaks i n t e r  a l i a  e x p re s s ly  n o t  o f  independence o f  th e  
j u d i c i a r y  b u t  o f  " J u s t i c e ,  s o c i a l ,  economic and p o l i t i c a l "  w h i le  the  s h o r t  
preamble o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  S r i  Lanka does n o t  make even an o b l iq u e  
re fe re n c e  to  " j u s t i c e " ;  i n  Bangladesh r e fe re n c e  was made n o t  o n ly  t o
" j u s t i c e "  b u t  a lso  t o  th e  " r u l e  o f  la w " .  In  any case the  preamble in  any 
o th e r  c o u n t ry  does n o t  appear t o  haue a t t r a c t e d  much a t t e n t i o n .
5.86 Apart from  the  case o f  S r i  Lanka which does n o t  have a
j u s t i c i a b l e  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts ,  i n  a l l  o th e r  cases th e re  i s  a "supremacy c la u s e "
in  each o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  which p ro v id e  a s t r o n g  hand le  f o r  j u d i c i a l  
'! 5re v ie w .  In  P a k is ta n  n o t  o n ly  th e  1962 C o n s t i t i t i o n  which d id  n o t
o r i g i n a l l y  c o n ta in  a j u s t i c i a b l e  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts ,  b u t  even th e  1973
16C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  c o n ta in e d  th e  f o l l o w in g  p r o v i s i o n :
(1 )  To e n jo y  th e  p r o t e c t io n  o f  law and t o  be t r e a te d  i n
accordance w i th  law i s  th e  a l ie n a b le  r i g h t  o f  eve ry
c i t i z e n ,  w herever he may be , and o f  eve ry  o th e r  person 
f o r  th e  t im e  b e in g  i n  P a k is ta n .
(2 )  In  p a r t i c u l a r  -
(a )  no a c t io n  d e t r im e n ta l  to  th e  l i f e ,  l i b e r t y ,  body, 
r e p u ta t io n  o r  p ro p e r ty  o f  any person s h a l l  be taken  
exce p t  in  accordance w i th  la w .
(b )  . . . ( c ) .  . .
The p r o v is io n  i s  reproduced  a lm ost v e rb a t im  i n  A r t . 31 o f  t h e  Bangladesh
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  In  d e fe n d in g  th e  i n d i v i d u a l ’ s r i g h t  t o  p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y  th e
P a k is ta n  j u d i c i a r y  in vo k e d  th e  above p r o v is io n s  w i th  g re a t  im a g in a t io n  and
cou rage . The "supremacy c la u s e "  i n  each C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  however, rep roduced
th e  In d ia n  p r o v is io n  which con tem p la te d  t h a t  o n ly  those  laws which were
" i n c o n s i s t e n t "  w i th  th e  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  fu n d a m e n ta l r i g h t s  shou ld  be
v o id  t o  the  e x te n t  o f  th e  in c o n s is te n c y ,  w h i le  i n  Bangladesh th e re  i s  an
a d d i t i o n a l  p r o v i s io n  ( A r t .  7 ( 2 ) )  which makes laws v o id  which are
in c o n s is t e n t  w i th  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  These p r o v i s io n s  in  Bangladesh and
P a k is ta n  d e f i n i t e l y  b u t t r e s s e d  th e  Rule o f  Law about which s p e c i f i c
p r o v i s io n  was a ls o  made by r e p ro d u c in g  the  In d ia n  A r t .  14 which
guaran teed  " e q u a l i t y  b e fo re  th e  la w "  and a ls o  "e q u a l  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  law "
17to  a l l  persons  ( t o  c i t i z e n s  o n ly  i n  P a k is ta n  and B a n g la d e s h ) .
5.87 However, i n  a l l  cases, any in c o n s is te n c y  a f f l i c t e d  th e
" e x i s t i n g  la w "  a ls o .  A lthough  the  scope o f  t h i s  p r o v is io n  was l i m i t e d
18by th e  Supreme C o u r t ,  by e v o lv in g  th e  d o c t r in e  o f  e c l i p s e ,  i t  d id  n o t ,
a p p a r e n t ly ,  u n l i k e  th e  p r o v is io n  i n  M a la y s ia ,  embody th e  p resum p tion  o f
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y .  The In d ia n  P a r l ia m e n t  c u r t a i l e d  th e  scope o f  j u d i c i a l
re v ie w  i n  v i r t u e  o f  th e  supremacy c lause  in  1971 by adding c lause  (4 )  to
A r t . 13 t o  p ro v id e  t h a t  th e  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  a r t i c l e  shou ld  n o t  app ly  to
20amendment o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  Thus, in  I n d i a  i t  was sought t o  be made
c le a r  t h a t  a lthough  th e  supremacy c lause  was (e ls e w h e re  a ls o )  p o s i t e d  i n  the
" P a r t "  c o n ta in in g  "Fundam enta l R ig h ts " ,  even th e s e  r i g h t s  co u ld  be v a l i d l y
ab roga ted  by an amendment o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  and a s u c c e s s fu l  j u d i c i a l
21c h a l le n g e  to  such an e x e r c is e  was im p o s s ib le .
5 .88  Among some o th e r  g e n e ra l  f e a tu r e s  o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  t h e
In d ia n  s u b - c o n t in e n t  m en t ion  must be made o f  th e  p r o v is io n s  which th e  
fo u n d in g  f a t h e r s  in  I n d ia  c o n s id e re d  to  be a " n o n - j u s t i c i a b l e "  B i l l  o f
27
R ig h t s . "  In  I n d ia  these  are c a l l e d  " D i r e c t i v e  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  S ta te  P o l i c y "
( a l s o  in  P a k is ta n  in  1956; i n  1973, " P r i n c i p l e s  o f  P o l i c y " )  and are p la ce d
a f t e r  th e  "Fundam enta l R ig h t s " ,  in  a se p a ra te  " P a r t "  ( " C h a p te r "  in
23P a k is t a n ) ;  in  Bangladesh and S r i  Lanka th e y  preceded th e  "Fundam enta l
R ig h ts "  and were c a l le d  r e s p e c t i v e l y  "Fundam enta l P r i n c i p l e s  o f  S ta te  P o l i c y
24and " P r i n c i p l e s  o f  S ta te  P o l i c y " .  To which ca te g o ry  ( j u s t i c i a b l e  o r  non-
j u s t i c i a b l e ) , one may ask, be longed  th e  "Fundam enta l D u t ie s "  i n s e r t e d  i n  the
I n d ia n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  in  1976 as P a r t  IVA, o f  which A r t . 5 1 - A ( a )  p r o v id e d ,
i n t e r  a l i a  t h a t  i t  s h a l l  be th e  du ty  o f  eve ry  c i t i z e n  " t o  ab ide by th e
25C o n s t i t u t i o n  and re s p e c t  i t s  i d e a l s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s "  ? In  P a k is ta n  th e re  
i s  a s i m i l a r  p r o v i s i o n ,  a l b e i t  i n  a m o d i f ie d  fo rm ,  which in  1973 makes
"obed ience  to  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  and la w "  ( i n  1962, o n ly  " la w " )  th e  " b a s ic
26o b l i g a t i o n  o f  eve ry  c i t i z e n " .  ' These p r o v is io n s  are n o te w o r th y ,  b u t  th e  
In d ia n  p h ra s e o lo g y ,  as w e l l  as th e  a d d i t i o n a l  In d ia n  p r o v is io n  ( c la u s e  (b )  
n f  A r t .  51-A) which impose " d u t y "  i n  exp ress  te rm s  " t o  sa fegua rd  p u b l i c  
p r o p e r ty  and to  a b ju re  v i o l e n c e " ,  deserve g r e a te r  a t t e n t i o n .  U n l i k e  the  
" d i r e c t i v e  p r i n c i p l e s "  which aro e x p re s s ly  made n o n - j u s t i c i a b l e , th e  
" fu n d a m e n ta l d u t i e s "  can p o s s ib ly  be rega rded  as e x c e p t io n s  to  the  j u s t i c i e b
" fu n d a m e n ta l  r i g h t s " ,  so t h a t  an i n d i v i d u a l  who has taken  p a r t  in  an 
" u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l "  p o l i t i c a l  a g i t a t i o n  e i t h e r  by r e s o r t i n g  t o  " v i o l e n t "  
methods o r  by denouncing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  " i n s t i t u t i o n s "  can p o s s ib ly  
f o r f e i t  h i s  r i g h t  to  e n fo rc e  h i s  " fu n d a m e n ta l  r i g h t s " .  In  o th e r  uiords i t  
can p o s s ib ly  be argued t h a t  P a r t  I I I  ( fu n d a m e n ta l  r i g h t s )  has to  be read 
s u b je c t  to  P a r t  IV A ( fu n d a m e n ta l  d u t i e s ) .
5 .89 I t  i s  n o t  p o s s ib le  t o  p r e d i c t  th e  j u d i c i a l  approach in  the
m a t te r  b u t  suppo rt  f o r  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  i s  to  be found  in  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e
b ackg roun d . In  P a k is ta n  n o t  o n ly  were the  two M a r t i a l  Law reg im es which
preceded th e  two C o n s t i t u t i o n s  p a te n t l y  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  b u t  they  were,
in  t u r n ,  preceded by v i o l e n t  p o l i t i c a l  d e m o n s t ra t io n s  and u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
27a c t i v i t i e s .  In  I n d ia  to o  the  Prime M in i s t e r  accused th e  o p p o s i t io n
p a r t i e s  o f  a d o p t in g  what th e y  them se lves  a d m it te d  t o  be " u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
28means" in  a speech made in  P a r l ia m e n t  on 3 u ly  72, 1975. ' She spoke o f  
t h e i r  " d ie r u D t iv e  c h a l le n g e "  and o f  th e  need to  "u p h o ld  th e  s a n c t i t y  o f  the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  and o f  P a r l ia m e n t " .  She observed  t h a t ,  " P o l i t i c a l  l i b e r t y  
and p o l i t i c a l  r i g h t s  can e x i s t  o n ly  so lo n g  as p o l i t i c a l  o rd e r  re m a in s "  
and t h a t  "e v e ry  r i g h t  t h a t  th e  S ta te  concedes to  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  imposes 
o b l i g a t i o n  on h im , "  b h i l e  r e f e r r i n g  c a t e g o r i c a l l y  t o  the  " v i o l e n t  a g i t a t i o n "  
t h a t  was b e in g  c a r r i e d  on i n  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  th e  c o u n t r y .  Even i f  th e  
In d ia n  l e g i s l a t i v e  background i s  ig n o re d ,  th e  In d ia n  and P a k is ta n  c o u r ts  
c o u ld  bo th  seek gu idance  i n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  s t a t u t e s  from  A r t . 6 (1 )  o f  th e  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Covenant on C i v i l  and P o l i t i c a l  R ig h ts  o f  1966, which has 
e n te re d  fo r c e  in  1976 and now has a c la im  to  rank  e q u a l l y  w i th  the  dom es t ic
5 .90  The B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts  o f  Commonwealth Asian S ta te s ,  c o m p r is in g
th e  In d ia n  s u b -c o n t in e n t  as w e l l  as M a la y s ia  and S ingapo re , j u s t i c i a b l e  
as w e l l  as in  S r i - L a n k a ,  n o n - j u s t i c i a b l e , d i f f e r e d  in  scheme and 
s t r u c t u r e  from those  o f  Commonwealth A f r ic a n  s t a te s  in  t h a t ,  u n l i k e  th e  
l a t t e r ,  they  do n o t  f o l l o w  th e  European C onven t io n  on Human R ig h ts  to
ft '  *JL
gua ra n te e  ’’th e  c l a s s i c a l  f reedom s” ; in s te a d  th e y  f o l l o w  th e  scheme
30adopted in  the  In d ia n  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  Even i n  the  u n i t a r y  s t a t e s
(B ang lad esh , S r i  Lanka and S ingapo re ) th e  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts  i n c lu d e  freedom
o f  movement and re s id e n c e  ( u n l i k e  th e  European C o n v e n t io n ) ,  f o l l o w i n g  th e
31f e d e r a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  I n d ia  and P a k is ta n .  Indeed , in  I n d i a  and
P a k is ta n ,  u n l i k e  A f r i c a ,  th e  in c o r p o r a t io n  o f  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts  i n  independence
C o n s t i t u t i o n s  was b u t  the  f u l f i l m e n t  o f  a lo n g - c h e r is h e d  n a t i o n a l  
32a s p i r a t i o n  and n o t  a work o f  c o l o n i a l  m a s te rs  d is c h a rg in g  t h e i r
33o b l i g a t i o n  under th e  European C o n v e n t io n .  However, i t  i s  necessa ry
t o  e x p la in  th e  genes is  o f  one p a r t i c u l a r  p r o v is io n  by em phas is ing  t h a t
th e  Bangladesh C o n s t i t u t i o n  and a ls o  th e  1973 P a k is ta n  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,
in  p r o h i b i t i n g  t o r t u r e  were a p p a re n t ly  i n s p i r e d  n o t  by th e  European
C onven tion  b u t  by a s in c e re  d e s i r e  to  p re v e n t  th e  re c u r re n c e  o f  th e
34u n p le a s a n t  e ven ts  o f  the  p a s t .
(B) P e rsona l L i b e r t y ,  P re v e n t iv e  D e te n t io n  and Emergencies
5.91 In  I n d ia ,  the  s e v e ra l  ’’r i g h t s  t o  f reedom ”  are grouped i n t o  two
35p a r t s .  One g roup , which in c lu d e s  the  r i g h t  t o  movo f r e e l y  and t o  r e s id e  
and s e t t l e  in  any p a r t  o f  I n d ia ,  was covered by A r t .  1 9 (1 ) ,  w i th  exp ress  
d e ro g a t io n s  ( ’’ re a s o n a b le  r e s t r i c t i o n ” ) enumerated i n  re s p e c t  o f  those  
r i g h t s  i n  s u b -c la u s e s  (2 )  t o  ( 6) o f  th e  a r t i c l e .  I n  re s p e c t  o f  freedom 
o f  movement d e ro g a t io n  i s  a l lo w e d  i n  the  ’’p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t ”  everywhere 
excep t i n  S r i  Lanka, where s . 18 (2 )  p ro v id e s  a m u l t i p le - g r o u n d  common 
c lause  f o r  d e ro g a t io n  from  a l l  ’’ fu ndam en ta l r i g h t s  and f re e d o m s” .
5 .9?  A r t s .  20 t o  22 are those  which d e a l  s o le l y  w i th  p e rs o n a l
l i b e r t y  i n  th e  In d ia n  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  S ub -c lause s  ( 3 ) ( b )  t o  (7 )  o f  A r t . 22 
d e a l t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  w i th  ’’p r e v e n t iv e  d e t e n t io n ” , w h i le  th e  o th e r  p r o v is io n s  
o f  t h i s  group r e - a f f i r m  th e  v a r io u s  common law p r o t e c t i o n s ,  i n c lu d in g  th e  
r i g h t  t o  be in fo rm e d  o f  t h e  grounds o f  a r r e s t ,  th e  r i g h t  a g a in s t  s e l f -  
i n c r im in a t i o n  and th e  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a in s t  doub le  je o p a rd y .  A r t .  21 in  
p a r t i c u l a r  deserves t o  be q uo ted :
No person s h a l l  be d e p r iv e d  o f  h i s  l i f e  o r  p e rs o n a l  
l i b e r t y  except a c c o rd in g  to  p rocedu re  e s ta b l is h e d  by
[em phas is  added]
36In  GOP ALAN the  Supremo C ourt c o n s tru e d  th e  u n d e r l in e d  words to
exc lude  th e  concept o f  "due p ro ce ss "w h ich  had in  f a c t  found  p la c e  in
th e  o r i g i n a l  d r a f t ,  a l th o u g h  s e v e r a l  members s t r o n g ly  p leaded  t o  r e t a in  
37th e  same. In  Bangladesh ( A r t . 32) and in  P a k is ta n  ( A r t . 5 (2 ) in  1956
and A r t . 9 in  1973) th e  word "p ro c e d u re "  i s  o m i t te d  by u s in g  th e  ph raseo lo gy
"save in  accordance w i th  la w "  in te n d in g  perhaps t o  make a d e l ib e r a te
d e p a r tu re  from  the  In d ia n  p r o v i s i o n ,  a l thoug h  th e  change was n o te d  w i th
38g re a te r  care  in  M a la y s ia .  In  S r i  Lanka, A r t . 18 (1 )  (b )  i s  t o  th e  same
e f f e c t  b u t  i t  speaks o f  " s e c u r i t y "  in  a d d i t io n  to  " l i f e "  and " l i b e r t y "
and, on th e  o th e r  hand, S r i  Lanka, u n l i k e  P a k is ta n  and Bangladesh does
n o t  f o l l o w  I n d ia  i n  r e - s f f i r m i n g  th e  o th e r  common law p r o t e c t i o n s  in d ic a te d
e a r l i e r .  In  Bangladesh A r t . 4 3 ( a ) ,  f o l l o w in g  the  f o u r t h  amendment o f  the
American C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a lso  gua ran tees  to  th e  c i t i z e n  th e  r i g h t  " t o  be
secure in  h ie  h o m e  a g a in s t  e n t r y ,  search end s e iz u r e " ,  th e  course which
39th e  fo u n d in g  f a t h e r s  in  I n d ia  re fu s e d  to  f o l l o w .
5.93 I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  the  p r o v is io n  f o r  p r e v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n  co n ta in e d
in  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  Commonwealth A s ia  are u n iq u e  in  one r e s p e c t .  
Everywhere, even in  S r i  Lanka (where th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  does n o t  c o n ta in  
exp ress  p r o v is io n  e i t h e r  a u t h o r i s in g  o r  p r o h i b i t i n g  such m easu res ) ,  
p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n  i s  p e r m i t te d  as a^peace tim e^m easure . Howi these  
p r o v is io n s  found  a p lace  in  the  In d ia n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  deserves 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  The p r o v is io n  d id  n o t  appear in  the  f i r s t  d r a f t  o f  th e  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  A f t e r  th e  C o n s t i t u e n t  Assembly had debated and s e t t l e d  th e  
l e g i s l a t i v e  competence o f  the  Union and th e  S ta te s  ( a d o p t in g  th e  scheme o f  th  
1935 c o l o n i a l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  then  in  f o r c e ) ,  i t  became n e ce ss a ry ,  s a id  D r. 
Ambedkar ( t h e  Chairman o f  th e  D r a f t i n g  C om m it tee ) ,  t o  p ro v id e  f o r  
" l i m i t a t i o n s "  on those  powers,. D esp ite  th e  p l a u s ib le  e x p la n a t io n ,  the  
p ro p o s a l  o f  the  D r a f t i n g  Committee ( f i g u r i n g  as c la u so  15-A) was h o t l y
debated, with members expressing two opposite views with great force
and s in c e r ity .  L ife  a id  l ib e r t y ,  according to  some, were the most
cherished freedoms and, as the provision made serious encroachments
on them, the proposal should not be accepted. Others re fe rre d  to the
widespread subversive a c t iv i t ie s  then current in  d if fe re n t  parts  o f the
country and pleaded fo r  strong measures to  p ro tec t the "security  of 
40the s ta te " .
5 .94 I t  i s ,  however, d i f f i c u l t  to say whether the acceptance of the
proposal came as a re s u lt o f the p ra c t ic a l explanation of Or. Ambedkar
or because of the  force o f the last-m entioned arguments. Whatever may have
been the reason, i t  cannot be denied th a t the fa c t th a t "preventive
detention" was an e x is tin g  provision under the c o lo n ia l C onstitu tion
41d e f in ite ly  had same bearing on the decision to  re ta in  i t .  S ix years
la te r  the f i r s t  Indian Prime M in is te r , Pandit 3awaharlal Nehru, to ld  M ichael
Brecher th a t he did not l ik e  the Preventive Detention Act, in  rep ly  to  h is
question whether such a measure had a place in  a democratic s ta te  except
in  tim e of n a tio n a l emergency. In  the whole o f In d ia , there were then
only 150 persons held under the Act, of whom only ten were " p o l i t ic a l
people" and the re s t were the "gangsters and ooondas" operating in  big
c it ie s ,  said the Prime M in is te r . There were "plenty o f p o l i t ic a l
opponents" said he, but only those who indulged in  "vio lence" were put 
42in  p riso n .
5.95 I t  is  necessary to  quote at length the Ind ian  p ro v is io n , e ls . (4 )
to  (7 ) of A r t .22 which has not only acted as a general model fo r  s im ila r
provisions in  the C onstitu tio ns  of Asian s ta tes  o f the Commonwealth but
has been the source of a "jurisprudence of preventive detention" in  In d ia
which has been described as *an odd but in e v ita b le  ju r id ic a l  phenomenon".^
(4 ) No law provid ing fo r  preventive detention s h a ll authorise  
the detention of a person fo r  a longer period than three  
months unless -
(a ) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who a re , or have 
been, or are q u a lif ie d  to  be appointed as, Judges of a 
High Court has reported before the exp ira tio n  o f the 
said  p erio d . . . t h a t  there is  in  i t s  opinion s u ff ic ie n t  
cause fo r  such deten tion :
Provided th a t nothing in  th is  sub-clause s h a ll authorise  
the d e ten tio n . . . beyond the maximum period prescribed  
by. • • Parliam ent under s u b -c l.(b ) of c l . ( 7 ) ;  or
(b ) such person is  detained in  accordance udth the provisions  
of any law made by Parliam ent under s u b -c ls .(a ) and (b ) 
of c l . ( 7 ) .
(5 ) When any person is  deta ined. . . the au th o rity  making the 
order s h a ll ,  as soon as may be. communicate to  such person 
the grounds on uhich the order has been made and s h a ll 
a ffo rd  him the e a r l ie s t  opportunity o f making
a representation  against the o rder.
(6 ) Nothing in  c .(5 )  s h a ll requ ire  the a u th o rity . . . to  
disclose fa c ts  uhich such a u th o rity  considers to  be 
against p u b lic  in te re s t  to d isc lo se .
(7 ) Parliam ent may by lam prescribe -
(a ) the circumstances under uhich, and the class or classes of 
cases in  uhich, a person may be detained fo r  a period longer 
than three months. . . u ithout obta in ing  the opinion of an 
Advisory Board. . . ;
(b ) the maximum period fo r  uhich any person may be detained
in  any class o r classes of cases be detained under any lau  
. . . ;  and
(c ) the procedure to  be fo llo u ed  by an Advisory Board in  an 
in q u iry  under e u b -c l.(a )  o f c l . ( 4 ) .  [emphaai8 added]
5 .96  I t  is  to be noted th a t although the Indian Supreme Court has over­
ru led  i t s  e a r l ie r  decision th a t c ls . (4 )  to  (7 ) made up a "complete code"
44of preventive detention by accepting the m inority  v ieu  in  GOPALAN, i t
has s t i l l  to a rr iv e  at a consensus on tuo broad aspects o f norms of
construction uhich, in  our op in ion , are o f paramount importance. F i r s t ly ,
i t  is  necessary, ue submit, to accept the pos ition  th a t ,  uhether or not
one subscribes to  the v ieu  th a t the Indian C onstitu tio n  is  a "goal-
45o rien ted " or "dynamic" document, one has to  concede th a t some of the
"fundamental r ig h ts "  are in  fa c t  p re -e x is tin g  r ig h ts  uhich are not
"conferred" fo r  the f i r s t  time by the C onstitu tio n  but are merely
46"guaranteed" in  the provisions o f P art I I I .  Secondly, on a p r io r i
considerations, even fo r  a dynamic in te rp re ta t io n , i t  is  necessary to  
read as a whole and harmonise ( i f  and where necessary) the re levan t 
provisions of the C onstitu tio n  on any p a r t ic u la r  aspect not merely 
genera lly  but to carry th is  process down to  the several "P arts",
"Chapters" and "A rt ic le s "  and the "clauses" and "sub-clauses" th ereo f so 
th a t the dynamics o f the process are able to  acquire v i t a l i t y  and also  
c r e d ib i l i ty  by attach ing  to , ra th e r than d ivorcing  from, the hard core 
of the basic values o f p e ren n ia l importance common to  mankind inc lud ing  
the Ind ian  s o c ie ty . In  th is  view of the m atter the several clauses  
and sub-clauses of A r t .22 ought to  be read together to  ascerta in  the 
tru e  in te n t and purport o f the p ro v is io n . Ue submit th a t by reading the 
provision in  the broad perspective along with the le g is la t iv e  l i s t s  and 
the preamble and by tak ing  note o f i t s  own sp ec ia l s e ttin g  in  P art I I I ,  i t  
can be e a s ily  seen th a t the dominant idea  underlying the provision is  th a t of 
using i t  as a " lim ita t io n "  on a d ra s tic  peacetime law and th ere fo re  
i t  is  not perm issible to  read any p a r t ic u la r  part (c lause or sub-clause) 
of i t  as an "enabling" provision and some other p art o f i t  as an 
"exception", using common law term inology. U nfortunate ly  there  was an 
apparent lack o f consensus among the judges on th is  po int but there  
was nevertheless a general recognition  o f the  fa c t th a t the C onstitu tio n  
sought to  co n tro l the power o f preventive detention by vesting  
exclusive le g is la t iv e  competence under c l . (7 ) in  Parliam ent in  respect 
o f a " t im e -lim it"  and by provid ing  c e rta in  mandatory safeguards in  the 
other clauses.
5.97 I t  is  true  th a t the Ind ian  5upreme Court has gradually  moved
towards the pos ition  which the Pakistan court had estab lished  at a very
e a rly  stage in  so fa r  as ambit o f sub jective  s a tis fa c tio n  of the deta in in g
47au th o rity  is  concerned. But as we s h a ll see n e ith e r court appsar to  
have attached importance to  the fa c t  th a t the C onstitu tio n  i t s e l f  had vested  
the  "u ltim a te "  power in  the Advisory Board by providing th a t i t  was the
48"opin ion” of the Board th a t had to  even tu a lly  p re v a il .  Indeed, in
In d ia  an a d d itio n a l provision was to  be found in  c l . (7 ) dealing  obviously
u ith  sp ec ia l "cases" and "circumstances" but i t  is  submitted th a t the
clause ought not to  be read as an "exception" but i t s  true in te n t  and
purport ought to  be id e n t i f ie d .  I t  i s  submitted th a t exclusive le g is la t iv e
competence was vested in  Parliam ent not merely fo r  the  reason th a t such
m atters as uiere l ik e ly  to  cause serious in fra c t io n s  of the r ig h t  to  personal
l ib e r ty  ought to  be d e a lt w ith a t a h igher le v e l but also fo r  the reason
th a t in  a fe d e ra l p o lity  i t  uias necessary to  achieve u n ifo rm ity  in  such 
49m atte rs . On th is  v ieu  i t  i s  submitted th a t not only the "maximum period"
ought to  be prescribed by Parliam ent but also the ess e n tia ls  o f the procedure
to  be fo llow ed by the Advisory Board. Houever, ue concede th a t the
v a l id i ty  o f th is  proposition remains to  be tes ted  as arguments on these
lin e s  have not been placed before courts in  In d ia . On the other hand, at
le a s t the m inority  opinion of the Supreme Court has accepted the pos ition
th a t the e ls . (4 ) and (7 ) ought to  be read together to  hold th a t the
c o n stitu tio n  has i t s e l f  la id  doun the "maximum period" of th ree  months as
a general provision and th a t i f  Parliam ent does not make any law to
"prescribe" the maximum period in  no case can detention exceed three  
50months.
5.98 In  Pakistan , in  1956. clauses ( 3 ) ,  (4 ) and (5 ) o f A rt. 7 o f the
C onstitu tio n  reproduced the safeguards embodied in  clauses (3 ) to (6 ) of 
A r t .22 o f the Ind ian  C onstitu tio n  u ith  one s ig n if ic a n t change, in  th a t the 
Advisory Board had to  be co n stitu ted  u ith  persons appointed by the Chief 
Justice  o f the  Supreme Court ( in  the case of a person detained under a 
C en tra l Act) and by the Chief Justice  o f the High Court fo r  the  province 
in  the case of detention under a P ro v in c ia l A ct. There uas no provision  
p a r a l le l  to  clause (7 )  o f A r t .22 o f the Indian C o n s titu tio n . The provisions  
enacted in  1973, ( l a t e r  amended in  respect to t im e -s c a le ) , houever, took a 
d if fe r e n t  form . They uere posited in  clauses (4 ) to  (9 ) o f A rt.10s
clause ( 4 ) ,  as o r ig in a lly  enacted, is  quoted belou in  extenso:
No law providing fo r  preventive detention s h a ll be made 
except to  deal u ith  persons acting  in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l  
to  the in te g r i ty ,  secu rity  or defence of Pakistan , or any 
part th e re o f, or e x te rn a l a f fa ir s  o f Pakistan , or pub lic  
order, or the  maintenance of supplies o r serv ices , and no 
such lau  s h a ll authorise the detention of a person fo r  a 
period exceeding one month unless the  appropriate Revieu 
Board has, a f te r  a ffo rd in g  him an opportunity o f being  
heard in  person, revieued h is  case and reported , before  
the e xp ira tio n  of the said perio d , th a t there i s ,  in  i t s  
opin ion , s u ff ic ie n t  cause fo r  such de ten tio n , and, i f  the 
detention is  continued a fte r  the said  period of one month, 
unless the Revieu Board has revieued h is  case and reported , 
before the e xp ira tio n  of each period of th ree  months th a t  
there i s ,  in  i t s  op in ion, s u ff ic ie n t  case fo r  such d eten tio n .
ThB provision  as respects the "Revieu Board" (Explanation I )  nou la id
doun the common q u a lif ic a t io n  of the Chairman and the members, namely, a
person uho is  or has been a Supreme Court o r High Court Judgs, to  be
appointed, as be fo re , by the appropriate Chief J u s tic e .
5.99 In  the neu clause (5 ) corresponding to  clause (5 ) o f the 1956
p ro v is io n , a t im e - l im it  o f "one ueek" uas provided fo r  communicating
"grounds". Clauses (6 ) to  (8 )  uere e n t ire ly  neu:
(6 )  The a u th o rity . . • s h a ll fu rn ish  to  th e . . . Revieu 
Board a l l  documents re le v an t to  the case unless a 
c e r t i f ic a te ,  signed by a Secretary to  the Government. . . 
to  the e ffe c t  th a t i t  is  not in  the pub lic  in te re s t  to  
fu rn ish  any documents, is  produced.
(7 ) W ithin a period o f tu e n ty -fo u r months commencing on the  
day of h is  f i r s t  d e ten tio n . . . no person s h a ll be 
detained in  pursuance of any such order fo r  more than . . .
e ig h t months in  the case of a person detained fo r  acting  
in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to  p u b lic  order and tu e lve  months 
in  any o ther case:
Provided th a t th is  clause s h a ll not apply to  any person 
uho is  employed by, or uorks fo r ,  or acts on in s tru c tio n s  
received from the enemy.
(8 ) The appropriate Revieu Board s h a ll determine the place of 
d eten tio n . . • and f i x  a reasonable subsistence allouance 
fo r  h is  fa m ily .
The provisions of P ak is tan 's  1973 C onstitu tio n  apparently circumscribed  
to a great exten t the pouer to  make laus fo r  preventive d e ten tio n , by 
provid ing many uholesome lim ita t io n s  in  e x p l ic i t  terms, in  uhich the Indian  
C o n stitu tio n  uas s ig n a lly  d e f ic ie n t .  U nfortunate ly  the  provision in  clause
(6 ) enabling "any" document to  be u ith h e ld  on the mere ipse d ix i t  of the 
executive detracted from the e ffe c tive n e ss  of the safeguard of a hearing  
and also of the neui provision o f an automatic p e rio d ic  rev ieu  contemplated 
under clause ( 4 ) .  I t  is  also to  be noted th a t nouihere in  Commonuealth 
Asia uas there  any c o n s titu tio n a l p ro tection  against detention incommunicado.
5.100 I t  i s ,  however, su rpris ing  th a t the Bangladesh C o n s titu tio n ,
uhich did not o r ig in a lly  contain any express provision on preventive
52d e ten tio n , opted la t e r  fo r  the Indian model. In  1973 the e x is tin g  A r t .33 
uas su b stitu ted  by a neu one and provision fo r  preventive detention uas 
posited in  clauses (4 ) to  ( 6 ) ,  o f uhich clause (5 ) reproduced the provisions  
of the tuo Indian clauses (5 ) and (6 ) in  respect of communication of 
"grounds". Clause ( 4 ) ,  although corresponding to the Indian clause, 
authorised detention fo r  s ix  months instead  of three months and the  
procedure fo r  an " in q u iry"  under clause (4 ) by the Advisory Board, 
according to clause ( 6 ) ,  could be made by la u . The same amending 
Act a lso , fo r  the f i r s t  tim e, introduced P art IX  A ("Emergency Provis ions") 
in to  the C o n s titu tio n . The neu provis ions, A rts . 141A to 141C also  
fo llo u e d  tbe Indian model (as in  1973), reproducing u ith  minor changes 
in  respect of t im e -lim its  the provisions of Indian A rts . 352, 358 and 359 
re sp e c tive ly  u ith  an a d d itio n a l requirement th a t the proclamation of 
emergency "'shall requ ire  fo r  i t s  v a l id i ty  the countersignature of the  
Prime M in is te r" . I t  may be noted th a t in  In d ia  and Pakistan a lso , as in  
Bangladesh, the C onstitu tio n  contemplates the "proclam ation" to  be made 
by the P res iden t.
5.101 Part X V /III of the Indian C onstitu tio n  contains the  "Emergency
P rovis ions". Although Republican In d ia  has been involved in  th ree  major
uars, f i r s t  u ith  China in  1962 and then u ith  Pakistan in  1965 and 1971, the
provisions came to be amended fo r  the f i r s t  time in  1975, and then again
53in  1976 uhen the country uas not threatened u ith  any such even t. Before 
discussing the provisions as amended, i t  may be u sefu l to note th a t the
events th a t led  to  the  s itu a tio n  in  1975 were purely p o l i t i c a l .  On Oune 12,
1975 the Allahabad Hi§h Court had set aside the e le c tio n  of th e  Prime
54M in is te r , Mrs In d ira  Gandhi. Th is  gave a f i l l i p  to  the nation-w ide
c iv i l  disobedience movement planned by the opposition p a rtie s  under the
leadersh ip  o f Mr. 3 .P. Narayan who had e a r l ie r  given c a lls  to  the army and
55the p o lice  to  reb e l against the government. On 3une 25, 1975, the 
President made the "proclam ation* under A r t .352(1) th a t "a grave emergency
56e x is ts  whereby the s ecu rity  o f In d ia  is  threatened by in te rn a l d isturbance".
The C o nstitu tio n  (T h ir ty -e ig h th ) Amendment Act 1975 was enacted on 1st August,
1975, amending re tro s p e c tiv e ly  (among others) A rts . 352, 356, 359 and 360.
The ru lin g  Congress Party appointed the "Suaran Singh Committee" to  suggest
fu r th e r  amenctnents to  the C o n s titu tio n . Following the report o f the
Committee the C o nstitu tio n  (Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976 was enacted
on 18th December 1976, amending various provisions includ ing  those of A rts .
352, 353, 356, 357, 358 and 359 of P art X V I I I .  I t  has, however, to  be
noted th a t the opposition disapproved of th is  venture and in  fa c t ,  except
fo r  a few, a l l  members of the opposition p a rtie s  were rounded up and held
57in  preventive detention a f te r  the proclamation was made.
5.102 Under A rt. 352(1) the President can make a "Proclam ation" i f  he is  
" s a t is f ie d "  th a t a "grave emergency" e x is ts  whereby the "sec u rity "  of the  
whole or any part o f In d ia  is  threatened "whether by war or e x te rn a l 
aggression or in te rn a l d isturbance" but such events, according to  clause ( 3 ) ,  
need not a c tu a lly  take place; an "imminent danger" thereo f is  s u f f ic ie n t  
fo r  th e  exercise o f the power. The proclamation has to  be placed before  
Parliam ent and unless approved w ith in  two months i t  w i l l  cease to  be 
o p e ra tiv e . The im portant e f fe c t  o f the amendments was th a t by the newly 
in s e rte d  clauses (4 )  and (5 ) the President was empowered to  issue  
successive proclamations on d if fe re n t  grounds and ju d ic ia l  challenge to  
the " s a tis fa c tio n "  o f the President or to  the  " v a lid ity "  o f h is  "d ec la ra tio n "  
as w e ll as to  the "continued operation" th ereo f was expressly barred by
*£  f.5
using such expressions as " f in a l  and conclusive" and " s h a ll not be 
questioned in  any court on any ground" and even "n e ith e r the Supreme Court 
nor any other Court s h a ll have ju r is d ic t io n  to  e n te rta in  any question on 
any ground".
5.103 A r t .358 provides fo r  sp ec ia l derogation during an emergency so 
th a t laws could be made in  derogation of A r t .1 9 . The provision fo r  
"suspension of the enforcement o f the r ig h ts  conferred by Part I I I  during 
emergencies" is  to be found in  A r t .35 9 . The President is  empowered to  
"declare" by an "order" th a t "the r ig h t  to  move any court fo r  the enforcement 
of such of the r ig h ts  conferred by P art I I I  as may be mentioned in  the 
order and also a l l  pending court proceedings in  respect thereof "s h a ll 
remain suspended" during an emergency or fo r  such period as may be sp ec ified  
in  the o rd er. This p a r t ic u la r  p ro v is io n , which fig u re d  as clause 280
in  the Ind ian  D ra ft C o n s titu tio n , was perhaps the most h o tly  debated 
provision and the founding fa th e rs  were presented with two opposite 
choices, e ith e r  to  d e le te  i t  in  to to  o r to  enable suspension of fundanental
r ig h ts  (e s p e c ia lly  suspension o f habeas corpus) to  be e ffe c te d  not by the
58executive but by P arliam ent. Again, as in  the case of the provision of 
preventive d e ten tio n , the choice in  favour o f re ta in in g  i t  was d ic ta te d  by 
the subversive a c t iv i t ie s  then continuing but the power was subjected to  
Parliam entary superv is ion . Thus, clause (3 )  o f A r t .359 provides th a t  
"as soon as" an order under clause (1 ) is  made, i t  "s h a ll"  be la id  before  
Parliam ent.
5.104 The new clause (1 -A ) which was in serted  in  A r t .359 re tro s p ec tiv e ly  
in  August 1975 (a f t e r  the proclamation of emergency was made e a r l ie r  th a t  
year in  3une) has brought about a major change in  the s tructure  of the 
emergency provisions of the  C o n s titu tio n . I t  enables the "S ta te"
(Parliam ent as w e ll as S tate  le g is la tu re s  and also the President) to  make 
temporary laws in  derogation of those r ig h ts , the enforcement o f which is  
suspended under c l . ( 1 ) ,  to  have e f fe c t  so long as the order under the said
clause is  in  operation; the  provision covered an "executive action" a lso .
The provision in  fa c t  enlarged the ambit of A r t . 358 under which the
provision of derogation is  re s tr ic te d  to A r t .19 and the  automatic suspension
does not extend to the r ig h t  o f personal l ib e r ty  guaranteed in  A r ts .20 to
22 or even to  A r t .14 guaranteeing the r ig h t  of e q u a lity . I t  is  to be noted
in  th is  connection th a t under A rt.123  the President can le g is la te  (when
Parliam ent is  not in  session) by promulgating "Ordinances" i f  he is
" s a t is f ie d "  th a t "immediate action" is  necessary. The amending Act o f 1975
added a new clause (4 ) in  A rt. 123 to  provide th a t the "s a tis fa c tio n "  o f the
President s h a ll be " f in a l  and conclusive end s h a ll not be questioned in  any
court on any ground". As a r e s u lt ,  we submit, i t  became possible in
Republican In d ia  to ru le  by means of decrees and also to  enact
comprehensive "Emergency Codes" in  derogation of the whole of P art I I I
59(Fundamental R ig h ts ). The pernicious aspect o f c l. (1 -A )  was 
apparently re fle c te d  in  the fa c t  th a t i t  covered "any executive action"  
also and the e f fe c t  o f the temporary laws and also executive actions uas 
expressly saved "as respects th ings done or om itted to  be done".
5.105 In  Pakistan , A r t .191(1) in  1955 and A r t .232(1) in  1973, 
reproduced in  substance the Ind ian  A rt. 352(1) but on each occasion there  
was a proviso to  clause (2 )  uhich expressly denied the power to  "suspend 
e ith e r  in  whole or in  p a rt the operation of any of the provisions o f 
the C o n stitu tio n  re la t in g  to  High Courts". I t  i s  to  be noted, however, th a t  
clause (2 )  did not correspond to  the Indian A rt. 358 but to  A r t .353 under 
which, as in  Pakistan (under clauss (2 ) o f A rts . 191 and 232 of 1956 and 
1973 re s p e c tiv e ly ), the le g is la t iv e  as w e ll as executive power o f the  
Centre could p re v a il on c e rta in  conditions over th a t o f the region during an 
emergency. I t  was th e re fo re  d i f f i c u l t  to  argue th a t the proviso in  any way 
detracted  from the force of the  provision fo r  "suspension of the r ig h t  to  
move the court fo r  the enforcement o f fundamental r ig h ts " , which was s im ila r  
in  terms to  the Indian Ar t . 3 5 9 ( 1 ) I n Pakistan a lso , as in  In d ia , the
proclam ation, as w e ll as th s  suspension order made by the  P res iden t, were
61both subjected to Parliam entary c o n tro l. In 1973 clause (6 ) of A r t .232
authorised Parliam ent to make law to  extend i t s  l i f e  by a year during an 
62emergency.
5.106 In  S ri Lanka in  the 1972 C o n s titu tio n , Chapter XVI contains the 
re levan t prov isions, captioned "Public  S ecu rity" , encapsulated wholly and
63s o le ly  w ith in  s .134. Sub>s.(1) provides th a t the Public  Security  Ordinance
s h a ll be deemed to  be a law enacted by the N atio n a l S tate Assembly, w hile
s u b -s .(2 ) contemplates th a t the President " 'sh a ll"  declare a "s ta te  of
emergency" upon the Prime M in is te r  "advising" him of the "existence or the
imminence o f a s ta te  of p u b lic  emergency" and th a t ,  during such p erio d , he
" s h a ll act on the advice o f the Prime M in is te r  in  a l l  m atters le g a lly
required  or authorised to  be done by the President in  re la t io n  to  a
s ta te  o f emergency". Ue propose to  deal w ith the Ordinance in  the appropriate
context but in  the present context i t  is  necessary to  re fe r  to  the
c o n s titu tio n a l l im ita t io n s  on le g is la t iv e  power contained in  ss.44 and 45.
The " le g is la t iv e  power" o f Parliam ent includes the power to  repea l or
amend the C onstitu tio n  even to  enacting a new C o n s titu tio n , but the
C o n stitu tio n  cannot be "suspended" e ith e r  wholly or in  p a r t .  Although
s .45 expressly p ro h ib its  "delegation  of p r in c ip a l law-making power", there
is  an exception provided in  clause (4 )  in  the fo llo w in g  term s:
The N atio n a l S tate  Assembly may. • . delegate to  the President 
the power to  make, in  accordance w ith the law fo r  th e  time 
being r e la t in g  to p u b lic  secu rity  and fo r  the duration o f a 
s ta te  of emergency, emergency reg u latio n s  in  the in te re s ts  of 
pu b lic  s e c u rity  and the preservation o f pu b lic  order and the  
suppression of m utiny, r io t  or c iv i l  commotion o r fo r  the
maintenance of supplies and serv ices e s s e n tia l to  the l i f e
o f the  community. . • o v e rrid in g , amending or suspending the  
operation of the  provisions of any law except the provisions  
of the C o n s titu tio n .
I t  may be noted th a t ,  under s . 52, a law " inconsis ten t" with the
C o n stitu tio n  can be passed by the m a jo rity  required fo r  the amendment of
the C onstitu tio n  and such law \ is  required to  be " in te rp re te d  as amending the
[re le v a n t3 provisions of the C o n s titu tio n " .
5.107 I t  is  th ere fo re  apparent th a t the C onstitu tio n  of S r i Lanka, 
of a l l  th e  C onstitu tio ns of the Indian sub-continent, m aintains the  
primacy o f Parliam ent even during an emergency, though i t  contains no 
ju s t ic ia b le  B i l l  o f R ights, in  contrast u ith  the pos ition  envisaged in  the 
other C onstitu tions uhich concede a large measure of freedom to  the  
executive during emergency. Us have also noted th a t of the other three
C o n s titu tio n s , P ak is tan 's  is  the most progressive in  th a t i t  provides many
uholesome checks on the le g is la tu re  and through i t  on the executive , in  so 
fa r  as measures fo r  preventive detention are concerned. Ue may nou turn  to  
examine some of the measures enacted in  the d if fe re n t  s ta te s .
(2 ) Some "preventive detention" laus
(A) In d ia
(a) J1P0AJ1 aid JWIsi!i
5.108 There are twenty-two s ta tes  (besides the nine 'Union te r r i to r ie s " )  
nou forming the Union of In d ia , inc lud ing  the te r r i to r ie s  of the  pre­
independence "Native S tates" uhich have ceased to  e x is t .  Although the 
C onstitu tio n  empowered the S tates also to  make laus on "preventive
64d e ten tio n ", the Union's pouer encompassed a l l  aspects of the  s u b jec t.
I t  is  ev id en tly  not possible to  cover the uhole gamut of the lau  on the
subject enacted, whether by Parliam ent or by the  State le g is la tu re s , or the
subsid iary le g is la t io n  mads by the various a u th o r it ie s , in  th is  study, and
th ere fo re  ue propose to  deal only u ith  some c e n tra l le g is la t io n s  of to p ic a l
im portance. In  1971 Parliam ent passed the Maintenance of In te rn a l
Security  Act (h e re in a fte r  c a lle d  MISA) uhich has been amended from time to
65time but is  s t i l l  the main le g is la t iv e  provision on the s u b jec t. Before
th a t the Preventive Detention Act o f 1950 (h e re in a fte r  ca lle d  PDA) held
the f i e l d . T h e  Preventive Detention B i l l  uas passed on February 15, 1950,
67u ith in  one month of In d ia  becoming a Republic. The measure as enacted 
uas to  have lapsed on 1st A p r il 1951. Even so, i t  uas b i t t e r ly  opposed
as a m a jo rity  of the le g is la to rs  uho formed the vanguard of the freedom
movement had fresh  and v iv id  memories of th e ir  own su ffe rin g s  in  detention
under c o lo n ia l r u le .  I t s  stout defence by Sardar Vallabhbhai P a te l (Home
M in is te r) and the l a t t e r 's  charism atic p erso n a lity  even tua lly  c a rried  the
68day. He spoke as fo llo w s:
The m a jo rity  o f detainees are communists. Our f ig h t  is  
not with communists or those who b e lieve  in  the theory of 
communism but w ith those uhose avowed ob ject is  to create  
d is ru p tio n , d is lo ca tio n  and tamper with communications, to  
suborn lo y a lty  and make i t  impossible fo r  normal government 
based on law to  fu n c tio n . Obviously we cannot deal with  
these people in  terms of ord inary law . . • When the law is  
flo u te d  and offences are committed there is  the c rim in a l law 
which is  put in  fo rc e . But where the very basis o f law is  
sought to be undermined and attempts are made to  create a 
sta te  o f a f fa ir s  in  which. . . men would not be men and law 
would not be law . . .
In  1952 the same Home M in is te r  was able to  secure a new l i f e  fo r  the Act up
to  1957 in  the tee th  of vehement opposition , by c it in g  s ta t is t ic s  to
prove th a t the Act was sparing ly  used and asserting  th a t "expression of
69p o l i t ic a l  opinion was never a ground fo r  d e te n tio n ."
5.109 Section 3 (1 ) o f MISA, which re-enacted in  s u b s ta n tia lly  
u n altered  form s .3 (1 )  of PDA, is  quoted below in  extenso:
The C entra l Government o f the State Government may -
(a ) i f  s a t is f ie d  w ith respect to  any person (in c lu d in g  a fo re ig n e r)  
th a t with a view to  preventing him from acting in  any manner 
p re ju d ic ia l to  -
( i )  the defence of In d ia , the re la t io n s  o f In d ia  w ith fo re ign  
powers, or the secu rity  o f In d ia , or
( i i )  the s ec u rity  o f the State or the maintenance o f pub lic  
order, .or
( i i i )  the maintenance of supplies and services e s s e n tia l to  
the community, or
(b ) i f  s a t is f ie d  with respect to  any fo re ig n e r th a t w ith a view to  
reg u la tin g  h is  continued presence in  In d ia  or with a view to  
making arrangements fo r  h is  expulsion from In d ia , i t  is  
necessary so to  do, make an order d ire c tin g  th a t such person 
be deta ined.
[emphasis added]
By sub-s«(2) i t  was provided th a t the power to  make a detention order in  
respect o f sub-clauses ( i i )  and ( i i i )  o f s u b -s .( l )  could also be exercised  
by d is t r ic t  m agistra tes , a d d itio n a l d is t r ic t  m agistrates (wherever so
7 nempowered) and the Commissioners o f P olice (wherever a p p o in te d ),'u Such
o ff ic e rs  were, however, required to  report the  fa c t  " fo rth w ith "  to  the
appropriate s ta te  government, together with the "grounds" and other
"p a rtic u la rs "  having a bearing on the m atte r, according to  s u b -s .(3 ) , uhich
provided th a t "no such order s h a ll remain in  force fo r  more than twelve
days a f te r  the making th ereo f unless in  the meantime i t  has been approved".
The proviso to  the sub-section in d ica ted  the circumstances under uhich such
72detentions could be fo r  twenty-two (in s tead  of tw elve) days. Under 
s u b -s .(4 ) the s ta te  government uas req u ired , whether i t  had "made or 
approved" any o rder, to  report the  fa c t  together with "grounds" and 
"p a rtic u la rs "  to  the c e n tra l government.
5 .110 . Under s .5 (corresponding to  s . 4, PDA) the  appropriate government 
uas authorised to specify  by a "general or sp ec ia l order" the place of 
detention  and also "conditions in c lu d in g  conditions as to  maintenance, 
d is c ip lin e  and punishment fo r  breaches of d is c ip lin e " . I t  was provided in  
s .6  (corresponding to s . 5, PDA) th a t "no detention order s h a ll be in v a lid
or in o p era tive  merely by reason" th a t e ith e r  the person concerned or the
place of detention was outside the " t e r r i t o r ia l  l im its "  o f the au th o rity  
passing the o rder. On the o ther hand the im portant "c o n s titu tio n a l  
safeguard" uas provided in  s .8 which is  quoted below:
(1 )  When a person is  deta ined. . . the a u th o rity  making the  
order s h a ll ,  as soon as may be. but o rd in a r ily  not la te r  
than f iv e  days and in  exceptional circumstances and fo r  
reasons to  be recorded in  w r it in g , not la t e r  than f i f t e e n  
days, from the date o f d e ten tio n , communicate to  him the  
grounds on uhich the order has been made and s h a ll  a ffo rd  
him the e a r l ie s t  opportunity o f making a^ representation  
against the order to  the appropriate government.
(2 ) Nothing in  s u b -s .(1 ) s h a ll requ ire  the au th o rity  to  disclose
fa c ts  which i t  considers to  be against the pub lic  in te re s t
to d is c lo s e . [emphasis added]
I t  may be noted th a t under the corresponding s .7 o f PDA the  grounds had 
to  be communicated s t r ic t ly  w ith in  f iv e  days. I t  n e ith e r contained the  
expression "o rd in a r ily "  nor the provision of "exceptional circumstances" 
and " f i f te e n  days". However, i t  i s  submitted th a t the expressions under­
lin e d  in  the dbove e x tra c t provided a scope fo r  ju d ic ia l  revieu  so th a t 
in  appropriate cases the courts could grant r e l i e f  by reso rtin g  to s t r ic t  
compliance u ith  the provisions and also by h o ld in g tk a t non-compliance 
u ith  any p a r t ic u la r  mandate th ereo f uas f a t a l  as the provision apparently  
reproduced a c o n s titu tio n a l guarantee ( A r t .2 2 ( 5 ) ) .  I t  is  to  be noted th a t the 
C onstitu tio n  speaks of "a rep resenta tion" but the a u th o rity  to  uhom i t  is  
to  be made » is  not s p e c ifie d . I t  could be said th a t the section contemplated 
representations to  the appropriate government p a r t ic u la r ly  fo r  in s te n t  
r e l i e f  in  such cases as o f mistaken id e n t ity  and th a t another representation  
in  terms of the C o n stitu tio n  fo r  d e ta ile d  in q u iry  uas not excluded.
5.111 The provision fo r  an "Advisory Board" contemplated under A rt.  
2 2 (4 )(a ) uas made in  s .9  uhich corresponded to s .8 o f PDA. Idhether such 
Board uas co n stitu ted  by the  C en tra l or S tate government each Board uas
to have a Chairman and tuo members, a l l  to  be appointed by the appropriate
government, a l l  possessing the c o n s titu tio n a l q u a lif ic a t io n . Although the
C o nstitu tio n  d id  not specify  the appointing a u th o rity , i f  the Act had
s p ec ified  the Chief Ju s tic e , as in  Pakistan , i t  would perhaps have b e tte r
secured the independence of the Board, as the C onstitu tio n  perm itted
appointment o f persons other than s it t in g  judges of the High Court and the
government uas l ik e ly  to  fe e l  disposed to  appoint such persons ra th e r than
73the s it t in g  judges.
5.112 The Board's ju r is d ic t io n  and procedure uere d ea lt u ith  in  a s .10 
and 11 (re -e n a c tin g  ss.9 and 10 of PDA) by providing fo r  reference to  i t
by the  government o f the "grounds" and the "rep resen ta tio n , i f  any", u ith in  
th i r ty  days and fo r  the re p o rt by the Board to  the government w ith in  ten  
weeks from the date o f d e te n tio n . The "proceedings" and the "rep o rt"  of 
the Board (except i t s  "opinion" as to  whether or not there uas s u ff ic ie n t  
cause fo r  the  detention) uere to be "c o n fid e n tia l" ; there  could be a 
personal hearing but no le g a l representation  before the Board, although 
the la t t e r  could c a l l  fo r  " in form ation" from "any person" inc lud ing  the
government before subm itting i t s  re p o rt. Follow ing the c o n s titu tio n a l 
mandate, 8 .12  (s .11  PDA) required  the government to  abide by the re p o rt.
5.113 Apparently, the C onstitu tio n  having vested in  the Board the  
f in a l  or u ltim a te  ju r is d ic t io n  fo r  the exercise o f the power of preventive  
d eten tio n , i t  was but n a tu ra l fo r  the courts to attach the utmost 
importance to th e ir  ro le  and fu n c tio n , a lb e it  the u ltim a te  "opinion" of 
the Board, according to  the C onstitu tio n  (and according to the Acts the  
primary " s a tis fa c tio n "  of the executive a lso) was to  be su b jec tiv e .
Thus, the courts could apparently only ensure th a t the detainee had a proper
hearing before the  Board, although the C o n stitu tio n  did not expressly
specify  the scope o f the hearing and only required  the "grounds" to  be
communicated and the " e a r lie s t  opportunity" to  be given fo r  making "a
rep resen ta tio n ", leaving the "procedure" fo r  the  " in q u iry"  to  be provided
by law . I t  was possible to contend th a t the c o n s titu tio n a l sanction o f
sub jective  s a tis fa c tio n  being lim ite d  to  the acts o f the Advisory Board, the
"prim ary" s a tis fa c tio n  of the executive d id  not deserve equal s ta tu s . The
p o sition  in  th is  respect was the sane in  both In d ia  and Pakistan . While
courts in  Pakistan exercised a la rg e r  measure o f ju d ic ia l  review from the
beginning (a lb e it  w ithout expressly noting  th is  d is tin c t io n  between the two
"s a tis fa c tio n s " ) the Indian courts were slow to  extend the scope of th e ir  
74power.
5.114 Under PDA (v ide  s .11 ) as w e ll as under MISA (v id e  s .13)
the maximum) period of detention was prescribed -  twelve months from the  
date o f d e ten tion . There was, however, a "temporary" anendment o f th is  
provision in  1971 ( in  DISA) when the words "or u n t i l  the expiry o f the  
Defence and In te rn a l Security  o f In d ia  Act 1971, whichever i s  la t e r " ,  were 
in s e rte d  and given re tro sp ec tive  e f fe c t .  I t  has to  be noted th a t the 
"temporary" amencfcnent also a ffe c ted  s .3 (2 ) of DISA by en larg ing  the  powers 
o f the subordinate a u th o r itie s  mentioned th e re in  by extending th e ir
7 5ju r is d ic t io n  to  m atters covered by sub-clause ( i )  o f the sub-section .
I t  was, however, the firs t-m e n tio n e d  amencknent which demanded greater
a tte n tio n  and uas confronted u ith  a ju d ic ia l  challenge, a lb e it  unsuccessfully
Of course the provision fo r  prolonged (nou almost in d e f in ite )  detention
uas sought to  be counterveiled  by enabling the e a r l ie r  revocation or
m o d ification  or even "temporary re lease" of detainees under ss .14  a id  15
(s s .1 3  and 14, PDA). However, the a u th o rity  to make a fresh  detention
order in  the case of revocation uas expressly reserved under e ith e r  Act.
Provision uas also mads in  both Acts to  debar le g a l proceedings " fo r  anything
77in  good fa ith  done or intended to  be done in  pursuance" o f the Acts.
5.115 In  197 5 a  neu provision (not in  PDA) uas in s erte d  in  PlISA as 
7 8ss.16A and 18 . The two sections uere complementary and apparently derived
a u th o rity  from the re tro s p e c tiv e ly  introduced c l . (1 -A )  o f A r t .359 of the
C o n s titu tio n . The v ire s  o f only the s ta tu to ry  (n o t C o n s titu tio n a l)
79am8nctaent uas challenged. According to  s .18 "No person (in c lu d in g  a 
fo re ig n e r) detained under th is  Act s h a ll have any r ig h t  to  personal 
l ib e r ty  by v ir tu e  of n a tu ra l law or common la u , i f  any." By s u b -s .( l )  of 
s.16A i t  uas provided th a t "Notwithstanding anything contained in  th is  
Act or any ru les  o f n a tu ra l ju s t ic e , the provisions of the section s h a ll  
have e f fe c t  during the period of operation" o f the two proclam ations of 
emergency (o f  1971 and 1975) sp ec ified  th e re in . The provisions o f 
s.16A contained draconian measures under uhich a l l  normal c o n s titu tio n a l 
safeguards (p a r t ic u la r ly  o f A r t .22) uere suept auay and replaced by a 
"d ec la ra tio n " made e ith e r  under s u b -s .(2 ) or (2A) or (3 ) of the section  
by the appropriate government or even by an o f f ic e r  (a c tin g  under s .3 (2 ) )  
to  the e ffe c t  th a t the detention uas "necessary fo r  dealing e f fe c t iv e ly  with 
the emergency". The provisions of sub-ss. 3 and 4 o f s .3 (d e a lin g  u ith  
in te rim  detention and re p o rt) uere amended and i t  uas provided (by su b -ss .(6 )
( i )  and ( 7 ) ( i i ) )  th a t the  provisions of ss.8  to 12 o f the Act (d ea lin g  
u ith  the communication of grounds and the hearing b efo re , and opinion o f ,  
the Advisory Board) would not apply to  cases uhere such a d ec la ra tio n
5 .116 The neu p ro v is io n  (s .1 6 A ) ,  uhich ue may describe  as on "Emergency
Code of Preventive D etention", provided fo r  neu forms of safeguards termed 
as "re v ie u " , "consideration" and "re -co n sid era tio n " by the executive  
i t s e l f ,  as contemplated under s u b -ss .(2 ) to  ( 5 ) .  The case of a person 
detained a f te r  25th 3une 1975 (th e  second emergency), but before the 
commencement o f the neu code uas to  be "reviewed"; th a t o f one detained  
a fte r  i t s  commencement uas to  be"considered", in  e ith e r  case by the  
appropriate government, w ith in  f i f t e e n  days, and then "reconsidered" by i t  
p e r io d ic a lly  every fo u r months. In  th is  connection the more draconian 
provisions of s u b -ss .(5 ) and (9 ) may be quoted:
(5 ) In  making any re v ie u , consideration or re -consideration  
under sub - s . ( 2 ) ,  s u b -s .(3 ) or s u b -s .(4 ) , the appropriate  
government or the o f f ic e r  may act on the basis of the 
in form ation  and m a te ria ls  in  i t s  possession or h is  
possession u ith o u t communicating or d isclos ing  any such 
in form ation  or m a te ria ls  to  the person concerned or 
a ffo rd in g  him any opportunity o f making any representation  
against the making under s u b -s .(2 ) , o r the making or 
confirm ing under s u b -s .(3 ) , . . .  o f the declaration  
in  respect o f him.
(9 ) Notwithstanding anything contained in  any other law or any 
ru le  having the force o f law -
(a ) the grounds on uhich an o rd B r o f detention is  made
under s u b -s .(1 ) o f s .3 against any person in  respect 
o f whom a d ec la ra tio n  is  made under s u b -s .(2 ) or
s u b -s .(3 ) and any in form ation  or m a te ria ls  on uhich
such grounds or d ec la ra tio n  . . . are based, s h a ll be 
tre a te d  as c o n fid e n tia l and s h a ll be deemed to  
re fe r  to  m atters o f S ta te  and to  be aqainst the 
p u b lic  in te re s t  to  d isclose and save as otherwise  
provided in  th is  Act, no one s h a ll communicate or 
disclose any such ground, in form ation or m a te ria l or 
any document containing such. . .
(b ) no person against whom an order of detention is  made 
. . . s h a ll  be e n t i t le d  to  the communication or 
disclosure o f any such ground. . . as is  re fe rre d  to  
in  clause (a )  or the  production to  him o f any 
document containing such. . .
[emphasis added]
5.117 I t  is  to be noted th a t u n like  c e rta in  provisions of the Act (PlISA) 
uhich uere "tem porarily  amended" in  v ir tu e  o f the provisions s .6 (6 ) o f
the Defence and In te rn a l S ecurity  Act, 1971, ss.16A and 18 came in  v ir tu e
of the amendments made in  the parent Act i t s e l f  (fllSA) by c e rta in  
Ordinances enacted by the President under A rt. 123. The Ordinances 
n e ith e r  re fe rre d  to  the fa c t  th a t a d ec la ratio n  of emergency and an 
order under A rt. 359(1) were in  operation nor did they specify  the l i f e  
of the new provis ions. Although the v a l id i ty  of the re le v an t C onstitu tio n  
(Amendment) Acts (amending in te r  a l ia  A rt. 359) could not be challenged and 
uere indeed not challenged in  the  HABEAS CORPUS case ( in f r a ) on the other 
hand an in d e f in ite  l i f e  fo r  the provisions of S.16A uhich uere p a ten tly  
u l t r a  v ire s  A r t .22(7) could not be supported on the strength o f A rt.
359(1-A ) .  I t  is  submitted th a t th e  expression "cease to  operate" of 
c l. ( 1 -A )  of A r t .359, l im it in g  the l i f e  o f laus made a id  executive actions  
taken during ths operation o f the Order under c l . ( 1 ) ,  contemplate merely 
an enabling p ro v is io n .
(b ) <lCOFE£OSA''
5.118 Although The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of
80Smuggling A c t iv it ie s  Act uas passed in  1974 (p o p u la rly  c a lle d  COFEPOSA
and re fe rre d  h e re in a fte r  as such) i t  not only a n tic ip a te d , but also came to
be s u b s ta n tia lly  a ffe c ted  by, the powerful wave of the "emergency
amendments" o f 1975 so as to  form a p a rt o f th e  neu "Emergency Code". I t
is  necessary to  quote the preamble in  extenso uhich purports to  expla in
in  d e ta i l  the ra t io n a le  o f the draconian measure:
tdhereas v io la t io n s  of fo re  ion exchange reg u la tio n s  and 
smuqqiinq a c t iv i t ie s  are having an in c reas in g ly  d e le te rio u s  
e ffe c t  on the n a tio n a l economy and thereby a serious adverse 
e ffe c t  on the  sec u rity  o f the S ta te ;
And uhereas having regard to  the  persons by whom and the manner 
in  uhich such a c t iv i t ie s  o r v io la t io n s  are organised and 
carried  on, and having regard to the fa c t  th a t in  c e rta in  
areas uhich are h ig h ly  vu lnerab le  to  smuggling, smuggling 
a c t iv i t ie s  o f a considerable magnitude are c lan d estin e ly  
organised and c a rr ie d  on, i t  is  necessary fo r  the e ffe c t iv e  
prevention o f such a c t iv i t ie s  and v io la tio n s  to  provide fo r  
detention of persons concerned in  any manner th e re w ith :
[emphasis added]
I t  must be noted th a t although entry  3, L is t I I I  authorised a law fo r  
preventive detention  to  be made fo r  "security  o f a S ta te " , (not "the  
S ta te") there uas no power o f such detention in  respect o f e ith e r  
" v io la tio n  o f fo re ig n  exchange reg u latio n s" or "smuggling a c t iv i t ie s "  
even under en try  9 o f L is t I  and the Act could th e re fo re  be challenged  
as void fo r  want o f le g is la t iv e  competence.
5.119 By s .3 (1 )  the  C entra l end S ta te  governments, as w e ll as 
the o f f ic e rs  s p e c ifie d  th ere in  can make a detention order against any 
person i f  " s a t is f ie d "  th a t i t  is  necessary to do so "with a v ieu  to  
preventing him from acting  in  any manner p re ju d ic ia l to  the conservation  
or augmentation of fo re ig n  exchange or u ith  a v ieu  to  preventing him from
( i )  smuggling goods, or
( i i )  ab ettin g  the smuggling of goods, or
( i i i )  engaging in  tran sp o rtin g  or concealing o r keeping 
smuggled goods, or
( iv )  dealing in  smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging 
in  tran sp o rtin g  or concealing or keeping smuggled 
goods, or
(v ) harbouring persons sngaged in  smuggling goods or in  
ab ettin g  the smuggling of goods.
[emphasis added]
Apparently, o f the tuo types of p re ju d ic ia l a c t iv i t ie s ,  the power in  
respect o f smuggling uas much circum scribed. Although the expression 
"in  any manner" also fig u re d  in  PDA and MISA ( in  s .3 (1 ) in  e ith e r  case), 
the c r i t e r ia  here ( "conservation or augmentation of fo re ig n  exchange") 
uas more nebulous than those in d ica ted  in  PDA and PIISA. The expressions 
(underlined  w ith in  brackets) uere l ik e ly  to be read and used co n ju n ctive ly , 
eiusdem generis  by the executive , in  v ieu  o f th e ir  economic context, 
u n lik e  th e ir  counterparts in  PDA and MISA. A "ground" given under 
PDA or niSA, i f  re c ite d  in  such terms as "secu rity  of the s ta te  or the  
maintenance of p u b lic  o rd er" , could be e a s ily  challenged as vague. A 
s im ila r  challenge under COFEPOSA in  re la t io n  to "fore ign  exchange" could be 
e a s ie r than th a t in  respect o f "smuggling" although i t  was possible here 
also to  impute vagueness to  the jo in t  use o f the tuo term s. S u b-s .(3 ) o f
8 .3  o f COFEPOSA corresponded to  s . 8 (1 ) MSA, except th a t i t  did not 
expressly provide fo r  Ha rep resen ta tio n ” and the provision could th ere fo re  
be challenged on th a t ground despite the provision made fo r  "Advisory 
Board" in  s .8 (discussed b e lo u ).
5.120 In  th is  connection reference may be made to  s.5A (in s e rte d  in
811975) uhich is  as fo llo u ss
 ^ Uhere a person has been detained in  pursuance of an order
. . • under s u b -s .(1 ) of s .3  uhich has been made on tuo
or more grounds, such o rd er. . . s h a ll be deemed to
have been made separate ly  on each o f such grounds and 
accordingly -
(a ) such order s h a ll not be deemed to be in v a lid  or
in o p era tive  merely because one or some o f the grounds
is  or are -
( i ) vague
( i i ) n o n -e x is ten t,
( i i i ) not re le v a n t,
( iv ) not connected or not proxim ately connected
such person, or
(v ) in v a lid  fo r  ©ly o ther reascn uhatsoevsr,
and i t  is  not th e re fo re  possib le to  hold th a t the government 
or o f f ic e r  making such order uould have been s a t is f ie d  as 
provided in  s u b -s .(1 ) o f s .3  u ith  reference to  the remaining  
ground or grounds. . .
(b ) the government o r o f f ic e r .  . . s h a ll be deemed to have 
made the o rd er. . • a f te r  being s a t is f ie d . . • u ith  
reference to  the remaining ground or grounds.
The neu "deeming" provision  uas meant to preclude any possible ju d ic ia l
challenge to  a detention order by s p e c if ic a lly  mentioning not only
"vagueness" but other grounds also on uhich the  Indian courts u su ally
granted r e l i e f .  Obviously i t  uas intended to  secure the position  obta in ing
82in  England under the  laus re la t in g  to  the "defence of the  realm ", -  a 
p o s itio n  against uhich the Ind ian  C o n stitu tio n  had made provision in  A r t .22 
uhich the Indian courts , as ue s h a ll see, secured more f irm ly  by 
attach ing  spec ia l s ig n ific a n ce  to  such expressions as "grounds" and 
" fa c ts " , and to  the provision fo r  an"Advisory Board". As in  England, a 
stereotyped order in  the form provided by the Act could nou supply a f u l l  and 
complete ansuer to  a ju d ic ia l  challenge uhether or not in  fa c t there  uas
83a " re a l"  s a tis fa c tio n  in  any p a r t ic u la r  case.
5.121 Under s .8 provision was roads fo r  the co n stitu tio n  of "advisory  
boards” and fo r  the procedure fo r  " in q u iry ” by the Board and fo r  i t s  
"opin ion” in  terms of "sub-clause (a ) of clause (4 ) and sub-clause (c )  
of clause (7 ) of a r t ic le  22 of the  C o n s titu tio n ” , on lin e s  s im ila r  to  
POA and MISA. But provision mas also made fo r  deta in ing  persons (on the  
ground o f "smuggling” on ly) longer than th ree  months biithout obta in ing  the 
opinion o f the Board in  s .9 , which was apparently the precursor o f s .16l\ 
of PI1SA, although s .9 did not ( l i k e  S.16A) to t a l ly  block out "re fe ren ce” 
to  the Board; the inexorab le  t im e - lim it  of three months was re laxed  w ith  
an a lte rn a tiv e  provision fo r  "review ” by the appropriate government. The 
maximum period of detention in  cases not covered by s .9 was f ix e d  at
two years by s .10. There was also provision  in  COFEPQSA ( in  ss.11 and 12)
fo r  revocation and temporary re lease as in  MISA. In  S.12A (in s e rte d  in
1975) "sp ec ia l provision fo r  dealing  with emergency” was made on the
lin e s  of s .16A of MISA, p ro h ib itin g  disclosure o f "grounds” and
in troducing  the provision of "cons idera tion” , "review ” , "recons ideration”
84fo llo w in g  a s im ila r  "d e c la ra tio n ” as was contemplated under MISA.
5.122 bJe thus see th a t in  the republican e ra  out o f the  th ree  p r in c ip a l 
enactments, PDA, MISA and COFEPQSA, only PDA represented "peacetime* 
measures and th a t by amendments made in  1975 in  the other two Acts an 
attempt was made to  es tab lis h  th a t preventive detention measures could be 
more s trin g e n t during an emergency. There was no doubt th a t th e  ju d ic ia ry  
could not question the wisdom of the p o l i t ic a l  judgment o f the ru le rs  in  
d ec la rin g  an emergency, but i t  was c e rta in ly  not powerless to  say whether 
the "Emergency Code” was v io la t iv e  o f the C o n s titu tio n . Apparently the  
new "Code” equalled i f  i t  did not surpass in  sev e rity  in  some respects ,
the measures enacted by the c o lo n ia l ru le rs  in  c u r ta il in g  personal l ib e r t y ,  
whether under the Bengal Regulation or the Rowlatt Act, or even the more 
recent provisions o f the 1939 Defence o f In d ia  Act and Rules, which we have
85discussed e a r l ie r .  However, in  so fa r  as COfEPOSA was concerned, the 
measures being d irec ted  towards ensuring "economic ju s tic e "  they upheld and 
gave l i f e  to  the s p i r i t  o f the C onstitu tio n  to  strengthen the foundations  
of ^economic democracy" in  the country as la id  down by the founding  
fa th e rs . I t  could be expected th a t in  1975 the courts would have 
grown wiser a fte r  th e ir  e a r l ie r  unsuccessful confrontations with  
Parliam ent and th a t they would act in  such a way in  in te rp re t in g  the 
provisions of COFEPOSA as not to  defeat i t s  o b je c t. How the courts  
a c tu a lly  behaved in  th is  m atter w i l l  be examined in  the context o f the  
general ju d ic ia l  response to  preventive detention law, but f i r s t  we may 
turn  to  examine some o f the laws of the other s ta tes  of the sub-continent.
(B) Pakistan and Bangladesh
5.123 I t  is  necessary to  po in t out a t the outset th a t the ro le  of 
preventive detention laws in  these two s ta te s  was not as pronounced as 
th a t in  In d ia  as in  both countries the "regu lations" o f the m a r t ia l law
86regimes played a paramount r o le ,  which we propose to  discuss sep a ra te ly .
The C o n stitu tio n s  o f both s ta tes  perm itted the enactment o f peacetime law
fo r  preventive deten tion , as in  In d ia , b u t, u n lik e  the Ind ian  law ,
The S ecurity  of Pakistan Act (h e re in a fte r  re fe rre d  to as SPA) was enacted
as a temporary measure in  1952, before the C o n s titu tio n .
I t s  ap p lica tio n  was continued although i t  was amended la t e r  from time 
87to  tim e . In  Bangladesh the East Pakistan Public  Safety Ordinance o f
1958 (h e re in a fte r  re fe rre d  to as PSO) enacted by the e rs tw h ile  ru le rs
88was adopted as a Bangladesh law . The p a r a l le l  provisions o f the two
enactments, in  so fa r  as they are re levan t fo r  our purpose, may be
quoted* The SPA provided, in  s .3 (1 ) :
The C entra l Government, i f  s a t is f ie d  with respect to any 
p a r t ic u la r  person, th a t ,  w ith a view to preventing him 
from acting  in  any manner p re ju d ic ia l to  the defence or  
the e x te rn a l a f fa ir s  or the secu rity  o f P ak is tan . . . 
or to  the maintenance o f supplies and services e s s e n tia l  
to  the community, or fo r  the maintenance of pu b lic  o rd er, 
i t  is  necessary so to  do, he may make an order -
(b ) d ire c tin g  th a t he be detained;
Under the PSO, 3 .1 7 (1 ) empowered the  P ro v in c ia l Government, i f  " s a tis fie d "  
with respect to any person th a t "with a view to preventing him" from doing 
any " p re ju d ic ia l act" i t  is  necessary so to  do, to  make an order d ire c tin g  
th a t he be deta ined. I t  i s  necessary, however, to  quote m a te ria l portions  
of s.41 o f PSO, although they had no p a r a l le l  in  SPA but were apparently  
in s p ire d  by the provisions of r .1 2 9 , framed under the Defence o f In d ia  
Act 1939.
(1 ) Any p o lice  o f f ic e r  not below the rank o f Sub-Inspector or  
. • . may a rres t w ithout warrant any person whom he 
reasonably suspects o f having done, or of doing, or o f 
being about to  do, a p re ju d ic ia l a c t.
Under su b -8 .(2 ) the fa c t  had to  be reported " fo rth w ith "  to  the P ro v in c ia l
government and "pending re c e ip t"  o f th e ir  order the  person arrested  could
be committed to  "such custody as the P ro v in c ia l government may, by general
or sp ec ia l order, s p e c ify " . Howsver, proviso ( i i )  l im ite d  the duration of
the "temporary custody" to  two months, under government orders and
according to proviso § i i ) ,  t h i r t y  days, w ithout th e ir  o rd er. I t  may be
noted th a t " p re ju d ic ia l act"  was defined to include a wide range of
a c t iv i t ie s  such as acts endangering pu b lic  safety  or pub lic  o rd er, the
i l le g a l  possession o f arms and also hoarding and smuggling.
5.124 S ub-s .(7 ) of s .3 o f SPA provided th a t such order would remain in
force fo r  the period , i f  any, s p ec ifie d  in  the ordBr, otherwise u n t i l  i t
was revoked. By an amendment, ss.3A, 3B and 3C corresponding
resp ec tive ly  to  ss .14 , 3A and 5 o f the  Ind ian  PDA were introduced to
89provide in te r  a l ia  fo r  temporary re lease o f the deta inees. Under s . 5 
"Advisory Boards" were to  be c o n s titu te d , each with two persons ( s i t t in g ,  
r e t ir e d  or p o te n tia l High Court judges) appointed by the C entra l 
government. The provision fo r  the communication of grounds and fo r  
representation  was contained in  s .6 , which corresponded with s .7 o f 
the Indian PDA but d if fe re d  m a te r ia lly  from the la t t e r  in  c e rta in  
respects . I t  provided fo r  a t im e - l im it  o f 15 days (o r ig in a lly  one month)
and made i t  a "duty” o f the deta in ing  au th o rity  to  inform the detainee
o f h is  r ig h t  to make R ep resen ta tio n " without specify ing  (as  in  In d ia )
90th a t i t  could only be made to the government. The reference to  the
Board could be made w ith in  three months according to s .7 , which was in
other respects s u b s ta n tia lly  s im ila r  to  s .9 o f PDA. The procedure fo r
in q u iry  by the Board prescribed in  s . 8 was s im ila r  to  the Ind ian
provision  ( s . 10, PDA) except th a t o r ig in a l ly ,  according to  s u b -s .(4 ) ,
the opinion of the Board was not binding but the proviso to  the sub-section
contemplated a six-m onthly automatic "review ". L a te r, the Board was also
involved in  the "review" and a second proviso was added with another
91sa lu ta ry  provision in  the fo llo w in g  terms:
Provided fu r th e r  th a t no fresh  o rd er. . • s h a ll be made 
against any person to  take e ffe c t immediately on h is  
re lease from d e ten tio n . • . unless such fresh order has 
been previously approved by the Advisory Board.
The same Amendment Act also in s erte d  another u n p ara lle led  provision  in
new s u b -s .(2A ), which requ ired  the Advisory Board to  specify  in  i t s  rep o rt
the " c la s s if ic a tio n  of the person against whom the order is  made fo r  the
purpose of the ru le s  re g u la tin g  h is  detention in  j a i l " ,  i f  the Board should
hold th a t there was s u ff ic ie n t  cause fo r  h is  d e ten tio n .
5.125 In  1959 an Ordinance was passed by President Ayub Khan, who
was then the Chief M a r t ia l Law Adm inistrator a lso , provid ing th a t s s .5 , 7
and 8 should be "deemed to  have been om itted on 10th October 1958",
namely the date o f the m il ita r y  ta k e -o ve r. I t  is  also to  be noted^th is  was
done when the C onstitu tio n  was suspended, b u t, even before the C o n s titu tio n ,
i t  was provided in  the Act in  s .9 th a t in  m atters concerning the defence,
e x te rn a l a f fa ir s  or secu rity  o f Pakistan , there could be detention  up to
92one year w ithout obta in ing  the opinion of the Advisory Board.
5 .126 In  PSO in  re la t io n  to  the detention order passed under s .17 (1 ) 
there  were p a r a l le l  prov isions in  ss .19 , 19A to  19D fo r  communication of 
grounds, representation  and in q u iry  by an Advisory Board to  be co n s titu te d ,
in  th is  case with a s i t t in g  High Court Gudgs aid another sen ior o f f ic e r
in  the service o f Pakistan to  be nominated by the Governor. Here also there
was an a d d itio n a l provision  fo r  a three-m onthly automatic review  by the
government and the  Board and the re s u lt  o f the review  was to  be communicated
(a lso  under SPA) to  the deta in ee . Following (a n t ic ip a t in g , in  Bangladesh)
the c o n s titu tio n a l mandate, the opinion of the Board was g iv /en  a binding
e f f e c t .  The provisions of PSO apparently provided g reater p ro tec tio n  except
perhaps in  one resp ect. There was no t im e - l im it  fo r  the communication of
grounds: they had to be communicated "as soon as p ra c tic a b le " , a lb e it  in
conformity with the c o n s titu tio n a l requirement as ths C on stitu tio n  also did
not prescribe any t im e - l im it  in  the m a tte r. Reference in  th is  connection
may be made to  the  Uest Pakistan Maintenance of P ub lic  Order 1960 under which
a shorter t im e - l im it  o f two months fo r  detention w ithout the opinion o f the
Board was provided. Apparently the provision was not u l t r a  v ire s  but
the court r ig h t ly  held detention in  a p a r t ic u la r  case fo r  s ix  months
93under the Ordinance (even w ith the Board's opin ion) to  be i l l e g a l .
5.126-A* Special n o tice  has to  be teken of a s ig n if ic a n t aspect o f 
the  provisions of the Pakistan law which ( in  sub-clauses (c ) to  (h ) of
s .3 (1 ) of SPA) contemplated other types o f re s tr ic t io n s  besides d e ten tio n .
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In  th is  respect Pakistan fo llow ed the  o ther s ta tes  o f the New Commonwealth.
In  In d ia , n e ith e r PDA, nor MISA, nor COFEPOSA, contained such p ro v is io n .
By p o s itin g  a lte rn a tiv e  types o f re s tra in ts  in  the same enactment which 
was sought to  be used as an "emergency measure", although enacted as a 
peacetime law , the a u th o rity  was provided with a ready option to  impose 
less  rigorous type o f r e s t ra in t ,  depending upon fa c ts  and circumstances 
of the case. I t  i s  true  th a t the C rim inal Procedure Code o f 1898 (common 
to  both s ta te s ) contained c e rta in  provisions ( in  ss.107 and 144 contemplating  
fu rn ish in g  of secu rity  and o th er re s tr ic t io n s  to prevent "breach o f the  
peace") but fo r  obvious reasons they could not prove equally  e f fe c t iv e  
s u b s titu te s .
(C) S ri Lanka
5.127 In  In d ia  the 1975 amendment o f MISA and COFEPOSA made up a s o rt o f 
"Emergency Code" by invoking the d ecla ratio n  of emergency made under the 
C o n stitu tio n  not only in  1975 but also in  1971, both o f uhich have since 
been continuing u n t i l  1977. In  Pakistan and Bangladesh m a r tia l lau  
re g u la tio n s  made up such a "Code" but in  S ri Lanka ( l i k e  In d ia )  the
"s ta te  of emergency" declared under the C onstitu tio n  continued in  force
from 1971 to  1977, during uhich re so rt uas had not only to  the Pub lic
S ecurity  Ordinance but a d d itio n a l provisions uere also made. A sp ec ia l
"Commission" uas set-up fo r  the t r i a l  of p o l i t ic a l  prisoners and the
Emergency (M iscellaneous Provisions and Pouers) Regulations uere enacted,
of uhich there uas uidespread use, e s p e c ia lly  o f A rts .1 9 (c ) and 20(2) of
Regulation No. 12 o f 1974, under uhich the p o lice  could deta in  any person 
94up to  15 days. However, before proceeding to  examine the provisions of
the Ordinance in  some d e ta i l ,  as i t  uas enacted ( in  1947) as a permanent
measure, us may u s e fu lly  re fe r  to  a general p ro v is io n . In  1972 the
In te rp re ta t io n  Ordinance uas amended to  provide th a t the pouer of the
court to  issue mandates in  the nature o f habeas corpus could be considered
to  be unaffected  by any s ta tu to ry  provision uhich p ro h ib ited  orders being
95"c a lle d  in  question in  any c o u rt" . The provision enabled the  courts to  
ignore and override a s p e c if ic  provision in  another lau  to  the e ffe c t  
th a t s .45  of the Courts Ordinance (uhich d e a lt u ith  habeas corpus) s h a ll  
not apply in  regard to  any person detained under any emergency re g u la t io n .96
5.128 The Public  S ecurity  Ordinance uas a pre-independence enactment
uhich uas modelled on the Emergency Pouers Order in  Council 1939. Under s .2
th e  Governor General ( l a t e r  the P res ident) could issue a "proclam ation" to
b ring  in to  operation P art I I  o f the Ordinance i f  and uhen he uas of the
"opinion" th a t i t  uas "expedient to  do so in  the in te re s ts  of p u b lic
s e c u rity  a id  the preservation  of pub lic  order and fo r  th e  maintenance of
supplies and services e s s e n tia l to  the community" but he uas also to  be 
s a t is f ie d  of the "existence or imminence of a s ta te  of p u b lic  emergency".
The fu lf i lm e n t o f the la s t  mentioned requirem ent, according to  s .3,
"could not be c a lle d  in  question in  any co u rt" . Under P art I I ,  
"reg u latio n s" could be made by him upon the recommendation o f the Prime 
M in is te r  or other authorised M in is te r  as might "appear to  him to  be 
necessary or expedient in  the  in te re s t  o f pu b lic  secu rity  and preservation  
of p ub lic  order and the  suppression of m utiny, r io t  or c iv i l  commotion or 
fo r  the maintenance of supplies and services e s s e n tia l to  the community" 
to  provide fo r  among other th in g s , detention of persons according to  
s u b -s . (2 ) (a ) . However, s .8 provided th a t "No emergency reg u la tio n  and 
no order, ru le  or d ire c tio n  made o r given thereunder s h a ll be c a lle d  in  
question in  any co u rt" . Th is  provision exp la ins  the  reason why there  is  
no case-law on preventive detention in  S r i Lanka d ie re , although under 
the  Republican C o n stitu tio n  of 1972 ju d ic ia l  review o f le g is la t iv e  
provision was c u r ta ile d , i t  ought to  have been possib le , neverthe less , to  
challenge but fo r  the  provision  of s .8, detention orders in  in d iv id u a l  
cases. I t  is  however submitted th a t i t  was possible to  construe s .8  as
not precluding ju d ic ia l  challenge grounded e ith e r  on m alice in  lau  or
9oa
m alice in  fa c t .
5.129 The Ordinance uas amendsd in  1959 when a new P a rt, namely
Part I I I ,  uas added to  i t  to  give "sp ec ia l pouers" to  the Prime
97M in is te r  during emergency. The new P art contained, in te r  a l i a , 
s .12, of uhich re levan t portions may be quoted:
(1 )  Where circumstances endangering the  pu b lic  s e c u rity  in  any 
area have arisen or are imminent and the Prime M in is te r  is  
of the opinion th a t the p o lice  are inadequate to  deal with 
such s itu a tio n  in  th a t area, he may, by order published in  
the g a ze tte , c a l l  out a l l  o r any of the members. . • of 
the armed forces fo r  the maintenance o f public order in  
th a t area.
(2 ) . . . they s h a ll  have pouers in c lu d in g  those of search and 
a rres t conferred on the p o lic e .
(7 ) . . . they s h a ll remain so ca lle d  out u n t i l  the expiry  or 
rescission  o f th a t o rd er.
I t  is  to  be noted, however, th a t despite the fa c t  th a t the use of m il ita r y  
fo r  an undefined period -  and th a t too to  be made dependent on the  
uncontro lled  d iscre tio n  o f a s ing le  functionary -  uas per se o ffe n s iv e , 
the power o f the  armed forces was s ig n if ic a n t ly  re s tr ic te d  w ith in  a narrow 
compass and i t  was not extended p a r t ic u la r ly  to  make deten tions . Under s .20 
i t  was provided th a t persons arrested  by the m il ita r y  s h a ll  be deemed to be 
in  the custody of the  p o lice  but under the ordinary law the p o lic e  also  
had no power to  make d e ten tio n . Some provision fo r  "curfew" uas also  
contemplated under 8.16 but the Ordinance s ig n if ic a n t ly  d id  not provide  
fo r  "preventive detention" and such measures had th e re fo re  to  be provided  
under the temporary "emergency reg u latio n s" as in d ica ted  above.
IV . The J u d ic ia l Response
(1 ) Some im portant decisions of the c o lo n ia l era
5.130 In  re AMEER KHAN, also known as the WAHIBI case, the  prisoner
2
challenged h is  detention under Bengal Regulation 3 of 1818. He uas a 
B r it is h  Indian subject res id en t in  C a lcu tta , who uas arrested  a t h is  
residence on 18th 3uly 1869 and detained in  the A lip u r j a i l  outs ide  
C a lc u tta . An ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus uas made on 1st August 1970.
The prisoner complained th a t he uas n e ith e r  supplied with the copy of the  
warrant under uhich he uas arrested  nor was he allowed the  inspection  
th e reo f and he was not informed even of the nature o f the charge on which 
he uas a rres ted . The case uas argued a t g reat length and various  
contentions were ra ised  on e ith e r  side apparently in v o lv in g  two main 
issues: -  (1 ) whether the court had the ju r is d ic t io n  to  issue habeas 
corpus in  the in s ta n t case, as the prisoner was an Indian subject and 
he was detained outside C a lcu tta ; (2 ) whether the detention uas le g a l.
5.131 On the f i r s t  po in t the court decided in  favour of the  p e t it io n e r
but held  th a t the court would not issue a f u t i l e  w rit as such w r it  could
not operate against the "warrant in  w ritin g  of the Governor General",
3
in  view of the provisions of the  1780 A ct. The ju r is d ic t io n  to  issue
the w r it  but fo r  the p a r t ic u la r  circumstances o f the case was founded
upon English s ta tu te  as w e ll as common law re la t in g  to  habeas corpus.
Reliance was placed on the various provisions o f the 1772 Act and the 1774
Charter o f the Supreme Court uhich, according to  the court, were to  be so
construed "as would enable the court to  issue a w r it  uhich the lau  gives
to  the  subject as a m atter of r ig h t" ,  and reference in  th is  connection
4
uas made to  the decision in  Re COZA ZACHRIAH. The court d id  not merely 
re ly  on the fourth  clause of the 1774 Charter as s ta ted  in  GIRINDRA NATH 
( supra) ,  in  which the correctness o f the  decision has been doubted w ithout 
ta k in g  note o f the  fa c t  th a t can appeal, as we have seen, the 
decision on the po in t o f ju r is d ic t io n  uas not expressly reversed, even i f  
not so endorsed.^
5.132 On the second p o in t, the f i r s t  court mainly considered the v ire s  
of the Regulation and held th a t i t  d if fe re d  from the Habeas Corpus 
Suspension Acts passed by the  B r it is h  Parliam ent in  th a t i t  uas, u n lik e  
those Acts, a permanent measure. I t  uas held th a t ,  "the p r in c ip le s  
uhich ju s t i f y  the temporary suspension of Habeas Corpus Acts in  England 
ju s t i f y  the Indian le g is la tu re  in  en tru s tin g  to the Governor General an 
exceptiona l power of p lacing  in d iv id u a ls  under personal re s tra in t  when, 
fo r  th e  secu rity  of the B r it is h  dominions from fo re ig n  h o s t i l i t y ,  and 
from in te rn a l commotion, such a course might appear necessary to  the  
Governor G en era l."  Thus the court came to  hold th a t the Regulation was 
"not repugnant to the laus of the realm " in  terms of 8 .36  o f the 1772 Act.*’ 
I t  appears th a t the court accepted the pos ition  th a t a f te r  the assumption 
of d ire c t government by the  Croun the d iscrim in atio n  in  the m atter of 
p ro tec tio n  of the B r it is h  laus re la t in g  to personal l ib e r ty  disappeared
7
in  v ir tu e  o f the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, as contended by the
priso ner against the Attorney G eneral's  opposition . I t  is  tru e  th a t the 
Regulation uas enacted in  1818 to  be applied only to  the Ind ian  subjects
and in  th is  respect, as me have seen, the 1780 Act supplied the im plied
8a u th o r ity . Th erefo re , the Regulation could possibly be upheld on the
a u th o rity  o f th e  Parliam entary enactment and n o t, i t  is  subm itted, on
the general a u th o rity  of Ind ian  le g is la t io n , as held by the c o u rt. On
the sane ground the court could also re je c t  the challenge based on the
theory o f a lleg iance  (evolved by Blackstone from Magna C a rta ), uhich uas
g
la te r  embodied in  the 1834 Act in  express term s.
5.133 On appeal the  court also considered uhether the detention  uas
10le g a l in  terms of 8 .2  o f the R egulation. The court held th a t the  
detention  uas not i l l e g a l  even i f  the prisoner uas i l le g a l ly  arrested  and 
th a t i t  uas not necessary th a t the uarrant should be in  the hands o f the  
o f f ic e r  uho is  to  have the custody o f the  prisoner before the  custody 
commences. In  the in s ta n t case a f te r  the prisoner had been arrested  and 
held  in  custody, the uarran t fo r  h is  custody uas issued. The court held  
th a t the uarrant uas not o f a rres t but o f commitment, uhich uas equal to  
conviction  by v ir tu e  o f the Regulation, and the p r io r  detention  of the 
person concerned uas presupposed. Th is  in te rp re ta t io n  uas uarran ted , 
according to the co u rt, to  give e ffe c t  to the in te n tio n  o f the le g is la tu re  
uhich had provided th a t the uarrant " s h a ll be s u ff ic ie n t  a u th o rity  fo r  the  
d e te n tio n " . In  dealing u ith  the nature o f the pouer the  court he ld  th a t  
"the le g is la tu re  intended th a t i t  should be placed beyond a l l  question and 
fo r  th a t purpose declared th a t le g a l i ty  o f imprisonment should depend 
upon the le g a l i ty  and s u ffic ie n c y  o f the imprisonment a lone". On the 
v ire s  o f the Regulation the judges in  appeal adopted a d if fe re n t  approach 
and held th a t the force o f the Regulation nou depended upon the e f fe c t  of 
the la t e r  Acts o f 1850 and 1858, uhatever might have been the p o s ition  in  
1818. I t  uas also held  th a t in d e f in ite  detention contemplated under the  
Regulation did not a ffe c t the ro y a l prerogative  in  th a t the court had
en te rta in ed  the complaint but on in q u iry  found the  "conviction and
commitment" to  be ex fa c ie  good, thus a n tic ip a tin g  the approach of the
11English courts displayed in  the wartime cases.
5 .134 tils may now examine some of the lead ing decisions under the
12c o lo n ia l emergency laws enacted in  In d ia  during the Second World War.
In  KESHAV TALPADE v EMPEROR13 the Indian Federal Court declared r .2 6 ,
framed under the Defence of In d ia  Act 1939, u l t r a  v ire s  s .2 (2 ) (x )  of the
parent Act, uhich provided a re fresh in g  contrast to  the approach o f the
English courts . The prisoner was detained ( " u n t i l  fu r th e r  orders") in
pursuance of an order passed by the government o f Bombay under r .2 6 ,
read w ith r .1 2 9 (4 ) ,  on re c e ip t o f a report from the Commissioner o f P o lice ,
Bombay, th a t he was arrested  and committed to  j a i l  custody by the p o lic e ,
under s u b -rr . (1 ) end (2 )  o f r .1 2 9 .1*  In  the order i t  uas re c ite d  th a t i t
uas necessary to  deta in  him with a view to  preventing him "from acting  in
a manner p re ju d ic ia l to  the defence of B r it is h  In d ia , the p u b lic  s a fe ty , the
maintenance of p ub lic  order end the  e f f ic ie n t  prosecution o f the w ar." The
Chief D ustice, S ir  Maurice Guyer, held th a t although the ru le  authorised
detention fo r  the purposes s ta ted  in  the o rder, para (x )  of 8 .2 (2 )  of
the  parent Act authorised ru les  to  be made fo r  detention of persons
"reasonably suspected" o f the s p ec ifie d  a c t iv i t ie s  and not o f any
15person, as contemplated under the ru le .  His Lordship he ld :
I t  may be th a t the  Government has only made detention
orders in  the case of persons uho are reasonably
suspected in  the manner requ ired  by para ( x ) ,  but th a t  
is  im m ateria l; the  question is  not what the government 
have in  fa c t  done under the ru le  but what the ru le  
authorises them to do. . •
16The decision in  the HALLIDAY case uas held in a p p lic a b le  on the ground
th a t due e ffe c t had to  be given to  ths s p e c if ic  provision  o f para (x )  by
s ta tin g  th a t " i f  para (x )  uere not in  the Act a t a l l ,  perhaps d if fe re n t  
considerations might ap p ly ."
5.135 The decision had two more im portant aspects. I t  was held
17th a t the  bar o f s .16(1) o f the Act did not operate as the order
uas a " n u l l i t y " , having been made by v ir tu e  of an in v a lid  r u le .  In
18re fe rr in g  to  the r e c i t a l  in  the order h is  Lordship observed:
I f  a de ta in in g  au th o rity  gives fo u r reasons. . • w ithout 
d is tin g u ish in g  between them, and any two o r th ree  o f the 
reasons are held to  be bad, i t  can never be certa in  to  
what exten t the bad reasons operated on the  mind of the  
au th o rity  or whether the detention order would have been 
made a t a l l  i f  only one o r two good reasons had been 
before them, bte confess th a t an order in  the terms o f th a t  
under which the a p p e lla n t. . . has been detained f i l l s  us 
with uneasiness. . . [ i t ]  reads l ik e  a mere mechanical 
r e c i t a l  o f the  language o f r .2 6 .  . .
The above e x tra c t shows how th e  Indian courts, not only in  th is  case, but
also in  the subsequent cases, in  the republican e ra  as w e ll,  made
vigorous e ffo r ts  to  r e s t r ic t  the ambit o f the English "sub jective
19s a t is fa c tio n  th eo ry".
205.136 In  EHPEROR v SHIBNATH BAftlERJI. however, the P rivy Council over­
ru led  the  decision and held th a t r .2 6  was not in v a l id .  T h e ir Lordships 
held  th a t the  function  of s u b -s .(2 ) o f 8 .2  o f the parent Act was merely 
an i l lu s t r a t iv e  one and th a t the rule-m aking power was in  fa c t conferred by sub-
( 1 ) ;  th a t the general language of s u b -s .(1 ) amply ju s t i f ie d  the terms of r .2 6 .
I t  is  submitted th a t th e ir  Lordships attached undue importance to  the  
expression "without pre jud ice to  the  g e n e ra lity  o f the  powers conferred by 
8 u b -s .(1 )"  in  th a t in  so f a r  as " i l lu s tr a te d  powers" contemplated under 
8 u b -s .(2 ) were concerned there could be no doubt th a t those powers were to  
be exercised in  the manner prescribed by the  le g is la tu re  and Chief Justice  
Gwyer had r ig h t ly  held  th a t there  would have been a scope fo r  a d if fe re n t  
in te rp re ta t io n  i f  para ( x ) ,  which defined the re levan t " i l lu s t r a te d  power", 
had not been th e re . But, i t  could be said  th a t s u b -s .(2 ) contained a 
s p ec ia l provision  and ought to  p re v a il over s u b -s .(1 ) according to  the  
maxim q e n ere lia  sp ec ia libus  non derooant. Both these aspects were ignored  
by the P rivy  C ouncil. The P rivy  Council was c a lle d  upon to  pronounce 
upon the v ire s  of the ru le  and the correctness of the Federal C ourt's
d ecis ion , in  v ieu  of the  fa c t th a t the prisoner in  the in s ta n t case
challenged the  Ordinance uhich uas enacted by the Governor General to
21n u l l i f y  the e f fe c t  o f the Federal C ourt's  decis ion . Thus, a f te r
holding the ru le  to  be v a lid  th e ir  Lordships observed th a t they uere
22"re lie v ed "  from any consideration o f the impugned Ordinance.
5,137 In  the above case the prisoner had been detained under an order
passed by the A d d itio n a l Home Secretary to  the Government o f Bengal
under r .2 6  and on an ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus he uas d irec ted  to
23be released by the  C a lcu tta  High Court, against uhich decision the
24Croun had appealed to the Federal Court. Varadachariar and Z a fru lla  Khan, 
3 .3 .  of the  Federal Court, had in te r  a l i a , held th a t the provisions of r .2 6  
had not been complied u ith  e ith e r  in  le t t e r  or s p i r i t  in  th a t the  
Governor uas not "personally" s a t is f ie d  and th a t the stereotyped form 
of the  order shoued th a t there uas no re a l s a t is fa c tio n , although th e ir  
Lordships also held  th a t the  "s u ffic ien c y  of the m a te ria l or the  
reasonableness of the grounds" uere not ju s t ic ia b le ;  Spens, C .3 .,  
disagreed on the fa c ts  in  so fa r  as the  f i r s t  p art of the decision uas 
concerned. The P rivy  Council held  th a t the pouer to  make the order could 
be v a lid ly  delegated under the ordinary ru les  of business framed under 
s .59 of the 1935 C o nstitu tio n  but endorsed (a lb e i t  in  a re s tr ic te d  uay) 
the requirem ent o f re a l s a tis fa c tio n  la id  doun by the m a jo rity  by 
s ta tin g  th a t in  the case of a detention order made under r .2 6  fo llo u in g  
an a rre s t (under r .1 2 9 ) the s a tis fa c tio n  (o f  the P ro v in c ia l government) 
(under r .2 6 )  uas dehors the recommendation o f the  p o lic e . I t  uas also  
held th a t although there  uas a presumption o f re g u la r ity  attached to  
o f f ic i a l  ac ts , the ju r is d ic t io n  of the courts "to in v es tig a te  the  
v a l id i ty "  o f any order uas not a ffe c ted  by s .16 o f the Act.
5.138 In  EMPEROR v VIMALABAI DESHPANDE25 the P rivy  Council upheld
26the decision of the Nagpur High Court th a t i f  an a rres t by the p o lice  
under s u b -r .(1 )  o f r .1 2 9  uas in v a lid  i t  uould ta in t  the v a l id i ty  o f the
order o f the  P ro v in c ia l government passed under s u b -r . (4 ) .  T h e ir
Lordships held th a t the ambit o f the pouer contemplated under r .12 9  uas
not enlarged under s u b -r. (4 ) and th a t the only substantive pouer
conferred thereunder uas re s tr ic te d  to  the temporary custody of any
person arrested  on "reasonable suspicion" as to  h is  a c t iv i t ie s .  I f
there  uas no reasonable ground o f suspicion, the government could not
make any order under s u b -r . (4 ) .  T h e ir  Lordships also pointed out the
d iffe ren ce  betueen the tuo provisions -  r r .2 6  and 129 -  by in d ic a tin g
th a t uhen an a rres t uas made by a po lice  o f f ic e r  the burden uas upon him,
and not the p riso ner, to  prove th a t there uas reasonable suspicion
against the l a t t e r .  T h e ir Lordships also added th a t even uhen an order
uas passed under r .2 6  the government had to be " s a t is f ie d "  and th a t mere
suspicion uas not enough, although the expression uas not q u a lif ie d  by
my such adverb as "reasonably" or "honestly". In  the High Court the
27decision in  the LIVERSIDGE case uas re fe rre d  to  but i t  uas la b e lle d  as 
a "very sp ec ia l case, decided on very sp ec ia l grounds". The Court also  
noted th a t the decision had come under severe c r it ic is m  both in  England 
aid  America and took care to reproduce the re le v an t e x tra c ts  from the 
opinions of the d is tinguished ju r is t s .  The P rivy  Council also held  the  
case in ap p licab le  on fa c ts . The High Court also made reference to  the  
provisions o f ss.14 and 15 to  say th a t the Act did not a l t e r  the r ig h ts  
or l ib e r t ie s  of the subject except as expressly provided thereunder by 
p ro h ib itin g  in te rfe ren c e  u ith  ord inary liv e s  and vocations of those 
proceeded under the A ct. T h e ir Lordships o f the Nagpur High Court held  
th a t the "conditions" prescribed by the  tuo sections uere "express", 
" re s t r ic t iv e "  and "fundamental" and the Act and the ru les  must be 
construed in  the l ig h t  o f those cond itions.
(2 )  Some im portant decisions of the  republican era  
(A) In d ia
( a) Z^e GpjDalan Case
28
5.139 The decision in  A.K. GOPALAN v STATE OF MADRAS has been
29compared with the renowned DARNEL case, r ig h t ly  so because o f th e ir  
h is to r ic  importance. In d ia  became a rep u b lic  on 26th January 1950 and 
the republican Parliam ent passed the  Preventive Detention Act w ith in  
a month. The p riso n er, a prominent communist lea d e r, was already in  
detention  in  Madras, and on 1st March 1950 was served with an order made 
under s .3 (1 ) o f the A ct. He applied to the Supreme Court fo r  habeas 
corpus on 20th March under A rt. 32 o f the C o n s titu tio n , contending th a t  
the Act contravened the provisions o f A rts . 13, 19 and 21 and th a t  
the  provisions of the Act did not accord with A rt. 22 and also th a t the  
order was mala f id B . U n fo rtu n a te ly , as has been pointed out, the
30habeas corpus aspect uas not brought to  the fo re fro n t in  the case. The 
opialoA was handed down on 19th May 1950.
5.140 The Act as a whole was held  to  be in t r a  v ire s  the  C o n stitu tio n
with the exception of s .14, the in v a l id i ty  o f which was held not to
a ffe c t  the main provisions of the Act. F a z l A li and Mahajan, 3 .3 .  fu r th e r
held  th a t s .12 was also u l t r a  v ire s  as i t  d id  not conform to  the re levan t
provisions of the C o n s titu tio n . By s .12 i t  was provided th a t in  c e rta in
cases a person could be detained fo r  more than three  months (b u t not
exceeding one year) w ithout obta in ing  the  opinion of the Advisory Board
whereas s .14 made i t  an o ffence to  d isclose among others the "grounds'* of
detention and forbade the  courts from e ith e r  allow ing evidence to  be
given before i t  o r o f re q u irin g  to be produced before i t ,  the forbidden
m atters in c lu d in g  the “ grounds". As a re s u lt of the decis ion , s .14 was
31f i r s t  om itted and la t e r  the o ffen s ive  provisions o f s .12 a ls o . While 
F azl A l i ,  3 . ,  held s .12 v io la t iv e  o f both A rts .22(7) and 1 9 (5 ) , Mahajan, 3 . 
held  the same to be u l t r a  v ire s  A r t .22(7) o n ly . The court unanimously
accepted the p ris o n e r's  contention th a t s .14 contravened the provisions  
of A rt8 .2 2 (5 ) and 32 but w hile  Fazl A li and Mahajan, 3 .3 . ,  allowed the 
a p p lic a tio n , the  other judges comprising the m a jo rity  dismissed the same 
holding th a t the in v a l id i ty  of s . 14 did not a ffe c t the p ris o n e r's  
d eten tio n .
5.141 The judges in te rp re te d  vario u s ly  the provisions o f A rts . 13,
19, 20 and 22 o f the C o n stitu tio n  but b r ie f ly  i t  may be s ta ted  th a t Kania,
C .3 .,  and also Mukherjea and Das 3 .3 . ,  held th a t A rt. 19 had no
ap p lica tio n  to a lau  dealing  with e ith e r  preventive or p u n itive
detention  as i t s  d ire c t o b je c t. Mahajan, 3 . ,  went so f a r  as to  accept
the  p o s ition  canvassed by the  Attorney General th a t A rt. 22 uas a s e l f -
contained Code in  respect o f preventive detention by holding th a t i t
32uas subject to  n e ith e r  A r t . 13(2) nor A r t. 19(5) and th a t i t  embodied the
33safeguard contemplated under A r t .2 1 . H is Lordship held th a t both A rts .
19(5) and 22(7) were enabling provisions and th a t th e re fo re , as one
could not be regarded as a safeguard against the o th e r, A r t . 13(2) had
no scope to  operate. I t  is  to  be noted th a t although Mahajan, 3 .
observed th a t in  in te rp re t in g  the provisions he attached importance to
"the solemn words of the d ec la ra tio n  contained in  the preamble to  the
C o n s titu tio n " , w hile describ ing the fundamental r ig h ts  as "one o f the
34greatest charters  o f l ib e r t y " ,  h is  approach in  the m atter bore strong
impress o f h is  view th a t "b e n e fit o f reasonable doubt" had to  be given
to  le g is la t iv e  action and th a t the subject o f preventive detention was
d e a lt with in  the chapter on fundamental r ig h ts  "because of the
35conditions p re v a ilin g  in  the newly bom R epublic ."
5.142 We may now discuss at some length the more powerful d issent
36of S ir  F azl A li  whose views have even tu a lly  come to  p r e v a il .  The basic
37soundness of h is  approach is  re fle c te d  in  the fo llo w in g  passage:
I  am aware th a t both in  England and in  America and also  
in  many other co u n tries , there  has been a re -o r ie n ta t io n  
of the o ld  notions of in d iv id u a l freedom uhich is  g radually
y ie ld in g  to  s o c ia l co n tro l in  many m atte rs . I  also  
re a liz e  th a t those uho run the S tate have very onerous 
re s p o n s ib il it ie s , and i t  is  not correct to  say th a t  
emergent conditions have a lto g e th er disappeared from 
th is  country. . . That a person should be deprived o f 
h is  personal l ib e r ty  u ithou t a t r i a l  is  a serious  
m a tte r, but the needs o f society  may demand i t  and the  
in d iv id u a l may often  have to  y ie ld  to  those needs.
S t i l l  th e  balance betueen the maintenance of in d iv id u a l  
r ig h ts  and p u b lic  good can be struck only i f  the person 
uho is  deprived of h is  l ib e r ty  is  allousd a f a i r  chance 
to  es tab lish  h is  innocence and I  do not see hou the  
establishm ent o f an appropriate machinery g iv ing  him 
such a chance can be an impediment to good and ju s t  
government.
[emphasis added]
Indeed h is  Lordship pro jected  in to  bold r e l i e f  m atters o f transcendental
value to  mankind e s s e n tia l fo r  the existence o f a fre e  society  such as the
one envisaged under the Ind ian  C o n s titu tio n . As ue have already seen, the
concern fo r  p ro tection  of personal l ib e r ty  and the need fo r  a ju s t balance
38eq u ally  occupied the minds of the founding fa th e rs . Some o ther judges
also re fe rre d  (as S ir  Fazl A li  had done) to the Report o f the D ra ftin g
Committee and to  the debates o f the C onstituent Assembly, but obviously
39they could not gather the r e a l in te n tio n  of the founding fa th e rs .
5.143 The crux o f h is  Lordship 's  judgment uas to  be found in  h is
decision on th ree  im portant p o in ts . In  the f i r s t  p lace, i t  uas held th a t
the freedom of movement guaranteed under A r t . l9 (1 ) (d )  embraced what h is
Lordship c a lle d  the " ju r is t ic  concept" o f personal l ib e r t y ,  re fe rr in g  to
40numerous a u th o ritie s  in c lu d in g  the decision in  BIRD v JONES. Although
i t  is  possible to support h is  Lordship 's broad proposition th a t A r t .19
41did not stand alone in  is o la t io n  (as  the court has subsequently held ) 
and th a t the term " re s tr ic t io n "  used in  clause (5 )  embraced cases of 
"d e p riva tio n " , i t  is  submitted th a t in  so fa r  as freedom of movement uas 
concerned the q u a lify in g  expression of clause (d ) ,  namely, "throughout 
the te r r i to r y  o f In d ia "  uas a patent m anifestation  of the im portant 
element o f the fe d e ra l s tru c tu re  of the neu s ta te . Th is  aspect uas perhaps 
not properly  emphasized before h is  Lordship. Secondly, although h is
Lordship r ig h t ly ,  in  common with the o ther judges, held  th a t the expression
"procedure estab lished  by lau " did not embrace the American due process
d o c trin e , the term "lau" according to  h is  Lordship did not merely mean
enacted lau  as held  by the o ther judges: i t  meant the "estab lished lau" or
"lau  of the land" in  uhich he included the p r in c ip le  th a t none s h a ll be
condemned unheard, based not only on the B r it is h  system o f lau  but
being "deeply rooted in  the ancient h is to ry "  of In d ia  and m anifested in  the
42"panchayat system from the e a r l ie s t  tim es ."
5 .144 The decision on the second po in t uas indeed equally  bold and
im aginative as on the f i r s t  and, although i t  had much to  commend i t ,  the
d e f in it io n  of " lau" suggested by h is  Lordship did have an aura of
vagueness about i t  uhich posed a la rg e r  question, namely, uhether a
u r it te n  C o n stitu tio n  uhich represented the "qrundnorm" of a s ta te ,
a p r io r i  postu lated the c o d ific a tio n  o f a l l  superior norms. The other
judges (th e  m a jo rity ) avoided a d ire c t ansuer to  the question uhich us
s h a ll examine. Lie may f i r s t  deal u ith  the decision of S ir  F azl A li on the
th ird  and im portant p o in t, namely, the in te rp re ta t io n  of A r t .2 2 (7 ) (a ) •
H is Lordship held  th a t s u b -c l. (a ) should be considered as an "exception"
to  the general " ru le "  embodied in  c l . ( 4 ) ( a )  uhich required detention beyond
th ree  months to  depend on the  opinion of the advisory board. I f  the
requirement is  to  be dispensed u ith  the class o r classes of cases as u e l l
as th e  circumstances must be o f a sp ec ia l na tu re ; the conjunction "and"
of s u b -c l.(a )  cannot be read d is ju n c tiv e ly  as contended by the  S ta te . I t
uas also held th a t the term "prescribe" im plied se lec tio n  uhich involved a
"mental e f fo r t " ,  more than a mere "mechanical process". A mere reproduction
of the e n tr ie s  in  the le g is la t iv e  l i s t s  uould not be a compliance u ith  the
provisions of s u b -c l.(a )  uhich uas of a "p ro te c tive "  nature p o stu la tin g
"some element o f exceptional g ra v ity  or menace" to  meet uhich an "extreme
43type of le g is la t io n "  uas contemplated thereunder. The tu o fo ld  l im ita t io n
44and i t s  ob ject and purpose uere spelled  out in  the fo llo w in g  terms:
The Act must prescribe  (1 ) "class or classes of cases" 
uhich are to  have reference to  the persons against uhom 
the lau  is  to  operate and th e ir  a c t iv i t ie s  and movements 
and (2 ) "circumstances" uhich uould b ring  in to  prominence 
the conditions a id  the  backgrounds against uhich dangerous 
a c t iv i t ie s  should c a l l  fo r  sp ec ia l measures . . .[ th u s ]  the  
sphere o f the la u  u i l l  be confined only to  a s p ec ia l type 
o f case -  i t  u i l l  be less vague, less open to  abuse and 
enable those uho have to adm inister i t  to determine 
o b je c tiv e ly  uhen a condition has arisen to ju s t i f y  the
use o f the power. . . [^ p h a s is  added]
5.145 U h ile  examining the provisions of the Act h is  Lordship held s .12 
u l t r a  v ire s  A r t .2 2 (7 ) (a )  as i t  did not specify  the "circumstances" and 
because even in  respect o f the "class of cases" there  uas no proper 
"se lec tio n " but an a rb it ra ry  reproduction of the le g is la t iv e  e n tr ie s .
His Lordship also held th a t the  provision uas "unreasonable". Gn the
other hand the provisions of s .3  (uhich did not exclude the opinion o f an
advisory board) uas held not to  be unreasonable merely because i t  provided
fo r  the a rre s t and the i n i t i a l  detention on the "so -ca lled  sub jec tive
s a t is fa c tio n " . The reason being th a t the said s a tis fa c tio n  could
eventua lly  be tes ted  by a s u ita b le  machinery through uhich grounds of
detention could be examined and the d e ta in ee 's  representation
45considered in  re la t io n  th e re to .
5.146 As the other judges held  th a t A r t .19 uas in a p p lic a b le , as freedom 
of movement did not include the concept of personal l ib e r t y ,  they found
no scope fo r  the  te s t o f reasonableness contemplated thereunder but
approached the  m atter from d if fe r e n t  angles. Kania, C .3 .,  d e a lt u ith  the
challenge to  s .3  on the ground of vagueness. The provision uas not in v a lid
fo r  the  reason th a t i t  provided fo r  a "sub jective  te s t" .  The very purpose of
preventive detention uas not only to  prevent an in d iv id u a l from acting in
a p a r t ic u la r  uay but also from achieving a p a r t ic u la r  ob ject and the said
te s t  uas based "on the cumulative e f fe c t  of d if fe r e n t  ac tio n s". Houever,
"preventive detention action must be taken on good suspicion", added h is  
46Lordship. S a s tr i,  3 . ,  endorsed these vieus and also d ea lt u ith  and
re je c te d  the challenge to  the section based on the concept of Hdue process"
uhich, according to  the p riso n er, d id  not permit the government to
47deta in  any person on i t s  mere " s a t is fa c tio n " .
5.147 Indeed the C o n stitu tio n  expressly provided le g is la t iv e  power to  
make laus on "preventive d eten tio n ", only i t  d id not define  the  term. 
Mukherjea, 3 . ,  d e a lt u ith  th is  aspect and re fe rre d  to the p a r a l le l  
provision of the 1935 C onstitu tio n  and, in  tra c in g  the o rig in  o f the 
expression, also adverted to the English wartime le g is la t io n  and case la u .  
His Lordship termed these measures as an "unwholesome encroachment upon the 
l ib e r ty  of the people"' and also said th a t i t  was unfortunate th a t they 
formed an " in te g ra l p a rt"  o f the C o n s titu tio n . U nfortunate ly  h is  Lordship
48proceeded fu rth e r  to  hold th a t the court uas not to  "explore the reasons".
As a re s u lt ,  h is  Lordship fB l t  content to  say th a t the term s ig n if ie d
"precautionary measures" and th a t "the ju s t i f ic a t io n  of such detention is
suspicion or reasonable p ro b a b ility ,"  re ly in g  on c e rta in  observations
49made in  HALLIDAY and LIVERSIDGE. Th is  approach apparently betrayed h is  
Lordship's re luctance to  take note o f the fa c t  th a t A rt. 22 uas 
incorporated p rec ise ly  fo r  th is  purpose -  fo r  the purpose of reso lv in g  the 
dilemma th a t the English judges faced and re lie v in g  the Ind ian  courts from 
the burden o f those decisions by imposing "c o n s titu tio n a l l im ita t io n s "  on 
the enactment o f such measures.
5.148 While in te rp re t in g  clause (7 ) (a )  o f the a r t ic le  to  te s t  the v ire s
of s .12, h is  Lordship held  th a t "the s u b -c l.(a )  o f the a r t ic le  lays  doun
a purely enabling provision  and P arliam ent, i f  i t  so chooses, may pass
50any le g is la t io n  in  terms of th e  same". Thus the court overlooked the over­
r id in g  concept o f " l im ita t io n "  th a t informed the e s s e n tia l character o f the  
a r t ic le  as a whole and came to  hold th a t both class or classes of cases 
and circumstances need not be s p e c ifie d . However, h is  Lordship took 
p a rtic u la r  care to  emphasize the "supreme importance" o f the safeguard  
of clause (5 ) uhich uas ap p licab le  to  " a l l  cases" (meaning possibly e ls .4 (a )
51and 7 (a ) )  according to  h is  Lordship. Accordingly, s . 14 utas held  
u l t r a  v ire s  Arts 22(5) end 32 uhich h is  Lordship r ig h t ly  h e ld , uere in te r ­
re la te d .
5.149 Although Das, 3 . ,  spoke of "c o n s titu tio n a l l im ita t io n s " , h is
approach uas also equally  cautious. He q u a lif ie d  the pouer o f the courts
to  examine the le g is la t iv e  actions u ith  respect to such l im ita t io n s  by
observing th a t the courts in  In d ia  had to  operate in  a " re s tr ic te d  f ie ld " ,
u n lik e  the American ju d ic ia ry  uhere the C onstitu tio n  estab lished  the
"absolute supremacy" of the courts; the p o s ition  o f Ind ian  courts uas "some-
52uhere in  betueen the courts in  England and the United S ta te s " . His
Lordship held  th a t s .14  in fr in g e d  the d e ta in ee 's  "substantive r ig h t"
under A r t .22(5) as u e l l  as h is  " r ig h t to  c o n s titu tio n a l remedies" under
53A rt.32 and th e re fo re  i t  uas void under A r t .1 3 (2 ) . On the o ther hand, as
s u b -c l.(a )  o f A r t .22 uas an "enabling p ro v is io n ", 8 .12  uas not u l t r a  v ire s
54fo r  not prescrib ing  both, class of cases and circumstances. In  considering
the  v ire s  o f s .12, Kania, C .3 . attempted to  look at the o b ject of s u b -c l.(a )
of A r t .22(7) and held th a t i t  uas a mere " c la s s if ic a tio n "  uhich can be
done by e ith e r  "grouping the  a c t iv i t ie s  o f the  people o r by spec ify ing  the
.. 55o b jectives  to  be a tta in ed  or avoided". The Chief Justice  uas also of
the v ieu  th a t C l . (5 ) of A r t .22 provided the re a l safeguard and th ere fo re
56only s .14  uas u l t r a  v ir e s . S a s tr i,  3 . ,  also in  holding s . 14 u l t r a  v ir e s .
57spoke in  s im ila r  terms but attached equal importance to  A r t .32. In
dealing u ith  the v ire s  of  s .12 he s im ila r ly  fo llo u ed  the  te s t  of
58" c la s s if ic a tio n "  propounded by the Chief J u s tic e .
5.150 liie thus f in d  th a t the general approach of the court in  the above 
case uas one o f ju d ic ia l  caution and th a t the provisions of c l . (5 ) and 
s u b -c l.(a )  of c l . (7 ) of A r t .22 received p a r t ic u la r  a tte n tio n  o f the court 
in  the in te rp re ta t io n  of th e  provisions of the Preventive Detention
Act 1950. The court also appeared to be conscious of the importance of
th e  p ro v is io n s  o f A r t .  32 although the m a tte r  uas app aren tly  no t argued
from the v ieu p o in t o f A rt. 32 as the  detention had not gone beyond three
59months and the priso ner had no complaint about the "grounds". The la t e r  
development in  the s u b s tan tia l volume of preventive detention jurisprudence  
d e a lt p a r t ic u la r ly  u ith  the last-m entioned aspect uhich us proceed to  
examine nou. I t  must be conceded th a t despite the ju d ic ia l  caution the 
massive judgment uas not e n t ir e ly  lack ing  in  im agination in  th a t reference  
to  the Constituent Assembly Debates and even to  the provision of 
C onstitu tions of o ther S tates uas made l ib e r a l ly  by some judges although 
g enerally  the court adhered to  the English common lau  ru les  o f in te rp re ta t io n ,
(b ) ^om^e^ojth^r^d^cisi^qrns^of^ jjen e ra l ini£ortance__t ^w°__categoriev3
5.151 The High Courts a t C a lcu tta , Nagpur and Patna had already  
considered the v ire s  of the Preventive Detention Act uhen the m atter uas 
being heard in  the Supreme Court in  the GOPALAN case and the vieus  
expressed by those courts uere duly considered by th e ir  Lordships of the 
Supreme Court. In  fa c t detention orders passed under the Act have been 
challenged in  ap p lica tio n s  made under A rt. 226 o f the C o n stitu tio n  over the  
years in  a l l  High Courts (nou 18 in  a l l )  and as a re s u lt  a form idable
body of case-lau  deciding many in te re s tin g  points of lau  has groun up, but 
i t  is  not possible to  deal in  th is  study even u ith  a l l  the decisions of the 
Supreme Court uhich are to  have, according to  A rt. 142>binding force  
throughout the country.
5.152 I t  is  to  be noted th a t the Indian C onstitu tio n  did not expressly  
sanction the pouer of p reventive  detention  to  be exercised on a "subjective  
s a tis fa c tio n *1. 60 Indeed, the C o n stitu tio n  merely provided fo r  pouer to  
make laus fo r  "preventive detention" u ith o u t d e fin in g  the  term and on the  
other hand i t  also provided fo r  a tu o fo ld  lim ita t io n  to uhich such laus  
must conform -  to  the e n tr ie s  9 and 3 o f le g is la t iv e  L is ts  I  and I I I  
resp ec tive ly  and of P art I I I  (Fundamental R ig h ts ), The courts uere 
th ere fo re  obliged to r e s t r ic t  the ambit o f the s o -c a lle d  "sub jective
s a tis fa c tio n "  provisions o f PDA and MISA embodied in  each case in  s .3 (1 ) ,  
s ig n if ie d  by the usa of the expression " s a t is f ie d " . In  fa c t the 
c o n s titu tio n a l l im ita t io n s  expressly contemplated such a course u ith  
the ob ject o f making a d e lib e ra te  departure from the pos ition  obtain ing  
in  English lau  as expounded in  the m a jo rity  opinion in  LIlfERSIDGE.
I t  is  not u n lik e ly  th a t in  doing so the constitution-m akers took a cue 
from the m inority  v ieu  of Lord Atkin to uhich the use of expressions
61"grounds" in  clause (5 ) and " fa c ts "  in  clause (6 ) can be e a s ily  tra c ed .
I t  is  also to  be noted th a t i t  uas not unnatural fo r  the founding fa th e rs  
to attach more importance to  the  vieus o f the Indian Federal Court and 
Nagpur High Court in  KESHAV TALPAPE62 end VIMLABAI DESPANDE66 r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  
re je c tin g  the m a jo rity  opinion in  LIVERSIDGE.
5.153 In  GOPALAN. as ue have seen, despite the lack of a general 
consensus a l l  judges equally  attached importance to  c l . (5 ) of A r t .22 
uhich contemplated communication of "grounds" to  the detainee and also  
opportunity to be given to  him fo r  making "rep resen ta tio n ". Follouing  
th is  lead the Indian courts applied tuo broad te s ts  -  o f vagueness and 
irre le va n c e  of "grounds" and o f "mala f id e " exercise of pouer. Ws propose 
to  fo llo u  the same scheme in  our discussions but i t  must be pointed out th a t 
the courts did not attach importance to the fa c t th a t the C onstitu tio n
had enabled laus to  be made under uhich, according to  c l . (4 )  of A r t .22, 
subjective  s a tis fa c tio n  o f the "Advisory Board" only could be provided. 
Indeed, even F a z l A l i ,  3 . ,  in  GOPALAN did not am plify the scope, ambit 
and e ffe c t of uhat ue have c a lle d  the " c o n s titu tio n a l sub jective  
s a tis fa c tio n " 6^ provided in  c l . (4 ) although he had noted th is  f a c t .66
( i )  i»cme_l£ajji£q_d£CjLsjLo£S_qn "s a tis fa c tio n "  v is -a -v is  "grounds"
5.154 In  STATE OF BOFIBAV v ATMARAfl66 the leading judgment uas 
delivered  by Kania, C .3 .,  u ith  uhom Fazl A l i ,  Mukherjea and Ayyar, 3 .3 .  
agreed uhereas S a s tr i ,  3 . and Das, 3 . d e livered  separate but concurring  
judgments a llo u in g  the appeal by the S tate against the judgment o f the
Bombay High Court issu ing  habeas corpus. The "grounds'* of detention  
supplied to  the detainee (an "active  trade u n io n is t" ) re c ite d  th a t -  "you 
are engaged and are l ik e ly  to be engaged in  promoting acts of sabotage 
on ra ilw ay  and ra ilw ay property in  G reater Bombay".
5.155 In  h is  a p p lica tio n  in  the High Court the p e tit io n e r  asserted
th a t he was not present in  Bombay during the re levan t perio d . The State
denied th is  by addressing a communication to  the p e t it io n e r . The High
Court considered the communication as fu rn ish ing  a d d itio n a l grounds and
held th a t th is  was not perm issible under A r t .2 2 (5 ) .  Kania, C .3 .,  in  thB
Supreme Court, explained the scope of the clause (5 ) and held  th a t i t
contemplated two types of r ig h ts  -  the r ig h t  o f the "grounds" being
communicated and the r ig h t  of making representation  with the a n c illa ry
r ig h t  o f being furnished with "p a rtic u la rs "  or " fa c ts " . H is Lordship pointed
out the d is tin c tio n  between "grounds" and "fac ts"  to  say th a t w hile  "new" or
" a d d itio n a l"  or "supplementary" grounds could not be fu rn ished , there could
be a communication o f fa c ts , subsequent to  th a t o f grounds, to  enable the
r ig h t  o f making representation  to  be e f fe c t iv e ly  exerc ised , although, as
h is  Lordship adm itted, clause (5 ) did not in  terms say th a t "the grounds
as w e ll as d e ta ils  o f fa c ts  on which they are based must be furn ished or
67furnished at one tim e ". Possibly fo llo w in g  th is  e a r ly  and wholesome
ju d ic ia l  activism  by the Indian Supreme Court, the p a r a l le l  c o n s titu tio n a l
provisions elsewhere in  the Commonwealth were made more e x p l ic i t  in  th is  
68resp ect. Indeed, the decision made e x p l ic i t  what fo llow ed by necessary 
im p lic a tio n  from the language of clauses (5 ) and (6 ) which h is  Lordship 
analysed w ith great care, p a r t ic u la r ly  th a t o f clause (5 ) by attach ing  
due importance to  the expressions "and" and "as soon as may be".
Although h is  Lordship did not re fe r  to the opinion of Lord Atkin in  
LIVERSIDGE. we have already submitted th a t the Indian c o n s titu tio n a l 
provision  purported to adopt h is  opinion and the decision of Kania, C .J . 
estab lish ed  th is  pos ition  more securely by s p e llin g  out the im p lica tio n s
of clause (5 ) o f A rt. 22.
5.156 H is Lordship also la id  down the twin te s t of ju s t ic ia b i l i t y  o f
the  "grounds” and ”fa c ts ” by tra c in g  a connection between the two r ig h ts
contemplated by clause ( 5 ) .  The court could see whether the ”grounds”
supplied had a " ra t io n a l connection with the ends mentioned in  s .3  of
the Act" and whether the grounds were " s u ff ic ie n t  to enable the detenu to
69make a rep resen ta tio n ". In  other words "grounds" must not be e ith e r  
ir re le v a n t or vague. Thus, although i t  was not said in  so many words, 
the courts could examine fa c ts  not to  te s t  the sub jective  s a tis fa c tio n  but 
to  see i f  the r ig h t  of representation  could be e f fe c t iv e ly  exerc ised .
70S a s tr i,  3 . ,  contested the p o s itio n , re ly in g  on the decision in  HALLIDAY
71and observed as fo llo w s:
. . .  I  am unable to  agree with what appears to  bg the major 
premise of the argument, namely, th a t clause (5 ) contemplates 
an in q u iry  where the person detained is  to be fo rm a lly  charged 
with s p e c ific  acts o r omissions of a culpable nature  and ca lled  
upon to  answer them.
His Lordship fu r th e r  held th a t on the face of clause (6 ) i t  wa3 not
incumbent on the government "to communicate p a rtic u la rs  which a court of
law c o n s id e re d ] necessary to ensble the  person detained to make a
represen ta tion"; the combined e f fe c t  o f clauses (5 ) aid (6 ) was th a t only
such p a rtic u la rs  were to  be communicated as th e  a u th o rity , and not the
72co u rt, considered s u f f ic ie n t .  Das, 3 . ,  more e x p l ic i t ly  held  th a t clause
73(5 ) did not in  terms contemplate "a second communication of p a rtic u la rs "
and th a t a s a tis fa c tio n  founded on vague grounds was "quite  v a lid "  i f  the
74vagueness was not proof o f bad f a i t h .  According to  h is  Lordship the
" irre levan cy" o f the  grounds would be a "cogent proof o f bad fa i th "  so
75as to  in v a lid a te  the o rd er.
5.157 U ith in  the f i r s t  h a lf  of 1951 th ree  more im portant decisions on
7 6"grounds" were handed down by the  Supreme Court. In  T ARP ADA DE. which 
was decided the same day as ATMARAM ( supra) . S as tri and Das, 3 .3 . ,  in  
dismissing ( in  concurrence with the m a jo r ity ) the appeal by the detainee
against C a lcu tta  High C ourt's  judgment re fus ing  habeas corpus, did not
add to  the reasons uihich us have already in d ic a te d , Kania, C .3 .,  speaking
fo r  the m a jo r ity , held th a t the mere descrip tion  of the second communication
as "supplementary grounds" did not make them so; one has to look at the  
77contents. H is Lordship also made the d is tin c t io n  betueen a "vague" 
and an " ir re le v a n t"  ground c le a re r , saying e x p l ic i t ly  th a t ,  "the  
s u ffic ien c y  of the grounds to  give the detained person the e a r l ie s t
opportunity to make a representation  can be examined by the co u rt, but
78 79only from th a t po int of v ie u " . In  U3AGAR SINGH the Supreme Court
issued habeas corpus under A r t .32 holding th a t "the p e tit io n e rs  uere given
only vague grounds which uere not p a rtic u la r is e d  or made s p e c if ic  so as to
a ffo rd  them the e a r l ie s t  opportunity  of making representations" and th a t
there uss "inexcusable delay in  acquainting then u ith  p a r tic u la rs "  in  v ieu
of the  fa c t  th a t there uas a tim e -lag  o f four months between the tuo
communications uriiich uas not exp la ined .
8Q5.158 In  RAMSINGH the m a jo rity  speaking through S a s tr i ,  3 .
(K ania, C .3 . and Oas, 3 . agreeing) dismissed the ap p lica tio n  under A r t .32
u h ile  Mahajan, 3 . ,  and Bose, 3 . ,  by separate judgments allowed the same.
The te s t o f ju s t ic ia b i l i t y  o f the "second" r ig h t ,  propounded by the
m ajo rity  in  ATMARAM uas put under severe s tra in  in  th is  case p a r t ly  because
S a s tr i, 3 . ,  uas p ro je c tin g  (a lb e i t  u n w ittin g ly ) h is  own views (uhich he
had expressed in  ATMARAD in  opposition to  those of Kania, C .3 .,  who had
spoken fo r  th e  m a jo r ity ) but m ainly because the te s t i t s e l f  uas in h eren tly
weak. The te s t  of ju s t ic ia b i l i t y  had been stated  in  terms o f "vagueness"
81uhich uas defined in  the fo llo w in g  terms uhich S a s tr i,  3 . ,  also quoted:
I f  on reading the around furnished i t  is  capable o f being
in te l l ig e n t ly  understood and is  s u f f ic ie n t ly  d e f in ite  to
fu rn ish  m a te ria ls  to  enable the detained person to  make a
representation  against the order o f detention i t  cannot be
c a lle d  vague. r . . , ,-i^  [emphasis addedJ
S a s tr i ,  3 . ,  read th is  passage u ith  another observation o f K ania, C .3 .,
th a t "a wide la t itu d e  is  l e f t  to  the  a u th o ritie s  in  the m atter o f
d isclosure" under clause (6 ) of A rt. 22, uhich r e a l ly  re la te d  to  " fac ts"
and not "grounds". Against th is  backdrop the observation (a ls o  of Kania,
C .3 .,  quoted by S a s tr i,  3 . )  th a t the "second" communication o f "p a rtic u la rs "
(" fa c ts " )  must be " s u ff ic ie n t  to  enable the detained person to  make a
representation  uhich, on being considered, may give r e l ie f  to  the
detained person", appeared p a le . As a re s u lt  the m a jo r ity , speaking
through S a s tr i,  3 . ,  did not f in d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  re je c t the p e t it io n e r 's
contention th a t i t  uas incumbent on the a u th o rity  to communicate to  him
at le a s t the g is t  o f the o ffending passages o f h is  a lleged speech uhich
uas said to  have prejudiced the maintenance o f p u b lic  order in  D e lh i. I t
is  submitted th a t the use of the "ground" (underlined  in  the above
e x tra c t)  unaccompanied by " fa c ts "  or " p a r tic u la rs " , and the omission to
re la te  the understanding to  th a t o f a "reasonable man" detracted  from the
e ffic a c y  o f the te s t .  In  fa c t  Mahajen, 3 . ,  in  h is  d issen t, in  the in s ta n t
82case, spoke oftiae "reasonable man". Bose, 3 . on the other hand, missed 
the importance of the po in t by p o s tu la tin g  a choice betueen the
83understanding o f the detainee and of the a u th o rity  re s p e c tiv e ly .
Obviously, the courts could more e f fe c t iv e ly  exercise the pouer of 
ju d ic ia l  rev ieu  i f  the understanding uas re la te d  to  th a t of a reasonable 
man than any other person.
845.159 I t  i s ,  houever, in te re s tin g  to note th a t la t e r ,  in  RAM KRI5HAN. 
S a s tr i (nou Chief 3 u s t ic e ), d e liv e r in g  the unanimous opinion o f the court,
held th e  impugned ground to  be vague as i t  could not be in te rp re te d  by a
85"layman" without le g a l a id  uhich uas denied to  him. In  th is  case i t  
uas also held th a t the detention  order as a uhole f a l l s  to  the  ground even 
i f  one only of the severa l grounds is  vague, re je c tin g  the argument of the 
s ta te  based on the te s t of "p re ju d ice" inasmuch as " c o n s titu tio n a l
86requirement must be s a t is f ie d  u ith  respect to each o f the grounds".
I t  is  to  be not8d th a t although h is  Lordship did not take care to  
c la r i fy  the te rm in o lo g ica l confusion as to  "grounds" and "fa c ts "  the use 
of the term " c o n s titu tio n a l requirement" was meant to apply to  both*
The ap p lica tio n  under A r t. 32 fo r  habeas corpus uas allowed.
875.160 In  SHIBBAN LAL the detention order was mads on two grounds b u t, 
the Advisory Board having upheld the  order on one of the grounds, the  
deta in ing  a u th o rity  confirmed the order on th a t ground and revoked the  
detention on the o ther ground. Th is  uas held to  be apparently i l l e g a l
in  th a t the o r ig in a l or i n i t i a l  s a tis fa c tio n  was i t s e l f  v it ia te d  in  v ieu  
of the fa c t th a t the deta in ing  a u th o r ity 's  action uas tantamount to  
adm itting th a t "one of the grounds upon which the o r ig in a l order o f  
detention was passed [was] unsubstantiated or non-ex isten t and [cou ld ] 
not b8 made a ground of d e ten tio n ". The Supreme Court proceeded fu r th e r
i. 4. i. 88to  s ta te :
The question i s ,  whether in  such circumstances the o r ig in a l  
order . . . can be allowed to  stand. The answer. . • can 
only be in  the n e g ative . The deta in ing  a u th o ritie s  gave 
here two grounds. . . Uie can n e ith e r  decide whether these 
grounds are good or bad, nor can we attempt to assess in  
what manner and to  what exten t each of these grounds
operated on the mind of the appropriate au th o rity  and
contributed to  creation  of the  s a tis fa c tio n  on the basis
o f uhich the detention order was made. To say th a t the  
other ground, which s t i l l  remains, is  qu ite  s u ff ic ie n t  to  
sustain the o rder, would be to  su b stitu te  an ob jective  
ju d ic ia l  te s t  fo r  the  sub jective  decision of the executive  
• . . uhich is  against the le g is la t iv e  p o licy  underlying  
the s ta tu te . . .
I t  was held th a t on the re c e ip t o f the  opinion of the Advisory Board the 
detain ing a u th o rity  had to e ith e r  confirm or revoke the order in  whole and
th a t i t  uas not precluded by such revocation from passing a fresh order,
under the Act.
5.161 In  the above case, although the court re fe rre d  to  the  
c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t under A r t .2 2 (5 ) , the decision uas apparently based 
on the contravention of the provisions of the Act (s .1 1 , PDA). In  la te r
cases, in  dealing  genera lly  u ith  the scope of the c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t in
89respect o f ’^ grounds" and " fa c ts " , the court observed in  THAKUR PRASAD
th a t the o b lig a tio n  of the government to fu rn ish  grounds trfiich are not
vague cannot be taken to mean th a t they must fu rn ish  "every meticulous
90d e ta i l" .  In  DUARKA DAS although the court re ite ra te d  th a t i f  some of the
several grounds be "non-existent or ir re le v a n t"  the very exercise of the
pouer to  deprive an in d iv id u a l of h is  l ib e r ty  uas bad, i t  uas also observed
th a t the order uould not be v it ia te d  merely because some ground or
reason of a "com paratively unessentia l nature" uas d e fe c tiv e ; the court
had to  be s a t is f ie d  th a t the sub jective  s a tis fa c tio n  might reasonably have
91been a ffe c te d . This v ieu  found an echo in  PURANLAL LAKHANPAL in  uhich
i t  uas held th a t although there uas an o b lig a tio n  on the s ta te  to  fu rn ish
precise and s p e c ific  grounds i t  had also the duty (to  the exclusion of
others) under clause (6 ) to  consider uhether the d isclosure o f any *!j£ct"
uould be against pub lic  in te r e s t .
925.162 In  NARE5H CHANDRA the Supreme Court dismissed the  appeal by
the detainee against C a lcu tta  High C ourt's  re fu s a l to  issue habeas corpus
and also h is  ap p lica tio n  under A rt. 32. In  th is  case the court not only
cleared the te rm in o lo g ica l confusion uhich appeared in  the judgment of the
High Court but also la id  doun in  c le a r end precise terms the procedure
93to  be observed by the a u th o r itie s  according to  as. 3 to  7 o f the Act.
I t  uas observed th a t the detainee had to  be furn ished u ith  a copy of the  
order containing -  (1 )  r e c ita ls  in  terms of one o r more of the s u b -c ls .
(a )  and (b ) of s .3 (1 ) ,  uhich could be c a lle d  a "preamble"; (2 ) the  
grounds contemplated by s .7 , namely, the conclusions of fa c ts  uhich led  
to  the passing of the order; and i t  uas also held th a t ,  i f  the grounds 
did not contain the necessary " p a rtic u la rs " , the detainee could ask fo r  
" fu rth e r p a rtic u la rs  of fa c ts " . The Chief Justice  pointed out th a t the  
High Court had urongly taken the "preamble" as "grounds". The court 
re fe rre d  to  the decisions in  ATWARATC and DUiARKADAS (both supra) and on the
m erits  upheld the High C ourt's  decision th a t the grounds were n e ith e r  
"vagus" nor " ir re le v a n t" . I t  is  in te re s tin g  to  note th a t th e ir  Lordships' 
construction of the s ta tu to ry  provisions uias aimed at b u ttress ing  the  
c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t  by in s is t in g  on " fac ts"  or "p a rtic u la rs "  to  be 
furnished in  the " f i r s t "  communication i t s e l f  so th a t the "second" 
communication contemplated under e ls .  (5 ) and (6 ) o f A r t .22 in  ATMARAN 
became a neui r ig h t  o f asking fo r  " fu rth e r p a rtic u la rs  o f fa c ts " .
5*1^3 In  HARIBANDHU DAS9^ the Supreme Court allotted the d e ta in ee 's  
appeal and quashed the detention o rd er. In  th is  case the S tate  
Government had "revoked" the detention order passed by the D is t r ic t  
M agistrate  during the pendency o f the w r it  p e tit io n  in  the High Court 
and made a "fresh" o rd er. I t  was held th a t the f i r s t  order was bad as i t  was 
not fo llow ed up by fu rn is h in g , w ith in  f iv e  days, to  the deta in ee , "grounds" 
in  the language which he could understand which amounted to d e n ia l of 
opportunity of making re p resen ta tio n . The m atter supplied to  the 
detainee consisted o f fourteen pages typed in  Eng lish . The court also 
re jec ted  the contention th a t the amended provision o f s .1 3 (2 ) merely 
affirm ed the e x is tin g  law declared in  SHIBBANLAL ( supra) . I t  was held th a t  
no fresh order could be made w ithout "fresh fa c ts "  and the term 
"revocation" included can ce lla tio n  of orders, in v a lid  as w e ll as v a lid ;  i t  
did  not mean "otherwise v a lid  and o p e ra tiv e " . The amended provision  was 
as fo llo w s :
The revo catio n . . • s h a ll not bar the making of a fre s h . . •
o rd er. . . in  any case where fresh fa c ts  have arisen a fte r
the date o f revocation . . .
( i i )  JSqme_ljBajdin^decisioris_o£ Jlsatisfa^tipri"^vi.s^a;iv is --"jnala^fIda"
5.164 Although the detention  order in  TARAPADA DE ( supra) was challenged  
on the ground of mala f id e  also only Das, 3 . ,  c a te g o ric a lly  d e a lt with i t  
and held on fa c ts  th a t the mere fa c t th a t a large  number o f detention  
orders were made "overnight" did not per se i ndicate bad fa i th  on the part 
of the a u th o ritie s  as i t  was found th a t the a u th o r itie s  had applied th e ir
minds to  the cases of each o f th e  several deta inees. I t  is  to  be noted th a t
the point o f mala f id e  had already received the p a r t ic u la r  a tte n tio n  of the
95court in  A5HUT0SH LAHIRI. I t  uas contended by the detainee th a t the use
of the pouer o f preventive detention to secure the purposes o f s .144 o f the
C rim inal Procedure Code uas per se a male fid e  exercise o f pouer. I t  uas
held th a t although the fa c ts  and circumstances of the case roused some
suspicion, Das, 3 . ,  (K ania , C .3 .,  Fazl A li and S a s tr i,  3 .3 . ,  concurring)
held th a t ,  "Suspicion, houever, is  not proof and I  an not convinced th a t
the act of the D is t r ic t  M ag istrate  uas actuated by any improper or
in d ire c t  m otive". M ukjerjea , 3 . ,  in  h is  separate (a lb e i t  concurring)
judgment, held th a t ,  ’There could be no b e tte r  proof o f mala f id e s  on the
p art o f the executive a u th o r itie s  than a use of the extrao rd in ary  provisions
contained in  the (P reventive  D etention) Act fo r  purposes fo r  uhich
ordinary lau  is  qu ite  s u f f ic ie n t" .  I t  i s  true th a t i f  the o b ject of the
impugned order uas to  prevent the detainee from attending a p a r t ic u la r
meeting o f a communal organ ization  to  ensure th a t no breach of the peace
took p lace , an order under s .144 of the Crim inal Procedure Code fo rb idd ing
him appropriate ly  from doing so uould have served the purpose.
5.165 In  U3AGAR SINGH ( supra) also the p lea  o f mala f id e  uas ra is e d .
I t  uas grounded on a reference in  the order to  past a c t iv i t ie s ;  the court
r ig h t ly  re je c te d  the p lea , saying th a t ,  " I t  i s  la rg e ly  from p r io r  events
shouing the tendencies or in c lin a tio n s  of the man th a t an in ference could
be draun whether he is  l ik e ly  even in  the fu tu re  to  act in  a manner
p re ju d ic ia l to  the maintenance o f p u b lic  o rd er". This uas re ite ra te d  in
PURANLAL LAKHANPAL ( supra) uhere the court added th a t the re le v an t
consideration in  such m atters uas uhether the detention uas fo r  " u lte r io r
purposes or purposes other than those mentioned in  the o rd er" . In  
96NARAN3AN SINGH the p lea appears to  have been founded on the non- 
compliance of the provisions of the Act i t s e l f  in  respect of a "fresh'* 
o rder. The court held th a t uhere an e a r l ie r  order uas d e fec tive  merely
on form al grounds, the "fresh" order based on the same ground uas not
per se m a la fid e . The court observed th a t s .13 i t s e l f  perm itted such a
course and the p lea uas bound to f a i l  even i f  the court should in s is t  on
s t r ic t  compliance; in  an ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus the court uas
concerned u ith  the le g a l i ty  of the detention at the  tim e of the re tu rn
and not on e a r l ie r  events . As ue have seen, Parliam ent uas quick to see
97the in ju s t ic e  o f the provision and amended s .13.
5.166 In  THAKUR PRASAD ( supra) there uas an im portant o b ite r  dictum
th a t , uhere the grounds on uhich a detention order uas based uere also the
subject m atter o f a c rim in a l prosecution, the detention may amount to an
abuse of s ta tu to ry  pouers but the order uas not n ecessarily  mala f id e  
98on th a t score. The question o f mala f id e  had to be decided on the
fa c ts  and circumstances of each case. This ru le  uas fu r th e r  embellished  
99in  MAKHAN SINGH uhere the court held the  p lea  must be made by proper 
pleadings at the t r i a l  stage to  enable the respondent to meet the case 
and the p lea  cannot be s ta ted  fo r  the  f i r s t  time in  the ap p lica tio n  in  the  
Supreme Court fo r  sp ec ia l leave to appeal.
5.167 An im portant observation uas made by the Supreme Court in  
RAMESWAR SHAW^ ^  to  the e ffe c t  th a t although s .3 (1 ) (a )  o f the Act 
contemplated sub jective  s a t is fa c tio n , cases might a rise  uhere the detainee  
might ground h is  challenge on mala f id e  uhich p lea he could support u ith  
fa c ts  to  shou in te r  a l ia  th a t the grounds served could not possibly or 
ra t io n a lly  support the conclusions draun against him by the deta in ing  
a u th o r ity . The "reasonableness or p ro p rie ty"  o f the subjective  
s a tis fa c tio n  thus became ju s t ic ia b le  only in  th is  in c id e n ta l manner
uhich could not otheru ise be questioned in  courts .
(c )  Some im portant decisions on^MISA*'and^COFEPOSA1'
5.168 A la rg e r bench o f seven judges of the Supreme Court over­
ru led  the decision in  GOPALAN ( supra) in  so fa r  as i t  uas concerned u ith  
the in te rp re ta t io n  of A r t .2 2 (7 ) (a )  and the court unanimously, speaking
through S h ela t, Acting C .3 .,  held S.17A of MISJl u l t r a  v ire s  A r t .2 2 (7 ) (a )
101of the C o n s titu tio n , in  SAHBHU NATH. In  fa c t  the court approved the
m in o rity  view in  GOPALAN holding th a t m atters in vo lv in g  r ig h t  of personal
l ib e r ty  provide a good ground fo r  the court to  review i t s  own decision
under A r t .137. Relying on the decision in  the COOPER case (popu larly
102c a lled  Bank N a tio n a lis a tio n  Case) the v ire s  of some other provisions
(s s .3  and 8 to 12) uas also challenged. Although the court decided to
leave the m atter open i t  re fe rre d  to  the m in o rity  v ieu  o f Fazl A l i ,  3 . ,  in
103GOPALAN and observed as fo llo w s:
In  Gopalan. . . the m a jo rity  had held th a t A r t .22 uas a 
s e lf-co n ta in e d  Code and th ere fo re  a lau  of preventive  
detention did not have to  s a tis fy  the requirements of A rts .
19, 14 and 21. . . i n  (1970) 3 SCR 530 (Cooper's case) the 
aforesaid  premise o f the m a jo rity  in  Gopalan uas disapproved 
and th e re fo re  i t  no longer holds the  f i e l d .  Though 
Cooper's case. . • d ea lt u ith  the in te r -re la t io n s h ip  of 
A r t .19 and A r t .31 , the  basic approach to  construing the  
fundamental r ig h ts  guaranteed in  the d if fe re n t  provisions  
of the C on stitu tio n  adopted in  th is  case held the major 
premise o f the m a jo rity  in  Gopalan. . . to  be in c o rre c t.
L a te r, in  HARADHAN SAHA ( in f r a )  the court c a te g o ric a lly  decided against
the detainee the po in t l e f t  open in  the above case but without re fe rr in g  at
a l l  to  the above decis ion , notw ithstanding the im portant observation made
th e re in , as quoted above. I t  is  to  be noted th a t S.17A, as also the
104amended s . 13, came by uay o f "temporary am eminent" but the v ire s  o f 
s .13, about uhich the court did not make any observation in  the above 
case, uas l e f t  open to  be decided f in a l ly  in  FAGU SHAU ( i n f r a ) .
5.169 However, ue may quote below the provision  struck doun in  the
decision under exam ination:
s .17A (1 )  Notwithstanding anything contained in  the foregoing  
p ro v is io n s . . . during the period o f .  . . emergency. . • 
any person in  respect o f uhom an order o f detention has 
been made. • • may be detained w ithout obta in ing the  
opinion of the Advisory Board fo r  a period longer than 
th ree  months, but not exceeding two years . • . in  any 
of the classes of cases or under any of the fo llo w in g  
circumstances, namely:
(a )  uhere such person has been detained u ith  a view to
preventing him from acting  in  any manner p re ju d ic ia l
to  the defence o f In d ia , re la tio n s  of In d ia  with  
fo re ig n  powers or the secu rity  of In d ia ; or
4C9
(b ) • • . p re ju d ic ia l to  the secu rity  o f the State or 
the maintenance of p u b lic  o rder.
[emphasis added}
The f i r s t  challenge, uhich uas grounded on the use of the uords "may be
detained" (underlined  in  the above e x t ra c t ) ,  by uhich, i t  uas claimed, an
unguided d is c re tio n  uas vested in  the deta in ing  a u th o rity , uas re je c te d .
I t  uas held th a t "the combined e f fe c t  o f the non-obstante clause in  the
commencement o f s .17A (1) and the q u a lify in g  uords "save otheruise
provided in  th is  Act" in  s .10 ru led  out the p o s s ib il ity  of the provision
producing any d iscrim in atio n  so as to in fr in g e  A r t .1 4 .
5.170 The contention th a t the provision uas inconsis ten t u ith
A r t .2 2 (7 ) (a )  uas considered at length and uas upheld on v ir t u a l ly  the
same reasons as had p reva iled  u ith  the m in o rity  in  GOPALAN. I t  uas held
th a t clause ( 7 ) (a )  of A rt. 22 uas to  be read as an exception to c l . ( 4 ) ( a )
and the lau  enacted under c l . ( 7 ) ( a )  must prescribe both "the circumstances"
105as u e l l  as the "class or classes of cases". R eferrin g  obviously to the
provisions of e ls . (a )  and (b ) o f s . 17A(1) o f the Act i t  uas held as
* 106 fo llo u s :
The subjects or heads set out in  the le g is la t iv e  e n tr ie s  
uere intended to  d e lin ea te  the bounds u ith in  uhich the  
le g is la tu re s  can pass detention la u . The purpose of these 
e n tr ie s  and c l . ( 7 ) ( a )  are d is t in c t ;  th a t of the e n tries  
to lay  doun the  top ics  in  respect o f uhich le g is la t io n  can 
be made and th a t o f c l . ( 7 ) (a ) to  d is tin g u ish  the ordinary  
from the excep tiona l to  uhich only the sa lu ta ry  safeguard 
provided by s . ( 4 ) (a )  uould not apply. Here re p e t it io n  of 
the subjects or to p ics  o f le g is la t io n  uould not mean 
p rescrib in g  e ith e r  the circumstances or the class or classes 
of cases. . . the  presumption uould be th a t such a d ra s tic  
lau  uould apply to  exceptional circumstances and exceptional 
a c t iv i t ie s  expressly aid in  precise terms prescribed .
E a r lie r  the court re fe rre d  to  concern fo r  " in te rn a l and e x te rn a l secu rity
of the country fo llo u in g  the p a r t i t io n "  and r ig h t ly  observed th a t "the
constitu iion-m akers accepted preventive detention as a necessary e v i l  to
be to le ra te d  in  a c o n s titu tio n a l scheme uhich, o th eru ise , guaranteed
personal l ib e r ty  in  ue ll-accepted  form" and accordingly the court appeared
to  v ie u , q u ite  a p p ro p ria te ly , the various provisions of the C onstitu tio n  as
so many l im ita t io n s .
1 flH
5.171 In  FAGU SHAlii the v ire s  o f the "tem porarily  amended" s. 13 of
niSA uas challenged, a lb e it  unsuccessfu lly . The m a te ria l p a rts  of the
provision may be quoted:
The maximum period fo r  uhich any person may be detained in  
pursuance of any detention order uhich has been confirmed 
under s .12  s h a ll be tu e lve  months from the date o f detention  
or the expiry o f the Defence of In d ia  Act. 1971. uhich ever
[emphasis added]
The portion  underlined in  the above e x tra c t uas added by the "temporary
amendment". The challenge involved in te rp re ta t io n  of the proviso to  c l . (4 )
and s u b -c l.(b ) of c l . (7 ) of A r t .22 of the C onstitu tio n  fo r  a decision
mainly on tuo p o in ts : (1 ) whether in  any lau  providing fo r  preventive
detention i t  uas o b lig a to ry  fo r  the le g is la tu re  to  f i x  the "maximum"
period; and (2 ) whether the amended provision did in  fa c t  f i x  the "maximum".
The case uas heard by f iv e  judges. The m a jo rity  opinion uas d e livered  by
Mathew, 3 . ,  u ith  uhcm Ray, (nou C .3 .)  end Chandrachud, 3 . ,  agreed and
although both of them uere p a rtie s  to  the unanimous opinion d e livered  in
SAMBHU NATH ( supra) the opinion of the m a jo rity  nou uas based on what i t
c a lled  a "dispassionate in te rp re ta t io n "  of the c o n s titu tio n a l p ro v is io n .
I t  uas held th a t the contention postu lated  an "o b lig a tio n  [u h ich ] could
only arise  from an in v is ib le  ra d ia tio n  proceeding from a vague and
109speculative  concept o f personal l ib e r t y " .
5.172 The m a jo rity  decision uas based on three main considerations.
F ir s t ly ,  i t  re lie d  ( in a p p ro p r ia te ly , as ue s h a ll see) on GOPALAN ( supra) ,
KRISHNAN110 and ASOK DEY. 111 Secondly, i t  held  th a t the le g is la t iv e  l i s t s
contemplated "plenary pouer" to  pass preventive detention laus and the
pouer to  f i x  the  period o f detention vested in  both Parliam ent and State
le g is la tu re s  "as a n c illa ry  to  th a t pouer or as inseparable p a rt of i t "
and th a t i t  uas not o b lig a to ry  on Parliam ent to  f i x  the maximum period e ith e r
112under the proviso to  c l . (4 )  or under c l . ( 7 ) ( b ) .  I t  uas also held th a t,
whether a lau  provid ing detention fo r  "any period" uould be v io la t iv e  of 
A r t .19 uas a " d if fe re n t  m a tte r" . S im ila r ly , i t  uas held th a t whether 
the power to  f i x  a "maximum" period under c l . ( 7 ) ( b )  uas an independent 
pouer or a pouer traceab le  to  the le g is la t iv e  e n tr ie s  "did not arise  in  
th is  case". However, h is  Lordship proceeded to  hold th a t a la u  made 
under c l . ( 7 ) ( b )  had "no s a n c tity "  as a detention lau  passed by Parliam ent
113
f ix in g  longer period "uould sub s ile n to  repeal the lau  made under A r t .2 2 (7 ) (b ) .
The m a jo rity  decided the second po in t also against the d e ta in ee . I t  uas held
th a t the "maximum period" need not be fix e d  in  terms of years , months aid
days and th a t i t  could be, as in  s .13, f ix e d  in  terms of an event. I t  uas
also held th a t only because the duration of the period depended upon the
v o lit io n  of the  President did not mean th a t Parliam ent had delegated i t s
function  to the P res id en t. H is Lordship fu r th e r  observed th a t during the
currency of the proclamation of emergency the v ire s  of  s .13 could not be
tested  u ith  reference to  A r t .19 and th a t in  any case the section uas not
u l t r a  v ire s  A r t .14, in  th a t i t  had fix e d  a maximum period and the deta in ing
au th o rity  uas given the d iscre tio n  to f i x  the period o f detention in  any
p a r t ic u la r  case a f te r  considering a l l  re levan t fa c ts  and circumstances.
5.173 Of the other two judges, A lag irisuam i, 3 . ,  disagreed u ith  the
m a jo rity  opinion on only one p o in t. H is Lordship held th a t ,  "the concept
o f a maximum period runs through the uhole o f A r t ic le  22(4) and (7 )"  and
th a t "an harmonious construction of the uhole o f A rtic le s  22(4) and 22(7)
uould. . . n ecessita te  th a t Parliam ent should provide a maximum period of
detention not merely in  respect of laus re la t in g  to preventive  detention
114made by S tate  Leg is la tu res  but also i t s  own law s". H is Lordship gave
cogent reasons fo r  th is  saying, "u h ile  Parliam ent and State Leg is la tu res
make laus i t  is  the executive th a t makes orders o f detention and i f  no
maximum period of detention is  s p e c ifie d  by lau  i t  uould be open to  the
115executive to keep persons in  detention in d e f in it e ly ."  H is  Lordship 
c a te g o ric a lly  held  th a t "maximum period" must be la id  doun by Parliam ent
in  a l l  cases o f d e te n tio n s , nam ely, both u ith  and u ith o u t o b ta in in g
the opinion of the Advisory Board. His Lordship also observed th a t h is
v ieu  uas supported by C onstituent Assembly Debates to uhich Bhaguati, 3 . ,
had re fe rre d  in  h is  separate d issen t. In  fa c t Bhaguati, 3 . ,  also answered
the question uhich h is  Lordship did not decide, namely, uhat uould be the
position  in  case Parliam ent chose not to  prescribe any "maximum perio d".
5.174 The in f ir m ity  of the m a jo rity  opinion m anifested in  i t s  misplaced
and in appropria te  re lia n c e  on e a r l ie r  decisions uas estab lished u ith  great
care and precis ion  by A lag irisu am i, 3 . ,  to  uhich fa c t  Bhaguati, 3«, in
tu rn , re fe rre d  in  h is  judgment. Iile may also deal u ith  those decisions f i r s t .
I t  uas r ig h t ly  pointed out th a t except Kania, C .3 .,  the o ther judges in
GOPALAN ( supra) did not deal u ith  s u b -c l. (b ) o f c l . (7 ) of A r t .22 and even
Kania, C .3 .,  did not give s p e c ific  reasons fo r  h is  terse o b ite r  th a t th9
r ig h t to deta in  in d e f in ite ly  sprang from c l . (7 ) i t s e l f .  Ida uould l ik e
only to point out the m in o rity  judges in  FAGU SHAlii could also have stressed
th a t uhat Kania, C .3 . observed uas o b ite r  as in  GOPALAN the provision of
s u b -c l.(a )  and not (b ) cone up fo r  consideration . S im ila r ly , in  KRISHNAN,
of the m a jo rity  only Mahajan, 3 . ,  (Das, 3 . ,  agreeing) d e a lt u ith  the
point but even he did not give any compelling reasons except s ta tin g  (indeed
erroneously) th a t the po in t uas "concluded by the  m a jo rity  decision in
Gopalan" and r e lie d  on the general reason given by Kania, C .3 .,  th a t sub-
c l .  (b ) uas "perm issive" uhich could be traced to  the general contention
made in  th a t case ( a lb e i t  re je c te d ) th a t the word "may" o f the main c l . (7 )
116ought to read as "must". Indeed, Bhaguati, 3 . ,  d id  re fe r  to  Bose, 3 .*s
lone dissent in  KRISHNAN a9 "strong and powerful" and observed th a t the same
117vieu  had found favour u ith  him. I t  i s ,  however, im portant to  po in t out 
th a t Bose, 3 . ,  r ig h t ly  observed on an in te rp re ta t io n  of A r t .22 as a uhole 
th a t ,  "a fundamental r ig h t regarding the length of detention uas intended  
to  be conferred" and th a t , " i t  uould be p o in tless  to  make the provision  
about th ree  months and place i t  in  the chapter on Fundamental Rights i f
118th a t were not so ." As regards the decision in  ASOKE DEY i t  uas r ig h t ly  
pointed out by A lag irisuam i, 3 . ,  th a t the court uas there  mainly concerned 
u ith  the in te rp re ta t io n  of a s ta te  lau  and u ith  the le g is la t iv e  competence 
of the s ta te  ra th e r than u ith  the broader aspect o f A r t .22 as a uhole; 
there the only contention uas th a t "may" in  the main c l . ( 7 )  ought to be
119read as "sh a ll'] only as respect s u b -c ls .(b ) and ( c ) ,  uhich uas re je c te d .
5.175 Bhaguati, 3 . ,  ue submit, adopted the r ig h t  approach uhen he 
observed:
Ue must remember th a t i t  is  a C onstitu tio n  ue are expounding -  
a C onstitu tio n  uhich gives us a democratic republican form of 
government and uhich recognises the r ig h t  o f personal l ib e r ty  
as the  most p rized  possession of an in d iv id u a l. . . S h a ll ue 
not respond fre e ly  and fe a r le s s ly  to  the in te n tio n  of the 
founding fa th e rs  and in te rp re t the c o n s titu tio n a l provision  
in  the broad and l ib e r a l  s p i r i t  in  uhich they conceived i t  
instead  of adopting a ra th e r mechanical and l i t e r a l  
construction uhich defeats  th e ir  in te n tio n  ?
Indeed, a C onstitu tio n  could not be equated u ith  an ordinary le g is la t iv e
instrum ent re q u irin g  uhat the m a jo rity  euphem istically  c a lle d  a
"dispassionate" o r, as Bhaguati, 3 . ,  c a lle d  i t ,  "mechanical and l i t e r a l "
constructio n . Indeed, in  th is  m a tte r, English courts could not
obviously o f fe r  any re a l guidance fo r  they had never been concerned u ith  the
in te rp re ta t io n  of a Republican C o n s titu tio n . H is  Lordship there fo re  r ig h t ly
turned to  American precedents fo r  a u th o rity  fo r  looking in to  Constituent
Assembly Debates. I t  i s ,  however, necessary to  make a comment on th is
p o in t. The Supreme Court in  In d ia  very e a r ly , in  GOPALAN. recognised
the d e s ir a b il i ty  of fo llo w in g  the American ru le  of l im it in g  uhat Krishna
121Iy e r ,  3 . ,  tuentythree  years la t e r ,  ca lle d  the "ru le  o f exc lus ion",
in  respect of le g is la t iv e  proceedings in  genera l. Bhaguati, 3 . ,  re lie d
on the dictum o f Krishna Iy e r  3 . ,  uhich, according to  h is  Lordship took
122n o tice  o f the "change in  the methodology of in te rp re ta t io n " . Ue 
submit th a t in  so fa r  as the  Ind ian  Supreme Court uas concerned i t  had 
already adopted the  neu or the "changed" norm of in te rp re ta t io n  by 
re fe rr in g  to  the ConstitueitAssembly Debates in  GOPALAN .
5.176 H is Lordship quoted exten s ive ly  from the Debates to  demonstrate
th a t the C onstitution-m akers d e lib e ra te ly  and consciously contemplated a
compulsory maximum on the period of preventive de ten tio n . As ue have
123already pointed out e a r l ie r  the  provision uas debated a t great length
and h is  Lordship took care to  quote D r. Ambedkar (D ra ft in g  Committee
Chairman) uhen he pleaded fo r  acceptance o f the re d ra fted  provision by
c a te g o ric a lly  re fe rr in g  to  the various safeguards o f uhich the  re levan t
124portion ue uould also l ik e  to  quote:
T h ird ly , in  every case, whether i t  is  a case uhich is  
required  to  be placed before the ju d ic ia l  board or n o t,
Parliam ent s h a ll  prescribe the maximum period of detention  
so th a t no person uho is  detained under any lau  re la t in g  
to  preventive detention can be detained in d e f in it e ly .  There 
s h a ll aluays be a maximum period of detention uhich 
Parliam ent is  required  to prescribe by la u .
However, h is  Lordship proceeded fu rth e r  to shou th a t the language of the
re levan t provision uas "not so in tra c ta b le "  th a t i t  could not be
in te rp re te d  so as "to e ffe c tu a te "  the in te n tio n  of the C o n s titu tio n - 
125makers. I t  uas held th a t the proviso to  s u b -c l.(a )  of c l . (4 ) of A r t .22
uas not used in  the " t r a d it io n a l orthodox sense" but uas intended to  enact
a "substantive provision" and th a t the proviso and the main provision of sub
126c l . ( a )  ought to  be read as "one s in g le  enactment". F in a lly  h is
Lordship c a te g o ric a lly  held  th a t ,  "There can be no detention fo r  a period
longer than three months unless the maximum period of detention is
127prescribed by Parliam ent under c . ( 7 ) ,  s u b -c l .(b ) ."  (lie have already
submitted e a r l ie r  th a t th is  v ie u , a lb e it  on ce rta in  other reasons a lso , has
128much to commend i t s e l f  as the  correct p o s ition  in  la u .
1295.177 A few months la t e r  came the decision in  HARADHAN SAHA. Ray, 
C .3 .,  d e live red  the unanimous opinion of the court -  again u ith  a bench of 
f iv e  judges u ith  Mathew and A lag irisuam i, 3 .3 . ,  but w ithout Bhaguati,
3 . Possibly the fa c ts  of the case d ic ta ted  a d if fe re n t  approach to  
conform to the philosophy of the C o nstitu tio n  as i t  uas a lleged  in  the  
"grounds" th a t the p e t it io n e r  uas involved in  the hoarding and smuggling
of fo o d s tu f f .  The v ir e s  o f th e  Act (M ISA) uas again challenged  u ith
reference more p a r t ic u la r ly  to  A r t .14, as also A r ts .19 and 21. The
unanimous decision in  SAMBHU NATH of seven judges, inc lud ing  Ray, 3 . (as
he then uas) uas t o t a l ly  l e f t  out o f consideration and the court observed,
contrary to the decision in  SAMBHU NATH, th a t the r a t io  of the COOPER
130case uas to  be confined to  the in te r - r e la t io n  of A rts . 19 and 31.
However, la t e r  in  the judgment the court observed th a t "even i f "  A r t .19 
uas examined in  regards to  preventive d e ten tio n , i t  did not increase the 
"content o f reasonableness" of the safeguards and th a t the procedure
131
prescribed in  the Act provided fo r  f a i r  consideration of the "rep resen ta tio n ".
The only reason given uas -  "The pouer of preventive detention uas
q u a lita t iv e ly  d if fe re n t  from p u n itive  detention . . . [ -  a ] precautionary
132power exercised in  reasonable a n tic ip a tio n ."  On the seme reasons the
133challenge grounded on A r t .14 uas also re jec ted  and w ithout e laborate
discussion and d e ta ile d  examination of the provisions i t  proceeded to  lay
down c e rta in  "broad p r in c ip le s "  emanating from certa in  "recent"
decisions (g iven by three judges in  each case) and in  th a t v ieu  o f the
134m atter i t  o ver-ru led  a decision of tuo judges in  BIRAM CHAND.
5.178 In  BIRAM CHAND. Gosuami, 3 . ,  speaking fo r  the co u rt, simply
rehearsed the  " u e ll-s e t t le d "  p r in c ip le s  th a t the "grounds" of detention
135must be "c le a r"  and " d e fin ite "  and proceeded to  add:
to  enable the detenu to make an e ffe c t iv e  representation  
to  the government to induce the a u th o ritie s  to  take a v ieu  
in  h is  favo u r. He must th e re fo re  have a re a l and e ffe c t iv e  
opportunity  to  make h is  representation  to  es tab lish  h is  
innocence. Being faced u ith  a c rim in a l prosecution uhich 
i s  pending against him a l l  through, ue are c le a r ly  o f the  
v ieu  th a t the detenu has not got a proper and reasonable  
opportunity  in  accordance u ith  lau  to  make an e f fe c t iv e  
representation  against the impugned o rd er. • .
[emphasis added^
His Lordship also observed th a t a "ground" o f preventive detention could
also be a "su b ject-m atter of prosecution" but there could not be tuo
136p a r a l le l  proceedings; the a u th o rity  had to  make a choice. The D is t r ic t
M agistrate  in  the in s ta n t case uas "in fluenced by the existence of c rim in a l 
prosecution" and in  th a t v ieu  of the  m atter the court held th a t ,  "the 
scope of the in q u iry  in  the case of preventive detention  based upon 
subjective  s a tis fa c tio n  being n ecessarily  narrow and lim ite d , the scru tiny  
of the  court has to  be even s t r ic t e r  than in  a normal case of p u n itive
4. • ■. M137t r i a l . "
5.179 I t  uas indeed s e tt le d  as e a rly  as in  ATM ARAM ( supra) th a t whether 
the "grounds" afforded reasonable opportunity to the detainee to make an 
e ffe c tiv e  representation  uas a ju s t ic ia b le  issue and whether "reasonable 
and proper" opportunity uas given in  a p a r t ic u la r  case depended upon the 
fa c ts  aid circumstances of each case. Thus, i t  uas not possible to  say 
th a t the decision in  BIRAM CHAND uas urong on fa c ts  e ith e r .  The use of the  
word "innocence" by Gosuami, 3 . ,  d id not mean th a t he uas o b liv io u s  of the 
d is tin c tio n  between a p u n itive  and preventive d e ten tio n . On the other 
hand h is  Lordship r ig h t ly  pointed out the proper ro le  of superior courts  
in  cases of preventive detention as the deta inee, u n lik e  an accused in  a 
crim in a l prosecution, could not claim a presumption of innocence but 
had to  "estab lish  h is  innocence". I t  uas indeed a negation of the ru le  of 
lau  embodied in  A r t .14 to  s ta r t  and continue tuo p a r a l le l  proceedings, 
in  respect o f the same "ground". I t  is  true th a t the ru le  of double 
jeopardy did not s t r ic t ly  apply in  such a case, but he uas e n t it le d  to  
exercise to the f u l le s t  possib le  extent h is  s ta tu ta ry  r ig h t of s ilence  
a ris in g  from the presumption of innocence in  the c rim in a l proceeding as 
w ell as the c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t o f making e ffe c t iv e  representation  in  a 
proceeding under the preventive detention lau  but obviously the tuo r ig h ts  
could not be sim ultaneously exercised as one m ilita te d  against the o th e r. 
One uas based on the presumption of innocence and the other on presumption 
of g u i l t .  I f  he took a d e f in ite  s ta id  and made out a p o s itiv e  case in  a 
"detention case", as he uas obliged to  do to  make an e ffe c t iv e  
rep resen ta tio n , he uas l ik e ly  to  be p re ju d iced !in  h is  defence in  the
crim in a l case. Thus, in  law also i t  was not possible to  say th a t the v ieu  
advocated by Gosuami, 3 . ,  uas p a ten tly  erroneous. Ray, C .3 .,  in  
HARADHAN SAHA, obviously s ta ted  the lau  too broadly (and th ere fo re  
in a c c u ra te ly , by ignoring  the  importance of the c o n s titu tio n a l safeguard 
of " e ffe c tiv e  rep resen ta tio n ") by c a te g o ric a lly  s ta tin g  as a p r in c ip le  
of lau  th a t a detention order could be v a lid ly  passed during the pendency 
of a c rim in a l prosecution and th a t only in  one case could i t  not be 
passed, namely, uhen the person concerned uas a c tu a lly  in  prison and 
there uas no lik e lih o o d  of h is  e a rly  re le a se . Although no reason uas 
given fo r  the last-m entioned dictum h is  Lordship possibly meant th a t in  
such a case i t  uas p h ys ica lly  im possible fo r  the  person concerned to  be 
involved in  any p re ju d ic ia l a c t iv i t y .
5,180 I t  is  however in te re s tin g  to note th a t although Ray, C .3 .,  had
stressed the d is tin c t io n  between preventive and p u n itive  detention to the
advantage of the executive a id Gosuami, 3 . ,  to  th a t o f the in d iv id u a l, in
HARADHAN SAHA and BIRAM CHAND, and the decision in  the la t t e r  case uas
overru led , i t  i s  the v ieu  of Gosuami, 3 . ,  th a t appears to  have found
favour u ith  most of the judges in  the la t e r  decis ions. The v ieu  of
Gosuami, 3 . ,  tended to  c u r ta i l  the scope of the sub jective  s a tis fa c tio n
of the executive by s tress ing  the need of subjecting i t  to a " s tr ic te r
138sc ru tin y " . In  KHUDIRAM DAS i t  uas held th a t the sub jective
s a tis fa c tio n  of the deta in ing  au th o rity  uas "not wholly immune from
ju d ic ia l  re v ie w a b ility "  and a fte r  i l lu s t r a t in g  a t some length the various
circumstances in  uhich the courts uould in te r fe r e ,  Bhaguati, 3 . ,  speaking
fo r  the co u rt, concluded by saying th a t ,  "The tru th  is  th a t in  a government
139under the la u , there  is  no such th ing  as unrevieuable d is c re tio n ."
140In a la t e r  decis ion , SADHU RAY. Krishna Iy e r ,  3 . ,  speaking fo r  the  
court, observed th a t ,  "the executive conclusion regarding f u t u r is t ic  
p re ju d ic ia l a c t iv i t ie s  o f the  detenu and i t s  nexus u ith  h is  past conduct 
is  acceptable but not in vu ln erab le"  and th a t , "the court can l i f t  the
141verb a l v e i l  to  discover the tru e  fa c e .” The Indian c o u rt’ s approach
has thus come very close to  P ak is tan 's , and possibly the courts in  In d ia
w i l l  soon be disposed to  review the detention orders in  a l l  cases except
when challenged on the ground o f s u ffic ie n c y  of n a te r ia ls .  Thus i t  may not
perhaps go so fa r  as to  requ ire  the executive to  produce a l l  m a te ria ls
142to  te s t the subjective s a tis fa c tio n  as the  Pakistan courts do.
5.181 We propose to  examine la te r  another im portant decision of
143"Ray Court" in  what has popularly  come to  be known as the HABEAS CORPUS
case, but we may f i r s t  examine the ju d ic ia l  response to  COFEPOSA. In  
144BHANUDAS. Ray, C .3 . concurred w ith the judgment d e livered  by 3 . Singh, 3
while Beg, 3 . ,  d e live red  a separate (a lb e i t  concurring) op in ion . The 
m atter arose out o f an appeal by the Union of In d ia  against the decisions  
o f Bombay and Karnataka High Courts d ire c tin g  c e rta in  f a c i l i t i e s  to  be 
given to the deta inees. The approach o f the court was amply re fle c te d  in
the fo llo w in g  passage in  (S ingh, 3 's  opin ion) which the court r ig h t ly
-i 145 observed:
The avowed object of the Act as m anifest from the preamble
being the conservation and augmentation of fo re ign  exchange
and the prevention of smuggling a c t iv i t ie s  o f considerable
magnitude s ecre tly  organised and c a rrie d  on which have a
baneful e f fe c t  on the n a tio n a l economy and gravely undermine
the secu rity  o f the s ta te , i t  is  e s s e n tia l th a t the contact
o f the detenus with the outside world would be reduced to
the minimum. r . , , ,-i[emphasis addedJ
However, as we have already seen th a t the use of the expression "secu rity  
of the S ta te" in  the preamble i t s e l f  was merely in d ic a tiv e  of the desperate 
attempt made to  preempt any possible challenge grounded on le g is la t iv e  
competence but s u rp ris in g ly  in  the in s ta n t case the opportunity to  
make such a challenge was not a v a ile d .
5 .182  I t  i s  to be noted th a t the importance o f th is  decision fo r  the  
purpose of our study l ie s  in  the fa c t th a t i t  presents a strong contrast 
to  the s itu a tio n  obta in ing  in  Pakistan where the courts could and did
in q u ire  in to  the le g a l i ty  not only of the "a u th o rity "  but also of the
146"manner" o f th e  d e te n tio n . Indeed , as h e ld  by Singh, 3 . ,  the
P re s id e n tia l Orders made under A rt. 3 5 9 (1 ), suspending the r ig h t  to  move
the court fo r  the enforcement o f the fundamental r ig h ts  guaranteed under
A rts . 14, 21, 22 and 19, purported to impose "blanket bans on any and every
ju d ic ia l  enquiry or in v e s tig a tio n " . Beg, 3 . ,  however, in  dealing w ith the
m erits  of the several cases in  a general way, observed th a t the grievances
in  respect o f conditions o f detention (which included those concerning
m edical treatm ent and food) could not be considered by the High Courts 
147under A rt. 226. I t  i s  tru e  th a t ,  as h is  Lordship observed, d ire c tio n s  
given by High Courts could not be enforced during the emergency and the  
court had r ig h t ly  set aside the decisions o f the Bombay and Karnataka  
High Courts. However, i t  is  to be noted th a t despite the verb a l d iffe ren ce  
in  the c o n s titu tio n a l p ro v is io n s , although in  In d ia  the courts (u n lik e  
th e ir  Pakistan counterparts) did not have s p e c ific  powers to  in q u ire  in to  
an "unlaw ful manner" of d e ten tio n , the general and wide language of A rt.
226 did not r e s t r ic t  th e ir  ju r is d ic t io n  in  such a manner as to  make them 
to t a l ly  powerless in  th is  respect.
5 .1 B3 Indeed, the ju r is d ic t io n  was lim ite d  and in  the in s ta n t case
Beg, 3 . ,  h im self proceeded to  examine the contention of the detainees in
respect o f only the  v a l id i ty  o f the ru les  reg u la tin g  the conditions of
d e te n tio n . I t  was contended th a t the conditions of detention could not
be " e ith e r  so made or administered as to  amount to p u n itive  d e te n tio n " .
c . , , 148Beg, 3 . h e ld :
Although preventive detention which is  c o n s titu tio n a lly  
sanctioned in  th is  country, and p u n itive  detention may be 
q u a lita t iv e ly  d if fe r e n t  and may be regu lated  by e n t ire ly  
d if fe re n t  procedures and may have very d if fe re n t  immediate 
o b je c tiv e s , y e t , i f  we c lose ly  examine the to t a l  e ffe c ts
and u ltim a te  s o c ia l purposes of d e ten tio n , whether
preventive or p u n it iv e , i t  seems to me, speaking e n t ire ly  
fo r  m yself, th a t the th e o re tic a l d is tin c tio n s  become less  
obvious. • . detention of a person by the S tate or i t s
o ff ic e rs  must necessarily  be a d e p riva tio n . . . Again,
"preventive" d e ten tio n , l ik e  p u n itiv e . . • may have some 
th erap eu tic  or re fo rm ative  purposes behind them. . .
[emphasis added]
Proceeding fu rth e r  h is  Lordship re fe rre d  to  the  decisions in  HALLIDAY
end LIVERSIDGE to  say th a t "the p r in c ip le  th a t the doctrine  of S tate
necessity is  not a v a ila b le  to  a State against i t s  oun c it iz e n s  becomes
in ap p licab le  during an emergency" and to re la te  i t  to  the maxim
149salus populi suprema le x .
5 .184 Speaking in  the sane vein Singh, 3 . ,  he ld  th a t "the doctrine of
le g a l i ty  and v ire s "  uhich uere "sacrosanct in  times of peace" had no
relevance in  regard to a le g is la t iv e  or an executive measure taken in
times of emergency and th a t the " ru le  of lau  during emergency" uas
nothing e lse  than uhat uas contained in  Chapter X U III  of the C onstitu tio n
150uhich uas the "p o s itive  and transcendental la u " . While there could be
no q u arre l u ith  the last-m entioned p ro p o s itio n , i t  c o n flic te d  u ith  the
other proposition uhich uas based on the doctrine  o f necessity in  th a t
necessity  uas n e ith e r p o s itive  lau  nor uas i t  an in f le x ib le  doctrine as
h is  Lordship* and even Beg, 3 . ,  attempted to  p ro je c t by re fe rr in g
in a p p ro p ria te ly  to  the English uartime cases. I t  is  to  be noted th a t
Singh, 3 . ,  also in a p p ro p ria te ly , re fe rre d  to observations made in  an
e a r l ie r  decision of the court uhich uas concerned u ith  uartime 
151le g is la t io n . As ue have already seen, the doctrine  of necessity  did not 
envisage a complete negation of ju d ic ia l  rev ieu  even in  times of uar and
the emergency provisions of the C onstitu tion  (Chapter X V I I I )  even in  the
not
amended form did/deny the v a l id i ty  of the basic p r in c ip le s  o f the ordinary  
concept of the Rule of Lau. I t  is  submitted th a t even in  the in s ta n t case 
the  v ire s  o f the parent Act i t s e l f ,  namely, C0FEP0SA, uas open to challenge 
on the  ground of le g is la t iv e  incompetence, as already pointed o u t. I t  is  
also submitted th a t ru les  reg u la tin g  conditions of detention ought to  
receive uhat ue have c a lled  a "humanitarian in te rp re ta t io n "  in  v ieu  of the  
p a r t ic u la r  fa c t  th a t the 1966 In te rn a t io n a l Covenant on C iv i l  and
P o l i t ic a l  Rights having entered fo rc e , compliance u ith  A rt. 7 th ereo f uas
152necessary.
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5.185 In  ABDUL KADER, a f u l l  bench of the Madras High Court
did te s t the v ire s  o f the Act u ith  reference to  le g is la t iv e  competence but 
from another aspect, namely, the e x t r a - t e r r i t o r ia l  operation of the Act, 
and r ig h t ly  negatived the challenge on th a t ground. The High Court also 
r ig h t ly  held th a t the so -ca lled  "b lanket ben" uas not to t a l  and th a t  
"any le g a l r ig h t conferred on a person by le g is la t io n  other than the 
fundamental r ig h t re fe rre d  to in  the  P re s id e n tia l Order" could be 
enforced in  a court o f la u . The court held th a t i t  could e n te rta in  
the ap p lica tio n  in  the exercise of i t s  re v is io n a l ju r is d ic t io n  under the 
C rim inal Procedure Code against an order by the M agistrate  passed under 
the Code in  respect o f the property of the p e t it io n e r , in  accordance u ith  
s .7 o f the A ct. Indeed, Singh, 0 . ,  in  BHANUDAS had also held th a t the 
prisoners in  th a t case uere not enforc ing  the provisions of the s ta tu to ry  
ru les  reg u la tin g  the conditions o f detention but they uere challenging the  
ru le s .
( d ) Th£  JHajDBjas_Corj3us Case
1545.186 The decision in  A.P.M. .  JABALPUR v SHIV/AKANT 5UKLA cane to be
popularly  knoun as the Habeas Corpus Case but u n fo rtu n ate ly  no arguments
appear to  have been advanced on the fo o tin g  of c l . (4 ) o f A r t .32 uhich
s p e c if ic a lly  d e a lt u ith  the "suspension" of the " r ig h t guaranteed by th is  
155A r t ic le " .  The a tte n tio n  o f the court uas d irec ted  almost so le ly  
touards A r t .21 and the decision proceeded on the basis th a t A r t .21 uas the 
"sole rep o s ito ry"  of the "r ig h t to  personal l ib e r ty "  and, the P re s id e n tia l 
Order made under A rt. 359(1) having suspended the " r ig h t to move the  
court fo r  the enforcement o f the r ig h t  conferred" by A rt. 21, the  
ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus uas not m ain ta in ab le . I t  is  to be noted 
th a t the uord "conferred" used in  A r t .3 5 9 ( l)  in  re la tio n  to Part I I I  
uas read l i t e r a l l y ,  and in  is o la t io n , divorced from the fa c tu a l background 
and the le g is la t iv e  h is to ry . I t  is  true  th a t P art I I I  d e a lt u ith  
c erta in  neu r ig h ts  and the term "conferred" could have been appropriate ly
used in  re la tio n  to  those r ig h ts  but the converse could not be true  and 
merely because o f the use of the uord, the fa c tu a l pos ition  th a t P art I I I  
included certa in  p re -e x is tin g  r ig h ts  also could not be ignored. This  
uas the crux of the m atter and deserved to  be set out in  the fo re fro n t but 
the m atter appears to  have been placed before the Supreme Court from a 
d if fe re n t  angle and, fo r  th is  reason perhaps, the court remained pre­
occupied mainly u ith  the "sole rep o sito ry" theory advanced by the A ttorney- 
G eneral. The fa c t  th a t A r t . 3 2 ,uhich d e a lt u ith  the " r ig h t to  the 
c o n s titu tio n a l remedy" of habeas corpus, uas not suspended by the  
P re s id e n tia l Order uas u n fo rtu n ate ly  re legated  to  the background.
5.187 Several appeals by the State uere consolidated and heard 
together in  the above case. The State had taken a p re lim inary  objection  
in  the d if fe re n t  High Courts in  ap p lica tio n s  fo r  habeas corpus against 
detention orders passed under MISA. Although nine High Courts had 
re jec ted  the ob jection  and had held th a t the P re s id e n tia l Order under
A r t .359(1) did not a ffe c t  the m a in ta in a b ility  of the p e tit io n s , the appeals 
in  the above case uere against decisions of s ix  High Courts. The High 
Courts had held th a t the court could examine uhether a detention order uas 
in  accordance u ith  those p a r t ic u la r  provisions of the Act u*iich 
constitu ted  the conditions~precedent to the exercise of the pouers under 
the Act and also uhether the order uas made mala f id e  or uas made on the  
basis of re levan t m a te ria ls  by uhich the deta in ing  a u th o rity  could have 
been s a t is f ie d  th a t the order uas necessary. I t  is  necessary to  mention 
in  th is  connection th a t the Supreme Court had e a r l ie r  d ea lt u ith  a 
s im ila r  objection  in  severa l decis ions.
5.188 In  the in s ta n t case the m atter uas heard by a bench o f f iv e
judges led by Ray, C .3 .,  and each o f them d e livered  separate judgments,
a l l  concurring, except the one by Khanna, 3 . In  the e a r l ie r  case of 
156MAKHAN SINGH the m atter uas heard by seven judges. The m a jo rity  (s ix  
judges) had held in  th a t case th a t the v ire s  o f the s ta tu to ry  provisions  
(th e  Defence o f In d ia  Act and Rules in  th a t case) could not be challenged
in  an ap p lica tio n  fo r  habea3 corpus in  v ie u  o f the P re s id e n tia l Order made
under A rt. 3 5 9 (1 ). I t  is  to  be noted th a t the Order in  th a t case uas
q u a lif ie d . Although the r ig h t  to move the court fo r  the enforcement o f
r ig h ts  under A rts . 21 and 22 uas suspended, as in  th is  case, i t  uas upon
the condition th a t ,  " i f  such person has been deprived of any such r ig h ts
under the Defence o f In d ia  Ordinance 1962". However, the m a jo rity  also
held th a t both under A rt. 226 and s .4 9 l(1 ) (b )  o f the C rim inal Procedure
Code i t  uas open to the app lican t to contend th a t the detention uas
157i l le g a l  fo r  the v io la t io n  o f the mandatory provisions of the Act and
158th a t the order uas made mala fid e  as such pleas uould be ^outside the 
scope of A r t .3 5 9 (1 )."  I f  the lau  su ffered  from the v ice  of excessive
159d e leg a tio n , such a p lea  could also be en te rta in ed  on the same ground.
In  fa c t the court did examine, but re je c te d , the contention th a t certa in
provisions of the Act and the Rules suffered  from such v ic e . Houever,
th e ir  Lordships said th a t they uould not express any opinion whether the
p e tit io n e r  could also challenge the detention order as void to  secure h is
160release i f  h is  contention uas accepted.
5.189 In  h is  d issent in  MAKHAN SINGH. Subba Rou, 3 . ,  (as he then uas) 
held th a t s .491 did not contemplate any r ig h t  to move a court by any party  
"The court can exercise the s ta tu to ry  pouer uhtmever i t  th in ks  f i t  i f  
the fa c t o f a lleged detention is  brought to i t s  n o tic e ,"  h is  Lordship said  
The section contemplated a "d iscre tio n ary  ju r is d ic t io n  conceived as a 
check on the a rb itra ry  action " and there uas n e ith e r  any o b lig a tio n  on the  
High Court to give r e l i e f  nor uas there  any r ig h t  created in  favour o f a 
detained person to move the court fo r  the enforcement of h is  fundamental 
r ig h t .  H is Lordship also held th a t A r t .359 expressly d e a lt u ith  "the  
c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t to move a court aid a c o n s titu tio n a l enforcement o f
th a t r ig h t"  and th a t the expression " r ig h t to move. . . e tc"  re fe rre d  to
162the r ig h t under A rts . 32 and 226. U n fortunate ly  h is  Lordship did not 
proceed fu r th e r  to examine the scope and in te n t or purport of c l . (4 ) of
A r t .32 to  determine i t s  re la t io n  to  the said  expression.
1635.190 In  a la t e r  case, RAM MANOHAR, (a lso  under the same s ta tu to ry  
p ro v is io n ) the Supreme Court allowed an ap p lica tio n  under A r t .32 (despite  
the same P re s id e n tia l Order) on the ground th a t the deta in ing  au th o rity  
had confused "pub lic  order" u ith  "law and ordBr" aid th a t the order uas 
bad as the pouer of detention uas only fo r  the purpose of maintenance of 
"p u b lic  o rd er" . H id a ya tu lla h , 3 . ,  (as he then uas) held th a t the 
P re s id e n tia l Order had merely shut out in q u iry  as to non-compliance u ith  
other laws and not u ith  the Defence of In d ia  Act and the Rules. The Order 
did not say th a t a person who was proceeded against in  breach o f the said
164provisions could not complain th a t the action taken uas a colourable one. 
Sarkar, 3 . ,  held  th a t A rts . 21 and 22 gave people lla c e rta in  personal 
l ib e r ty "  end th a t there uas nothing in  the order uhich deprived the 
detainee of h is  r ig h t to move the court under A r t .32 uhich uas one o f the  
fundamental r ig h ts  and could not be taken away "except by the methods
16provided in  the C o n s titu tio n , one of which uas by an order under A r t .359."  
Although h is  Lordship did not deal with c l . (4 ) in  p a r t ic u la r  he had at 
le a s t gone as fa r  as holding th a t the Order under A r t .359 must expressly
mention A r t .32 i f  the " r ig h t to  move the court" uas to  be suspended.
166In  MOHAN CHOUDHURY. Sinha, C .3 .,  however, gave a d if fe re n t  in te rp re ta t io n  
of the P re s id e n tia l Order and held th a t the court*s power under A rt. 32 
had not been suspended although the p e tit io n e r  had no locus standi as h is  
r ig h t  to move the court had been suspended.
5.191 I t  is  thus c le a r th a t the severa l High Courts uhich had re jec ted  
the p re lim in ary  ob jection  were w ith in  th e ir  r ig h t  to  act upon and fo llo u  
the e a r l ie r  decisions of the Supreme Court under uhich the p lea  fo r  a to t a l  
ouster o f the ju r is d ic t io n  of the courts by a P re s id e n tia l Order under 
A r t .359(1) had been re je c te d . Indeed, the decision in  MAKHAN SINGH
posed a form idable challenge to  the p lea  of b lanket ban advanced by the 
State and Bhaguati, 3 . ,  took great pains and care to  d is tin g u ish  the
decision on tuo broad p o in ts , namely, th a t the re levan t observations  
made in  th a t case ought to be read as o b ite r  and th a t the P re s id e n tia l
167Order in  th a t case uas, u n like  the present o rder, a "co n d itio n a l o rd er".
Ray, C .3 ., also came to a s im ila r  conclusion (a lb e i t  u ithou t d e ta ile d
analys is ) and held th a t ,  "the decision in  MAKHAN SINGH's  case and
subsequent cases fo llo u in g  i t  have no ap p lica tio n  to the present case
uhere the suspension is  not hedged u ith  any condition of enforcement of
168any r ig h t under A rtic le s  21 and 22". Beg, 3 . (as he then uas), uho
d ea lt u ith  the case from d if fe re n t  angles and urote an e laborate  and u e l l -
considered judgment, uas quick to point out the ueaker aspect of MAKHAN
SINGH in  th a t i t  had l e f t  the f in a l  point of e n fo rc e a b ility  undecided and
169th a t the other observations uere "h y p o th e tic a l" . Chandrachud, 3 . ,
however, sau the strength of the decision but observed th a t ,  "no judgment
can be read as i f  i t  is  a s ta tu te " . His Lordship summarised the "conclusions"
of the decision and observed th a t ,  "these conclusions oue th e ir  ju s t i f ic a t io n
to  the p e cu lia r wording of the P re s id e n tia l Order uhich uas issued in  th a t 
170case". On the other hand, although Khanna, 3 . ,  in  h is  lone d issent,
a rrived  at s u b s ta n tia lly  the  same conclusions as in  MAKHAN SINGH, and
re fe rre d  to  i t  and also to  RATO MANOHAR's  case, he did not take p a r t ic u la r
care to  deal u ith  the m a jo r ity 's  ob jection  to  accept th a t decision as
conclusive, and uas content to  say th a t ,  ‘'the observations made in  those
cases uhich uere not lin ke d  u ith  the phraseology of the e a r l ie r
171P re s id e n tia l Orders" can be re lie d  upon.
5.192 I t  is  submitted th a t the basic po in t in  a l l  cases uas uhether 
A r t .359(1) contemplated a P re s id e n tia l Order (c o n d itio n a l or o theru ise) 
by uhich a b lanket ban on ju d ic ia l  review could at a l l  be imposed. A ll  
seven judges unequivocally answered the question in  MAKHAN SINGH in  the  
n eg ative . There uas also another aspect of the m atter uhich Subba Row, 3 .
(as he then uas), d e a lt u ith  in  h is  d issent in  th a t case and Sarkar, 3 . ,  in  
RAM MANOHAR and Sinha, C .3 . in  MOHAN CHQWDHURY. I t  uas in  respect of the
power and ju r is d ic t io n  of the court and not the r ig h t  o f the in d iv id u a l. The
judges in  the in s ta n t case overlooked th is  p a r t ic u la r  aspect. Perhaps they
found another new dimension which was sought to be added in  the in s ta n t
case more in te re s tin g  and tempting to  deal w ith . In  fa c t  Bhagwati, 3 . ,
explored the new dimension in  considerable d e ta i l  but i t  also a llu re d  Beg, 3 . ,
who, in  dealing  with the contention th a t the s itu a tio n  re s u ltin g  from
the P re s id e n tia l Order under A rt. 359(1) could be equated to  a d ec la ratio n
of m a rtia l law, held th a t ,  although there was no s p e c ific  provision in
the C o n s titu tio n , A r t . 34 recognised "the p o s s ib ility  of m a r t ia l law ".
However, h is  Lordship held th a t a "take-over" by m il ita r y  courts was
"outside the provisions of A rt. 3 5 9 (1 )" . On the other hand he re fe rre d
to the P re s id e n ts  powers as the  Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
under A r t .5 3 (2 ) , which was inappropria te  because the a r t ic le  i t s e l f  said
172th a t "the exercise thereo f s h a ll be regulated  by law ".
5.193 Bhagwati, 3 . ,  based h is  conclusions mainly on an a r t ic le  w ritte n
by P ro f. P.K. T r ip a th i which we have already discussed e a r l ie r  and we have
173noticed the in f ir m ity  of the views expressed by the learned author.
His Lordship u n fo rtu n ate ly  accepted as v a lid  the so -c a lle d  doctrine of
m a rtia l law and r e lie d  on the decision in  the ALLEN case which we have
174already examined to d is c re d it the d o c trin e . ^ is  Lordship also
examined the American decisions and s u rp ris in g ly  came to the conclusion 
th a t, "there can be no two opinions th a t during m a rt ia l law the courts  
cannot and should not have power to  examine the le g a lity  o f the action  
of the m il ita r y  a u th o ritie s  or the Executive on any ground whatsoever, 
inc lud ing  the ground o f mala f id e "  and proceeded to  hold th a t such a
175s itu a tio n  could be brought about by a P re s id e n tia l Order under A r t .359(1)
As we have seen, Beg, 3 . ,  did not subscribe to  th is  view and he even r ig h t ly
176doubted i f  m a rt ia l law was a "law" a t a l l .
5.194 However, the judges forming the m a jo rity  genera lly  fo llow ed the
lead of Ray, C .3 .,  who observed: "The heart o f the m atter is  whether
A r t .21 is  the sole reposito ry  of the r ig h t to  personal l ib e r t y .  I f  the
answer to  th a t question be in  the a ff irm a tiv e  the P re s id e n tia l Order w i l l
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be a b a r" . Relying on the decision in  KHARAK SINGH h is  Lordship
held th a t ,  ’‘Personal l ib e r ty  in  A r t .21 includes a l l  v a r ie t ie s  o f r ig h t which
179go to  make personal l ib e r ty  other than those in  A r t . l9 (1 ) (d ) "  and
added th a t ”i f  any r ig h t  ex is ted  before the commencement o f the C onstitu tio n
and the same r ig h t with i t s  same content is  conferred by P art I I I  as a
fundamental r ig h t the source o f th a t r ig h t  is  in  P art I I I  and not in  any
180p re -e x is tin g  r i g h t . ” H is Lordship appeared to  overlook and indeed did
not say a s in g le  word about the in te n t ,  purpose and underlying concept of
a B i l l  o f R ights. The purpose of a B i l l  of Rights is  not to  introduce a
le g a l f ic t io n  by "co n fe rrin g ” what already e x is ts ; i t  is  meant to  im part a
new a id  superior character to ce rta in  r ig h ts , whether new or o ld . The
dominant fea tu re  of the new character is  in v io la b i l i t y .  I f  the common law
r ig h t to personal l ib e r ty  became merged in  the r ig h t  contemplated under
A r t .21 then i t  could only be upgraded and not degraded. At Common Law
personal l ib e r ty  was protected by the w r it  of habeas corpus which could
be taken away (to  be more precise only "suspended”) only by le g is la t io n
whereas the r ig h t  under A r t .21 could be taken away ("suspended”) by an
executive  o rder. Th is  was the basic pos ition  which could not be ignored
but the other judges a lso , l ik e  Ray, C .3 .,  ignored i t ,  although some of
them attempted to  exp la in  vario u s ly  but inadequately (u n lik e  S a s tr i ,  D ., in
1 81
GQPALAN) the basic theory o f the  B i l l  o f R ights.
5.195 In  th e ir  separate opinions in  the massive judgment the judges 
examined from d if fe re n t  angles the  various contentions of the p a rtie s  but 
as i t  is  not possib le to deal with each aspect w ith in  a short compass we 
may confine fu r th e r  examination of the m a jo rity  opinion to  the views 
expressed on the habeas corous aspect, to  which we have re fe rre d  in  the  
la s t  paragraph. Indeed, the actua l decision in  the case was, in te r  a l i a .
p 182as fo llo w s :
Order by M a jo r ity :
In  view of the P re s id e n tia l Order dated Dune 27f 197 5, no
person has any locus standi to  move any w rit p e tit io n  under
A r t .225 before a High Court fo r  habeas corpus or any other 
w rit  or order or d ire c tio n  to challenge the le g a l i ty  of an 
order o f detention on the ground th a t the order is  not under
or in  compliance with the Act or is  i l l e g a l  or is  v it ia te d  by
mala fid e s  fa c tu a l or le g a l or is  based on extraneous 
considerations.
I t  is  in te re s tin g  to note th a t the re s u ltin g  pos ition  is  comparable to  one
obtain ing  under the s o -c a lle d  doctrine  o f m a rtia l law although the court
had re fu ted  the suggestion by the respondents to  th is  e f fe c t .  I t  is  also
to  be noted th a t although the court placed a large  measure of re lian ce  on
the English wartime cases the decision in  the in s ta n t case proceeded fa r
183beyond what was warranted by the r a t io  o f those cases* To be more
precise we can say th a t the m a jo rity  had put the clock back by 300 years
by a rr iv in g  a t the same decision as in  the DARNEL case by fo llo w in g  the
184te s t  of necessity la id  down in  the ancient SHIPMONEY case.
5.196 Ray, C .D ., d e a lt w ith the habeas corpus aspect in  a casual and
c a v a lie r  manner by s ta tin g  th a t a fte r  1923 there  was no common law r ig h t
to  the w r it  in  In d ia  (re ly in g  on the decisions in  GIRINDRA NATH and
SHIBNATH BANNERDEE fs u p ra !) and th a t "the s ta tu to ry  r ig h t  to  personal
l ib e r ty "  embodied in  s .491 of the Crim inal Procedure Code was abrogated
when the section was repealed , f in a l ly  ending with the observation th a t:
Even i f  th a t section exis ted  today i t  could not be 
exercised as a separate r ig h t  d is t in c t  from the 
fundamental r ig h t ,  the enforcement o f which is  suspended 
by the P re s id e n tia l Order.
S im ila r ly , although h is  Lordship took notice  of the p ra c tic e  in  England of
passing the "Habeas Corpus Suspension Acts", he did not proceed fu rth e r  to
re la te  th is  to  the le g a l h is to ry  and c o n s titu tio n a l development o f e ith e r
co lo n ia l or republican In d ia  but h u rrie d ly  came to the te rse  conclusion
th a t "L ib erty  is  confined and co n tro lled  by law, whether common law or
s ta tu te " . Indeed, i t  sounded l ik e  a p o l i t ic ia n ’ s cant and h is  Lordship,
A gg
quoting Burke, added th a t i t  was "a regulated  freedom". Ue submit 
th a t th is  could not be said  to  be the correct le g a l approach to  trace  the
precise nature and content o f the common law r ig h t to  personal l ib e r ty  
th a t remained posited in  the le g a l and c o n s titu tio n a l system o f the pre­
republican e ra .
5.197 Beg, 3 . ,  deviated s t i l l  fu r th e r  and lim ite d  h is  in q u iry  to
the "power to  issue w rits  o f habeas corpus and other powers o f High
Courts under A r t .226 of the C o n stitu tio n " and, u n like  Ray, C .3 .,  ignored
187the h is to r ic a l  perspective in  to to . Chandrachud, 3 . ,  fo llow ed the
approach of Ray, C .3 .,  and re fe rre d  to  the English as w e ll as American
p ractice  o f suspension of habeas corpus but did not deal with the pre-
188republican c o n s titu tio n a l po s itio n  o f the w r it  in  In d ia . The approach o f 
Bhagwati, 3 . ,  was c loser to  Chandrachud, 3 . ,  although h is  Lordship took a 
mor® general view o f the English s ta tu tes  of l ib e r t y ,  inc lu d in g  Magna
5.198 Us may now turn to the illu m in a tin g  dissent of Khanna, 3 . ,  
concentrating on i t s  more s ig n if ic a n t aspects. Perhaps the most im portant 
and most i llu m in a tin g  observation of h is  Lordship was th a t ,  "The 
P re s id e n tia l Order cannot put the detenu in  a worse pos ition  than th a t 
in  urfiich he would be i f  A r t .21 were repealed ". His Lordship explained  
th is  sayings
I t  cannot be disputed th a t i f  A r t .21 were repealed , a detenu 
would not be barred from obta in ing  r e l ie f  under a s ta tu te  
in  case there is  a v io la t io n  of s ta tu to ry  provisions [and 
th a t ]  lik e w is e , in  the event o f repeal of A r t .21, a detenu 
can r ig h t ly  claim in  a court o f law th a t he cannot be 
deprived of h is  l i f e  or personal l ib e r ty  without the  
a u th o rity  of law .^g£j
There could not be any stronger argument to expose the hollowness of the
191"sole rep o s ito ry" th eo ry . Proceeding fu rth e r  h is  Lordship observed:
. . .  a P re s id e n tia l Order under A r t .359(1) cannot have the 
e ffe c t  of suspending the r ig h t  to enforce r ig h ts  flow ing  
from s ta tu te s , nor can i t  bar access to  courts of persons 
seeking redress on the score of contravention of s ta tu to ry  
p ro v is io n s . . .S ta tu to ry  provisions cannot be tre a te d  as 
mere pious e xh o rta tio n s . . . which may be abjured or 
disobeyed with im punity . Nor is  compliance with s ta tu to ry  
provisions o p tio n a l or at the sufferance o f the o f f ic i a l  
concerned. I t  i s  the presence o f le g a l sanctions which 
d istingu ishes p o s itive  law from other systems of ru le s  and 
no rms • • •
E a r l ie r ,  h is  Lordship r ig h t ly  held th a t , on the '’p la in  language" o f A rt.
3 5 9 (1 ), the President had no power "to suspend the r ig h t  to  move any court
fo r  the enforcement o f r ig h ts  which [w ere] not fundamental r ig h ts  conferred
192by P art I I I  of the C o n s titu tio n " . Th is  was indeed a f i t t i n g  answer to  
the theory of "conferment", a t tr ib u t in g  l i t e r a l  meaning to the word 
"conferred".
5.199 H is Lordship's in te rp re ta t io n  o f A r t .21 from another aspect,
which was f i r s t  noticed in  GOPALAN ( supra) . also deserves a tte n tio n .
In  connection with the theory o f coexistence in  A r t .21 o f "substantive
power" and "procedural safeguard" f i r s t  recognised in  GOPALAN. h is  
193Lordship observed:
The close bond which is  there between the existence of 
substantive power of depriv ing  a person of h is  l i f e  o f 
personal l ib e r ty  and the procedure fo r  the exercise of 
th a t power, i f  the r ig h t  contained in  A r t .21 ware in  
operatio n , would not n ecessarily  hold good i f  th a t r ig h t  
were suspended because the removal of compulsion about 
the p rescrip tio n  of procedure fo r  the exercise of the  
substantive power would not do away with the compulsion 
regarding the existence of th a t power.
Accordingly, a ju d ic ia l  challenge grounded on non-existence of substantive
power could not be excluded.
5.200 The importance of the  dissent was also re fle c te d  in  tak ing
note o f the growing ju d ic ia l  t ra d it io n  of what we may c a l l  the
"in tern atio n al-d im en sio n " of the new norms of construction . I t  was
r ig h t ly  held th a t when two constructions of m unicipal law were p o ssib le ,
the courts should lean in  favour o f one which would be in  harmony with
194the in te rn a t io n a l law or the tre a ty  o b lig a tio n s . Reference was made
to  the observation to th is  e f fe c t  made by S ik r i ,  C .3 .,  in  KE5AUANANPA 
195BHARATI. in  which h is  Lordship had re lie d  on the provisions of A r t . 51 
of the C onstitu tio n  embodying the " d ire c tiv e  p r in c ip le "  th a t "the  
sta te  s h a ll endeavour to fo s te r  respect fo r  in te rn a t io n a l law and tre a ty  
o b lig a tio n s " . Indeed, the ju d ic ia ry  was as much a p art of the "s ta te "  as 
the executive or the le g is la tu re  was. Reliance was also placed on a
s im ila r  observation made by Lord Denning in  COROCRAFT LTD v PAN AMERICAN 
196AIRWAVS. Accordingly, h is  Lordship held th a t the P re s id e n tia l Order
under A rt. 359(1) ought to  be so construed as not to  c o n flic t  w ith A rts . 8
197and 9 of the U n iversa l D eclaration  of Human R ights. I t  was r ig h t ly
pointed out th a t acceptance o f the "sole rep o s ito ry" theory would mean
th a t the executive o ff ic e rs  would be able to  w ield "more or less despotic
198powers" as they would not be answerable to any co u rt.
5.201 I t  i s ,  however, necessary to in d ic a te  also the weaker p o in t of the
dissent in  th a t i t  t r ie d  to es tab lish  the primacy of the " ru le  o f law" as a
199su p ra -c o n s titu tio n a l p r in c ip le . Although Ray, C .3 ., went so fa r  as to
say th a t the ru le  of law was "not id e n t ic a l with a fre e  s o c i e t y " , w h i c h
perhaps w i l l  not be acceptable to  many ju r is t s ,  h is  Lordship, however,
r ig h t ly  held th a t "the emergency provisions in  P art X V III  are by themselves
201the ru le  o f law during times of emergency." The re a l issue was the  
in te rp re ta t io n  o f these provisions fo r  which i t  was not only necessary to  
adopt the " te s t of necessity" but i t  was equally  necessary to  accept, as
we have already subm itted, th a t the tru e  " te s t of necessity" did not negate
. . . . .  . 202 ju d ic ia l  review .
5.202 The weakness of the decision as a whole, as we have said  in  the
beginning, was th a t i t  did not construe the e f fe c t  o f c l . (4 )  o f A r t . 32
which, according to  us, is  the only provision enabling the r ig h t  to
habeas corpus to be "suspended". As Sarkar, 3 . ,  had pointed out th a t one
of the methods was expressly to  suspend the r ig h t under A r t .32 (4 ) by the
203P re s id e n tia l Order under A r t .3 5 9 (1 ). The other method, we submit, is  
to  enact s p e c if ic  le g is la t io n , as in  England, to suspend the r ig h t .  I t  is  
unfortunate  th a t the co u rt, w ithout independent in q u iry , re ly in g  on e a r l ie r  
decis ions, held th a t the common law r ig h t to habeas corpus did not e x is t ,  
which, as we have seen, was not the true p o s itio n .
5.203 I t  is  unfortunate th a t in  adjudging the v ire s  o f ss.16A and 
18 of NISA the court was probably swayed by the consideration th a t the
P re s id e n tia l Order under A rt.3 5 9 (1 -A ) in  respect o f A r t .19 was in
operation although the judges had given d if fe re n t  reasons, b r ie f  as
w sll as d e ta ile d , fo r  th e ir  respective  decisions which us do not propose
to  examine. Ray, C . 3 . ,  and also Chandrachud, 3 . ,  held  th a t s .18 did
not s u ffe r from the vice o f excessive de leg a tio n , w hile Beg, 3 . held
205th a t the section was added by way of abundant caution and in  respect
of s.16A (9) i t  was held by the m a jo rity  th a t the provision was not
u l t r a  v ire s  A r t .226 in  th a t i t  contained a ru le  o f evidence and i t
206did not a ffe c t the c o u rt’ s ju r is d ic t io n .  On the o ther hand, even the
m ajo rity  judges with the s in g le  exception of Ray, C . 3 . ,  took care to
s ta te  exceptions to the b lanket ban to  ju d ic ia l  review during emergency.
Beg, 3 . ,  held th a t a "p aten tly  i l l e g a l  detention" which was not by the
State or on i t s  b e h a lf , could be challenged to  secure releaseeven during  
207emergency. Chandrachud, 3 . held th a t the court might grant r e l i e f  i f
the order was ex fa c iB  bad, namely, when i t  was passed by an unauthorised
o f f ic ia l  or when i t  bore no signature or when i t  was passed fo r  a purpose
208not contemplated by s .3 (1 ) of the Act. Bhagwati, 3 . ,  held th a t the
P re s id e n tia l Order would have no operation i f  the detainee was re ly in g  on
a provision o f law to  enforce h is  le g a l r ig h t and not to  deny le g a l
209au th o rity  in  the m atter o f d e ten tio n .
(B) Pakistan and Bangladesh
5.204 As we have already seen, the c o n s titu tio n a l provisions in
Pakistan , made in  1962 and 1973, in  p a r t ic u la r ,  postulated a la rg e r
measure of ju d ic ia l  autonomy aid  i t  could th e re fo re  be reasonably
expected th a t the courts in  Pakistan would be disposed to carve out a
la rg e r area of in te rfe re n c e  in  so fa r  as in fra c tio n s  of the r ig h t to
210personal l ib e r ty  was concerned. I t  i s  fo r  th is  reason th a t we propose 
to  examine some of the lead ing decisions, a lb e it  b r ie f ly ,  w hile conceding 
th a t in  Pakistan also there was a large volume of case-law on preventive  
deten tio n . However, i t  is  to be noted th a t there appears to  have been 
greater use in  Pakistan of P ro v in c ia l as wbI I  as of temporary s ta tu te s ,
ra th er than of SPA, the counterpart of Indian PDA. This fa c t did not 
a ffe c t the tone or tenor o f ju d ic ia l  response in  as much as the m a te ria l 
provision in  a l l  s ta tu te s  fo llow ed the scheme of the e a rly  law , SPA, and 
enabled detention orders to be made on the sub jective  s a tis fa c tio n  of the 
execu tive . We have already noted th a t the s p e c ific  provisions as respect 
preventive detention in  the successive C onstitu tio ns of Pakistan broadly  
corresponded to the Indian provision in  so fa r  as the "u ltim ate  s a tis fa c tio n  
theory re fle c te d  in  the twin safeguard of communication of "grounds" to  the
detainee and hearing of "representation" by the "Advisory Board" was
. 211 concerned.
2125.205 In  an e a rly  case, GHULAM HUH Am AD v STATE. under the f i r s t  
C onstitu tio n  of 1956, the Lahore High Court quashed the detention order 
holding the seme to be void ab in i t io  as a d if fe re n t  ground and not the 
ground on which the order was re a lly  passed was communicated to  the detainee  
The court looked in to  the record and found th a t the Chief M in is te r  had 
ordered detention on the ground th a t the detainee was l ik e ly  to  create  
tro u b le  in  the d is t r ic t  on the occasion o f the v is i t  of the Chinese 
Prime M in is te r but in  the "ground" communicated to him i t  was stated  th a t 
he had been fomenting agrarian tro u b le  in  the d is t r ic t  between landlords  
and ten an ts . The delay of about two weeks in  supplying the ground was 
also held to  be f a t a l  and i t  was held th a t the ground should be served 
along with the detention order so th a t the r ig h t of representation  could 
be e f fe c t iv e ly  exerc ised . However, the Supreme C ourt's  decision in  a la t e r  
case, ABDUL AZIZ v LJE5T PAKISTAN, 2^3 also under the f i r s t  C o n s titu tio n , 
appears to  have taken a d if fe re n t  view of the c o n s titu tio n a l safeguards, 
which was deceptive ly  unrepresentative  o f the la te r  tren d . I t  was held  
th a t the C on stitu tio n  did not make i t  o b lig a to ry  to  in s e r t in  a preventive  
detention law a provision  fo r  reference to  an advisory board. No doubt, the 
detention order was quashed fo r  non-compliance with the c o n s titu tio n a l 
provisions but the law i t s e l f  was not declared u l t r a  v ir e s , ignoring  the
po sitio n  th a t the c o n s titu tio n a l mandate was equally  binding on the  
executive as w e ll as the  le g is la tu re .
5.206 bJe may now examine fo u r leading decisions under the 1962
C o nstitu tio n  with i t s  "due process clause" provided in  A rt. 2 -  a provision
which the 1956 C onstitu tio n  had avoided fo llo w in g  In d ia 's  example where the
founding fa th e rs  had d e lib e ra ted  at length in  1949 on the a d v is a b ility  of
opting fo r  a s im ila r  p ro v is io n .214 In  ROUSHAN B13AYA 5HAUKAT ALI KHAN. 215
the High Court had allowed the  ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus against
which the P ro v in c ia l government appealed to  the Supreme Court and t r ie d
unsuccessfully to  support the detention order passed by them under s .17
216of the Cast Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance. The detention order was
preceded by the  a rres t of the detainee by a P olice O ffic e r  under s .41 
217of the Ordinance. The High Court had h e ld , in te r  a l i a , th a t the 
detention in  temporary custody pursuant to  the a rres t was bad in  law as 
no m a te ria l was placed before the court to  show th a t the condition  
regarding reasonableness of suspicion contemplated under s . 41 was duly 
f u l f i l l e d  and th a t the detention order passed under s .17 merely extended 
the temporary detention which was i t s e l f  i l l e g a l .  I t  was also held th a t 
the "grounds" furnished to  the detainee were too vague and in d e f in ite .  The 
High Court also held s .41 to  be void on two a lte rn a tiv e  grounds: i f  i t  
was to  be considered as a law provid ing fo r  preventive d e ten tio n , i t  did not 
provide fo r  (co n tra ry  to  the c o n s titu tio n a l requirem ent) the "grounds" 
to  be furn ished; i f  i t  was not such a law i t  did not f u l f i l  the o th e r  
c o n s titu tio n a l requirement o f“being informed of the reasons o f arrest"and  
o f'b e in g  produced before a M ag istra te ’! On the last-m entioned po in t the 
judges in  the Supreme Court were not unanimous.
5.207 Hamoodur Rahman, 3 . (as he then was) agreed with the High Court 
and r ig h t ly  held th a t the basic p r in c ip le  underlying the  incorporation  of 
the  B i l l  o f Rights was th a t i t  was a mandate against both executive and 
le g is la tu re  and h e ld , re fe rr in g  to  the provisions of A rts . 133 and 98,
th a t i t  would be a fa i lu r e  on the p art o f the court to  enforce the
C onstitu tio n  in  the exercise o f the power of ju d ic ia l  review conferred
219on i t  i f  i t  did not declare void an inconsisten t p ro v is io n . C ornelius,
C . 3 . ,  however, observed th a t the two provisions (ss .17  and 41 o f the  
Ordinance) were p a r a l le l  to  r r .2 6  and 129 of the Defence of In d ia  Rules
220and held  th a t they could be so in te rp re te d  as to  pronounce them in t r a  v ir e s .
S.A. Rahman, 3 . ,  (F azl-A kb ar, 3 . ,  agreeing) re lie d  on the decision in
VIMLABAI DESHPANDE ( supra) to  s tr ik e  down the detention order and at
the same tim e he also expressed h is  preference fo r  the second a lte rn a tiv e
221of the High C ourt's  in te rp re ta t io n  of s . 41. H is Lordship held the
decision in  LIVERSIDGE to  be in ap p licab le  in  the m atter o f interpretation of
222"the peacetime - measure". Although the m a jo rity  decision appeared to  
turn  even tu a lly  on fa c ts  in  the in s ta n t case, the new trend of the  
ju d ic ia l  approach could be e a s ily  perceived.
5.208 The new trend estab lished  i t s e l f  more c le a r ly  end f irm ly  in
223 224GHULAFl 3 ILA N I. In  th is  case, C ornelius, C . 3 . ,  observed:
The ascertainment of reasonable grounds is  e s s e n tia lly  a 
ju d ic ia l  or at le a s t a q u a s i- ju d ic ia l fu n c tio n . I t  is  too 
la te  in  the day to r e ly ,  as the High Court has done, on 
the dictum in  the English case of LIVER5IDGE fo r  the  
purpose of in ves tin g  the deta in ing  a u th o rity  with complete 
power to  be judge of i t s  own s a t is fa c t io n . Public  power 
is  now exercised in  Pakistan under the C onstitu tio n  of 1962, 
of which A rt. 2 requires th a t every c it iz e n  s h a ll be d e a lt 
with s t r ic t ly  in  accordance with law . I f  then r . 3 2  owes i t s  
v ire s  to  s .3 ( 2 ) ( x ) ,  i t  must fo llo w  th a t by the use of thB 
words "reasonable grounds" clause (x )  has unmistakably 
imported in to  th is  r u le , c o n tro llin g  the exercise of 
p u b lic  power, the requirement th a t to gain the pro tection  
of the ru le  fo r  i t s  action thereunder, the au th o rity  
should be prepared to  s a tis fy  the courts , to  which the  
subject is  e n t i t le d  to  have re so rt fo r  the determ ination of 
the question whether he has been tre a te d  in  accordance with 
law , th a t i t  has acted on reasonable grounds.
5.209 In  the in s ta n t case, detention orders ware passed under r . 32  
of the Defence o f Pakistan Rules framed under s . 3 ( 2 ) ( x )  of the  
Defence of Pakistan Ordinance 1965, which enabled ru les  to  be made fo r  
detention of persons whom the deta in ing  au th o rity  suspected "on grounds 
appearing to  such a u th o rity  to be reasonable" o f , in te r  a l i a , having acted
or being about to act in  a p re ju d ic ia l manner. H is Lordship observed:
Reading clause (x ) according to the tenor o f i t s  language, 
and bearing in  mind th a t i t  makes le g a l provision fo r  
re s tra in t  upon personal l ib e r ty  which is  a fundamental 
r ig h t of c it iz e n s  in  Pakistan , the conclusion th a t appears 
unavoidable is  th a t to gain pro tection  fo r  any action  
thereunder, the existence of reasonable grounds is  
e s s e n tia l and a mere d eclaration  of s a tis fa c tio n  is  not
s u f f ic ie n t .  [emphasis added]
I t  is  to  be noted th a t r .3 2  did not in  terms re fe r  to  "reasonable
grounds" but merely required  the deta in ing  au th o rity  to  be " s a t is f ie d "  
in  re la t io n  to the person concerned th a t i t  was necessary to  detain him
fo r  preventing him from acting  in  a p re ju d ic ia l manner, but the court held
There must be in  the mind of the deta in ing  a u th o rity  a
b e l ie f  th a t the person in  question is  e ith e r  about to  act 
or is  l ik e ly  to act in  the a foresaid  manner; only so can the  
word " s a t is f ie d "  be construed. Preventive action is  c a lle d  
fo r  only by imminent and re a l n ecess ity , under th is  ru le .
Such s a t is fa c tio n , as has been said above, would be w ith in  
the power o f the rule-m aking au th o rity  to  prescribe under 
s . 3 (2 ) ( x) . . . even under the e a r l ie r  words, v i z . ,
"suspects, on grounds appearing to  such au th o rity  to  be 
reasonable" of being about to act to the p re ju d ice  of pub lic  
o rd er. But i f  " s a tis fa c tio n "  may, fo r  securing pro tection  
to empowered a u th o ritie s  be deemed to be included w ith in  the 
meaning o f "suspicion", the other condition must also be 
deemed to  apply, v i z . ,  the requirement of reasonable grounds 
fo r  s a t is fa c t io n . (emphasis added)
Proceeding fu r th e r  h is  Lordship held th a t i t  was not perm issible to  
d if fe r e n t ia te  between p ro tec tion  fo r  action on "suspicion" and action on 
" s a tis fa c tio n "  according to  s .3 (2 ) (x )  of the Ordinance.
5.210 The extensive quotations in  the foregoing paragraphs demonstrate
the im aginative  approach of the court in  th a t s im ila r  provisions in  the
1939 Defence le g is la t io n  were d if fe re n t ly  in te rp re te d  by the Privy Council
in  SHIBNATH B ANNER3I. VIMLABAI DESHPANDE and KESHAV T ALP APE ( a l l  supra)
227to  which h is  Lordship re fe rre d , but he observed as fo llo w s:
In  the conditions e x is tin g  under the Government of In d ia  Act 
1935, a conclusion such as th a t reached by the  3 u d ic ia l  
Committee in  SHIBATH BANER3I*s case was ten ab le . I t  was a 
period in  which the co n tro l by the courts o f the exercise  
of pu b lic  power by the a u th o ritie s  was at a minimum. The 
C entra l Government o f In d ia  . . . was not an independent 
government. • . I t  was not conceivable th a t in  re la t io n  to
a law of such c r i t ic a l  importance as the  defence of 
In d ia . . . there could be any scope fo r  the in te rve n tio n  
o f the courts . . . Under the C onstitu tio n  o f Pakistan a 
wholly d if fe re n t  s ta te  o f a f fa ir s  p re v a il .  Power is  
expressly given by A r t .98 to  the superior courts to  probe 
in to  the exercise o f pu b lic  power by executive a u th o r itie s  
. . . The ju d ic ia l  power is  reduced to  a n u l l i t y  i f  
laws are so worded or so in te rp re te d  th a t the executive  
a u th o ritie s  may use th is  freedom to  make themselves 
judges of th e ir  own "s a tis fa c tio n "  fo r  imposing re s tra in ts  
on the  enjoyment of the fundamental r ig h ts  o f c it iz e n s .
A r t .2 of the C o nstitu tio n  could be deprived of a l l  i t s  
contents through th is  process and the courts would cease 
to  be guardians o f the n a tio n 's  l ib e r t ie s .
[emphasis added]
The above e x trac t contains the ju s t i f ic a t io n  of the ju d ic ia l  activism  of
the Pakistan Courts. Whether the Indian Courts would have taken a s im ila r
course i f  there was a s im ila r  "due process clause" (A r t .  2 ) in  the
Indian C o n s titu tio n , i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  say but in  the in s ta n t case,
u n like  the Indian courts the Pakistan court "reviewed the fa c tu a l
p o s itio n " a f te r  going in to  "the evidence on record" and gave r e l i e f  in  
228deserving cases.
5.211 In ABDUL BAQI BALUofc^ h e  court explained the above decision
by saying th a t the trend o f the recent decisions in  England as w e ll as in
Pakistan has been to l im it  the decision in  LIVERSIDGE to the in te rp re ta t io n
of Reg.l8B as a sp ec ia l war measure; th a t in  GHULAM 31 LAN I  the court
merely s ta ted  the conventional view th a t was accepted even in  England
u n t i l  the decision in  LIVERSIDGE. In  the in s ta n t case the Supreme
Court allowed the appeal and rem itted  the case to the High Court to
examine the m a te ria ls  placed before i t  to te s t the reasonableness of
the grounds of d e ten tio n . The court also am plified  the d is tin c tio n
between the two expressions "being s a t is f ie d "  and “ suspecting upon
reasonable grounds" and observed th a t the former connoted a s ta te  of
mind bordering on conviction induced by the existence of fa c ts  which
have removed the doubts and th ere fo re  a duty of more onerous nature
was cast on the person charged with being " s a t is f ie d "  to  " s a t is fy "  the
230court th a t he had acted in  such a manner.
5.212 A fte r the decision in  GHULAM 31LAN I  ( supra) ,  s u b -c l.(x )  o f  
s .3 (2 ) of the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance 1965 was amended and the  
words "suspects on ground appearing to  such au th o rity  to  be reasonable" 
were replaced by the  words "of the opinion" and an "explanation" was 
added s ta tin g  th a t "the s u ffic ien c y  of the grounds on which such opinion  
as aforesaid  is  based s h a ll be determined by the au th o rity  forming such 
opin ion". The High Court having decided against the government the 
pre lim inary  ob jection  ra ised  by i t  against the ju r is d ic t io n  of the court 
to  e n te rta in  the ap p lica tio n  in  BEGUM AGHA ABDUL KARIM SHORISH KASHMIRI.231 
the Supreme Court was ca lle d  upon to decide the po in t in  appeal by the  
Government. The appeal was dismissed. The court held th a t the amendment 
was "an exercise in  f u t i l i t y "  and th a t i t  was an " in c id en t o f the power
of ju d ic ia l  review" granted to the court under A r t .98 to determine 
whether there were grounds upon which a reasonable person would have 
formed the "opinion" and th a t th is  p o s itio n  could not be a lte re d  by any 
language th a t might be used in  a "su b -co n s titu tio n a l le g is la t io n " .
5.213 The court not only pointed out the d iffe ren ce  in  language on 
the one hand between A r t .226 of the Indian C onstitu tion  end A r t .170 of the 
1956 Pakistan C o n s titu tio n , which was c losely  p a r a l le l  to  i t ,  and the new 
A r t .98 o f the 1962 Pakistan C onstitu tio n  but a lso , on the other hand, 
between the sub-clauses (a ) and (b ) of A r t .98 i t s e l f .  I t  was also  
observed th a t the expressions "without law fu l au th o rity "  and "in  an 
unlaw ful manner" of s u b -c l.(b ) "were not merely tautologous". A ll  m atters  
which f a l l  w ith in  the scope of ju d ic ia l  review apart from questions of v ire s  
were covered by the expression "unlawful manner". I t  was also held  th a t  
the scope of in q u iry  under A r t .9 8 (2 ) (b )  was not in  any way fe tte re d  by the  
procedure o f a w r it  of habeas corpus, as the law enjoined upon the courts  
the duty to  s a tis fy  themselves th a t the detention was in  any manner 
contrary to  law . The court also observed th a t the expression “in  an 
unlaw ful manner" was used d e lib e ra te ly  in  A r t .9 8 (2 ) (b )  to give meaning
and content to  A rt. 2, which was as comprehensive as the American “ due 
process" clause.
5.214 In Bangladesh, in  the s ingle a v a ila b le  reported decis ion ,
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HABIBUR RAHMAN v GOVT. OF BANGLADESH. the court re lie d  on the decisions  
of the Pakistan Supreme Court which we have discussed above. Indeed, the 
same provisions (s s . 17 and 41) which had been in te rp re te d  in  
RQW5H AN B13 AY A SHAUKAT ALT KHAN ( supra) and which were adopted by the
Bangladesh Government, were used by them in  the in s ta n t case. I t  was held
th a t the "temporary custody" order under s .41 was not in  accordance with law 
and mala f id e  in  th a t i t  was based on the statement o f a detainee who was 
h im self im p licated  in  p re ju d ic ia l a c t iv i ty .  The f in a l  detention order under 
s .17 was also held to be bad because i t  ca rried  the r e c i t a l  "the government 
is  s a t is f ie d "  but did not in d ic a te  the person who was a c tu a lly  s a t is f ie d .
As the government was an "abstract e n t ity "  i t  could not be " s a t is f ie d "  
w ith in  the meaning of s .17; somebody must a c tu a lly  have the s a t is fa c tio n .
The court had to s a tis fy  i t s e l f  th a t the detention order was passed by 
somebody tiio was duly authorised in  th a t duty but no such au th o rity  was 
shown in  the in s ta n t case. As we have seen, not only the s ta tu to ry  
provision but the re le v an t c o n s titu tio n a l provisions in  Bangladesh were 
the  same as th a t of P akis tan . That ap art, i t  was n a tu ra l fo r  the  ju d ic ia ry  
of Bangladesh to  m aintain the co n tin u ity  of the ju d ic ia l  t ra d it io n  as i t
had formed a part of the Pakistan ju d ic ia ry  fo r  a long tiw e .
Conelusion
5.215 This short comparative study o f the ju d ic ia l  approach in  In d ia ,  
Pakistan and Bangladesh to m atters concerning personal l ib e r ty  leaves no 
doubt about the fa c t th a t although the judges in  these three sta tes  
shared a common background in  so fa r  as le g a l tra in in g  and pro fessional 
experience was concerned, which had a common c o lo n ia l base, the approach 
of the  Ind ian  judges d iffe re d  from th a t of th e ir  colleagues in  the other 
two s ta te s . The judges in  In d ia  fa i le d  to  develop a common consensus in
the m atter owing possibly to  the fa c t  th a t they belonged to a society
m anifesting  a wider spectrum of s o c ia l, p o l i t ic a l  and economic views,
which were coloured in  the case of each in d iv id u a l judge by h is
233educational and environmental background* In  Pakistan , a wholesome
tra d it io n  was estab lished  in  th is  respect at an e a r ly  stage. I t  is
apparently due to th is  reason th a t ,  u n lik e  th e ir  Indian colleagues, they
could see the English wartime cases in  the proper perspective and they
r ig h t ly  discarded th e ir  relevance to  the contemporary s itu a tio n  in  c le a r
aid unambiguous term s. In  doing so they were merely adhering to  the
B r it is h  Indian judges who had a lso , as we have seen, refused to  accept
234the a u th o rity  o f those cases. U n fo rtu n a te ly , in  Republican In d ia ,
Bose, 3 . ,  who was a party  to the decision in  VIMLABAI DESHMUKH ( supra)
found h im self in  a m inority  in  KRISHNAN ( supra) . On the other hand even
the be lated  change in  trend in  In d ia  is  noteworthy. Indeed, the decision of 
235the Ray Court in  the HABEAS CORPUS case was an exception a3 was the
236d ec la ra tio n  of emergency i t s e l f .  Even in  th a t case, with the exception
of Ray, C .3 .,  a l l  the judges of the m a jo rity  also made a desperate attempt
to  r e t a i l  an area, however sm all, fo r  ju d ic ia l  s c ru tin y . G en era lly , l ik e
t h e ir  Pakistan colleagues they have come to ho ld , "in  a government under
237the law there is  no such th ing  as unreviewable d is c re tio n ."
Chapter 6
EMERGENCY PROVISIONS UNDER LEGISLATION:
SOUTHEAST ASIA
I . Personal L ib erty  aid C o lonia l Rule
(1 ) C o n s titu tio n a l developments in  the reqions an o u tlin e
6.1 Although the B r it is h  in flu en ce  in  the Malayan peninsula in
Southeast Asia dates back to  1786 when the is lan d  of Penang uas ceded
to  the  East In d ia  Company by the ru le r  of Kedah, the s ta r t in g  p o in t of
c o n s titu tio n a l development uas the co n stitu tio n  in  1826 of the  " S tra its
Settlem ents" u ith  Singapore, Malacca and Penang, as part o f the government 
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of Bengal. U n t i l  1867, when the "Settlem ents" were converted in to  a 
separate colony, the le g is la tu re  of B r it is h  In d ia  held i t s  sway over the 
t e r r i t o r y .  In  the remaining part o f the peninsula B r it is h  in flu en ce  uias 
lim ite d  to g iv ing  "pro tection" to the  n a tive  s ta tes  -  f i r s t  to  those of 
Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri Sambilan, which were k n it  together in to  
a loose fed era tio n  in  1895. In  1909 th is  se t-u p , known as the Federated 
Malaya S ta tes , uas provided u ith  a le g is la tu re . The same year fo u r o ther 
s ta te s , Kedah, Kelantan, P e r lis  and Trengganu, accepted B r it is h  pro tection  
and were jo ined in  1914 by Johore, but th is  group remained unfederated . 
During the second world war th is  c o n s titu tio n a l t r i lo g y  uas swept away 
by the Japanese occupation of the peninsula between 1942 and 1945.
6 .2  In  1946 uhen the Malayan Union uas founded embracing the whole
of the peninsula (except Singapore which uas made a separate colony) the  
n a tive  s ta tes  lo s t much o f th e ir  independence as a re s u lt  o f the  
c e n tra lis a tio n  of power. The Malayan population became apprehensive o f 
B r it is h  designs aid ra ised  a demand fo r  self-government which produced 
the Federation of Malaya in  1948, a lb e it  u ith  the same co n stitu en t s ta te s , 
but with a l ib e r a l  C o n s titu tio n . In  1955 the Federation had i t s  f i r s t  
le g is la tu re  with e lec ted  m a jo r ity . Th is  was fo llow ed by f u l l  independence
on August 31^1957 ("Merdeka DayH) u ith  a nau C o n s titu tio n . The colony
of Singapore also had a le g is la t iv e  assembly u ith  e lec ted  m a jo rity  in  1955
but i t  did not get in te rn a l self-governm ent u n t i l  1959. To complete the
story  o f c o n s titu tio n a l development, i t  may be added th a t Singapore
jo ined  the Federation along u ith  the tuo Borneo s ta tes  of Sabah and Sarawak
on August 31^1963 ("M alaysia  Day"), but announced i t s  w ithdrawal on
August 9^1965. By s .6 (1 ) of the Singapore Independence Act, notw ithstanding
the secession, some portions o f the C onstitu tion  of M alaysia were
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"continued in  fo rc e " , m utatis  mutandis, in  Singapore.
(2 )  P o l it ic s .  "Junole War" and Terrorism
6 .3  Since 1965 M alaysia and Singapore have been separate p o l i t ic a l  
e n t i t ie s  and members of the Commonwealth but i t  cannot be fo rgo tten  th a t  
they had both in h e r ite d , and s t i l l  share to  a great e x te n t, a common le g a l  
system. T h e ir e rs tu h ile  p o l i t ic a l  and c o n s titu tio n a l u n ity , th e ir  
geographical propinquity  and, more than th a t ,  th e ir  shared experience
in  dealing  with the problems of in te rn a l s e c u rity , make i t  d es irab le  th a t  
these common problems of the tuo s ta tes  be dealt with to g e th er.
I t  may also be added th a t these problems had a common aspect uhich, in  
i t s  e a r ly  phase, resembled in  some respect those of Northern Ire la n d  and 
Kenya, in  p a r t ic u la r ,  u ith  the c o lo n ia l government pitched against an 
armed u p ris in g  by a body of persons described as " te r r o r is ts " .  This  
examination may prove to  be a u sefu l study in  p a ra lle ls  as we propose to  
discuss in  the next chapter the "emergency" during the  Mau Mau movement 
in  Kenya.'*
6 .4  The opening of the rubber p lan ta tio n s  and the  t in  mines in  
d if fe re n t  p arts  of the peninsula by the B r it is h  entrepreneurs encouraged
the im m igration of the Chinese and the Indians who were requ ired  to  man them. 
In  course of tim e they not only grew in  number but also acquired considerable  
economic in flu e n c e . By the 1940s, in  Singapore the Chinese formed 75J& of 
the population and on the mainland they were 3 8 as against 49% Malays
, 4and 11% In d ian s . In  the case o f the Chinese, who were the more numerous 
of the immigrants and uiho outnumbered the Malays in  the peninsula as a 
whole, the Malayan Communist P a rty , which was founded in  1920 by the "agents
5
o f the Communist Party of China", appears to  have generated in  them 
p o l i t ic a l  a sp ira tio n s . The Malays were generally  a p o l i t ic a l .  One 
observer has noted th a t "they lik e d  the benevolence and paternalism  of 
c o lo n ia lism ."6 I t  has also been noted th a t they were "devout Muslims" 
and they did not associate with the P arty .
6 .5  Uhen the war came aid the Japanese invaded the peninsula, the
Malayan Communist Party o ffe red  i t s  co-operation to the B r it is h  government. 
In  the newly s ta rted  In s t itu te  in  Singapore the B r it is h  tra in ed  the  
Chinese as g u e rr il la s  to  f ig h t  the advancing Japanese from in s id e  the  
jungles covering almost 80% of the to ta l  area o f the  peninsula. The 
g u e r r i l la  force eventually  came to be made up of 7000 men and acquired
the name of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (flPAJA), although
7
th e ir  leadership and contro l vested in  the Communist P a rty . The p a rty , 
however, made no secret o f i t s  plans and as e a rly  as 1943 they declared  
th e ir  o b jec tive  -  "Drive the Japanese fa s c is t  out o f Malaya and estab lish
g
the Malaya R epublic." So, when the war was over they devised a 3-phase
strategy to  give i t  a p ra c t ic a l shape. The la s t two phases, contemplating
withdrawal of B r it is h  a u th o rity  f i r s t  from the ru ra l area and then from
the e n tire  country, were never reached but c ripp led  the economy. The
Communist g u e rr il la s  s ta rted  carrying out ra id s  on the rubber p lan ta tio n s
and the  t in  mines, operating from ins ide  the jungles from the e a rly  part of
1948. They also struck a t is o la te d  po lice  s ta tio n s  and v illa g e s  and
g
conducted a general t e r r o r is t  campaign. In  1951 the B r it is h  High 
Commissioner uas ambushed and k i l le d .
6 .6  The success in  the " ju n g le  war" achieved by the B r it is h
adm in istra tion  was mainly due to e f f ic ie n t  m il ita ry  operation and to  a 
large number o f other p ra c t ic a l measures adopted by them, such as an
10"independence amnesty" and "s tarve-them -o ut-s tra tegy" which th e ir
successors continued. I t  w i l l  be considered la t e r  whether some at leas t
of the measures adopted d id  not exceed the le g a l au th o rity  granted.
Indeed, i t  has been observed th a t , "No government in  the world had such
11sweeping powers even in  w artim e." Thus emergency laws were enacted 
on a massive scale during the f i r s t  f iv e  years, representing what has 
been termed as an "im portant contribution  to the a r t  of counter-insurgency."  
Provision was made fo r  compulsory n a tio n a l re g is tra tio n  and id e n tity  cards 
to  is o la te  the faceless t e r r o r is t .  S im ila rly  "re -se ttlem en t"  was provided  
fo r  the Chinese "squatter community" l iv in g  on the jungle  fr in g e  to deprive  
the g u e rr il la s  o f th e ir  support. But i t  is  impossible here to view the 
e n tire  spectrum.
(3 )  The Law: R estra in ts  and Habeas Corpus
(A) Personal l ib e r ty  and some ordinary and semi-emeroencv laws
6.7  I f  a chronological order is  to  be fo llow ed, one has to  say th a t
an o ld  law, to ta l ly  unre lated  to  the "emergency", continued in  use even
a f te r  the independence, purporting to m aintain "public  order" by
13re s t r ic t in g  the movement of persons. This was the R estric ted  Residence
Enactment, 1935, cap. 39 of the Laws of the Federated Malay S tates, which
was extended to  the Federation of Malaya by Ordinance No. 4 o f 1948.
Another Ordinance, No. 13 of 1948, amended i t  and introduced in to  i t
the provision of "p o lice  supervision" by s .2A . The "Enactment" was in  fa c t
meant "to  provide fo r  the  making and enforcing of orders regarding
residence in  and exclusion from c erta in  parts of the s ta te " . But s .2
provided the Executive with such draconian powers th a t i t  could serve
e ffe c t iv e ly  the problems of "s e c u rity " . I t s  m a te ria l portion  ran thus:
Whenever i t  s h a ll appear to [the  State Chief M in is te r] on 
such inform ation and a f te r  such in q u iry  as he may deem necessary 
th a t there are reasonable grounds fo r  b e lie v in g  th a t any person 
should be required  to reside in  any p a r t ic u la r  d is t r ic t .  • . 
or should be p ro h ib ited  from entering  in to  any p a r t ic u la r  
d is tr ic t^
he could order th a t person's a rres t and deten tion . Although " fu rth e r
5in q u ir ie s "  were contemplated before a " re s tr ic te d  residence order" fo r  
l i f e  or any p a r t ic u la r  term could be made, the power of a rre s t and 
detention was not conditioned by any d e fin ite  objectiv/e c r i t e r ia .  The 
M in is te r  was made the sole judge of what he considered to be "reasonable  
grounds" fo r  making the o rd er.
6 .8  The Public  Order Ordinance, No. 14 o f 1947, o f the Malayan Union, 
made under s .85 of the Malayan Union O rder-in -C ouncil 1946, appeared to
be the f i r s t  law th a t d ea lt with c e rta in  secu rity  measures. I t  made an 
offence of such a c t iv i t ie s  as the wearing of uniform s, organising or 
belonging to  a q u a s i-m ilita ry  organization  and i l l e g a l  d r i l l in g .  I t  was 
in  a sense a preventive and an tic ip a to ry  measure and was even tu a lly  
fo llow ed up in  July 1948 by Ordinance No. 10 o f 1948 (The Emergency 
Regulations Ordinance) but i t  has to be mentioned th a t w ith the r is e  in  the 
tempo of the "'jungle war" an increased m il ita ry  in te rve n tio n  was c a lled  fo r  
and the provisions of the C rim inal Procedure Codes had to  be amended, to  
which we may f i r s t  r e fe r .
6 .9  The Amendment substitu ted  provisions in  the Codes o f the
States as w e ll as the Settlem ents (chapters W ill in  a l l  cases), re la t in g
to  "unlawful assemblies", by which the common law concept o f the army acting
14in  a id  o f c iv i l  power was superseded to  a great e x te n t. The new s .87 
in  the  States Codes and s .97 in  the Settlem ents Codes, using common 
language, empowered a Commanding O ffic e r  of the Armed Forces, under 
c erta in  circumstances, acting  independently, to  disperse an unlaw ful 
assembly and to a rres t and confine any person forming part th e re o f. 
S im ila r ly , s .88 in  the S tates Codes, and s .98 in  the Settlem ents Codes, 
afforded pro tection  to such o ff ic e rs  against prosecution fo r  acts done in  
"good fa i th "  and fu rth e r  provided th a t any act done in  obedience to  
M il i ta r y  Law s h a ll not amount to an o ffence.
(B) R estra in ts  on personal l ib e r ty  under "emergency" le g is la t io n  
( a) Jhs. Ern^r^eric^ Ftejgj^ajtionjs JDrdinanc£ 1948
6.10 The im portant point about the emergency le g is la t io n  of the
peninsula may be noted f i r s t .  In  A fr ic a , as we s h a ll see, reg u latio n s  were
made by the Governors in  the d if fe re n t  t e r r i t o r ie s  under the Emergency Powers
Order in  Council 1939 but in  the peninsula th e  powBr and ju r is d ic t io n  of the
Crown was, as we have seen, o f a d if fe re n t  n a tu re . The 1939 Order was
applicab le  only in  the S tra its  Settlem ent. However, in  the peninsula, the
High Commissioner had wider le g is la t iv e  and ad m in is tra tive  powers. I t  was
stated  in  1957 th a t , "in  some respects he acted purely as a represen ta tive  
15of His M ajesty" and th a t ,  " . . . the foundation of the present system. . .
16depends on h is  o verrid in g  powers". Indeed, th is  position  uas re fle c te d  in
16a
the re levan t c o n s titu tio n a l p ro v is io n s . Ue quote below the re le v an t e x tra c ts :
The Federation of Malaya Order in  Council 1948 ( S . I . 1948 No.108)
s .6 -  The High Commissioner is  hereby empowered end commanded 
to do a l l  th ings belonging to h is  o ff ic e  in  accordance 
with th is  Order, the Federation Agreement. . •
The Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948
c l .  8 -  The Rulers undertake to accept the advice o f the  High
Commissioner in  a l l  m atters connected with the government 
of the Federation . . .
(by clause 5 m atters re la t in g  to  Muslim re lig io n  and 
cu lture  were expressly excepted).
6.11 By s .3 the High Commissioner in  Council was empowered to  declare
an emergency whenever i t  appeared to  him th a t an occasion o f emergency or
pub lic  danger had arisen or th a t action had been "taken or [was] immediately
threatened by a body of persons" calcu lated  to  deprive the community or a
17s u b stan tia l portion of i t  o f the  essen tia ls  of l i f e .  During the 
currency of the emergency s .4 (1 ) empowered the High Commissioner in te r  a l i a , 
to make regu lations  "whatsoever" which he considered "desirab le  in  the  
pub lic  in te re s t"  and to p rescribe  p en a lties  inc lud ing the death penalty  
fo r  offences against such re g u la tio n s . Sub-s. (2 ) s p ec ifie d  c e rta in  m atters , 
without prejudice to  the general power conferred by s u b -s . ( l ) ,  in  respect 
of which reg u la tio n s  could be made. They included:
(b ) a r re s t, d e ten tio n , exclusion and deporta tion ;
(c ) re s t r ic t io n  o f the movement o f persons, curfew;
(m) conferring  upon h im self and upon other p u b lic  o f f ic e rs  or 
other persons such a d d itio n a l powers as he may consider 
necessary inc lu d in g  powers to  make, issue o r give orders, 
ru le s . . . in  respect o f any m atter or th in g ;
(p ) m o d ific a tio n , amendment, supersession or suspension of a l l  
or any of the  provisions of any w ritte n  law;
( t )  entry in to  and search of premises. . . and search and 
in te rro g a tio n  of persons;
(v ) any other m atter in  respect of which i t  i s  in  the  opinion  
of the High Commissioner desirab le  in  the p u b lic  in te re s t  
th a t re g u la tio n s  should be made. [emphasis addedJ
6 .12  By s u b -s .(3 ) i t  was provided th a t the re g u la tio n s  re la t in g  to  
"detention" could be made subject to two safeguards, a t im e - l im it  of two 
years and a "p erio d ic  review" of the case of each in d iv id u a l under d e ten tio n . 
Although s u b -s .(4 ) made the l i f e  o f a l l  regu lations  co-extensive w ith the 
emergency, the embiguous r id e r  ("un less the High Commissioner otherwise  
d ire c ts " )  could possibly be so construed as to  make detentions in d e f in ite .
By s . 5 (1 ) every reg u la tio n  and every n o t if ic a t io n  was to  have e f fe c t  
"notw ithstanding anything in co n s is ten t therew ith  contained in  any other 
w ritte n  law ."
6 .13  The provisions quoted above demonstrate amply the width o f the  
powers assumed and render unnecessary comments. S u ffice  i t  is  to  say 
th a t the g reates t v ice o f the Ordinance was to  be found in  s .4 in  the  
e xten t o f delegation and in  the enumeration of the wide range of m atters , 
epitomised in  such expressions as "any other m atter" (s u b .s .( 2 ) (v ) )  and 
"other persons" (s u b .s .(2 ) (m )) ,  e t c . ,  the  only l im ita t io n  being provided  
by the requirement of "pub lic  in te r e s t" .  L eg is la tio n  l ik e  th is
was only possib le because of the wide powers conceded to  the  Governors 
in  the colonies who, in  the absence of a "rep resen ta tive" le g is la tu re  
combined in  h im self both executive and le g is la t iv e  functions but in  the 
peninsula, as we have seen, the High Commissioner was expressly invested  
with wide powers by the c o n s titu tio n a l documents.
6 .1 4  N evertheless, the  provisions of s .4 (2 ) (p )  and s .5 (1 ) mere
open to  c o n s titu tio n a l challenge in  th a t they contained the expression
"any w ritte n  law ", embracing the ap p licab le  Acts of the B r it is h  P arliam ent.
One uas e n t i t le d ,  houever, to  ask i f  the Regulations could also p re v a il
against common la u . In  Northern Ire la n d , ue have seen, the S pec ia l Pouers
18Act re ta in ed  the primacy o f common la u . I t  is  not possible to  say th a t
the same p o s itio n  uas sought to  be m aintained in  the pen insula . On the
other hand, i t  uas perhaps considered unnecessary to include a reference to
common lau  as the c rim in a l lau  in  the e n tire  peninsula uas c o d ifie d  on
th e  Indian model and there uas l i t t l e  scope fo r  the  common lau  to  operate
in  c rim in a l cases. Houever, i t  could be said th a t vesting  of such
extensive executive and le g is la t iv e  pouers in  a s in g le  functionary  acting
through such in s t itu t io n s  as the "Federal War Council" and the "Uar
Executive Committee" at State and D is t r ic t  le v e ls  re s p e c tiv e ly , e v id en tly
contemplating a dominant ro le  fo r  the m il ita r y  likened the s itu a tio n  to  one
th a t obtained under such notion o f " M a rtia l Lau" uhich, as ue have seen,
19uas negated by common la u .
6 .15  In  Singapore, the p a r a l le l  le g is la t io n , the Emergency Regulations
Ordinance, No. 17 of 1948, had to be enacted possibly fo r  the reason th a t  
the 1939 Order could be invoked only in  1956 uhen the Order uas mads 
app licab le  to  "Singapore", among o thers , by d e le tin g  the uord " S tra its  
S ettlem ents". Houever, s . 4 o f th e  Ordinance, i t  appears, fo llow ed more 
c lo se ly  the phraseology of s .6 (1 ) o f the 1939 Order in  th a t i t  conferred  
pouer to  make reg u la tio n s  fo r  "the defence of the colony, p u b lic  s a fe ty , 
maintenance of pub lic  order and m aintain ing  services e s s e n tia l to  the l i f e  
o f the  community". I t  cannot houever be d e f in ite ly  said th a t i t s  o b ject 
uas to  cut doun the scope of the ju d ic ia l  review of the  re g u la tio n s  since 
i t s  counterpart in  the Federation provided the bare requirement of 
"p u b lic  in te r e s t" .  Instead o f leav ing  i t  to the ju d ic ia ry  to  s p e ll  out
the d e f in it io n  of the term conforming to  common lau  no tio n s , in  the colony
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th is  r is k  uas possibly sought to  be avoided. N evertheless, i t  has to  be 
conceded th a t in  both cases, the provisions of the Ordinances themselves 
being unchallengeable fo r  reasons sta ted  e a r l ie r ,  they provided fo r  neu 
c o n s titu tio n a l norms and a general l im ita t io n  on the  pouer of the  
ju d ic ia ry , in  the tuo t e r r i t o r ie s ,  a lb e it  not of the same am plitude. In  
Singapore, there uas no provision p a r a l le l  to  clause (v ) o f s . 4 (2 ) of the  
Ordinance of the Federation but in  so fa r  as provision re la t in g  to  
"detention" uas concerned, sub-s. (3 ) of s . 4 in  both cases used the same 
language.
(b) The Emergency jte_gulati£n_s 1948
6.16 The Regulations not only made provisions of various natures but uere 
also subjected to copious amendments during the course of the f i r s t  f iv e  
years of the emergency -  a process fo r  which Kenya, as ue s h a ll see, provided  
a close p a r a l le l .  I t  must houever be pointed out th a t in  1951 the e n tire  
body of the o r ig in a l and amended regu lations  of 1948 uere repealed and re ­
enacted, u ith  certa in  m o d ifications  and a feu neu provisions, in  the  
Emergency Regulations 1 9 5 1 ,.but in  th is  study ue propose to  re fe r  mainly
to  the o r ig in a l re g u la tio n s . In  Singapore also s im ila r  reg u la tio n s  uere 
framed u ith  minor verb a l changes and ue do not consider i t  worthwhile to  
discuss these sep ara te ly .
( i )  Detention
6.17 We propose to  discuss in  th is  study not a l l  but only the  im portant
provisions of the 1948 Regulations o f the Federation . The provision  fo r
"detention" uas made in  Reg.17, o f which clause (1 )  is  quoted below :
The Chief Secretary may by order under h is  hand d ire c t th a t any 
person named in  such order s h a ll be dstainBd fo r  any period not 
exceeding one year in  such place of detention as may be 
sp ec ifie d  by the Chief Secretary in  the o rd er, [emphasis added]
Apparently the provision contained a th re e -fo ld  l im ita t io n  of which only
one uas of ra th e r v i t a l  importance in  th a t i t  lim ite d  the duration of the
detention which uas ra ised  from one to tuo years in  1949 by Amendment No.12.
10
The requirem ent as to  the p lace o f d e te n tio n  could a lso  p ro v id e  a handle
fo r  ju d ic ia l  in te rve n tio n  in  th a t a detainee could secure h is  release in
case no place uas s p ec ifie d  in  the order and also uhen he uas detained at
a place other than the one s p ec ifie d  in  the o rd er. S im ila r ly  on the
ground of mistaken id e n t ity  also a detainee could successfu lly  move the
co u rt. But uhat uas most s ig n if ic a n t  about the reg u la tio n  uas th a t i t
uas a pure and simple executive f i a t .  In  the Commonuealth the only p a r a l le l
fo r  such a p ro v is io n , as ue s h a ll see, uas to  be found in  the decrees
20passed by the m il ita ry  governments. In a l l  cases, everyuhere else in
the Commonuealth, the pouer o f preventive detention uas circum scribed by tuo
basic conditions: the provisions s p ec ified  the o b ject or purpose uhich
uas sought to  be achieved by d e ta in in g  the person concerned and the  bona-
f id e  use of the pouer uas ensured by specify ing  another p o s itiv e  requirem ent,
namely, the " s a tis fa c tio n "  o f the d e ta in in g  au th o rity  about the purpose.
I t  may be re c a lle d  th a t s .4 (1 ) o f the  Ordinance contemplated reg u la tio n s
being made in  the "pub lic  in te r e s t" .  The executive possibly took i t  fo r
granted th a t the ju d ic ia ry  uould not hold the omission of the  requirement
to be f a t a l  and uould uphold the v ire s  of the reg u la tio n  by reading in to
i t  the requirement adopting the neu norms o f in te rp re ta t io n  evolved in
21the English uartim e cases.
6 .18  A tu o - t ie r  forum uas provided to dispose of "ob jections"
against orders made under clause ( 1 ) .  The Advisory Committee, uhose 
Chairman uas to  be a person uho held or had held a ju d ic ia l  o f f ic e ,  and 
uhich uas appointed by the  High Commissioner, considered the ob jection  
and made "recommendation" to  a Commission, uhich uas also appointed by the  
High Commissioner and uhose Chairman uas also to  be s im ila r ly  q u a lif ie d .
The pouer o f passing f in a l  orders uas vested in  the Commission uhich 
could e ith e r  r e je c t  the same or vary the period of detention or order 
th a t the detention  should cease. D ire c t representation  to the Commission 
and hearing any person by the Commission uas expressly barred . The
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Commission could, in  i t s  d is c re tio n  "requ ire  any person to  supply any 
in form ation  in  h is  possession re la t in g  to any ob jection  which [was]
being considered by the Commission".
6#19 The Emergency Regulation (D etention  Order) Rules 1948 framed
under clause (4 ) s p e lt out in  some d e ta i l  the procedure fo r  the hearing
of o b je c tio n s . Rule 3 made i t  "o b lig a to ry" th a t the detainee should
be informed of h is  " r ig h t to  lodge an ob jectio n " in  the prescribed form
"as soon as p ra c tic a b le "  a f te r  h is  a r r iv a l  at the place of d e ten tio n .
Form I  o f the Schedule prescrib ing  the ob jection  required  "grounds" to  be
s ta te d , among other p a r t ic u la rs . On the other hand, a reference to  the
grounds of detention appeared only in  Form I I  which prescribed the notice
fo r  the hearing of the o b je c tio n , in  the fo llo w in g  terms:
The grounds fo r  the making o f the detention order against 
you were th a t you were suspected of having recently  acted 
or being l ik e ly  to  act in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to  p ub lic  
safety  and good o rd er.
Th is  shows how il lu s o ry  was the  safeguard. Rule 5 empowered the Advisory
Committee to allow  le g a l representation  but i t  was doubtfu l i f  in  the
course of the o ra l hearing the  detainee could in s is t  on the fa c ts  a id  o ther
p a r tic u la rs  re la t in g  to the grounds of detention being supplied to him to
22supplement h is  o b je c tio n . The proceeding before the Committee was to  be
in  camera. In  the absence of such other id e a l safeguards as tim e -
co-orcLi naxe
l im its  in  the procedure and the  vesting  of e x p l ic i t /  au th o rity  in  the  
execu tive , to grant in s ta n t r e l i e f ,  there  was every lik e lih o o d  of 
hardship being caused in  genuine cases, such as of mistaken id e n t i ty .
6 .20  Reg.17B made provision fo r  suspension of the detention order
on cond itions. Reg.17C empowered the executive to order any person to  
leave the Federation i f  he was not a c it iz e n  or a B r it is h  subject bom in  
the Federation or in  the Colony. These provisions also did not provide  
adequate o p p o rtu n ities  o f making rep resen ta tio n , which we do not propose 
to  discuss in  d e t a i l .  Concentrating on Reg.17 i t s e l f  we submit th a t a two-
t i e r  forum presided over by a ju d ic ia l ly  tra in ed  person although a n ovelty ,
d id not m itig a te  the rigours  of the provision , in  v ieu  of the fa c t th a t the
order could perem ptorily deprive a person of h is  l ib e r ty  fo r  a period of
two years as Reg.17 reduced the r ig h t  to "period ic  review" contemplated
23by s .4 (3 ) to one of making a s in g le  "o b jectio n ".
6.21 In Singapore, the provisions of some of the regu lations made
under the re levan t Ordinance were la t e r  re-enacted in  The Preservation  
of Public  Safety Ordinance, No. 25 of 1955, a lb e it  fo r  another purpose, 
fo r  the secu rity  of Malaya. The provision re la t in g  to "detention" was 
as fo llo w s :
s .3(1) I f  the Governor in  Council is  s a t is f ie d  with respect
to  any person th a t ,  with a v ieu  to preventing th a t
pBrson from acting in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to  the
secu rity  of Malaya or the maintenance o f pub lic  order
th e re in  or the maintenance th ere in  o f e ss e n tia l 
serv ices , i t  is  necessary so to  do, the Chief 
Secretary s h a ll by order under h is  hand make an 
order (a ) d ire c tin g  th a t such person s h a ll be 
detained fo r  any period not exceeding two years. . .
The order could also r e s t r ic t  h is  place of residence, employment or other
a c t iv i t ie s ,  impose a "curfew" on him, require him to n o tify  h is  movements
and also p ro h ib it him from leav ing  the is lan d  of Singapore. By s .4
a detention  order could be suspended on conditions. A r ig h t of appeal
was provided by s .5 to  a T ribuna l constitu ted  under s .6 with two High
Court judges and a O is t r ic t  judge. According to  s .7 the T ribunal could
revoke, amend or confirm the o rd er. Provision fo r  p erio d ic  review , every
s ix  months, was made v ide ss.8 and 9 . Although the safeguards were made
more r e a l is t ic  by p rovid ing , among o thers, th a t the order had to be passed
on the s a tis fa c tio n  of the h ighest executive body and also ind ica ted  the
object o r purpose, such as, the security  of Malaya e t c . ,  under s .11 the
deta in ing  au th o rity  could w ithhold inform ation and as a re su lt the
d e ta in ee 's  r ig h t to prosecute h is  "appeal" could be seriously  a ffe c ted .
The e x t r a - t e r r i t o r ia l  extent of the regu lation  was s ig n if ic a n t and could,
i t  is  subm itted, provide grounds fo r  a ju d ic ia l  challenge.
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( i i )  D8tention_ “pending decis ion11
6.22  Reg. 23 empowered any p o lice  o f f ic e r  o f o r above the rank of a
Corporal, and Rag. 27 empowered any member of His M ajesty 's  Forces of or 
above the rank of a Warrant O ff ic e r , to a rres t any person suspected of the  
commission o f an offence against the Regulations or of being a person 
ordered to be detained under Reg.17; n e ith e r  Regulation required th a t  
the suspicion had to  be reasonable. But more serious was Reg.23A, as 
fo llo w s:
(1 ) Any p o lice  o f f ic e r  may without warrant a rres t any person in  
respect of whom he has reason to  b e lieve  th a t there are 
grounds which would ju s t i fy  h is  detention under Reg.17.
Any such person may be detained fo r  a period not exceeding 
14 days pendino the decision whether order under Reg.17 should 
be made.
(2 )  Any person detained under powers conferred by th is  regu lation  
s h a ll be deemed to be in  law fu l custody. . .
[emphasis added]
I f  the two clauses are read with Reg.17(1) i t  at once becomes c lear th a t i t  
conferred a power o f in d iscrim in ate  a rres t and detention on the p o lice  
o ff ic e r  fo r no grounds are spelled  out in  any manner in  Reg.17(1) ; even so, 
the ju d ic ia ry  was not l ik e ly  to  iiLeelar© i t  u ltra , v ire s  fb r  obvious-reasons and 
the power was l ia b le  to be misused fo r  in v e s tig a tio n  pending the in te rim  
deten tion . Possibly such a course was d e lib e ra te ly  provided by th is  
reg u la tio n , as Reg.17(1) did not contemplate th a t the deta in ing  au th o rity  
must be in  possession of the required  inform ation at the time of making 
the order. Reg.23A which was in serted  by an amendment, was c le a rly  aimed 
at f a c i l i t a t in g  the e ffe c tiv e  exercise of the powers of detention under 
Reg.17. Thus, in  e f fe c t ,  an a rres t and detention by a p o lice  o f f ic e r  
became the basis of the order passed even tu a lly  by the Chief Secretary who 
was not required to s ta te  the ground or fa c ts  on which the order was 
passed. This was the to t a l  e f fe c t  and the re a l m ischief of the provisions  
re la t in g  to "deten tion".
( i i i )  lnJbe£roqatiqn
6 .23  The power o f in te rro g a tio n  was conferred by Reg.24 but Reg.23A 
appears to  have rendered i t  o tiose to  a great e x te n t. The power could be 
exercised on two grounds, namely, when a p o lice  o f f ic e r  wanted to be 
s a t is f ie d  e ith e r  as to the id e n t ity  o f a person or as to  the purpose of 
h is  being in  the place where he was found. He could be arrested  and 
detained pending en q u iries  i f  the po lice  o f f ic e r  suspected th a t he had 
acted or was about to act in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to  the "pub lic  safety
or the maintenance o f pub lic  o rd e r .11 The requirement o f "pub lic  in te re s t"  
which was l ik e ly  to  be in te rp o la te d  in to  Regs. 17(1) and 24 was c e rta in ly  
of wider ambit than those u n d erlin ed . Such detention could be fo r  a period  
o f 24 hours only unless i t  was extended fo r  an a d d itio n a l period of 14 
days by the o f f ic e r  in  charge of a p o lice  d is t r ic t  who had to  fo rth w ith  
report the circumstances to h is  su p erio r. In  clause (3 ) was to  be found a 
pro tection  s im ila r  to  one provided in  clause (2 ) of Reg. 23A. There could 
be thus no action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment against e ith e r  the  po lice  or the 
army as th is  power was also conferred on "any member" o f the armed forces  
by Reg. 27 by trfiich they were also empowered along with the  p o lice  
o f f ic e r  to  exercise the powers to  stop and search any in d iv id u a l or 
veh ic le  and to  seize o ffen s ive  evidence or weapon found on them or any 
premises conferred under Regulations 21 and 22.
6 .2 4  The scheme of these im portant reg u la tio n s  thus fo llow ed
closely  th a t o f Northern Ire la n d  reg u la tio n s  made under the Special Powers
Act which, however, as we have seen, expressly saved common law in  the  
24proviso to  s .1 (1 ) .  On th is  account possibly the Army F ie ld  In s tru c tio n s
there in s is te d  on suspicion being properly grounded before action could be
taken against a suspect who did not stop to answer as required  by Reg. 7
th e re . That notw ithstanding, f a t a l  shots were f i r e d  there at unarmed 
25persons. In  the peninsula, u n lik e  Northern Ire la n d , the reg u latio n  did  
not impose a "duty" to stop but as Harry M i l le r  observes th e  "operational
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order" authorised such a course which re su lte d , at one tim e, in  a "mass 
k i l l i n g " . 26
( c) J^ociaL T r ia l  £r£C£dure and £T erro rian £
6 .25  A few other p a ra lle ls  with certa in  aspects o f the s itu a tio n  in  
Northern Ire la n d  are to  be found re fle c te d  in  the procedure fo r  t r i a l  of 
offences, which was d e a lt with by Regulations 33, 34 and 35, in  p a r t ic u la r .  
Statements made to a po lice  o f f ic e r  which were generally  inadm issible  
under the C rim inal Procedure Code were made admissible in  evidence. The 
court could hold a t r i a l  in  camera "in  the in te re s t of ju s tic e "  or fo r  
"public sa fe ty" or "s ec u rity " . I t  could also p ro h ib it pub lication  of the  
names e tc . of the witnesses to  prevent th e ir  id e n t i f ic a t io n .  The Emergency 
(C rim ina l T r ia ls )  Regulations 1948 were more comprehensive. Under Reg.7 , 
the Public Prosecutor could c e r t ify  "any case" and "any offence" to be 
t r ia b le  under the "emergency procedure" which dispensed with the ordinary  
"prelim inary enquiry" and made "ju ry  t r i a l "  d is c re tio n a ry , besides 
providing th a t " b a il s h a ll not be granted."
6.26 As we have seen, the term "terro rism " was defined in  Northern
Ire la n d  fo r  the f i r s t  time in  the Detention of T e rro r is ts  Order 1972 but
terrorism  was not mads an offence despite recommendations made to th a t
27e ffe c t  by the Gardiner Committee in  1975. The new Regulation 6D
inserted  in  1950 by Amendment No.12 made possession of a " te r ro r is t
document" an offence in  the peninsula and defined the term " te r ro r is t"
with an ad d itio n a l clause s ta tin g  th a t "terrorism  s h a ll have a
corresponding meaning". The d e f in it io n  as we s h a ll see, was re ta ined  in
28the In te rn a l Security Act i960 but in  the present context i t  has to  be 
noted th a t Regulations 4, 5, 6 and 6A created offences which could be 
said to have covered a large  part of t e r r o r is t  a c t iv i t ie s .  Carrying or 
possessing or being in  contro l o f unlicensed fire a rm , ammunition and 
explosive were made punishable with death; fa i lu r e  to report to  the police  
about such persons and consorting with persons engaged in  such a c t iv i t ie s
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and with persons harbouring them were punishable with imprisonment fo r  ten  
years .
6.27 However, in  the Malayan co n text, Reg. 4C also in s e rte d  by an
amendment in  1950, was more s ig n if ic a n t .  To demand, c o lle c t o r receive
supplies in  circumstances which ra ised  the presumption of p u b lic  safety  or
maintenance of pu b lic  order being prejudiced was made an o ffen ce , the scope
29of which was fu r th e r  widened in  s .59 o f the 1960 Act. But the provision
of c o lle c tiv e  punishment, also introduced in  the same y ea r, vide Rgg.170A ( 2 ) ,
was indeed so pern icious th a t a f te r  independence i t  could have no
30ju s t i f ic a t io n  and was discarded.
(C) Habeas Corpus in  M alaysia  and Singapore 
( a) £re-inj1e£einden£6__pMvij3ions
( i )  jjnder £qmmon_La Lj_end_E(igli_sh__s_tajtute_s
6.28  The r ig h t  to  the w r it  o f habeas corpus was a v a ila b le  in  England,
as we have ssen, at common law as w e ll as under the Habeas Corpus A cts, to
31any person who was "u n law fu lly "  deta ined . When the remedy became
a v a ila b le  in  the peninsula has, th e re fo re , to  be determined with reference
to  the date o f reception there o f the English common law and the re le v an t
s ta tu te s . However, i t  has to be remembered th a t the English courts also
had the  power to  issue w rits  o f habeas corpus " in to  a l l  p arts  o f the
32dominions of the crown" and th a t th is  pos ition  was obviously re la te d
to  the c o n s titu tio n a l s ta tus  o f each te r r i to r y  on a p a r t ic u la r  d a te . In
th is  respect the p o s itio n  of Singapore was the lea s t complicated of a l l
in  th a t i t s  c o lo n ia l s ta tus  remained e s s e n tia lly  u n a ltered  between 1826
and 1955. On the o ther hand, Penang and Malacca which, along with
Singapore, comprised the colony o f S tra its  Settlem ents, had become, we
might r e c a l l ,  part o f ,  f i r s t ,  the Malayan Union in  1946 and then , o f the
Federation of Malaya, in  1948 and the Federation , i t  has been asserted ,
33remained a "p ro te c to ra te "  u n t i l  attainm ent o f independence in  1957.
Whether the c o n s titu tio n a l change had any e ffe c t  on the e x is tin g  law in
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force in  those t e r r i to r ie s  bias indeed of great relevance in  so fa r  as 
the position  obta in ing  there between 1946 and 1957 was concerned but we 
do not propose to discuss th is  minor issu e . The major issue which re la te s  
to  the position  obta in ing  generally  in  the native  s ta tes  o f the peninsula
during c o lo n ia l ru le  obviously demands g reater a tte n tio n .
6.29 In  dealing f i r s t  with the position  obtain ing during c o lo n ia l ru le
in  Singapore and also th a t obtain ing in  Penang and Malacca u n t i l  1946,
we re fe r  to  a decision of the P rivy Council, given in  1875, in  CHEAH NEO v
•»  A
PNG CHENG NEO. T h e ir Lordships re fe rre d  to the Royal Charters o f 1807,
1826 and 1855 and also to  Ordinance No. 5 of 1868 which constitu ted  the
f i r s t  "Supreme Court" in  the colony of S tra its  Settlem ents and observed:
• . • the  Charters re fe rre d  to , i f  they are to  be regarded
as having introduced the law of England in to  the colony,
contained in  the words "as fa r  as circumstances w i l l  admit", 
the  same q u a lif ic a t io n . In  applying th is  general p r in c ip le ,  
i t  has been held th a t s ta tu te s  re la t in g  to m atters and 
exigencies p ecu lia r to  the lo c a l conditions of England, and 
which are not adapted to  the circumstances of a p a r t ic u la r
colony, do not become a part of i t s  law, although the general
law o f England may be introduced in to  i t .
In  the judgment th e ir  Lordships had d ea lt e a r l ie r  with the question of
c o n s titu tio n a l s ta tus  of the ceded and s e ttle d  colonies and f in a l ly  they
held th a t the position  in  Penang, which was under th e ir  consideration in  the
in s tan t case, would be the same in  any event which they in d ica ted  in  the
above passage. Indeed, Sheridan has pointed out th a t the question
whether Penang, Malacca and Singapore were s e tt le d  or ceded colonies was
of l i t t l e  le g a l s ig n if ic a n c e . The crux of the m atter was th a t the general
law of England, as obtained there  in  1826, was introduced in to  the colony
35of S tra its  Settlem ents.
6 .30  I t  fo llow s from the dictum of the P rivy Council quoted above th a t
the r ig h t to the w r it  of habeas corpus under common law and also under the  
re levan t English s ta tu tes  could be exercised in  the te r r i to r ie s  comprising 
the colony of S tra its  Settlem ents from 1826 onwards. I t  has to  be noted 
however th a t the r ig h t under common law also included the a n c illa ry  r ig h ts
which we have d ea lt with e a r l ie r  in  some d e ta i l .  In  th is  connection 
n otice  may be taken of the fa c t th a t the powers and ju r is d ic t io n  of the  
"Supreme Court" remained e s s e n tia lly  unaltered  and the subsequent le g is la t io n  
did not in te r fe re  with i t s  ju r is d ic t io n  to issue habeas corpus. In  
Ordinance No. 30 o f 1907 uhich re-enacted  the Courts Ordinance of 1878 
i t  was s ta ted  th a t the court should have ju r is d ic t io n  in  c iv i l  m atters  
"as form erly exercised in  England by the High Court o f Chancery, the Court 
of Queen*s Bench" e tc . and in  c rim in a l m atters , as exercised in  England
37"by Her M a jes ty 's  High Court of Justice  and the severa l judges th e re o f."
6.31 I t  is  also necessary to  re fe r  to  the fa c t th a t in  v ir tu e  o f the
ju r is d ic t io n  exercised by the Crown in  these te r r i t o r ie s  the superior
courts of England acquired a contemporaneous au th o rity  to issue w rits
in to  these te r r i to r ie s  end th ere fo re  the r ig h t  could be exercise d by
B r it is h  subjects res id en t there even before the Supreme Court was
estab lished  there in  1868 uhich even tua lly  provided them with a lo c a l 
38forum. In  th is  respect the p o s itio n  in  the n ine n a tive  s ta tes  was
not much d if fe r e n t .  Ue have seen th a t the nine n a tive  s ta tes  had obtained
B r it is h  "p ro tec tio n " between the years 1895 and 1914 although f iv e  o f them
remained outside the framework of the "Federated Malay S ta tes", co n stitu ted
in  1895. Depending on the exten t and nature of "p ro tec tio n " obtained by
each s ta te , the r ig h t to  thB w r it  could be enforced at the superior courts  
39of England.
6 .32  The p o s ition  obta in ing  in  the n a tive  s ta tes  in  respect of
in tro d u ctio n  of English law is  fa r  from c le a r . Indeed, i t  is  stated  th a t ,
40"in  some areas, i t  was d i f f i c u l t  to t e l l  what law, i f  any, a p p lie d ."
However, some guidance can be obtained from one enactment of the Federated
Malay S ta tes . In  s .2 (1 ) of the  C iv i l  Law Enactment 1937 i t  was thus s ta ted :
. . . The Common Law of England, and the ru les  o f Equity , as 
adm inistered in  England at the commencement of th is  Enactment, 
other than any m o d ificatio n s  o f such law or any such ru les  
enacted by s ta tu te , s h a ll be in  fo rc e . . .
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This provision was repealed and replaced in  1956 by the C iv i l  Lau
Ordinance of the fed eratio n  uhich uas fu r th e r  amended by Ordinance N o.41
of 1956. U n fortunate ly  even in  these enactments only the "Common Lau
of England" uas mentioned. I t  has th ere fo re  been r ig h t ly  observed th a t
i t  uas doubtfu l i f  the uhole body of English lau , inc lud ing  the s ta tu te s ,
41uas ever introduced in to  these t e r r i t o r ie s .  Apparently the English  
Habeas Corpus Acts did not proprio  vigore apply and even i f  the r ig h t  to  
habeas corpus could be exercised under common lau  i t  appears th a t  there  
uas no forum s im ila r  to  the "Supreme Court" of the S tra its  Settlem ents  
uhere the r ig h t  could be enforced. In  fa c t there uas an in s t itu t io n  
ca lled  "Supreme Court" in  the federated Malay States but i t s  pouers and 
ju r is d ic t io n  uere not the same as those of the "Supreme Court" of the  
S tra its  Settlem ents. I t  consisted of a "Court of Appeal" and a "Court of a
Judge" and although the la t t e r  uas invested u ith  " o r ig in a l c rim in a l
42ju r is d ic t io n " , i t  uas s p e c if ic a lly  lim ite d  to the t r i a l  of o ffences.
( i i )  .Rijght jjndejr _the_ C rim inal Procedure Codas
6.33  The S tra its  Settlem ents and the federated  Malay States each had a
separate Code, but since 1947, a f te r  the form ation of the Malayan Union, the
43position  hae changed. Nou Singapore has a separate code; a l l  o ther
44states  o f the peninsula have a common code. The provisions of the  
Singapore Code may be examined f i r s t .
6 .3 4  In  Singapore (a lso  in  Penang and Malacca u n t i l  1946) the Code
provided tuo types of remedies. I t  can also 'be suggested th a t a t le a s t in
so fa r  as the  r ig h t  under the English s ta tu tes  uas concerned i t  uas
45replaced by one provided under the code. The re levan t chapter o f the
Code uas captioned "Habeas Corpus and D irec tio n s  in  the nature o f Habeas
Corpus", [emphasis added] The provisions of the tuo sections uhich
46embodied the tuo d if fe re n t  types of remedies are quoted belou:
s .317 -  Any person -
(a ).......................uho is  detained in  any prison u ith in  the l im its  of 
Singapore or on a uarrant of e x tra d it io n  under any 
lau  fo r  the time being in  force in  Singapore re la t in g  
........................... to  e x tra d itio n  or fu g it iv e  o ffenders; or
(b ) who is  a lleged to  be i l le g a l ly  or im properly detained in  
pu b lic  or p riva te  custody u ith in  such l im its ;  or
(c ) who claims to be brought before the court to be d ea lt with  
according to law,
may apply to  the High Court fo r  a w r it  of habeas corpus, [emphasis added]
s .325 -  The High Court may, whenever i t  th inks  f i t ,  order th a t
a prisoner detained in  any prison s itu a te  w ith in  the
l im its  of Singapore s h a ll be -
(a ) admitted to b a i l ;  or
(b ) brought before a c o u rt-m a rtia l;  or
(c ) removed from one custody to another fo r  the purpose
of t r i a l  or fo r  any other purpose uhich the court 
deans proper.
The procedure fo r  making ap p lica tio n  fo r  the w r it  o f habeas corpus and fo r  
the disposal of the ap p lica tio n  by the court uas prescribed by ss.316 and 
319 but the provisions mentioned nothing about the a n c illa ry  r ig h ts
a va ilab le  under common la u . Two arguments may be advanced to  support the
proposition th a t those r ig h ts  were not abrogated; f i r s t ,  the High Court 
uas a successor o f the “ Supreme Court"; second, the r ig h ts  uere a v a ila b le  
at common law uhich had become a part o f the procedure o f the Supreme
Court whereas the provision in  question n e ith e r  d ea lt with the general
procedure o f the High Court nor did i t  deal with the common lau  r ig h t to the  
w rit  i t s e l f .
6 .35  In the re s t of the peninsula the re levan t chapter of the Code
was captioned "D irection s  of the nature o f a habeas corpus" and the main
47provision uas in  the fo llo w in g  terms:
s .365 -  The Court o f a Judge may whenever i t  th inks f i t  d ire c t -
( i )  th a t any person who
(a ) is  detained in  any prison u ith in  the l im its  o f the 
Federated Malay S tates on a warrant of e x tra d itio n  
whether under the E x trad itio n  Enactment or the  
F u g itiv e  Offenders Enactment; or
(b ) is  a lleged  to be i l le g a l ly  or improperly detained  
in  p u b lic  or p riva te  custody u ith in  the l im its  o f 
the Federated Malay S ta tes ,
be set at l ib e r t y .  [emphasis added]
Apparently, although the provision did n o t, in  term, re fe r  to  the w r it  of 
habeas corpus, i t  embodied i t s  g is t .  As ue have already noted, i t  uas 
doubtful i f  the English Habeas Corpus Acts were at any time made app licab le
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in  these t e r r i t o r ie s .  Besides, as we have seen, they did not also have a 
"Supreme Court" s im ila r  to  th a t o f the S tra its  Settlem ents and th e re fo re , 
as already observed, the r ig h t to the w r it  o f habeas corpus could not be 
exercised at a lo c a l forum in  these t e r r i t o r ie s .  I t  can th ere fo re  be 
safe ly  suggested th a t the e n tire  law re la t in g  to  habeas corpus was 
co d ified  in  these t e r r i to r ie s  which was re fle c te d  in  the provisions of 
the Code. This proposition is  supported by the fa c t th a t the succeeding 
sections, 366 to 374, la id  down the procedure in  e laborate  d e ta i l :  even a 
r ig h t of appeal was s p e c if ic a lly  provided in  s .374.
6.36 However, one common po in t of great importance to be noted about the 
r ig h t o f habeas corpus generally  in  Singapore and M alaysia is  th a t in
both cases the ambit of the r ig h t  was widened: a person could succeed even 
i f  he fa i le d  to make a case of " i l le g a l"  detention; an "improper" 
detention could even be challenged. In  England, only a person who was 
"u n law fu lly" detained could apply fo r  habeas corpus. I t  cannot be gainsaid  
th a t the word " i l le g a l ly "  used in  both Codes corresponded to the English  
pro v is io n , namely, "u n law fu lly" but the use of the word "im properly", 
in  a d d itio n , in  both the Codes, d e f in ite ly  s ig n if ie d  an improvement fo r  
the concept o f "im propriety" was, undisputed ly , wider than th a t o f 
" i l le g a l i t y " .  Thus we submit th a t although the provisions of Regulations  
23A and 24 contemplated th a t the detentions thereunder ( a f te r  a rre s t) should 
be tre a ted  as " la w fu l" , they could very w e ll be "improper" and could 
there fo re  be challenged. However, i t  must be noted th a t the use o f the 
word "improper" in  the habeas corpus provision of the C rim inal Procedure
48Codes of the Commonwealth genera lly  owe th e ir  o rig in  to  the Indian Code.
(b ) £ojst- iridj^enjtence provisions
6.37 The provision o f habeas corpus, though not in  terms but in
substance, was embodied in  the C onstitu tio ns  of the two s ta te s . Art 5(2) 
of the C o nstitu tio n  o f M alays ia, which was app licab le  in  Singapore also by 
v ir tu e  of s . 6 (1 ) of the  Singapore Independence Act 1965, is  quoted:
lilhere a complaint is  made to a High Court or any judge 
th ereo f th a t a person is  being u n law fu lly  detained the 
court s h a ll in q u ire  in to  the complaint and, unless  
s a t is f ie d  th a t the detention is  la w fu l, s h a ll order him 
to be produced before the court end release him.
[emphasis added]
The use of the expression "or any judges" could possibly suggest 
re ten tio n  of the common law r ig h t of successive ap p lica tio n  in  view of the
fa c t th a t by A rt. 162 the "e x is tin g  laws" were continued in  force and the
last-m entioned term was defined in  A r t .160 to include "common law ". However, 
in  Singapore, although s .13 o f the 1965 Independence Act s im ila r ly  
continued in  force the "e x is tin g  laws", the term was defined to mean 
"w ritten  law ".
6 .38  Reference has also to  be made to  another p ro v is io n . In M alaysia,
the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 re ite ra te d  th a t the High Court s h a ll
have power to  issue "w rits  in  the nature of habeas corpus" fo r  the
enforcement of the r ig h ts  conferred by Part I I  of the C onstitu tio n  or fo r
any other purpose. However, the rule-m aking powers of the courts was
stated in  s .1 6 (a ) o f the Act in  very wide terms, as fo llo w s:
fo r  reg u la tin g  and prescrib ing  the procedure. • . and the
p ractice  to be fo llow ed in  any High Court. . . in  a l l  cases
and m atters whatsoever . . . end any m atters in c id e n ta l 
to  or re la t in g  to  any such procedure or p ra c tic e . . .
[emphasis added]
I t  is  not proposed to  discuss here the question whether the court could by 
ru le s , abrogate the common law a n c illa ry  r ig h ts  of the  w r it  as the m atter 
has been discussed a t some length in  another context. This controversy 
does not a ffe c t  the position  in  independent Singapore where the C rim inal 
Procedure Code provides fo r  the w r i t ,  in  terms.
6.39 I t  is  also im portant to note th a t although the C onstitu tio n  of
M alaysia was modelled genera lly  on the Indian C o n s titu tio n , in  the la t t e r  
the remedy of habeas corpus was named although i t  was q u a lif ie d  by the  
expression "in the nature o f" .  The p re -c o n s titu tio n a l le g a l h is to ry  o f the  
te r r i to r ie s  comprising independent M alaysia, discussed above, supply the  
answer to the question why the c o n s titu tio n a l draftsmen in  M alaysia departed
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from the Indian provision in  th is  respect. As ue have seen, the r ig h t to 
the w r it  of habeas corpus uas not entrenched in  the le g a l system firm ly  and 
e q u a lly , in  a l l  parts  of M alays ia . This had an im portant bearing , as ue 
s h a ll see, on the approach o f the ju d ic ia ry  in  m atters concerning personal 
l i b e r t y .
I I . Personal L ib erty  and Independence 
(1 )  C o n s titu tio n a l Provisions
6 .40  The im portant provision uas A r t .5 o f the Malaysian C onstitu tio n  
uhich d e a lt u ith  " l ib e r ty  of the person" and subsumed the p ro tec tio n
48a
afforded by hdbeas corpus in  clause ( 2 ) ,  uhich ue have already quoted.
The remaining clauses are quoted belou but ue may point out th a t P art I I
o f the Malaysian C o n s titu tio n , uhich included A rts . 5 to  12 (adopted in
Singapore) and uas headed "Fundamental L ib e r tie s " , uas not s p e c ia lly
49entrenched, u n like  Part I I I  of the Indian C o n s titu tio n .
5 (1 ) No person s h a ll be deprived of h is  l i f e  or personal l ib e r ty  
save in  accordance u ith  la u .
(3 ) Where a person is  arrested  he s h a ll be informed as soon as
may be of the grounds of h is  a rres t and s h a ll be alloued to
consult and be defended by a le g a l p ra c t it io n e r  of h is  
choice.
(4 ) Where a person is  arrested  end not released he s h a ll u ithou t 
unreasonable delay, aid in  any case u ith in  tuenty fo u r hours 
. . .  be produced before a m agistrate and s h a ll not be fu r th e r  
detained in  custody u ith o u t the m ag is tra te 's  a u th o rity .
(5 ) Clauses (3 ) and (4 ) do not apply to an enemy a l ie n .
[emphasis added]
6.41 Notice has also to  be taken of A r t .8 (1 ) uhich stated  th a t
" A ll persons are equal before the lau  and e n t it le d  to  the equal p ro tection  
of the lau " and of the f i r s t  tuo clauses of A r t .9 uhich are quoted belou;
(1 ) No c it iz e n  s h a ll be banished or excluded from the Federation .
(2 )  Subject to Clause (3 ) and to any lau  re la t in g  to the secu rity
o f the Federation or any part th e re o f, p ub lic  o rder, p ub lic
h e a lth , or the punishment of o ffenders, every c it iz e n  has the
r ig h t  to move fre e ly  throughout the Federation and to reside
in  any part th e re o f. rlemphasis
I t  is  also necessary to  quote A r t .4 (not adopted in  Singapore) in  i t s  
m a te ria l p a rt to shorn how the scope of ju d ic ia l  review uas re s tr ic te d  
by the C onstitu tio n  in  M alaysia:
(1 ) Th is  C onstitu tion  is  the supreme lau  of the Federation aid
any lau  passed a f te r  Merdska Day uhich is  in co n sis ten t u ith
th is  C onstitu tio n  s h a ll ,  to  the exten t of inconsistency, be 
vo id .
(2 )  The v a l id i ty  of any lau s h a ll not be questioned on the ground 
th a t -  (a ) i t  imposes re s tr ic t io n  on the r ig h t  mentioned in
Art 9 (2 ) but does not re la te  to the m atters  
mentioned th e re in ; or
(b ) . . .
(3 )  The v a l id i ty  o f any la u . . . s h a ll not be questioned. . . 
except in  proceedings fo r  a declaration  th a t the lau  is  
in v a l id .  . .
(4 )  Proceedings fo r  a d ec la ratio n  th a t a lau  is  in v a l id .  . . s h a ll 
not be commenced u ithout the leave of a judge of the Federal
Cp.PT.t • • • [emphasis added]
6 .42 In P art X I I ,  "Temporary and tra n s it io n a l provisions" uere made
and by A r t .162 of th is  P art i t  uas sought to  extend, in  a sense, the
operation of A r t .4 to the e x is tin g  (pre-Merdeka) laus uhich uere continued
as e f fe c t iv e ,  subject to such "m odification" as might be necessary "fo r  
the purpose of bring ing  the provisions of th a t lau  in to  accord u ith  the 
provisions of th is  C o n s titu tio n ."  Clause (4 ) of the a r t ic le  conferred the  
power to  do so on the Executive head of the fe d e ra tio n . A s im ila r  power
uas conferred by clause (6 ) on "any court or tr ib u n a l applying tbe provisions  
of any e x is tin g  la u " . However, i t  may be noted th a t the use of the  
expression "may" in  both clauses create an i l lu s io n  th a t the power uas 
d is c re tio n a ry . Indeed, Sheridan r ig h t ly  suggests th a t the power conferred
50
by clause (6 ) could not be d is c re tio n a ry .
6 .43  I t  w i l l  not be disputed th a t the in te rp re ta tio n  of the provisions  
of a C onstitu tio n  demands a d if fe re n t  approach; they are not to be 
narrowly construed. Reading A r t . 162 as a whole against the background of 
A r t .4, the in te n tio n  of the fram ers of the C onstitu tion  appears to  suggest 
th a t the provision uas mandatory, and not d ire c to ry . The case-lau , uhich ue 
s h a ll soon d is c u s s ,. also supports th is  v ieu  u ith  the exception of a stray
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51a u th o rity . Support fo r  th is  v ieu  may also be derived from the fa c t th a t 
Singapore did not adopt th is  a r t ic le ,  ev id en tly  fo r  the reason th a t A r t .4  
uas not adopted by i t .  In M alaysia A r t .4 appears to  have given recognition  
to the p r in c ip le  o f presumption of c o n s t itu t io n a lity  as a u n iv e rs a l ru le  
to  be applied to the e x is tin g  as u e l l  as to  the fu tu re  la u s . A r t. 162 
uas required to  bu ttress  the p r in c ip le  by making-up a g rid  together u ith  
A r t .4. Commentators appear to  have missed th is  aspect.
6 .44  "Special pouers against subversion and Emergency Pouers" uas the
heading given to  P art X I ,  u ith  A rts . 149 to 151# uhich uas adopted in  
52Singapore in  to to . The m a te ria l p art of A r t .149, as amended in  1960,
deserves to be quoted:
(1 )  I f  an Act of Parliam ent re c ite s  th a t action has been 
taken or threatened by any s u b s tan tia l body of persons, 
uhether in s id e  or outside the Federation -
(a ) to cause, or to  cause a s u b s tan tia l number of c it iz e n s  
to  fe a r , organised vio lence against persons o r property; 
or
(d ) to procure the a lte ra t io n , otheruise than by la u fu l  
means of anything by lau estab lished; or
(e )  uhich is  p re ju d ic ia l to  the secu rity  o f the Federation or 
any part th e re o f, any provision of th a t lau  designed to  
stop or prevent th a t action is  v a lid  notw ithstanding  
th a t i t  is  in co n sis ten t u ith  any of the provisions of 
A rt ic le  5, 9 or 10. . •
I t  may be noted th a t the uords underlined in  the above e x tra c t uere
53borrousd from the Emergency Regulations Ordinance 1948.
6 .45  The executive head of the Federation (th e  Yangi d i-P ertuan  Agong)
could issue a "Proclamation of Emergency" under A r t .150(1) uhen he uas 
"s a tis fie d "  th a t a "grave emergency" ex is ted  uhereby "the s ecu rity  or 
economic l i f e "  of the  Federation uas threatened "uhether by uar or e x te rn a l 
aggression or in te rn a l d is turbance". Clause (2 ) o f the a r t ic le  empouered 
him to promulgate ordinances i f  immediate action uas required  and 
Parliam ent uas not s i t t in g .  Parliam ent could, however, "annul" under clause
(3 ) the Proclamations and also the Ordinances uhen i t  met a f te r  being 
summoned "as soon as might be p ra c tic a b le " . I t  may be pointed out th a t
clause (3 ) in  i t s  o r ig in a l and unamended form corresponded in  one respect 
to  the Indian provision in  th a t unless approved by Parliam ent the Proclamation  
(and Ordinances also in  M alaysia) ceased autom atica lly  to  have e f fe c t  a f te r  
tuo months. The most im portant p ro v is io n , houever, uas to  be found in  
clause ( 6 ) uhich provided th a t such Ordinances s h a ll not be in v a lid  "on the 
ground o f any inconsistency u ith  the provisions of P art I I " .  Even clause (7 )
uas equally  im portant in  th a t i t  extended the l i f e  of such Ordinance fo r
another s ix  months a f te r  the emergency ceased. That a p a rt, even th is  s ix  
months t im e - lim it  uas saddled u ith  a vague exception "except as to  th ings  
done or om itted to be done before the e xp ira tio n  of th a t p e rio d ". Could 
i t  possibly mean th a t the  executive could pass an order o f preventive  
detention  at any tim e, up to  s ix  months a fte r  the emergency had ceased, 
contemplating detention even beyond th is  t im e - lim it  ?
6.46 A r t . 151 required the fo llo u in g  safeguards to  be provided in
any lau  made fo r  "preventive deten tion" under Part X I:
( 1 ) (a ) the a u th o rity  [o rd erin g  d e ten tio n ] . . . s h a ll ,  as soon as 
may be, inform him of the orounds fo r  h is  detention and, 
subject to clause ( 3 ) ,  the a lle g a tio n s  of fa c t on uhich 
the order is  based, and s h a ll give him the opportunity  of 
making representations against the order as soon as may be;
(b ) no c it iz e n  s h a ll be deta ined . . . fo r  a period exceeding
three months unless an advisory board co n stitu ted  as
mentioned in  clause ( 2 ) has considered any representations  
made by him under paragraph (a )  and made recommendations 
thereon to the Yang d i-Pertusn Aqonq.
(2 ) An advisory board. . . s h a ll consist of a chairman, uho 
s h a ll be appointed by the  Yang d i-Pertuan Agong from among 
persons uho are or have been judges o f the Federal Court
or are q u a lif ie d  to be judges of the Federal Court, and tuo  
other members, uho s h a ll  be appointed. . . a f te r  
consu ltation  u ith  the Chief J u s tic e . . .
(3 ) This a r t ic le  does not requ ire  any a u th o rity  to  disclose  
fa c ts  uhose d isclosure uould in  i t s  opinion be against 
the n a tio n a l in te r e s t .
[emphasis added]
6.47 Tuo d is t in c t iv e  fea tu res  of the p ro tection  of the hearing of
representations by the independent advisory board immediately a rres t our 
a tte n tio n . In  the f i r s t  place such hearing uas lim ite d  to c it iz e n s  o n ly . 
Secondly, detention beyond th ree  months uas made dependable on the
O ri 
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s a tis fa c tio n  of the executive head of the Federation, possibly to  pre­
empt challenges on the ground of mala f id e . But the Head of S ta te , being 
required to  act on the advice of the ‘ Cabinet* (v ide  A r t .40 ), th is  exercise  
uas of a doubtful v a l id i t y .  Nevertheless, th is  consideration appears 
generally  to have p reva iled  u ith  the courts, as ue s h a ll see. U ith  
another exception, namely, clause 1 (a ) uhich required "a lle g a tio n s  of 
fa c ts "  in  addition  to  the "grounds" to  be supplied to the detainee, the 
safeguards generally  corresponded to those provided in  the Indian  
C o n s titu tio n . The use of the expression "n a tio n a l in te re s t"  in  clause (3 )  
is  also noteuorthy in  th a t i t  replaced the concept of "public  in te re s t"  
embodied in  the 1948 Emergency Ordinance.
6 .48 tiie may nou take note of a spec ia l fea tu re  of the Singapore 
C o n s titu tio n . In P art IVA ue f in d  the provision o f "P re s id e n tia l Council" 
uhich appears to have been in sp ired  by the provision made in  1958 in  the  
C onstitu tion  of Kenya, uhere i t  uas la te r  repealed . Among the d if fe re n t  
" p a rtic u la r  functions" of the Council i t  uas required to give i t s  opinion 
on any B i l l  or subsidiary le g is la t io n  th a t i t  considered to be inconsistent 
uith  the "fundamental l ib e r t ie s "  of the sub ject, vide A r t .813. I t  uas 
houever robbed of i t s  e ffec tiven ess  by Amendment Act No.40 of 1970 uhich 
provided, v id e  A rt.8 1 K (7 ), th a t the provision uas not to apply to a B i l l  
uhich uas c e r t i f ie d  by the Prime M in is te r as one "uhich a ffe c ts  the  
defence or the secu rity  o f Singapore or uhich re la te s  to  pub lic  s a fe ty , 
peace or good order in  Singapore".
(2 ) Some Emergency Laus
( A) The Xntej?nj3l_ S £ c u rit^  jftct i960
( a) jft General Vieu
6.49 The Emergency Regulations Ordinance 1948 uas continued in  force
u n t i l  31st Duly 1960 (by v ir tu e  of A r t .163 of the C o n stitu tio n ) uhen the 
emergency uas term inated . The government of M alaysia then decided to enact 
a permanent measure. Ue have already seen th a t in 1960 a r t . 149 of the 
C onstitu tion  uas amended and th a t the neu clause (1 )  had used the ..................
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phraseology borrowed from the 1948 Ordinance. The preamble o f the 1960 
A ct, enacted th e re a fte r , which we propose to  discuss now, thus contained 
the prescribed r e c i t a l  to  invoke the pro tection  of a r t . 149 to  pre-empt 
ju d ic ia l  challenge. The Act was also app licab le  in  Singapore. In s .2  
of the Act, i t  was stated  th a t a ' 't e r r o r is t"  means any person who -
(a ) by use of any fire a rm , explosive or ammunition acts in  a 
manner p re ju d ic ia l to the pub lic  safety  or to  the 
maintenance o f pub lic  order or in c ite s  to v io lence or 
counsels disobedience to  the law or to  any law fu l order; or
(b ) c a rr ie s  or has in  h is  possession or under h is  co n tro l any 
fire a rm , ammunition o r explosive w ithout law fu l au th o rity  
th e re fo r; or
(c ) demands, c o lle c ts  or receives any supplies fo r  the use of 
any person who intends or is  dbout to act or has recen tly  
acted in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to  pub lic  safety  or maintenance 
of pub lic  o rd er. [emphasis added]
The exhaustive d e fin it io n  ("means") su rp ris in g ly  extended the ordinary
concept of "te rro rism " which we found defined, a lb e it  in  an in c lu s iv e
54manner, in  the Detention o f T e rro r is ts  (Northern Ire la n d ) Order 1972.
The d e fin it io n  generally  c a rried  the legacy of the Emergency Regulations  
55of 1948. By ss. 3, 5 and 6  association with "q u a s i-m ilita ry  o rgan isations", 
the wearing of the uniform of such association and i l l e g a l  d r i l l in g  were 
made offences.
6.50 Part I I  (ss .47  to 71) of the Act contained "Special provisions
re la t in g  to  secu rity  areas". Uhen, in  the opinion of the executive head 
of the Federation i t  was necessary fo r  suppressing "organised vio lence  
against person or property" he could "proclaim " any area as "secu rity  
area". U ith in  th is  area, the M in is te r  could, fo r  "public  s a fe ty " , declare  
d if fe re n t  areas as "danger area" and "co n tro lled  area", imposing 
re s tr ic t io n s  th e re in  of d if fe re n t  degrees on entry  and residence in  such 
areas. In the "danger area" the army could take measures "dangerous and 
f a t a l  to  human l i f e " ,  w ithout in cu rrin g  any l i a b i l i t y  fo r  compensation, v ide  
s .48(4) and ( 5 ) .  Indeed, the s itu a tio n  resembled a s ta te  of " M a rt ia l Law".
A s im ila r  provision was not made in  Northern Ire la n d , perhaps fo r  the  
a d d itio n a l reason th a t the g u e r r i l la  warfare there was of urban and not
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ru ra l type , or "jungle war” as in  the peninsula. Power o f a rres t in  the  
security  area was conferred by s .64 a d d itio n a lly  on a "guard, watchman and 
any person generally  authorised by the Chief P o lice  O ff ic e r" .
6.51 In  th is  P a rt, chapter I I I  (ss.57 to 63) prescribed the
offences and punishments. Persons carry ing  arms and those who consorted 
with such persons faced the death p en a lty . The offence prescribed in  s . 59
re fle c te d  the e ffe c t iv e  ro le  of the "starve-them -out s tra teg y" and of the
extended d e f in it io n  of t e r r o r is t .  L ife  imprisonment was prescribed fo r  
any person, w ith in  or w ithout the secu rity  area, who demanded, co llec ted
or received any supplies from any other person in  circumstances which ra ised
a presumption th a t such supplies were intended fo r  the  use of any
" te r r o r is t " .  Any person who was s im ila r ly  found in  possession of any
supply or provided any supply e ith e r  d ire c t ly  or in d ire c t ly  also faced
l i f e  imprisonment. S ub-s .(4 ) provided th a t i t  s h a ll not be necessary to
specify e ith e r  the person from whom any supplies were demanded, co llec ted
or received or the person fo r  whom i t  was intended. This s p ec ia l ru le  of
56evidence made any reasonable defence im possible.
( b -) "Detentions" and In te rro g a tio n
6.52 The power o f in te rim  detention pending en q u iries  and in te rro g a tio n  
uas posited in  s .7 3 (1 ) under which any po lice  o f f ic e r  could a rre s t w ithout 
warrant "any person in  respect of whom he [had] reason to  b e lieve  th a t there  
[were] grounds which would ju s t i fy  h is  detention under s . 8  and th a t he 
[h ad ].acted  or [was] about to act or [was] l ik e ly  to  act in  any manner 
p re ju d ic ia l to  the secu rity  o f Malaya or any part th e re o f" . The provision  
uas modelled on Reg.23A o f 1940. S im ila r ly , s u b -s .(2 ) and the  remaining  
provisions of the section genera lly  fo llow ed the scheme of Reg.24 with one 
notable change th a t the maximum period of such detention was now ra ised to  
28 days from 14 days provided in  the re g u la tio n s . The provisions of s .73 
were apparently more d ra s tic  being devoid of any safeguard and contravened 
A r t .5 o f the C onstitu tio n  but A r t .149 saved i t *
J
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6.53  Ub now come to the "Powers of Preventive Detention" which 
were provided in  Part I ,  in  chapter I I  (s s . 8  to 2 1 ). The m a te ria l parts  
of s . 8  are set out below:
(1 )  I f  the Yang di-Peruan Aqonq is  s a t is f ie d  with respect to any 
person th a t ,  with a view to preventing th a t person from acting  
in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to  the security  of Malaya or any part 
th e re o f, i t  is  necessary so to do, the M in is te r s h a ll make
an order -
(a )  d ire c tin g  th a t such person be detained fo r  any period  
not exceeding two years;
(2 )  Every person detained in  pursuance of an order made under 
paragraph (a ) o f s u b -s .( l)  s h a ll be detained in  such place
as the M in is te r may d ire c t and in  accordance with in s tru c tio n s  
issued by the M in is te r and the ru les  made under s u b -s .(3 ) .
[emphasis added]
Paragraph (b ) o f s u b -s .(1 ) provided an a lte rn a tiv e  to deten tion . I t  
envisaged the im position of a v a r ie ty  of other re s tr ic t io n s  a ffe c tin g  
h is  a c t iv i t ie s  and movements, inc lud ing  p ro h ib itin g  him from addressing 
public  meetings or from holding o ff ic e  in  any organisation or from taking  
part in  any p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t ie s .  He could be proh ib ited  from being out 
of doors between certa in  hours and could be required to n o tify  h is  
movements in  the sp ec ified  manner. Execution o f a "bond" in  respect of 
any order made under th is  paragraph was also contemplated. By v ir tu e  of 
s .47 the bond could be enforced in  accordance with the provisions of the  
C rim inal Prevention Code but there was also a penal provision in  s .45 
which made i t  an offence to contravene any provision of P art I  or any 
order or d irec tio n  made thereunder.
6 .54  s .9 re fe rre d  to A r t .151 of the C onstitu tion  and reproduced the 
safeguards mentioned th e re in . By s .10 the M in is te r was empowered to  suspend 
the operation of the detention order on conditions uhich corresponded to  
the re s tr ic t io n s  contemplated in  paragraph (b ) o f s . 8 ( 1 ) and also to  the 
requirement o f execution of a "bond", contemplated thereunder. The 
suspension order could be revoked e ith e r  in  the "public  in te re s t"  or fo r  
non-observance of any cond ition , s . 11  d ea lt u ith  representations against
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detention orders. The service o f the order "as soon as may be a f te r  the 
making thereof'* could possibly be construed to mean serv ice a t the tim e of 
the a rre s t mads fo r  the purpose of d e ten tio n . U ith in  fourteen days the 
M in is te r  was required to fu rn ish  the detainee with not only the  "grounds” 
and the "a lle g a tio n s  of fa c t" ,  but such other "p a rtic u la rs "  which he might 
consider necessary to  enable the detainee to  make representations to  the  
advisory board. Rules could be made dealing  with representations and the  
procedure o f advisory boards.
6 .55  I t  is  im portant to note th a t while A r t .1 5 1 (1 )(a )  merely 
mentioned "making representations against the o rder", s u b -s .(2 ) ( a )  of s . 11  
re fe rs  to  "h is r ig h t  to make representations to  an Advisory Board". I t  is  
submitted th a t the "representations" contemplated by the C o n stitu tio n  did  
not exclude the co-ordinate ju r is d ic t io n  of e ith e r  the M in is te r  or o f the  
Yang di-Petuan Agong: the fa c ts  th a t the word was used in  the p lu ra l and 
th a t the au th o rity  was unspecified  support th is  v iew . In so fa r  as 
s u b .s .(2 ) ( a )  sought to c u r ta i l  the r ig h t ,  i t  was, we submit, u l t r a  v ire s  
A r t .1 5 1 (1 ) (a ) . I t  may be noted th a t being a post-Merdeka lau , the
courts could not invoke A r t .162(6) and th a t the p ro tection  o f A r t .149(1) was 
confined to challenges grounded on A rts . 5, 9 and 10; the rule-m aking power 
conferred on the M in is te r  by clause (3 )  of the sec tio n , did not also a ffe c t  
the position  in  th a t the ru les  could not t ra v e l beyond the Act.
6 .56  The advisory board's duty was tw o fo ld . Under s .12(1) i t  was
required to consider represen ta tions  and submit i t s  recommendations to  the  
Yang d i-Pertuan Agong u ith in  three months w hile  s .13(2) contemplated i t s  
recommendations on review , once in  every s ix  months, o f the orders passed 
under ss . 8  and 10, being submitted to the M in is te r . The decision of the 
Yang d i-Pertuan Agong under s .12(2) was, subject to s . 13, " f in a l" ,  and i t  
was sta ted  th a t i t  " s h a ll not be questioned in  any c o u rt" . This p r iv ile g e  
was not extended to the M in is te r 's  order pursuant to  the recommendations 
made under s .1 3 (2 ) . I t  has, however, to  be noted th a t the decision of the
Yang d i-Pertuan Agong uas to  be on the advice o f the Council of M in is te rs , 
according to the C o n s titu tio n . That apart, the f in a l i t y  attached to h is  
decision uas as respects the substance or m erits  and i t  d id  not a f fe c t ,  ue 
submit, the pouer o f the courts to see uhether the procedual safeguards 
provided by the c o n stitu tio n  aid the statutew ere complied u ith .  The 
M in is te r s  order under s .13(2) could possibly be challenged on the m erits  
also as i t  uas no longer based on the o r ig in a l s a tis fa c tio n  of Yang d i-  
Pertuan Agong, uhich had lo s t i t s  force u ith  the expiry  of three months.
6.57 Notice may also be taken of the re levan t provisions of the
In te rn a l Security  (Detained Persons Advisory Board) Rules 1964 made under
s .11(3) of the i960 Act. While the provisions of ru les  3 and 5 of the 1948 
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Rules uere re ta in ed  in  almost unaltered  form, the neu r . 6  provided a more
l ib e r a l  procedure in  respect of the "review" contemplated under s .13 of the
Act. Legal representation  in  such cases uas to  be as of r ig h t ,  and not to
depend on the d iscre tio n  of the Board. In  a d d itio n , the Board could also
require the detainee to be produced before them. The neu ru le  d e f in ite ly
buttressed the d is tin c tio n  made in  the Act betueen the tuo stages o f
hearing before the Board but i t  uas d i f f i c u l t  to understand the importance
attached to the s ta tu to ry  r ig h t  of "revieu" in  preference to the
c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t o f "representa tions". In  a strange contrast stood
the neu Emergency (C rim in a l T r ia ls )  Regulations 1964. Although the
provision respecting the r ig h t of the Public  Prosecutor to  c e r t ify  a
case fo r  t r i a l  under the reg u la tio n s  by dispensing u ith  the ju ry  and
58assessors uas re ta ined  fo llo u in g  the 1948 Regulation, paragraph 7 nou 
authorised b a i l  to be refused in  such cases unless the offence uas not 
one uhich uas punishable u ith  death or l i f e  imprisonment or the accused 
uas a woman or a person under 16 years of age.
( B) ih e  JEme_rgejicy_ _(_E_sS£n_ti_al_P£k!eirs )_Aj: t_196_4
6.58 In  1963 uhen Sabah and Sarauak, o f the Borneo Islands jo ined
the Federation to  form M alaysia, the neu s ta te  uas "confronted" u ith . . . .
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h o s t i l i t ie s  from Indonesia as the la t t e r  had i t s  own designs on those 
t e r r i t o r ie s .  An emergency was proclaimed under A r t .150 of the C o nstitu tio n  
uhich uas fo llow ed by the enactment of the Emergency (E s s e n tia l Pouers)
Act 1964 by uhich power to  make reg u la tio n s  uas conferred on the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong fo r  "securing pu b lic  s a fe ty , the defence o f the 
fe d e ra tio n , the maintenance of p u b lic  order and of supplies and serv ices  
e s s e n tia l to  the l i f e  of the community". Ue proceed now to  examine, 
a lb e it  u ith in  a narrow compass, th is  Act and the feu reg u la tio n s  made 
thereunder.
6.59 The scheme of delegation of power fo llow ed g en era lly  th a t of the 
1948 Ordinance in  the use o f such expressions as "whatsoever" and "any
59m atter" and also in  the enumeration of the s p e c ific  m atters in  s . 2 ( 2 ) ;
clause (a )  deserves to be quoted:
make provision fo r  the apprehension, t r i a l  and punishment 
of persons offending against the reg u la tio n s  and fo r  the  
detention of persons whose detention appears to  the M in is te r  
fo r  Home A ffa irs  to  be expedient in  the in te re s t  o f the  
pu b lic  safety  or the defence of the Federation;
[emphasis added]
The provision was apparently a departure from the 1960 Act which requ ired  
the s a tis fa c tio n  of the Yang d i-P ertuan  Agong. A rt. 150(6) having barred  
challenges grounded on the contravention of the provisions o f Part I I  
of the C o n s titu tio n , th is  p ro v is io n , as w e ll as the  other m atters as 
respects neu offences, neu p e n a ltie s  and sp ec ia l procedure o f t r i a ls  e tc .  
were saved. This uas re fle c te d  in  s .4 o f the Act uhich embodied the non­
ob st an t& c l au se .
6 .60  Pursuant to the Act, The Emergency ( in te r n a l Security  and
Detention Order) Regulations 1964 were made. By paragraph 2 (a )
the f i r s t  f iv e  lin e s  in  s .8 (1 ) o f the 1960 Act uere replaced by the
fo llo w in g  prov is ion :
I f  the  Yang d i-P ertuan Agong is  s a t is f ie d  u ith  respect to  
any person th a t ,  u ith  a v ieu  to  preventing th a t person 
from acting  in  any manner p re ju d ic ia l to  the secu rity  of 
M alaysia or any p art th ereo f or to  the maintenance of 
pub lic  order or e s s e n tia l serv ices , i t  is  necessary so to  
do, the M in is te r  s h a ll make an order -
By paragraph 2(b) two neu sub-sections uere in s e rte d , one of uhich uas 
as fo llo u s :
(1A) The Yang d i-P ertuan  Agong may d ire c t th a t the period of 
any order made under s u b -s .(1 ) be extended fo r  a fu r th e r  
period or periods not exceeding tuo years at a tim e .
[emphasis added]
Sections 11 and 12 of the 1960 Act uere made in a p p lic a b le  to  a d irec tio n  
given under s .8 (1A ) by paragraph 3 of the R egulations. S ub -s .(1 ) of s . 13 
of the Act uas replaced by paragraph 4. The neu provision contemplated 
urev ieu " by the advisory board at an in te rv a l of not more than 1 2  months.
By paragraph 6 (2 ) the operation of the Prevention of Public  Safety  
Ordinance 1955 of Singapore uas suspended during the currency of the  
re g u la tio n s .
( C) Thj3 Junerjgen.cy. _{_Pub_li_c _0rde_r _and Preyention__o_f Crime)__0rdin_an_ce_1_96£
6.61 Even a f te r  the Indonesian confrontation  had subsided, the troub les  
uere not o ver. C erta in  elements in  the Chinese section of the population  
continued to sympathise u ith  the movement sponsored by the Malayan 
Communist Party uhich uas re fle c te d  in  the afterm ath of the r a c ia l  
disturbances th a t took place in  the Federal c a p ita l in  May 1969. The 
occasion had c a lle d  fo r  the promulgation of the Emergency (P u b lic  Order
and Prevention o f Crime) Ordinance 1969 by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under 
A r t .150(2) of the Malaysian C o n s titu tio n , fo llo u in g  the d isso lu tio n  of 
Parliam ent in  March 1969. The P arty , nou uorking c landestine ly  uas 
attem pting to  take  advantage of the s itu a tio n  as severa l hundred people, 
mainly Chinese, had been k i l le d  during the r io ts  and the fa c t  th a t 
v ir t u a l ly  a l l  the policemen and s o ld ie rs  c o n tro llin g  the s itu a tio n  uere 
Malays, had em bittered  the fe e lin g s  of the C h in e s e .^
6 .62  In  contrast u ith  the measures discussed so fa r  ue f in d  th a t  
in  th is  Ordinance, the tuo pouers of de ten tio n , th a t o f the p o lice  
o ff ic e r  pending en q u iries  and th a t o f the M in is te r , uere subjected to a 
neu requirement -  th a t of "pub lic  order" and "suppression o f crimes 
in vo lv in g  v io le n c e " . By s .3 (3 ) (c )  the maximum period of detention
fo llo w in g  a rres t and in te rro g a tio n  by a po lice  o f f ic e r  was now fu rth e r
ra ised to 30 days. The scope of the power was also enlarged in  s . 3 ( 1 )
and ( 2 ) :  in  s u b -s .(1 ) instead of a tw ofold requirement as contemplated
in  s . 7 3 ( 1 )  of the 1960 Act, the power could now be exercised on the
s a tis fa c tio n  of a s in g le  requirement corresponding to clause (a )  of
s .7 3 (1 );  in  s u b -s .(2 ) the new requirement ind ica ted  above uas s tated  in
the a lte rn a tiv e  and only one o f them was subjected to the c r ite r io n  of
reasonableness of b e l ie f .  In  the M in is te r 's  substantive power of
preventive detention provided in  s . 4 (1 ) a s ig n if ic a n t change was
introduced by in s e rtin g  in  s .5 a neu sub-s.(2A ) by an amending Ordinance,
No.13 o f 1969. I t  ran as fo llo w s:
Notwithstanding the provisions of A r t .1 5 1 (1 )(b )  of the 
C o n s titu tio n , a c it iz e n  detained in  pursuance of an order 
made under s .4 (1 ) may be detained, w ithout any representation  
made by him under A r t .1 5 1 (1 ) (a) o f the C onstitu tion  having 
been considered, and u ithout recommendations having been made 
thereon, by an advisory board constitu ted  fo r  the purpose of 
th a t A r t ic le ,  fo r  a period of three months commencing 
immediately a f te r  the s ix t ie th  day fo llo w in g  the date of 
h is  a rres t under s .3;
6 .63  I t  is  in te re s tin g  to note th a t the neu provision purported to
lin k -u p  the M in is te r 's  pouer with th a t of the p o lice  o f f ic e r 's ,  w hile  
reducing the ambit of the safeguard as respects the t im e - l im it .  The l in k ­
up was expected, possib ly , to  accord recognition to  the fa c tu a l
61position  p re v a ilin g  since the 1948 Regulations, as in d ica ted  e a r l ie r .  
Nevertheless, the new dimension added to  the po lice  o f f ic e r 's  power, 
as pointed out in  the preceding paragraph, uas bound to reduce fu r th e r  
the scope of the safeguards g en era lly , even i f  such an e f fe c t  uas not 
d e lib e ra te ly  intended. By s .7 the provision re la t in g  to "review" was 
a lte re d  to scale down the pro tections a step fu r th e r . I t  could now be 
made "from time to tim e" and "at the d iscre tio n  of the Chairman" of the  
Advisory Board.
C.
3
I l l . The ju d ic ia l  response to  emergency le g is la t io n
6 .6 4  Ue have seen th a t the legacy of the emergency le g is la t io n  o f the 
c o lo n ia l period was c a rried  over not only in  p a r t ic u la r  emergency laws of the  
independence era  but even in  the c o n s titu tio n a l p ro v is io n s . I t  has also  
been noted th a t some of the emergency provisions, enacted before as w e ll
as a f te r  independence, were open to challenge. P r io r  to  independence such
challenge could genera lly  be made in  habeas corpus proceedings b u t, as
we have seen, the r ig h t to the w r it  i t s e l f  could not be enforced in  a l l
62courts in  the peninsula. A fter independence, the scope of challenge was
re s tr ic te d  by the sp ec ia l procedure provided in  a r t ic le  4 o f the C onstitu tion
in  addition  the remedy o f habeas corpus was not naned in  the C onstitu tion
6 2 a
apparently m aintain ing  the pre-independence p o s itio n . Nevertheless, the  
scope of ju d ic ia l  review under the C onstitu tion  in  m atters appertain ing  
to  emergency laws came to  be considered in  a number of cases which we 
propose to  examine in  some d e ta i l .  But, i t  is  necessary to  po in t out 
th a t in  so fa r  as the  c o lo n ia l period was concerned the po s itio n  was the  
same as th a t which obtained in  Northern Ire la n d  or even in  A fr ic a , as we 
s h a ll seej the reason however was perhaps d if fe r e n t ,  namely, the  r ig h t to  
the w r it  o f habeas corpus in  a l l  c o lo n ia l t e r r i t o r ie s  o f South-east Asia 
was not f irm ly  and equally  entrenched everywhere.
6.65 The scope of ju d ic ia l  review under the C onstitu tio n  came to be
considered generally  in  M alaysia in  an e a rly  case, CHIA KHIN SZE v
MENTERI BESAR. SELANGOR. The applicant was arrested and detained
under an order of the M entri Besar (th e  State Chief M in is te r) passed
under s .2 of the R estric ted  Residence Enactment 1935, pending " fu rth e r  
64in q u ir ie s " . He applied fo r  a w r it  of mandamus d ire c tin g  the a u th o ritie s  
to allow him to be represented by a counsel and to c a l l  witnesses at the  
in q u iry , re ly in g  on A r t .5 of the C o n s titu tio n . I t  was in te r  a l ia  held  
th a t A r t .4 did not make void pre-Merdeka law on the ground of inconsistency  
with the c o n s titu tio n a l provision and as such the impugned provision was 
v a lid  and i t  p reva iled  against A r t .5. I t  was fu rth e r  held th a t A r t .5(3)
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was merely declaratory  of p re -e x is tin g  position  end applied only to
c rim in a l proceedings under the Code. The court appeared to  have overlooked
the fa c t th a t A r t .162(6) was complementary to A r t .4 and r e l i e f  could
be granted w ithout in v a lid a t in g  the law . The decision has been c r it ic is e d
65but th is  aspect appears to have been viewed in  a d if fe re n t  perspective .
6 . 6 6  A fte r ten years, in  AMINAH v SUPERINTENDENT OF PRISONS. 6 6  the
decision in  the above case was considered but dissented from . This was an
ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus by the w ife of a person s im ila r ly  deta ined,
on the ground th a t the detainee was not informed of the  ground of h is  
arres t as required by A r t .5 (3 ) .  The court re lie d  on A r t .162(6) and 
"ap p lied 11 the Enactment not in  the o r ig in a l but in  the "m odified" form
by reading in to  i t  the requirements of A r t .5 (3 ) ,  c a te g o ric a lly  holding  
th a t the impugned provision was not void fo r  the absence th e re o f. I t  
was also held th a t A r t .5 applied to a l l  types of a rres t under any law 
in  force in  the country. On the fa c ts  i t  was found th a t the provision  
was complied with and the ap p lica tio n  was th ere fo re  dismissed.
6.67 In AS5A SINGH v HENTRI BESAR. 30H0RE. 67 the Federal Court was
required  to answer, on a reference made to i t  the question as to  whether 
the Enactment was u l t r a  v ire s  the C o n s titu tio n . The m atter arose out o f 
an ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus by a person arrested and detained under 
the Enactment on the ground th a t he was not informed of the  "grounds"
of h is  a rres t and d eten tio n . I t  was contended th a t the Enactment was
v io la t iv e  of A r ts .5 (1 ) ,  ( 2 ) ,  (4 ) and 9 (2 ) .  On behalf of the s ta te
re lia n c e  was placed mainly on A r ts .4 (2 ) and 1 6 2 (6 ). S uffien  and G i l l ,
F .3 .3 . ,  c a te g o ric a lly  held th a t the Enactment was a law re la t in g  to
68"public  order" and accordingly A r t .9 (2 ) was not v io la te d . T h e ir  
Lordships also held th a t the provisions of A r t .5(2) and (3 ) ought to  be 
read in to  the Enactment. I t  is  tru e  th a t in  the Federal L is t  of le g is la t iv e  
competence (L is t  I ) ,  item No. 3, " in te rn a l s ecu rity"  was mentioned as 
inc lud ing " (a ) pub lic  order" and "(c ) re s tr ic t io n  of residence" but th e ir  
Lordships did not s p e ll out the reason fo r  holding, the impugned law as
one r e la t in g  to  "p u b lic  o rd e r" . The preamble o f the  Act d id  not give
such a h in t .  T h e ir  Lordships appear to  have been influenced by the fa c tu a l 
69p o s it io n .
6 . 6 8  Raja Azlan Shah 3 . also re fe rre d  to  A r t .162(6) but fo llo w in g
what was apparently the Doctrine o f Eclipse evolved by the Indian Supreme
Court, held th a t pre-Merdeka laws were not void ab in i t io  and i f  any
provision  was "ec lipsed", the  shadow had to be removed by the courts  
70using A r t .1 6 2 (6 ). I t  may be pointed out th a t the d iffe ren ce  in  the
Ind ian  and the Malaysian s itu a tio n  was th a t the C onstitu tio n  in  M alaysia
(of invalidation)
did not grant th is  power/to the courts . In  In d ia , although the courts
could in v a lid a te  the p re -C o n stitu tio n  laws, they could not s tr ik e  down
71any p re -C o n s titu tio n  executive act done pursuant to those laws.
6.69 In  dealing with A r t .162(6) i t  is  necessary to  mention the
decision of the Privy Council in  SURENPIER SINGH KANDA v FEDERATION OF 
72MALAY A although the case arose out of a m atter re la tin g  to public
72 as erv ices . The short dictum of Lord Denning deserves to be quoted:
In a c o n flic t  of th is  kind between the e x is tin g  law and the  
C o n s titu tio n , the C onstitu tio n  must p re v a il .  The court must 
apply the e x is tin g  lew with such m odifications as may be 
necessary to  bring  i t  in to  accord with the C o n s titu tio n .
[emphasis added]
6.70 The leading case in  the peninsula on preventive detention was
KARAM SINGH v MENETRI HAL EHWAL DALAM NEGERI. 7 3  The m atter had come up
in  appeal before the Federal Court and arose out of an unsuccessful
ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus by the deta in ee . The grounds fo r
deta in ing  the appellan t were s tated  in  the order passed under s . 8 ( l ) ( a )
of the In te rn a l Security  Act 1960, as fo llo w s:
With a view to p re v e n tin g / him /  from acting  in  any 
manner p re ju d ic ia l to  the secu rity  nf M a la y s ia /th e  
maintenance of p u b lic  order t h e r e in /  in  the maintenance 
o f e s s e n tia l serv ices th e re in .
In  h is  a f f id a v i t ,  the M in is te r  however s tated  th a t the decision of the
Cabinet was to  prevent the appellan t from acting in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l
to the secu rity  of M alaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance
of pub lic  order or e ss e n tia l services th e re in . On the other hand, the  
"grounds ' 1 served on him simply mentioned th a t since 1957 he had consis ten tly  
acted in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to  the secu rity  of M alaysia. In th is  s ta te  
of a f fa ir s  i t  was contended by the appellan t th a t the order showed the  
casual and c a v a lie r  a tt itu d e  of the  a u th o r it ie s , co n s titu tin g  mala f id e s . 
Reliance was placed on the decisions of the Indian courts . I t  was also  
contended th a t the a lle g a tio n s  of fa c ts  supplied were vague, in s u ff ic ie n t  
and ir re le v a n t  which hampered the appellan t in  the exercise of h is  r ig h t  
to make representa tions.
6.71 In  dealing with the firs t-m e n tio n e d  contention Azmi, L .P .,
accepted the m inority  view expressed by Dayal, 3 . ,  of the Indian Supreme
74Court in  RAM MANOHAR and also re lie d  on a dictum of Humphreys, 3 . in  
75Ex p. LEES. His Lordship held th a t the defect in  the order was one of
form only and th a t the court knew as a fa c t  th a t the question whether the
appellan t should be detained or not was decided by the Cabinet a fte r
7 6considering a l l  the fa c ts  end evidence against the deta inee. E a r l ie r
in  the judgment i t  was noticed th a t there  were certa in  a lle g a tio n s  of
fa c t which were w ithheld from the appellan t as perm itted by A r t .151(3) but
77they were considered by the Cabinet as w e ll as by the advisory board.
The instances of past a c t iv i t ie s  were considered to be "re levan t" and
i t  was he ld  th a t  thB "s u b je c tiv e  s a t is fa c t io n  o f the d e ta in in g  a u th o r ity "
was not ta in te d  on th a t ground. The second contention was disposed of
by re fe rr in g  to the judgment of S u ffia n , F .3 . but as a ta ilp ie c e  h is
7 8Lordship also c ited  two passages from the LI\/ERSIDGE case, in  which 
lim ite d  scope fo r  ju d ic ia l  in te rfe ren c e  was in d ic a te d .
6 .72  We propose to discuss now the lengthy judgment of S u ffia n , F .3 . ,
but in  making a short comment on the opinion of Lord President Azmi we 
submit th a t h is  Lordship does not seem to have attached s u ff ic ie n t  
importance to the d iffe ren ce  in  the provisions of the laws and the  
C onstitu tio ns of the three  countries, the U nited Kingdom, In d ia  and 
M alaysia. We w i l l  presently  see th a t S u ffia n , F .3 . ,  on the other hand,
took great pains to naitice thB d iffe ren ce  between the Indian and the 
Malaysian provisions but did n o t, u n fo rtu n a te ly , extend the same zeal 
to  the United Kingdom, despite the fa c t th a t h is  Lordship followed the 
English decisions. However, i t  has to be said th a t the theory of 
"subjective  s a t is fa c tio n " , f i r s t  expounded in  the English wartime cases, 
was applied in  i t s  f u l l  force by Lord President Azmi in  a more prominent 
fash io n , which was re fle c te d  in  h is  u n q u a lified  re lia n c e  on the general 
p rin c ip le  of re s tr ic te d  ju d ic ia l  review advocated in  the LIV/ERSIDGE case.
6 .73  In  discussing the Indian cases, S u ffia n , F .3 . ,  was c a re fu l to
set out in  h is  judgment the re levan t c o n s titu tio n a l and s ta tu to ry
provisions and also e x trac ts  from a few decis ions. Having f i r s t  observed
th a t the judgments were of great persuasive va lue , as the Indisn
C onstitu tio n  was the model fo r  the Malaysian C o n s titu tio n , h is  Lordship
eventually  held th a t the Indian precedents should not be followad in  the
79preventive detention cases. Before proceeding to deal with the 
d iffe ren ce  noted by h is  Lordship between the p a r a l le l  provisions of the
two countries , i t  w i l l  be appropriate to quote one of the extracts  c ited
80 81 by h is  Lordship. In SAD AN AN DAN v STATE OF KERALA Gajendragadkar, C .3 .
of the Indian Supreme Court had observed as fo llo w s:
. . . the freedom of Indian c it iz e n s  cannot be taken away 
without existence of the ju s t ify in g  necessity spec ified  by 
the ru les  themselves. The tendency to t r e a t  these m atters  
in  a somewhat casual and c a v a lie r  manner which may conceivably 
re s u lt from the continuous use o f such u n fe tte red  powers, may 
u ltim a te ly  pose a sBrious th re a t to  the basic values on which 
the democratic way of l i f e  in  th is  country is  founded.
[emphasis added]
By "spec ified  ru les  o f necessity" in  In d ia  and M alaysia the provisions of 
the w ritten  C onstitu tions were super-imposed on the s ta tu to ry  requirements 
which was not the case in  the United Kingdom but M alaysia had in  addition  
the "continuous use of u n fe tte re d  powers" through the 1948 Emergency 
Regulations. This e x tra c t thus had a message of the utmost relevance  
which was lo s t s ight o f .
6 .74  I t  is  th ere fo re  not strange to note th a t h is  Lordship immediately
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proceeded to fo llo w  the decision in  Ex p. LEES end then re fe rre d  to the
decision in  LIUERSIDGE. U nfortunate ly  no mention was made in  the judgment
82o f the la te r  decision of the House of Lords in  GREENE, although the
challenge in  th a t case was also grounded in  the use of a lte rn a tiv e s  as
happened in  the in s ta n t case and in  Ex p. LEES. We have already submitted
th a t the English wartime cases ought to  be read together fo r  a true
evaluation  o f th e ir  import which, as we have seen, was to be found in  the ad.
83Jaoc norm o f in te rp re ta t io n  in sp ired  by the doctrine of necess ity . We
have also seen th a t in  GREENE the House of Lords adopted the cas t-iro n
84te s t  of Humphreys, 3 . of the D iv is io n a l court, namely, n o n -sp ec ifica tio n
of any p a r t ic u la r  form fo r  the o rd er. The House of Lords applied the more
85f le x ib le  te s t of ”p re ju d ic e " . Later in  the judgment, S u ffia n , F .3 . ,  also
speaks o f p re ju d ic e , but in  a d i f fe r e n t  c o n te x t, in  respect o f thB r ig h t
86of rep resen ta tio n . The c en tra l issue in  both cases, LEES and GREENE, 
on the other hand, was the sub jective  s a tis fa c tio n  of the M in is te r . In 
fa c t in  the English cases, much importance was not attached to the r ig h t of 
making representa tion . This d is t in c t iv e  fea tu re  of the English cases also  
deserved specia l n o tice  in  view of the c o n s titu tio n a l guarantee of the r ig h t  
in  In d ia  and M alaysia.
6 .75  In dealing with the Indian cases and the Indian provisions the
points of d iffe ren ce  were r ig h t ly  sta ted  when h is  Lordship observed th a t
Ind ian  courts in s is te d  on s t r ic t  compliance with the law fo r  two main
reasons. The detention orders under d if fe re n t  s ta tu tes  were made by c iv i l
servants and A r t .21 of the C onstitu tion  (corresponding to A r t .5 of
M alaysia) spoke of ’’procedure” which was not to be found in  the Malaysian  
87p ro v is io n . In  M alaysia the power of detention was given to the Head of 
State out the fa c t th a t he acted on Cabinet advice did not warrant the 
English analogy of m in is te r ia l re s p o n s ib ility  to be invoked, as the 
advice given could not possibly be questioned. Further, the position  ought 
to have been considered in  the context of clauses (a ) and (b ) of A r t .151 and
s .12(2) o f the Act. Thus, re lian ce  on LIVERSIDGE was, we submit,
8 8
in a p p ro p ria te . As suggested e a r l ie r ,  vesting of power in  the Head of State
was possibly intended to pre-empt challenges grounded on mala fid e s  in  the
ord inary sense and not in  the sp ec ia l sense, as contended in  the in s ta n t  
89case.
6 .76  Proceeding fu r th e r  h is  Lordship re ite ra te d  the d iffe ren ce  more
vigorously and added th a t in  M alaysia the detainee was e n t i t le d  to two
a d d itio n a l safeguards, namely, to  be informed of the “a lle g a tio n s  of
f a c t 1* (which was c o n s t itu t io n a l) ,  and “other p a r t ic u la rs ’^  which was 
90s ta tu to ry ) .  The fa c t th a t the last-m entioned safeguard was p a ten tly
d iscre tio n ary  was, however, ignored. S im ila r ly , the dissent of S a s tr i,  3 . ,
91 92of the Indian Supreme Court in  ATMARAM which h is  Lordship accepted,
besides other cases, held th a t "necessary p a rtic u la rs "  had to be supplied
to  the deta inee. Thus the supposed d iffe ren ce  between the two pos itions
became im m ateria l. The appeal of the dissent of S a s tr i,  3 . ,  was found
93in  the fa c t th a t i t  expressly fo llow ed the l in e  adopted in  HALLIDAY.
6.77 An illu m in a tin g  fea tu re  of h is  Lordship’ s judgment was, however,
to  be found in  the d is tin c tio n  drawn between what he c a lled  "purposes"
94and "grounds". This exercise made eas ier the task of re je c tin g  challenges
based on irre levan cy  of "grounds" and "a lle g a tio n s  of fa c t"  as the
c o n s titu tio n a l p ro tection  extended to these two terms o n ly . In  fa c t  h is
Lordship held th a t the "so -ca lled " discrepancy between the order and the
95grounds did not in v a lid a te  the o rd er. A rts . 5 and 151 as w e ll as s .9
of the In te rn a l Security Act a l l  used the term "ground". By the term 
"purposes" h is  Lordship meant such expressions as "s ec u rity " , "pub lic  order"  
e tc .  used in  s .8 (1 ) (a )  of the Act, which we have p re ferred  to describe as 
the conditions or requirements fo r  the exercise of the power. The Indian  
courts ca lled  them the "objects" of the s ta tu te  but by in s is t in g  on a 
nexus between the "objects" and the "grounds" they extended the scope of the  
c o n s titu tio n a l guarantee le g it im a te ly  fo r  "grounds", we submit, in  c rim in a l
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law, are made up of both fa c tu a l and le g a l elements. When an accused is
to be informed of the grounds of h is  a rres t he is  required  to  be to ld  th a t
he has committed a p a r t ic u la r  th e f t ,  or any other o ffen ce , as the case may
be. However, in  the case of preventive d eten tio n , any challenge based on
vagueness or irre le va n c y  could not be tre a te d  on thB same fo o tin g  in
respect of both "grounds” and "a lle g a tio n s  of fa c t"  in  view of the subjective
nature of the decision of the deta in ing  a u th o rity , u n like  an ordinary
c rim in a l case, as an offence is  judged by o b jective  c r i t e r i a .  The
96d is tin c tio n  between these two terms was indeed properly drawn.
6 .78  I t  was, accordingly, r ig h t ly  held th a t the "vagueness,
in s u ffic ie n c y  or irre le va n c e  of the a lle g a tio n s  of fa c t  supplied do not
97re la te  back to the order of d e te n tio n ."  Indeed, they did not touch the
question as to whether the s a tis fa c tio n  was r e a l ,  fo r  we have already seen
th a t even in  the English wartime cases the scope of in q u iry  by the court up
to th is  po in t was genera lly  adm itted, although an a f f id a v i t  by the M in is te r
was held to be conclusive of the m a tte r. But h is  Lordship*s decis ion ,
fo llo w in g  those cases, th a t the discrepancy between the "grounds" and
"purposes" ought to be considered as one of form only was, we submit,
v io la t iv e  of the s p i r i t  as w e ll as the le t t e r  of A r t .151 of the
C o n s titu tio n . Power to make a detention order was circumscribed by
the A r tic le  which postu la ted , a p r io r i , ju d ic ia l  review o f the exercise
of the power. The C onstitu tio n  undoubtedly clamped re s tr ic t io n s  on the
ju d ic ia l  review of le g is la t io n  v ide A r t .4 genera lly  and P art XI esp e c ia lly
but i t  was not contemplated, we submit, th a t the re s tr ic t io n s  should extend
to the executive acts a ls o . The scope of p ro tection  under the Malaysian
as tke In d ia n .
C onstitu tion  in  th is  respect was almost the sane./ The m a te ria l d iffe ren ce  
between the re levan t provisions of the two C o nstitu tio ns  was in  respect 
of the u ltim a te  8nd not the primary exercise o f the power of detentions  
in  Malaysia the u ltim a te  power rested with the Executive (th e  Yang d i-  
Pertuan Agong) under A r t .1 5 1 (1 ) (b ) , but in  In d ia , with the Advisory Board,
under A r t .2 2 (4 ) (b ) . However, the courts in  the peninsula viewed th is  
d iffe re n ce  in  another perspective which resu lted  in  the two stages being 
pro jected  as one s in g le  process.
6.79 Ignorance o f th is  aspect o f the m atter fig u red  more prominently
in  the judgment of Ong, C .3 .,  which was re fle c te d  in  h is  fo llow ing  
98observations:
English courts take a more r e a l is t ic  view of th in g s , w hile
Indian judges, fo r  whom I  have the highest respect, impress
me as in d e fa tig ab le  id e a lis ts  seeking v a lie n t ly  to reconcile  
the irre c o n c ila b le  whenever good conscience is  pricked by en 
abuse of executive powers.
The other im portant reason which he gave fo r  p re fe rrin g  the English decisions
was "compactness" in  e ith e r  case, meaning perhaps the geographical area
which was fa c tu a lly  correct but had l i t t l e  re levance, in  our submission.
H is reference to the so c ia l s tru c tu re  was, however, we submit, p a ten tly
inapposite  in  th a t the m u lt i - r a c ia l  character of the society even fa c tu a lly
corresponded more to the Indian than to the English society of those days
(1917 and 1939). In  h is  short judgment h is  Lordship simply re fe rre d  to
the LIVERSIDGE case and another English decision and also to  the legacy
of the 1948 Regulations to  dispose of the m atte r.
6 .80  Of the other two judges, G i l l ,  F .3 . spoke almost in  the same vein
save h is  s ig n if ic a n t reference to Lord Atkinson's observations in  respect
99of "preventive ju s tic e "  in  HALLIDAY. A l i ,  F .3 . ,  however, d ea lt with the
m atter a t g reater len g th . Though he re lie d  on the English decisions, he
examined the Indian a u th o ritie s  also and eventually  expressed h is  agreement
with the m inority  views expressed in  the Indian c a s e s . U n f o r t u n a t e ly
he too took a narrow view of A r t .1 5 1 (1 )(a )  by g iv ing  primacy over i t  to
101the provisions of s .8 (1 ) (a )  of the Act. The fa c t  th a t the s ta tu te  
provided fo r  two fu n c tio n a ries  to act c o n jo in tly  could not provide a v a lid  
derogation, we submit, from the c o n s titu tio n a l p ro te c tio n . I t  was not 
fo r  th is  reason, as h is  Lordship appears to suggest, th a t the order should 
embody a r e c i t a l  of the "objects" in d ica ted  in  the s ta tu te . The r e c i ta l  
was im portant, as we have submitted e a r l ie r ,  to enable .the courts to see
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i f  the executive had acted w ith in  the scope of the pouter conferred on i t ,
102which was the purport of A r t.1 5 1 (1 ) ( a ) .
6.81 I t  is  tru e  th a t the emergency le g is la t io n  in  the peninsula
fo llow ed a tough l in e  a l l  through and the 1960 Act, by using the expression
" s a t is f ie d ” adopted the scheme of the 1939 Defence Regulations of the
United Kingdom d e lib e ra te ly  on the expectation th a t the Malaysian courts
would fo llo w  the English wartime decis ions. U nfortunate ly  th is  expectation
103was founded on a wrong premise fo r ,  as we have submitted e a r l ie r ,  the
c o n s titu tio n a l p ro tec tio n  provided in  the Indian C onstitu tio n  was based
on the m inority  view expressed by Lord Atkin in  LIVERSIDGE and in  th is
respect the Malaysian provisions were on the same fo o tin g . Secondly, i t
has also been shown th a t even in  England Lord A tkin*s  m inority  view has
104now come to p re v a il .  These two im portant considerations were to t a l ly  
overlooked by the Malaysian Federal Court in  the above case and u n fo rtu n a te ly , 
as we s h a ll p resently  see, the Singapore courts also genera lly  fo llow ed  
the same l in e .  To th is  m ischief the m in o rity  view in  the Indian decisions  
d e f in ite ly  contributed a great deal but th a t position  ha3 to be examined 
in  the appropriate context. Most probably the " r e a l i t ie s "  of te rro rism  
in M alaysia as in  Northern Ire la n d , had im perceptib ly  in fluenced  the  
ju d ic ia ry ; the Indian s itu a t io n , fo r tu n a te ly , did not c a l l  fo r  such an 
approach. As we have seen the Malayan Communist Party was associated with 
"terro rism " and in  the in s ta n t case i t  was alleged th a t the appellan t was 
a member o f the P arty .
6 .82  I t  is  in te re s tin g  to note th a t in  an e a r l ie r  Singapore case,
105Re: CHOP 3EE 3ENG, under the Preservation of Public  Safety Ordinance 
1955, a s im ila r  view was expressed re ly in g  on the decision in  LIVERSIDGE. 
Indeed, in  the preceding paragraph we had a n tic ip a ted  such a course in  
respect o f the emergency laws of the peninsula as a whole. The Chief 
Secretary in  h is  a f f id a v it  in  the in s ta n t case had stated  th a t the fa c ts  
of the case were placed before the Governor who had considered the m atter
and was s a t is f ie d  th a t  the d e te n tio n  o f the p ris o n e r was necessary. The
court re jec ted  the p riso n er's  contention th a t the a f f id a v it  showed no
ground on which the s a tis fa c tio n  was based. I t  was held th a t the grounds
having been supplied to the p riso ner, on h is  own admission, he had fa i le d
to  show th a t there were no grounds end the court was not bound to draw
an in ference against the deta in ing  a u th o rity . The decis ion , however, had
one im portant aspect in  th a t i t  infused a meaningful content in to  the scope
of the "appeal" provided under s .5, a f te r  having observed th a t the "subjective
te s t"  had handicapped the court in  granting the w r it  of habeas corpus. I t
appears to have suggested th a t the Tribunal could go in to  fa c ts  in  the
appeal. The challenge to  the v ire s  grounded on the e x t r a - t e r r i t o r ia l
operation of the Ordinance m anifested in  s .3 (1 ) ,  also fa i le d .  The court
re fe rre d  to the le g is la t iv e  powers conferred on the Governor by s .52 of the
106Singapore O rder-in -C ouncil 1955 and observed:
s .3(1) provides fo r  pu b lic  security  and aims at stamping out 
a c t iv i t ie s  p re ju d ic ia l to pu b lic  safety  carried  on in  the 
Federation of Malaya and the Colony by a subversive organis­
ation operating in  both t e r r i t o r ie s .  . . i t  is  fo r  peace,
order aid good government. . .
6 .8 3  A post-independence decision of a Singapore court however
provides a re fresh in g  co n tra s t. In LIM HOCK SIElii and others v MINISTER OF
107INTERIOR AND DEFENCE, the court allowed the ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus
by s ix  detainees. They were o r ig in a lly  detained under the same 1955
Ordinance but subsequently orders were passed under s .8(1 A) of the In te rn a l
Security  Act 1960. The orders were signed by the Permanent Secretary to
the M in is try  and were in  the fo llo w in g  terms:
Whereas the President is  s a t is f ie d . . . Now th ere fo re  in  the 
exercise of powers conferred on me under s .8(1 A ). . . be 
deta ined. . . the M in is te r  hereby d ire c ts . . . be detained  
. . . fo r  a fu r th e r  period o f two years , [emphasis added]
108I t  was held as fo llo w s:
The f iv e  orders or d ire c tio n s  complained of in  th is  ap p lica tio n  
were ex f  acie not made under the hand of the President nor 
were they in  compliance with s . 34 o f the In te rp re ta t io n  Act.
They were not even signed by a M in is te r . On the face of 
the f iv e  orders the M in is te r  s p e c if ic a lly  purports to 
exercise the power conferred by s .8(1 A) and as I  have stated  
above no powers are conferred on the M in is te r by s .8(1 A ). . .
E a r l ie r  in  the judgment the court held th a t power to  continue detention under
s .8(1 A) of the Act was conferred on the President only and th a t even under
s . 8 ( 1 ) ( a )  the making of the order of detention was "merely performance of an
ad m in is tra tive  function  in  compliance with the executive decision of the
P res id en t" . Relying on the GREENE case the court observed th a t habeas corpus
w i l l  issue when an order which is  produced as a ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  the
detention of a person is  bad on i t s  face .
6 .84  I t  was also contended by the prisoners th a t the orders were 
m otivated by bad fa i th  on the part of the Government as the prisoners  
belonged to the opposition p a r ty . In  re je c tin g  the contention the court 
observed
. . . [the a p p lic a n t] must not only show th a t the courts are 
e n t i t le d  to enquire in to  the good fa ith  or otherwise of the  
P res iden t. . . but assuming the courts are so e n t it le d , he 
must also a llege  and prove th a t the President and not some 
one else had acted mala f id e  in  d ire c tin g  th a t he be deta ined. . .
The observation th a t the mala f id e  of the au th o rity  could be a ju s t ic ia b le
issue is  another re fres h in g ly  novel aspect of the case which, however,
appears to overlook the fa c t  th a t under the C onstitu tion  the President was
bound to act on the advice of the Cabinet. However, by using the expression
"the President and not some one e lse" , the court appears to fo llo w  the
s ta tu to ry  provision l i t e r a l l y  to  m aintain the lo g ic  and co n tin u ity  o f i t s
decision cn the f i r s t  p o in t. In  the in s tan t case the  contention of mala
f id e  being based on m alice of fa c t ,  namely in  the ordinary sense of the word,
the observation was s ig n if ic a n t in  th a t i t  purported to defeat the ob ject 
110of A r t .151. The issue in  th is  form does not appear to  have been ra ised
in the other cases.
6 .85  The Malaysian court re lie d  on th is  decision in  S00 KUA v
111PUBLIC PROSECUTOR. The appellan t in  th is  case was convicted of breach
of the co n d itio n  o f the " r e s t r ic t io n  o rd er"  which was o r ig in a l ly  passed
under s .8 (1 ) (b )  but la t e r  extended under s .8(1A ) of the Act. The order
was expressed in  terms id e n tic a l to those of the order passed in  the
Singapore case (" th e  M in is te r hereby d ire c ts " ) .  I t  was held th a t,
although A r t .5 had to be read in  the context of A r t .1 4 9 (1 ), th a t did not
"imply th a t there  should not be any s t r ic t  adherence and due compliance
112with the provisions of the In te rn a l Security A c t."  A "d ire c tio n "
from the Yang d i-Pertuan Agong was a "p re -re q u is ite "  but there was nothing
in  the order to  th a t e f fe c t .  Nor did the prosecution evidence prove the
fa c t .  In  the order i t  was s tated  th a t i t  was made by the M in is te r "in the
113exercise of the powers conferred on him under s .8(1A ) of the A ct."
The ins is tence on " s t r ic t "  adherence which apparently emenated from a fresh  
appraisa l of the tru e  in te n t and purport of the re le v an t provisions of the  
C onstitu tio ns was indeed s ig n if ic a n t in  th a t i t  corresponded to the Indian  
view.
6 . 8 6  However, in  a la te r  Singapore case, the decision in  the KARAM SINGH
case ( supra) was extens ive ly  discussed and the p r in c ip le  based on the
n o n -a p p lic a b ility  of the Indian decisions was carried  fu r th e r  -  a step
114 115which has been r ig h t ly  c r it ic is e d .  This was the case of LEE MAU SENG.
The ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus by the prisoner was re je c te d . He was
arrested and held in  po lice  custody fo r  21 days before the  order of
detention under s .8 (1 ) (a )  of the i960 Act was served on him. He was
refused consu ltation with h is  lawyer w hile in  po lice  custody. £n the
"grounds of detention" he was charged with d ire c tin g  the paper he managed
in such a way as amounted to "glamourising communism" and " s t ir r in g  up
communalistic and c h au v in is tic  sentiments over Chinese language, education
aid c u ltu re"  but in  the order the "purposes" were s tated  in  the a lte rn a tiv e ,
as was done in  KARAM SINGH, in  which a plea of "mala f id e " was s im ila r ly
founded. The a d d itio n a l contention in  th is  case was v io la t io n  of A r t .5 (3 )
re s u ltin g  from the d en ia l of le g a l counsel. This was upheld but i t  was
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observed th a t habeas corpus was not the appropriate remedy. On the scope of
s .74 ( s .73 in  M a lays ia ), the court observed:
I t  is  d is tu rb in g  to  hear a submission. . . t h a t  the  
le g is la tu re  by enacting s .74 . . . must have intended  
to deprive a person of a fundamental l ib e r t y ,  namely, 
r ig h t to consult a law yer, so as to  enable a po lice  
o f f ic e r  acting under preventive detention powers to  
b e tte r  carry out in q u ir ie s . . . fo r  detention under 
s . 8 . . .
Indeed, the provision did envisage the fa c tu a l pos ition  in d ica ted  by the
116court which we have pointed out e a r l ie r .  The lim ite d  safeguard of A rt.
5 (3 ) conceded by the co u rt, as proved by the decision in  the in s ta n t case,
could not e f fe c t iv e ly  check i t s  fa r-re ac h in g  consequences.
6.B7 In  dealing with the second contention the court r e lie d  on
the decisions in  KARAM SINGH and Ex p. LEES to  hold th a t the r e c i t a l  in
the order s t r ic t ly  fo llow ed the language of s .8(1 ) and th a t the Act did
not prescribe any p a r t ic u la r  form fo r  the o rder. An a d d itio n a l im portant
d is tin c tio n  in  the Ind ian  c o n s titu tio n a l provision was found in  the fa c t
th a t the decision of the advisory board was binding on the government in
In d ia  but not in  M alays ia . The r ig h t of making representations being
guaranteed in  both cases, i t  is  not understood how, i f  the Singapore court
had fo llow ed the Indian court and in s is te d  on ensuring th a t the detainee
was able to  exercise th is  r ig h t e f fe c t iv e ly ,  i t  would be "wholly
117in co n sis ten t with the scheme o f the Act", as the court h e ld . On the
other hand i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to agree with the opinion th a t in  In d ia  the
courts held "vagueness" of the ground to be f a t a l  by applying common law
118p rin c ip le s  o f n a tu ra l ju s t ic e .  In  fa c t the learned commentator has
him self conceded th a t the term "law" of A r t .21 was construed to mean
119"enacted law" and to exclude common law . The Indian courts re a lis e d  
the pos ition  th a t i t  was the duty of the courts to lay down norms which 
could ensure e ffe c t iv e  exercise of the c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t in  the absence of 
s p e c ific  s ta tu to ry  norms. A s im ila r  exercise by the courts in  e ith e r  
Singapore or M alaysia would not have run counter to  e ith e r  s ta tu to ry  or
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c o n s t itu t io n a l p ro v is io n s .
6 . 8 8  The im portant po in t which does not appear to  have been noticed
so fa r  in  any quarter is  th a t in  both In d ia  and the peninsula, u n like
England under the wartime re g u la tio n s , the C onstitu tio ns provided fo r  a
two-stage process fo r  preventive d e ten tio n . In  so fa r  as the  exercise of
the primary power of detention was concerned there  was l i t t l e  d iffe ren ce
between the two C o n stitu tio n s , but by p u ttin g  a narrow construction on
A r t .1 5 1 (1 ) ( b )  th e  c o u rts  in  thB  p e n in s u la  came to  ig n o re  th e  two
1 2 0separate stages of the process. The exercise of th is  power was, ja 
p r io r i , l ia b le  to  be tes ted  by the doctrine of u l t r a  v ir e s . Th is  was 
what the Ind ian  courts did but the courts in  Singapore, as in  the in s ta n t  
case and those in  M alaysia, as in  KARAM SINGH, were h e s ita n t to  do so, by 
d is tin g u ish in g  what they c a lle d  "purposes" from "grounds" and at the sane 
time ignoring  the im portant nexus between the two, and a lso , as we s h a ll see, 
by c o n s tr ic tin g  the anbit and scope of A r t .1 5 1 (1 ) (b ) .
1 2 16.89 In  UEE TOON LIP and others v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS. SINGAPORE,
fo u r persons applied fo r  habeas corpus on the grounds th a t they had been 
held in  detention continuously fo r  over nine years and fo r  the la s t few 
months they had been detained a t the c e n tra l p o lice  lock-up under 
abnormal and p u n itive  cond itions, which was alleged to  be "improper" and to  
have resu lted  in  the "greatest abuse of power". The court held  th a t the  
power to  d e ta in , the place of detention and the manner thereo f were a l l  
provided in  the Act. The prisoners had fa i le d  to prove the v io la t io n  of any 
provision of the Act. I t  was also held th a t lack of good fa i th  ("im proper") 
was not a ju s t ic ia b le  issue, re ly in g  on LEE MAU SENG ( supra) . The challenge  
to the " s a tis fa c tio n "  of the President in  making orders fo r  extended 
detention under s . 8(1 A) also fa i le d .  The court held th a t the fa c t  th a t the  
impugned orders were passed a f te r  cance lling  the e a r l ie r  order did not 
v i t ia t e  h is  " s a t is fa c t io n .
6 .90  A case of detention under the Emergency (P u b lic  Order and
122Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 1969 cane before a High Court in  
M alays ia  in  YEAP HOCK SENG v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS, 1 2 3  in  an 
a p p lic a tio n  fo r  habeas corpus by fo u r persons. The prisoners were 
o r ig in a l ly  charged with murder in  ordinary c rim in a l proceedings. A fter 
t h e i r  discharge they were immediately apprehended and were detained fo r  two 
years under the Ordinance. In  the order i t  was a lleged th a t they had 
taken part in  c rim in a l a c t iv i t ie s  as members of a group of fishermen who 
were engaged in  such a c t iv i t ie s .  The court held th a t the burden of proving 
la w fu l detention was on the respondent and was discharged by the production  
of th e  order, and th a t i t  was fo r  the  detainee to show th a t the power 
under the Ordinance was exercised mala f id e .  Reliance was placed on the 
Ind ian  cases in  which i t  was held th a t the mere existence of suspicious 
circumstances was no proof of mala f id e ; nor was the  fa c t  th a t there were 
c rim in a l proceedings pending. I t  was held th a t the ’'ob ject and ambit" of 
the Ordinance was such, end the "purposes" sp ec ified  in  s .4 (1 ) thereof 
was so "wide", th a t the r ig h t to claim t r i a l  or the  protection  of 
ord inary law in  preference to preventive detention was "negated". Mere 
circumvention of the ordinary process of law did not co n stitu te  mala 
f id e .  One of the encouraging aspects o f the decision was th a t i t  upheld 
the  r ig h t  to apply fo r  habeas corpus notw ithstanding the r ig h t to make
representation  and the pendency th e re o f.
1246.91 In TAN BOON LI AT. another case under the Ordinance, the scope
of A r t .1 5 1 (1 )(b ) came to be considered against the background of KARAM SINGH 
( supra) . The p riso n er, in  h is  a p p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus, contended 
th a t the provisions of the A r t ic le  having been v io la te d  fo r  non-submission, 
w ith in  three months, o f the recommendation by the Advisory Board, the  
detention had become u n law fu l. In  re je c tin g  the contention the court held  
th a t on the date o f the ap p lica tio n  the v a lid  detention order was in  force  
and there fo re  the detention was le g a l notw ithstanding the la te  submission 
of the recommendation, s .6 (1 ) of the Ordinance, corresponding to s .12(1)
of the 1960 Act, provided th a t the Board ’’s h a ll w ith in  three  months" 
consider the representation  and make recommendation thereon. This  
provision appears to  have been held as d ire c to ry , being "procedural". I t  
was observed th a t from the "p rin c ip le s  in s p ir in g  the judgment" in  KARAM SINGH, 
the "substantive r ig h ts "  of a detained person, under ss. 4, 5 and 6  of the  
Ordinance could be " d is t i l l e d " .  The r ig h t  claimed was not considered as
one o f the "substantive" r ig h ts , which were l is te d  in  the judgment.
125The court observed:
. . .  I f  these r ig h ts  have been accorded to the detenu and 
subsequent to  th is  on the d ire c tio n  of the Yang di-Pertuan  
Agong the detention order is  confirmed and r a t i f ie d  then the 
detention is  le g a l and no m ischief has been done to s .6 . . . 
or A r t . 151. . .
6 .92  The same question was ag ita ted  before another High Court in
M alaysia in  SUBRAMANIAM v MEIMTRI HAL EHWAL PELEM NEGERI. 1 2 6  I t  was held  
th a t the courts should in te r fe re  only in  those cases when any " re a l and 
substantive r ig h t guaranteed by the C o n stitu tio n " was in fr in g e d . The court 
must not be blinded by " le g a l n ic e tie s "  le s t th e ir  approach to the issue  
becomes " u n re a lis t ic " . I t  was he ld , we submit erroneously, th a t the r ig h t  
conferred under s .6 (1 ) was wider in  ambit than th a t conferred by A r t .1 5 1 (1 )( b ) . 
Following the lin e  adopted in  TAN BOON LAIT ( supra) , which was expressly  
re fe rre d  to , i t  was held th a t the A rtic le  merely guaranteed consideration of 
representation  and submission o f recommendation thereon and th a t i t  did not 
lay down any tim e l im it  as in  s .6 (1 ) .  As in  the other case, no importance 
was attached to the words "unless" and "threB months" occurring in  the 
A r t ic le .  The court fa i le d  to appreciate the consequences or m ischief 
th a t was bound to fo llo w  i f  the A r t ic le  was so construed as to exclude the
127requirement of t im e - l im it .  Th is  is  re fle c te d  in  the fo llo w in g  observation:
. . . mere non-compliance with the d irec to ry  p ro v is io n , 
so long as the advisory board considers the representation  
and makes i t s  recommendation, should n o t, I  th in k , render 
unlawful a detention le g a lly  made, [emphasis addedj
The court appears to have overlooked the fa c t th a t such a course would render
the pro tection  of the A rt ic le  hollow  and i l lu s o r y .  I t  was possible to
postpone, i f  such course was fo llow ed , the "consideration" and 
’tecommendation" u n t i l  the la s t day of the d eten tion .
6 .9 3  Apparently, the lo g ic a l conclusion th a t follow ed from the la s t  
two decisions was th a t any challenge grounded on the v io la t io n  of
A r t .1 5 1 (1 )(b ) was l ia b le  to f a i l  fo r  i t  would always be open to the
State to contend th a t the p o s s ib il ity  of the r ig h t  being given e f fe c t
to  exis ted  u n t i l  the la s t day of the deten tion . Another im portant
consequence th a t follow ed from the two decisions was th a t the ro le  of
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong became a subsidiary one. He was to  merely
"confirm and r a t i f y "  the M in is te r ’ s o rd er. This was v io la t iv e  of the
s p i r i t  of A r t .151. The A r t ic le ,  as we have already subm itted, circumscribed
the power of the M in is te r in  two ways: in  clause (a ) the perm issible
"objects" or "purposes" were sp ec ified  and in  clause 1 (b ) the requirement
of t im e - l im it  acted as a check on h is  powers. The A r t ic le  vested the
"u ltim a te" power of detention in the Yang di-Pertuan Agong but the
decisions projected the "prim ary" power of the M in is te r  as the "u ltim ate"
power. No doubt clause 1 (b ) which in  i t s  o r ig in a l form corresponded
verbatim to A r t .2 2 (4 ) (a )  of the Ind ian  C o n s titu tio n , was amended, the
e ffe c t  of the amendment, we submit, was misconstrued. I t  merely
tra n s fe rre d  the "u ltim a te "  power from the hands of the Advisory Board
to  the Yang di-Pertuan Agong; i t  did not abolish the two stages to vest
plenary powers in  the "a u th o rity "  contemplated under any "law or
Ordinance". This position  was in  fa c t recognised in  the new sub-s.(2A )
of s .5 o f the 1969 Ordinance which extended, but did not ab o lish , the
1 28c o n s titu tio n a l t im e - l im it  of three months.
1296.94  In PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v MUSA, the court allowed an appeal
against a c q u itta l and ordered r e t r i a l  of the charge of contravention of a 
" re s tr ic t io n  order" passed under s .8 (1 ) (b )  of the 1960 Act. I t  was held  
th a t the t r i a l  court had wrongly tre a te d  a person under preventive  
detention as an offender and a " re s tr ic t io n  order" as a punishment fo r  the  
same o ffen ce . The accused in  th is  case was in "detention" under an order
passed under s . 8  (1 ) (a )  of the Act when the order under clause (b ) was 
passed and he was released despite h is  re fu s a l to  execute the "bond". 
U nfortunate ly  i t  does not c le a r ly  emerge from the fa c ts  stated in  the 
judgment as to  whether the impugned order was passed on the expiry or 
during the currency of the order of d e ten tio n . In  the la t t e r  case the 
contention th a t the order was in v a lid ,  as the M in is te r  had become functus  
o f f ic io  a f te r  passing the order under clause ( a ) ,  ought to p re v a il ,  fo r  the 
provisions of s . 1 0  fo r  suspending such order on conditions would otherwise  
become o tio s e . A subsequent " re s tr ic t io n  order" cannot re la te  back to the 
s itu a tio n  obtain ing at the date of the passing of the "detention order"  
on which the "s a tis fa c tio n "  of the M in is te r was based. The court of course 
held th a t the passing of an order under clause (b) would requ ire  "fresh  
s a t is fa c tio n " .
6.^5 A b r ie f  reference may be made now to  the Privy Council decision in
130PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v PIE HEE KOI e t c . , in  which the decision in  a group
of appeals from the Malaysian Federal Court on the question of the extension
of the pro tection  of the Geneva Convention to the persons taking  part in  the
"Indonesian C onfrontation" was challenged. The accused persons were
Malaysian Chinese who had been convicted of various charges under the
provisions of the 1960 Act and had been sentenced to death. The Federal
Court had, in  001 HEE KOI and 001 WAN YUI v PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, 1 3 1  upheld
the contention of two of the accused th a t they were e n t i t le d  to be tre a te d
as Prisoners-of-W ar in  accordance with A r t .4 of the Geneva Convention. In
the Privy Council the contention was re je c te d . I t  was held th a t the
protection  did not extend to n a tio n a ls  or to those who "owed a duty of
a lleg iance" to the deta in ing  power. In the context of the development th a t
has since taken place in  th is  p a r t ic u la r  f ie ld  of In te rn a t io n a l law, which
132we have already discussed, i t  is  submitted th a t the decision is  not now 
l ik e ly  to be considered as good law.
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Conclusion
6.96 Having analysed at some length the re levan t provisions of the
d if fe re n t  enactments and of the C onstitu tions and also the case-law of the
two S ta tes , we are now in  a position  to  say th a t although, at present,
te rro rism  is  probably not so much a l iv e  issue there as i t  is  in  Northern
Ire la n d  or as i t  was there i t s e l f  between 1948 and 1960 or 1963, the
ju d ic ia l  approach in  the peninsula is  s t i l l  marked by an unsparing anxiety
fo r  the " in te rn a l s ec u rity "  of what has been described as "an insecurely
133based m u lt i - r a c ia l  S ta te ."  On the other hand we have also found th a t the  
provisions of the emergency laws in  the peninsula were, with minor 
exceptions, almost s im ila r  in  extent and scope to those of Northern  
Ire la n d . But they were possibly not enforced there  in  such a perverted  
and in v id io u s  manner as to  give r is e  to complaints of gross and serious  
v io la tio n s  of d if fe re n t  aspects of the r ig h t of personal l ib e r t y ,  as 
happened in  Northern Ire la n d . Notice has however to be taken of the  
d iffe ren ce  in  the fa c tu a l s itu a tio n  obta in ing  in  the two te r r i t o r ie s  
appertain ing mainly to the type of the g u e r il la  a c t iv i t ie s  and to the 
nature of the p o l i t ic a l  problems.
6.97 Another aspect o f c o n s titu tio n a l development v is -a -v is  ju d ic ia l  
approach to problems of personal l ib e r ty  in  the peninsula has to  be 
adequately emphasized. The two s ta tes  have fo llow ed the Indian example and 
have provided fo r  preventive detention as a peacetime or permanent measure 
by amending the C onstitu tio n  which, a lb e it ,  was not "autochthonous" in
thB true sense. This is  an exception to the general pos ition  obta in ing  in  
the New Commonwealth: in  A fr ic a , as we s h a ll see, the "autochthonous" 
C onstitu tions generally  maintained the position  obta in ing  under the  
Independence C onstitu tio ns and preventive detention is  provided, fo llo w in g  
the English example, as an"emergency" measure. Notwithstanding the  
d iffe ren ce  in  the c o n s titu tio n a l position  the ju d ic ia l  approach in  the two 
states is  strongly in fluenced by the English wartime cases and as a re s u lt  the 
c o n s titu tio n a l provisions have been narrowly construed. I t  is  to  be
noted th a t even in  the case where the p e t it io n e r  was successful
( Lira HOCK SIEW) ,  the  ra tio n a le  was provided by an English wartime
case. On the other hand, the le g is la tu re  in  M alaysia appears to
have fo llow ed the Ind ian  P arliam ent, a lb e it  with one s ig n if ic a n t
d iffe re n c e . In In d ia , although A rt. 359 of the C onstitu tio n  was amended
in  1975, the c o n s titu tio n a l remedy of habeas corpus was not expressly
excluded. I t  is  true  th a t the m a jo rity  decision of the Indian Supreme
Court in  the HABEAS CORPUS case (supra) did not recognise th is  fa c t  and
held to  the contrary , a lb e it  on the basis of the e x is tin g  unamended
pro v is io n s . In  M alaysia, the c o n s titu tio n a l amendment of 1976, however,
expressly denied the c o n s titu tio n a l remedy (the  pro tection  of a r t .  5) to
134p o l i t ic a l  deta inees. With i t s  tra d it io n  of ju d ic ia l  re s tra in t  the
Malaysian court was l ik e ly  to fo llo w  the m a jo rity  decision of the
Indian Supreme Court in  in te rp re t in g  the new provision although such
an opportunity does not appear to have arisen so f a r .  M alaysia, l ik e
In d ia , is  committed to " n e o -lib e ra l"  democratic tra d it io n  but the
"value-process" apparently operated there at a l l  le v e ls  in  a more
b iza rre  fashion owing possibly to  the precarious ra c ia l  balance. In
Pakistan and Bangladesh the society  was more homogeneous and there the
135"value-process" th ere fo re  operated more s a t is fa c to r i ly .
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C hapter 7
EMERGENCY PROVISIONS UNDER LEGISLATION: AFRICA
I . Personal L ib erty  and C o lon ia l Rule 
(1 ) The C o lon ia l C o n s titu t io n a lis m 1
7.1 Whether i t  was a 'colony* or a 'p ro te c to ra te ' or a m ixture of
the two, the c o n s titu tio n a l s ta tus  of a B r it is h  possession in  A fr ic a  was
no guide to the search fo r  'c o n s titu tio n a lis m ' in  any p a r t ic u la r
t e r r i t o r y .  Everywhere, as has been suggested, 'ru le  by decrees was a
1
c o n s titu tio n a l p o s s ib i l i t y ' ,  which continued u n t i l  independence. This
p o s s ib il ity  apparently sprang from what has been termed as 'two great
p r in c ip le s  of subord ination ' -  of the le g is la tu re  to the executive in
the colony and of the c o lo n ia l government to the im p eria l government -
which are , i t  has been asserted, "inherent in  the modern B r it is h  tra d it io n
2
of c o lo n ia l government."
7 .2  I t  may sound strange th a t even sm all is lands in  the Caribbean 
have had a long and continuous h is to ry  of rep resen ta tive  government by 
v ir tu e  of which they enjoyed immunity from the le g is la t iv e  a u th o rity  of
3
the B r it is h  Crown. On the other hand, in  not a s ing le  A frican
possession (except Southern Rhodesia) was there  any 're p re s e n ta tiv e  
4le g is la tu re ' w ith in  the meaning of the C o lo n ia l Laws V a l id ity  Act 
which could, by v ir tu e  o f s .5 of the Act, a l t e r  i t s  own "c o n s titu tio n , 
power and procedure". Of course, s . 2 would even then have ensured the  
continued supremacy of the Im p eria l Parliam ent and, th e re fo re , on the  
attainm ent of independence i t  had to be provided th a t the Act would cease 
to apply to  the t e r r i t o r y .  In  the la s t re s o r t , th e re fo re , the B r it is h  
subjects in  the dependencies could depend only on the good sense 
of the law-makers at Westminster. This p o s ition  was d e f in ite ly  a lte re d  
when the B r it is h  Settlem ents Acts of 1887 and 1945 and the Foreign  
J u ris d ic tio n  Acts 1890 and 1913 were enacted. The ad m in is tra to rs  at 
W hitehall obtained a g reater say thereunder a id  i t  is  a notorious
fa c t  th a t the expediency of the c o lo n ia l p o licy  came to p re v a il over a l l  
other considerations. Needless to  say th a t to entrench and perpetuate  
c o lo n ia l ru le  was the  main plcnk of the p o licy  which could hardly ensure 
personal freedom fo r  the subject in  the dependencies.
7 .3 .  However, i t  has to  be mentioned th a t by the Orders in  Council
made under the enactments re fe rre d  to  above, the ru le s  of English
Common Law and the S tatutes o f "general a p p lic a tio n "  were introduced in to
East A fr ic a ; in  the C entra l and West African colonies the seme re s u lt
was achieved by lo c a l s ta tu te s . Besides, 'Supreme Courts' or 'High
Courts* were set up, with powers and ju r is d ic t io n  s im ila r  to those
exercised by the 'High Court of J u s tic e ' in  England. These measures
could have been expected to f irm ly  e s tab lish  the 'Rule of Law' as in
England, but events took another tu rn . What tran sp ired  in  r e a l i ty
5has been ap tly  described in  the fo llo w in g  words:
The laws themselves assert vigorously and em phatically  
the executive supremacy g iv ing  vast d is c re tio n a ry , even 
a rb it ra ry , powers to o f f ic i a ls .  The courts play a 
minimal ro le  in  the c o n s titu tio n a l system, there  being 
few lim ita t io n s  on the exercise of power.
7 .4  We would n o t, however, remain s a t is f ie d  by blaming only the
laws enacted in  the dependencies fo r  the p e c u lia r  brand of
co n stitu tio n a lism  th a t developed in  c o lo n ia l A fr ic a . I t  is  to be
noticed th a t although in  the beginning both le g is la t iv e  and executive
functions were combined in  the person o f the Governor, when a le g is la tu re
was estab lish ed , the form ula, as applied  elsewhere, contemplated th a t i t
had to make laws fo r  the "peace, order and good government" of the
t e r r i t o r y .  An a rb itra ry  and despotic government could not be a "good
government" in  the best tra d it io n s  of B r it is h  ju s t ic e .  U n fortunate ly  the
6formula came to bB regarded as a term of a r t  and /  re s u lt was th a t i t  
merely buttressed the c o lo n ia l p o licy  in d ica ted  e a r l ie r .  I t  was 
conveniently fo rgo tten  th a t ju d ic ia l  review of subsid iary le g is la t io n  
and executive action has always been a p art of B r it is h  ju s tic e ; th a t the
judges in  England wielded considerable power to  co n tro l the exercise  
of d iscre tio n ary  power by in te rp re t in g  s ta tu te s  impinging upon the 
l ib e r ty  of the person in  a manner consonant with the common law 
presumption of in v io la b i l i t y  of the l ib e r ty  o f the su b jec t.
7 .5 .  I t  is  tru e  th a t the ju d ic ia ry  as w e ll as the  le g a l profession
in  A fr ic a  was almost wholly e x p a tr ia te  but in  In d ia  as we have seen, the  
e a rly  B r it is h  judges and lawyers a lik e  displayed a d if fe re n t  temper so th a t 
long before independence, although th e ir  number had dwindled to a
7n e g lig ib le  few, the tra d it io n  of ju d ic ia l  review was firm ly  es tab lish ed .
In  East and C entra l A fr ic a , in  t e r r i to r ie s  of white settlem en t, the 
s e t t le r s ' in fluence might w e ll have contributed  to the course of 
development but even in  West A fr ic a , ra th e r s u rp ris in g ly , ua f in d  the 
development of ad m in is tra tive  law not reaching an advanced stage. I t  
is  th ere fo re  d i f f i c u l t  to understand the reasons fo r  the d if fe re n t  ju d ic ia l  
approach th a t was found to p re v a il in  A fr ic a . Could i t  be the lack of
g
opportunity or the stance of " c iv i l is in g "  the continent ?
7 .6  The B r it is h  generally  adopted 'In d ire c t  Rule* in  A fr ic a  although
g
there ie re  lo c a l v a r ia tio n s ; th is  was wholly u n like  the Indian s itu a t io n .  
The system e v id en tly  provided less opportunity fo r  a d ire c t confrontation  
between the in d iv id u a l and the c e n tra l a d m in is tra tio n . This not only 
mads l i t ig a t io n  scanty but people, by h a b it ,  less l i t ig io u s .  Otherwise, 
too , the Africans were perhaps in h eren tly  less l i t ig io u s ,  as the 
t r a d it io n a l  le g a l system which, u n like  the In d ian , was not only not
10superseded but fo rm ally  allowed a p a r a l le l  ro le , discouraged l i t ig a t io n .
D iffe re n t reasons, however, have to be a ttr ib u te d  to the  period of the
Mau Mau movement in  Kenya which, as we s h a ll see, resembled the s itu a tio n
11in  Northern Ire la n d . Reasons app licab le  in  the case of Northern
12Ire la n d  would th ere fo re  apply in  the case of Kenya a lso . Whatever may 
be the reasons, however, we s h a ll soon see th a t the case-law in  A fr ic a , 
with the exception perhaps of Zambia, not only in  the c o lo n ia l period but
even in  th a t of the independence era, is  s ig n a lly  d e fic ie n t in  bulk and 
a lso , g e n era lly , in  le g a l exposition , in  proportion to the population, the 
t e r r i t o r i a l  expanse and the degree of a rb itra ry  powers, conceded in  law 
end exercised in  fa c t .  This ju d ic ia l  in a c t iv i ty ,  we submit, represents  
one of the g la rin g  aspects of the co lo n ia l co n stitu tio n a lism  and i t s  
legacy, in  A fr ic a .
7 .7  The attempt to adopt the stance of " le g a lity "  was yet another
aspect of the process, a lb e it as well-known and tested  a method used in  
the peninsula of Malaya and also in  Northern Ire la n d  to a tta in  
' le g it im a c y 1 w hile  governing without consensus. This argument, we have
13already shown, applied with greater strength to the s itu a tio n  in  A fr ic a .
I t  was a common fea tu re  of co lon ia l co n stitu tio n s  th a t the  Governor's  
enormous d ire c t and in d ire c t powers of veto , d isallow ance, reservation  
and le g is la t io n  remained undiminished u n t i l  independence. However, the  
scope of the power cane to be considered as in s u ff ic ie n t  to  meet 
•emergency' s itu a tio n s  -  s ituations  in which laws could be made in  
derogation of fundamental p rin c ip les  of B r it is h  ju s tic e  embodied in  the 
provisions of the Magna Carta and habeas corpus which forbade such 
measures as detention without t r i a l .  As we have seen, the B r it is h
14Parliam ent had enacted special measures during the two world wars.
For the dependencies a s im ila r process was fo llow ed and the Emergency 
Powers Order in  Council 1939 and the Emergency Powers (C o lo n ia l Defence) 
Order in  Council 1939 were enacted which we s h a ll soon examine. But 
what stood out as the most s ig n if ic a n t s tra in  of the A frican brand of the  
c o lo n ia l constitu tiona lism  was the in troduction  of the concept of 
'd ep o rta tio n ' infused with a p o l i t ic a l  bias as an element of c o n s titu tio n a l 
power in East and Central A frica; and everywhere, includ ing  West A fr ic a ,  
deportation was provided fo r in  lo c a l s ta tu tes  as w e ll, in  a v a r ie ty  of 
forms. This we propose to examine f i r s t .
Cl
( 2) “D eporta tion 11 Laws
7 .8  The e a r lie s t  'c o n s titu e n t1 document to introduce the concept 
of "deporta tion" was perhaps the A fr ic a  Order in  C ouncil, 1889, which 
app lied  to "the continent of A fric a "  ( a r t . 4 ) .  P art X I I I  (a r ts  1 02 -3 ), 
captioned "Deportation and Removal" contemplated "deportation  fo rth w ith "  
on th e  orders of the court o f any person to  any of the prescribed  
A frican  possessions or other parts  of the dominions in  d e fa u lt of 
fu rn is h in g  s e c u rity , when a person was " e ith e r  convicted of any offence"  
or charged with such conduct as was " l ik e ly  to  produce or e x c ite  breach 
of the peace". The only check besides i t s  ju d ic ia l  exercise appeared
in  the form of a subsequent rep o rt to the Secretary of S ta te . L a te r, 
the  requirement of "breach o f the peace" acquired a p o s it iv e ly  p o l i t ic a l
colour and came to  be stated in  1902 in  the B r it is h  C entra l A fr ic a  Order
15 16in  Council, the East A frica  Order in  C ouncil, the Uganda Order in
17 18C ouncil, and in  1920 in the Tanganyika Order in  Council, as fo llow s
tioiial
(h e re in a fte r  c a lled  the " c o n s t i tu / . fo rm u la"):
. . . any person is  conducting h im self so as to  be 
dangerous to peace and good o rd er. . . or [ i s ]  e x c it in g  
enmity between the people. . . and H is M ajesty or is  
in tr ig u in g  against His M a jes ty 's  power and a u th o r ity . . .
7 .9  In the reg u latio n s  made under s .52 o f the East A fr ic a  Order in
Council, 1897, by the Commissioner and Consul G eneral, a r t .  77 sta ted  the
19requirement in  more or less s im ila r  term s. Instead of being deported
the person could only be "removed to or in terned  in "  any place w ith in  the
lim its  of the P ro te c to ra te . In a l l  cases now the power came to be
vested in  the executive head. In Northern Rhodesia, however, the
Proclamation No.12 of 1915, q u a lif ie d  the power in  th a t i t  could be
exercised on the "recommendation" of the High Court, v ide s .1 3 (3 ) .  In
Tanganyika, the chapter was captioned "Deportation of p o l i t ic a l  o ffen d e r" .
In  Northern Rhodesia the caption envisaged deporta tion  "in  cases of
20dangerous conduct"; elsewhere the 1889 caption was re ta in e d . In a l l  
cases the provision of report to the Secretary of State was also re ta in e d .
7 .1 0  The power in  a l l  cases could be exercised s u b jec tiv e ly  ( " i f  
he th inks  f i t " )  but i t  was saddled with a condition-precedent:
21"UJhere i t  is  shown by evidence on oath to the s a t is fa c tio n . . ."
I t  was, indeed, an im portant safeguard as the order was expressly made 
non-appealable, although reviewable suo motu, everywhere. In Northern 
Rhodesia, the in te rp o s it io n  of the ju d ic ia ry  reduced fu rth e r  the  
p o s s ib il ity  of a rb itra ry  exercise of the power. Another noteworthy 
common safeguard was absence of express provision of d e legation . 
N evertheless, the re a l m ischief o f the power lay in  the fa c t th a t the  
provision postu la ted , as a necessary in c id e n t, in te rim  custody, which 
could be of in d e f in ite  du ra tio n . The lew, everywhere, was s ile n t  on th is  
aspect. In d ir e c t ly ,  th e re fo re , detention without t r i a l  was provided 
fo r  in  the constituent document with the avowed ob ject of achieving  
" le g a l i ty " .
7.11 The la s tin g  e ffe c t of the above exercise was apparent: the
power was c o n s titu tio n a lly  entrenched in  the c o lo n ia l le g a l systems of
the d if fe re n t  t e r r i to r ie s  as a permanent "emergency" measure long before
the b ir th  in  England of the concept of "emergency" during the second world 
22war. The r ig h t of the s ta te  to deport and also , possib ly , to in te rn ,
an a lie n , has been recognised in  customary in te rn a tio n a l law but use of
such power against i t s  own c it iz e n s  has been perm issible only in  those
s itu a tio n s  which, in  the modern context, are described as "time of war
23or pub lic  emergency th reaten ing  the l i f e  of the nation^" th e  doctrine
24of necessity too , as we have seen, embraced s im ila r  p r in c ip le s .
However, as we come to discuss some other measures of a s im ila r  n a ture , 
inc lud ing those concerning a lien s  and "sem i-a lien s", i t  w i l l  become 
apparent th a t the c o lo n ia l adm in is tra tion  was attuned to a perpetual 
state  of emergency.
7 .12  The permanent lo c a l s ta tu tes  which belonged to the same genus 
generally  repeated the  provisions of the enactments discussed above but
provided, ins tead , in t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l  "d ep o rta tio n ". These s ta tu tes
s p e c if ic a lly  provided fo r detention ( in te r im  custody) o f the deportee
which, in  the case of Tanganyika, was more e x p l ic i t ly  s ta ted : "in
custody or in  prison u n t i l  a f i t  opportunity fo r  h is  deportation occurs
The person charged with the execution of the order could possibly claim
indemnity but i t  was doubtful i f  the provision e f fe c t iv e ly  precluded
27ju d ic ia l  challenge to  the d e ten tio n . In  Kenya, although the Governor 
in Council (elsewhere ths Governor) was invested with the power, there  
was ju d ic ia l  in te rp o s itio n  s im ila r  to the Northern Rhodesian p ro v is io n , 
with another ad d itio n a l safeguard of the ru le  of audi alterem  partem 
(s s .2  and 3 ):  however, i t  lacked express provision fo r  suo motu review , 
as provided in Tanganyika ( s . 8 ) .  Kenyan provision also contemplated 
deportation fo r  an "unlim ited" period while the o ther s ta tu tes  were 
s ile n t on th is  p o in t.
7 .13  In the absence of any reported decision i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to
hazard a conjecture on the probable ju d ic ia l  approach in  the m atter of 
in te rp re ta t io n  of the provisions discussed above; the tra d it io n
29u n fo rtu n a te ly , as we have seen, pointed to a negative approach.
However, the several questions of general importance th a t the ju d ic ia ry  
in  A frica  was l ik e ly  to face may be in d ica ted , namely -
(a ) Whether to read the ru le , audi alterem partem, in to  the provisions  
of the te r r i to r ie s  other than Kenya ?
(b) To what extent was ju d ic ia l  review excluded by the use of the 
expression implying subjective  s a t is fa c tio n , reading the provision  
as a whole ?
(c ) What was the e ffe c t o f: ( i )  the period of deportation being e ith e r  
unspecified  or bBing provided fo r  "un lim ited" period ? ( i i )  the 
absence of safeguards (besides ju d ic ia l  in te rp o s it io n  in  one case) 
on the choice of ru les  o f in te rp re ta t io n  ? ( i i i )  the unspecified  
period of in te rim  custody ?
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7 .1 4  In  another, e a r l ie r  lo c a l s ta tu te  of the Gold Coast, which
provided fo r  e x t r a - t e r r i t o r ia l  "d ep o rta tio n 1', a problem o f a d if fe re n t
nature appears to have been ta c k le d . I t  was enacted during the f i r s t
world war. Probably i t  was meant to supplement the provisions of the
31Defence of the Gold Coast Ordinance. The formula in  th is  case there fo re  
d if fe re d . Providing assistance to , or communicating w ith , the enemy was 
tre a te d  as the ob jectionable a c t iv i ty :  the Governor's power was p lenary; 
n e ith e r  appeal, nor review was provided fo r  and even the requirement of a 
subsequent report to the Secretary of State was not to be found. In
32Southern N ig e ria , the Crim inal Code contained the "deportation" p ro v is io n .
Although the Northern Rhodesian Penal Code also contained s im ila r
provis ions, u n like  N ig e ria  i t  did not s p e c if ic a lly  provide th a t a c it iz e n
33could not be deported e x t r a - t e r r i t o r ia l ly . The provision containing  
the preventive sanction, in  e ith e r  case, incorporated the "c o n s titu tio n a l
34formula" adopted in  the constituent documents of East and C entra l A fr ic a .  
7*15 We may now look at the laws re la t in g  to a liens  and persons
who could be ca lled  sem i-a lien s . The la t t e r  were described as "immigrant
35 36B r it is h  subjects" in the Gold Coast as w e ll as in  Kenya. Another
Gold Coast law d ea lt with "a lie n s " , which was defined in  the in c lu s ive  
37sense. A ll  these laws contemplated e x t r a - t e r r i t o r ia l  deportation which
38was, as conceded, unexceptionable. I t  was the in c lu s ive  d e f in it io n  in  
one case and an a r t i f i c i a l  (deeming) d e fin it io n  in  the o ther case th a t  
was objectionable  in  th a t the d is tin c tio n  between a c it iz e n  and a non­
c it iz e n  was almost b lu rre d . This position  possibly resu lted  from the 
presence of "B ritis h  protected persons" in  the d if fe re n t  t e r r i to r ie s  whose 
anomalous status has prompted us to c la s s ify  such persons as sem i-a lien s .
A person could be brought w ith in  the mischiBf of the law as and when the
39Secretary of State desired . While absence of procedural safeguards in  
the case of an a lien  could not be objected to there was nothing much to 
be said against those provided in the other case. The measures in  a l l
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cases were of a hybrid v a r ie ty  provid ing two a lte rn a tiv e  sanctions -
preventive  as w ell as p u n itiv e , s im ila r  to  those of the Southern Nigerian
C rim inal Code. In the former case also ju d ic ia l  in te rp o s it io n  was
provided although in Kenya the ju d ic ia l  in q u iry  contemplated could be 
4uin camera. Kenya, however, provided an a lte rn a tiv e  of " re s tr ic t io n
41order" which could be supplemented by a "secu rity  o rd er". These were 
apparently le n ie n t measures. An a lien  could be deported fo r  "public  good" 
(not defined) but in  the case of "immigrant B r it is h  su b ject" , the c o u rtf s 
"recommendation" a fte r  inqu iry  was s u f f ic ie n t .  The order in  a l l  cases was 
ncn-appealable.
7 .16  Ue thus fin d  th a t the concept f i r s t  introduced in  the form of a
penal sanction la te r  gained prominence more as a preventive sanction.
I t  has to  be admitted th a t the sanction was not unknown to  the t ra d it io n a l
62leg a l systems of A fr ic a . However, the sanction was genera lly  applied
63 46only against deposed Chiefs and w itches, in a preventive sense. In
45a few other cases i t  was used as a p u n itive  sanction in c e rta in  areas.
In a l l  cases i t  was in t r a - t e r r i t o r ia l  in  the modern sense. I t  is  
d i f f ic u l t  to say th a t the African so c ie ties  everywhere, in  general, 
could have found the preventive sanction and th a t of the e x t r a - t e r r i t o r ia l  
type, acceptable against an ordinary in d iv id u a l but the c o lo n ia l ru le rs  
appear to  have taken i t  fo r  granted. There is  no other convincing 
hypothesis which can explain the in tro d u ctio n  of th is  extraord inary  
concept in  the co lo n ia l leg a l system of A fr ic a , fo r  the operation  
possibly had no p a r a l le l .  I t  was an ill-c o n c e iv e d  experiment which 
nEither benefited  the co lo n ia l common law (common fea tu res  of the co lo n ia l 
leg al systems of the dependencies) nor contributed to the development of 
any wholesome trend in  the African Common Law of the fu tu re .
7.17 Between 1957 and 1964, the Gold Coast, N ig e r ia , Tanganyika,
Uganda, Kenya, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia a tta in ed  th e ir  independence 
in th a t order. Each state  except Gold Coast and Tanganyika was given a
ju s t ic ia b le  B i l l  of Rights in i t s  Independence C o n s titu tio n , in  more
46or less s im ila r  terms, as Lie s h a ll soon see. Freedom of movement was
guaranteed, in  each case subject to re s tr ic t io n s  "reasonably ju s t i f ia b le
47in  a democratic society" in  the in te re s t o f ,  in te r  a l i a , defence, pub lic
s a fe ty , p u b lic  o rder. The v a l id i ty  of the c o lo n ia l s ta tu tes  which
remained in force were there fo re  open to challenge and the courts could
decide i f  they were saved by the derogation clause. I t  is  in te re s tin g
to  note the c o lo n ia l legacy being carried  over in  the Independence
C o n stitu tio n  o f N ig e ria  in  A rt. 2 7 (4 ) , which s p e c if ic a lly  saved laws
provid ing fo r  the deportation of C h iefs . Reasons are not fa r  to  seek.
I t  was in  tune with the t ra d it io n a l le g a l system in  the f i r s t  place and
46secondly the Privy Council, in the two ELEKO cases, did not decide 
whether the order passed by the Governor under the Deposed Chiefs  
Removal Ordinance 1917 could be upheld on the m erits ; in  other words, 
whether the English Common Law ru les  had abrogated the ru les  of the 
t r a d it io n a l le g a l system in th is  respect.
7 .1 8  I t  is  indeed strange th a t the v a l id i ty  of the deportation laws,
those which are s t i l l  extan t, has not been challenged even where i t  is
possible to do so. This position  supports our e a r l ie r  observations on
49the tra d it io n s  of ju d ic ia l  review in  A fr ic a . Another aspect of the
c o lo n ia l legacy is  to be found in  the enactment by independent Ghana, of
the Deportation Act, No. 14 of 1957, to provide fo r  e x t r a - t e r r i t o r ia l
deportation of a person whose presence is  "declared" by the Governor
50General to  be "not conducive to the public  good". The burden of proof
51l ie s  on the person who claims exemption as a c it iz e n .  Deportation
52under the Act was challenged in  BALOGUN v EDU5I but the le g is la tu re , by
53enacting ad horninem le g is la t io n , robbed the  court of the opportunity  to  
pronounce upon the v a l id i ty  o f the Act as w e ll as of the action taken  
thereunder. In Kenya and Zambia and, in  a re s tr ic te d  sense, in  Malawi 
(because of the new c o n s titu tio n ) the opportunity s t i l l  e x is ts . In
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N ig e ria  and Uganda, where the m il ita ry  ru le£  have not suspended the
C o n s titu tio n a l B i l l  of R ights, a ju d ic ia l  challenge cannot be ru led  out,
notw ithstanding the inherent l im ita t io n s  of the "New Grundnorm".
(3 ) Emergency Laws and Preventive Detention
(A) A General Wiew
7.19 Ue have seen th a t the term p re v e n tiv e  d e te n tio n 1 was used in
54 55certa in  enactments of England and A fric a  dealing  with the contro l of 
rec id iv ism . Even so, the term is  also used throughout the "New Commonwealth" 
to mean detentions without t r i a l  o r, in  o ther words, detentions with a 
p o l i t ic a l  complexion. I t  is  in  the la t t e r  sense th a t the term is  used 
in th is  part o f the study. Early examples of laws expressly providing
re s tra in ts  of such nature are to  be found in  the two enactments of
56 57Nyasaland and Gold Coast. The la t t e r  measure was enacted during the
f i r s t  world war and the provisions themselves speak of a "sta te  of war",
"imminent danger" and "great emergency" end of th e ir  a p p lic a b ility  to 
58"a liens" o n ly , (u n lik e  the Defence of the Realms Acts o f 1914). The
Governor in  Council could invest any person with powers of " a rre s t" ,
59"detention" and "search". Any person "suspected to have assisted the
enemy" could be arrested  w ithout warrant by a D is t r ic t  Commissioner or a
European O ffic e r  of the Police Force and detained " u n t i l  the Governor's
d irec tio n s  are o b t a i n e d . T h e  Governor could a lso , by order in  w rit in g ,
fo r  the same reasons, d ire c t a rre s t and also detention and the continuation
61thereof " fo r  such period as he s h a ll th ink  necessary." In  e ith e r  case,
the power was exerc isab le  subject to regu lations made by the Governor in
C ouncil.. By an amendment in  1935 the w r it  of habeas corpus was expressly
6 2suspended in  respect of such orders and also of d ep o rta tio n . In view 
of i t s  re s tr ic te d  app lica tion  to a lien s  the absence of safeguards is  
understandable but the v a l id ity  of the amendment is ,  neverthe less ,
challengeable as u l t r a  v ir e s . At common law even an a lie n  had the r ig h t to
(Gola uoast)
habeas corpus. In 1935 .&&&&&-/ did not have a "rep resen ta tive  leg is la tu re"  
to abrogate t h is . r ig h t . ......................................................................................................................
7 .2 0  The Nyasaland law, on the o ther hand, was app licab le  to a "n a tiv e ”
The power of "detention” was exercisable  by a D is t r ic t  Commissioner who had
to rep o rt " fo rth w ith "  h is  actio n , with the grounds th e re fo r , to the  
6  3Governor. Provision fo r  a f in a l  order by the Governor contemplated two
forms o f detentions detention fo r  such period as he considered necessary
"in  the in te re s ts  of peace, order and good government", e ith e r  w ith in  or
64without the d is t r ic t  in which the detainee "o rd in a r ily  res id ed ". The
D is t r ic t  Commissioner's exercise of power was, however, provided according
65to the " c o n s titu tio n a l formula" of d eporta tion . In  the same way,
the Governor was to report " fo rth w ith "  to the Secretary of State and h is
order was made non-appealable but reviewable by him, suo motu
The Governor in Council was given the rule-m aking power but i t  is  doubtful
i f  by ru les  e ffe c tiv e  provision fo r  review by independent tr ib u n a l could
be made which was necessary in  view of the in d e f in ite  detention and the
person a ffec ted  being a subject and not an a lie n . In fa c t the v ire s  of the
67Ordinance i t s e l f  was open to challenge. Rules were in  fa c t made which
6 8provided only fo r  the conditions of d e ten tio n . The wives, children
and "fo llow ers" of detainees could be perm itted to remain w ith , or have
access to , such " p o l i t ic a l ly  detained n a tiv e s " . Provision fo r  the supply
of food and fo r  medical supervision was also contemplated. P ro h ib itio n  
against detention in  a "prison or lock-up" was possibly provided as a
safeguard against po lice  to r tu re .
(B) The Emergency Powers Order in  Council 1939
7.21 The Emergency Powers Order in  Council 1939 was made under the
B ritis h  Settlements Act 1887 and the Foreign J u ris d ic tio n  Act 1890 end was 
amended from tim e to  tim e, but we are concerned with amendments made up
to 1956. The r e c i t a l  in the preamble was noteworthy: "Whereas i t  is
expedient to  make other provision than th a t now e x is tin g  fo r  secu rity  in
time of emergency of the colonies and p ro tectora tes  mentioned in P art I
of the schedule. . ."  which included the te r r i to r ie s  under discussion.
The Emergency Powers (C o lo n ia l Defence) Order in  Council 1939, made 
under s . 4(1 ) o f the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939 was also made 
ap p licab le  to them and extended to them the Act with adaptations, 
m o d ifica tio n s  and exceptions. The parent Act i t s e l f  being a temporary 
s ta tu te  th is  Order also had a lim ite d  e ffe c t in  the dependencies although 
i t  was invoked in  Gold C oast^  and in N ig e ria *^  as w e ll.  Regulations
were framed by the respective Governors fo r  the r e s t r ic t io n  of movement
71 72of suspected persons and also fo r detention orders which follow ed
73Reg.18B of the United Kingdom, in  terms. A discussion of these 
reg u la tio n s  i s ,  th e re fo re , redundant.
7 .2 2  EJn the other hand, the captioned Order (herass^ter re f  erred to as
the 1939 Order ) was of a permanent nature and th ere fo re  m erits  greater
a tte n tio n . I t  had become "part of the law" of each te r r i to r y  and in  the
Independence C onstitu tions s p ec ific  provision had to be made to discontinue
i t s  e f fe c t .  By the new s .3 of the Order, which was replaced in  1956 by a
m odified provis ion , the declaration  of a "public  emergency" in a p a rt,
as w e ll as the whole of the te r r ito r y  was contemplated, on the mere
" s a tis fa c tio n "  of the Governor. 5 .6 (1 ) ,  which became operative when
the declaration  was made, deserves to be quoted:
The Governor may make such Regulations as appear to  
him to be necessary or expedient fo r  securing the 
public  s a fe ty , the defence of the t e r r i t o r y ,  the  
maintenance of public order and the suppression of
mutiny, re b e llio n  and r io t ,  and fo r  m aintain ing supplies
and services essen tia l to the l i f e  o f the community.
S ub-s.(2) i l lu s t r a te d  the m atters which could be provided fo r  by the
re g u la tio n s . Clauses (a ) and (d ) were as fo llo w s:
( a) . . . fo r  the detention of persons and fo r  the
deportation end exclusion of persons from the te r r i to r y ;
(d) . . . fo r  amending any law, fo r  suspending the
operation of any law and fo r  applying any law with or 
without m odification;
The la t te r  provision was fu rth e r  fo r t i f ie d  by s . 8 which contemplated th a t
any regu lation  and any order or ru le  made thereunder s h a ll have e f fe c t
notw ithstanding i t s  inconsistency with "any law ". Whether an Order in  
such terms could be made under B r it is h  Settlem ents Act and the Foreign 
D u risd ic tio n  Act does not appear to have been questioned so fa r  but the  
v ire s  of the Order was challenged on the grounds of non-compliance 
with s .1 (1 ) of the Rules P ublication  Act 1893 in  Ex.p. MUJENYA ( in f r a )  .
(4 ) Emergency during Mau Mau Movement in  Kenya
(A) A General View
7 .2 3  On 21st October, 1952, an emergency was declared in  Kenya which
was to continue u n t i l  i9 6 0 . During th is  period , a large number of
regu lations  were made and onended from time to  tim e, under the provisions
of s . 6 of the 1939 Order. The process was s im ila r  to the one th a t
74obtained in  the peninsula of Malaya. I t  was a m atter of curious  
coincidence th a t not only were the events in  the two dependencies 
almost contemporaneous but the nature of the emergency was also in  
some respects the same. The reasons and the background were, however, 
d if fe re n t  although, as we s h a ll see, almost s im ila r  le g a l means and 
measures were adopted in  the two t e r r i to r ie s  notw ithstanding the fa c t  
th a t there was a much la rg e r human involvement in Kenya which was of an 
e n tire ly  d if fe re n t  type . This d is t in c t iv e  fea tu re  has to be 
explained f i r s t  in  some d e ta i l .
7 .2 4  The various in te rp re ta t io n s  of the Mau Mau movement, which
has been subjected to d e ta ile d  study, may be b r ie f ly  summarised f i r s ts
7 5 76"a re lig io n " ; "a form of m illenarism "; "a self-conscious re tu rn  to
77tr ib a lis m . . . based on syn th etic  paganism"; "a wholly t r ib a l
7 8m anifestation aimed at t r ib a l  domination, not a n a tio n a l movement";
79"a pseudo-relig ious c u lt .  . . of the golden age"; and f in a l ly  " p o lit ic o -
agrarian . . . d irec ted  against European ru le  and w h ite -s e tt le r
80occupancy of a lien a ted  African lands". The last-m entioned, we submit, 
has to be p re fe rred  to the others as i t  has ev id e n tia ry  support in  the  
Mau Mau oath which expressly re fe rre d  to the European as "our enemy" and
81spoke of "our s o il"  and "people of A fr ic a " . The r i tu a ls  of the oath 
ceremony appear to have a ttra c te d  greater a tten tio n  of the observers who 
have given a contrary in te rp re ta t io n . A to t a l  den ia l of the fa c t  th a t 
the movement had a n a t io n a lis t ic  outlook w i l l ,  th e re fo re , be u n re a lis t ic .
7 .2 5  For a proper appreciation of the scope and extant of the le g a l
measures th a t we s h a ll examine i t  is  necessary to take an account of the 
s a lie n t fea tu res  of the events th a t marked the period of the emergency 
which spanned over a period of nearly  e ig h t years. The Mau Mau was 
proclaimed to be an "unlawful socie ty" under s .69 of the Penal Code which 
contemplated a declaration  to  be made by the Governor in  Council s ta tin g  
th a t the society was "dangerous to the good government of the colony" i f  i t  
was formed fo r  purposes, in te r  a l i a , of "subversion" o f ,  and of "levying  
war" on, the government. To be a member of such a society or to allow  
i t s  meeting to be held in one's house was an offence punishable by thres  
years ' imprisonment. Another provision of the Penal Code which s im ila r ly  
played an im portant ro le , supplementing vigorously the emergency laws 
was to be found in s .61 which was a more serious offence punishable with 
ten years 1 imprisonment. I t  made offences in te r  a l i a , of tak in g , 
adm inistering and being present at the adm in istration  of an oath . By 
s .63 i t  was provided th a t compulsion was not to be a defence unless w ithin  
f iv e  days of e ith e r  tak ing  the oath (o r ,  i f  prevented by physical force or 
sickness, a fte r  the term ination of such force or sickness) i t  is  reported  
to the p o lic e . The reported cases of the period were undoubtedly feu but 
they in d ica ted , as we s h a ll see, th a t these provisions were extensively  
used. This was one of the d is t in c t iv e  fea tu res  of the s itu a tio n  in  Kenya 
fo r which n e ith e r Northern Ire la n d  nor Malaya o ffered  any exact p a r a l le l .  
7.76 In May 1951 the Kenya A frican Union had submitted a memorandum
to the Secretary of State fo r  the Colonies suggesting certa in  changes in  
the c o n s titu tio n a l set-up which included appointment of an African member 
to the Executive Council and an increase in  African representation  in the
r? q, 
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L e g is la tiv e  Council from four to twelve besides pressing fo r  the repeal of
c e rta in  d iscrim inatory  laws and the a b o litio n  of the Native Authority
Ordinance under which the lo c a l Chiefs and the D is t r ic t  Commissioners
could p ro h ib it people from holding meetings. In a "top secret" le t te r  to
the M in is te r  in  Duly 1952 the P olice Chief o f Kenya spoke of " re v o lt"  and
of the possible fa i lu r e  of the po lice  s im ila r  to th a t of " Ire la n d  and 
82P a le s tin e " . I t  is  against th is  background th a t the Governor declared an
83emergency and made the Emergency Regulations 1952 which, as already 
in d ica te d , were, from time to tim e, revised and also amended, substitu ted  
and supplemented in  various ways. Lie propose to  examine a feu of the 
Regulations only to  point out s im ila r it ie s  w ith , and also deviations from, 
the reg u latio n s  of the Malayan peninsula and Northern Ire la n d . I t  may 
be stated at once th a t everywhere the armed forces had been conceded an 
important ro le  in a rres t and " in te rro g a tio n " .
7.27 Some words must be said about the a c t iv i t ie s  of the "rebels" th a t
were sought to be tackled with the help of the emergency measures and also
about the consequences th a t ensued from the enforcement of those measures.
Leakey observes th a t the Mau Mau a c t iv i t ie s  were d irec ted  towards
"te rro r is in g "  the European s e t t le rs  -  "incessant ra id s  upon European-
owned farms. . . maiming of valuable  liv e s to c k , burning of grain stores
. . .  in  some cases wanton massacre of the European occupants.
K a riu k i, on the other hand, contends th a t the ra id s  were p rim arily  aimed
8 5at procuring arms and ammunition. I t  is  a notorious fa c t th a t the
European s e t t le rs  in Kenya were a v i t a l  force to be reckoned with and the
law had to be therefore  vigorously enforced. During the emergency 78,000
persons were detained without t r i a l  and in the "Operation A nvil" alone,
carried  out in N airob i in A p ril 1954, the number detained went as high as 
8635,000 . The s itu a tio n  was made even more pernicious by the i l l - t r e a tm e n t
87of certa in  detainees which necessitated  o f f ic ia l  in q u ir ie s  being h e ld .
In Hola detention .camp eleven persons died of such i l l - t r e a tm e n t .
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7 .28  Coming now to the measures themselves, we fin d  th a t while they
fo llow ed more closely  the scheme of the Malayan reg u la tio n s , the 1952
Emergency Regulations of Kenya made up a more complete coda, possibly
p ro f it in g  from the Malayan experience. The provision req u irin g  an
’’id e n t ity  card” to be c a rried  by every male A frican aged sixteen and
produced on demand'by any po lice  o f f ic e r  or member of the armed forces
was made a part of the code, in  Reg.16B(6). At f i r s t  i t  was applicable
to the members of Kikuyu tr ib e s  o n ly . L a te r, other tr ib e s , Mem or 
88Embu, were added, and by fu r th e r  amendment i t  was made app licab le  to
89’’any n o t if ie d  t r ib e ” . The argument noticed e a r l ie r  th a t Mau Mau was
a t r ib a l  and not a n a tio n a l movement is  b e lie d  by th is  fa c t .
907.29 As in  the Malayan peninsula, there was a provision fo r
c o lle c tiv e  punishment in  Reg.4A but i t  was more s tr in g e n t. I f  i t
appeared to any D is t r ic t  O ffic e r  th a t any of the spec ified  offences, which
included those re la t in g  to ’’unlaw ful oath” and ’’unlaw ful s o c ie ty ” , was
committed in  any area and the in h ab itan ts  thereof fa i le d  to take
reasonable steps to prevent the same or i f  they were members of ’’un law fu l
so cie ty” or consorted with or harboured any such member, he could impose
punishment on them. The occupation of a dw elling house could be
proh ib ited  and the closure of shops could be ordered fo r  up to 14 days.
C a ttle  could be seized and sold and proceeds thereof applied fo r  payment of
compensation fo r  any in ju ry  to e ith e r  person or property suffered  on
account of the offence committed. L a te r, the im position of fin e s  was
also provided fo r ,  which could be re a lis e d  by the seizure and sale of 
91moveables.
9 27 .30  The Malayan ”s ta rve -them -out” provision (Reg.4C) took
another form in  Kenya. While Reg. 8 F contained a s im ila r  p rov is ion , Reg.11 
a d d itio n a lly  empowered the a u th o r itie s  to order any person "to perform fo r  
such remuneration. . . such duties  or carry out such works as may be 
necessary or expedient fo r  securing the continuance of any necessary s e rv ic e ."
74
In  Kenya the Regulations d ea lt with ’’te rro rism " more e ffe c t iv e ly  by
93making i t  an offence and in  addition  providing th a t "acting  as a
94te r r o r is t "  was also an o ffence. In the la t t e r  case a person had to  
be "found or captured or otherwise taken in to  custody in  circumstances 
which ra ised  a reasonable presumption th a t he intended to act as a 
t e r r o r is t ."  The offences re la t in g  to firearm s (possessing, carry ing  e tc .  
vide Reg. 8 ) was amended from tim e to time to ensure maximum convictions.
The provisions re la t in g  to "sp ec ia l areas" (Reg.22B) war© however less  
elaborate  than those of Malaya. In  such areas, as in  Malaya, "reasonable 
fo rce" extending to the use of " le th a l weapons" could be used to e ffe c t  
a rre s t, to overcome resistance to a rre s t, to prevent escape and rescue. The 
separately made Emergency (C rim in a l T r ia ls )  Regulations 1952, fo llo w in g  the 
Malayan counterpart, provided fo r  "emergency procedure" to meet mainly the 
problem of in tim id a tio n  of w itnesses. In a l l  these provisions was 
re fle c te d  a determined e f fo r t  to  f ig h t  "terrorism " through extraord inary  
leg a l measures. To what extent th is  was checked by the unabrogated common 
law ru les  we s h a ll soon see.
(B) A rrest. In te rro g a tio n  and Detention
7.31 In a l l  the three te r r i to r ie s  an almost s im ila r  pattern  was
followed but the use of the power of in te rro g a tio n  in  both Northern
Ire lan d  and Kenya assumed g reater importance. In  e ith e r  case in te rro g a tio n
continued during detention g iv ing  r is e  to serious complaints of i l l - t r e a tm e n t
and to r tu re . In  Kenya i t  was euphem istically  ca lled  "screening" and
ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r  i t  was thus s ta ted : " . . . the in te n tio n  behind the
policy was re fo rm is t and not p u n itiv e . . . to accelerate release by
95breaking the s p e ll of Mau Mau oath . . ."  and th a t in  considering the
evidence of i l l- t r e a tm e n t  due weight has to be given to attempts made to
96deal " fa ir ly  and in te l l ig e n t ly  with an unprecedented s itu a t io n ."  The
threshold in te rro g a tio n  by the use of the power of stopping and questioning
which involved the "s h o o t-a t-s ig h t"  po licy  also appeared to produce s im ila r  
97re su lts  in  Kenya.
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7 .3 2  The general power of a rres t w ithout warrant was conferred by 
Reg.28(1) a d d itio n a lly  on a member of T r ib a l P o lice  Force and headman 
appointed under the Native Authority Ordinance. I t  could be exercised  
against a person who "was g u ilty  or was suspected of being g u ilty "  of 
an offence against the reg u la tio n s  and also against one who acted "to  
endanger public  s a fe ty " . Apart from omission of the requirement of 
reasonableness, the expression "pub lic  safety" being undefined there was 
every lik e lih o o d  of the power being misused in  view of the fu r th e r  fa c t  
th a t report to and production before the M ag istrate  was to be "as soon
as p ra c tic a b le"  and not w ith in  any fix e d  period of tim e (v id e  sub-clause 
( 2) ) .
7 .3 3  Reg. 2 was o r ig in a lly  headed "Detention Orders" and i t  provided
comprehensively fo r a rres t and detention "pending decision" w hile  the
power to  stop and question was posited in  Reg. 3. I t  was amended from
tim e to time and in  1955 i t  was given a new heading "Detention Orders and
Power to detain suspected persons" while making su b stan tia l changes in the
98power of a rres t fo r  detention "pending in q u ir ie s  and d ec is io n ."  Under the  
new clause ( 6 ) of Reg.2, "any authorised o f f ic e r "  could a rres t pending 
in q u ir ie s  and decision any person "reasonably suspected" of having acted 
or o f being about to or l ik e ly  to  act in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to  pub lic  
safety  e tc . and detain him up to 28 days but fo r  "continued detention"  
beyond 24 hours he had to  obtain au thorisation  in  w ritin g  from the 
prescribed a u th o rity . Custody during such detention was expressly made 
" law fu l"  and a po lice s ta tio n  was also named fo r  th is  purpose, besides 
any place "generally  or s p e c ia lly "  authorised. In th is  respect the  
provision of Reg.3 was s im ila r  but detention could normally be fo r  24 
hours which could be extended up to 7 days by a M agistrate  or a superior 
police o f f ic e r .
7 .34  The power to pass a detention order ( f o r  an un lim ited  period) 
o r ig in a lly  vested in  the Governor on ly , to be passed " i f  s a t is f ie d " , fo r
"m a in ta in in g  p u b l ic  o rd er"  and re p re s e n ta t io n  in  w r i t in g  could also be
made to him (R eg .2 ) .  He had powers to revoke, vary or suspend on
conditions, such orders. In  1954 the general power of delegation
provided in  Reg.32 was amended by d e le tin g  the exception in  respect of 
99Reg.2. UJe are to ld  th a t the power was, in  fa c t ,  delegated f i r s t  to the
P ro v in c ia l Commissioner and then to the D is t r ic t  Commissioner.^^ By an
amendment in  1953 provision was made enabling "objections" to be made,
a d d it io n a lly , to  an Advisory Committee but the Governor was not obliged
101to accept the Committee*s recommendations. N evertheless, in  1954 the
status of the Committee was ra ised  by providing th a t a person q u a lif ie d  to
be a judge of the Supreme Court should be i t s  Chairman and i t  was he who
was required to inform the objector "the grounds" as w e ll as "the
p a rt ic u la rs " . By the Emergency ( Amendment)(No.3) Regulation 1953 the new
prov is ion , Reg.2A, introduced "R es tric tio n  Orders", but there  was no r ig h t
of making e ith e r  "representations" or "objections" in such cases, except
t h a t  these  were re v ie w a b le  suo m o tu . The G ove rno r,  and l a t e r  th e  C h ie f
Secretary also , fo r  "m aintaining public  order" required  any person "not to
be in  any sp ec ified  place" except by a "w ritten  perm it" and also to  n o tify
h is  movements in  the s p ec ified  manner. Forc ib le  removal was also
contemplated and disobedience with the order was made an o ffence.
7 .35  The provision apparently conformed s u b s ta n tia lly  to  the usual
pattern  and^notwithstanding the absence of more sa lu ta ry  safeguards such
as automatic p erio d ic  review and tim e-scaled procedure fo r  disposal of the
"representations" and "ob jections", these could be e f fe c t iv e ly  resorted to
102by the detainees but the fa c tu a l position  was e n t ire ly  d if fe r e n t .  There 
was apparently no p o s s ib ility  of any successful ju d ic ia l  challenge to e ith e r  
the law or the order passed thereunder, on account not only of the ju d ic ia l  
approach in  th is  m atter exh ib ited  in the case-law of o ther dependencies but 
also of the undeveloped tra d it io n  of ju d ic ia l  review in  Kenya and of the  
widely defined power. However, the spec ia l dimension o f the problem in
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Kenya, which resembled th a t of Northern Ire la n d  in  th is  respect, cannot be
underrated . I t  was the problem of " le g itim a c y " . We are to ld  th a t in  Kenya
too the "au th o rity  of the Kenya Government was re jec ted " and also th a t the
103Mau Mau had set up i t s  own courts . I t  is  not su rp ris in g  th e re fo re  th a t
we do not fin d  a s in g le  reported decision in  which any detention was
104challenged despite i t s  use on a colossal sca le .
1057 .36  A separate set of Regulations were made to provide fo r
in c id e n ta l m atters in  connection with such d eten tio n . I t  made the Prisons
Ordinance (cap. 78) app licab le  to "detention camps" and "sp ec ia l detention
camps" and also made specia l provisions fo r  m aintain ing  d is c ip lin e  in
camps which included corporal punishment, besides s o lita ry  confinement
and reduced d ie t e tc . The "hard core" detainees could be segregated and
could be made to  work "to ass is t the process of re h a b il ita t io n "  which was
106not to be "penal or oppressive." Monthly v is i ts  by a "Committee of
Inspection" were also contemplated to hear complaints and make "remarks
107and recommendations." These measures could not u n fo rtu n ate ly  prevent
the Hola in c id en t and to what exten t the concept of " le g a lity "  was used to
ju s t i fy  even e x tra - le g a l measures was proved by the fa c t  th a t although i t
was found th a t the detainees met th e ir  deaths as a re s u lt  of "considerable
beating" with batons the actio n , i t  was he ld , was protected by these
108Regulations and the Prisons Ordinance.
7.37 I f  i t  is  accepted th a t "Mau Mau" had a n a t io n a lis t ic  outlook,
109th a t i t  was a freedom movement and th a t a c iv i l  war took place in  Kenya
between 1953 and 1960, the prosecution of the Mau Mau detainees fo r
crim inal offences and the subjection of them to i l l - t r e a tm e n t  was open
to s im ila r  objections in in te rn a t io n a l law as in  the cases of Northern
110Ire la n d  and Malaya. Nevertheless, the common law pro tection  proved 
e ffe c tiv e  in the few cases th a t came before the courts in  Kenya, which 
we propose to examine now.
7.38  The commcn law approach o f the presumption of innocence and s t r ic t
111compliance with procedure dominated the cases -  (1 ) KARIUKI v
PHILIP MUIG A v R, 1 1 2  and SIMON N3ER0GE v R. 1 1 3  In  a l l  th ree  cases
convictions were set aside. In  the f i r s t  case the M ag istra te  had acquitted
the accused of the charge of adm in is tra tion  of un law fu l oath but had
convicted him of being a member of an unlaw ful society under 8 .7 1 (a ) .
The Supreme Court held th a t the evidence was not re le v an t to  the offence
fo r  which he was convicted. In  the th ird  case also the conviction under
3 .7 1 (a ) was set aside on the ground th a t the evidence of an accomplice
could not be the basis fo r  any co n v ic tio n . In  the second case conviction
fo r  the sane offence was set aside on the ground of d e fec tive  p a rtic u la rs
being given in the charge. On a more or less s im ila r  ground of 'duplex*
114charge a conviction was set aside in  CHERERE v FI, in  which the T r ia l  
Court held th a t "the accused e ith e r  ac tu a lly  adm inistered the oath or at 
le a s t was present at and played an im portant part in  i t s  a d m in is tra tio n ."
I t  was held th a t the accused was prejudiced and th a t i t  was an "elementary 
p rin c ip le "  of the C rim inal Procedure Code th a t the accused must be informed 
p recise ly  with what he was charged.
7 .39 In two cases, MWANGI v and GITHIN3I v the offence
involved was possession o f a home-made gun contrary to the Emergency 
R egulations. In the f i r s t  case, although conviction was set aside on the 
ground th a t the ob jectionab le  a r t ic le  was not proved to be a " le th a l  
b a rre lle d  weapon", the court made im portant observations on what i t  
ca lled  " ir r e g u la r i t ie s  by ths p o lice "  and "u n satis fac to ry  aspects of the 
case". The po lice  had not cautioned the accused before questioning, as 
required by the English Judges' Rules which were adopted in  Kenya. The 
arres t was unlaw ful fo r  not fo llo w in g  the common law ru le  sta ted  in  the  
CHRISTIE case req u irin g  th a t the person arrested be informed o f the  
reasons fo r  h is  a rre s t. The court observed th a t the ru le  was hot 
abrogated by the Emergency R egulations. I t  was also observed th a t a 
" t r i a l  w ith in  a t r i a l "  must be held when the vo luntariness of a statement 
was at issue. The accused had stated  th a t he was beaten by the po lice  and
uas made to put h is  thum b-print on a piece of paper. However, in  the  
second case the conviction was upheld on other evidence, d isregarding the
statement made to a ’’screening team” but the fo llo w in g  observations were
. 117made:
From th is  case and others th a t have come to our notice i t  
seems th a t i t  may be a common p ractice  when a person is  
arrested in  the commission of a te r r o r is t  o ffence, or on 
suspicion of such o ffence, fo r  the police to  hand him over 
to the custody o f one of these teams, where, i f  accounts 
given are tru e , he is  subjected to  a "softening up” 
process with the ob ject o f obtaining inform ation from him 
. . . What le g a l powers o f detention these teems have or 
under whose au th o rity  they act we do not know. . . Such
methods are a negation of the ru le  of law which i t  is  the
duty of th is  court to  uphold. . .
1187 .40  In the same vein in  N3UGUNA v R the court observed:
* awfulncss of the crime is  ir re le v a n t to the standard o f p roo f. . .
the im p lica tio n  of th is  case is ,  po lice  in  Kenya is  try in g  to  become a
119law unto i t s e l f .  . and in  re p e llin g  the contention th a t "p ro tec tive
custody” was to guard against re p r is a ls  by te r r o r is ts ,  ” . . . [th ere  is ]
no law fu l au th o rity  in  Kenya fo r  detention by the po lice  of p o te n tia l  
1 2 0witnesses. . . ” Conviction fo r  murder by the domestic servants of an 
e ld e rly  European was set aside by the court, upon holding th a t the  
confessions having been alleged to have been extrac ted  by to r tu re , the 
t r i a l  court need only consider th a t the story of to r tu re  was "reasonably
tru e ” . That not having been done, the le t te r  as w e ll as the s p i r i t  of the
Judges' Rules had been v io la te d .
7.41 A fte r the emergency ended a few more measures, envisaging what
121Holland c a lls  "semi-emergency powers", were enacted in  Kenya "to cope
1 2 2with post-emergency period of d ec lin in g  tens io n". One was the  
Detained and R estric ted  Persons (S p ec ia l Provisions) Ordinance 1959 
which empowered the Governor to  make regu lations fo r  detention or 
re s tr ic t io n  of persons against whom e ith e r  a detention order or a 
re s tr ic t io n  order was in  force under the Emergency Regulations immediately 
p rio r to the enactment of the Ordinance. The power could also be used
against persons "outside the Colony" whom i t  was considered "necessary 
to  co n tro l"  in  case they entered the Colony. This measure was temporary 
and does not m erit d e ta ile d  examination but the Preservation of Public  
S ecurity  Ordinance (No. 2 of 1960) is  s t i l l  in  fo rc e , a lb e it  in  a 
m odified form, in  the Republic of Kenya. We propose to  examine i t ,  with 
other p re -e x is tin g  laws continuing as post-independence provisions, in  
the appropriate context.
(5 ) Emergency in  Nyasaland
7 .4 2  I t  was r ig h t ly  said -  "A fr ic a  has, since the days o f Mau Mau,
become a key continent in the area of world p o lit ic s  and the dominant
123fa c to r  in  A fric a  is  the s w ift r is e  o f A frican n a tio n a lism ."  The 
emergency in  Nyasaland was declared in  March 1959 under the 1939 Order.
The background was provided by the re fu s a l to heed the protests  against 
the Federation with Southern Rhodesia in to  which Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia were forced in 1953. From the middle o f 1958 the Nyasaland 
African Congress "su ffered  fru s tra t io n "  and stepped up i t s  a g ita tio n  as
"the government had made i t  c lear th a t A frican m a jo rity  was not coming
124 125soon." The Emergency Regulations 1959 of Nyasaland, made under the
1939 Order, not only provided s im ila r  powers of a rre s t, in te rro g a tio n
and detention but contained many other provisions s im ila r  to those of
Kenya's Emergency Regulations of 1952, which were meant to deal with
"te rro rism ". Nyasaland also had, among other provisions, a separate set
126of Emergency (C rim in a l T r ia ls )  R egulations. We propose to  discuss,
th e re fo re , in short, only the d is t in c t iv e  fea tu res  of the p a r a l le l
127provisions and th e ir  implementation in  Nyasaland.
7 .43  Following the Kenyan p attern  two types of orders were
contemplated: "detention orders", to be made by the Governor under Reg.24,
and "contro l orders" which were equ iva lent to " re s tr ic t io n  orders", to  be 
made by an A dm inistrative O ffic e r  under Reg.25. A safeguard, the hearing  
of objections by the Advisory Committee, was provided in respect of
•'detention orders" only, but i t  was expressly stated  th a t the proceedings 
of the Committee would be in  camera and th a t the procedure should be 
governed by such d irec tio n s  as the Governor might issue in  w r it in g . The 
provision  in  respect of "representation" was replaced by an automatic b i­
annual perio d ic  review by the Governor. The power which appeared to be 
abused most was, however, contained in  clause (7 ) of Reg.24. I t  was 
apparently much wider than i t s  Kenyan counterpart, R eg .2 (6 )(b ) and ( c ) ,  
which contemplated in  c lear terms an in te rim  detention pending decision  
on detention o rder. In Nyasaland, any authorised o f f ic e r ,  which term 
included a Grade I I  P olice In sp ecto r, could a rres t a person and make a 
"detention order" against him fo r  28 days i f  "he had reason to  be lieve  th a t
there [were] grounds which would ju s t i fy  h is  d eten tio n ". The Devlin Report
128records th a t the order was renewed in many cases and th a t a large
1 29number of a rres ts  and detentions were made under i t .
7 .4 4 . Reg. 26, which provided the power to  stop and question,
reproduced the provisions of i t s  Kenyan counterpart but in  Nyasaland i t
was used e x ten s ive ly , in conjunction with the power of search under Reg.46,
to impose c o lle c tiv e  punishment in  "specia l areas", contemplated under 
130Reg.11. The Nyasaland A frican Congress having been declared as
"unlawful society" under s .70 o f the Penal Code, Reg.46 was also used,
131i t  has been observed, to "round up" i t s  members. I t  does n o t, however, 
appear c lea r how Reg. 48 ac tu a lly  operated, although the p o s s ib ility  of 
in c a lc u la b le  m ischief being caused by i t  cannot be overlooked. I t  
provided th a t "any power" conferred upon "any o f f ic e r "  could be exercised  
by "any other o f f ic e r  acting by h is  d ire c tio n s " . Apparently th is  did not 
touch Reg. 24 which, in  the essence of the provision fo r  de legation , 
remain, vested in  the Governor, u n lik e  the position  in  Kenya.
7 .45  The dominant ro le  of the Armed Forces was re fle c te d  in  Reg.51,
the e ffe c t  of which too, l ik e  th a t of Reg.48, does not fig u re  e ith e r  in
132 133H olland 's  study or in  the Devlin  Report. Any member of the armed
fo rces  could perform "any or a l l  of the duties and functions of a po lice
o f f ic e r "  when d irected  by h is  Commanding O ff ic e r .  How fa r  the r id e r ,
"a t the request of or at the concurrence of the P o lice  C h ie f" , was
e f fe c t iv e ,  is  d o u b tfu l. Apparently i t  ind icated  the army acting "in aid
o f c iv i l  power", fo llo w in g  the common law ru le . A s im ila r  doubt could be
expressed also in  respect of the power under Reg. 1 1 (3 ) , which reproduced
134the Kenyan Reg.22B(3). How fa r  the expression "reasonably necessary"
could check the power to u s b  force (expressly provided "with le th a l
weapons") to e f fe c t  a rre s t, overcome resistance and prevent escape or
rescue is  anybody's guess in  view of the in te rp o s itio n  of the armed fo rces .
I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to deny the fa c t  th a t the common law powers in  these
m atters were apparently extended by th is  p ro v is io n , although the Devlin
135Report as w e ll as Holland appear to  express a contrary view .
7 .46  The cumulative e f fe c t  of the Emergency Regulations as they
operated in  Nyasaland v illa g e s  could be best summed up in  the words of the
Devlin Report: "They were p u n itive  expeditions intended to make i t  p la in
th a t s id ing  with Congress led to  very unpleasant consequences". The
fa c tu a l s itu a tio n  has been described thus: F irs t  an area would be
declared as a "spec ia l area" under Reg. 11, a search would then take
place under Reg.46 and persons would be detained pending in q u ir ie s  under 
137Reg.26. I t  amply demonstrated the position  th a t to  achieve a perfec t
" le g a lity "  in  the face of the " r e a l i t ie s "  of a p o l i t ic a l  s itu a tio n  was
merely an exercise in  f u t i l i t y ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  when there  was an
in te rp o s it io n  of the armed fo rc e s . The Devlin Report asserted th a t
"the Army regarded i t  as a m il ita ry  operation to subdue troub le  makers in
some areas," and th a t the " i l le g a l i t ie s  were expressly o r im p lied ly
1 38authorised from the to p ."
( 6 ) Emergency Regulations of Northern Rhodesia
7.47 In Northern Rhodesia, the Emergency Powers Ordinance, No.9 of 1927,
provided fo r  what we have c a lled  " c iv i l  emergency" in  the Kenyan context, in
terms almost s im ila r  to th a t of the Kenyan p ro v is io n . There was however 
one m a te ria l d iffe re n c e . In Kenya the law envisaged a "s ta te  o f emergency" 
in  s itu a tio n s  a r is in g , in te r  a l i a , from " in te rfe ren ce  with the supply and 
d is tr ib u tio n  of food, water, fu e l or l ig h t  or with the means of locomotion". 
In  Northern Rhodesia, instead , the s itu a t io n , in te r  a l i a , ought to  
be such as to  be " l ik e ly  to endanger pu b lic  s a fe ty " . Th is  notw ithstanding, 
f i r s t  in  1956 and then in  1958, an emergency was declared under the 1939 
Order. In  1959, however, the Ordinance was invoked and the Safeguard of 
E lections and P ub lic  Safety Regulations were framed thereunder. As the 
name in d ica te d , the purpose was lim ite d : p r in c ip a lly , the provision fo r  
" re s tr ic t io n  orders" made there in  was used, in  respect of the leaders of 
Zambia N atio n a l Congress, to  "safeguard" the e le c tio n s .
7.48 The emergency declared in  1958 was in  respect of the ra ilw ay  system 
and the regu lations  provided fo r  " re s tr ic t io n  orders" only (R eg .8 ) .
The Governor, " i f  s a t is f ie d " , could pass such order against any person 
arrested under Reg.5 " fo r p ro tectin g  the ra ilw ays of the te r r i to r y  or the 
safety of any person using such ra ilw a y s " . Arrest could be made, among 
others, by any member of the armed fo rces . However, clause (2 ) of Reg.5 
provided fo r  in te rim  detention "pending decision" up to 28 days with the 
w ritten  consent of the Chief Secretary; up to 14 days any p o lice  o f f ic e r  
of the rank of Superintendent or above could provide a u th o rity . Clause (3 ) 
made a c e r t if ic a te  by the Chief Secretary "conclusive evidence of the  
le g a lity  of such d e ten tion", to exclude, possib ly , actions fo r fa ls e  
imprisonment. For, a rres t could be made on "reasonable suspicion" and not 
on subjective s a tis fa c tio n  and the detention which fo llow ed a rres t was 
a^so» a p r io r i , saddled with th is  requirem ent, which was buttressed by 
the expression "reason to  b e lieve" which occurred in clause ( 2 ) .  The 
re s tr ic t io n  order, however, was w ithout any safeguard of any nature , even 
of time l im i t .
7.49 The Emergency Regulations 1956, however, provided fo r  both
"d e te n t io n  orders" and " r e s t r i c t io n  o rd e rs " .  Although the power to  pass
such orders was vested in  the Governor, Reg. 47 provided fo r  delegation
in wide terms, as fo llo w s:
The Governor may. . . e ith e r  generally  or s p e c ia lly , 
depute any person or persons e ith e r  by name or o ff ic e  
to exercise a l l  or any of the powers conferred upon the 
Governor by these Regulations. . .
I t  was th is  provision which, along with Reg. 1 6 (1 ) , quoted below, provided
the basis fo r  a detention order passed by the P ro v in c ia l Commissioner
against 54 persons being challenged in a habeas corpus proceedings.
Reg.16(1) Whenever the Governor is  s a t is f ie d  th a t .  . .
fo r  m aintain ing  pub lic  order i t  is  necessary 
to exercise co n tro l over any person he may
moke on o rd e r. . . d ire c tin g  th a t such person
be deta ined.
By clause (2 ) he could vary , revoke and suspend on conditions such order 
at any tim e.
1 397 .50  In STEWART v CHIEF SECRETARY i t  was held th a t Reg.47
envisaged delegation of "powers" o n ly . On the other hand Reg.16(1)
imposed a "duty" on the Governor to  be " s a t is f ie d " . The detention order
made by the P ro v in c ia l Commissioner was held to  be u l t r a  v ir e s , as no
step was taken to invoke the Governor's " s a t is fa c tio n " . I t  was he ld ,
o b ite r , th a t there could be a v a lid  delegation of both the duty of being
s a t is f ie d  and of the power to  make a detention order i f  a proper instrument
o f delegation was made. In another o b ite r  i t  was said that under A rt. 7
of the 1939 Order such an instrum ent could be made, but the delegate had
to  be unambiguously id e n t if ie d  or s p e c ifie d . In an action fo r  wrongful
arres t and imprisonment the decision was, however, reversed on appeal:
ATTORNEY GENERAL v MUNGONI^  jh e  Federal Supreme Court appears to have
held th a t "functions" included both "powers" and "duties" and th a t although
141Reg.47 spoke of "powers" the word should be read as "fu nctions". I t
was also held th a t Reg.16 required a l l  functions prescribed th ere in  to be
1 42performed by one and the same person. The Supreme Court, i t  is  
submitted, took a narrow view of the m atter and ignored the fa c t th a t
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th e  l i b e r t y  o f  the  s u b je c t  was in v o lv e d ,  which re q u i r e d  t h a t  the  s t a tu te  
be s t r i c t l y  c o n s t ru e d .
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7.51  In  Fx p . WWENVA i t  was, i n t e r  a l i a , contended t h a t  th e
" c o n f in e m e n t11 unde r a r e s t r i c t i o n  o rd e r  passed under th e  Emergency
R e g u la t io n s  a g a in s t  th e  a p p l i c a n t  was o f  such a n a tu re  t h a t  i t  co u ld  be
c h a l le n g e d  i n  a habeas corpus  p ro c e e d in g s .  The case had come up in  appeal
a g a in s t  th e  d e c is io n  o f  the  D i v i s i o n a l  C ou rt  h o ld in g  th e  a p p l i c a t io n  to  be
b a r re d  by s.1 o f  th e  Habeas Corpus Act 1861. The d e c is io n  on th e
p r e l im in a r y  p o in t  was s e t  as ide  by th e  C ou r t  o f  Appeal b u t ,  b e fo re
r e h e a r in g  o f  th e  case, th e  G overnor revoked th e  impugned o r d e r .  A
r e s t r i c t i o n  o r d e r ,  we have seen, d id  n o t  con tem p la te  t o t a l  r e s t r a i n t  on
th e  movements o f  a person as happens in  the  case o f  an im p r is o n m e n t .  The
d i f f e r e n c e  bias n o t  o n ly  in  re s p e c t  o f  th e  ambit o f  movement b u t  a lso  in
re s p e c t  o f  th e  in c id e n t s  o f  the  r e s t r a i n t .  On the  o th e r  hand, th e  common
law concept o f  ' im p r is o n m e n t '  was so w ide t h a t  i f  a man was n o t  a b le  t o  go
144to  " a l l  p la c e s  a t  a l l  t im e s "  he was s a id  to  be im p r is o n e d .  The p o in t
i s  re s  i n t e n r a . I t  w i l l  be presumptuous on o u r  p a r t  to  suggest a d e f i n i t e
answer to  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  q u e s t io n .
( 7 ) Emergency R e g u la t io n s  in  O the r  T e r r i t o r i e s
1 457 .5 2  The 1954 R e g u la t io n s  o f  Tangany ika  were un ique  in  t h a t  th e y
p ro v id e d  f o r  n e i t h e r  " d e te n t io n  o r d e r s "  no r  " r e s t r i c t i o n  o r d e r s " .  Reg.
12 m e re ly  p ro v id e d  f o r  g e n e ra l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on movement in  any p a r t i c u l a r  
a rea . On th e  o th e r  hand i t  a ls o  p ro v id e d  f o r  the  d e c la r a t io n  o f  " s p e c ia l  
a reas"  (R e g .3 ) ,  p r o h ib i t e d  th e  c a r r y in g  o f  arms in  such areas (R e g .4)
and imposed a du ty  t o  s to p  when c h a l le n g e d  i n  such areas (R e g .9 ) .  The 
la s t -m e n t io n e d  p r o v is io n  d id  n o t ,  how ever, e n t a i l  th e  p e r n ic io u s  consequence 
o f  ' d e t e n t i o n '  which f o l lo w e d  in  o th e r  A f r ic a n  t e r r i t o r i e s  l i k e  Kenya and 
N yasa land .
7 .5 3  In  West A f r i c a  a ls o ,  r e g u la t i o n s  were made under the  1939 O rde r .
These were u n ique  in  a n o th e r  sense. P r o v is io n  was made f o r  ’’ d e te n t io n '*  
and " re m o v a l ”  b u t ,  as we s h a l l  see, th e re  was a d e l i b e r a t e  a t te m p t to  
e x c lu d e  sa fe g u a rd s  a g a in s t  them. In  th e  Gold  Coast r e g u la t io n s  were made 
i n  March 1948 which were amended from  tim e  to  t im e  and f i n a l l y  revoked
i n  O c to b e r .  In  1950 a new s e t  o f  r e g u la t i o n s  were made which were
v i r t u a l l y  a re -e n a c tm e n t  o f  th e  e a r l i e r  ones, and c a r r i e d  the  same t i t l e
as w e l l  -  The Emergency (G e n e ra l)  R e g u la t io n s .  A d i f f e r e n t  ph raseo lo gy
as f o l l o w s ,  was used in  the  p r o v is io n  a p p e r ta in in g  to  "D e te n t io n  O rd e rs "
(R eg. 28 o f  1948 and R eg.22 o f  195 0 ) :
(1 )  I f  th e  G overnor has re a s o n a b le  cause to  b e l ie v e  
any person t o  be concerned i n  a c ts .  . . i n  th e  
o p in io n  o f  th e  G o v e rn o r . . . p r e j u d i c i a l  t o  
p u b l i c  s a fe t y  and m a in tenance o f  p u b l i c  o r d e r .  . .
[em phas is  added]
Clause (5 )  a ls o  deserves  to  be quo ted :
No a c t io n ,  p r o s e c u t io n  o r  o th e r  l e g a l  p ro c e e d in g s  c a l l i n g  
in  q u e s t io n  th e  l e g a l i t y  o f  any t h in g  done under o r  by 
v i r t u e ,  o r  in  pursuance o f  t h i s  r e g u la t i o n  o r  any o rd e r  
o r  d i r e c t i o n  made o r  is s u e d  th e re u n d e r  s h a l l  be b ro u g h t ,  
i n s t i t u t e d  o r  m a in ta in e d  o r  s h a l l  be e n te r t a in e d  by 
eny c o u r t  a t  any t im e .
The c u m u la t iv e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  a fo re -q u o te d  p r o v i s io n s  was to  make any
j u d i c i a l  ch a l le n g e  a t o t a l  i m p o s s i b i l i t y .  The two s e ts  o f  u n d e r l in e d
e x p re s s io n s  made s u b je c t i v e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  f u l l y  im p e rv io u s  to  r e v ie u j
and
Clause (3 )  which made a r r e s t  f o r  d e te n t io n  a " l a w f u l  c u s to d y ” /  c la u se  (5 )  
i n  a s i m i l a r  way, embodied a modern v e r s io n  o f  Habeas Corpus Suspension
A  i. 1 4 6A c ts .
7 .5 4  In  N ig e r i a ,  Regs. 2 (1 )  and 5, r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  o f  The Emergency
Powers ( D e te n t io n  o f  Persons) R e g u la t io n s  1949, rep roduced  the  p r o v i s io n s  
o f  th e  above r e f e r r e d  c la u s e s  (1 )  end (3 )  w i th  m in o r  v e r b a l  changes.
R eg.4 ( 1 ) ,  which co rresponded to  c lause  (5 )  o f  th e  Gold Coast r e g u l a t i o n ,  
however, d i f f e r e d  m a t e r i a l l y  i n  one r e s p e c t .  P roceed in gs  co u ld  be 
i n s t i t u t e d  w i th  the  leave  o f  a Supreme C ourt  Judge i n  such manner as th e  
C h ie f  J u s t i c e  m ig h t  d i r e c t ,  u n le s s  p re s c r ib e d  by r u l e s ,  to  ensure t h a t
p u b l i c  s a fe ty  was n o t  endangered. The absence o f  the  i n t e r p o s i t i o n  o f  
th e  armed fo r c e s  on th e  one hand and th e  power to  make o r a l  D e te n t io n  
O rde rs  ( v id e  Reg .2 ( 2 ) ) ,  on the  o th e r  hand, were th e  o t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  
f e a t u r e s  o f  th e  N ig e r i a !  R e g u la t io n s  w h ich ,  as we s h a l l  see, se rved  as 
a s o r t  o f  l o c a l  l e g i s l a t i v e  p re ce d e n t  so t h a t  even th e  p a t e n t l y  o f f e n s iv e  
f e a t u r e s  d id  n o t  lo s e  t h e i r  appea l in  the  p o s t- indep endence  e ra .
7 .5 5  The p r o v is io n  o f  "Removal o r d e r s "  (R e g .29 o f  1948 and Reg .23
o f  1950) i n  th e  Gold Coast con te m p la te d  app rehe ns ion , d e te n t io n  and
of a peroon
r e m o v a l / to  a p lace  where he i s  r e q u i r e d  to  be and l i v e ;  unde r an o rd e r  
passed by th e  G ove rno r,  " i f  s a t i s f i e d .  . . f o r  s e c u r in g  th e  p u b l i c  
s a fe t y  and th e  m a in tenance o f  p u b l i c  o r d e r . "  I t  a lso  had a s i m i l a r  
c lause  (5 )  as w e l l .  In  Reg.10 (5 )  was p o s i te d  th e  "Power to  d e ta in  
suspec ted  p e rso n s "  which co rresponded  to  " d e te n t io n  pend ing i n q u i r i e s "  
p r o v is io n  o f  Kenya and N yasa land . The d e te n t io n  cou ld  be f o r  48 h o u rs  
and c o n t in u e d  up to  10 days w i th  the  a p p ro v a l  o f  th e  P o l ic e  C h ie f .
A p p a re n t ly  the  scope o f  " re m o va l o r d e r s "  was w id e r  than  " r e s t r i c t i o n  
o r d e r s "  and such o rd e rs  co u ld  p o s s ib ly  be c h a l le n g e d  i n  a habeas co rpus  
p ro ce e d in g s  i f  c lause  (5 )  had n o t  been t h e r e .  I t  has a ls o  t o  be 
m entioned t h a t  i n  th e  Gold Coast th e  i n t e r p o s i t i o n  o f  armed fo r c e s  does 
no t appear t o  be p e rv a s iv e  and i t  d id  n o t  produce such a c u te  p rob lem s 
as i t  d id  in  Kenya and Nyasa land a l th o u g h  th e y  co u ld  make a r r e s t s  as 
cou ld  a p o l i c e  o f f i c e r  and even a Customs P re v e n t iv e  S e rv ice  O f f i c e r .
In  the  Gold Coast, th e  power to  s to p  and q u e s t io n  was n o t  p ro v id e d  
w h ich , as we have seen, was l i k e l y  to  c re a te  p rob lem s and become o p p re s s iv e .  
N e v e r th e le s s  the  Gold Coast R e g u la t io n s ,  as a w ho le , i n f r i n g e d  th e  l i b e r t y  
o f  th e  s u b je c t  r a t h e r  s e v e r e ly .  A lthough  th e  b la c k - o u t  o f  j u d i c i a l  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  was l i f t e d  in  1950 (by  o m i t t i n g  c lause  5 ) ,  a person who was 
e i t h e r  " d e ta in e d "  o r  "rem oved" c o u ld  lo o k  o n ly  f o r  a p o s s ib le  re d re s s  in  
the  G o v e rn o r 's  g e n e ra l  power t o  " re v o k e  o r  v a r y "  (R e g .23 o f  1948) and 
" to  a n n u l"  (R e g .30 o f  1950) any o rd e r  made un d e r  th e  R e g u la t io n s .
1 1 . P e rs o n a l  L i b e r t y  and Independence
(1 )  A G enera l V iew o f  th e  Independence C o n s t i t u t i o n s
7 .5 6  In  each and every  one o f  the A f r ic a n  s t a te s  covered by ou r
s tudy  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  fram ework d e v ise d  a t  independence d id  n o t
l a s t  lo n g .  A lthough  as " n e g o t ia te d  t r e a t i e s "  r e s u l t i n g  from "ad hoc
b a r g a in in g "  they  d id  n o t  r e f l e c t ,  as has been sugges te d , " p o p u la r  demands
1
o r  in d ig e n o u s  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e "  and cou ld  n o t  t h e r e fo r e  be expec ted
t o  s u r v iv e  lo n g ,  t h e i r  im m ed ia te  su cce s so rs ,  n o t  u n u s u a l l y ,  appear
p r i m a r i l y  to  be concerned w i th  a c h ie v in g  " a u to c h th o n y " and i n  the
2process  s e c u r in g  a re p u b l ic a n  s t a tu s  f o r  the  c o u n t r y .  The p rocess 
however sew E x e cu t ive  P re s id e n ts  b e in g  i n s t a l l e d  f i r s t  i n  Ghana and 
th e n  in  T angany ika  b u t  i n  n e i t h e r  case d id  the  Independence C o n s t i t u t i o n  
c o n ta in  any B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  and i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  n o te  t h a t  e v e n tu a l l y  
th  esc two c o u n t r ie s  became o n e -p a r ty  s ta te s  by abandoning y e t  ano th e r  
and more im p o r ta n t  i n s t i t u t i o n  which they  had i n h e r i t e d .  N ig e r ia ,  on 
th e  o th e r  hand, r e ta in e d  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  fram ework which in c lu d e d  a 
B i l l  o f  R ig h ts ,  a l th o u g h  i t  a t t a in e d  independence b e fo r e ,  b u t  r e p u b l ic a n
3
s ta tu s  a f t e r ,  Tangany ika . Each one o f  th e  Independence C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f
Uganda, Kenya end M alaw i a ls o  c o n ta in e d  a B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  m ode l led  on the
N ig e r ia n  p r o v is io n  b e s id e s  t h a t  o f  Zambia, which a t t a in e d  independence
4
l a s t  bu t  w i th  a r e p u b l ic a n  s t a t u s .  Whether th e  A f r i c a n  brand o f
" p r e d e n t ia l i s m "  and a lso  th e  o n e -p a r ty  system ( d e fa c to  i n  Kenya ),  which
came to  p r e v a i l  everyw here  e xcep t N ig e r i a ,  re p re s e n te d  a genuine appea l
t o  the  " in d ig e n o u s  p o l i t i c a l  c u l t u r e "  i s  a d e b a ta b le  p o in t  b u t  the
5
g e n e ra l  lo s s  o f  appea l o f  th e  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  n o tw i th s ta n d in g  t h e i r  
re p u te d  "buoyancy"^  c o u ld  p o s s ib ly  be a t t r i b u t e d ,  w i th  g r e a te r
7
c e r t a i n t y ,  t o  c o l o n i a l  a c c u l t u r a t i o n .  I t  i s  a ls o  p o s s ib le  to  sugges t 
t h a t  in  te rm s o f  the  du ty -b a se d  t r a d i t i o n a l  l e g a l  system w h ich , u n l i k e  
I n d ia ,  c o n t in u e d  to  h o ld  sway, a l b e i t  le s s  v ig o r o u s ly  ow ing to  i t s  
m o d i f ie d  fo rm , th e  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  was a f o r e ig n  concept and was le s s
l i k e l y  to  he accepted i n  A f r i c a  n o tw i th s ta n d in g  th e  argument t o  th e  
c o n t r a r y  based on con tem porary  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  human r i g h t s .
7 .5 7  W hatever t h a t  may be, the  f a c t  t h a t  a B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  was
. 9
i n s e r t e d  i n t o  th e  1954 F e d e ra l  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  N ig e r i a  by an amendment, 
b e fo r e  and n o t  a t independence, i n d i c a t e  t h a t  i n i t i a t i v e  in  the  m a t te r  
came from  th e  B r i t i s h  Government im p e l le d  by the  n e c e s s i t y  o f  d is c h a r g in g  
i t s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  a f t e r  i t s  access ion  in  1951 to  th e  
European C onven t ion  o f  Human R ig h ts  on which th e  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts  o f  th e  
Independence C o n s t i t u t i o n s  were based.
7 .5 8  However, P r o f .  5 . A. de Smith d e a ls  e x h a u s t iv e ly  w i th  the
N ig e r ia n  s i t u a t i o n  in  p a r t i c u l a r  and sugges ts  t h a t  l o c a l  p o l i t i c a l  r i v a l r y
was re s p o n s ib le  f o r  the  p ro p o s a l  which was e v e n tu a l l y  approved by t h ^
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Conference i n  1958 n o tw i th s ta n d in g  the  f i n d i n g s  o f  thfJ
M i n o r i t i e s  Commission t h a t  ’’th e re  was l i t t l e  enthus iasm  in  N ig e r ia  f o r  th e
10en trenchm e n t o f  fundam en ta l r i g h t s  as a s a fe g u a rd " .  G e n e r a l ly ,  th e
N ig e r ia n  p r o v i s i o n ,  f o l l o w in g  the  European C on ve n t io n ,  embraced the
11" c l a s s i c a l  l i b e r a l  freedom s" h u t  th e  p r o v is io n s  i n  e i t h e r  case d e f in e d
1 2
t h e  range o f  p e r m is s ib le  r e s t r i c t i o n s  w i th  a g re a t  d e a l  o f  p r e c i s i o n .
W h ile  th e re  was a s p e c i f i c  p r o v is io n  d e a l in g  w i th  d e p r i v a t io n  o f  'p e r s o n a l
l i b e r t y 1 th e re  were o th e r  n o te w o r th y  cognate p r o v is io n s  as w e l l ,  such as
th  ose d e a l in g  w i th  d e p r iv a t io n  o f  " l i f e " ,  t o r t u r e ,  inhuman o r  d e g ra d in g
13punishm ent o r  o th e r  t r e a tm e n t  and a ls o  s la v e r y  and fo r c e d  la b o u r ;
freedom o f  movement was a lso  guaran teed  a long w i th  th e  r i g h t  t o  r e s id e
in  any p a r t  o f  N ig e r ia  and a ls o  n o t  to  be " e x p e l le d "  from o r  " re fu s e d
e n t r y "  i n t o  N ig e r i a  bu t t h i s  p r o v is io n  was a p p l ic a b le  in  the  case o f  
1 4c i t i z e n s  o n l y .  Be ing  a f e d e r a l  s t a t e  and the t r a d i t i o n a l  and th e  
c o lo n ia l  l e g a l  systems bo th  p e r m i t t i n g  " d e p o r t a t i o n " ,  c i t i z e n s '  r i g h t  t o  
move f r e e l y  as w e l l  as t o  re s id e  and remain in  th e  c o u n try  needed 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o t e c t i o n ;  th e  o th e r  p r o v is io n s  b ro a d ly  conformed to  ^those 
o f  A r t s .  2 t o  6 o f  th e  European Conven tion  which in c lu d e d  many such
C
D
p r o c e d u r a l  s a fe g u a rd s  as were a lre a d y  a v a i l a b l e  a t Common Law. The
g e n e ra l  p a t t e r n  o f  r e le v a n t  p r o v i s io n s  o f  th e  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts  o f  th e  o th e r
s t a t e s  was th e  same as th e  N ig e r ia n  a l th o u g h  th e y  co n ta in e d  some
m o d i f i c a t i o n s  r e s u l t i n g  p a r t l y  from  " s p e c ia l  l o c a l  c o n d i t i o n s "  and p a r t l y
from  " d r a f t i n g  im provem ents"  on accoun t o f  which those  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts
15have been c a l l e d  " N e o - N ig e r ia n " .
7 .5 9  I t  w i l l  be u s e f u l  however t o  ta k e  n o te  o f  an im p o r ta n t  d i f f e r e n c e
in  th e  case o f  East and C e n t r a l  A f r ic a n  s t a t e s .  In  these  s t a te s  th e re
were s t r o n g  m i n o r i t y  g roups l i k e  th e  w h i te  s e t t l e r s  end th e  As ians w i th
e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  c u l t u r a l  backg roun ds . E v id e n t l y ,  he re  th e  s i t u a t i o n
was d i f f e r e n t ,  u n l i k e  West A f r i c a ,  where th e  e t h n ic  m in o r i t y  groups
shared  th e  p o l i t i c a l  and c u l t u r a l  v a lu e s  and a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  th e  m a j o r i t y
of
e t h n i c  groups n o tw i th s ta n d in g  the  c o n f l i c t / i n t e r e s t s  genera ted  by
" t r i b a l i s m " ,  N a t u r a l l y ,  th e  n o n -A f r ic a n  m i n o r i t y  g roups , e s p e c ia l l y  in
Kenya, as has been p o in te d  o u t ,  a t ta c h e d  g r e a te r  im p o r ta n ce  to  th e  B i l l s
16o f  R ig h ts  "as  sa fegua rd s  a g a in s t  abuse o f  p o w e r" .  N o tw i th s ta n d in g  the  
d i f f e r e n c e  in  approach t h a t  was to  be found  i n  the  d i f f e r e n t  s ta te s  i t  
i s  necessa ry  to  s t r e s s  th e  im portance  o f  c e r t a in  common f e a tu r e s  r e le v a n t  
to  o u r  s tudy  such as th e  n a tu re  and scope o f  th e  d e r o g a t io n s ,  e s p e c ia l l y  
i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  "em ergency", and o f  the  rem ed ies ,  i n  so f a r  as th e  
p r o v is io n s  r e l a t i n g  to  p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y  _:are concerned .
7 .6 0  I t  may be s ta te d  a t  the  o u ts e t  t h a t  the  A f r ic a n  Independence
C o n s t i t u t i o n s  adopted a d i f f e r e n t  te c h n iq u e  i n  d e a l in g  w i th  rem edies
which may be c o n t ra s te d  w i th  th e  r e le v a n t  p r o v i s io n s  o f  the  In d ia n
C o n s t i t u t i o n  enacted and adopted in  1949. Not o n ly  were th e  rem ed ies
named in  I n d ia  bu t th e  r i g h t  to  app ly  t o  th e  Supreme C ourt f o r  the
a p D ro p r ia te  remedy f o r  th e  en fo rcem en t o f  th e  fundam en ta l r i g h t s  as we
17have seen, was a lso  g u a ra n te e d .  The European C onvention  which was 
s igned in  1950 a lso  p ro v id e d  t h a t  f o r  th e  v i o l a t i o n  o f  th e  r i g h t s  and 
freedoms se t f o r t h  t h e r e i n ,  th e re  s h a l l  be "an e f f e c t i v e  remedy b e fo re  a
n a t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y ”  ( A r t . 1 3 ) ,  b e s id e s  o th e r  fo rum s env isaged  th e re u n d e r .
D u r in g  th e  c o l o n i a l  r u l e ,  as we have seen, th e  ” H igh C o u r ts ”  and
’’ Supreme C o u r ts ”  o f  the  d i f f e r e n t  t e r r i t o r i e s  were in v e s te d  w i th  the
power t o  is s u e  th e  w r i t  o f  habeas corpus in  A f r i c a .  As th e  w r i t  s i g n i f i e d
the  command o f  th e  E n g l is h  so v e re ig n  th e  In d ia n  p r o v is io n  used th e
p r e f a t o r y  e x p re s s io n  ” in  th e  n a tu re  o f ”  t o  q u a l i f y  i t  w i th o u t  l i m i t i n g
the  g e n e ra l  scope o f  the  C o u r ts *  power t o  is s u e  such ’’w r i t s ” , ’’d i r e c t i o n s ”
and ’’o r d e r s ”  as would be ’’ a p p r o p r ia t e ”  f o r  th e  en fo rcem en t o f  th e  r i g h t s
in  any p a r t i c u l a r  case. In  A f r i c a  no w r i t  was named b u t  th e  In d ia n
p h ra se o lo g y  in  re s p e c t  o f  th e  g e n e ra l  scope o f  c o u r t ' s  power was 
1 Rn e v e r th e le s s  used . In  v ie w  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  the  A f r ic a n  R epub lican  
C o n s t i t u t i o n s  r e ta in e d  in  u n a l t e r e d  form  th e  en fo rcem en t p r o v is io n  
and th e  A f r ic a n  C o u r ts  g e n e r a l ly  d id  n o t  i n t e r f e r e  os r e a d i l y  as th e  
In d ia n  c o u r ts  d id ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  sugges t t h a t  the d i f f e r e n c e  d id  
r e a l l y  hev”  some b e a r in g  on th e  j u r i s t i c  o u t lo o k s  d is p la y e d  in  th e  two 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
7.61 I t  i s  w o r th w h i le  however to  ta k e  no te  o f  th e  emphasis on
com pliance  w i th  ’’p ro c e d u re ”  i n  d e p r iv in g  a person o f  h i s  l i b e r t y  which
was common in  a l l  t h r e e  cases -  the  European C onvention  as w e l l  as th e
In d ia n  and N ig e r ia n  p r o v i s io n s ;  th e  ” n e o - N ig e r i r n ”  p r o v i s io n s  were
d i f f e r e n t  and were c lo se  in  t h i s  Respect to  those  o f  M a la y s ia  and S in g a p o re .
Even so, th e re  was one im p o r ta n t  d i f f e r e n c e  between the  In d ia n  and the
N ig e r ia n  p r o v i s io n s  which must be m e n t io n e d .  In  A f r i c a  th e  te rm  ’’ la w ”
20was d e f in e d  to  in c lu d e  ” en u n w r i t t e n  r u l e  o f  la w ”  whereas in  I n d i a ,  as
21we have seen, th e  Supreme C ourt in  the GOPALAN case h e ld  t h a t  i t  was th e
enacted lew  to  which A r t .21 re fe r r e d  i n  thB expression, "according to
procedure  e s ta b l i s h e d  by la w ” . On th e  o th e r  hand, th e  In d ia n  and the
A f r ic a n  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts ,  g e n e r a l l y ,  as w e l l  as th e  European C o n ve n t io n ,
shared c e r t a in  s u b s ta n t iv e  as w e l l  as p ro c e d u ra l  r i g h t s  which cou ld  be
22t ra c e d  t o  Common Law. These in c lu d e d  -  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  doub le
je o p a rd y ,  r i g h t  a g a in s t  s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n , r i g h t  to  b8 in fo rm e d  o f  th e  
reasons  o f  a r r e s t ,  r i g h t  to  a f a i r  t r i a l  ( i n c l u d i n g  le g a l  r e p r e s e n ta t io n )  
and th e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  the maxim N u l la  poena s in e  le g e .  In  th e  European 
C onven tion  as w e l l  as the  A f r ic a n  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts  the  r i g h t  to  compensation 
f o r  u n la w fu l  d e te n t io n  was e x p re s s ly  s ta te d  and in  A f r i c a ,  a d d i t i o n a l l y ,  
th e  p resum p tion  o f  inn o ce n ce ;  the  In d ia n  c o u n te r p a r t  la c k e d  these  two 
p r o v i s i o n s .
(2.) Some Im p o r ta n t  P r o v is io n s  o f  th e  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts
(A ) D e ro g a t io n s  and R ig h ts  o f  P e rs o n a l  L i b e r t y  and Movement
7 .6 2  D e ro g a t io n s ,  g e n e r a l l y ,  were o f  two ty p e s ,  f o r  peace tim e  and
emergency, in  o th e r  words, g e n e ra l  and s p e c ia l .  Among th e  d i f f e r e n t
p e r m is s ib le  g e n e ra l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  t o  which th e  r i g h t  t o  p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y
was s u b je c te d  p a r t i c u l a r  n o t i c e  has to  be taken  o f  th e  p r o v is io n  embodying
th e  concept o f  " p r e v e n t iv e  j u s t i c e "  which d id  n o t ,  however, a u th o r is e
d e te n t io n  w i t h o u t  t r i a l .  R e s t r i c t i o n s  on th e  l i b e r t y  o f  a person are
p e r m i t te d  " t o  such e x te n t  as may be re a s o n a b ly  necessa ry  to  p re v e n t  h i s
23c o m m it t in g  a c r im in a l  o f f e n c e " .  ' The g e n e ra l  d e ro g a t io n  in  the  case o f  
freedom o f  movement i s  grounded on such c o n s id e r a t io n s  as de fence , p u b l i c
s a f e t y ,  p u b l i c  o r d e r ,  p u b l i c  m o r a l i t y  o r  p u b l i c  h e a l th  which have however
r  i 24to  be " re a s o n a b ly  j u s t i f i a b l e  in  a d e m o c ra t ic  s o c ie t y "  [ Gmphasis addedJ.
In  th e  f i r s t  case th e  p r o v is io n  was d i r e c t l y  i n s p i r e d  by the  European 
25C onven tion  b u t  in  the  second case i n d i r e c t l y ,  as th e  C onven tion  d e a l t  
w i th  b road  "human r i g h t s "  and n o t  th e  na rrow  " c i t i z e n ' s  r i g h t s " .  In  
th e  European C onven t ion  th e  e x p re s s io n  "necessa ry  in  a d e m o c ra t ic  s o c ie t y "  
i s  used b u t  i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  d i f f e r e n t  r i g h t s  such as p r i v a t e  and f a m i l y  
l i f e ,  th o u g h t ,  consc ience  and r e l i g i o n ,  e x p re s s io n ,  assembly and 
a s s o c ia t io n ,  [em phas is  a d d e d ] ^
(B ) "Reasonab ly  j u s t i f i a b l e  i n  a D em ocra t ic  S o c ie t y "
7 .6 3  I t  i s  to  be n o t i c e d  t h a t  th e  c a p t io n e d  e x p re s s io n  d i f f e r e d  
from i t s  c o u n te rp a r t  i n  th e  European C o n ve n t io n .  I t  has been o p ined  t h a t  
th e  word "n e c e s s a ry "  t h a t  o c c u r re d  i n  the  European C onven tion  had a n a r ro w e r
coinnotation and im p lied  an o b je c t iv e  t e 9 t  but the  expression "reasonably
j u s t i f i a b l e "  im p o r te d  an e x e r c is e  o f  d i s c r e t i o n  which th e  ju d g e s  s h o u ld  be 
27s lo w  t o  d i s t u r b .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  th e  a m p l i tu d e  o f  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  in  th e
tw o cases cou ld  n o t  be th e  same b u t  a t  the  same t im e  i t  cannot be s a id
t h a t  in  A f r i c a  i t  was t o t a l l y  e x c lu d e d .  In d e e d ,  as E l ia s  p o in t s  o u t ,  th e
e x p re s s io n  in d ic a t e d  t h a t  c o u r ts  cou ld  " 9 e a s t r re . "  th e  v a l i d i t y  o r  o th e rw is e
o f  th e  s p e c i f i e d  l i m i t a t i o n s .  The c o u r t  in  an in d e p e n d e n t  s ta te  may
e x e r c is e  j u d i c i a l  r e s t r a i n t  i n  i n t e r f e r i n g  w i th  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  judgment
o f  what was re a s o n a b ly  j u s t i f i a b l e  in  a d e m o c ra t ic  s o c ie t y  b u t  n o t  in  th e
case o f  an e x e c u t iv e  judgm en t.  The t r a d i t i o n a l  A f r ic a n  s o c ie t y ,  as we
have seen, was g e n e r a l l y  d e m o c ra t ic  and i t  was th e  u n d e m o c ra t ic  c o l o n i a l
p o l i t y  which had superim posed upon i t  u n d e m o c ra t ic  t r a d i t i o n s  by e n a c t in g
and a d m in is te r in g  laws i n  d e ro g a t io n  o f  th e  E n g l is h  Common Law and
28m aking a fa r c e  o f  th e  "n o rm a l j u d i c i a l  p r o c e s s " .  In d e e d ,  as Read
s u g g e s ts ,  s o c ie t i e s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  th e  Commonwealth d id  n o t  share
l.he same v a lu e s  and th e  judges  in  d i f f e r e n t  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  were bound to
29respond d i f f e r e n t l y  i n  d i f f e r e n t ,  c o n te x ts .  T h e r e fo r e ,  a l th o u g h  the  same 
fo rm u la  was used i n  a l l  "N e o -N ig e r ia n "  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts  i n  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  
is su e d  from W e s tm in s te r ,  to  expec t a u n i f o r m i t y  in  approach was an i d l e  
w is h .  S t i l l ,  one g e n e ra l  remark c o u ld  perhaps be meade w i th  some 
c e r t a i n t y .  In  the  c o n te x t  o f  freedom o f  movement which c o u ld  be r e s t r a in e d  
by peace tim e l e g i s l a t i o n  eve ryw here , th e  appea l t o  j u d i c i a l  r e s t r a i n t  was 
l i k e l y  to  take  a m i l d e r  form i n  t h a t  freedom o f  movement was m e re ly  an 
aspect o f  p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y  and in  th e  l a t t e r  case, no d e ro g a t io n ,  in  
s i m i l a r  te rm s ,  was p e r m i t t e d  i n  peace t im e .
( C) D e ro o a t io n  i n  Ememency and P re v e n t iv e  D e te n t io n
7 .6 4  Lie have a l re a d y  seen t h a t  in  th e  c o l o n i a l  ju r is p r u d e n c e
"emergency" was a w e l l - d e v e lo p e d  concept which d id  n o t  a lways co rrespond  
e i t h e r  w i th  th e  Common Law p r i n c i p l e s  o f  n e c e s s i t y  o r  w i th  t h a t  e v o lv e d
in  the European Convention. The l a t t e r  p erm itted  derogation "to th e
e x te n t  s t r i c t l y  r e q u i r e d  by th e  e x ig e n c ie s  o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n "  i n  t im e o f  war
o r  o th e r  " p u b l i c  emergency th r e a te n in g  th e  l i f e  o f  th e  n a t i o n "  ( A r t . 1 5 ( 1 ) ) .
The d e ro g a t io n  p r o v is io n  appended to  th e  p re - independence  1959 N ig e r ia n
B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  env isaged  th re e  ty p e s  o f  "em ergency" s i t u a t i o n s ,  nam ely ,
war and when th e re  was in  fo r c e  e i t h e r  a p ro c la m a t io n  by th e  Governor
G e ne ra l d e c la r in g  t h a t  a " s t a t e  o f  p u b l i c  emergency e x i s t s "  o r  a r e s o lu t i o n
passed by a t l e a s t  t w o - t h i r d s  o f  th e  members o f  the  F e d e ra l  L e g is la t u r e
d e c la r in g  t h a t  "d e m o c ra t ic  i n s t i t u t i o n s  in  N ig e r ia  are th re a te n e d  by
s u b v e rs io n "  and they  a u th o r is e d  enactm ent o f  law  d e ro g a t in g  from  the  B i l l
o f  R ig h ts  " t o  such e x te n t  as m ig h t  be re a so n a b ly  j u s t i f i a b l e  i n  o rd e r  to
d e a l  w i th  the s i t u a t i o n " ;  th e  r e s o l u t i o n ' s  l i f e  was f i x e d  at two y e a rs
31s u b je c t  to  e x te n s io n  f o r  the  same p e r io d .  The p r o v is io n s  had however
3?undergone changes in  th e  Independence and R epub lican  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
Among o th e r s ,  the  E x e c u t iv e 's  power to  d e c la re  emergency was s u b s t i t u t e d  by
a "s im p le  m a jo r i t y  r e s o l u t i o n "  o f  t h e  F e d e ra l  L e g is la t u r e  and d e ro g a t io n
from  the  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  d u r in g  emergency was r e s t r i c t e d  to  s p e c i f i e d
freedom s which in c lu d e d  l i b e r t y ,  b u t  n o t  movement. I t  must a ls o  be
p o in te d  o u t  t h a t  in  o th e r  s ta te s  th e r e  was a s i g n i f i c a n t  d e p a r tu re  from
the  N ig e r ia n  p r o v is io n  in  t h a t  th e  E x e c u t iv e  was n o t  p re c lu d e d  from
33d e c la r in g  emergency e lse w h e re ;  i n  some s ta te s  a d e c la r a t io n  c o u ld  be
34made in  re s p e c t  o f  "sem i-em ergency" s i t u a t i o n s  as w e l l .
7 .6 5  The s p e c ia l  d e ro g a t io n  d u r in g  emergency was f u r t h e r  q u a l i f i e d  by
p r o v id in g  p ro c e d u ra l  sa fegua rd s  in  r e s p e c t  o f  bo th  d e te n t io n  as w e l l  as
r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  movement. The o r i g i n a l  1959 p r o v is io n  was r e ta in e d
35s u b s t a n t i a l l y  i n t a c t  in  N ig e r i a .  N o t ic e  has however to  be taken  o f  an 
im p o r ta n t  a l t e r a t i o n .  A f t e r  independence , i t  was the  l e g i s l a t u r e  and 
n o t  th e  E x e c u t iv e ,  as was th e  case o r i g i n a l l y ,  which cou ld  dec ide  i f  th e  
acceptance o f  th e  recommendation o f  th e  " T r i b u n a l "  c o n s t i t u t e d  t o  de te rm ine  
th e  c o n t in u e d  d e te n t io n  o r  r e s t r i c t i o n  sh o u ld  be made m an d a to ry .  The
p r o v is io n  i n  t h i s  re s p e c t  resem bled t h a t  o f  M a la y s ia  and S ingapore w h ich ,
u n l i k e  I n d ia ,  d id  n o t  e x p re s s ly  make acceptance o f  t h e  recommendation
36m anda to ry .  However, M a la y s ia n  p r o v is io n  was, as we have p o in te d  o u t ,
c lo s e r  t o  In d ia n  in  t h a t  i n  bo th  cases th e  u l t im a t e  e x e rc is e  o f  th e  power
37o f  d e te n t io n  re s te d  w i th  th e  A d v iso ry  B oa rd . The N ig e r ia n  s a fegua rd
o f  c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  th e  m a t te r  by th e  ' ’t r i b u n a l ”  was n o t  i n  the  n a tu re
38o f  a c o n d i t io n -p r e c e d e n t  t o  c o n t in u e d  d e te n t io n .  I t  was s ta te d  th u s :
Where a person i s  d e ta in e d .  . . o r  [ h i s ]  movement. . . 
i s  r e s t r i c t e d .  . . [ h e ]  s h a l l  be e n t i t l e d  t o  re q u i r e  
t h a t  h i s  case shou ld  be r e f e r r e d  w i t h i n  one month o f  th e  
b e g in n in g  o f . . . d e te n t io n  o r  r e s t r i c t i o n  and t h e r e a f t e r  
d u r in g  t h a t  p e r io d  a t  i n t e r v a l s  o f  n o t  more than  s i x  months 
to  a t r i b u n a l .  . . [w h ic h ]  may make recommendations 
co n ce rn in g  th e  n e c e s s i t y .  . . o f  c o n t in u in g  th e  d e te n t io n .  . .
7 .66  I t  may be no ted  t h a t  the  N ig e r ia n  sa fegua rd s  la cke d  te e th  as
th e re  was no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n  to  p ro v id e  th e  d e ta in e e  w i th  the
"g ro u n d s ” o f  h i s  d e te n t io n .  The j u d i c i a r y  i n  I n d i a ,  as we have seen,
cou ld  e f f e c t i v e l y  r e s t r a i n  th e  E x e c u t iv e  from abus ing  th e  power o f
p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n  by t e s t i n g  th e  "g ro u n d s "  w h ich , under th e
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  th e  E xe cu t ive  was bound to  supp ly  t o  th e  d e ta in e e .  Indeed ,
the N ig e r ia n  p r o v is io n  d id  n o t ,  i n  te rm , c o n fe r  upon th e  d e ta in e e  any
38r i g h t  o f  " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " ,  u n l i k e  I n d i a .  A lthough  the  " independence 
and i m p a r t i a l i t y "  o f  th e  T r ib u n a l  was ensured  by p r o v id in g  i t  w i th  a 
Chairman who had to  be a la w ye r  and a p p o in te d  by th e  F e d e ra l  C h ie f  
J u s t i c e ,  i t  was d o u b t f u l  i f  th e  T r ib u n a l  c o u ld  p la y  any e f f e c t i v e  r o l e  
no t  o n ly  because i t s  recommendation had no b in d in g  e f f e c t  b u t  because i t  
ccu ld  no t  make e f f e c t i v e  i n q u i r y  t o  s u p p o r t  i t s  recommendation in  th e  
absence o f  an e f f e c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  i t s  p rocesses  by th e  d e ta in e e  
who cou ld  m e re ly  r e q u i r e  h i s  case to  be " r e f e r r e d ”  t o  i t .
7 .67 The o th e r  " N i g e r i a n - s t y l e  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts ”  a c c o rd in g  to  de Sm ith ,
a lso  p ro v id e  o n ly  "a  f r a i l  s a fe g u a rd "  f o r  th e  d e ta in e e ,  nam ely , p e r i o d i c
39re v ie w  a t  s ix - m o n th ly  i n t e r v a l s  by an i m p a r t i a l  a d v is o ry  t r i b u n a l .  There 
was no re q u ire m e n t ,  as i n  N ig e r i a ,  f o r  a m andatory r e v ie w  w i t h in  a minimum
period  a f t e r  d e te n t io n .  He however c re d i ts  the C o n s t i tu t io n s  of Uganda
and Kenya as a f f o r d in g  " r e a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  s a fe g u a rd s " .  These a re :  the
d e ta in e e  must be fu r n is h e d  w ith  "g ro u n d s "  w i t h in  f i v e  days; th e  f a c t  o f
d e te n t io n  must be p u b l i c l y  n o t i f i e d  w i t h in  fo u r te e n  days; h i s  case i s  to  be
rev iew ed  w i t h i n  one month and t h e r e a f t e r  a t  s ix -m o n th ly  i n t e r v a l s  by an
indepe nden t a d v is o ry  t r i b u n a l ;  he i s  to  be a l lo w e d  e i t h e r  p e rs o n a l
appearance o r  l e g a l  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  b e fo re  th e  t r i b u n a l ;  a M i n i s t e r  ( i n
Uganda) i s  to  make a m o n th ly  r e p o r t  to  th e  P a r l ia m e n t  w i th  d e t a i l s  o f
40d e te n t io n  and recom m endations . Ue may add t h a t  th e  p o s i t i o n  in  Zambia
41and M alaw i was n o t  much d i f f e r e n t .  In  f a c t  i n  a l l  these  cases even 
though th e  recommendation had no b in d in g  e f f e c t ,  as i n  N ig e r i a ,  th e  
de ta ine e  was, i n  these  cases, u n l i k e  N ig e r ia ,  g iv e n ,  in  te rm s ,  a " r i g h t  o f  
r e p r e s e n t e t io n ," s i m i l a r  t o  th e  In d ia n  p r o v i s i o n .
I I I .  P e rs o n a l  L i b e r t y  and R epub lican  Governments
(1 )  Some Im p o r ta n t  F ea tu res  o f  the  R epub lican  C o n s t i t u t i o n s
7 .6 8  The s t a te  o f  Zambia, as we have a lre a d y  n o te d ,  was born  w i th  a
R epub lican  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  which th e  r e le v a n t  p r o v is io n s  have a lre a d y  been
n o te d .  The case o f  M a law i may a ls o  be e xc lu d e d  from  d e t a i l e d  c o n s id e ra t io n
at t h i s  p o in t  as the R epub lican  C o n s t i t u t i o n  tu rn e d  i t  i n t o  a O ne -pa r ty
s ta te  in  1966. Uganda was un ique  in  ano th e r  r e s p e c t .  By a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
amendment i n  1963 i t  c o n fe r re d  upon i t s e l f  the  s t a tu s  o f  an " ind e p e n d e n t
sove re ign  s t a t e "  w i th  a P re s id e n t  r e p la c in g  th e  B r i t i s h  monarch as th e  
1
Head o f  S ta te .  R e fe rence , t h e r e f o r e ,  w i l l  have to  be made to  th e
r e le v a n t  p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  t r u l y  R epub lican  1967 C o n s t i t u t i o n  b u t  i t
shou ld  be no te d  t h a t  th e  1963 amendment d id  n o t  a f f e c t  the  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts
2which appeared in  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  th e  same form in  th e  1967 C o n s t i t u t i o n .
In  the R epub lican  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  N ig e r i a  (1963) and Kenya (1964) a ls o  
th e  P ro v is io n s  o f  the  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts  remained i n t a c t ,  b u t  w h i le  i n  the
3
Ugandan and N ig e r ia n  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  these  were s p e c ia l l y  e n t re n c h e d ,  i n  th e
Kenyan Republican C o n s t i tu t io n  the s p e c ia l  entrenchment was remov/ed.
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  say how f a r  t h i s  change r e f l e c t e d  th e  p h i lo s o p h y  o f  th e
new c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  s ta tu s  which i s  s a id  to  have marked th e  p ro g re s s  o f  th e
4c o u n try  from  th e  f re e d o m /"g ro u p s "  t o  t h a t  o f  " i n d i v i d u a l s "  a l though  i t
may he s a id  t h a t  th e  p rocess  s t a r t e d  a t  independence when th e  R i l l  o f
R ig h ts  re p la c e d  th e  e a r l i e r  d e v ic e  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a in s t  d i s c r im in a t i o n  on
5
r a c i a l  and r e l i g i o u s  grounds th ro u g h  the  " C o u n c i l  o f  S ta te " .
7 .6 9  In  the  case o f  Ghana and T angany ika  th e  absence o f  B i l l s  o f  
R ig h ts  in  th e  Independence C o n s t i t u t i o n s  has been n o te d .  However, i n  th e  
R epub lican  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  Ghana (1960) and T angany ika  (1 9 6 ? ) ,  as w e l l  
as t h a t  o f  Malaw i (1 9 6 6 ) ,  human r i g h t s  are n o t  ig n o r e d .  T angany ika  
r e ta in e d  th e  preamble o f  th e  Independence C o n s t i t u t i o n .  The R epub lican  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  p ream b le , was t o  p ro v id e  f o r  th e  government 
o f  Tangany ika  as a " d e m o c r a t ic "  s o c ie t y ;  i t  a ls o  spoke o f  the  r i g h t s  to  
l i f e ,  l i b e r t y  and s e c u r i t y  o f  p e rso n ,  among o th e r  r i g h t s ,  as "e q u a l  and 
in a l i e n a b le  r i g h t s  o f  a l l  members o f  th e  human f a m i l y "  b u t  " s u b je c t  to  
re s p e c t  f o r  th e  r i g h t s  and freedom s o f  o th e r s  end f o r  th e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t "  
In  M a la w i,  unde r th e  c a p t io n  "Fundam enta l P r i n c i p l e s  o f  Governm ent", i t  
was s ta te d  in  s . 2 (1 )  ( i i i )  t h a t  th e  government and th e  people o f  Malaw i 
s h a l l  c o n t in u e  to  re co g n is e  th e  s a n c t i t y  o f  th e  p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t i e s  
e n s h r in e d  i n  the  U n i te d  l \ la t io n *s  U n iv e r s a l  D e c la ra t io n  o f  Human R ig h ts  and 
s h a l l  adhsre t o  th e  "Laws o f  N a t io n s "  from  w h ich ,  a c c o rd in g  to  s u b -s .  ( 2 ) ,  
th e re  co u ld  be d e ro g a t io n  by any law when " re a s o n a b ly  r e q u i r e d  i n  th e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  de fence , p u b l i c  s a f e t y ,  p u b l i c  o r d e r  o r  th e  n a t i o n a l  economy.
7 .70  In  th e  R epub lican  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  Ghana s . 13 p ro v id e d  t h a t  the  
P r e s id e n t ,  im m e d ia te ly  a f t e r  assuming o f f i c e ,  shou ld  make a "so lem n 
d e c la r a t io n  b e fo re  th e  p e o p le "  o f  h i s  "a d he rence "  t o  c e r t a in  " fu n d a m e n ta l  
p r in c ip le s . "  which d id  n o t ,  i n  te rm ,  fo r m u la te  any B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  b u t  
n e v e r th e le s s  spoke o f  c e r t a in  r i g h t s ,  as f o l l o w s :
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Tha t s u b je c t  to  such r e s t r i c t i o n s  as may be necessa ry  f o r  
p r e s e r v in g  p u b l i c  o r d e r ,  m o r a l i t y  o r  h e a l t h ,  no person 
sh ou ld  be d e p r iv e d  o f  freedom o f  r e l i g i o n  o r  speech, o f  
th e  r i g h t  to  move and assemble w i th o u t  h in d ra n c e  o r  o f  th e  
r i g h t  o f  access to  c o u r ts  o f  law .
In  th e  fo rm  o f  th e  d e c la r a t io n  i t  was a ls o  s ta te d  t h a t  "freedom  and j u s t i c e
sh o u ld  be honoured and m a in ta in e d "  and t h a t  "no person sh ou ld  s u f f e r
d i s c r im in a t i o n  on grounds ( i n t e r  a l i a ) o f  r a c e ,  t r i b e  and p o l i t i c a l  b e l i e f . "
(em phas is  added ). I t  may be n o te d  t h a t  th e re  was no m e n t io n ,  in  te rm s ,  o f
p e rs o n a l  l i b e r t y .  By s . 55 the  P r e s id e n t  was empowered d u r in g  h i s  i n i t i a l
p e r io d  o f  o f f i c e ,  t o  g ive  d i r e c t i o n s  by l e g i s l a t i v e  in s t ru m e n ts  i n  the
" n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t "  by which any enactm ent o th e r  than  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n
co u ld  be a l t e r e d .  In  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  th e  second R e p u b l ic  o f  Ghana,
enac ted  i n  1969, n o t  o n ly  was th e r e  a pream ble  which a s s e r te d ,  i n t e r  a l i a ,
" re s p e c t  f o r  th e  d i g n i t y  o f  th e  i n d i v i d u a l " ,  b u t  a ls o  a comprehensive B i l l  o f
R ig h ts  m o d e l le d  on th e  1967 Uganda C o n s t i t u t i o n ;  i n  e i t h e r  case i t  was
g
as se r te d  t h a t  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s h a l l  be th e  "supreme la w "  o f  th e  la n d .
7 .71 The power t o  d e c la re  t h a t  a " s t a t e  o f  p u b l i c  emergency e x i s t s " ,
in  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  Uganda (1967) and Ghana (1 9 6 9 ) ,  i s  g iven  to  th e
P re s id e n t  " a c t i n g  i n  accordance w i th  th e  adv ice  o f  th e  C a b in e t "  a l th o u g h ,
as eve ryw he re , th e  d e c la r a t i o n  has t o  be r a t i f i e d  by P a r l ia m e n t  w i t h i n
g
th e  p re s c r ib e d  p e r io d .  In  e i t h e r  case d e t a i l e d  p ro c e d u ra l  sa fe g u a rd s  are
to  be found  in  r e s p e c t  o f  p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n  ( a l s o  ' r e s t r i c t i o n *  in
1 0Ghana) d u r in g  an emergency: "g ro u n d s "  are to  be fu r n is h e d  "as soon as
re a so n a b ly  p r a c t i c a b le "  b u t  n o t  l a t e r  than two m onths, i n  Uganda, and 
t w e n t y - f o u r  h o u rs ,  i n  Ghana, where th e  "n e x t  o f  k i n "  has a lso  t o  be 
in fo rm e d  w i t h in  s e v e n ty - tw o  h o u rs ;  a n o t i f i c a t i o n  in  th e  G a ze t te  has to  
be made o f  th e  f a c t ,  w i t h i n  ten  days in  Ghana and tw e n t y - e ig h t  days in  
Uganda. The p r o v is io n s ,  how ever, d i f f e r e d  m a t e r i a l l y  in  re s p e c t  o f  th e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  th e  Review T r i b u n a l  and i t s  powers and f u n c t i o n s .
7 .7 2  In  Uganda the  scheme, which was common t o  t h e  o th e r  p r o v is io n s
r e l a t i n g  t o  o r e v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n ,  fo l lo w e d  f a i t h f u l l y  the  Independence 
C o n s t i t u t i o n  w i th  m in o r  a l t e r a t i o n s  in  re s p e c t  o f  t im e - s c a le s  as p a r t
o f  a common p a t te r n  t h a t  marked th o  fe u  changes. In  Ghana th e  t im e -
s c a le s  were indeed  s h o r te r  b u t  th e re  were o th e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  changes.
The t r i b u n a l  uas to  be c o n s t i t u t e d  u i t h  a t  l e a s t  th re e  j u s t i c e s  o f  the
Supreme C ourt and p re s id e d  o v e r  e i t h e r  by th e  C h ie f  J u s t i c e  h im s e l f  o r  by
ano the r  j u s t i c e  appo in ted  by h im , and th e  same t r i b u n a l  uas n o t  t o  re v ie u
any case more than  once. The t r i b u n a l  had th e  pouer t o  o rd e r  re le a s e  o f
the  de ta in e e  and payment o f  com pensation to  h im . There uas a u id e sp re a d
use o f  p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n  d u r in g  th e  Nkrumah re g im e , and though to  a
le s s e r  e x te n t ,  d u r in g  m i l i t a r y  r u l e  under th e  N a t io n a l  L ib e r a t io n  C o u n c i l .
The p r o v is io n s  a c c o rd in g ly  r e f l e c t e d  th e  a n x ie ty  o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  makers
t o  p ro v id e  adequate sa fegua rds  a g a in s t  th e  abuse o f  p o u e r .  T h is  found
11e xp re ss io n  in  th e  p r o v is io n  r e l a t i n g  to  "e n fo rc e m e n t"  as ire 11. As in
I n d ia  th e  remedies in c lu d in g  habeas corpus were named u i t h  a t w o - t i e r  r i g h t
o f  appeal f o r  th e  "pe rson  a g g r ie v e d " .  The r e s id u a r y  c lausa  deserves
s p e c ie !  a t t e n t i o n :
A r t . 2 E ( 5 ) .  The r i g h t s ,  d u t ie s ,  d e c la r a t io n s  and gua ran tees  
r e l a t i n g  t o  th o  fu n dam en ta l human r i g h t s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
m entioned in  t h i s  C hap te r s h a l l  n o t  be reg a rd e d  as e x c lu d in g  
o th e rs  n o t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  m en tioned  which are co n s id e re d  to  
bo in h e re n t  in  democracy and in te n d e d  to  secure th e  freedom 
and d i g n i t y  o f  man.
7 .7 3  A f te r  Konya became a R e p u b l ic  a fe u  im p o r ta n t  amendments were
made to  the  C o n s t i t u t io n  in  re s p e c t  o f  p r o v i s io n s  r e l a t i n g  to  s p e c ia l
1 2d e ro g a t io n  and emergency. The same amending Act a lso  in t ro d u c e d
im portan t,  changes in  a o re - independence  enac tm en t,  The P re s e rv a t io n  o f
1 3P u b l i c  S e c u r i ty  Ac t,  and in c o r p o r a te d  i t s  p r o v is io n s  r e f e r e n t i a l l y  i n t o
the  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  There was no p r o v is io n  now f o r  " d e c la r in g  an em ergency",
bu t  the  P re s id e n t  cou ld  make an o rd e r  a t any t im e  " t o  b r i n g  i n t o  o p e r a t io n "
P a r t  I I I  o f  the A c t ,  w h o l ly  o r  p a r t l y ,  g e n e r a l ly  o r  i n  any p a r t  o f  Kenya,
s u b je c t ,  o f  course, to  th e  u s u a l  p r o v is io n  o f  r a t i f i c a t i o n  by th e  N a t io n a l  
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Assembly; is  such event th e  s p e c ia l  d e ro g a t io n  p r o v i s io n s  became 
o p e r a t i v e .  he c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  sa fe g u a rd s  a p p l ic a b le  in  the  case o f  
p r e v e n t iv e  de ten t io n  were, however, r e t a in e d  i n t a c t
( 2 )  Some Emergency Laws
( A) The "Preservation of Pub lic  S ecu rity1* Lauts 
(a£ A general view
7 .7 4  In  i960  measures carry ing  the same t i t l e  were enacted by the
c o lo n ia l government, which have continued to  operate a lb e it  in  amended
and m odified forms, in  Kenya, Zambia and Malawi although Zambia has
s t i l l  re ta in ed  in  i t s  C onstitu tio n  the terminology as w e ll as the concept
o f "emergency" which disappeared a lto g eth er from the Republican
C o n stitu tio n  of Malawi and re-appeared in  a d if fe re n t  form in  Kenya.
18In  Zambia and Malawi, the term "pub lic  secu rity"  has been given
in c lu s iv e  d e fin it io n s  embracing, in  common, such ideas as:
securing the safety  of persons and property , maintenance 
of supplies and services e s s e n tia l to the l i f e  of the 
community and of the  adm in istra tion  of ju s t ic e , prevention  
and suppression of re b e llio n , m utiny, v io len ce , 
in tim id a tio n , d isorder and crim e, concerted defiance of 
end disobedience to the law and law fu l a u th o rity .
In  Kenya, the term, "preservation of p ub lic  s ecu rity"  included
"unlawful attempts and conspiracies to overthrow the  Government or the
C o n s titu tio n " and a lso , a d d it io n a lly , "the defence of the te r r i to r y  and
19people of Kenya" fo r  which n e ith e r Zambia nor Malawi provided a p a r a l le l .
7 .7 5  In  Malawi the M in is te r , and^.in both Zambia and Kenya, the
P res iden t, when s a t is f ie d  as to  the existence of the conditions s p e c ifie d ,
may bring  the re levan t provisions of the enactments in to  operation and
make "reg u latio n s" fo r  the preservation  of pub lic  s e c u rity , but the scheme
in  a l l  th ree  cases was d i f fe r e n t .  In  Kenya and Zambia, d if fe re n t
20measures could be enacted under d if fe re n t  circumstances but in  Malawi
21no such d is tin c tio n  was made. In Kenya reg u latio n s  providing fo r
"detention of persons" could be made as "Special Pub lic  Security Measures"
22when the President had made an order under s .29 of the C o n stitu tio n ;
in  Zambia, when a d ec la ratio n  under s .2 9 (1 )(b )  of the C onstitu tio n  was
23in  force and he was s a t is f ie d  th a t the s itu a tio n  was "grave", whereas 
in  Malawi there was no sp ec ia l requirem ent. In  a l l  cases however, i t  was 
expressly provided th a t such reg u la tio n s  could also provide fo r  payment of
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compensation to  "persons a ffec ted  by the reg u la tio n s" and also fo r
suspending the operation o f any lau  other than the C onstitu tio n  and (except
v 25in  Zambia) fo r  amending any such la u . In  Zambia and M alau i, provision
could also be made fo r  the "delegation and tra n s fe r  of pouers and duties
26conferred and imposed by or under the re g u la tio n s ,"  possibly
27ex abundant! cau te la  in  v ieu  of e a r l ie r  ju d ic ia l  pronouncements, in
28add ition  to  the usual " in c id e n ta l and supplementary c lause."
7 .76  In  a l l  cases i t  uas provided th a t the reg u latio n s  uould p re v a il
29against a l l  o ther lau s , except the C o n s titu tio n s . The pouer to  make
re g u la tio n s  uas expressly subjected to le g is la t iv e  co n tro l in  both 
30Kenya and Zambia, but not in  M alau i. Houever, to  examine the actu a l 
scope and operation of the pouer i t  is  necessary to examine the re le v a n t 
provisions of the subsid iary le g is la t io n s  in  a l l  three cases.
( b) Kenya
7.77 In  Kenya, The P ub lic  Security  (Detained and R estric ted )
Persons Regulations 1966 uere made by the President under s .4 of the Act.
By Reg.3 the M in is te r  uas authorised to pass a " re s tr ic t io n  order" against 
any person i f  he uas " s a t is f ie d "  th a t i t  uas necessary " fo r the preservation  
of pub lic  s ecu rity  to  exercise co n tro l over the residence and movement"
of the person and, i f  "co n tro l"  uas necessary "beyond th a t afforded by a 
re s tr ic t io n  o rd er", the M in is te r  could pass, under Reg.6 , a "detention  
o rd er". The re s tr ic te d  person could be removed " fo rth u ith "  to  the  
s p ec ified  area but the M in is te r  could vary or revoke the order a t any 
tim e. The nature of " re s tr ic t io n s "  contemplated uere set out in  Reg.4 
and covered a uide range. I t  could even amount to  a "detention" in  
th a t a person could be requ ired  to "reside in  a p a r t ic u la r  house" and 
to  remain there "during such hours o f darkness as may be s p ec ified  in  
the o rd er". S im ila r ly , although under Reg.5 the M in is te r could perm it him 
to tem porarily  leave the area, he could also d ire c t th a t during such 
absence he s h a ll "remain in  po lice  or prison custody". I t  is  indeed
i
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enigm atic th a t such a condition is  not sp ec ifie d  in  the case of the permit 
which the M in is te r  may issue to  a detained person "to leave the place of 
detention  fo r  a fix e d  period" under Reg.7(1) and i t  is  merely provided  
th a t the provisions of Reg.5 s h a ll m utatis  mutandis apply in  such a case.
On the other hand, although a detained person s h a ll be "deemed to  be 
detained in  law fu l custody" there was no p a r a l le l  provision in  Reg.5 .
7 .7 8  The "Review T rib u n a l"  co n stitu ted  under Reg. 8  was to  make
"recommendations on the cases of re s tr ic te d  persons under s .25 (4 ) and
(5 ) and on the cases of detained persons under 3 .2 7 (2 ) and (3 ) of the
C o n s titu tio n " . I t  could have s ix  members but i t  uas to be presided over by
the member uho uas appointed by the Chief Dustice from among persons
31q u a lif ie d  to  be appointed as a judge of the High Court. The 
c o n s titu tio n a l guarantee of the " r ig h t o f representa tion" and appearance 
and le g a l representation  before the tr ib u n a l uas re ite ra te d , o m ittin g , 
however, the tim e l im i t  fo r  the "review ", in  express term s. The 
c o n s titu tio n a l guarantee of "spec ify ing  in  d e ta il  the grounds" uas also re ­
s ta ted  in  Reg.10(1) but in  clause (2 ) i t  uas provided th a t such " fa c t,  
in form ation  or document" need not be disclosed as would be l ik e ly  to  be 
p re ju d ic ia l to e ith e r  "preservation o f p ub lic  sec u rity "  or "public  in te re s t"  
The re s e rv a tio n , i t  may be noted, uas w ithout a p a r a l le l  c o n s titu tio n a l
p ro te c tio n , u n like  the Indian c o n s titu tio n a l provision on uhich i t  uas 
32apparently based.
7 .79  How the recommendation by the T ribuna l uas to  be draun up uas
s tated  but not how i t  would weigh u ith  the M in is te r  to  whom i t  uas to be
made. N a tu ra lly , i t  bscame a merely advisory opinion according to  the
c o n s titu tio n a l provisions at le a s t in  so fa r  as i t  re la te d  to a detention  
33o rd er. The p o s ition  in  respect o f the re s t r ic t io n  order would, however, 
depend on whether s u b -s .(5 ) o f 8.81 uas to be read subject to s u b -s .(3 ) 
of s .83 of the 1969 C o n s titu tio n . The la t t e r  la id  doun th a t "unless 
otherwise provided by lau " th e  a u th o rity  s h a ll not be obliged to  accept
the  recommendation whereas in  th e  form er th e  p o s it io n  uas re ve rs ed .
Even so, no tice  has to  be taken of the fa c t  th a t the former d e a lt u ith
the "general" derogation in  respect of freedom of movement u h ile  the
la t t e r  concerned the "sp ec ia l"  derogation uhich, houever, applied only
to  regu lations  made under Part I I I ,  namely in  the in s ta n t case.
Th erefo re , the l i s t  o f m atters in  respect o f uhich reg u la tio n s  could
be made did not apply u ith  f u l l  e f fe c t  to  Part I I ,  but only mutat is
mutandis, u ith  the re s u lt  th a t the scope of reg u la tio n s  made under
35P art I I  uas c o n s tric te d . This d iffe re n ce  appears to  have been over-
36looked by Ghai and PlacAuslan who are ra th e r c r i t ic a l  o f the common l i s t .
In  th is  v ieu  of the m atter i t  is  submitted th a t , in  the  case of
re s tr ic t io n  orders contemplated under reg u la tio n s  made under P art I I ,  the
recommendation ought to ha construed as haying hinding force in virtue of 
s, 81(5) itself,
i ■. ' • . . - i'' ■ 7 ) ’ ’ : .
(C) jZambia^
7.60  In  Zambia, The Preservation of P ub lic  Safety Regulations uere
made in  1964 under s s .3 ,5  and 6  of the Preservation of Public  Security
37Ordinance (c a p .265), uhich uere amended from time to tim e. The
President could pass a 'r e s t r ic t io n  order* under Rag.15 against any
person i f  he uas " s a t is f ie d "  th a t i t  uas necessary fo r  "preserving public
secu rity"  in  the "prescribed area". U nlike  Kenya, the re s tr ic t io n s
contemplated uere feu and simple -  the re s tr ic te d  person s h a ll or s h a ll
not remain u ith in  the prescribed area or at any p a r t ic u la r  place th ere in
and s h a ll n o t ify  h is  movements. Any contravention of the order uas an
offence but i t  was also provided th a t a re s tr ic te d  person could be
removed to the appropriate p lace . A "detention order" could be passed
by the President under Reg. 31A i f  he uas " s a t is f ie d "  th a t fo r  "preserving
public  s ecu rity"  i t  uas necessary "to  exercise co n tro l"  over any person.
Such a person could then be arrested  and detained uhether he uas u ith in
38or outside the prescribed area. Although the reg u la tio n  did not
expressly s ta te  so, i t  was im p lied , in  the omission o f the requirement o f a 
"prescribed area", th a t a detention order could be passed uhen i t  uas not 
a case of a lo c a l and minor disorder b u t, as s ta ted  in  s .3 (3 ) of the  
O rd ina lce , uhen "the s itu a tio n  in  Zambia" uas "grave".
7.81 U n like  Kenya, in  Zambia a detention order could be "suspended" 
on conditions, the contravention of uhich uas an o ffence . Also, un like  
Kenya, "the place o f detention" had to be so declared by the President 
and the detention had also to  be in  accordance u ith  such in s tru c tio n s
as the President might issue . There uas, th e re fo re , more scope fo r  the 
detention  being challenged in  Zambia, despite the use of the expression 
"deemed to  be in  la u fu l custody" in  both cases. On the o ther hand, 
u h ile  in  Kenya the provision of "26-days detention pending decision"
39fo llo w in g  a rres t by any authorised o f f ic e r  o f the flau (lau reg u la tio n s
40uas not repeated, i t  uas now introduced in  Zambia; however, here i t
uas provided th a t the person could be released i f  the p o lice  o f f ic e r  uho
arrested  him found, on fu rth e r  in q u iry , th a t there uere "no grounds
uhich would ju s t i fy  h is  d e te n tio n ."  S im ila r ly  the pouer to  stop and
question and the provision of in te rim  custody fo llo w in g  such event, though
41discarded in  the neu Kenyan pro v is io n , uas introduced in  Zambia as
42"Power to  deta in  suspected persons". Indeed, in  Zambia the in te rp o s it io n
43of "defence forces" uas expressly contemplated.
7 .82  Houever, the provision uhich demands sp ec ia l sp ec ia l a tte n tio n  
is  R eg .31f. I t  is  applicab le  to the "prescribed area" declared by the 
P res id en t. An "authorised o f f ic e r"  may estab lish  " re h a b ilita t io n  centres" 
in  such an area and d ire c t th a t any person or class of persons be held
in  such cen tres . Apparently the reg u latio n  contemplates "detention" and 
" re s tr ic t io n "  s im p lic ite r . This is  borne out by the provision uhich 
makes procedural safeguards granted to "detained" persons, v id e  sub-regs. 
( 7 ) ,  ( 8 ) and (9 ) of Reg.31 A, ap p licab le , in  terms, to persons held  under 
th is  re g u la tio n . As thB term "prescribed area" uas used in  th is  reg u la tio n ,
as in  Reg.15, to in d ic a te  lo c a l and minor d isorder, the  re g u la tio n , i t  
i s  subm itted, uias u l t r a  v ire s  8 .3 (3 ) of the O rd in an c e ;^  n e ith e r the  
language used nor any other in t r in s ic  evidence suggested th a t the term 
uas used in  two d if fe re n t  senses in  the two p ro v is io n s .
7 .8 3  U n like  Kenya, the  reg u la tio n s  in  Zambia uere made a feu months
45before the country a tta in ed  independence. I t  is  fo r  th is  reason th a t
some of the reg u latio n s  such as, 20, 31A (6), 31C and 31F smacked of a
c o lo n ia l f la v o u r. In  fa c t  the procedural safeguards, re fe rre d  to above,
46uere also in s erte d  subsequently, but before independence. A tr ib u n a l
uas contemplated, consisting of a Chairman, q u a lif ie d  to be en ro lled  as an
advocate, appointed by the Chief Justice and such other persons as
might be appointed by the P res id en t. I t  uas to  revieu  cases of persons
" la w fu lly  detained1* u ith in  a month of the detention and th e re a fte r  at
six-m onthly in te rv a ls . I t  had to submit recommendations to  the President
"concerning the necessity or expediency of continuing" the detention but
the la t t e r  uas not obliged to  accept the same. The c o n s titu tio n a l
safeguards provided at independence uere on the same lin e s  and as ue 
47have seen, a d d itio n a lly  spoke of the r ig h t of "rep resen ta tio n ", a lb e it
confined expressly to  the t r ib u n a l, u n like  the Indian p ro v is io n . In
the amended c o n s titu tio n a l provisions the safeguards uere extended to a
" re s tr ic te d "  person also but i t s  nature uas changed as u i l l  appear from
48s .2 6 A (1 )(c ) , quoted belou:
i f  he so requests a t any time during. . . such re s tr ic t io n  
or detention not e a r l ie r  than one y ea r. . . h is  case s h a ll  
be revieued by. . . t r ib u n a l.  . . presided over by a person 
appointed by the Chief Justice who is  or is  q u a lif ie d  to  be
a judge of the High Court.
In  clause (d ) the " r ig h t o f rep resen ta tio n " uas expressly extended to the
deta in ing  a u th o rity  as u e l l ,  uhich uas an improvement on the Indian  
49provis ion ; the "advisory" nature o f the tr ib u n a l 's  recommendation uas, 
however, m a in ta in e d .^
7 .8 4  Some of the im portant provisions of The Preservation of Public
S ecurity  (D eta ined Persons) Regulations mads under s .3 o f the Ordinance may 
51also be in d ic a te d . A "place of d e ten tion" uas defined as a place 
authorised by the President under Reg.33(5) of the p r in c ip a l reg u la tio n s .
A "Committee o f Inspection" uas contemplated uhich could v is i t  such places  
to  hear complaints and make recommendations. Provision uas also made fo r  
re g u la r m edical examinations of the  detainees and also fo r  th e ir  d ie t ,  
c lo th in g , reading m a te r ia l, f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  communication and rece iv in g  
v is ito r s  in c lu d in g  lau yers . I t  uas also provided th a t "unreasonable fo rce"  
s h a ll  not be used in  dealing  u ith  a detained person and more e x p l ic i t ly ,  
he s h a ll not be provoked and also not s tru ck , except in  s e lf-d e fe n c e . The 
" o f f ic e r  or guard" contravening th is  reg u la tio n  could be held  as "g u ilty  
against d is c ip lin e "  and punished. These uholesome measures uere l ik e ly  
to  m o llify  the e v i l  and unpleasant consequences of p o l i t ic a l  de ten tions .
In  the f i r s t  place there  uas s u ff ic ie n t  precaution against any possible  
use of to r tu re  as uas l ik e ly  to  happen in  such cases. Secondly, the 
p u n itive  e f fe c t  o f the deten tion , uhich caused b itte rn e s s  and made a 
physica l and mental ureck of a man, uas reduced by re q u irin g  him to  be 
accorded benevolent treatm ent attuned to  the preventive purpose of the  
measure. Even so, there uas scope fo r  in c lu d in g  a s p e c if ic  provision  
against s o lita ry  confinement and also other rigorous measures used 
against ord inary  crim inals  uhether in  the normal course or as a 
" d is c ip lin a ry "  measure under the Prison Rules. Houever, these provisions  
appearing as subsid iary le g is la t io n  and not as rniere executive in s tru c tio n s ,  
there  uas scope fo r  compelling compliance th e re u ith  by the  a u th o r itie s  
through the u r i t  o f mandamus.
( d) M alaui
7 .8 5  In  M a lau i, the Pub lic  Security  Regulations made under s .3 of the
Act (c a p .14:02) d ea lt u ith  "detention orders" and "c o n tro l o rders", under 
Regs. 3 and 4 re s p e c tiv e ly . In  both cases the only requirement uas:
" . . . the M in is te r . • . considers i t  to  be necessary fo r  the  preservation
of pu b lic  order so to  do. . ."  Any member of the armed forces also ,
besides any ad m in is tra tive  o f f ic e r  and p o lice  o f f ic e r ,  may a rres t a
person against uhom a detention order uas passed. There uere also some
o ther provisions normally used fo r  the  co n tro l of te rro ris m , such as the
c o n tro l of firearm s e t c . ,  "sp ec ia l areas", offences of consorting u ith
52and harbouring "suspected persons", e tc . The reg u la tio n s  also contained
the usual"28-days detention pending decision" in  the case not only of
detention  orders but also co n tro l orders, u ith  the usual "reason to  b e lie v e"  
53clause. The scope of the "co n tro l orders" o f Malaui uas otheruise
s im ila r  to  th a t or the " re s tr ic t io n  orders" o f Zambia. The "sp ec ia l
derogation" provisions of the Independence C onstitu tio ns  of both Malaui
and Zambia did not touch the freedom o f movement and uas subjected to the
fu r th e r  q u a lif ic a t io n  -  "reasonably ju s t i f ia b le  fo r  the purpose of dealing
54u ith  the s itu a t io n " . In  Zambia the "28-days detention" provision
uas confined to "detention orders" but in  M alaui the ap p lica tio n  of the
provision to  "co n tro l orders" also uas apparently open to challenge so
long as the Independence C o n stitu tio n  held the f i e ld .
7.86 The M in is te r  could vary , revoke and suspend on conditions,
any detention order at any tim e but he uas obliged to "revieu" such
55order every s ix  months; in  the case of co n tro l orders although the
f i r s t  rev ieu  uas to take place a f te r  s ix  months, the subsequent revieus at
56q u arte rly  in te r v a ls .  Apparently the Reg.3 as a uhole uas u l t r a  v ire s
in  th a t i t  d id  not s a tis fy  the c o n s titu tio n a l condition-precedent of
providing the detainee u ith  the r ig h t  to  have h is  case revieued by an
"independent and im p a rt ia l t r ib u n a l" .  Another s ig n if ic a n t ly  obnoxious
feature  compelled the detainee to  "perform such uork as [m igh t] be required
57of him from time to tim e by any person la u fu lly  in  a u th o rity  over him ". 
Houever, i t  is  submitted th a t the e n tire  provisions o f both Regs. 3 and 4 
uere open to  challenge on the ground th a t they authorised the exercise of
1G8
the M in is te r *s  powers u ith  resp ect to  " p u b lic  o rd e r"  and not "p u b lic
s e c u r ity " , notw ithstanding the fa c t  th a t the la t t e r  term uas defined in  an
in c lu s iv e  manner in  the parent A ct. In  v ieu  of the penal in c id en ts  o f the
prov is ions , i t  could be argued, such a d e f in it io n  i t s e l f  uas u l t r a  v ire s
the common lau  pro tections embodied in  ss.13 and 18 o f the Independence
C o n s titu tio n . In  fa c t the 1non-obsta&te clause embodied in  s .5 (2 ) o f the
Act i t s e l f  re ite ra te d  the supremacy of the c o n s titu tio n a l provisions and
the "sp ec ia l derogation" clause of the C o n stitu tio n  also did not a ffe c t
58the r ig h ts  granted under ss.13 and 18.
(B) Some Other Im portant Laws
( a) M alaui
7 .87  A b r ie f  reference may be made to another pr*-independence lau  of
M alaui uhich is  s t i l l  in  f u l l  fores -  the R e s tric tio n  and Security  Orders 
59Act. I t  provided fo r  " re s tr ic t io n  orders" and "secu rity  orders" uhich
60
could be made by the M in is te r  against a convict and also "undesirable persons". 
By a re s tr ic t io n  order a person could be p ro h ib ited  from en tering  or 
leav ing  any area w ithout the "consent" of the s p ec ifie d  o f f ic e r jh e  
secu rity  order corresponded to  the provision fo r  binding over "to  keep the  
peace and to  be of good behaviour". An undesirab le  person uas defined to  
mean -
a person uho is  or has been conducting h im self so as to  be 
dangerous to  peace, good o rd e r, good government or pub lic  
m orals, o r uho is  or has been attem pting, o r conducting 
h im self in  a manner c a lc u la ted , to  ra is e  discontent or 
d is a ffe c tio n . . . o r to  promote fe e lin g s  of i l l - u i l l  and 
h o s t i l i t y  betueen d if fe r e n t  races or classes.
The emphasis added in  the above e x tra c t in d ica tes  the p o l i t ic a l  aspects of
the pouer s im ila r  to  one posited in  what ue have c a lle d  "co n s titu tio n a l
61form ula" of the c o lo n ia l deportation  lau s . The provision d ire c t ly  
impinged upon the  freedom of movement and the general derogation, as ue 
have seen, uas not only lim ite d  to  perm issib le  exceptions to  such cases as 
"pub lic  s a fe ty"  and "public  m orals", but uas also required  to s a t is fy  the
62te s t  of the lau  being "reasonably ju s t i f ia b le  in  a democratic s o c ie ty" .
Inasmuch as there  uas provision fo r  a ju d ic ia l  in q u iry , p r io r  to  the
o rd er, i t  uas possible fo r  the person concerned to  contend th a t h is
a c t iv i t ie s  amounted to nothing more than the p u rsu it o f leg itim a te
63p o l i t ic a l  aims alloued in  a democratic s o c ie ty . N evertheless, the  
rep o rt o f the M agistrate  not being binding on the M in is te r , the provision  
could possibly be challenged as u l t r a  v ir e s .
(b ) j<enya
7 .8 8  Reference may nou be made to the sp ec ia l provision made in
64the Kenya Independence Order in  Council 1963 and the subsidiary
le g is la t io n  made thereunder, The North Eastern Province and Contiguous
65O is t r ic t  Regulations 1966. The Governor G eneral, under s .19(1) of the
66Order, and the P res iden t, under s .127 of the 1969 C o n s titu tio n , could
make reg u la tio n s  fo r  "ensuring e ffe c t iv e  government" in  the north -eastern
region by uhich "temporary adaptations, m o d ificatio n s  or q u a lif ic a tio n s  of
exceptions to  the provisions of the C onstitu tio n  o r of any other lau"
could be made. This sp ec ia l provision uas mads to  deal u ith  the
secession ist a c t iv i t ie s  th a t had been gaining strength in  the region  
67fo r  some tim e . The reg u la tio n s  fo llo u e d  the  scheme of some of the most 
s trin g e n t Mau Mau reg u la tio n s  aid  contemplated in te rp o s it io n  of the 
"secu rity  forces" besides c o n s titu tin g  "prescribed areas" and "proh ib ited
zones" to  r e s t r ic t  freedom of movement in  those areas and create offences
6 8in  respect o f s p ec ified  a c t iv i t ie s  in  those areas. The nature o f uide 
end uncanalised pouers assumed under the reg u la tio n s  uas best re fle c te d  
in  Reg.11 dealing u ith  the pouer o f a r re s t . Any person, uhether found 
u ith in  the prescribed area or n o t, i f  "reasonably suspected" of having 
committed "an offence a ffe c tin g  the preservation o f pub lic  secu rity  in  
the  prescribed area" could be arrested  u ithout uarran t but there uas no 
precise d e f in it io n  of the o ffen ce . He could then be detained up to 28 
days pending decision on the question of charge and on the au th o rity  of
n o
the P ro v in c ia l P o lice  Chief the detention could be continued fo r  a 
fu r th e r  pBriod of 28 days.
7 .89  Part V I I I  ( s s .22-31) provided fo r  "R es tric tio n  and Detention
o f Persons" but i t  uas expressly contemplated th a t many of the provisions  
of the Pub lic  Security (Detained and R estric ted ) Persons Regulations 
1966 s h a ll ,  m utatis  mutandis, apply. Houever, instead  o f the Revieu 
T rib u n a l, an "Appeal T rib u n a l"  uas constitu ted  end the M in is te r  uas 
required  to supply the order and the "statement of grounds" and also  
"p a rtic u la rs "  to  enable the detained as u e l l  as the re s tr ic te d  person 
to  present h is  "appeal", u ith in  tuo months. In  both cases there  uas also 
provision fo r  a six-m onthly "revieu" but in  n e ith e r case uas the M in is te r  
obliged to accept the "report" o f the T rib u n a l uhich uas empouered to  
regulate  i t s  oun procedure end expressly authorised to conduct 
proceedings in  camera as u e ll  as to  dispense u ith  the "ru les  of evidence". 
Although, n e ith e r in  the Public  Security  Regulations nor in  these 
reg u la tio n s  uas there  a r ig h t of le g a l represen ta tion , in  both cases 
there uas the r ig h t  of making " u r itte n  submissions" and as u e l l  of a 
personal h earin g . On the uhole, Part V I I I  provided fo r  b e tte r  safeguards 
compared to  the other prov isions.
(C) The Emergency Pouers Acts
7 .90  In  Ghana, N ig e ria , Uganda and Zambia laus u ith  the captioned
t i t l e ,  in  common, uere also enacted, in  each case, almost immediately
69a fte r  independence. In  N ig e r ia , there uas, in  a d d itio n , the Emergency 
Pouers (J u r is d ic t io n ) Act uhich conferred "exclusive" o r ig in a l ju r is d ic t io n  
on the Federal Supreme Court u ith  respect to any question th a t may arise  
as to  the v a l id i ty  of the Emergency Pouers Act or of any re g u la tio n , order or
other instrument made thereunder as u e l l  as of any act done under them.
In a l l  s ta tes  the enactments conferred on the Heads of the States the  
pouer to  make regu lations  during an emergency uhich, in  Ghana, embraced
three d if fe re n t  types of s itu a tio n s  -  " lim ite d  s ta te  o f emergency",
70" lo c a l s ta te  o f emergency" and "s ta te  of emergency"; in  other s ta tes
reference uas made to  the c o n s titu tio n a l d e f in it io n  of the term s. In
the Ghana enactment, and as ue have seen, in  the Independence
C o n stitu tio n s  o f the d if fe re n t  s ta te s , i t  uas provided th a t the Head of
71State could make the re q u is ite  d e c la ra tio n .
7.91 The requirement o f the regulation-m aking pouer in  N ig e ria
corresponded to  th e  ordinary lau-making form ula -  " fo r  m aintain ing  and
securing peace, order and good government"; in  Uganda, a d d itio n a lly  fo r
"suppression o f m utiny, re b e llio n  and r io t  and m aintain ing  supplies and
services e s s e n tia l to  the  l i f e  o f the community; in  Zambia, and also in
Ghana, in  one case (" s ta te  o f emergency"), the "defence" of the  s ta te
72and also "p u b lic  order" and "p u b lic  s a fe ty"  uere added. In  Ghana, in
the case o f the " lo c a l s ta te  of emergency" the  requirement of "defence"
uas dropped and the o ther ob jects  uere re la te d  to  a p a r t ic u la r  "emergency
73area " th a t might be s p ec ifie d  in  the proclam ation; in  the case of
" lim ite d  s ta te  of emergency" the requirement uas d if fe r e n t ly  s ta te d ,
namely, " in  the in te re s t  of p ub lic  health  or to  make ava ilab le  the
un in terru p ted  supply and d is tr ib u tio n  of food, u a te r, fu e l  or l ig h t  o r the
means o f locomotion to  the community and the  continued acfcninistration of
government serv ices", embodying what ue have c a lle d  the concept of
74" c iv i l  emergency".
7 .92  In N ig e r ia , the reg u la tio n s  could provide fo r  the  detention
as u e l l  as the "deportation and exclusion" from the country or any part
76th e reo f; in  Uganda, in  a d d itio n , fo r  r e s tr ic t io n  of movement; in
Zambia, the provision uas s im ila r  to  th a t of Uganda but q u a lif ie d  in  one
respect, namely, "deportation and exclusion from the Republic" could be
77made of persons uho uere not c it iz e n s ;  in  Ghana, in  the case of "s ta te  
7 8of emergency", fo r  detention  as u e l l  as fo r  "deportation and exclusion
79of persons from Ghana" but in  the case of " lo c a l s ta te  of emergency", 
fo r  "exclusion" from the ^emergency area" and detention " fo r  the commission
o f any act in  r e la t io n  to  th e  lo c a l  s ta te  o f emergency". The use o f the
term "act" underlined in  the la s t sentence uas indeed in a p p ro p ria te . I t
uas intended to mean an offence as appears from The Local State of Emergency
80(Ooroma S ta te ) Regulations 1958 made under s .s .  3 and 6  of the Act.
Reg.2 (2 ) provided th a t any of the persons named in  schedule 2 s h a ll ,  on
en terin g  the area described in  schedule 1 , be g u ilty  o f an offence uhich
uas punishable, on summary co nvic tion , by a term o f imprisonment uhich
could extend to three  months or a f in e  of £50 or both . The provision
combined "detention" u ith  "exclusion from the emergency area" but there
uas the in te rp o s it io n  of the ju d ic ia l  process of t r i a l  u ith  the r ig h t to
b a i l  and other common lau  p ro tec tions  uhich, despite the absence of a B i l l
of Rights in  the Ghana C o n s titu tio n , could be e f fe c t iv e ly  invoked. Even
so, the fa c t  th a t the reg u la tio n s  co n stitu ted  ad hominem le g is la t io n
81fo r  uhich there uas no dearth o f precedent in  Ghana, made i t  less  
in o ffe n s iv e .
7 .93  Of the o ther subsid iary le g is la t io n  made under the Emergency
Pouers Act, reference may be made to  those of N ig e ria  u ith  uhich the
s itu a tio n  a r is in g  out o f the c o n s titu tio n a l breakdoun in  1962 in  the
82uestem  region uas sought to  be d e a lt u i th .  Under Reg.2 o f The
Emergency Pouers (D etention  of Persons) Regulations, i f  the "A dm inistrator"
(uho uas to  discharge the functions of the superseded reg io n a l executive
and uas responsible to the Federal Prime M in is te r) uas " s a t is fie d "  th a t
any person in  the "emergency area" (uestern reg ion) uas or recen tly  had
been"concerned in  acts p re ju d ic ia l to  p u b lic  safety  or in  the preparation
or in s tig a t io n  of such acts" and i t  uas necessary to  "exercise contro l"
over him, he could pass a detention order e ith e r  o ra lly  or in  u r i t in g .
Although a u r it te n  confirm ation of the o ra l order uas req u ired , i t  uas
contemplated th a t the order in  any case, s h a ll be "complied u ith  fo r th u ith "
83-  a provision uhich uas apparently based on a c o lo n ia l precedent uhich 
could possibly be challenged as u l t r a  v ire s  s . 28 o f the Independence
C o n s titu tio n  on the  ground th a t  i t  uas not "reasonably ju s t i f i a b le  fo r
the purpose of dealing u ith  the s itu a t io n " . There uas in  fa c t a move
to  amend the C o nstitu tio n  to introduce the pouer o f preventive detention
u ithout d ec la ratio n  of emergency but uhether the proposal contemplated
84d e le tio n  of the above clause is  not knoun.
7 .9 4  Under Reg.2 o f the Emergency Pouers (R e s tr ic t io n  Orders)
Regulations i t  uas provided th a t the Adm inistrator could, i f  " s a t is f ie d "  
th a t i t  uas necessary fo r  "m aintaining pub lic  o rd er" , d ire c t th a t any 
person "s h a ll be and remain at or s h a ll not be "u ith in  the emergency area
and also "n o tify  h is  movements", e ith e r  in  add ition  or in  the a lte rn a t iv e .
The only safeguard in  the case o f detention as u e l l  as re s tr ic t io n  order 
uas a mere executive c o n tro l. The copy of the order in  each case uas to
be transm itted  "as soon as p ra c tic a b le "  to  the Fedaral Prime M in is te r  uho
could "d is a llo u "  the order uhich uas, o th e ru ise , o f an u n lim ited  d u ra tio n . 
Regulation 2 in  both cases, th e re fo re , uas open to  challenge as u l t r a  v ire s  
s .29 o f the Independence C o n stitu tio n  uhich contemplated th a t "the 
necessity  or expediency of continuing the  detention or r e s t r ic t io n "
uas to  be determined by an independent and im p a r t ia l tr ib u n a l u ith in  a 
month and th e re a fte r  p e r io d ic a lly  at s ix  months in te r v a ls .
(D ) The Preventive Detention Acts
(a )  Ghana
7 .9 5  In  Ghana, as ue have seen, reg u la tio n s  provid ing  fo r  "detention"
could be made a f te r  a d ec la ra tio n  -  e ith e r  o f a "s ta te  of emergency" or o f a 
" lo c a l s ta te  of emergency" -  had been made, but i t  uas also provided in
the 1957 Act th a t reg u la tio n s  appropriate fo r  those s itu a tio n s  could
also be made and th e ir  approval obtained from Parliam ent in  advance although
85they could be brought in to  e f fe c t  only uhen a d ec la ra tio n  uas made.
The Act a ffirm ed th a t i t  had . replaced . the Emergency Pouers Orders 
in  Council 1939,®^ but i t  Aid not fo llo w  thel Order to provide th a t the  
regu lations  must also contemplate adequate safeguards ; on the contrary i t
07  also 6 8
incorporated an "indem nity1/  and/a !non-obstante> clauses. The Act
uas a permanent measure and i t  did not also lay doun the maximum tim e­
l im i t  during uhich the proclamation of emergency could remain in  fo rc e . 
Ii/hen enacted in  1958 the Preventive Detention Act uas given a lim ite d
l i f e  of f iv e  years, sub ject to provision fo r  extension fo r  a fu r th e r
89period of th ree  years, but i t  did auay u ith  the necessity o f making
any proclamation of emergency and subsid iary le g is la t io n  to  provide fo r
detention in  some but not a l l  of the s itu a tio n s  envisaged in  the 1957 Act.
I t  conferred pouer, under s .2 (1 ) ,  on the Governor-General to  make a
detention order against a c it iz e n , i f  " s a t is f ie d "  th a t i t  uas necessary to
"prevent him from acting  in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to the defence of Ghana,
the re la tio n s  of Ghana u ith  other countries or the  secu rity  o f the S ta te " .
Housver, i t  provided fo r  tuo im portant safeguards -  u ith in  f iv e  days the
detainee uas to be informed of the "grounds" and he uas to be afforded an
opportunity o f making "representations in  u r it in g "  to the Govemor- 
91G eneral. Indeed these uere fa r  too inadequate in  th a t detention in  any 
p a r t ic u la r  case could extend to ten years and the  Governor-General uas 
not ansuerable to  Parliam ent uhereas the  scope of ju d ic ia l  rev ieu  uas 
p aten tly  lim ite d  by the "sub jective  s a tis fa c tio n  clause" o f the Act and 
absence of a B i l l  of Rights in  the C o n s titu tio n .
7 .9 6  The background fo r  the  enactment o f the  measure uas provided,
i t  is  sa id , by the d e te r io ra tin g  re la tio n s  betueen the ru lin g  party
(th e  Convention People's P arty ) and the opposition (th e  United P a r ty ) .
Some o f the leading members of the opposition had been deported and tuo
of th e ir  Pl.Ps had been convicted although the conviction uas quashed on 
92appeal. Although the 1957 Act did not lay  doun any requirement other 
than the s a tis fa c tio n  of the Governor-General fo r  the proclamation of a 
"state  of emergency" such a step in  the uake of the events ju s t mentioned 
uould have d e f in ite ly  resu lted  in  a less of leg itim acy uhich the ru lin g  
party uas perhaps not prepared to  accept. The meagre safeguards, uhatever 
they uere uorth , apparently re fle c te d  the anxiety of the government to
secure c r e d ib i l i ty  and leg itim acy by improving upon the provisions of 
the 1957 A ct. However, notw ithstanding the professedly preventive  
character of the Act as expressed in  s .2 (1 ) ,  the provision of s .3 (3 ) 
uhich authorised deten tion^for double the period s p ec ified  in  the order, 
of a person uho attempted to evade i t ,  uas p a ten tly  penal.
7 .97 The Act uas amended from time to tim e u n t i l  1964 when the new
93Act consolidated the law and replaced the old enactment. I t  provided, 
in  a d d itio n , fo r  " re s tr ic t io n  orders" uhich could be passed as a l t e r ­
n a tive  measures and uere not saddled u ith  a separate requirement except 
th a t "in  the opinion of the President a detention order would not be
s u ita b le  on account o f the age or health  o f the person or fo r  any o ther  
94reason." Such re s tr ic t io n  order could be made fo r  a period of f iv e
years and, in  add ition  to  imposing re s tr ic t io n  on movements, i t  could also
impose "conditions" in  respect o f "employment or business" and "association
or communication u ith  other persons". Under s . 8  the President could, uhen
he considered such order to  be "more appropriate" in  the case of any
detained person, s u b s titu te  such order fo r  the detention o rd er. In  the
1958 Act there uere no p a r a l le l  provisions but there uas a provision to
vary , revoke a id  suspend on conditions the detention order which uas made
more l ib e r a l  in  the 1964 Act in  th a t the suspension could be even
unconditional and the provision uas also made app licab le  to  r e s tr ic t io n  
95ord ers . The 1964 Act being enacted as a permanent measure, i t  uas 
provided in  s .3 th a t a detention as u e l l  as a re s tr ic t io n  order could be 
extended by the President fo r  a fu r th e r  period of f iv e  years . The penal 
provision of s .3 (3 ) o f the 1958 Act uas re-enacted in  the la t e r  Act in  s . 6  
uhich uas also app licab le  to  r e s tr ic t io n  orders. The procedural
96safeguard embodied in  s . 2 ( 2 ' ) uas also re-enacted in  a s im ila r  manner.
7 .9 8  I t  i s ,  however, necessary to  take note of the a lte re d  
c o n s titu tio n a l p o s itio n . Under the Republican C onstitu tio n  the P resident 
combined the  power uhich uas previously  exercised by the  Governor General
and the  Prime M in is te r . F u rth er, in  the neu C onstitu tio n  there also 
appeared in  s .13 a statement o f "fundamental p rin c ip le s "  to  uhich the  
President uas req u ired , on assuming charge of the o f f ic e ,  to  "solemnly 
declare h is  adherence". There uas houever a s ig n if ic a n t change in  the  
scheme o f the 1964 Act. The pouer to  make the re s tr ic t io n  and detention  
orders and the provision fo r  the procedural safeguard uere posited in  
separate sections uherees in  the 1958 Act the pouer of making the 
detention order uas posited in  the f i r s t  sub-section and the procedural 
safeguard uas posited in  the second sub-section of the seme s .2 so th a t  
under the old Act i t  could be said  u ith  g reater emphasis th a t the
pouer uas q u a lif ie d . Houever, fu r th e r  observations on th is  point are 
reserved u n t i l  examination o f the ju d ic ia l  response. N evertheless, i t  u i l l  
not be in appropria te  to mention in  th is  context th a t u ith in  a feu  days
97of the enactment o f the la t e r  Act, the Habeas Corpus Act 1964 uas enacted.
(b ) X®Q92PX*Jia—
7 .9 9 . The d is t in c t iv e  fe a tu re  o f the lau  enacted in  Tanganyika uas th a t
there  uas no provision fo r  " re s tr ic t io n  orders" in  the Preventive
98Detention Act, 1962, of Tanganyika although i t  had other provisions -
such as the procedural safeguard uhich corresponded to the language and
99scheme of the 1964 Ghana Act and the provision under uhich the  
President could "rescind" and also "suspend" the detention orders.
On the other hand i t  had other m a te ria l d iffe ren ces  a lso . The pouer of 
the President to  d ire c t "detention" of any person uas saddled u ith  tuo 
a lte rn a tiv e  requ irem ents:^^
(a ) Where i t  is  shoun to  the s a tis fa c tio n  o f the President 
th a t any person is  conducting h im self so as to  be 
dangerous to  peace and good order in  any p art of 
Tanganyika or is  acting in  a manner p re ju d ic ia l to the 
defence of Tanganyika or the secu rity  of the S ta te ; jar
(b ) The President is  s a t is f ie d  th a t an o rd er. . . is  
necessary to  prevent any person from acting  in  a 
manner p re ju d ic ia l to  peace and good order in  any 
part of Tanganyika, o r to  the defence of Tanganyika 
or the secu rity  o f the State
[emphasis added]
Houever, the  apparent d is tin c tio n  between the  tuo requirements uas
narroued doun by provid ing  th a t in  a l l  cases the President " s h a ll requ ire
th a t any inform ation on uhich he s a t is f ie s  h im self" s h a ll be given on
oath , unless he is  " s a t is f ie d  th a t i t  is  not fe a s ib le  or p ra c tic a b le"
102to  do so in  respect of "any p a r t ic u la r  item of in fo rm atio n ".
F u rth er, th ere  uas another im portant provision  th a t -  "No order made
103under th is  Act s h a ll be questioned in  any c o u rt."
7 .100  The scope of ju d ic ia l  review in  Ghana (under the 1958 A c t), 
and in  Tanganyika, apparently narroued doun to  one common p o in t, uhich 
uas not debatable. In  e ith e r  ju r is d ic t io n  the court could a t le a s t hold
a detention i l l e g a l  i f  there uas any v io la t io n  of the  procedural safeguards, 
For, in  Tanganyika, i t  uas only the v a l id i ty  o f the order and not the 
detention th a t uas immunised against ju d ic ia l  challenge. I t  could also  
be argued th a t i t  uas only the "form al" v a l id i ty  th a t uas p ro tected .
In  other uords the  exercise o f the pousr o f detention must conform to  the  
prescribed requirem ents. Houever, an order passed under clause (b ) 
quoted above appeared to  have been in s u la te d  to a g rea te r exten t against
ju d ic ia l  challenge by the use of the uord " s a t is f ie d "  to  in d ic a te  the
P res id en t's  sub jective  s a t is fa c t io n . In  the case of an order passed 
under clause (a ) the court could in s is t  th a t i t  had to be s a t is f ie d  
th a t the President had s u ff ic ie n t  m a te ria l before him, even i f  unsworn, 
on uhich he had based h is  " s a t is fa c tio n " .
7.101 There uas yet another angle to  ju d ic ia l  review  in  Tanganyika.
Here, u n like  Ghana, the Act provided fo r  an "Advisory Committee" u ith
tuo members to be appointed by the Chief Justice  and another tuo as
104u e l l  as the Chairman, by the P res id en t. Although the President uas 
not obliged to accept i t s  "advice" a duty uas la id  on him to  re fe r  to i t
every order passed by him, "u ith in  a year o f the order" even when no
representation  uas made to him, but "as soon as may be" uhen a 
representation  uas made. Possibly because the enactment uas a permanent
measure and i t  d id  not prescribe a maximum tim e l im i t ,  th ere  was a 
provision  fo r  p e rio d ic  review "a t in te rv a ls  not exceeding a year" which 
had an im portant fa c e t which required the President not only to  inform  
the Committee o f the  "grounds" but also "such other m atters" which were 
re le v an t to  h is  "continued d e ten tio n ". The Committee could " in te rv iew "  
the detained person but i t  is  doubtfu l i f  the la t t e r  could in s is t  on a 
personal h earing . In  any case, i t  could bs argued th a t fo r  a 
"continued detention" beyond a year th ere  had to  be a f a i r  and im p a rt ia l  
consideration of the case. In  any case where th is  r ig h t was in fr in g e d  
the aggrieved person could possibly secure h is  re le a se .
7 .102  Although the Republican C o n stitu tio n  o f Tanganyika, l ik e  th a t 
of Ghana did not contain any B i l l  of R ights, the preamble spoke of 
l ib e r ty  as an " in a lie n a b le  r ig h t"  and o f the s ta te  being governed as
a "democratic s o c ie ty " . This appears to have in s p ire d  the provision  
fo r  the "Advisory Committee" and i t  could equally  be expected th a t the 
ru le rs  were l ik e ly  to  to le ra te  an independent ro le  o f the ju d ic ia ry  which 
could ensure the exercise o f the power of ju d ic ia l  review in  a normal 
and u n in h ib ite d  manner. U n fo rtu n a te ly , the provisions of s .4 cast 
doubts on the in te n tio n s  of the  ru le rs . I t  enabled the detainees being  
tre a te d  as ordinary crim in a ls  by authoris ing  the President to  make 
regu lations  fo r  applying to  them "any of the provisions of the Prisons 
Ordinance o r o f any ru les  made thereunder re la t in g  to  convicted c rim in a l 
prisoners and d isapplying such provisions re la t in g  to  c iv i l  p ris o n e rs ,"  
although the detainee was to  be held as a " c iv i l  p risoner in  custody or 
prison" by any po lice  o f f ic e r  or prison o f f ic e r .
I \J. Personal L ib e rty  and One-party S tates
(1 ) The ph ilosophica l base
7 .103  A m u lti-p a rty  p o l i t ic a l  system has come to be regarded in  the 
western world as the only system which can ensure a democratic form of 
government and guarantee personal l ib e r t y .  There is  also a strong current
which favours the opinion th a t a parliam entary form of government best
1
serves a modern democracy. These id eas , however, did not carry
conviction with the leaders o f the  new nations of Commonwealth A fric a
who were faced with tasks which the c o lo n ia l ru le rs  had not contemplated.
There is  now a growing re a lis a tio n  in  the West of the p o s itio n , which
has been succinctly  described as fo llo w s :
The e n tire  system of law and in s t itu t io n s  in h e r ite d  from 
colonialism  at independence d ic ta ted  th a t the new s ta tes  
were to be racked between the values of the subsistence 
sec to r, embodied in  customary law a id  in s t i tu t io n s , the  
values of modernising enclaves embodied in  the received  
English law and in s t itu t io n s  and the new values re f le c t in g  
the claim of e g a lita ria n is m  and in s ta n t development blown 
up by the wind of change. [emphasis addedJ
7 .104  An im portant aspect of the "modernising" process does not appear
to  have been noted in  the above passage. Our fin d in g s , as we have seen,
suggest th a t the customary p o l i t ic a l  in s t itu t io n s  did not b e n e fit from
the modernising process. Rather, in  the new form, they became a burden to
the new ru le rs . The new Chiefs who had lo s t th e ir  t r a d it io n a l  ro le  end
a u th o rity  and also perhaps th e ir  relevance in  the modern age to a great
e x te n t, came to be in s t itu t io n a lis e d  in  the Independence C onstitu tio ns  o f 
3
many s ta te s . The in s t i tu t io n ,  as we have seen, was best suited to  a 
t r ib a l  society  but the new s ta tes  had cut across t r ib a l  boundaries and 
i t  was necessary fo r  them to curb " tr ib a lis m "  to  ensure such s ta b i l i t y  
as was required  fo r  " in s ta n t development". On the o ther hand, in  many 
t e r r i to r ie s  p o l i t ic a l  p a rtie s  came to be organised mostly along t r ib a l
4
lin e s . The misuse of "freedom o f association" by them, proved d etrim enta l 
to  n a tio n a l u n ity , as they no longer remained un ited  n a t io n a lis t  movements 
of the pre-independence p erio d . Each s ta te  had d if fe re n t  problems and 
th e ir  d if fe r e n t  b ra ids  of " tr ib a lis m "  but even in  Tanzania, according to  
Nyerere, a m u lti-p a rty  system could have encouraged the growth of
5
"f act ion a l i  sm " .
7 .105  F irs t  Ghana, then Tanganyika, M alawi, Uganda and Zambia, one
a fte r  another, in  th a t o rder, became de lure one-party s ta te s . Although
Ghana and la t e r  Uganda each succumbed to m il ita r y  r u le , i t  i s  im portant
to  take  note of the views expressed in  December 1958 by President Nkrumah
(then Prime M in is te r) on democracy, parliam entary government and preventive
d eten tio n .^  In  a speech made at the Indian Council of Uorld A ffa irs  in
New D elh i he asked those who c r it ic is e d  him fo r  adopting "undemocratic"
methods to  consider the " r e a l i ty  o f the s itu a t io n " . He observed:
C erta in  d is lo y a l and subversive elements in  Ghana had had 
to be d e a lt with f irm ly  because they prejudiced our very 
existence as a fre e  and independent s ta te . There had been 
p lo ts  and various attempts to  e x p lo it  t r ib a l  and reg io n a l 
lo y a lt ie s .  Obviously steps had to  be taken to  preserve 
our in te rn a l s e c u rity .
Speaking about h is  approach to  democracy he asserted th a t Ghana society was
"fundamentally democratic" by i t s  "own form end tra d it io n "  in  th a t the
Chiefs had to  "adhere to  the ru les  and reg u latio n s  la id  down by the
people". He added th a t the parliam entary system of western type was
"subtle  and soph istica ted" as w e ll as " d i f f ic u l t  a id  cumbersome to  apply
to  the t r a d it io n a l  p a tte rn  of government". The essence of democracy,
according to him, lay  in  u n iv e rs a l ad u lt suffrage and re g u la r , fre e
and u n fe tte red  e le c tio n s .
7 .106 There is  no doubt about the fa c t  th a t the "Convention People's  
P arty" of President Mkrumah fought " tr ib a lis m "  and what has been 
described as "the chorus of voices" against i t  was composed of such 
elements as the Ashanti C h ie fs , who formed the hard core of the landlord  
and c a p ita l is t  c lass , the Kumasi businessmen and the  "Ewe" cocoa-farmers 
of Trans-A/olta Togoland uho demanded secession. Another form of " t r ib a l"  
opposition manifested i t s e l f  in  the "N ational L iberation  Movement" led by 
Dr. K .A . Busia, which re f le c te d  an " e l i t i s t "  a t t itu d e . Even the 
"United P arty" , i t  appears, came to be organised as a p ro test against the
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ban on t r i b a l ,  re lig io u s  and reg io n a l p a r t ie s . Apparently th e  opposition
in  Ghana did not play a constructive ro le  as could be expected of i t  
in  a parliam entary system o f the uestem  type, but the ru lin g  party uas 
i t s e l f  speaking in  terms of a neu philosophy uhen i t  asserted th a t:
"The ju d ic ia ry  is  an organ o f Society and in  our society people are 
supreme; hence the in s t itu t io n s  of our society  can enjoy fre e  autonomy
g
only up to the po in t th a t they serve the highest id e a ls  o f s o c ie ty .w
7.107 About the Ghana ju d ic ia ry  i t  has been observed th a t "Many
of the judges uere p ra c tis in g  p o lit ic ia n s  and not tra in ed  lawyers" and
those uho valued independence and in te g r ity  e ith e r  resigned or uere 
g
dismissed. Following an attempt on h is  l i f e  in  1962 President Nkrumah
dismissed tuo of h is  Cabinet M in is te rs  and the Executive Secretary of
the Party uho uere la t e r  t r ie d  fo r  treason by a sp ec ia l court presided
over by the Chief Justice  S ir  Akru Korsah; they uere acqu itted  b u t, as
a re s u lt ,  the Chief Justice  uas h im self dismissed and the defendants uere
10re -a rre s te d  under the Preventive Detention Act. A spec ia l lau  uas
11enacted the next day and the ju d ic ia l  v e rd ic t came to  be n u l l i f ie d .
7 .108  In  Tanzania, President Nyerere c a te g o ric a lly  diecarded the
concept of a "n eu tra l"  judge. He spoke of a neu philosophy in  the  
12fo llo w in g  terms:
The fa c t th a t judges in te rp re t  the lau  makes i t  v i t a l  
th a t they should be part o f the  society uhich is  governed 
by the la u . T h e ir in te rp re ta t io n  must be made in  the  
l ig h t  o f the assumptions and asp ira tio n s  of the society  
they l iv e  in .  Otherwise th e ir  in te rp re ta t io n  may appear 
rid icu lo u s  to  th a t socie ty  and may lead to  the whole concept 
of lau  being held in  contempt by the people. . . In  a one 
party s ta te  l ik e  Tanzania some of the problems of 
id e n t if ic a t io n  u ith  the people are e as ie r than in  nations  
uhich are more d ivided or uhere the p o l i t ic a l  system 
stresses d iv e rs ity  more than u n ity . • • Uhat b e tte r  place 
to teach, both by example and by precept, the fundamental 
p rin c ip le s  of Rule o f Lau then a t party  meetings and party  
a c t iv i t ie s  ? Our n a tio n a l u n ity  a llo u s  us to  use th is  
opportunity fo r  showing an understanding of the requirements 
of ju s tic e  and fo r  lea rn in g  about p e o p led  meaning uhen 
they ta lk  o f ju s t ic e . [Emphasis addedJ
Although Nyerere uas speaking of the "lau" and the "Rule of Lau" the fo c a l
po in t o f emphasis in  h is  address uas "n a tio n a l u n ity "  uhich uas bound to
re leg ate  la u , as an in s t i tu t io n  of c o n tro l, to  a secondary p lace . Houever,
at another place he observes th a t the " ju d ic ia ry  at any le v e l must be
independent of the executive arm of the s ta te "  and th a t the "execution o f
13lau  should be u ith o u t fe a r  and favo u r" . Indeed, the ju d ic ia ry  uas 
invested u ith  a neu and d i f f i c u l t  ro le  -  to  be fre e  from personal but 
not p o l i t ic a l  b ia s .
7.109 I t  has, houever, to  be admitted th a t N yerere 's  p o l i t ic a l
philosophies uere not aluays expressed in  c lea r and precise terms.
About h is  v ieus on personal l ib e r ty  Cranford P ra tt  u r ite s  th a t i t  uas
expressed in  terms of a "neu balance" betueen the in d iv id u a l and the
society u ith  emphasis on s o c ia l du ties  and communal re la tio n s h ip  ra th e r
14than on in d iv id u a l r ig h ts . This uas ra th e r an abstract descrip tion  
uhich broadly corresponded to  the  t r a d it io n a l  African values. Houever, 
John Hatch exp la ins  th is  in  more concrete term s. The Preventive  
Detention Act uas passed uhen Nyerere uas out of o ff ic e  but as Hatch 
has sa id , "he considered th a t in  a neu country u ith o u t the b e n e fit of a 
la rg e , respected po lice  force and secu rity  netuork, u ith  scanty 
communication and many enemies, i t  uas necessary to s a c r if ic e  the 
l ib e r ty  of a feu innocent people to  prevent the sabotage of the uhole 
n a tio n ." 15
7.110 In  the course of an im portant speech d e live red  in  1964 on the
occasion o f the opening o f the U n iv e rs ity  College campus, Nyerere d ea lt
at some length u ith  the provision fo r  preventive  detention and h is
comments on human r ig h ts  in  general provide an in s ig h t in to  h is
16philosophy and deserve to be quoted:
I f  fo r  example, one person uses h is  freedom o f speech end 
organisation  in  a manner uhich u i l l  g re a tly  reduce our 
prospect o f economic development or endanoer our n a tio n a l 
s e c u rity , uhat is  th e  government to do ? Freedom of 
speech. . . movement. • • association are valuable  th ings
i  *  9JL (  j J
uhich ue want to  secure fo r  a l l  our people. But a t the  
same tim e ue must also secure, u rg e n tly , freedom from 
hunger and from ignorance and d isease, fo r  every one.
Can ue a llo u  th e  abuse of one freedom to  sabotage our 
n a tio n a l search fo r  another ?
Take the question o f detention u ith o u t t r i a l .  This is  
a desperately serious m a tte r. I t  means th a t you are 
im prisoning a man uho has not broken any u r it te n  lau  or 
uhen you cannot be sure of proving beyond reasonable 
doubt th a t he has done so. You are r e s t r ic t in g  h is  
l ib e r ty  and making him s u ffe r .  . . fo r  uhat you th ink  
he intends to do. . . Feu th ings are more dangerous to  
the freedom of socie ty  than th a t .  For freedom is  
in d iv is ib le . . . the freedom o f every c it iz e n  is  [th u s ]  
reduced. To suspend the Rule o f Lau under any 
circumstances is  to  leave open the p o s s ib il i ty  of the  
grossest in ju s t ic e s  being p e rp e tra ted . Y e t. . . I  
have. . . supported the in tro d u c tio n  of [ th e ]  la u . . . Our 
Union has n e ith e r  the long t r a d it io n  of nationhood, nor 
the  strong physica l means of n a tio n a l s e c u rity  uhich 
o ld er countries take fo r  granted. . .
In  the above passage ue f in d  ample evidence fo r  the proposition  th a t
Nyerere*s continuing search fo r  neu norms is  perhaps the  reason uhy h is
ideas appear in tra c ta b le  to  one uneducated in  h is  philosophy. Even so,
th ere  is  one p o in t uhich emerges in  bold r e l i e f  and i t  is  th is  -  i t  is
the in d iv id u a l in  the socie ty  a id  not the in d iv id u a l versus the
society  o r the s ta te  fo r  uhom he expresses h is  concern, in  uhich, ue
can say, the r e a l i t ie s  of the s itu a tio n  re f le c te d  are common not only to
the A frican s ta te s  but to  the th ird  uorld as a uhole . P ra tt  re la te s
the idea to  the notion of an " id e a l democratic so c ie ty"  u ith  an
"underlying harmony of in te r e s t"  in  uhich there  u i l l  be no need fo r
17an organized p o l i t ic a l  fa c t io n .
7.111 In  Zambia, President Kaunda spoke o f h is  "Humanism" in  more
c erta in  and d e f in ite  term s, fo r  he made no secre t o f the fa c t th a t he
understood " l ib e r a l  democracy" to mean th a t th ere  should be "respect
fo r  the in d iv id u a l in  s o c ie ty " . But i t  uas the "common man" uho needed
pro tection  against d iscrim in a tio n  by the " p r iv ile g e d  fe u " ; th is
pro tec tio n  the Party must a ffo rd  him and i t  must th e re fo re  be "strong"
18and "supreme" to do so. Thus he emphasised the r ig h ts  of the  in d iv id u a l:
"The f i r s t  and most im portant u n it  u ith  the Party as indeed u ith  the
19government, is  the in d iv id u a l" . As ue have seen in  N yerere 's  philosophy,
Kaunda also makes an appeal in  express terms to t r a d it io n a l  values:
This high va lu a tio n  of man and respect fo r  human 
d ig n ity  uhich is  a legacy of our tra d it io n  should 
not be lo s t in  the neu A fr ic a . . . A frican society  
has aluays been man-centred. . .^ q
Indeed, as has been observed, both Nyerere and Kaunda uere profoundly
in fluenced  by the  l i f e  and uork of Mahatma Gandhi of In d ia  and i t  uas
Gandhi's emphasis on the people's  t r a d it io n a l  cu ltu re  uhich appears to
21have appealed strongly to  the tuo A frican statesmen.
7 .112  I t  i s ,  houever, necessary to  take no tice  of the sp ec ia l
s itu a tio n  th a t obtained in  Zambia uhere tr ib a lis m  uas rampant and the
economy had a strong in d u s tr ia l b ias  because of the copper mines. There
uas fo re ig n  investment in  large measure and the e x p a tr ia te  personnel uho
manned in d u s tr ia l establishm ents also made th e ir  presence f e l t  in  Zambia.
Houever, u n like  Kenya, n e ith e r  in  Tanganyika nor in  Zambia, uas there
any acute problem of the uh ite  s e t t le rs  but the h o s tile  Rhodesian regime
on i t s  borders posed specia l problems of in te rn a l secu rity  fo r  Zambia.
On account of i t s  advantages o f "party cohesion, t r ib a l  harmony and
22economic autonomy", Tanganyika's commitment to socialism  uas more
secure and c erta in  u ith  the re s u lt  th a t in d iv id u a l r ig h ts  came to  be
in creas in g ly  subordinated to the r ig h ts  of the community. In  Zambia the
lo c a l s itu a tio n  did not a llo u  the  process to  move fa s t .  Kaunda had to
meet t r ib a l  c o n flic t  u ith in  the party  and government. His personal
f r ie n d , Simon Kapuepue, deserted him, and formed the United People 's
23Party at the c a l l  of h is  tribesm en, the Bemba. I t  i s  no surprise  
th ere fo re  th a t Kaunda's slogan, "One Zambia, One Nation"' found a place 
in  the preamble to the 1973 C o n s titu tio n .
7 .113  In  M alau i, the underlying philosophy fo r  the proposed One- 
party State C onstitu tion  recommended by the "C o n s titu tio n a l Committee"
- 125
24uias s ta ted  succ inctly  in  i t s  rep o rt in  the fo llo w in g  terms:
The Committee p a r t ic u la r ly  kept in  mind at a l l  tim es the 
need in  a country com paratively under-developed and 
inexperienced in  nationhood, fo r  a form of government uhich 
w i l l  a ffo rd  the maximum degree o f u n ity , reso lu tio n  end 
s t a b i l i t y  to  perm it the maximum fu lf i lm e n t o f the country 's  
human and physical resources in  the shortest period  
of tim e .
Apparently the  Report rehearsed the  common arguments. I t s  d e ta ile d
observations on ideas and in s t i tu t io n s  of government uere s im ila r ly
based on common arguments to  a g reat e x te n t, although in  some areas i t
was more outspoken and candid. I t  was observed th a t the function  of the
ju d ic ia ry  was ttnot to question or obstruct the p o lic ie s  o f the executive
government but to ascerta in  the purposes of those p o lic ie s  by reference
to  the laws made by P arliam ent, and f s i r ly  and im p a r t ia lly  to  give e f fe c t  
25to those purposes. The Report uas extrem ely c r i t ic a l  o f the B i l l  of 
Rights which, in  the Independence C o n s titu tio n , uas accepted with  
"considerable" re s e rv a tio n . I t  provided, i t  was sa id , " u n re a lis t ic ,  
i l lu s o ry  and in e ffe c tu a l safeguard fo r  m in o rity  groups": "in  a
democratic s ta te  laws depend fo r  t h e ir  u ltim a te  au th o rity  upon the  
desire o f the people to  see them en fo rced ."  I t  uas also said th a t as a 
member o f the U nited Nations Malawi had "p u b lic ly  guaranteed respect"  
fo r  human r ig h ts  which could be re ite ra te d  in  the preamble to  the
proposed C o n s titu tio n ; a form al B i l l  o f Rights uas l ik e ly  to  create
26c o n flic t  between the Executive and the J u d ic ia ry .
(2 ) The In s t i tu t io n a l  Devices fo r  the P ro tection  of Personal L ib e rty
(A) C o n s titu tio n a l Provisions
7.114  On a p r io r i  considerations the concepts o f "u n ity"  and "secu rity
of the s ta te "  which formed the common p h ilo so p h ica l base in  a l l  One-party
States found expression in  the common provision  in  a l l  C o n stitu tio n s  which
declared the  ru lin g  party as the only organ isation  e n t i t le d  to  carry on
27p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t ie s .  The "freedom of association" being thus 
c o n s titu tio n a lly  c u rta ile d  there uas no scope fo r  any organised opposition
to function  and fo r  th a t m atter there could be no grievance of 
"persecution" o f any c it iz e n  fo r  professing any p a r t ic u la r  p o l i t ic a l  
b e lie f  o r id e a l ,  although i t  i s  a notorious fa c t th a t i t  was not the 
charm of p o l i t ic a l  dogma but the tuss le  fo r  power th a t re a lly  generated 
heat in  the p o l i t ic a l  controversies in  which the new s ta tes  o f the th ird  
world found themselves embroiled as there could be l i t t l e  d iffe re n ce  among 
the p o l i t ic a l  p a rtie s  on the basic issues of such problems as poverty, 
i l l i t e r a c y  and th e ir  l i k e .  Apparently cases of d ep riva tio n  o f personal 
l ib e r ty  in  the p o l i t ic a l  context were bound to assume d if fe re n t  
complexions, such as over-zealous acts o f the bureaucrats and party  
o f f ic ia ls ,  depending upon the lo c a l s itu a tio n  in  each s ta te . I t  could 
th ere fo re  be argued th a t there was in  fa c t  no necessity  to provide fo r  
c o n s titu tio n a l p ro tection  of personal l ib e r ty  in .th e  p o l i t ic a l ,  context 
inasmuch as any " p o l i t ic a l"  act o f any person could only take such form 
as sed itio n  o r other types of c rim in a l a c t iv i t y ,  and th a t d epriva tion  of 
l ib e r ty  in  any p a r t ic u la r  case being grounded upon the fa c ts  o f the  case, 
he was assured of the p ro tection  of the Rule of Law which was m aintained  
under the new C o n s titu tio n s . The new philosophy, not the c o n s titu tio n a l 
provis ions, however, envisaged, as we have seen, a d if fe re n t  ro le  fo r  the  
ju d ic ia ry  and th ere fo re  i t  was not unusual to fin d  in  the new C onstitu tio ns  
a new in s t i tu t io n a l  device through which the Rule o f Law could be 
e ffe c t iv e ly  ensured; Malawi uas an exception not only in  th is  respect 
b u t, as ue s h a ll see, in  many other respects as w e ll .
7 .115 In  both Tanzania and Zambia, the preamble formed an im portant 
part of the C onstitu tions although, u n fo rtu n a te ly , th e  judges, fo llo w in g
the Common Law canons of in te rp re ta t io n , did not recognise th is  fa c t ,
(and Republican)
ignoring  the pos ition  th a t a w ritte n /C o n s titu tio n  was unknown to  the  
Common Lau o f England. Although the preamble did not c o n s titu te  the  
" le t te r "  or the operative part or substantive provisions of the  
C o n s titu tio n , i t  nevertheless c a rried  the "ethos" o r " s p ir i t "  o f the
C o n s t itu t io n . That i t  uas not meant to  be a fo rm a l r e c i t a l  o r an empty
in can ta tio n  of a feu  lo f ty  id e a ls  is  borne out by the fa c t  th a t the 1975
c o n s titu tio n a l amendment in  Tanzania also touched on the o r ig in a l preamble
uhich had broadly re-enacted the preambles o f the Independence end
28Republican C o n s titu tio n s .
7 .1 l£  In  M a lau i, the C o n stitu tio n  did not contain any preamble 
although the "C o n s titu tio n a l Committee" had, as ue have seen, recommended 
one. In  Tanzania and Zambia, the preambles expressly re fe rre d  to  
" ju s tic e "  and " l ib e r ty " ,  although in  Zambia the reference uas extended 
to  the " in d iv id u a l r ig h ts  o f c it iz e n s " . The fo llo u in g  short e x tra c ts  
u i l l  bear out the d iffe re n c e :
T anzania
Whereas freedom, ju s t ic e , f r a te r n i ty  and concord are founded 
upon (a ) the  recogn ition  o f the e q u a lity  of a l l  men and of 
th e ir  inherent d ig n ity ; (b ) the recognition  of the r ig h t  
of a l l  men -
( i )  to  p ro tec tio n  of l i f e ,  l ib e r ty  and property;
[emphasis added]
Zambia
Recsgnising th a t in d iv id u a l r ig h ts  of c it iz e n s  inc lu d in g  
freedom, ju s t ic e , l ib e r ty  and e q u a lity  are founded on the 
re a lis a tio n  of the r ig h ts  and duties  of a l l  men in  the  
p ro tection  of l i f e ,  l ib e r ty  and pro p erty . . .
[emphasis added]
There uas ye t another im portant d iffe re n ce  betueen the tuo . In  Zambia 
i t  uas s ta ted  th a t i t  uas the "bounden duty" of the State to  "uphold the 
laus" whereas in  Tanzania, "uhen men are un ited  together in  a community 
i t  is  th e ir  duty . . • to  uphold the lau s" .
7.117 In  Tanzania there  uas no B i l l  of Rights but Zambia had one, a
29re-enactment o f the provision of the Independence C o n stitu tio n  u h ile  
in  Plalaui in  s .2 (1 ) i t  uas s ta ted  th a t "subject to the  C o n s titu tio n , the  
government o f the Republic s h a ll be founded upon the fo llo u in g  p r in c ip le s " .  
This provision as u e ll  as th a t o f clause ( i i i )  read u ith  s u b -s .(2 ) ,  
quoted belou , could be in te rp re te d  as inco rp o ratin g  r e fe re n t ia l ly  an 
enforceable B i l l  of Rights as enumerated in  the U n iversa l D eclaration  
of Human R ights.
4 ^ 0
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s « 2 ( 1 ) ( i i i )  The Government and the people o f Plalaui s h a ll  
continue to  recognise the s an c tity  of the  personal l ib e r t ie s  
enshrined in  the United Nations D eclaration  of Human R ights, 
arid o f adherence to  the  Lau of Nations;
s .2 (2 )  Nothing contained in  or done under the au th o rity
of any lau  s h a ll be held to  be inconsis ten t u ith  or in  
contravention of s u b .s .(1 ) to  the exten t th a t the lau  in  
question is  reasonably required  in  the in te re s ts  o f 
defence, pub lic  s a fe ty , p u b lic  order or the n a tio n a l 
economy, [emphasis added]
I t  is  submitted th a t s .2 uas not a mere preamble but a substantive part
o f the C o n stitu tio n  and the tone and tenor o f the provisions ind ica ted
th a t i t  d id  not contain uhat are ca lle d  "D ire c tiv e  P rin c ip les "  but th a t
the  government had imposed upon i t s e l f  a mandatory duty to  do c erta in
th ings uhich i t  could be compelled to  perform* The fa c t th a t the
recommendation of the "C o n s titu tio n a l Committee" uas not fu l ly  accepted
also supports th is  v ie u . I t  is  also submitted th a t the expression
"subject to th is  C o n stitu tio n " in  both ss.35 and 45, dealing resp ective ly
u ith  the exercise of le g is la t iv e  and executive pouers, suggests th a t s .2,
according to  the scheme of the C o n s titu tio n , uas to  be tre a ted  as the
i
"supreme clause".
7 .118  In  Tanzania and Zambia the C onstitu tio ns introduced a neu 
in s t i tu t io n a l  device modelled on the provision of "Ombudsman" o f the uestem  
u o rld . In  Tanzania, chapter V I (s s .67-69) provided fo r  "The Permanent 
Commission of Enquiry"; in  Zambia, P art IX  ( A r ts .117 -19 ), fo r  the  
"Commission fo r  In v e s tig a tio n s " . The Commission, in  e ith e r  case, is  to  
" inqu ire  in to  the conduct of any person to  uhom the A rtic le /s e c tio n  
applies in  the exercise o f h is  o f f ic e  or au th o rity  or in  the abuse 
th e re o f" . There is ,  houever, a d iffe ren ce  in  the co n stitu tio n  of the tuo 
bodies in  th a t an " In ves tig a to r-G en era l"  and three "Commissioners" in  
Zambia and in  Tanzania, one "Chairman" and th ree  "members", a l l  appointed
in  both cases by the P res iden t, constitu ted  the Commission.
7.119 In e ith e r  case i t  uas provided th a t pouers, immunities and functions  
of the Commission s h a ll be prescribed by an Act of Parliam ent and the Act
could also specify  the persons to uhom i t  ap p lied . In  the m atter of 
a p p lic a b ility  the c o n s titu tio n a l l im ita t io n  excluded from enquiry the 
conduct of the President and the Head o f the  Executive fo r  Zanzibar in  
Tanzania and in  Zambia only the President from i t s  scope as u ie ll as 
rev ieu  of ju d ic ia l  decis ions. Houever, the more im portant and serious  
l im ita t io n s  uere those th a t made i t s  ju r is d ic t io n  a t once d iscre tio n ary  
(enquiry a t the P re s id e n t's , and the Commission's d is c re tio n ) end 
advisory (re p o rt to  the President a t the conclusion of the e n q u iry ).
The in s t itu t io n  deserves to be examined at g reater length in  order to  
appreciate i t s  e ffic a c y  as a neu in s t itu t io n  of co n tro l in  the tuo One- 
party s ta te s , one of uhich, Zambia, had another in s t itu t io n  uhich may be 
examined f i r s t ,  b r ie f ly .
7.119 In  P art IV (A r ts . 32-36) of the C onstitu tio n  of Zambia provision  
uas mads fo r  a "Leadership Code" uhich uas to be prepared by the 
Leadership Committee and uas to  be app licab le  to  "sp ec ified  o f f ic e r s " .
A ll a lle g a tio n s  of non-compliance or breach of the Code uere to  be heard 
by a "Tribunal" u ith  a Chairman q u a lif ie d  to be a High Court judge and 
appointed by the Chief J u s tic e , end tuo other members. Although the 
C onstitu tio n  in  terms did not accord primacy to the organs of the Party  
over those of the S ta te , President Kaunda advocated, as ue have seen, 
the need fo r  a "strong" P a rty . N a tu ra lly  there  could be a tendency among 
the party  leaders to behave a t times in  an overbearing fashion actuated  
e ith e r  by excessive zea l and enthusiasm or by motives of personal gain . 
Uhen leaders uere in sp ired  by personal ambition th ere  could even be cases 
of serious in tra -p a r ty  feuds developing to  such proportion as to  endanger 
the "secu rity  of s ta te " . I t  uas d esirab le  to co n tro l such conduct more 
e f fe c t iv e ly  than could be secured through the device of the  "Commission 
fo r  In v e s tig a tio n s "  to  m aintain the "Rule o f Lau" and e ss e n tia ls  of 
democracy. Despite the  uide scope fo r  the Code envisaged under the  
C o n stitu tio n , un fo rtu n ate ly  the present Code merely concerns i t s e l f  u ith
cases o f accum ulation o f w ealth  and resources by th e  le a d e rs .
(B) The A frican Ombudsman
7.120  In  the "N ational E th ic" which President Nyerere prepared and
c irc u la te d  among the members o f the Commission which was appointed to
d ra ft  the One-party S tate C o n s titu tio n , i t  was mentioned th a t every
in d iv id u a l should have the r ig h t ,  among o thers , to  d ig n ity  and respect
and also to  freedom o f movement, which was subjected to  the equal freedom
32of other c it iz e n s ; freedom from a rb itra ry  a rres t was also mentioned.
In  th is  context the Commission "re-examined" the question of a B i l l  of
R ights . I t  was observed th a t "c o n s titu tio n a l guarantees fo r  the
in d iv id u a l w i l l  defeat th e ir  own purpose i f  they serve to  p ro tec t those
33whose o b ject is  to subvert and destroy democracy i t s e l f " .  However, i t  
was re a lis e d  th a t a safeguard should be provided against any possible  
abuse of "d iscre tio n ary  power" as i t  was in e v ita b le  th a t such power was 
bound to be exercised in  large  measure in  a developing country by the  
o f f ic ia ls  of the State as w e ll as o f the P arty . The Commission noted th a t 
a D is c ip lin a ry  Committee had been set up by TANU but considered th a t  
there  should be a Committee estab lished  by law invested with necessary 
powers (no t executive) and p ro tections to  perform the task which w i l l
34
deal with a lle g a tio n s  of abuse of power by the s ta te  o f f ic ia ls  as w e ll.
The Report does not s p e ll out how mere enquiry and submission of i t s
fin d in g s  could provide an e ffe c t iv e  ''remedy" to the aggrieved in d iv id u a l.
I t  was observed th a t "the independence of the ju d ic ia ry  is  the foundation
of the ru le  o f law" but i t  was not s ta ted  what ro le  the ju d ic ia ry  could
play in  not only "c o n tro llin g "  the abuse o f power but also "remedying"
35the wrong done. There was a common f ie ld  w ith in  uhich the tuo 
in s t itu t io n s  might operate, but the Report did not suggest how th e ir  ro les  
could be defined and co-ord inated . This was re f le c te d , as we have seen, 
in  the re le v a n t provisions of the C o n s titu tio n .
7.121 In  3.1 o f The Permanent Commission of Enquiry Act 1966 i t  bias
36s tated  th a t i t  " s h a ll be read as one u ith  the C o n s titu tio n " . Apparently,
th e re fo re , the Act i t s e l f  does not expressly set out the nature and exten t
of " ju r is d ic t io n "  and "ap p lica tio n " uhereas in  the p a r a l le l  enactment of
Zambia, The Commission fo r  In v es tig a tio n s  Act 1974, ss.7 and 3
37resp ec tive ly  d e a lt u ith  these m atters in  precise term s. I t  has been
observed th a t the range of the " in s titu t io n s "  and " in d iv id u a ls "  uho could
38be the subject m atter of enquiry in  Zambia uas u id er than Tanzania;
apart from the Heads of State and Government, the "Peoplet s Defence
39Force" uas also excluded in  Tanzania. I t  has been suggested th a t the
expression "an a lle g a tio n  of misconduct or abuse of o ff ic e  or au th o rity "
( s .7 (1 ) )  could embrace "any m atter of in d iv id u a l in ju s t ic e  and adm in is tra tive
abuse o f pouer and a u th o rity  in vo lv in g  corrup tion , t r ib a lis m , nepotism,
in tim id a tio n  end other forms o f d is c rim in a tio n " , as contemplated by the
N atio n a l Commission on the Establishment o f One-party P a rtic ip a to ry
40Democracy in  Zambia. Houever, the Ombudsman h im self c la r i f ie s  the ambit 
41of ju r is d ic t io n . Complaints a lle g in g  in fra c tio n s  of the Leadership 
Code uere excepted. He also expla ins the expression "any m atter uhich 
is  sub lud ice" of s .7 (2 ) .  Not only uas the Commission unable to "revieu"  
any " ju d ic ia l"  decis ion , but i t  uas also unable to receive complaints 
against any m atter pending in  a court o f la u .
7.122 In  both Acts there uas an im portant provision uhich invested
the Commission u ith  ju r is d ic t io n  to enquire in to  m atters in  respect of
uhich ju d ic ia l  rev ieu  uas expressly barred . I t  uas provided th a t the
Commission could exercise ju r is d ic t io n  "notu ithstanding any provision in
u r it te n  lau  to the e ffe c t th a t an act or omission s h a ll be f i n a l ,  or th a t
no appeal s h a ll l i e  in  respect th e re o f, or th a t no proceeding or decision
42s h a ll be challenged, revieued, quashed or c a lle d  in  question ." Indeed, 
the ju r is d ic t io n  conferred on the Commission uas u ider than the supervisory
and " u r i t "  ju r is d ic t io n s  o f the High Court but the snag uas th a t  the
Commission could not grant any r e l i e f  to  the aggrieved person. There was,
of course, another aspect o f the m a tte r. The e ff ic a c y  of the provision
depended upon the in te rp re ta t io n  placed upon the expression "misconduct
or abuse o f o ff ic e  o r a u th o rity "  uhich uas the general ju r is d ic t io n a l
43requirem ent. I t  i s  doubtfu l uhether cases in v o lv in g  "malice in  lau "  
and the  "recommendations" o f the "Revieu T ribunals" set up under the  
preventive detention laus could be covered.
7 .123  The Tanzanian Ombudsman is  to  some extent r ig h t  in  asserting
44th a t the in s t i tu t io n  f u l f i l l e d  the "due process of la u " . The countries
in  the " th ird  uorld" cannot provide fo r  adequate le g a l a id  and i t  is  true
th a t l i t ig a t io n  is  an expensive as u e l l  as d ila to ry  process uhich the
common people of these countries cannot aluays cope u ith .  Although in
both Acts the Commission uas not given any "executive pouer" to  r ig h t  any
urong done to  any person, from the Annual Reports o f the Permanent
Commission of Enquiry i t  is  found th a t in  some cases the Commission could
" s a t is fa c to r ily  co rrec t"  mistakes by "d ire c t n eg o tia tio n s" u ith  the p a rtie s  
45invo lved . Th is  could perhaps be done by invoking the provision  of the
proviso to  s . 10(2) uhich requ ired  the Commission to  hear the person or
au th o rity  complained against before i t  makes adverse report against i t  
46to  the P res iden t.
7 .124  There are c e rta in  im portant points about the procedure to  be
noted in  th a t they shou th a t the enquiry could be re a lly  e f fe c t iv e  as
u e ll  as inexpensive and in fo rm a l. The procedure uas defined u ith
greater precis ion  in  the Zambia Act uhich contemplated in  express terms
"complaint or a lle g a tio n "  to  be made e ith e r  o ra lly  or in  u r i t in g  and even
47prescribed a tuo yea rs 1 l im ita t io n  u ith  a provision fo r  ua iving  the b ar.
Flore im p o rta n tly , i t  uas provided in  e ith e r  case th a t the proceedings
48s h a ll be conducted in  camera and th a t the Commission could compel 
production o f evidence from any source, inc lu d in g  o f f i c i a l  records except
those uhich uere c e r t i f ie d  by the President as might prove p re ju d ic ia l
49to the s e c u rity , defence or in te rn a t io n a l re la tio n s  of the country
50or might involve disclosure of the d e lib e ra tio n s  of the cab inet.
51
In Zambia, le g a l representation  "as o f r ig h t"  uas expressly excluded;
52in  Tanzania, ru les  of evidence uere so excluded.
7.125 Indeed, the in q u is i to r ia l  nature o f the  procedure best subserved 
the ob ject o f the enqu iry. The Commission uas not meant to act as a 
ju d ic ia l  tr ib u n a l adjucating upon the r ig h ts  o f the p a rtie s  but to act
as a domestic v ig ila n te  uhich rendered merely advisory opin ion. An
observation of the Tanzanian Ombudsman may be quoted to shou th a t the
people uere in te re s te d  in  u ltim a te  re s u lts  uhich a p u b lic  hearing uould
not have a lte re d . He observed th a t "People are in te res te d  more in  the
re s u lts  o f the case than in  proceedings and since such in s t itu t io n s  do
not have the pouer to change or reverse any decis ion , th is  alone renders
53p ublic  hearing meaningless". On the other hand, there could be cases
in  uhich a pub lic  hearing could prove to be inconvenient and embarrassing
to the establishm ent and the la t t e r  uould, th e re fo re , n a tu ra lly  tend to
"obstruct" the course of the prdceedings in  such cases d e featin g , thereby,
the ob ject of the enquiry; h a p p ily , causing "obstruction" in  any manner
54uas an offence in  both Tanzania and Zambia. In  e ith e r  Act i t  uas also
provided th a t except on the ground o f "lack of ju r is d ic t io n " ,  i t s  " in q u iry ,
proceeding, process or re p o rt"  s h a ll not be "challenged, revieued,
55quashed or ca lle d  in  question in  any co u rt" . This provision c e rta in ly  
added to the e ffic a c y  of the in s t i tu t io n ,  notu ithstand ing  the r id e r ,
"any e rro r  or ir r e g u la r i ty  of form1".
7.126 The annual reports  o f the Tanzanian Commission shou th a t i t  had 
to deal u ith  a number of cases o f "detentions" by such a u th o ritie s  as 
the p o lic e , the Area and Regional Commissioners and other executive  
o f f ic ia ls ,  but uhether the decline  in  the number proved the e ffic a c y  of 
the Commission is  open to  doubt. In  the f i r s t  Report the to t a l  cases
56of "detentions" uere shown as 76 , but in  the  Second, 30. The period
57of "detentions" ranged from a feu hours to a feu days. As fo r  example,
in  one case a Member of Parliam ent uas "locked-up" fo r  f iv e  days under
orders of the Regional Commissioner uhose explanation uas found 
58unacceptable. Indeed, i t  could not be supported, as pleaded, on the
provisions of Regional and Area Commissioners (Amendment) Act 1963. The
Act provided th a t uhen any Regional Commissioner had "reason to b e lieve"
th a t any person uas l ik e ly  to commit a breach of the peace and th a t such
breach could not be prevented except by tak in g  th a t person in to  custody,
the Commissioner could a rres t the person or d ire c t h is  a rres t but he had
to be e ith e r  produced before a M ag istra te  or released u ith in  48 hours
59and he could not be re -a rre s te d  fo r  the same cause. In the in s ta n t 
case i t  uas suggested th a t the detention uas "renewed" every 48 hours 
uhich uas in  c le a r v io la t io n  of the re le v an t p ro v is io n . I t  uas in  cases 
of th is  type th a t i t  should have been possible fo r  the Commission to be 
able to  term inate the i l le g a l  detention ins tead  of holding a post mortem 
over i t ,  to  prove i t s  e ffec tiven ess  and to gain c r e d ib i l i ty  among the 
common people. The Commission re a lis e d  th is  and also noted in  i t s  Annual 
Report fo r  1967-68 th a t in  one case i t  received a le t t e r  th a t seven 
people uere "locked-up" but even a f te r  a week uhen the le t t e r  reached i t ,  
the Commission could not get them released and i t  observed th a t "something 
must be done to remedy t h i s . " ^
7.127 The advice o f the Tanzanian Commission appears to have appealed 
to Zambia. In s .11 of the Zambia Act i t  i s  provided th a t the Commission 
can "make such orders, issue such u r i ts  and give such d ire c tio n s " , having  
the same force as the order o f the co u rt, uhen i t  appears to the Commission 
th a t i t s  pouers are " l ik e ly  to  be fru s tra te d  by any action taken" by any 
person to  uhom the Act ap p lies . The p ro v is io n , as i t  stands, cannot 
e ffe c t iv e ly  f u l f i l  i t s  purpose. The ju r is d ic t io n a l requirement is  p a ten tly  
ambiguous. I t  u i l l  not aluays be easy to  make out a case th a t "pouers"
of the Commission w i l l  be fru s tra te d  i f  in te rim  r e l ie f  is  not granted in  
a p a r t ic u la r  case, i f  the term "power" is  equated u ith  ju r is d ic t io n  to  
in q u ire , as is  l ik e ly  to  happen; and then the proof of i t s  lik e lih o o d  
of being fru s tra te d  may also present problems. That ap art, the Commission 
cannot, obviously, claim powers and ju r is d ic t io n  of the High Court to  
issue uhat are knoun as "prerogative w r its " , such as manadamus and 
p ro h ib it io n . On the other hand, the Commission is  not invested with  
s p e c ific  powers and ju r is d ic t io n  of s im ila r  nature under e ith e r  the C iv i l  
or the C rim inal Procedure Code. Thus, i t  may be possible to  challenge any 
order granting in te rim  r e l i e f  as unenforceable fo r  want of ju r is d ic t io n .
V . Personal l ib e r ty  and the law of Hebeas Corpus in  A frica
7 .128  I t  is  not proposed to  make a d e ta ile d  study of e ith e r  the
evolution  o r the development of the law of hebeas corpus in  A fric a  but to
p o in t but th a t habeas corpus has come to stay here as a deeply entrenched
in s t i tu t io n  and has acquired a su p raco n stitu tio n a l importance: i t s  form
may have undergone changes in  a few cases but i t s  substance has withstood
many changes th a t the C onstitu tio ns  and laws have undergone in  the d if fe re n t
s ta te s . As an in s t i tu t io n  i t  has survived not only the frameworks of
One-party States but even of the "New Grundnorm" of the  M il i ta r y  Governments
under uhich, in  one s ta te , as ue s h a ll see, i t  was merely "suspended" in
1
p a r t ic u la r  cases and not g e n e ra lly . In some cases spec ia l laws have 
been enacted with the avowed o b ject of codify ing the law w hile in  other 
cases even under the general lau  there s t i l l  e x is t two p a r a l le l  r ig h ts .
Th is  p o s ition  may be examined f i r s t  to  id e n t ify  the scope and extent of 
these r ig h ts .
(1 ) P osition  under general law.
7 .129 The Independence C onstitu tio ns  as w e ll as the successive 
C o n stitu tio n s  in  each s ta te  d id  not a lt e r  the general law in  force in  
the t e r r i t o r ie s  p r io r  to independence. Such laws th ere fo re  also  
co n stitu ted  an im portant in s t i tu t io n a l  device fo r  the pro tection  of
personal l ib e r ty  in  the post-independence period in  a l l  s ta te s .
Besides the lo c a l s ta tu tes  in c lu d in g  the Codes of Crim inal Procedure, in
p a r t ic u la r , the general law in  a l l  s ta tes  consisted, in te r  a l i a , of the
Common Law of England and "s ta tu tes  o f general ap p lica tio n " as obta in ing
in  England on p a r t ic u la r  dates; in  many s ta tes  th is  position  was re ite ra te d
2a fte r  independence by s p e c ific  enactments. The remedy of habeas corpus 
uias, as life have seen, a v a ila b le  in  England at Common Law as w e ll as 
under s ta tu te s , p a r t ic u la r ly  of 1640, 1679 and 1816, fo r  the pro tection  
of personal l ib e r t y .  As Roberts-liJray observes, "the expression 's ta tu te s  
of general ap p lica tio n * is  usually  regarded as d escrip tive  o f Acts of 
Parliam ent which are o f general relevance to the conditions of other 
countries and, in  p a r t ic u la r ,  not based upon p o lic ie s  and circumstances
3
p ecu lia r to  England". I t  has never been challenged, except on one 
occasion, th a t the English Habeas Corpus Acts werB in ap p licab le  in  
A fr ic a .^
7.130 However, i t  must be sta ted  th a t the formula employed in  the 
Gold Coast Ordinance of 1876 which, i t  is  asserted, became the "prototype"
5
of a l l  A frican reception s ta tu te s , contained one im portant q u a lif ic a t io n  
notw ithstanding the minor v a r ia tio n  of "technique" in  some cases:^ the  
received law was to  be administered by the "Supreme Court" (s e t up by the 
seme document) w ith in  i t s  ju r is d ic t io n  which was, in  the f i r s t  instance,
7
confined to the non-Africans or in  o ther words, the Europeans. In  th is
g
respect the s itu a tio n  in  A fric a  resembled th a t of In d ia . Whether in  
In d ia  or in  A fric a  the "Supreme Courts" everywhere were modelled on the 
High Court of Justice  in  England and the  B r it is h  judges of those courts 
were empowered to  exercise powers s im ila r  to  those exercised by the  
judges of the Queen's Bench D iv is io n . In  some A frican te r r i t o r ie s  the  
superior courts were named "High Courts" instead  of "Supreme Courts" but 
each court was a "Court of Record" and had ju r is d ic t io n  s im ila r  to  th a t  
of the  Supreme Court. Therefo re , as in  England, these courts had powers
to issue w rits  of habeas corpus under Common Law as w e ll as under s ta tu to ry  
law o f England. The r ig h t to  the  w r it  under Common Law which was introduced  
by a s ta tu te  could be taken away by a s ta tu te . Therefore, although these 
courts had power to  make general ru les  as to  conduct of proceedings 
th ere in  such ru le s , obviously, could not take away such im portant 
common law r ig h ts  c o rre la tiv e  to the r ig h t  to the w rit as the r ig h t of 
successive ap p lica tio n s  and of p r io r i ty  in  the hearing of the ap p lica tio n  
as w e ll as the r ig h t of appeal, Whether such r ig h t  did in  fa c t  survive  
a fte r  independence is  however another question which w i l l  be d ea lt with  
sep ara te ly .
7.131 In  East and C entra l A fr ic a  (except Northern Rhodesia), fo llo w in g
the Indian technique, the remedy of habeas corpus was also provided in  the
Crim inal Procedure Codes which were of general ap p lica tio n  throughout the 
g
t e r r i t o r ie s .  The High Courts, under these provisions, were empowered to  
give "d ire c tio n s  in  the nature of habeas corpus" in  the fo llo w in g  terms:
(1 ) The High Court may whenever i t  th inks  f i t  d ire c t -
(a ) any person w ith in  the l im its  of the P ro tecto rate  be 
brought up before the court to  be d e a lt with according 
to  law;
(b ) any person i l le g a l ly  or improperly detained in  pu b lic  
or p riva te  custody be set a t l ib e r ty ;
[emphasis added")
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We have, elsewhere in  th is  study, commented upon the s ig n ifican ce  of the 
underlined term "im properly" but in  the present context we re fe r  to the  
fa c t  th a t in  the provision re fe rre d  to above i t  was also contemplated 
in  s u b -s .(2 ) th a t the court could frame ru les  to  regulate  the procedure 
in  these m atte rs . I t  could be argued th a t the provision in  the C rim inal 
Procedure Codes did not derogate from the powers o f the High Courts to  
issue w rits  of habeas corpus under e ith e r  the English Common Law or the 
s ta tu te s . The Codes did not genera lly  deal w ith the powers and 
ju r is d ic t io n s  of the High Courts and th ere fo re  there could be no question  
of the e x is tin g  powers aid  ju r is d ic t io n  being in  any manner c u rta ile d  by 
the Codes, by im p lic a tio n .
7.132  The pos ition  in  East and C entra l A fr ic a  was apparently d if fe re n t
from th a t o f West A fric a  in  another respect. Such questions as whether
here such im portant Common Law rig h ts  as of successive ap p lica tio n s  and
11other cognate r ig h ts  were a v a ila b le , as in  West A fr ic a  and i f  so, whether 
such r ig h ts  could be abrogated by the High Courts in  the exercise of 
th e ir  rule-m aking powers, conferred by the Codes s p e c if ic a lly  in  respect 
of proceedings "in  the nature o f habeas corpus11 do not appear to have 
been a g ita ted  before courts . I t  could be argued th a t in  these te r r i to r ie s  
i t  was a case of trichotomy o f powers. On the C rim inal side the High 
Court could make ru les  to  abolish the a foresaid  r ig h ts  because the Code 
did n o t, in  terms, deal with the r ig h t  to the w r it  of habeas corpus but 
conferred a d is t in c t  and separate power on the  High Court and created a 
d is t in c t  and separate ju r is d ic t io n . However, in  the absence of any ru les  
or any provision  to the contrary in  the ru les  there could be scope fo r  
invoking the Court*s general ju r is d ic t io n , which was s im ila r  in  nature to  
th a t o f the West African Court. However, whether the a n c illa ry  r ig h ts ,  
re fe rre d  to above, d id , in  f a c t ,  survive in  the general ju r is d ic t io n  of 
the Court a f te r  independence has to be answered sep ara te ly .
(2 ) P osition  under sp ec ia l laws
7.133 In  the independent Malawi the provision was re-enacted in  a
m odified form and also separate ly  and not as p art of the new C rim inal
12Procedure and Evidence Code. In  s .16(1) of the S tatute  Law (M iscellaneous  
13Provisions) Act i t  was s ta ted  th a t the High Court s h a ll "not issue any
prerogative w r it  in  the exercise of i t s  c iv i l  o r c rim in a l ju r is d ic t io n "
but in  s u b -s .(6 ) a remedy embodying the concept of habeas corpus was,
nevertheless, provided. In  Western N ig e ria  also there  appeared in  1958
14a lo c a l enactment, the Habeas Corpus Law. Even in  the absence of repeal 
in  express terms of the English law of habeas corpus, i t  must be said  th a t  
in  these two te r r i t o r ie s  the Common Law as w e ll as the S tatu te  Law of
U
England re la t in g  to  habeas corpus was, by necessary im p lic a tio n , repealed .
The language employed in  Western N ig e ria , in  fa c t ,  e x p l ic i t ly  re fe rre d  to  
the English Acts of 1679 and 1816. I t  also follow ed the language and
scheme of those two s ta tu te s  leaving  no doubt th a t they were repealed and
th a t the lo c a l enactment had co d ified  the law on the su b jec t. The 
position  in  independent Ghana was, however, d if fe re n t  and w i l l  be separately  
examined.
7 .1 3 4  We may f i r s t  look at another aspect of the m atter and fo r  th is  
i t  is  necessary to  point out th a t a f te r  independence the C onstitu tion
in  each s ta te  became the primary source of powers and ju r is d ic t io n  of the
superior courts . Therefo re , the mere fa c t  th a t the s tatus quo as 
respects general law was not disturbed did not mean th a t there was no 
change of such nature in  the s tatus of these courts as could a ffe c t  
th e ir  powers and ju r is d ic t io n . As fo r example, these courts could no 
longer c la im , ipso fa c to , powers and ju r is d ic t io n  s im ila r  to  th a t of the  
Queen's Bench D iv is ion  o f England. On the other hand, as we have seen, 
some of the a n c illa ry  r ig h ts  o f the  w r it  o f habeas corpus were
16traceab le  to  the nature o f the w r it ,  namely the Command of the Sovereign.
Therefo re, how fa r  the sp ec ia l laws and the C onstitu tio n  in  each sta te
a lte re d  the scope and extent of these r ig h ts  is  a question, a lb e it
an im portant one, but i t  can be answered only on a d e ta ile d  in v es tig a tio n
of the po s itio n  in  each s ta te . Nevertheless, i t  is  possible to  say th a t
such in v e s tig a tio n  must be aimed p rim a rily  at the determ ination of
one im portant f a c t ,  namely, whether the courts were true  le g a l successors
of the former Supreme Courts. In  fa c t during the m il ita ry  ru le  in
N ig e ria  as w e ll as in  Ghana the framework of the superior courts was 
17indeed a lte re d ; in  Ghana the court even held th a t under the 1960
C o n stitu tio n  the Supreme Court was estab lished  as a "completely new
X8in s t i t u t io n ."
7 .135  The Habeas Corpus Act, I9 6 4 j0 f  Ghana, professed to  "consolidate"
19and "amend" the "law re la t in g  to  the ap p lica tio n s  fo r  habeas corpus and
by s .6 expressly declared th a t the re levan t English s ta tu te s  o f 1640,
1679, 1803, 1804, 1816 and 1862, s h a ll cease to  apply in  Ghana. As a 
re s u lt  the provision of b a i l  embodied in  ss 2 and 3 o f the English s ta tu tes  
o f 1679 and 1816 resp ec tive ly  became the foremost casualty fo r  the Act did  
not have a p a r a l le l  p ro v is io n . The Act, in  fa c t ,  did not express any
concern to  sustain the ethos or s p i r i t  of the English law o f -habeas
corpus th a t i t  was fo r  the  deta in ing  a u th o rity  to  produce the body of 
the prisoner with the "cause and caption" of the detention to  s a tis fy  the 
court th a t the detention was le g a l although s .4(1 ) o f the Act i t  could 
be argued, placed a duty on the court to  "order the re lease of the person 
detained unless s a t is f ie d  th a t the detention was in  accordance with law ". 
What was conspicuously missing was an express duty to  " in q u ire  in to  the  
tru th  of the fa c ts  set fo r th  in  the re tu rn " as imposed by s .3 o f the 
English 1816 Act. However, such a duty re s u lte d , i t  could be argued, 
from the cumulative e f fe c t  of s s .1 (1 ) ,  2(b) and 4 (1 ) .  I t  was s . 2 which
suffered  the utmost d e b i l i ta t io n .  I t  in te r  a l ia  provided th a t the court
"may" make an order re q u irin g  e ith e r  the deta in ing  a u th o rity  or the 
prisoner to  "submit a rep o rt in  w ritin g  s ta tin g  the grounds of the  
deten tion" .
7.136 The Act also took away two Common Law r ig h ts  re la t in g  to
successive ap p lica tio n  and appeal but in  th is  i t  was merely fo llo w in g  the
developments in  England: s s .1 (4 ) and 5 o f the Act incorporated the
provisions of s s .14 (2 ) and 15(1) re s p e c tiv e ly , o f the English s ta tu te ,
20the Adm inistration of Justice  Act i9 6 0 . In  th is  m atter N ig e r ia  had
taken the lead by enacting in  1961, the Adm inistration of Justice  (Habeas
Corpus) Act, with a s im ila r  provision by providing an appeal in  the case
21of an order of re lease as w e ll as o f re fu s a l to  do so. I t  did not 
expressly abrogate the Common Law r ig h t of successive ap p lica tio n  and on 
the other hand i t  was re ite ra te d  in  s .3 th a t the appeal s h a ll "take  
precedence over a l l  o ther m atte rs" . I t  has also to  be noted th a t the
N igerian  Act used the term " w rit  o f habeas corpus ad subiciendum" w hile  
The Ghana Act avoided i t .  The N igerian Act buttressed the r ig h t  by 
fu r th e r  providing in  s .2 (3 ) (b )  th a t fa i lu r e  to hear an ap p lica tio n  and 
adjudicate thereon w ith in  a "reasonable tim e" s h a ll be tantamount to 
re fu s a l to issue the w r i t .
7.137 There were some other aspects o f the Ghana Act which showed th a t
i t  was enacted to curta in  the ambit o f the e x is tin g  r ig h t .  Under s .3
hearing
the  Chief Justice of the Supreme Court could d ire c t th a t / in  any p a r t ic u la r
to fee
case, in  any High Court, / before a bench of th ree  judges. Under s .4(2) 
the High Court was debarred from deciding i t s e l f  any question touching 
the v ire s  of any law which i t  had to  re fe r  fo r  the  decision of the  
Supreme Court; of course pending decision the Supreme Court could enlarge  
the detained person on b a i l .
V I . The ju d ic ia l  approach to personal 
l ib e r ty  in  A fric a
7 .138  Whether i t  is  correct or not to  equate the m il ita r y  governments
with one-party governments, as has been suggested, is  a question which we
do not propose to answer at th is  stage but the proposition th a t they tend
1
to  be more a u to c ra tic  admits o f no exception . In  the l ig h t  of the
discussion made so fa r  i t  is  also possible to  accept the view expressed
in  another quarter th a t the theory of the one-party s ta te  is  not opposed
to  the  existence of independent courts a id  th a t the c o n s titu tio n a l fram e-
2
work is  not necessarily  geared to  au th o rita rian is m . I t  is  necessary 
to po in t out th a t Ghana as a one-party s ta te  had a framework which was 
d if fe re n t  in  many respects, which has already been noted. In  any case i t  
is  reasonable to  expect the ju d ic ia l  response to bear some re la t io n  to the 
type o f government and the c o n s titu tio n a l framework in  any p a r t ic u la r  
s ta te  and, as the m il ita ry  government by i t s  nature stands fa r  apart 
from the other types, the co n trib u tio n  of the ju d ic ia ry  to the development 
of the  jurisprudence of m il ita r y  ru le  is  l ik e ly  to  assume a d if fe re n t
complexion. We there fo re  propose to  confine our study to the  ju d ic ia l  response 
under n o n -m ilita ry  governments, s ta r tin g  with Ghana during the Nkrumah regime.
(1 ) Ghana
3
7 .139  We have already re fe rre d  to  the decision in  BALQGUN v EDUSI 
in  connection with the deportation laws and also to  the le g is la t iv e  
t r a d it io n  o f the c o lo n ia l times which made l ig h t  work of the w r it  of 
habeas corpus by suspending the w r it  on many occasions. The 
M in is te r  had c a rried  out the deportation in  the BALQGUM case pending 
hearing of a habeas corpus a p p lic a tio n . He was indem nified by Parliam ent 
against a l l  p e n a ltie s  fo r  contempt of court but in  i t s  judgment the court 
nevertheless deplored the conduct of thB government and held th a t the 
fin d in g  o f contempt stood although no fu r th e r  order was made. I t  was held  
th a t by passing the enactment the government had accepted the position  th a t  
the respondent was in  contempt. However, th is  e a rly  j o l t ,  in  the very 
f i r s t  year of attainm ent o f independence appears to  have l e f t  a la s tin g  
e ffe c t  on the ju d ic ia ry  so as to  in fluence i t s  approach in  dealing with  
habeas corpus ap p lica tio n s  in  cases of preventive d e ten tio n .
7 .140  W ithin almost a year a habeas corpus ap p lica tio n  challenging an 
order made against 37 persons under the Preventive Detention Act 1958 came
4
up before the court in  re OKINE. The Court*s approach was re fle c te d  in  
the very f i r s t  paragraph of the report in  which the court held th a t the  
Act was "analogous to  the Preventive Detention Regulations which were in  
force in  B r ita in  as a wartime measure". Reliance was placed, among others ,
5
on the LIVERSIDGE case and i t  was held th a t even Lord Atkin in  h is  
dissenting judgment had re fe rre d  to c e rta in  reg u la tio n s  in  which the word 
"s a tis fie d "  was used w ithout tak ing  care to  analyse e ith e r  the whole 
judgment o r even the dissent of Lord Atkin and disposing of the decision  
in  a few sentenced by a few stray remarks. The Act req u ired , as we have 
seen, the s a tis fa c tio n  to  be in  respect of "any person" which could w e ll 
be in te rp re ted  to  mean th a t the Act did not contemplate a "general" but
" s p e c if ic "  o rd er in  resp ect o f each person sought to  be d e ta in ed  w h ile
the impugned order had set out the names of 37 persons in  the schedule.
The order re c ite d  the "s a tis fa c tio n "  of the Governor-General but i t  was
signed by D r. Nkrumah as the Prime M in is te r  and M in is te r  o f Defence who
did n o t, i t  appears, swear any a f f id a v i t  th a t there was a " re a l
s a t is fa c tio n "  in  respect of each person despite the a lle g a tio n  th a t the
r e a l  o b ject o f the order was to  s ilence  the opposition . The court held
th a t onus was on the ap p lican t: to  "prove bad fa i th "  which they had not
done aid  th ere fo re  an a f f id a v i t  would not serve "any u sefu l purpose."^
7
7.141 The m atter was taken to the  Court o f Appeal. The court held th a t
there  was no r ig h t of appeal. Although the court disposed o f the m atter
on the p re lim in ary  issue i t  pointed out "by way of o b ite r  dictum" th a t
habeas corpus l ie s  only in  cases o f un law fu l detention and also re fe rre d
to  s .3 (1 )  o f the Act which provided th a t any person detained in  pursuance of
the order should be in  " la w fu l custody". The in te rp re ta t io n  was erroneous
and apparently expanded the scope o f the Act to  give i t  e f fe c t  more widely
than the f i r s t  court had done. Th is  decision excluded challenge even in
a case of mistaken id e n tity  which the f i r s t  court had conceded in  p r in c ip le
(although on the fa c ts  o f the case of one of the applicants  the prayer fo r
r e l i e f  grounded thereon had been re fu s e d ). The f i r s t  court also conceded
th a t detention could also be challenged on the ground of the "genuineness
of the order" and of the "over-stepping of s ta tu to ry  l im its  by the M in is te r" ,
as w e ll as o f "the n a t io n a lity  o f the ap p lic a n t" , as such m atters  were,
according to  the court, "re levan t to the le g a l i ty  of the d e te n tio n ."
However, the m atter was fu rth e r  taken to  the Supreme Court where,
u n fo rtu n a te ly , the argument was based on the re tro sp ec tive  a p p lic a tio n  of
the Courts Act 1960, which conferred power on the Supreme Court to  e n te rta in
0
"any appeal from any c o u rt."  The argument was re je c te d  but i t  is
submitted th a t the Court of Appeal had apparently overlooked the fa c t  th a t
g
there was a Common Law r ig h t  o f appeal in  such cases.
107.142  In  re AKOTQ and seven o thers, the Supreme Court uas dealing
u ith  an appeal against the re fu s a l by the High Court to issue a w rit of 
habeas corpus against a s im ila r  o rder. I t  uas contended, in te r  a l ia , th a t
(2 ) by v ir tu e  of the Habeas Corpus Act o f 1816 the court is
required to  enquire in to  the tru th  o f the fa c ts  contained
in  "The Grounds" upon uhich the Governor-General uas 
s a t is f ie d . . •
(4 ) the grounds upon uhich the appellants  uere detained do not 
f a l l  u ith in  the ambit of the expression "Acts p re ju d ic ia l  
to the secu rity  of the s ta te " ;
(6 )  the Preventive Detention Act. . . is  in  excess of the pouers 
conferred on Parliam ent by the C o n s titu tio n . . • u ith  respect 
to A r t .1 3 (1 ) . . . o r is  contrary to  the solemn declaration
of the fundamental p r in c ip le s  made by the P res iden t. . .
(7 ) [th e  A c t]. . . not having been passed upon a declaration  of
emergency is  in  v io la t io n  of the C o n s titu tio n . • .
The court h e ld , s e ria tim . as fo llo u s :
(2 ) As a "s ta tu te  o f general a p p lic a tio n " , the 1816 Act uas in  
force in  Ghana but according to the r a t io  o f the decision  
in  the LIVERSIDGE case the '"s a tis fac tio n "  o f the President 
could not be challenged;
(4 ) The terms "security  o f s ta te "  uas not lim ite d  to the defence 
of Ghana against a fo re ig n  pouer; the pouer of preventive  
detention could be invoked uhen the "basis o f lau" uas 
undermined and the normal function ing  o f the government uas 
being disrupted;
(6 )  A r t .13(1) imposed only a "moral o b lig a tio n "  on the President 
as the a r t ic le  used the uord "should" and not "s h a ll" ; the 
"declara tion  did not co n stitu te  a b i l l  o f r ig h ts "  and did not 
create le g a l o b lig a tio n s  enforceable in  a court of lau  -  i t  
uas s im ila r  to  the "coronation oath" o f the Queen o f England;
(7 ) There uas no c o n s titu tio n a l p ro h ib itio n  against enactment 
of the Act as a peace-tim e measure.
The la s t  point uas r ig h t ly  decided in  th a t the f i r s t  Republican
C onstitu tio n  did not have any s p e c if ic  provision re la t in g  to an "emergency".
The re lia n c e  on the LIVERSIDGE case uas misplaced in  th a t i t  fo llo u ed  the
lin e  in d ica ted  in  the QKINE case ( supra) : i t  uas open to  the court to see
i f  the " s a tis fa c tio n "  uas " re a l" .  I t  i s ,  houever, tru e  th a t the concept of
"security  o f the s ta te "  had a u ider connotation as pointed out by h is
Lordship, although i t  is  doubtfu l i f  the decision uas r ig h t on the fa c ts .
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7 .143  The most im portant po in t in  the case uas the in te rp re ta t io n  of
th e  "d e c la ra tio n 11 under A rt. 13 and i t  is  submitted th a t the court urongly
equated i t  u ith  the English coronation o a th . The court fa i le d  to  take
n o tice  o f a feu  im portant points th a t should have had a great bearing on
the in te rp re ta t io n  of the p ro v is io n . U n like  the u n u ritte n  English
C o n s titu tio n , Ghana's C onstitu tio n  uas u r i t te n .  B es id es ,A rt. 12
s p e c if ic a lly  provided fo r  the oath of o f f ic e .  The provisions uhich uere
s p e c if ic a lly  described as the "fundamental p rin c ip le s "  uere embodied
separate ly  in  A rt. 13, uhich uas not a mere preamble but a substantive
p art o f the  C o n s titu tio n . The requirement o f "adherence" co n stitu ted  a
duty th a t uas imposed by the C onstitu tio n  on the President uho not only
combined in  h im self the o ff ic e s  o f the Heads of State and Government but
uas also a p a rt o f P arliam ent. Both the le g is la t iv e  end the executive
pouer of the Republic vested u ltim a te ly  in  him. He uas to exercise the
pouers subject to each and every provision  of the C onstitu tio n  and, as such,
although the provision uas captioned "fundamental p rin c ip le s "  and not
"fundamental r ig h ts "  as in  the case o f the "N igerian" end the "Neo-N igerian"
11provis ions, i t s  import uas not in  eny uay d if fe r e n t .
12
7 .144  In re DUilOGA and 12 others the question uhether the court can 
in q u ire  in to  the tru th  or o theru ise of the ground of detention under the  
1816 Act uas also a g ita ted  before the High Court a t Accra before the  
Supreme C ourt's  decision in  the AKOTQ case ( supra) . The High Court h e ld , 
o b ite r , th a t the 1816 Act uas not an Act o f "general a p p lic a tio n "  and i t  
did not th ere fo re  apply in  Ghana. The decision uas not c ite d  in  the AKOTQ 
case but the o b ite r  dictum c le a r ly  lo s t i t s  force a fte r  the Supreme C ourt's  
decis ion . Despite the o b ite r  the High Court ensuered the question in  the 
same uay as in  the cases of OKINE, e a r l ie r ,  and AKOTQ, la t e r .  The pouer
to detain  under the Act fo r  "security  of s ta te "  uas equated to the pouer to  
arres t and deta in  fo r  the "defence of the realm ", exercised in  England
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during the two world wars, and re lia n c e  uas accordingly placed on the
13English "war-time cases'1. As in  the OKINE case, re lian ce  uas also
placed on s . 3(1 ) o f the Act snd the court uent so fa r  as to  say th a t
"there can surely be l i t t l e  or no po in t in  re so rtin g  to  the court" and
th a t the only uay open uas to  make "constant approach and appeal to
in f lu e n t ia l  parliam entarians to use th e ir  in fluence  and good o ff ic e s "  to
procure a reductio n , i f  possib le , in  the period of detention and "the
1Aterm ination  o f the operation of the enabling A ct."
7.145 The Ghana cases had one d is t in c t iv e  fea tu re  in  common uhich is
worthy of n o tic e . In  a l l  cases extensive re lia n c e  uas placed upon s .3 (1 )
of the Act end i t  uas assumed th a t the detention order constitu ted  a
" law fu l"  au th o rity  fo r  a " law fu l custody", although the section simply
spoke of the order as an "a u th o rity " . I t  is  in te re s tin g  to  see hou the
f ic t io n  uas introduced as a re s u lt  of the use of the term " la w fu l" . The
detention orders in  a l l  cases uere expressed in  the form of subsidiary  
15le g is la t io n . The court appears to  have accepted the position  th a t  
detentions under each order uere under the d ire c t a u th o rity  of Parliam ent 
in  th a t the orders constitu ted  "lau" end not executive ac tio n s . Although 
the judges did not expressly say so in  the DUEIOG A case ( supra) , the court 
gave vent to  i t s  fe e lin g  by s ta tin g  th a t although Ghana uas not a t war, "a 
fu l ly  sovereign parliam ent composed of representa tives  of the people duly 
e lected  by u n iversa l adu lt su ffrage" had " a f te r  due d e lib e ra tio n  decided 
th a t conditions e x is t  as to  make i t  necessary fo r  th is  ra th e r d ra s tic  
pouer to  be conferred on the ch ie f executive o f f ic e r  of the  s ta te  to be 
by him exercised in  h is  d iscre tio n  and has accordingly made provision fo r
(2 ) N ig e r ia :
7.146 As observed by Read, the in tro d u ctio n  of b i l l s  of r ig h ts  during
17the 1960s have had "only a very lim ite d  impact" in  many s ta te s . Even 
so, i t  has to be noted th a t in  N ig e r ia , uhich led the other s ta tes  in  th is
re s p e c t, w ith in  s ix  years  th e  C o n s titu tio n  was abrogated and th e re fo re
i t  is  not possible to  suggest along what course the development of
c o n s titu tio n a l jurisprudence would have otherwise proceeded. At lea s t
18in  one of the e a rly  cases, CHER AN Cl v CHE RAN Cl an attempt was made, i t  
appears, to make a promising s ta r t  by tak ing note of the "standard of 
reasonableness" evolved in  the c o n s titu tio n a l jurisprudence o f the U .S .A . 
and In d ia  w hile  in te rp re t in g  the expression "reasonably ju s t i f ia b le  in  a 
democratic s o c ie ty " . The case more d ire c t ly  involved the  freedoms o f 
conscience, expression, assembly and association but i t  is  in d ic a tiv e  of 
the e a r ly  ju d ic ia l  approach towards the B i l l  of Rights a t the dawn of 
independence.
7.147 The app licant was convicted under 8 .35 o f the Children and
Young Persons Law 1958 of the Northern region fo r  in c it in g  a young boy to
p a rtic ip a te  in  p o l i t ic s .  The provision whoch p ro h ib ited  young persons
from tak ing  part in  p o l i t ic a l  a c t iv i t ie s  was impugned as u l t r a  v ir e s .
The courts upheld the  c o n s t itu t io n a lity  o f the provision on the ground of
"pub lic  order" and "m o ra lity"  o f the general derogation clause. The court
quoted with approval from the decision o f the Indian Supreme Court in  
19fl ADR AS v ROW and also from B asu^ Commentary on the Indian C onstitu tio n
and s ta ted  the p r in c ip le s  to  be fo llow ed in  the m a tte r. I t  was observed:
"The courts have been appointed s en tin e ls  to  watch over the fundamental
r ig h ts  secured to the people o f N ig e r ia  by the C o n s titu tio n . . . and to
guard against any infringem ent o f those r ig h ts  by the s ta te . . . to  be
e ffe c tiv e  guardians. • • the judges must not only act with s e l f - r e s t r a in t
and due respect fo r  the judgment o f the le g is la tu re  but they must also
use th e ir  own im p a rt ia l judgment w ithout undue regard fo r  the claims
20e ith e r  o f the c it iz e n  or o f the s ta te . . ."  The court added th a t to do 
so some standard had to  be evolved fo r  which i t  was necessary to draw upon 
the experience of other co u n tries , as there had been no time to develop
any lo c a l  standard  in  N ig e r ia .
217 .148 In  OLAMOYIN v A.G. NORTHERN REGION. the seme enactment uas 
again challenged but the decision in  the case uas on the point of locus 
standi o n ly . The app lican t had a lleged  th a t he intended to  educate h is  
oun ch ild ren  p o l i t ic a l ly  and th a t h is  r ig h t to  do so might be in fr in g e d  i f  
the lau  uas enforced at any time in  the fu tu re . The court re fe rre d  to  
decisions on the point by the courts in  the U .S .A ., A u s tra lia  and In d ia  
and held th a t the app lican t lacked standing on the fa c ts  of the case. I t  
uas observed th a t the court had ju r is d ic t io n  to  make a declaratory  
judgment a t the instance o f a person uho uas found, on the fa c ts , as having  
s u ff ic ie n t  in te re s t  in  the subject m a tte r, uhen there  uas an a lle g a tio n  of 
in fringem ent of fundamental r ig h ts .
7.149 Me have already re fe rre d  to  the  Emergency Pouers Act 1961 and
the reg u la tio n s  framed thereunder to deal u ith  the "emergency" s itu a tio n
in  the Mestern Region re s u ltin g  from the c o n s titu tio n a l breakdoun in  
22January 1962. Me are to ld  th a t re s t r ic t io n  orders, and also detention
orders in  some cases, uere passed against some p o l i t ic a l  leaders and 
23th e ir  supporters. There are , houever, only tuo reported decisions and 
those also in  respect of re s t r ic t io n  orders possibly because o f the fa c t  
th a t ,  as has been pointed o u t, more than h a lf  of those re s tr ic te d  or
24detained uere released during the f i r s t  three months of the emergency.
The leading case is  MILLIAPIS v MAJEKQPUNMI (No. 3 ) . ^  An action under the 
Emergency Pouers (J u r is d ic t io n ) Act 1962 uas brought in  the Federal Supreme 
Court fo r  d ec la ra tio n  and in ju n c tio n  challenging the v ire s  o f the Act and 
the re le v an t reg u la tio n s  fo r  r e s t r ic t io n  framed thereunder.
7 .150 The court held th a t there uas no abdication of le g is la t iv e  
a u th o rity  in  au thoris ing  the making o f the re g u la tio n s . U nfortunate ly
the challenge uas not grounded on excessive d e leg a tio n . The co u rt, houever, 
held on the fa c ts  of the case th a t, “there was nothing in  the evidence
from uhich i t  could be in fe rre d  th a t i t  uas reasonably ju s t i f ia b le  to
26r e s t r ic t  p la in t i f f 's  freedom of mov/ement and residence". I t  uas held
th a t the fundamental r ig h ts  must be regarded as e s s e n tia l to  be maintained
and preserv/ed to  serve as a norm of le g is la t io n  under m a jo rity  ru le  and
th a t s i invasion may be "essen tia l"  to  the  extent th a t i t  is  necessary fo r
some recognised pub lic  in te r e s t ,  and not fu r th e r :  the expression "reasonably
27ju s t i f ia b le .  . ."  of the derogation clause meant "ordered freedom".
By subjecting the provision to the c o n s titu tio n a l te s t of the derogation
clause i t  uas shoun th a t the "subjective  s a tis fa c tio n  clause" no longer
provided an impenetrable sh ie ld  against ju d ic ia l  challenge. On the fa c ts
the court r ig h t ly  held  th a t the mere fa c t  th a t the p la in t i f f  uas the le g a l
adviser o f the Action Group uhose fa c tio n a l in f ig h t in g  had resu lted  in  the
emergency, could not be the ground fo r  "s a tis fa c tio n "  about the fa c t
th a t i t  uas necessary to r e s t r ic t  him. Houever, as pointed out e a r l ie r ,
i t  uas also possible fo r  the court hold u l t r a  v ire s  the provision of "o ra l
28o rder", i f  challenged. The decision uas follow ed in  ADEGBENRO v
29A.G. of the FEDERATION. uhere a s im ila r  order uas challenged although 
on the fa c ts  o f the case the court a rrived  at a d if fe re n t  conclusion.
(3 ) East A fr ic a :
7.151 Although there e x is t in  Kenya measures fo r  "the preservation of 
pu b lic  s e c u rity " , and in  Tanzania, The Preventive Detention Act, there is  
no reported decision on any of these enactments. There are a feu cases 
to  be found in  the Reports under the Deportation Ordinance and under the  
Emergency Pouers (D etention) Regulations 1966, both of Uganda. The 
leading case uas UGANDA v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, exp. MATOVU. 30 The 
"neo-Nigerian" b i l l  o f r ig h ts  o f Uganda had guaranteed more e f fe c t iv e ly ,  
as ue have seen, the r ig h t of personal l ib e r ty  against invasion in  times 
of emergency but the c o u rt's  approach, in  sharp contrast to th a t of the 
Nigerian court in  the WILLI AMS case ( supra) ,  rounded o ff  the edge i t  had 
over i t s  N igerian  counterpart. Following the l in e  adopted by the Ghana
court in  the DUMQGA case ( supra). the Uganda court also re lie d  on the 
English war-tim e cases to hold th a t the "s a tis fa c tio n "  o f the M in is te r uas 
impervious to  ju d ic ia l  challenge. The court observed: " I t  is  d i f f i c u l t
to  see hou th is  court can, by ap p lica tio n  of an o b jective  te s t ,  uhich is  
an operation in  ab s trac t, hold th a t the pouers uhich over e ighty  c it iz e n s  
of Uganda, Members o f Parliam ent had considered reasonably ju s t i f ia b le  to  
be granted to the M in is te r  to  enable him to deal u ith  a serious s itu a tio n
31in  the country, uas not reasonably ju s t i f ia b le  in  the e x is tin g  s itu a t io n ."
7 .152  The challenge to the v ire s  o f the provision having been re fu ted  
in  the manner ind ica ted  above, the court proceeded to determine the 
question of compliance, on the fa c ts  of the case, u ith  the c o n s titu tio n a l 
pro v is io n s . The contention th a t the "grounds" were not furnished w ith in  
f iv e  days uas re jec ted  upon holding th a t the requirement uas applicable
to  detention under the detention order passed by the M in is te r and not to the
"28-days pending decision" d e ten tio n . Houever, the court upheld the
contention th a t the c o n s titu tio n a l requirement of "specify ing  in  d e ta il"
the grounds had not been s a t is f ie d  upon holding on fa c ts  th a t s u ff ic ie n t
in form ation  uas not given to enable the detainee to  prepare h is  defence
before the Review T r ib u n a l. The mandatory language of the provision
compelled the court to  say so, but the court did not conceal i t s
d is s a tis fa c tio n  u ith  the provision and went on to question the wisdom of
32the founding fa th e rs  in  the fo llo w in g  terms:
I t  is  not c le a r to  us uhy A r t .3 1 (1 ) (a )  o f the C onstitu tio n  
should have requ ired  the M in is te r to  fu rn ish  a detainee  
u ith  a statement specify ing  in  d e ta il  the grounds. . •
One wonders to  what exten t the M in is te r could go in  the  
s p e c ific a tio n  of the grounds. . . The M in is te r . . . in  
v ir tu e  of h is  p o s itio n , must o f necessity , obtain h is  
in form ation  through secret and c o n fid e n tia l sources. I t  
might not be in  the in te re s t  of pub lic  secu rity  th a t such 
sources be d isclosed .
7.153 The la s t  two sentences in  the above e x tra c t reproduced almost 
verbatim the language of the English war-time cases. Thus, a f te r  having 
re lu c ta n tly  upheld the contention against the r a t io  of these cases, the
court termed the noncompliance a "mere m atter of procedure" uhich uas not 
f a t a l  to  the order of d e ten tio n . I t  uas not a "condition-precedent"
33but a "condition-subsequent", and th a t i t  uas "curbble", the court said .
I t  is  tru e  th a t the Uganda C o n s titu tio n , u n lik e  the In d ian , did not
circumscribe the pouer by a r ig id  t im e - l im it ,  b u t, i f  the c o n s titu tio n a l
condition th a t the pouer o f detention  uas subject to an e ffe c tiv e  r ig h t o f
representation  uas not s t r ic t ly  enforced, the executive could very u e ll
defeat the r ig h t  by de lay ing , as u e l l  as by fu rn ish in g  in s u f f ic ie n t  d e ta il
on various p re te x ts , despite the c o u rt's  d ire c tio n . I t  is  submitted th a t
the d if fe re n t  c o n s titu tio n a l provisions uere a l l  narrouly construed. As
a r e s u lt ,  the guarantee provided by the  B i l l  o f Rights lo s t i t s  e f f ic a c y .
347 .154  In  IBINGRA v UGANDA. the v ire s  of the Deportation Ordinance 
enacted before the co n s titu tio n  came in to  e f fe c t ,  uas challenged. The 
question arose on appeal against the re fu s a l by the High Court to issue a 
u r i t  o f habeas corpus on the ap p lica tio n  o f the a p p e lla n t, uho uas held in  
custody pending the decision of the M in is te r  on the question of d ep o rta tio n .
I t  uas held th a t only " la u fu l"  orders made under a s ta tu te  re s t r ic t in g  
freedom of movement should be held  not to have in fr in g e d  the C o n s titu tio n a l 
pro tection  of personal l ib e r t y .  The C onstitu tio n  having perm itted  
general derogation in  respect of n o n -c itize n s  o n ly , the order made under
the Ordinance in  respect o f a c it iz e n  contravened the c o n s titu tio n a l provision  
and could not be a " la u fu l"  order u ith in  the meaning of the C o n s titu tio n .
The court d irec ted  the High Court to issue the u r i t  prayed fo r .
7.155 The decision had an im portant sequel. The case came up again
35before the Court of Appeal. On the u r i t  being issued the f iv e  
ap p ellan ts , uho uere detained a t several p laces, uere brought to  Entebbe 
in  Bujfganda. They uere there  re leased only to  be rearrested  under 
detention orders passed under the Emergency Pouers (D eten tion ) Regulations  
1966 uhich uere in  force in  Buganda o n ly . The court held th a t the prisoners
uere not Mu n la u fu lly ,, brought in to  Buganda to  enable the impugned orders
being passed end the  orders, th e re fo re , uere not mala f id e . I t  uas held
th a t  although the judge had passed the order fo r  immediate release o f
the  prisoners the government acted r ig h t ly  according to the common lau
procedure by bring ing  the prisoners to Entebbe to be produced in  court.
I t  is  submitted th a t the a lle g a tio n  of mala f id e  could not be s a t is fa c to r i ly
disposed of on th is  ground inasmuch as the vo luntary act of the government,
uhich uas not in  pursuance of the c o u rt's  o rder, did not give i t
p ro tection  against a charge of mala f id e .
367 .156  In  re IBRAHIM and others , 78 a lien s  applied fo r  a u r i t  of
habeas corpus u h ile  being detained by the po lice  pending a decision on a
detention o rd er. During the pendency of the a p p lic a tio n , the M in is te r
made the detention o rd er. The names of the app licants  uere contained in
a l i s t  attached to the order uhich uas not signed and the app licants  uere
not given any copy but the order uas read out to them. I t  uas held th a t
i t  uas not necessary to  serve the order uhich uas in  the nature of a
committal u a rra n t. I t  uas a lso , s u rp ris in g ly , held th a t the order uas not
ex fa c ie  bad fo r  o m itting  to  specify  in  i t s  body the  names of the
ap p lican ts . The court uent on to hold th a t the c o n s titu tio n a l requirement
th a t the prisoners be informed of the reasons fo r  a rres t and detention
uas complied u ith  and th a t the "grounds", according to  the C o n s titu tio n ,
could be served u ith in  tuo months. In  the absence of any ru le s  prescrib ing
the  form of the order, the court h e ld , "the order as i t  stands is  not
37obnoxious and is  v a l id " .
7.157 I t  uas conceded in  the case by counsel fo r  the app licants  th a t 
the court cannot look behind a v a lid  detention order but the court fu r th e r  
held th a t " i t  must be assumed th a t the M in is te r ought to  be and is  deeply 
concerned about the l ib e r ty  of the subject aid issues order a f te r  
considering a l l  inform ation before him" and th a t "he has the in te re s t  of
the State in  mind and he is  assumed to have acted ju d ic ia l ly  in  a rr iv in g  
at the conclus ion .11 The court, i t  appears, used the word " ju d ic ia l ly "  
in a d ve rte n tly  in  place o f " ju d ic io u s ly"  in  th a t i t  uas nobody's case th a t 
the p a rtie s  should have been heard. The repeated use of the uord "'assumed" 
in d ica te s  the ju d ic ia l  approach uhich surpassed even th a t in  the English 
wartime cases uhere the Home Secretary had f i l e d  a f f id a v its .  As regards 
the grievance against detention by the po lice  "pending a decis ion", the  
court held  th a t the m atter could be challenged in  appropriate proceedings.
(4 ) C en tra l A fr ic a :
7 .158 Of a l l  the A frican s ta tes  Zambia has the la rg e s t number of
reported decisions on personal l ib e r t y ,  uhich are notab le  also fo r  the
freshness of the ju d ic ia l  approach. F irs t  ua may examine the lone decision
38from M alaw i, in  re PINDENI. The applicant uas arrested on a charge of
being a rogue and vagabond. Later the same day a uarrant under the  
Preservation of Pub lic  Security  Regulations 1965 uas is s u e d fo rh is
39detention in  custody fo r  28 days pending decision on a "contro l o rder".
The uarrant uas extended from time to time and the detention continued fo r  
three months. In  an ap p lica tio n  under s .1 6 (6 ) of the S tatute Lau 
(M iscellaneous Provisions) Act 1967 i t  uas, in te r  a l i a , contended by the  
applicant th a t he had been arrested  on one ground but detained on another, 
and th a t ,  the "extension" of the uarrant not being contemplated under the 
Regulations, the detention uas i l l e g a l .  I t  uas held th a t although giving
40fa ls e  reasons fo r  a rres t uould v io la te  the ru le  in  CHRISTIE v LEACHINSKY, 
in  the in s ta n t case there uas a second a rres t by v ir tu e  of an order under 
the Regulations. The second contention uas, houever, upheld. The court 
observed th a t the Regulations had to  be " s t r ic t ly  construed" as they uere 
concerned with the l ib e r ty  o f the su b jec t. The power of "pending-decision" 
detention uas circumscribed by the requirement of "having reason to  be lieve  
th a t there uere grounds" fo r  the  making of e ith e r  a detention order or a
c o n tro l o rd er by the M in is te r .  The o rd er had to  be made w ith in  28 days
and, as i t  was not so made, the continued detention uas i l l e g a l .
7 .1 5 9 . In  Zambia, the lead ing case uas the  decision in  the CHIPANGQ
case. The detention order was set aside by the High Court, holding th a t
41i t  v io la te d  the c o n s titu tio n a l safeguards. The app licant was furnished
4
with the "'grounds" a f te r  16 days and not w ith in  14 days, as the  
C onstitu tio n  contemplated; s im ila r ly ,  the Gazette n o t if ic a t io n  was made 
a fte r  seven weeks, and not w ith in  "one month". The court fo llow ed the  
Indian a u th o r it ie s  and held  th a t the " c o n s titu tio n a l conditions subsequent 
to  a rre s t"  were equally  mandatory and th a t a detention in  v io la t io n  of any
such condition would be "u n co n s titu tio n a l and u n law fu l" . The Attorney
42 / \G eneral's  appeal was dismissed. Doyle, C .3 .,  observed ( in  the appeal)
as fo llo w s:
s.26A appears in  a p a rt o f the C o n stitu tio n  which has 
fo rm a lly  and d e lib e ra te ly  set out to enshrine the r ig h ts  
and freedoms of the people. . . to  be in te rp re te d  e f fe c t iv e ly  
to  p ro tec t the r ig h ts  and freedoms. That the pro tection  
given is  a lim ite d  p ro tection  is  no reason fo r  c u ttin g  down 
what is  g iven.
7 .160 H is  Lordship held th a t s u b -s .(1 )(b ) gives p ro tec tion  against 
detention "incommuniendo" . The condition was not a mere procedural step  
but i t  v i t a l l y  a ffe c ted  the fa c t  o f d e ten tio n . The p u b lica tio n  of the fa c t  
in  the Gazette uas meant to enable the  d e ta in ee 's  e a rly  re lease to  be 
secured. I t  uas not necessary, h is  Lordship sa id , to  decide whether the  
delay in  fu rn ish in g  the grounds was also f a t a l  as the  condition was "in  
some order o f descending im portance". Th is  observation undoubtedly 
w h ittle d  down to some extent the force of the High C ourt's  decision but 
i t  was made up by the fa c t  th a t the m a jo rity  opinion in  the LIVERSIDGE 
case was not accepted and, on the other hand, Lord A tk in 's  dissent was 
expressly approved as "vigorous" and "c o rre c t" . H is Lordship also quoted 
with approval from a decision of the Ind ian  Supreme Court where i t  was held  
th a t ,  because of the sub jective  determ ination o f the fa c ts  by the Executive,
Parliam ent had provided the necessary safeguards and th ere fo re  the 
requirements of the s ta tu te  must be complied u i t h . ^  G ardiner, 3 . ,  
concurred and added th a t "carry ing  out of e ith e r  of these o b lig a tio n s  out 
of tim e could not remedy the defect"; a new order uas necessary.
AA
7.161 In SINKAMB A v DOYLE. C .3 . .  i t  uas held th a t sub-regs.(B ) and
also 7 ( i i ) ( a )  of Reg. 31 o f the Preservation of Public  Security  Regulations,
being in  c o n flic t  u ith  the neu s .2 6 A (1 )(c ) of the C o n s titu tio n , uere
45im p lied ly  repealed by the l a t t e r ,  uhich provided th a t the r ig h t  to
"revieu" did not a ris e  u n t i l  one year had elapsed. Under the reg u la tio n s
the Chief Justice  uas required  to appoint the Chairman o f the Revieu
T rib u n a l and the applicant had applied to  the Chief Justice to  do so
u ith in  a feu days of h is  d e ten tio n . The app licant had contended th a t the
r ig h t of rev ieu  under the reg u la tio n  uas not taken auay and th a t the neu
s .26A (1 )(c ) provided fo r  a fu rth e r  r ig h t  of rev ieu  "on request". On
uhat i t  ca lle d  "the apparent grammatical connotation", the court held th a t
the le g is la tu re  had s tip u la te d  a condition precedent ( " i f  he so requests")
and also added a l im ita t io n  in  p o in t of tim e to the performance of the
cond ition . The construction uas also supported by s ta tin g  the le g is la t iv e
h is to ry  and the scheme of the re levan t amendments. I t  is  tru e  th a t absurd
re s u lts  uould have fo llo u ed  in  the p ra c t ic a l ap p lica tio n  of the tuo
provisions as p a r a l le l  measures but some o f the reasons given uere not
convincing, such as th a t c o n s titu tio n a l p rovision  and the reg u la tio n s  both
stood in  the same category o f "general la u " .
467.162 In  KAPWEPbJE and KAENGE v A.G. . i t  uas contended th a t the  
requirement o f "specify ing  in  d e ta i l  the grounds" uas not complied u ith  
and also th a t the d iscre tio n  to  detain uas urongly exercised as the  
a lle g a tio n s  constitu ted  c rim in a l offences fo r  uhich no prosecution uas 
in s t itu te d . In  the High Court, S cott, 3 . ,  held th a t uhether the court had 
the pouer to  revieu  the d is c re tio n  of the President must be vieued in  the  
l ig h t  of the fa c t  th a t the re g u la tio n s  uere designed to cover the existence
o f a s itu a t io n  described  in  s .2 9 ( l ) ( b )  and th a t  i t  must be shoun th a t
the measures taken uere so unreasonable as to  bring  the ap p lica tio n
u ith in  the pro tection  of s .28 (th e  "enforcement p ro v is io n " ). On appeal,
47Doyle, C .3 .,  uas more s p e c if ic . Relying on English cases, h is
Lordship held th a t uhere an au th o rity  has a d iscre tio n  to act but
gives no reason fo r  such actio n , the court can in fe r  th a t i t  had no
good reason to  a c t, b u t, in  the in s ta n t case, the grounds of detention
uere g iven. As to  th e  point uhether the grounds uere bad, not being "in
d e ta i l" ,  h is  Lordship equated the expression to the term "vague" used by
Kania, C .J .,  of the Indian Supreme Court in  h is  judgment in  the ATM ARAM 
48case, uhich h is  Lordship quoted u ith  approval. As the  bona fid e s  
of the President uas not impugned h is  Lordship held  th a t the fa c t  th a t 
the  d e ta in in g  au th o rity  had chosen to detain  in  preference to  lay in g  a 
crim in a l charge did not make the act per se unreasonable.
7 .163  Baron, 3 .P .,  l is te d  a number of possible reasons fo r  such
preference but said th a t there  uas no onus of proof on the deta in ing
a u th o r ity . The a lle g a tio n s  need not be p a rtic u la r is e d  in  the same uay as
a c rim in a l charge. H is Lordship also re lie d  on the ATMARAM case ( supra)
*•
to  say th a t s u ff ic ie n t  in form ation  such as uould enable the detainee to  
make a "meaningful rep resen ta tio n ", has to be furn ished . G ardiner, 3 . A ., 
accepted the statements of lau  made by h is  colleagues but the three judges 
d iffe re d  in  th e ir  decision on the fa c ts  o f the case o f one of the  
ap p e llan ts .
497 .164  The a p p lican t, in  re PUTA. uas detained on 18 .10 .72  under 
an order passed on 17 .10 .72  uhich uas revoked and replaced by a fresh  
order on 2 1 .1 0 .7 2 , under the Preservation of Public  Security  R egulations. 
There uas only one Gazette n o t i f ic a t io n ,  in  uhich the date of detention  
uas not s p e c ifie d . In  the u r it te n  statement of grounds, also one, the  
date o f detention uas shoun as 1 8 .1 0 .7 2 . I t  uas held th a t although one 
G azette n o t i f ic a t io n ,  uhich uas u ith in  tim e , met the c o n s titu tio n a l
requirem ent in  th a t  th e  d e ten tio n  uas no lo n g er !tincommonien du "
despite the fa c t th a t the date uas not mentioned, the  w ritte n  statement
uas bad as i t  mentioned only one date and also did not in d ic a te  whether
the same grounds covered both detentions. The court quoted with approval
50from the Indian decision in  the RAM KISHEN case to  say th a t the question
of pre jud ice uas ir re le v a n t when a c o n s titu tio n a l safeguard uas in frin g e d
and th a t the o b jective  standard in  such cases should be th a t of an ordinary
layman. The statement in  the a p p lic a n t's  a f f id a v i t  th a t he considered
the grounds as re la t in g  to the detention of 18 .10 .72  uas accepted as an
"opinion reasonably h e ld ” . The decision in  the CHIPANGQ case ( supra)
uas re lie d  upon to re ite ra te  th a t the c o n s titu tio n a l p ro tections
embodied in  S.26A should be in te rp re te d  e f fe c t iv e ly  to  p ro tec t them.
7.165 The ju d ic ia ry  in  Zambia acted u ith  courage and im agination in
b u ild in g  up a wholesome tra d it io n  of ju d ic ia l  rev ieu  to p ro tec t
c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h ts  by tak in g  a bold decision i n i t i a l l y  to  fre e  i t s e l f
from the impressive au th o rity  o f the English wartime cases uhich had
been misunderstood and wrongly applied in  the o ther ju r is d ic t io n s . In  
51re ALICE MULENGA the High Court re -asserted  th is  position  and observed 
th a t in  the CHIPANGQ case ( supra) a precedent uas set up by the Court of 
Appeal in  expressing i t s  preference fo r  the Indian a u th o ritie s  despite  
the d iffe ren ce  in  the re levan t provisions of the two C o n s titu tio n s . The 
applicant uho uas detained under the reg u la tio n s  made a request fo r  a 
revieu  a fte r  three years but the Revieu T rib u n a l not having been f u l ly  
constitu ted  she complained th a t her c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t uas in fr in g e d .
The contention on behalf o f the S tate th a t i t  could w ait fo r  one year 
before p lacing  the m atter before the T rib u n a l uas re je c te d . The court 
held th a t although the Zambian C onstitu tion  (u n lik e  the Ind ian ) did not 
specify the period u ith in  uhich revieu  must take p lace , i t  ought 
not to be unreasonably dslayed. The court held th a t i f  the  executive  
did not show good cause fo r  the  delay, "the bona fid e s  of the continued
d e te n tio n ” could be challenged .
7.166  Houever, the app lication  fo r  habeas corpus uas allowed mainly on 
the  ground th a t the mandatory provisions of Reg.33(5) had been v io la te d .
A "s p e c if ic ” as w e ll as a "general" au thorisation  fo r  a place of detention  
uas contemplated. The d e fin it io n  of "place of detention" in  Reg. 2 
of the Preservation of Public Security  (Detained Persons) Regulations and 
also the double use of the uord "such" in  the main Reg.33(5) uas re fe rre d  
to .  In  the in s ta n t case the court found th a t there  was no "s p e c ific "  
authorisation  in  respect of place where the app licant uas detained and 
the  detention uas therefore  "un law fu l". Once again the court refused to  
apply the te s t of "pre jud ice".
7.167 In  re HENNING BllITENDAG. ^  the court acted with care and caution  
to  see th at the pouer of ju d ic ia l  review uas exercised u ith in  appropriate  
l im it s .  The exercise of the d iscre tio n  to  detain  uas challenged on the 
ground th a t the reason given fo r  the detention uas id e n t ic a l to  the 
crim in a l charge of uhich the applicant uas a cq u itted . The onus to  prove 
mala f id e  uas on the app lican t, the court said and indeed r ig h t ly
added th a t in  the in s tan t case i t  uas not " c le a r ly "  shoun th a t the 
appellant uas innocent and his subsequent detention on the same ground uas 
"unreasonable" in  view of the fa c t th a t the a c q u it ta l uas fo r  various  
breaches of the 3udges Rules.
537.168 An app lica tion  fo r  habeas corpus uas allousd in  re THOU AS CAIN 
fo r  supplying the grounds to the detainee a f te r  14 days, in  v io la t io n  of 
the c o n s titu tio n a l provisions. The applicant uas arrested  by the po lice  
and detained "pending decision" under su b -re g .(6 ) but th is  order uas 
revoked a fte r  three days only to  be substitu ted  by a fresh o rder. A fte r  
13 days the detention order of the President under su b -reg .(1 ) uas served 
to  be revoked and substitu ted  in  turn  by a s im ila r  order a f te r  another 12 
days. U ith in  12 days of the la s t detention order the "grounds" uere served 
on the applicant and i t  uas contended on behalf of the State th a t the
service was u ith in  tim e . Doyle, C .3 .,  observed th a t the app licant uas 
in  continuous physical detention at a l l  re levan t times and there uas no 
in te rru p tio n  o f th a t detention by the minimum fra c tio n  of tim e uhich elapsed 
between the handing over of the  revocation order and the handing over 
of the neu order of detention; there uas also no in te rru p tio n  in  lau  as 
detention uas by the same au th o rity  and fo r  the same reasons. In  lau , the  
detention and the revocation orders uere co-term inus. Besides the 
p rin c ip le  o f de m inim is, the c o n s titu tio n a l provision i t s e l f  re fe rre d  to  
"detention1* w hile speaking of the  14-days t im e - lim it  and of "orders", 
the court s a id . In  other words the C onstitu tio n  did not contemplate 
d if fe re n t  orders of 14 days.
7.169 The expression "as soon as reasonably p ra c tic a b le"  used in  the
provision in  respect of the 14-days t im e - lim it  imported a sense o f urgency,
the court h e ld . I t  did not extend the t im e - l im it .  The court also held ,
re ly in g  on an Indian decis ion , th a t the grounds must be in  existence on the 
54date of the o rd er. But the court l e f t  open th e  question as to  uhat would 
be the position  i f  the successive detention orders uere on d if fe re n t  
grounds. I t  uas also l e f t  to the consideration of the appropriate au thority  
the question of v ire s  end form of su b -reg .(6 ) in  th a t the policeman may 
not be able to  give the grounds fo r  the probable detention order, to  
conform to the c o n s titu tio n a l requirem ent.
7 .170 The decision in  the CHIPANGQ and also in  the KAPWEPUE ( supra)
55were re lie d  upon in  GILBERT flUTALE v A.G. ,  in  uhich the court a lloued an 
ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus against a detention order upon holding th a t the 
grounds supplied uere vague and the applicant uas unable to make e ffe c t iv e  
representation to the P res id en t. On behalf of the State an a f f id a v i t  uas 
f i l e d  to exp la in  the grounds uhich the court possibly took as neu grounds 
and observed th a t i t  uas concerned u ith  the grounds th a t uere furnished to  
the app licant u ith in  14 days t im e - l im it .  Perhaps the pos ition  uas b e tte r
I C O
sta ted  in  re PUT A ( supra) as what was m a te ria l was the fa c t o f the  
d e ta in ee 's  own understanding, tested  by an ordinary layman's standard. 
Conclusion
7.171 I t  has to be noted th a t in  a l l  the cases we have discussed,
except in  the sing le  case from Malawi, decisions were given on app lica tions
fo r  habeas corpus and n e ith e r  the courts nor the l i t ig a n ts  appear to have
taken seriously  the spec ia l enforcement provisions of the C onstitu tio ns  which,
56i t  was expected, would supply the place of the named remedies. In Zsnbia,
57in  PARDOOR KATQNGQ v A.G. i t  was held th a t the provision added nothing  
new to  the power which the court already possessed and even the Uganda 
court in  the MATOVU case ( supra) emphasised the fa c t th a t the  provision  
could be invoked only when there  was no a lte rn a tiv e  remedy. Thus, the 
"e x tra -c o n s titu t io n a l"  remedy of habeas corpus came to occupy an almost 
"s u p ra -co n s titu tio n a l"  s ta tu s . U n fo rtu n ate ly , i t  was not matched everywhere, 
as we have seen, by a vigorous ju d ic ia l  response possibly fo r  the reason 
th a t i t  had a f r a g ile  existence in  th a t i t  could be, as was the case in  
M alawi, abrogated by an ordinary law . However, th a t could be avoided by
a c o n s titu tio n a l entrenchment o f the r ig h t .  This was achieved in  the
581969 C onstitu tio n  of Ghana which, as Read points ou t, "surely  resu lted  
from a f u l l e r  reap p ra isa l than any other current C onstitu tio n  in  A frica"  
as Ghana, we may add, had not only seen One-party ru le  and M i l i ta r y  ru le  
but had seen enfeebled ju d ic ia l  e f fo r ts  to p ro tec t personal l ib e r t y .  Even
though m il ita r y  ru le  has been re in s ta te d , the change in  the complexion
59of the ju d ic ia l  approach is  worthy of spec ia l n o tic e . For a "re th ink ing  
of the ju d ic ia l  ro le "  advocated by C la ire  P a l le y ^  we have to examine the 
new jurisprudence evolved under the m il ita ry  governments of Ghana, N ig e ria  
and Uganda, but we have also to  commend as bo ld , im aginative and courageous 
the approach of the Zambian courts .
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Chapter 8
EMERGENCY PROVISIONS UNDER MILITARY RULE
I . The new "Grundnorm"
(1 ) Some aspects o f m il ita ry  "take-overs” in  the Neu Commonwealth
8.1 The p r in c ip le  of c iv i l  supremacy, which was a m anifestation
of the common law ru le  contemplating the c iv i l  power c a llin g  the army to
"a id" i t  and not to  supplant i t ,  i s  one of the com er stones of the  B r it is h
C o n s titu tio n . U n fo rtu n a te ly , as we have seen, the doctrine o f m a rtia l law
evolved in  the c o lo n ia l context negated th is  p r in c ip le . We have however
1
noticed  th a t the doctrine  did not s tr ik e  roots in  Commonwealth A fr ic a .
On the other hand, there was a d if fe re n t  c o lo n ia l t r a d it io n  in  so fa r  as
2the Indian sub-continent was concerned. N evertheless, although Pakistan  
was the f i r s t  Commonwealth s ta ts  to  witness a m il ita ry  " take-o ver" , on the  
continent of A fr ic a , N ig e r ia , Ghana, S ie rra  Leone and Uganda also witnessed 
s im ila r  events . F iner has given three general reasons fo r  m il ita r y  
in te rv e n tio n  in  the new sta tes  and he has put "pre-existence of a 
t r a d it io n  o f m il ita ry  in te rv e n tio n "  at the th ird  p lace, as a 
"supplementary" reason, the two "p r in c ip a l"  reasons being -  "leg itim acy"  
was shaken and disputed and "the m a te ria l conditions fo r  fo s te r in g  and
3
susta in ing  powerful c iv i l ia n  organisations" were lac k in g .
8 .2  In  Pakistan , President Iskander M irza  issued a "Proclamation"
on 7th October 195(8 to  "abrogate" the C o n stitu tio n ; dismiss the C entra l 
and P ro v in c ia l governments; d issolve the le g is la tu re s ; "abolish" a l l  
p o l i t ic a l  p a rties ,' and to declare th a t " u n t i l  a lte rn a tiv e  arrangements are 
made Pakistan w i l l  come under M a r t ia l Law" end th a t General Ayub Kharn was 
appointed as the C -in-C  of the  Pakistan Army and Chief M a r t ia l Law 
A dm in istrator. He gave d e ta ile d  reasons ju s t ify in g  the action taken, 
blaming mainly the p o lit ic ia n s  end also the C onstitu tio n  which according
to  him did not Ns u it  the genius of the Muslim people**. General Ayub Khan,
as Supreme Commander and Chief M a r t ia l Law Adm inistrator issued
4
separately the same day a "Proclamation of M a r t ia l Lau". A feu  ueeks
la t e r ,  on October 27, President M irza  resigned and General Ayub Khan
5
assumed the Presidency. The f i r s t  m a rt ia l lau  regime continued u n t i l  
Oune 8, 1962.
8 .3  On the second occasion there uere tuo "Proclamations of
M a rt ia l Lau", both under the signature of General Yahya Khan uho declared
th a t President Ayub Khan had "handed over a l l  pouers" to  him aid also
th a t he had "assumed the o ff ic e  o f the President" and th a t "in  the in te re s t
o f n a tio n a l sec u rity "  i t  had become "necessary to  place the country under
M a rt ia l Lau" as a s itu a tio n  had arisen "in uhich c iv i l  acfeninistration
cannot e ffe c t iv e ly  fu n c tio n " .6 Reference in  the f irs t-p u b lis h e d
proclamation (both dated 3 1 .3 .69 ) uas made to the "d ec la ra tio n " made on
25th March, 1969, by President Ayub Khan uhen he re linqu ished  o ff ic e  and
in v ite d  General Yahya Khan, C -in-C  o f the Pakistan Army, to  "do h is
C o n s titu tio n a l duty" of re s to rin g  lau  and order in  the country. I t  has
been suggested th a t ,  although there  uas general discontent among the
people u ith  the ad m in is tra tio n , the immediate cause o f the promulgation
of m a rtia l lau  uas the signing of the peace agreement between In d ia  and
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Pakistan , uhich had evoked strong pu b lic  p ro tes ts . Although the  
second m a rtia l lau  regime did not end u n t i l  the 20th A p r il,  1972, by a 
"Proclamation" made on 20th December 1971, President Yahya Khan 
re linquished o f f ic e  and "declared" th a t Mr. Z .A . Bhutto "s h a ll be the  
Chief M a r t ia l Lau Adm inistrator and s h a ll command a l l  the armed forces
g
of Pakistan and s h a ll also be the  President o f P ak is tan ."  I t  has to  be
g
noted th a t , possibly because of the decision in  ASMA 31LANI the
In terim  C onstitu tion  of 1972 uhich replaced the second m a rtia l lau  regime,
10contained a "v a lid a tio n  clause" in  A rt. 281, u n like  the "saving and
rep ea l"  provisions contained in  A rt. 225 of the 1962 C o n s titu tio n , uhich 
had replaced the f i r s t  m a r t ia l lau  regime.
8 .4  On the th ird  occasion the "Proclamation of M a r t ia l Lau" uas
issued by the Chief of Army S ta f f ,  General Z ia -u l-H u q , on the 5th 3u ly ,
1977, in  uhich i t  uas s ta ted  th a t he had "proclaimed M a r t ia l Lau throughout
Pakistan" and had assumed the o ff ic e  of the Chief M a r t ia l Lau Adm inistrator;
th a t the President uould continue in  o ff ic e  but the Prime M in is te r and the
Federal M in is te rs  uould cease to hold o f f ic e ;  th a t the C entra l and the
P ro v in c ia l le g is la tu re s  uould stand dissolved and th a t the C onstitu tion
11"s h a ll remain in  abeyance". On th is  occasion, houever, there uas
"M a rtia l Lau" already in  force in  some of the c it ie s ,  having been declared
12by the Federal government a feu  months e a r l ie r .
8 .5  In  contrast with the bloodless coups of Pakistan , the President
of Bangladesh, Shaikh M ujibur Rahman, uas the foremost v ic tim  of the coup
th a t took place there on the 15th August 1975. There uas a radio
announcement th a t Khondkar Mostaque Ahmed had become the neu President;
th a t the armed forces had utsken-over", and th a t m a rtia l lau  had been 
13proclaim ed. A "proclam ation" uas issued by the neu President a feu
days la t e r ,  on 20th August, by uhich he "suspended" certa in  provisions of
14the C onstitu tio n  and assumed pouer to  issue M a r t ia l Lau Regulations. The
reasons fo r  the coup uere not s tated  in  the proclamation but i t  has been
suggested th a t the main causes of the coup uere the prevalence of corruption
15in  ru lin g  c irc le s  aid favours shoun to  the "Auami League M i l i t i a " .
Subsequently, on 8th November 1975 and 29th November 1976 tuo more
"proclamations" uere issued by A.M. Sayem, to  whom Khondkar M. Ahmed
16had "handed over" the o f f ic e  o f the P res id en t. In  the second 
proclamation (o f 8th November 1975) i t  uas s ta ted  th a t fo r  the "e ffe c tiv e  
enforcement of m a rtia l lau" i t  had become necessary "to assume the pouers 
of Chief M a r t ia l Lau A dm inistrator" and the signatory uas described in  the
proclamation as "President and the Chief M a r t ia l Law A dm in istrato r"• By
the th ird  proclamation (o f  29*11.76) President Sayem "handed over" the
o ff ic e  o f the Chief M a r t ia l Lau Adm inistrator to the Chief o f Army S ta ff ,
Major General Z ieur Rahman, uho uas la te r  suom in  as the President also on
21st A p ril 1977 on the resignation  o f President Sayem. On 23rd A p ril 1977
General Z iau r Rahman (a c tin g  as the President and Chief M a r t ia l Lau
A ctain istrator) made The Proclamations (Amendment) Order 1977 by uhich a
neu p ro v is io n , para 3A, captioned "V a lid a tio n  of certa in  proclamations e tc ."
17uas in s erte d  in  the Fourth Schedule of the C o n s titu tio n . I t  
contemplated a b lanket ban against ju d ic ia l  review of "proclamations and 
a l l  m a rt ia l lau  regu lations  and orders aid  a l l  other laus made during the  
period betueen 15th August 1975 and the date of revocation of the said  
proclamations aid u ith d rau a l of m a rtia l la u " .
8 .6  The position  uas d if fe re n t  in  Commonusalth A fr ic a : nouhere has the
m ilita ry  "take-over" resu lted  in  "promulgation" of "M a rtia l Lau" as a
d e lib e ra te  measure to form an in te g ra l p art of the neu "Grundnorm".
However, the f i r s t  N igerian coup, l ik e  th a t o f Bangladesh, resu lted  in
the k i l l in g  of im portant p o l i t ic a l  fig u re s  inc lud ing  the Federal Prime
M in is te r and Finance M in is te r besides others and there also appeared a
fa in t  reference to "M a rtia l Lau" in  a broadcast over Radio Kaduna in
18re la tio n  to  the Northern provinces. The coup had been engineered by the  
young Majors end uas organised re g io n a lly  at Kaduna, Ibadan and Lagos. 
Therefore, there uas some confusion in  the i n i t i a l  stage but f in a l ly  on 
behalf of the Federal Cabinet a "handing-over document" uas signed 
e n tru s tin g  the adm in is tra tion  o f the country as a "temporary measure" to
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the army and the p o lice  "under the co n tro l of "Major-General Iro n s i . On 
15th January 1966 (almost twelve hours a fte r  the Kaduna broadcast) the 
cabinet decision uas broadcast over the rad io  and M ajor-G eneral Iro n s i,  as 
Supreme Commander o f the M il i ta r y  Government announced the decrees fo r  the
suspension o f th e  o f f ic e s  o f P re s id e n t, Prime M in is te r , the d is s o lu tio n  o f
Parliam ent and o f the fu n c tion ing  of a m il ita r y  government in  each region
19responsible to  the Federal m il ita ry  government. There uas no reference  
to  " M a r t ia l Lau" in  General Iro n s i*s  broadcast from Lagos.
8.7 I t  has been observed th a t the f i r s t  N igerian co up , uhich
20displaced the c iv i l  government th e re , uas m otivated by "n a tio n a l in te re s t" .
The general background of a l l  coups according to Nuabueze, uas provided by
"co rru p tio n , uaste, concentration o f ueelth  in  a feu  hands, increasing
unemployment, general m aladm in istration , esp e c ia lly  of the army, e le c to ra l
m alpractices aid other types of p o l i t ic a l  perversions o f the c o n s titu tio n a l
21system and tr ib a lis m " . In  the African context g reater importance has to  be
attached to the last-m entioned fa c to r . For, on 29th July 1966, N ig e ria
uitnessed a second coup re s u ltin g  in  General Iro n s i h im self being k i l le d .
I t  has been pointed out th a t the January coup came to  be considered as
22"an Ibo plan fo r  Ibo dom ination". As has been suggested, the immediate
cause fo r  the second coup uas Decree No. 34, made on May 24, uhich
23purported to abolish fed era lism . The k i l l in g  of Ibos in  the North as a 
re s u lt  of the second coup even tu a lly  involved N ig e ria  in  a c iv i l  uar uhen 
the m il ita r y  leader of Eastern N ig e ria  declared there  the Republic of 
B ia fra  on 30th May 1967 uhich uas, houever, liq u id a te d  u ith in  less than 
three years.
8 .8 .  The im portant po in t to  be noted about the N igerian coup uhich does
not appear to  have received due a tte n tio n  is  the apparent lack o f concern 
by the m il ita r y  ru le rs  to  bridge appropriate ly  and c a re fu lly  the breach of 
le g a l c o n tin u ity . In  s .18 (2 ) o f the C o nstitu tio n  (Suspension and 
M o d ific a tio n ) Decree 1966 (Decree No. 1) i t  uas sta ted  th a t the decree s h a ll  
be deemed to have come in to  force on 17th January 1966 although the breakdoun 
of c o n s titu tio n a l machinery took place on 15th January 1966. In  the  
Federal M il i ta r y  Government (Supremacy and Enforcement o f Pouers) Decree 
1970 (Decree No. 2 8 ), uhich uas made a f te r  the Federal M il i ta r y  Government
had uon the B ia fra  war and uhich uas in  fa c t mads to  n u l l i f y  the e ffe c t
24o f the  decision in  the LAKANMI case, reference uas, no doubt, made to  the
"revo lu tions" uhich took place in  1966, on January 15 and July 29, but
re tro sp ec tive  operation o f the decree uas not expressly contemplated. A
retu rn  to c iv i l  ru le  is  contemplated by October 1979 but i t  is  not knoun
i f  the neu C onstitu tion  nou being d ra fted  u i l l  contain a "v a lid a tio n
clause" s im ila r  to , or even b e tte r  uorded than A rt. 281 o f P ak is tan 's
In te rim  C onstitu tion  of 1972, to  bridge f in a l ly  the breach uhich has so fa r
25remained unchallenged.
8 .9  The Ghana coups on both occasions had one d is t in c t iv e  fe a tu re  
in  th a t there uas a co llab o ra tio n  of the p o lice  and the armed fo rces; the  
Commissioner of P o lice  fig u re d  as the Deputy Chairman of the "N ational 
L ib era tio n  Council" uhich uas estab lished  by the "Proclamation" made on 
the occasion of the f i r s t  coup. Although th is  proclamation expressly  
re fe rre d  to the "co-operation of the P o lice  serv ice" in  assuming the 
"Government of the State o f Ghana" by the armed forces on the 24th February 
1966, there uas no reference in  the N atio n a l Redemption Council (Establishm ent) 
Proclamation 1972 to  the p art played in  the second coup by the po lice  
service except the bare fa c t  th a t the Inspector General o f P o lice
fig u red  as a member of the N atio n a l Redemption Council estab lished  on 
13th January 1972 under the proclam ation. Houever, u n lik e  N ig e r ia , uhere 
n e ith e r the 1966 Decree No. 1 nor the 1970 Decree No. 28 o ffe re d  any 
ju s t i f ic a t io n  fo r  the " take -o ver" , on both occasions in  Ghana the  
proclamations expressly re c ite d  th a t i t  uas "in  the in te re s t  o f the  
people o f Ghana"* The Ghanaian "Proclamations" and the N igerian  "Decrees" 
had an im portant common fe a tu re  in  th a t they did not contain any 
reference uhatsoever to "M a rtia l Laus"; th is  uas also common to the 1971 
"Proclamation" of Uganda.
8.10 I t  ha^ houever, to  be noted th a t uhen the f i r s t  period of m il ita ry
ru le  came to an end in  Ghana on 1st October 1969, The C onstitu tio n  
(Consequential and T ra n s itio n a l Provisions) Decree 1969 (NLCD 406) 
uas enacted and by s .4 (1 ) o f the Decree i t  uas provided th a t a l l  decrees 
issued in  pursuance of the proclamation " s h a ll form p a rt of the laus of 
Ghana" and in  the preamble o f the decree i t  uas re c ite d  th a t the decree 
uas made in  the exercise of the pouers "reserved to the N a tio n a l L iberation  
Council" under the neu C onstitu tio n  i t s e l f .  The "Proclamation" uas 
repealed by s .3 and even in  the "saving clause" provision  uas made only 
as respects e x is tin g  r ig h ts  under th e  former C o n s titu tio n . I t  uas doubtful 
i f  s . 4 could extend to executive acts done in  pursuance of the decrees; 
besides, i t  did not a ffo rd  a b lanket pro tection  against ju d ic ia l  challenge  
to the decrees themselves.
8.11 I t  has been suggested th a t fo r  each coup in  Ghana the corporate
in te re s t o f the army supplied the primary m o tiva tio n : in  1966 i t  uas favour
shoun by Nkrumah fo r  the "P re s id e n tia l Guard" a id h is  neglect of the men and
m a te ria l o f the army; in  1969 D r. B usia 's  government uas charged s p e c if ic a lly
u ith  "v ic tim iza tio n  of m il ita r y  and po lice  personnel" besides being accused
26generally  of "m alpractice, mismanagement and a rb itra ry  d ism issa ls ."  I t  is ,
houever, an admitted fa c t  th a t Ghana under the Nkrumah regime had reached
27a s ta te  of economic and p o l i t ic a l  bankruptcy. Although in  Ghana p o l i t ic a l
detentions had assumed a serious form, the m il ita r y  ru le rs , as has been
observed, ju s t i f ie d  th e ir  seizure  of pouer fo r  re s to rin g  freedom in
28N ig e ria  and Uganda a lso , by re leas in g  p o l i t ic a l  deta inees.
8.12 In  1967 there uas a coup in  S ie rra  Leone but m il ita r y  ru le
there las ted  fo r barely  th ir te e n  months. The arm y/police partnersh ip  there
bore some resemblance to  the Ghana ru le  but i t  had a d is t in c t iv e  fe a tu re .
As has been observed, "the i n i t i a l  purpose o f the coup uas to  use a
lim ite d  period of m a rtia l lau " and to  use the army "as an instrum ent o f
29c iv i l ia n  p o l i t ic s " .  Houever, B rig a d ie r Lansana, uho had staged the f i r s t  
coup on March 21, uas h im self deposed and arrested  in  the second coup
le d  by M a jo r B la k e , on March 23 . I t  i s  s ta te d  th a t ,  although th e  authors
o f the second coup uere also in fluenced  by c iv i l ia n  p o l i t ic s ,  the a d d itio n a l
fa c to r  in  th e ir  case uas the in flu en ce  of the N igerian and the Ghanaian 
30coups o f 1966. I t  is  th ere fo re  possible to suggest th a t the in ad verten t
reference in  Kaduna to " M a rtia l Lau", uhich uas in  a sense re tra c te d  at
Federal le v e l in  N ig e r ia , might have m isled the coup-makers in  S ie rra
Leone. For B rig a d ie r Lansana had only declared " M a rtia l Lau" and such
steps as suspension of the C o n s titu tio n , d isso lu tio n  of p o l i t ic a l  p a rtie s
and form ation of the N a tiona l Reformation Council (composed of army and
31p o lice  o f f ic e r s ) ,  uere taken subsequently. I t  has also been pointed out
th a t S ie rra  Leone uas the f i r s t  A frican country uhere the successor
32c iv i l ia n  government had put on t r i a l  i t s  former m il ita r y  ru le rs .
On March 23, 1971, there  uas an attempt to stage another coup but i t  f a i le d .
8 .13 Besides N ig e ria  and Ghana, the only other s ta te  in  Commonwealth
A fric a  uhere m il ita r y  ru le  is  s t i l l  continuing is  Uganda, where the  
"Proclamation" o f the coup uas "made" as w e ll as published on 2nd February 
1971; i t  appeared under the signature o f Major General Id i  Amin Oada as 
M il i ta r y  Head o f S ta te , Head of Government and C -in-C  of Armed Forces.
In the preamble of the proclamation i t  uas sta ted  th a t "on the 25th day 
of January, 19719 the Armed Forces o f Uganda, fo r  reasons given in  the 
statement by them to  the Nation on th a t day, took over the powers of the 
Government o f the Republic of Uganda and vested those powers in  me".
8 .14  Houever, the "Proclamation" in  Uganda as also i t s  counterparts in
Ghana and N ig e ria , had a d is t in c t iv e  fe a tu re : they a l l  d if fe re d  in  yet 
another im portant aspect (besides the absence of reference to "m a rtia l lau ") 
from th e ir  counterparts in  Pakistan uhere, on the f i r s t  two occasions, the  
"Proclamations o f M a r t ia l Lau" contemplated s e ttin g  up o f "Special Courts"
(in 1958) and " M ilita ry  Courts" ( in  1969) fo r  the t r i a l  and punishment 
not only o f breaches o f the M a r t ia l Lau Regulations and Orders but of
offences under ordinary law as w e ll; in  1977 also a s im ila r  provision
was made in  Pakistan , but by a separate instrum ent, C .M .L .A .'s  Order No. 4,
which was made a few days a fte r  the coup. In  respect of Ghana and N ig e ria
i t  has been observed th a t the m il ita ry  ru le rs  there " tr ie d  to  m aintain
conditions of a fre e  society and the ru le  of law" and th a t there uere
"no p o lice  s ta te  methods, no regim entation of in d iv id u a l's  l i f e  such as
33are c h a ra c te r is tic  o f the society of to t a l i ta r ia n  s ta te s " . I t  is
doubtfu l i f  the same th ing  could be said of Pakistan as w e ll as Uganda.
General Amin has been quoted as speaking to the High Court judges and
m agistrates in  November 1976 to the e f fe c t  th a t he respected and attached
34great importance to the ru le  o f law but i t  is  also stated  th a t "there is
no way of t e l l in g  how many people have been murdered since Amin cane to
power" aid th a t the o f f ic i a l  explanation of the k i l l in g s  by f i r in g  squads
35was th a t they had been t r ie d  and sentenced by m il ita ry  tr ib u n a ls .
8.15 I t  has been observed th a t in  Pakistan the army was im patient
with "cumbrous and corrupt bureaucracy" and th a t i t  had "emerged in  a
36p o l i t ic a l ly  constructive ro le "  to  serve "s o c ia l ends". I t  may be
questioned whether such a process did not lead to  a ce rta in  amount of
regim entation of s o c ia l l i f e .  There i s ,  however, no doubt th a t the
Pakistan army has gradually  departed from the c o lo n ia l t ra d it io n  uhich
had provided a strong a p o l it ic a l  and p ro fessional base fo r  the  armed fo rces .
I t  has been observed th a t the "s o c ia l ro le "  of the armed forces in  the new
sta tes  depended on the p o l i t ic a l  s ta b i l i t y  and also the nature of the
37n a tio n a l leadership and i t s  standing in  the eyes of the masses.
Events in  Pakistan , however, show th a t these fa c to rs  also determined the 
p o l i t ic a l  ro le  of the army. Although Pakistan shared with In d ia , as a part 
of B r it is h  In d ia , a prolonged experience of the working of parliam entary  
democracy, u n lik e  the s ta tes  of Commonwealth A fr ic a , i t  had the m isfortune  
of losing  very e a rly  i t s  experienced and charism atic p o l i t ic a l  leaders
like fir. n.A. Dinnah and nr. Liaquat Ali Khan.
8.16 A mere change in  the personnel of the government or even the
replacement o f one party by another in  the seat of government in  a m u lti-
p a rty  democracy does not necessarily  invo lve  the process of change in
the replacement o f one "grundnorm" by another; p a rtie s  or personnels
committed to amending the "grundnorm" carry out th e ir  "e lec tio n  pledges"
in  accordance with the "procedure" la id  down by the existing"grundnorm"
to secure at once " le g a lity "  and " le g itim a c y" . However, in  the m il ita ry
"take-o vers", as we have seen, these concepts lo s t th e ir  meaning and
re levance. As Hans Kelsen has observed, a successful revo lu tion  begets
38i t s  own leg itim a c y . The tru e  reason perhaps is  th a t when a "revo lu tio n "  
is  engineered by the m il i t a r y ,  the la t t e r  has to  face certa in  p ra c t ic a l  
problems re la t in g  not only to  the d i f f ic u l t y  of working w ith in  the 
e x is tin g  in s t i tu t io n a l  framework but also those re la t in g  to  i t s  own 
establishm ent which make i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  the new ru le rs  to  adopt in  to to  
the e x is tin g  "grundnorm". By t ra in in g , experience and also because of the 
fa c t th a t they had to function w ith in  the m onolith ic  s tru c tu re  of the 
m ilita ry  o rg an isatio n , the neu ru le rs  were i l l - s u i t e d  to f u l f i l  the ro le  
of the p o lit ic ia n s  who not merely manned but successfu lly  manipulated the 
in t r ic a te  mechanism of the executive and le g is la t iv e  organs of the government. 
Thus, we fin d  th a t the m il ita ry  ru le  fo llow ing  a "take-over" f u l f i l s  i t s e l f  
in  a new "grundnorm" by modifying the e x is tin g  "grundnorm" to  s u it  the 
in s t i tu t io n a l  framework of the  government. This process of metamorphosis 
was not the same everywhere. Therefore, we propose to  examine separately  
in  one group, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and in  another group the  
Commonwealth A fr ic a . I t  has to be noted however th a t even these two 
groups had one common element in  th a t the claim o f " leg itim acy" was mainly 
founded in  the fa c t  th a t the new ru le rs  did not arrogate to themselves 
the e s s e n tia l ju d ic ia l  power. In  th is  respect the p re -e x is tin g  "grundnorm" 
continued to  p re v a il .  On the other hand, the m a r tia l law group found an
a d d itio n a l prop to  support what wa may c a l l  the in te rn a l or domestic 
aspect o f leg itim a c y , based on c o lo n ia l t r a d it io n .
(2 ) The in s t i tu t io n a l  framework of m il ita ry  governments
(A) Pakistan and Bangladesh
8.17 I t  is  in te re s tin g  to  note th a t ini Pakistan , although the o ff ic e
o f the President ua9 preserved during the three m il ita r y  regimes, the  
r ig h t  to  tamper with the e x is tin g  "grundnorm", the C onstitu tio n  in  
p a r t ic u la r ,  uas arrogated by the Chief M a r t ia l Law A dm in istrator.
Apparently, " M a rtia l Law" was considered as a s u p ra -co n s titu tio n a l as 
w ell as superior norm which could be invoked to  claim leg itim acy  fo r  the  
action taken to  "abrogate" or "to  keep in  abeyance" the C o n s titu tio n .
A fte r the la s t  coup o f 1977 (a lso  a f te r  the f i r s t  coup of 1958, fo r  some 
t im e ), the o ff ic e s  of the President and Chief M a r t ia l Law A dm inistrator 
have been held by d if fe re n t  persons despite the "take-over" but on the 
second occasion General Yahya Khan assumed both o ff ic e s  from the  o u tse t.
The P ro v is io n a l C onstitu tio n  Order was promulgated by him in  h is  capacity  
as Chief M a r t ia l Lau A dm inistrator and not as the P res iden t. On the la s t  
occasion, in  1977, although on other m atters "P res id en t's  Post- 
Proclsnation Orders" were issued, the basic document o f the new "grundnorm", 
the Laws (Continuance in  Force) Order 1977, was issued as C .M .L .A .'s  
Order No. 1 o f 1977. On the f i r s t  occasion, however, the basic document, 
the Laws (Continuance in  Force) Order 1958, uas issued as P res id en t's  
Order (Post Proclam ation) No. 1 of 1958. But in  th is  case also i t  was 
observed th a t the Order was made in  pursuance of a proclamation o f 7th  
October (under which the country was placed under m a rtia l la w ). In  
Bangladesh in  the P re s id e n tia l Proclamation of 20th August 1975 i t  was 
stated  th a t the "M a rtia l Law Regulations and Orders" made by him "s h a ll 
have e f fe c t  notw ithstanding anything contained in  the C o n stitu tio n " and
39th a t "subject to  such Regulations the C onstitu tio n  to continue in  fo rc e " .
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Ms have also seen th a t under the Second Proclamation in  Bangladesh the
President found i t  necessary to assume powers of Chief M a r t ia l Law
A dm inistrator and th a t when the C onstitu tio n  was amencLedin 1977 to
in s e r t  there a v a lid a tio n  clause (para  3A,Fourth Schedule) the re levan t
instrum ent was issued under the signature of "President and Chief
40M a r t ia l  Law A dm in istrato r". Thus, i t  could be said th a t a l l  instrum ents  
made during m il ita ry  ru le  in  Pakistan and Bangladesh, whether they were 
issued by the President or the Chief M a r t ia l Law Adm inistrator (when the 
two o ff ic e s  were not combined in  one person), derived th e ir  v a l id i ty  from 
the basic fa c t  th a t the country was placed under M a r t ia l Law or in  other 
words in te rn a l or "domestic leg itim acy" was sought to oe achieved through 
"m a rtia l law ".
8 .18  I t  is  apparent, however, th a t some d is tin c tio n  was sought to be
m aintained in  Pakistan between "Regulations" end "Orders" and also between
the instrum ents which were made by the Chief M a r t ia l Law Adm inistrator
and those which uere made by h is  subordinates. As fo r  example, Order No. 9
of the "M a rtia l Law Orders" made on 11th October 1958 by the Chief
M a r t ia l Law A dm inistrator expressly contemplated th a t in  case of c o n flic t
between the "orders and regu lations" made by him and those made by the
A dm inistrators and sub-adm in is tra tors , "the la t t e r  s h a ll conform to  the  
41form er". The Chief M a r t ia l Law A dm inistrator also reserved to h im self
u n fe tte red  powers to  delegate le g is la t iv e  au th o rity  by provid ing th a t
"M a rtia l Law Orders and M a r t ia l Lau Regulations" could be issued "by any
A dm inistrator or by any o f f ic e r  authorised" by him, vide Reg. 2 of the
42M a r t ia l Law Regulations made on 7th October 1958. Uhat should be the 
status  o f a P re s id e n tia l order was also an im portant question in  so fa r  
as the 1977 coup was concerned as the c iv i l ia n  (c o n s titu t io n a lly -e le c te d )  
President has continued in  o ff ic e  a l l  along. The answer is  to be found in  
paragraph 3 (1 ) o f C .M .L .A .*s  Order No. 1 of 1977 which provided th a t "the  
President s h a ll act on and in  accordance with the advice of the Chief
M a r t ia l Lau A d m in is tra to r."
8.19 The basic documents of a l l  three coups of Pakistan contained one 
common provision  uhich should be considered to  be an im portant part o f the  
core of the neu "grundnorm". Notwithstanding the "abrogation" ("Abeyance" 
in  1977) of the  C o n s titu tio n , the country was to  be "governed as nearly
as may be" in  accordance with the said C o n s titu tio n , a lb e it  subject to  any
instrum ent ("R egulation" or "Order") made by the Chief M a r t ia l Law
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A dm inistrator and also by the P res iden t, in  1958 aid 1977. I t  was
also expressly provided on a l l  th ree  occasions th a t a l l  courts s h a ll
continue to have and exercise a l l  powers and ju r is d ic t io n s  which they
44possessed on the date o f the coup. However, each tim e th is  provision
was subjected to a tw ofold l im ita t io n :  any manner of process of any court
s h a ll not issue to any m a rtia l law au th o rity  and no court "s h a ll c a l l  or
perm it to be c a lled  in  question" the "Proclam ation", the "Regulations" and
"Orders" and also ( in  1958 aid  1969) "any f in d in g , judgment [sentence]
45or order of a Special M il i ta r y  Court or a Summary M il i ta r y  C o u rt."  The
"fundamental r ig h ts "  were e ith e r  "abrogated" (1969) or "suspended" ( 1 9 7 7 ) ;^
the e x is tin g  laws ( " a l l  lawd') were to continue subject to  adaptation as
47might be made from tim e to  tim e. On a l l  three occasions i t  uas also
provided th a t the provision in  any law fo r  consideration by a "Review
48(Advisory) Board" of any "detention order" s h a ll be of no e f fe c t .
Reference may be made to a general but im portant provision o f the
"Proclamations o f M a r t ia l Law": the reg u la tio n s  and orders had to  be
49published but in  such a manner as was found convenient.
8 .20 These provisions, in  our submission, made up the core o f the new 
"grundnorm" o f the M a r t ia l Law regimes in  Pakistan and co n stitu ted  the basic  
fea tu res  o f the new in s t i tu t io n a l  framework w ith in  which was accommodated 
the scope of au th o rity  of the Chief Adm inistrator and the subordinate 
fu n c tio n aries  appointed by him, such as the "Deputy" and "Sub" A dm in istrators. 
P ro f. G le d h il l  appropriate ly  po ints  out th a t the f i r s t  m a r tia l law regime
"resembled the government of B r it is h  In d ia  by the Cast In d ia  Company 
in  the nineteenth century more than the m il ita ry  regimes uhich have been
50
set up in  other countries uhich have a tta in ed  independence". On 
subsequent occasions also i t  uas the seme position  in  Pakistan and, 
as ue have seen, the c o lo n ia l t ra d it io n  had created the precedent and 
the pattern  fo r  i t .  There uas, of course, some devia tion  from the 
pattern  to  be noted in  the case of Bangladesh m ilita ry  regime fo r  i t s  
sustained devotion to  the C onstitu tio n  uhich in  fa c t ,  made i t  
outstanding in  the uhole of the Commonuealth in  th is  respect.
(B) Commonuealth A fric a
8.21 The bureaucracy undoubtedly has been, as Nuabueze points out,
51the mainstay o f m il ita r y  governments everyuhere. The c o lo n ia l armies
52in  A fr ic a , i t  is  s ta te d , uere b u i l t  on the B r it is h  Indian model. I t  
uas th ere fo re  the uork of the bureaucracy in  A fr ic a , unaccustomed as i t  uas 
u ith  the concept o f "M a rtia l Lau", th a t the in s t i tu t io n a l  frameuork of the 
m ilita ry  ru le  there uas not b u i l t  upon the e d if ic e  of m a rtia l la u . Ue 
propose houever to examine b r ie f ly  the basic documents of the m il ita ry  
regimes of Ghana, N ig e ria  and Uganda.
8.22 Xn Ghana, fo llo u in g  both coups, as u e l l  as in  Uganda, 
"Proclamations" uere issued but in  every case i t  uas by the head of
the neu regime and in  every case i t  uas provided th a t subject to  certa in  
reservatio n s , the C onstitu tio n  ( in  Uganda, only Chapters IV/ and V/, uhich 
re la te d  to  "The Executive" and "The Parliam ent" re sp e c tive ly ) uas 
"suspended". In  Ghana, ss.2 o f the "Proclamations" appertain ing to both 
coups embodied the "suspension clause" uhich uas q u a lif ie d  by the uords 
"subject to  any Decree" (a lso  subject to the other provisions of the  
proclamation i t s e l f  in  1972). In  Uganda the proclamation also contained 
an "inconsistency clause" in  s .8 uhich contemplated th a t those provisions  
of the C onstitu tio n  (in c lu d in g  A rts . 1 ,3  and 63) uhich uere inconsistent
w ith  the proclam ation s h a l l ,  " to  the e x te n t o f such in c o n s is te n c y , be
void" but subject to the proclamation "the operation of the C onstitu tion
and the e x is tin g  laws s h a ll not be a ffec ted " but s h a ll be "construed uiith
such m o d ifica tio n s , q u a lif ic a t io n s  and adaptations" as might be considered
53necessary "to bring them in to  conform ity" with the proclam ation.
In  N ig e ria  also the f i r s t  document, the C onstitu tion  (Suspension and
M o d ific a tio n ) Decree 1966, numbered as Decree No. 1 , "suspended" parts  of
54the C onstitu tion  in  an almost s im ila r  manner. Houever, fo llo w in g  the
55decision of the Supreme Court in  the LAKANMI case, Decree No. 28,
The Federal M il i ta r y  Government (Supremacy and Enforcement o f Pouers)
Decree 1970, used the term "abrogated" in  i t s  preamble, as fo llo u s :
Whereas the m il ita ry  revo lu tio n  uhich took place on 
January 15, 1966 and uhich uas follow ed by another on 
duly 29, 1966, e f fe c t iv e ly  abrogated the whole pre­
e x is tin g  le o a l order in  N ig e ria  except uhat has been 
preserved under the C onstitu tio n  (Suspension and 
M o d ifica tio n ) Decree 1966 (1966 No. 1) . . . and 
uhereas. . . there  uas estab lished  a neu government. . . 
the "Federal M il i ta r y  Government" u ith  absolute pouers 
to  make laws fo r  the peace, order and good government of 
N ig e ria . . . the said Federal M il i ta r y  Government 
perm itted c e rta in  provisions of th e . . . C onstitu tion  
of 1963 t9 remain in  operation as supplementary to  the  
said Decree. . . [emphasis addedj
8 .23  By S .1(1 ) of the Decree the preamble uas "affirm ed and declared
as forming p art"  of the Decree, but the use of the expression in  the  
preamble "except uhat has been preserved" in  reference to Decree No. 1, 
c le a r ly  in d ica ted  th a t the Decree (n o .28) uas to  be read subject to  
Decree No. 1: the la te r  Decree did not es tab lish  a neu le g a l order and the  
expression "the whole p re -e x is tin g  le g a l order" could n o t, th e re fo re , be 
tre a ted  as re fe rr in g  e ith e r  to the "general lau" o f the land, uhich uas 
preserved by the e a r l ie r  Decree subject to  the ru le  la id  down in  s .3(4) 
th e re o f, or to the ju d ic ia ry , whose pouers, a lb e it  circumscribed by s .6 
th e re o f, uere preserved. As in  Pakistan , in  N ig e ria  end in  Ghana and 
Uganda, a lso , two neu norms uere estab lished  under m il ita ry  ru le  -  
(1 ) lau made by the neu ru le rs  (by Decrees and by Edicts in  the Regions, in
N ig e ria ) was to p re v a il over any other ru le  of both w ritte n  and unw ritten
law as w e ll as of the former C onstitu tio n  i f  and whatever re ta in ed  in  any 
56s ta te , and (2 ) the ju d ic ia ry  was precluded expressly ( in  Ghana and 
Uganda, by im p lic a tio n , and only p o te n t ia lly )  from "questioning1' such 
law .
8 .24  In  N ig e r ia , s .6 o f Decree No. 1 provided th a t "No question as
to  the  v a l id ity  of th is  or any other Decree or of any Edict s h a ll be 
en terta in ed  by any court of law in  N ig e r ia " , and in  ss 4 and 5 i t  wa3 
declared th a t a Decree aid an E d ict were "made" when they were "signed" 
and they could be promulgated "in  any manner", not necessarily  by gazette  
n o t if ic a t io n s . In  Uganda, in  s .7 of the Proclamation i t  was in te r  a l ia  
stated  th a t "No action or o ther le g a l proceedings whatsoever, whether 
c i v i l  or c rim in a l, s h a ll be in s t itu te d  in  any court fo r  o r on account of 
or in  respect o f any a c t, m atter or th ing  done during the continuation  
of operations consequent upon or in c id e n ta l to  the said take-over of the 
powers of the Government", [emphasis added]; ss. 3 aid 4 vested " a l l  
le g is la t iv e  powers re fe rre d  to in  the C o n stitu tio n " in  M ajor-G eneral Amin 
and empowered him to exercise the same "through promulgation of decrees 
evidenced in  w ritin g "  signed by him and "sealed with the Public  S ea l".
In  Ghana, s .2(3) of the Proclam ation, "subject to  any decree th a t may be 
made", allowed continued existence with the "same powers" and discharge 
o f "sane functions" by " a l l  courts". In  a l l  cases, th e re fo re , "the power 
and ju r is d ic t io n "  o f courts to e n te rta in  ap p lica tio n s  fo r  habeas corpus 
was not touched as in  Bangladesh ( in  respect o f both "c o n s titu tio n a l"  and 
"s ta tu to ry "  r ig h ts ) and also in  Pakistan ( in  respect o f the "s ta tu to ry "  
r ig h t ,  also "c o n s titu tio n a l"  r ig h ts  in  1958). In  Ghana and Uganda even 
the scope of in te rfe ren ce  by courts in  such ap p lica tio n s  was not d ire c tly  
a ffe c te d . Everywhere, except possibly in  N ig e ria  under Decree No. 28, 
v a l id ity  of subsidiary le g is la t io n  could also be challenged subject of 
course to the fa c t th a t o ften  the d iffe ren ce  between the p r in c ip a l and
subsid iary  le g is la t io n  and also between them and executive action was 
o b lite ra te d  as the new le g a l order did not s t r ic t ly  recognise the doctrine  
of separation of powers. I t  is  tru e  th a t the absolute le g is la t iv e  power 
o f the new regimes confronted the ju d ic ia ry  with a form idable challenge; 
any inconvenient decision could be n u l l i f ie d  by an ex post fac to  
le g is la t io n  to uphold the supremacy of not only a le g is la t iv e  but also  
an executive ac tio n .
(3 ) The "New Rule of Law11
8 .25  I t  was id le  to  expect the new regimes to accept the view th a t any
form of firm  and r ig id  co n tro l on i t s  powers was necessary as a sine qua non 
of a "good government", w ithout being a "c o n s titu tio n a l"  government. The 
f i r s t  document, whether i t  was a "proclam ation" or a "decree", by i t s  
own terms, y ie ld ed  absolute le g is la t iv e  sovereignty to the new regimes.
( In  Bangladesh, power to  "amend" the proclamation was expressly reserved  
in  clause (h ) o f the f i r s t  p roclam ation .) In  the u ltim a te  analysis  
there fo re  i t  turns out th a t each successive document dealing with e ith e r  
ju d ic ia l  or le g is la t iv e  power (which could be termed as the means of co n tro l)
hoisted  i t s  own "'grundnorm". Thus, a search fo r  the new "grundnorm" in  the
le g is la t iv e  instrum ents of the new regimes was bound to be a mere
exercise in  f u t i l i t y .  The search had to be d irec ted  to  the appropriate
in s t itu t io n  of s ta b i l i ty  which was to be found in  the ju d ic ia ry  and i t s  
immutable ro le  of in te rp re t in g  laws. The very fa c t th a t not only the  
superior courts but even the other ordinary courts were allowed to  fu n c tio n , 
a lb e it  supplemented (bu t not supplanted) by m il ita r y  courts, was i t s e l f  
of great importance. By re ta in in g  the ju d ic ia ry  the new ru le rs  
demonstrated th e ir  adherence (o fte n  form al) to "Rule of Law" to  b o ls te r  
th e ir  claim to not only in te rn a l or domestic, but also to e x te rn a l, 
" leg itim acy". I t  cannot be gainsaid th a t any modern s ta te , ir re s p e c tiv e  o f 
the form of i t s  p o l i t ic a l  o rder, could not ignore the c a l l  of in te rn a t io n a l  
accountab ility  in  the new world o rd er. President Amin's pub lic
pronouncement (quoted at para 8 .14 above) strongly supports th is  
co n ten tio n .
8.26 Indeed, the m il ita ry  regimes o f A fr ic a  re je c te d  the id ea  of 
"m a rtia l law" but even in  the case o f Pakistan and Bangladesh i t  must 
be said th a t the basic fea tu re  of the new "grundnorm" was not m a rtia l  
law but (as everywhere e lse ) a m odified form of ru le  o f law which might 
be c a lle d  the "New Rule of Law". Despite the apparent lack o f concern 
to  conform to the old norms o f " le g a lity "  and " leg itim acy", in  a l l  cases 
an appeal to  the former C onstitu tio n  was re ta in ed  in  some form or o ther; 
i t  was e ith e r  "suspended" ( in  some cases p a r t ly ) ,  and even "m odified" or 
"amended" in  some cases, or "kept in  abeyance", and the country was to  be 
governed "as nearly  as may be" in  accordance with i t .  In  Bangladesh sub- 
para (5 ) of the newly in serted  para 3A of the Fourth Schedule of the  
C o n stitu tio n  expressly contemplated "continuous" operation of the
59C o nstitu tio n  notw ithstanding the in te rp o s itio n  of the m a rt ia l law ru le .
This appeal m anifested i t s e l f  p a ten tly  in  the fa c t  th a t the ju d ic ia l  power 
vested by the C onstitu tion  in  the superior courts remained posited th e re . 
The mere fa c t th a t th e ir  "powers" said " ju r is d ic t io n "  were circumscribed did 
not mean th a t they were e ith e r  not allowed to  function  independently or 
th a t ju d ic ia l  power ceased to  vest in  them, as Professor Nwabueze appears 
to  c o n te n d .^  He observes th a t the ju d ic ia l  power ceased to  be 
"independent" and th a t i t  was "submerged" in  the "absolute le g is la t iv e  
sovereignty" o f the m il ita r y  governments because o f the "absoluteness"
of the "sovereignty" of the N a tio n a l L iberation  Council in  Ghana, and in
61N ig e ria , because of the provisions of the 1970 Decree (No. 2 8 ) . This  
narrow approach obviously overlooks the argument of in te rn a t io n a l  
a c c o u n ta b ility . Ue r e ite ra te  th a t the independence of the ju d ic ia ry  
was ensured by the "New Rule o f Law".
8.27 The d is t in c t iv e  fea tu re  of the "New Rule o f Law" was th a t i t  was
a " s e lf-a c tiv a t in g "  and "s e lf-re g u la to ry "  device th a t the ju d ic ia ry  could
usb as a neu norm of in te rp re ta t io n  by assuming a prominent ro le  in
the neu frameuork u ithout re so rtin g  to  in d isc rim in a te  ju d ic ia l  activ ism .
I t  i s  a notorious fa c t th a t in  each s ta te  m il ita ry  in te rve n tio n  took place
fo r  lack of the requ ired  degree of p o l i t ic a l  accu ltu ra tion  due to  uhich
c o n s titu tio n a l means uere found inadequate to correct deviant p o l i t ic a l
behaviour expressed in  the charges of various forms of corruption ,
e s p e c ia lly  of " tr ib a lis m "  in  A fr ic a , against the p o l i t ic a l  lead ers .
Such behaviour often manifested i t s e l f  in  "oppression" uhen the
C o nstitu tio n  uas perverted and the "Rule of Lau" uas v io la te d  u ith
62impunity, as in  Ghana. Therefore, the neu ru le rs  uere committed to 
restore and preserve the "Rule o f Lau" but the nature o f the m il ita r y  
o rg an isa tio n , i t s  d is c ip lin e  and tra in in g  and also the task of providing  
a "clean ackninistration" necessarily  produced a d if fe re n t  approach in
m atters re la t in g  to personal l ib e r ty  in  p a r t ic u la r  of uhich the ju d ic ia ry  was
ea
e x p e c t / to  take notice  to  s a t is fa c to r i ly  f u l f i l  i t s  neu ro le . The
C onstitu tio n  provided fo r  various types of in s t i tu t io n a l  re s tra in ts
on a l l  organs of government but under the neu le g a l order the ju d ic ia ry
appeared to  be the only in s t i tu t io n  uhich could exercise any re s t ra in t  on
th e  neu regimes uho combined in  themselves both executive and le g is la t iv e  func<
ticuas n ecessita ting  g reater use o f "ex tern a l"  r e s t r a in t .  The task of
upholding the "Neu Rule o f Lau" th ere fo re  devolved so le ly  upon the
ju d ic ia ry  and the "Nbu Rule of Lau" could be equated to the capacity o f
the ju d ic ia ry  to evolve a s u ita b le  approach in  the m atter of in te rp re ta t io n
of the Decrees and Orders of the neu regimes; in  the area o f personal
l ib e r ty  i t  could be reasonably expected th a t the ju d ic ia ry  uould be in c lin e d
to shou more " ju d ic ia l  courage" than " ju d ic ia l  re s tra in t"  in  v ieu  of th e ir
63Common Lau background.
8.28 C learly  the t r a d it io n a l  pouer and ju r is d ic t io n  of courts to
in te rp re t laus had to be exercised in  each case in  the context o f lo c a l 
provisions. In  Commonuealth A fr ic a , i t  uas only in  N ig e ria  th a t the courts
were expressly debarred from "questioning” the " v a lid ity "  of the "Decree",
64"Edict" and the "Instrum ent"; in  Pakistan also the protected instrum ents  
65were named. Houever, i t  uas possible fo r  the courts everywhere (in c lu d in g
Bangladesh) to construe the expression "question as to  v a l id i ty "  as meaning
th a t the pouer to  make the named documents could not be questioned. The
expression did not hold out a mandate fo r  the makers, the court could hold ,
to  ignore the procedural requirements fo r  the performance of the le g is la t iv e
and executive acts contemplated under the  "Proclam ations", "Decrees" aid
other instrum ents o f the neu ru le rs  and also under e x is tin g  la u s . In
other uords a d is tin c tio n  could be made between "essen tia l"  and "form al"
v a l id ity  and i t  could be held th a t a challenge to the "form al" v a l id ity
uas not excluded and the court could s tr ik e  down the document i f  i t  uas
not signed by the appropriate a u th o rity  or uas not sealed in  the prescribed
manner or did not f u l f i l  any other procedural requirem ent.66 Of course
i t  could possibly be argued th a t in  S ib e r ia  D@6reo.&o,28 (s.l(2)(o)) aimed at
destroying th is  d is tin c tio n  but th is  could be met by reading the tuo
67clauses ejesdem g en eris . In  a l l  cases there uas, in  a d d itio n , a l im it le s s  
scope fo r  in te rp re tin g  the provisions of the documents themselves and also  
of acts done or action taken under them. U n fo rtu n a te ly , in  Pakistan  
( in  1969 and also in  1977), the power of in te rp re ta t io n  of the le g is la t iv e  
instruments (M .L . "Regulations" and "Orders") uas taken away from the 
courts and vested in  the au th o rity  issuing the same: i t  uas provided th a t 
a l l  question of in te rp re ta t io n  thereo f "s h a ll"  be re fe rre d  to  such au thority  
and the decision by the la t t e r  thereon "s h a ll not be questioned in  any 
c o u rt."68
I I . Neu forms of "emergency" provisions
(1 ) Special law-enforcement pouers of the armed forces
8.29 In  Pakistan , in  1958, M a r t ia l Lau Regulation No. 18 prescribed
the death penalty ( la t e r  reduced) fo r  fa i lu r e  by any person to  g ive , when
re q u ire d , "h is  correct name and address and produce h is  perm it or pass,
to  any m il ita ry  or c iv i l  o f f ic e r  or any s o ld ie r or policeman". In
Bangladesh the power o f in v e s tig a tio n  of an offence was vested in  an
o f f ic e r  not below the rank o f Major vide Reg. 7 who could exercise a l l
powers of search, seizure and a rres t contemplated under the Code of
69C rim inal Procedure. In  Ghana, the provision took a s lig h t ly  d if fe re n t
form . I t  was te rs e ly  s ta ted  in  the Law Enforcement (Powers of the Army)
70Decree 1966. I t  empowered "any member of the Ghana Army not below the  
rank of Sergeant"' to perform "any fun ctio n " conferred on a member of the 
P olice  Service "in  re la t io n  to  the prevention and detection of crime, 
apprehension of o ffenders , maintenance of p u b lic  order and the safety  of 
persons and property" and conferred on him the pouers of a rres t and search 
exercised by a po lice  o f f ic e r .  The s ig n if ic a n t aspect o f the new power 
was re fle c te d  in  the underlined expression, which was a term o f a rt uhich 
embodied the concept of "emergency". Apart from thB fa c t th a t thB term 
was not dafined, u n like  the ordinary powers of a po lice  o f f ic e r  under 
the C rim inal Code, i t  was not circumscribed by the requirement of 
"reasonable cause to  b e lie v e " . There was, th e re fo re , l i t t l e  scope under 
the decree fo r  the court to  play a m onitoring ro le  in  reg u la tin g  the 
power by subjecting in  each case the exercise o f the power to  the te s t of 
"necessity".
8.30 In  N ig e ria , the Armed Forces and P o lice  (S p ec ia l Powers) Decree
1967 expressly mentioned th a t "a s ta te  of emergency e x is ts  in  N ig e ria "
re q u irin g  "specia l powers" to  be conferred "during i t s  continuance"
71in  derogation of the provisions o f the C rim inal Code. The Decree
conferred powers o f a rre s t, e n try , search and seizure  on members of the
armed forces concurrently w ith the po lice  o f f ic e r s ,  but in  a l l  cases the
requirement o f "reasonable grounds/cause to b e lie v e"  was added w hile
extending the ap p lica tion  of the power to  "any o ffence", which was not 
72defin ed . The most s ig n if ic a n t  provision o f the Decree was s .3 which
c o n c u rre n tly  au th o rised  th e  P o lic e  and the Army C h ie fs  to  o rd er th e
detention of any person fo r  an u n lim ited  period i f  they were " s a tis fie d "
th a t such person " is  or re cen tly  has been concerned in  acts p re ju d ic ia l to
p u b lic  o rder, or in  the preparation or in s tig a t io n  of such acts and th a t
by reason th ereo f i t  is  necessary to exercise co n tro l over him ." The
language uas apparently borrowed from preventive detention laws but with
one im portant change in  th a t the power could be exercised only "by order 
73in  w r it in g " . The N igerian  C onstitu tio n  perm itted the enactment of
such laws only during an "emergency" and i t  is  im portant to note th a t
Decree No. 1 promulgated by the Federal M il i ta r y  Government did not
74"suspend" the re levan t provisions of the C o n s titu tio n . In  dealing
with cases under the "emergency laws" made under the C o n s titu tio n , the
N igerian  ju d ic ia ry  had made a courageous and im aginative approach
unburdened by the au th o rity  o f the English wartime cases and there fo re
i t  could be expected th a t the approach could be maintained with greater
vigour and th a t the courts would refuse to accept the ipse d ix i t  o f
the deta in ing  au th o rity  despite the use of "sub jective  s a tis fa c tio n
75clause" in  the Decree.
8.31 In  Uganda the provisions were more e laborate and the power which
came to be conferred on the army was also more circum scribed. The Armed 
Forces (Powers of A rrest) Decree 1971 which, fo r  the f i r s t  tim e, conferred
them on "a s o ld ie r or prison o f f ic e r "  had a l i f e  o f twelve months and i t
76was re-enacted in  1972 but f in a l ly  repealed in  1973. The DecreB 
s p ec ifie d  the provisions of the Penal Code in  respect o f which the power 
o f summary a rres t was to be exerc ised , and th a t too "on reasonable grounds" 
( s . 2 ) ,  but in  e ffe c tin g  a rre s t or preventing escape "necessary" (no t 
reasonable) force could be used under s .3 . The Decree also conferred  
powers in  respect of e n try , search and seizure but under s .10 i t  was 
provided th a t the person exerc is in g  the power "s h a ll show h is  id e n t ity
card" to "any one uho asks to see i t  and uho is  a ffec ted  by any ac tio n ".
These provisions uere re-enacted in  The M il i ta r y  P olice (Pouers o f A rrest) 
77Decree 1973 but nou the b e n e fic ia ry  o f the pouer uas "a m il ita r y  p o lice  
o f f ic e r  in  uniform ". Under c erta in  circumstances the m il ita r y  po lice  
o f f ic e r  could, under s .7 , use arms but he had to give uarning and he 
could act only uhen the uarning uas unheeded and in  the case o f preventing  
a rescue and e ffe c tin g  an a rre s t, only uhen he had "reasonable grounds to  
b e lie v e"  th a t there uas danger o f grievous bodily  harm to somebody. Under 
s .8 (A ) an arrested  person could be detained up to 28 days pending 
in v e s tig a tio n  but he could not be subjected to " to rtu re  or undue 
hardship"^ in  the case of an offence t r ia b le  by a M il i ta r y  T rib u n a l, 
only on the  order of the o f f ic e r  commanding he could be detained fo r  
more than tuenty fo u r hours.
2. M il i ta r y  Courts
8.32 The M a r t ia l Lau regimes in  Pakistan and Bangladesh contemplated
7 8s e ttin g  up m il ita ry  courts a t the very inception  of th e ir  r u le .  In
Bangladesh, as u e l l  as on a l l  three occasions in  Pakistan , tuo types of
such courts uere set up -  Special M il i ta r y  Courts and Summary M il i ta r y
79(M a r t ia l Lau) Courts. The ordinary c rim in a l courts continued to
80function  u ith  concurrent ju r is d ic t io n , but fo r  t r i a ls  in  the neu courts
of e ith e r  type the procedure app licab le  to Courts M a r t ia l under the
81Pakistan Army Act uas to be fo llo u s d . The 1977 regime in  Pakistan
prescribed neu and enhanced forms of punishments uhich included uhipping
82and, in  the case o f th e f t ,  dacoity  and robbery, amputation of the hand.
The Summary M il i ta r y  Courts could n o t, houever, impose the sentence of
e ith e r  death or "amputation" uhich the Special M il i ta r y  Courts could do
83(to  be confirmed a lb e it  by the Chief M a r t ia l Lau A d m in is tra to r). The
proceedings o f the Summary M i l i ta r y  Courts had to  be submitted "u ithout
84
delay" to the Zonal M a r t ia l Lau Adm inistrator fo r  " re v ie u " . In  1969,
the " M a rtia l Lau Orders" (No. 8) prescribed spec ia l procedure fo r  grant 
85of b a i l .  The President o f the Court could grant b a i l  only uhen he uas
s a t is f ie d  th a t the charge uas "not o f a serious nature" and th a t the accused
uould n e ith e r  abscond nor temper u ith  ev/idence. As ue hav/e already seen,
no decision or v e rd ic t of such courts could be challenged in  any c iv i l  
86co u rt. In  Bangladesh also the m il ita r y  courts could t ry  any offence but
the  Summary M il i ta r y  Court could pass a sentence of f iv e  years imprisonment.
There could be no appeal against the "unanimous judgment or decision" of a
Special M il i ta r y  Court but an "Appellate T rib u n a l"  co nstitu ted  u ith  a
judge of e ith e r  Supreme Court o r High Court could hear appeals against
other decisions of the neu courts . Sentences of death and l i f e  imprisonment
87requ ired  confirm ation by the P res id en t, In  fa c t  the Bangladesh M a rt ia l
Lau Regulations (No. 1 of 1975) uas meant to be a complete code by
providing in  Reg.3 fo r  the "procedure of m a rtia l lau  courts", in  Reg.4, fo r
88"appeals and confirm ation" and in  Reg.6 fo r  re s tr ic t io n s  on b a i l .  In
1976 neu Regs. 15, 16 and 17 uere added to create neu offences prescrib ing
imprisonment fo r  ten years and f in e  ( in  case o f Reg. 17 also confiscation
of uhole or part of accused's property) fo r  " c r it ic is in g  m a rtia l la u " ,
89"crea tin g  fe a r"  and fo r  " p re ju d ic ia l ac ts" . The offence under Reg.17
90could be t r ie d  by a sp ec ia l tr ib u n a l in  accordance u ith  sp ec ia l procedure.
918.33 Under "The T r ia l  by M il i ta r y  T ribunals  Decree" of Uganda,
the "Defence Council" could co n stitu te  such Tribunals  u ith  f iv e  to seven 
o ff ic e rs  o f the armed forces fo r  conducting t r i a l s  under the Decree in
respect o f such offences of the Penal Code as the Decree had i t s e l f
92 93s p e c ifie d . Under s .4 the President could order the t r i a l  of any
person (members of the armed forces excepted) by the T ribuna l i f  he uas
" s a t is fie d "  th a t acts of such person uho uas charged u ith  any of the
offences o f the Penal Code s p ec ifie d  in  the section uere "ca lcu la ted  to
in tim id a te  or alarm members of the pub lic  or to  bring  the m il ita r y
94government under contempt or d is rep u te". The Decree did not specify
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th e  procedure to be fo llow ed by the T rib u n a l but in  s .5 i t  was sta ted  th a t
although sentence in  the case of an offence under s .183 of the Penal Code
s h a ll  be determined by the T rib u n a l i t  s h a ll not be carried  out w ithout the
consent o f the President; in  other cases, sentence was to be imposed
according to the Penal Code. In  Uganda the B i l l  of Rights o f the
C o n stitu tio n  not being suspended le g a l i ty  of any t r i a l  in  v io la t io n  of the
c o n s titu tio n a l safeguards could possibly be challenged even i f  the
95" s a t is fa c t io n 11 of the President could not be reviewed. Much depended 
however on the fa c t whether the court was prepared to construe
96s t r ic t ly  the term "operations" th a t occurred in  clause 7 of the Proclamation
97as w e ll as in  the subsequent Decrees.
(3 ) "Preventive Detention" le g is la t io n  
( A) Uctanda
988 .34  The Detention (P re s c rip tio n  of Time L im it) Decree was fo r  a l l
in te n t  and purposes an ex post fa c to  le g is la t io n . I t  was to  "provide fo r  the
99lim ite d  detention of persons arrested  during and a f te r  m il ita ry  o p eratio n s."
Special notice  has to be taken of the fa c t th a t the term "’operations" in  s.1
of the Decree was q u a lif ie d , u n lik e  i t s  counterpart in  clause 7 of the
Proclam ation, by the word " m il ita ry " .  The section prescribed a s ix  months'
t im e - lim it  fo r  the continued detention of such p e r s o n s . B y  s .2 the
M in is te r  o f In te rn a l A ffa irs  was empowered to  appoint "a Committee
consisting o f such number of persons as he considered appropriate to
review the cases" of the detained persons and "advise the President in
re la tio n  thereto  as i t  sees f i t " .  The procedure fo r  the "review" of the
cases of preventive detention provided by A r t .10(5) was expressly
superseded and a new procedure was provided in  s .3 which contemplated
th a t the detainee
(a ) s h a ll be afforded reasonable f a c i l i t i e s  to  consult 
at h is  own expense a le g a l represen ta tive  o f h is  own 
choice who s h a ll be perm itted to make representations  
to the committee on th a t person's b eh a lf; and
(b ) s h a ll be perm itted to  appear before the committee 
in  person or by a le g a l represen ta tive  of h is  
choice.
8.35 In  a d d itio n , i t  was provided by s .4 th a t the Commissions of
In q u iry  Act, with c e rta in  exceptions and m o d ifica tio n s , s h a ll apply to an
"in q u iry"  under the Decree but whether th is  was done to emphasize the " fa c t-  
fin d in g "  or the "advisory” nature of the Committee’ s ju r is d ic t io n  i t  is  
d i f f i c u l t  to  say. By s .6 the M in is te r was required  to "designate" the
"place of d e ten tio n ". On the other hand, s .5 provided fo r  "immunity"
in  wide terms to preclude actions fo r  compensation by the detainees but the 
courts could use as a handle the requirements o f "good fa i th " ,  "execution  
of duty", "defence of Uganda", "public  s a fe ty " , "enforcement of d is c ip lin e " ,  
"law and order" and "pub lic  in te re s t"  despite th e ir  being in  the a lte rn a tiv e  
and in  large number, to  give r e l i e f  in  appropriate cases.
8.36 The power to  make detention orders prospective ly  was conferred
by a new s .2, su b stitu ted  by The Detention (P re sc rip tio n  of Time L im it)
101(Amendment) Decree. The M in is te r  was required to be "personally  
s a t is fie d "  before making such orders, although he could act on the "report 
of any authorised o f f ic e r " ,  who could order the a rres t of any person whom 
he suspected "upon reasonable grounds to be a person to  whom the section
applied" but he had to report the a rres t to  the M in is te r "as soon as
p ra c tic a b le " . The omission of the requirement of "reasonableness" is  due 
possibly to  the fa c t  th a t the person could be detained u n t i l  the expiry of 
fourteen days and w ith in  th is  period the M in is te r  could pass an order fo r
h is  continued d e ten tio n . The section a p p lie s , i t  was s ta te d , to any
person who,
(a ) is  conducting or has conducted h im self in  a manner 
dangerous to peace and good order; or
(b) is  endeavouring or has endeavoured to exc ite  enmity
between the people of Uganda and the Government; or
(c ) is  in tru g u in g  or has in tr ig u e d  against the law fu l 
au th o rity  of the Government.
8.37 The provision fo r  "review" was re -c a s t in  new ss. 3 and 4 to
conform closely to  those o f a r t . 10(5) which was, in  terms, inapp licab les
w ith in  30 days the detainee was to  be given a statement "specify ing in  
d e ta i l  the grounds"; the f i r s t  review , and the p erio d ic  reviews, were to  
take place every three months and "he s h a ll at a l l  reasonable times be 
afforded  f a c i l i t i e s  to  consu lt, a t h is  own expense an advocate of h is  
choice; the "Review Committee" was to  consist of one Chairman (who s h a ll be 
a judge of the High Court) and not less than two members who were a l l  to  
be appointed by the M in is te r  " a fte r  consultation with the Chief Ju stice"; 
the Committee was to  "examine a l l  a lle g a tio n s  of fa c ts "  and was to  be 
"informed of a l l  sources of in form ation" but when so required by the 
State i t  had to  withhold from any person the id e n t ity  as w e ll as the fa c ts  
tending to disclose the id e n t ity  of the inform ant; the M in is te r was to  give 
reasons to  the Committee i f  he did not accept i t s  "recommendations" and to  
cause to  be published in  the Gazette "from time to time" the names o f not 
a l l  but o f those persons whose cases had been reviewed in d ic a tin g  whether 
detention in  any case was continuing against the "recommendations". The 
Committee could even v is i t  the places of detention and receive complaints 
which i t  could communicate to the M in is te r . Under the new s .11 i t  was 
provided th a t the Decree would e xp ire , unless e a r l ie r  repealed, on the 
repeal or expiry o f the Suspension of P o l i t ic a l  A c t iv it ie s  Decree.
(B) N ig e ria
8.38 The State Security  (D etention  of Persons) Decree 1966
(h e re in a fte r  c a lled  the p r in c ip a l decree) was the f i r s t  le g is la t io n  on the
subject in N ig e ria  which, in  i t s  schedule, contained the names o f the
102detained persons, twelve in  number. In  the cases of subsequent detentions, 
Decrees were made in  a s im ila r  way, and numbered consecutively  
as Nos. 2 to  15. The schedule in  each case named the detainees and in  
each Decree i t  was stated  th a t the provisions o f ss.2  to  6 of the p r in c ip a l 
Decree also a p p lie d [in  the p r in c ip a l as w e ll as in  the subsequent Decrees^  
the preamble re c ite d  the " s a tis fa c tio n "  (as to the necessity of the
d e te n tio n s ) o f the Head o f th e  F ed era l M i l i t a r y  Government and a lso  th e
fa c t th a t the a rres t and detention were "in  the in te re s t of the security
of N igeria";and  s.1 in  each case fix e d  a s ix  months t im e - l im it  fo r
detentions under the decreef a t such places as might be d irec ted  by the
Head of the Federal M il i ta r y  Government "e ith e r  generally  or s p e c if ic a lly "
and under such conditions as he might d ire c t as to  "confinement inc lud ing
conditions as to  maintenance, d is c ip lin e  and punishment fo r  breaches of 
103d is c ip lin e " . The provision of ss.2  to  6 o f the p r in c ip a l decree may 
now be examined in  g reater d e ta i l .
8.39 Section 2 enabled a detainee to  make "representations in  w ritin g "  
to  the Federal M i l i ta r y  Government but did not impose any duty on the  
l a t t e r  to supply the detainee with the "grounds" fo r  the  d e ten tio n . The 
section made a vague and unconnected statement th a t -  "but in form ation  
which is  against the pu b lic  in te re s t  s h a ll not at any timB be disclosed  
th e re a fte r  by any persons." The underlined word " th e re a fte r"  could be 
re la te d  in  the context only to  the event of submission of representation  
but the court could also in fe r  a r ig h t to obtain "grounds" as a necessary 
co ro lla ry  of the r ig h t  of "representation" and re ly  on the statement as 
embodying the q u a lif ic a t io n  of the r ig h t to be supplied with the "grounds". 
This  would have made e ffe c tiv e  the r ig h t o f "representation" granted under 
the Decree although under s .3 "Tribunals" fo r  "advising" the Government
"on the detention cases" could be constitu ted  i f  the government thought i t  
f i t  to do so at " i ts  d is c re tio n " . A two-member tr ib u n a l was contemplated, 
of whom one was to  be the Chairman, a lawyer "nominated by the Chief 
J u stice", but both members must "appear to  the Federal Government" to  
be capable of exerc is in g  "independent and im p a rt ia l judgment". Members 
could be appointed fo r  a p a r t ic u la r  case or a series  o f cases and the  
tr ib u n a l could consider not a l l  cases but only those which the Government 
considered "necessary" to re fe r  to i t .
8.40 The tr ib u n a l was empowered to regu late  i t s  own procedure and i t
could possibly hear the detainee in  person or even allow  le g a l 
represen ta tion  despite the provision in  clause (d ) of s .3 -  "but nothing  
in  th is  section s h a ll e n t i t le  any person. . . to  attend in  person or to be 
represented by any person during the consideration by the tr ib u n a l of the  
case. . ."  The tr ib u n a l had to "submit i t s  report on the basis of m a te ria l 
placed before i t " ,  w ith in  fo u r weeks of the date of re fe ren ce . Not only 
was the report not binding on the government but there was also no duty 
imposed on the government to  communicate i t s  decision e ith e r  to the 
tr ib u n a l or to  the deta in ee . Indeed the detainee had no other r ig h t  
e ith e r .  Under s .6 (b ) the remedy of habeas corpus appears to  have been 
^exppes^ly excluded but the provision th a t the ap p lica tio n  s h a ll not l i e  "a t 
the  instance of a person detained under the decree", i f  construed s t r ic t ly ,  
might enable the court to grant r e l i e f  inasmuch as at common law the ru les  o f 
standing in  such ap p lica tio n s  were very l ib e r a l  and the section , in  terms/  
did not take away the c o u rt's  ju r is d ic t io n  in  such m atters although i t  
expressly suspended the B i l l  of Rights of the C onstitu tion  " fo r  the purpose 
of the decree". Clause (a ) debarred the courts from ad jud icating  on the 
v io la t io n  of the B i l l  o f Rights expressly but on the terms of the Decree 
i t s e l f  r e l i e f  could apparently be given in  cases of mistaken id e n t ity ,  
detention beyond s ix  months and of detention at places not authorised  
" e ith e r  generally  or s p e c if ic a l ly " .
8.41 I t  i s ,  however, necessary to  point out th a t preventive
detention as a permanent measure appears to  have been provided fo r
104subsequently in  s .3 of Special Powers Decree of 1967. Although the 
1967 Decree did not contain procedural safeguards, such as the r ig h t of 
representation  or provision fo r  any kind of "review" i t  also did not 
expressly suspend e ith e r  the c o n s titu tio n a l B i l l  of Rights or the remedy of 
habeas corpus♦ Moreover, in  any p a r t ic u la r  case the " v a lid ity "  of a 
p a r t ic u la r  "order" of detention would be challenged aid not the provision  
of the Decree i t s e l f  and the courts, th e re fo re , would possibly fe e l  less
handicapped. In the case of the State Security  Decree of 1966, on 
th e  other hand, i t  would req u ire  tremendous e f fo r ts  to  convince the  
court th a t what was being challenged was not the Decree or the ‘'v a lid ity "  
of any o f i t s  provisions but an action taken under the decree which was 
not in  conformity with i t s  prov is ions . In  e ith e r  case, however, the 
detainees could aspire fo r  success only in  the event o f the courts  
showing th e ir  w illin g n ess  to use ju d ic ia l  va lour without undue 
circum spection. Indeed, the 1967 Decree, providing fo r  u n lim ited  
detention ( " u n t i l  the order is  revoked") without expressly invoking the 
aid of emergency prov is ions , made i t  a l l  the eas ie r fo r  courts to  s tr ik e  
down detention orders in  p a r t ic u la r  cases fo r  in fra c t io n  of the r ig h t  to  
personal l ib e r t y .
(C) Ghana
8.42 The N atio n a l L ib era tio n  Council (P ro te c tive  Custody) Decree
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1966 (h e re in a fte r  c a lled  the p r in c ip a l decree) was also ex post fac to  
le g is la t io n . I t  was made on 2nd March 1966 but in  s .2 of the Decree i t
was s tated  th a t " i t  s h a ll be deemed to have come in to  force at 4 o 'c lock
in
in  the morning o f the 24th day o f February, 1966" and/the schedule i t  
l is te d ,  among o thers, the M in is te rs , the Members of Parliam ent a id  the 
S ecretaries  o f the "dissolved Convention People's Party" who were, 
according to  s .1 , "taken in to  custody and kept in  p ro tec tive  custody fo r  
such period as the N atio n a l L ib era tio n  Council may determ ine". In  the  
preamble i t  was re c ite d  th a t the Council was " s a t is f ie d "  th a t the Decree 
was "necessary fo r  the preservation o f pub lic  peace and the p ro tection  of the  
persons described in  the schedule" and th a t i t  was made "in pursuance of the  
Proclam ation".
8.43 For subsequent detentions a process s im ila r  to th a t o f N ig e ria
was follow ed but in  the short t i t l e  of each of the Decrees the word
" (Amendment)" was in serted  and in  s.1 of each such Decree i t  was stated  
th a t the p r in c ip a l decree was amended by in s e rtio n  at the end o f the
schedule to th a t decree certa in  names which were mentioned in  each decree.
On the 6th September 1966, The N atio n a l L ib era tio n  Council (P rotectiv/e
107Custody)( Amendment) (N o .8) Decree 1966, was made to impose
re s tr ic t io n s  on movement on "every person released from p ro tec tive
custody under [ t h a t j  Decree". He was required to “n o tify  in  w r it in g " ,
a t le a s t seven days before h is  intended departure from Ghana, h is  exact
date of departure, mods o f t r a v e l ,  d estin a tio n  and such other m atters as
the Commissioner of P o lice  ( C . I .D . )  might "reasonably s p e c ify " . Any person
who contravened the Decree was l ia b le  to  be prosecuted and to s u ffe r
imprisonment up to  one year. This Decree, as w e ll as the other "Amendment"
Decrees and also the p r in c ip a l decree, were a l l  "repealed" by The N atio n a l
108L ib era tio n  Council (P ro te c tive  Custody)(Consolidation) Decree 1966,
which, in  fa c t ,  re-enacted the substantive provisions of No. 8 Amendment
Decree and also probably consolidated the detentions, a lb e it  under a new
provision ( s .1 ) ,  as fo llo w s:
Each of the persons described in  the schedule. . . s h a ll be 
taken in to  custody and s h a ll be detained in  such place and
fo r  such period as the N a tio n a l L ib era tio n  Council may
determ ine. [emphasis added]
8 .44  The N atio n a l L ib eratio n  Council (P ro te c tiv e  Custody) Decree 1967^^
provided fo r the detention of a large  number of persons belonging to  the
armed fo rces, whose names as w e ll as respective ranks were in d ica ted  in  the
schedule. In s .2 i t  was provided th a t each of the detainees is  to be
"deemed to be a prisoner w ith in  the meaning of s .60 of the Prisons Act".
The process of preventive detention was brought to an end at the term ination
of the m ilita ry  ru le  under the f i r s t  coup by The Release of Persons from
110Custody Decree, 1969, but not w ithout providing fo r  indemnity in  s .1 (2 ) ,  
as fo llow s:
U n t il  th e ir  re lease the holding in  custody o f a l l  persons 
described in  sub-paragraph (1 ) o f th is  paragraph s h a ll ,  
notw ithstanding anything to the con trary , be deemed a t 
a l l  times and fo r  a l l  purposes to  have been la w fu l.
B esides , as the  1969 C o n s titu tio n  drew i t s  a u th o r ity  from The C o n s titu en t
Assembly (Amendment) Decree 1969 (N .L .C .D . 3B0), i t  was doubtfu l whether the
c iv i l ia n  government could enact any re tro -a c t iv e  law to  impugn the v a l id ity
of the detentions or even, whether the courts could give any r e l i e f
imputing spec ia l s ig n ifican ce  to the term "suspension" in  re la t io n  to the
former C o n s titu tio n . However, i t  has to  be re ca lled  th a t n e ith e r  the
Proclamations nor any o f the "P ro tective  Custody" Decrees expressly barred
ju d ic ia l  review and th ere fo re  the courts in  Ghana possibly possessed the
la rg es t measure of freedom in  granting r e l ie f  to the deta inees. Although
the Preventive Detention Act 196A was repealed during m il i t a r y  r u le ,  the
111Habeas Corpus Act 1964 does not appear to  have been touched.
8 .45 During the second coup also provision was mads fo r  the detention
of any person "in  such place and fo r  such period and subject to  such
conditions as the N ationa l Redemption Council [m ight] d ire c t" , by the
112Preventive Custody Decree 1972 but the technique was s lig h t ly  changed,
vide s .2, as fo llo w s:
[the Council] may, by executive instrum ent authorise the  
arres t aid detention of any other person in  respect o f ufaom 
they are s a t is f ie d  th a t i t  is  in  the in te re s t  of n a tio n a l 
security  or in  the in te re s t  of the safety  of the person so 
to do and any such instrum ent may amend or repeal the  
schedule to th is  Decree, [emphasis added]
The scope of the ju d ic ia l  review was not reduced, i t  is  subm itted, by the
new phraseology or even by the new technique of "executive instrum ents"
and as we have seen even the 1969 Proclamation did not expressly c u r ta il
i t s  scope. However, i t  is  doubtfu l i f  the courts could go so f a r  as to  hold
113s p e c ific  re tro a c tiv e  le g is la t io n  u l t r a  v ire s  the maxim n u lla  poena sine lege 
or even the general p r in c ip le s  o f common law.
■?r, 9>Jj_ Qj/ fc j
I I I . The J u d ic ia l Response
(1 ) Pakistan
8.46 We have already seen th a t a fte r  a l l  th ree  coups the basic
documents purported to  c u r ta i l  the scope of ju d ic ia l  review in  almost
id e n t ic a l terms, by providing th a t the sp ec ifie d  instrum ents made by the
114m a rtia l law a u th o ritie s  s h a ll not be questioned in  any court. In  1969
and 1977 the a u th o r it ie s , as we have seen, reacted strongly against the
ju d ic ia l  courage of the superior courts and enacted a d d itio n a l measures
to s t u l t i f y  the e f fo r ts  o f the ju d ic ia ry  who had made a determined b id  to
promote the ’’New Rule of Law” by handing down the decisions in  MIR HASAN 
115and ASMA 3ILA N I. No doubt the la te s t  en te rp rise  had taken away the 
•'power of in te rp re ta t io n ” from the courts but the "power o f ad ju d ica tio n ” , 
which formed the very basis of the existence of the courts, obviously  
could not be d ealt with in  a s im ila r  way. The courts s t i l l  possessed the  
power to  apply to  the fa c ts  o f a given case the " in te rp re ta t io n "  of any
116instrument which could now be given only by the a u th o ritie s  themselves.
The question, however, did not arise  in  th is  form in  e ith e r  of the decisions: 
in  both cases thB courts m ainly d e a lt with the le g a lity  of the regimes and,
while in  MIR HASAN the f u l l  bench of the Lahore High Court in te rp re te d  the
impugned reg u latio n s  and held the same to have been im p lied ly  repealed , in  
ASMA JILANI the Supreme Court c a te g o ric a lly  held u l t r a  v ire s  the impugned 
reg u latio n  and also the  J u ris d ic tio n  of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order 
1969, holding the maker o f the  instrum ents (General Yahya Khan) to  be an 
usurper.
8.47 Ue propose to  discuss now some other decisions but consider i t
necessary to  point out th a t in  1977 an e f fo r t  was made to tamper with the
c o u rt's  "power of ad jud ication" also by the Chief M a r t ia l Law A d m in is tra to r’ s
Order No. 10 [para  ( b ) J  by providing th a t -
I f  any question a rises  as to  correctness, le g a lity  or 
p roprie ty  of the exercise of any powers or ju r is d ic t io n  
by a Special M il i ta r y  Court or a Summary M il i ta r y  Court or a 
M a rtia l Law A u th o rity . . . i t  s h a ll be re fe rre d  to Chief 
M a rtia l Law A dm inistrator whose decision thereon s h a ll
be f in a l .  . [emphasis added]
I t  i s  subm itted th a t the p ro v is io n  d id  not a f fe c t  the  c o u r t 's  power to
adjudicate  upon a fin d in g  o f fa c t made by the named fu n c tio n a ries ; the
p ro tec tio n  was extended merely to th e ir  "power" and " ju r is d ic t io n " . The
provision  has not come fo r  in te rp re ta t io n  in  any decision u p t i l  now but i t
has to  be noted th a t i t  had a p a r a l le l  in  A r t .3 (3 ) of Removal of Doubts
Order 1969. The instrum ent, which was la te r  held u l t r a  v ire s  as a whole
in  ASHA 31 LANI by the Supreme Court, was unsuccessfully challenged in  the
117Lahore High Court in  FAZAL AHMED v STATE. The court observed th a t in  
the preamble aid in  a r ts . 2, 3 and 4 o f the Order the in te n tio n  of the law­
g iver was c le a r ly  spelled  out and added as fo llo w s:
A fter the promulgation of th is  declaratory  s ta tu te  there  
is  no doubt. . . th a t the m a rt ia l law a u th o ritie s  are the 
sole judges of both law and fa c ts  of the m atter before  
t hem. . .
Of course the decision is  no longer good law, even then i t  may be mentioned 
th a t law was too broadly sta ted  in  the case.
8.48 On e a rly  occasions, however, the same High Court showed conspicuous
ju d ic ia l  courage in  SHER MUHAMMAD v NASIRUDDIN118 and MUNZOOR ELAHI v 
119STATE. Of course i t  has to  be conceded th a t the decisions were handed 
down during the f i r s t  m a rt ia l law regime when the "a d d itio n a l provision"  
was not th e re . In  the f i r s t  case the court quashed the proceedings taken 
against the p e tit io n e r  by the m unicipal a u th o r it ie s . I t  was held th a t the  
ju r is d ic t io n  of the court was not ousted on the mere assertion th a t the  
impugned proceedings were authorised by a M a r t ia l Law reg u la tio n  or o rder.
The court could see i f  the purported exercise of power was ju s t i f ie d  in  law 
and was exercised in  accordance with the re g u la tio n . In  the second case 
the court held th a t , as an order passed without ju r is d ic t io n  was a n u l l i t y ,  
the court could see i f  the m il ita r y  tr ib u n a l had the power to  try  the  
offence or to  pass the impugned sentence.
8.49 In 1977 the M a r t ia l Law regime was in  fa c t  an extension of the
m a rtia l law declared by the c iv i l  government and we have seen th a t the
Lahore High Court had held the said declaration  to be i l le g a l  and th a t i t
120had struck down the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act No. X of 1977. In
121IQBAL AHUED v STATE the court ordered the prisoner to be set a t l ib e r ty  
upon holding th a t the tr ib u n a l to  which the case was tra n s fe rre d  fo r  t r i a l  
under the  said Act had lo s t i t s  ju r is d ic t io n  to deal with the m atter and 
the remand order passed by i t  was th ere fo re  i l le g a l  and the p e tit io n e r  
was being held in  i l l e g a l  d e ten tio n .
8 .50  In  a la te r  case the same High Court s im ila r ly  ordered the  
priso ner to be re leased . In  n m m  SHAHEEN RAM AY v STATE. 122 although the 
provisions of the C onstitu tio n  could not be invoked, the court could issue 
a w r it  in  the nature of habeas corpus under s .491 of the C rim inal Procedure 
Code as the prisoner had been i l le g a l ly  deta ined. The warrant under which 
the p e tit io n e r  was committed to j a i l  was not signed in  the in s ta n t case by 
a l l  the members c o n s titu tin g  the tr ib u n a l:  the detention was there fo re  
held to  be i l l e g a l .
8.51 In  Pakistan , as we have seen, the basic documents in  e f fe c t
authorised preventive detention fo r  an in d e f in ite  period by provid ing th a t
the e x is tin g  provision of law fo r  the review of the case of a detainee
123s h a ll cease to be e f fe c t iv e .  U n fo rtu n ate ly , the provision does not 
appear to  have been in te rp re te d  by any court but in  view of the importance 
attached to the machinery o f the m il ita ry  courts in  Pakistan i t  can be 
reasonably suggested th a t preventive detention had perhaps become 
unnecessary there under m il ita r y  r u le .  In  Bangladesh Reg.17 apparently  
provided a handy a lte rn a tiv e  to  preventive detention by defin ing  
" p re ju d ic ia l acts" to  mean such acts as could be p re ju d ic ia l to  the  
"defence of Bangladesh" or to  "pub lic  sa fe ty"  which could be t r ie d  and
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punished by "specia l t r ib u n a ls " . In  th is  connection i t  is  to  be noted 
th a t the b lanket ban against ju d ic ia l  review contemplated under Reg.4(9) 
protected only "order, judgment, decision or sentence of a m a r t ia l law 
c o u rt" .
(2 ) Commonwealth A fric a
8.52 In  view of the assertion in  Deeres No. 29 of 1970 by the m il i ta r y
ru le rs  of N ig e ria  th a t the " m ilita ry  revo lu tio n " had "abrogated the whole
p re -e x is tin g  le g a l order" which, by im p lic a tio n , claimed the establishm ent
of a new le g a l o rder, and not an emergency s itu a tio n  under the p re -e x is tin g
le g a l o rd er, the m il ita ry  ru le  could not be characterised  as a "n a tio n a l
emergency" in  c o n s titu tio n a l terms as observed in  some quarters  but i t  i s
c o rre c t, as has been s ta te d , th a t only a few cases in vo lv in g  in fra c t io n s  o f
125personal l ib e r ty  came before the courts . I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to  say i f  th is  
was because the l i t ig a n t s  f e l t  te rro r is e d  by the "gun-power" or because 
there was lack of proper appreciation of the new jurisprudence which
demanded a courageous and im aginative approach on the p art of both bar and
126the  bench. I t  is  true  th a t although the m il ita r y  ru le rs  of N ig e r ia
claim to be a merely "co rrec tive  regime", in  the case of Ghana as w e ll as
Uganda, serious complaints of " p o l i t ic a l  k i l l in g s "  and to rtu re  o f p o l i t ic a l
127detainees have been recorded.
8 .53 In  fa c t there is  not a s ingle reported decision on any case of
preventive detention by m il ita r y  government in  Uganda, ye t in  NSUBUGA v 
128A.G. the court allowed in  p a rt an action fo r  damages fo r  fa ls e  
imprisonment which was alleged to have been made under the 1969 Emergency 
R egulations. I t  was held th a t the a rre s t and detention under the  
Regulation was not proved and, as the p la in t i f f  was n e ith e r taken before the 
M agistrate  nor re leased on bond nor charged with any o ffen ce , the provisions  
of the C rim inal Procedure Code were v io la te d  in  holding him in  detention  
fo r  21 days. I t  was also held th a t the claim was not barred by Decree No.
19 of 1972 which p ro h ib ited  the in s t i tu t io n  of le g a l proceedings fo r  the  
recovery o f damages against the new ru le rs  in  respect of wrongs committed 
by the C iv i l  government fo r  " p o l i t ic a l  m atte rs" . The court re je c te d  the  
contention holding th a t th«i words "or fo r  any cause whatsoever" of s .1 (1 )
of the Decree ought to  be read ejesdem g en eris ,
1298 .54  In  P103EED AGBA3E v COIWIR. OF POLICE. the High Court of the
Western State of N ig e ria  issued a w rit o f habeas corpus holding the
detention order to  be i l le g a l  fo r  non-conformity w ith the provisions of
130s .3 (1 ) o f Decree No. 24 o f 1967. The order re la te d  the " s a t is fa c t io n ”
of the deta in ing  au th o rity  to  "secu rity  o f the Federation of N ig e ria "
uhich u;as not l is te d  in  the section as one of the ju r is d ic t io n a l requirements
which were s tated  in  terms of d if fe re n t  acts concerned with "p u b lic  o rd er".
The detainee had complained th a t he was not informed of the reasons of h is
a rres t and detention in  sp ite  of repeated demands. Indeed, i t  was a case
of ’^ flag ran t" v io la t io n  of s .21 (2 ) of the C o n s titu tio n , which provision
the Decree under which the order was passed had not suspended as had been
done in  the case o f detentions under the "State S ecurity" Decrees.
131Aguda, 3 . ,  observed:
. . • these are wide and a rb itra ry  powers in  derogation  
of the entrenched clauses of the C onstitu tio n  re la t in g  
to  fundamental r ig h ts . . . there is  cast upon the 
Inspector General of Police the onus to  estab lish  before  
any co u rt. • . th a t he has complied s t r ic t ly  with the 
enactment. . . any m a te ria l devia tion  from the provisions  
of the Act must. . . render the d e ten tio n . • . n u l l  and 
v o id . . . fo r  uhich. . . habeas corpus is  an appropriate  
remedy.
Although the court made a ra th e r inapposite  reference to  the decisions in  the
HALLIDAY and LIV/ERSIDGE cases,132 to  h ig h lig h t the " c o n flic t"  -  the l ib e r t y  o f
the c it iz e n  versus the safety  and corporate existence of the s ta te  -  i t  was
r ig h t ly  observed th a t "in  the process the courts have a v i t a l  ro le  to  p lay"
and th a t " i t  is  p a rtly  fo r  the re s to ra tio n  of such c o n flic ts  th a t courts in
133the land have been es tab lish ed . The decision was indeed the trend­
s e tte r  in  the exposition of what we have p re ferred  to c a l l  the "New Rule 
134of Law".
1358 .55  In  re : M. QLAYORI and o thers , the Lagos High Court also
allowed an ap p lica tio n  fo r  habeas corpus, holding an order under the same 
Decree to be i l l e g a l .  The applicants  were contractors to the N igerian  Army.
I t  was a lleged th a t they had received money fo r  services not rendered and
fo r  goods not d e liv e re d . They were arrested  by the Army but la t e r  released
on Mb a i l"  on uhst uas said to  be an ’’enforced promise” to  pay the money
claimed by the Army. They were re -a rre s te d  and detained a f te r  they had
s ta rte d  le g a l proceedings on being re leased . Relying on the GREENE case
the State Counsel contended th a t the court could not in q u ire  in to  the order
and th a t i t  uas also not necessary fo r  the government to f i l e  an a f f id a v i t
to  deny the a lle g a tio n s . The court quoted a passage from the decision  
137and observed:
I  hope th is  quotation shous beyond doubt th a t the court 
did in q u ire  in to  the accuracy of the statements in  the  
a f f id a v i t  and on such enquiry held th a t there uas ample 
evidence to  ju s t i fy  the a c tio n . . .
E a r lie r  in  the judgement thB court cautioned "those uho advisa the
a u th o r itie s  on these m atters and seek to ju s t i fy  the action under the
138 139um brella of Ex p. Greene case” . The court re fe rre d  to J o u itt  and
140Halsbury on the meaning of the term "public  o rder” and held th a t mere
fa i lu r e  to pay an amount a r b it r a r i ly  imposed could not be tre a te d  as "an act
141p re ju d ic ia l to pub lic  o rd er" . Although the decision in  the AGBAJE
case (supra) does not appear to  have been c ited  in  the in s ta n t case, the
court expressly re fe rre d  in  th is  case to "Rule of Lau" and observed th e t
the same must p re v a il even though there uas an a lle g a tio n  in  th is  case of
corruption and embezzlement of pub lic  funds and i t  uas possible fo r  the
Chief of the Army to  make a Decree to deal u ith  the inconvenient s itu a tio n  
142th a t might a r is e . The court also held th a t the order uas ambiguous
and uas bad on th a t ground. I t  merely reproduced the language o f s .3 (1 )
of the Decree uhich contemplated a lte rn a tiv e  charges. The court observed
th a t the impugned order uas one of the "stereotyped copies" uhich uere
143ava ilab le  fo r  "ready use uhen req u ire d " . I t  is  submitted fo r  the same 
reasons the court could have fu rth e r  held th a t the " s a tis fa c tio n "  uas not 
re a l .
8.56 The same High Court, in  a subsequent decis ion , OK ON EYO and
144E.O.  EYO v .  ARMED FORCES, however, re je c te d  the challenge made aga inst
an order under the same Decree on the s im ila r  ground of "u n certa in ty" ,
holding th a t the impugned order was an "instrum ent" w ith in  the meaning of
145s .1 (3 ) (b )  of Decree No. 28 of 1970. The term being not defined e ith e r
145in  the Decree or even in  the In te rp re ta t io n  Act, i t  ought to  have been 
construed to  mean subordinate le g is la t io n  and th a t the impugned order 
could n o t, apparently , bB categorised as such. The re s tr ic te d  and 
unim aginative approach o f the court could possibly be explained by the  
fa c t th a t i t  re jec ted  a l l  other contentions of the prisoners although 
some of them were indeed su b stan tia l and m erited serious consideration .
I t  had been contended th a t the order did not specify the period of 
detention and th a t i t  was not addressed to any p a r t ic u la r  prison o f f ic e r .  
The detention was also challenged as being mala f id e , but the contention  
uas re jec ted  by making a reference to the HALLIDAY and LIVERSIDGE cases 
and observing th a t the reasons of " s a tis fa c tio n "  o f the deta in in g  au th o rity  
could not be in q u ired  in to .  I t  was unfortunate th a t the court fa i le d  
to  note the d is tin c tio n  between the two contentions.
8.57 The bar of s .1 (3 ) (b )  o f the 1970 Decree does not appear to have
147been pleaded in  C.D. QNWUDIWE v CDMMR. OF POLICE and the Enugu High 
Court held th a t the order was bad as i t  contained a l l  the a lte rn a tiv e  
"grounds or causes" sp ec ified  in  s .3 (1 ) o f the 1967 Decree. In  the 
a f f id a v i t  o f the State only the fa c t and the date of detention were s ta ted : 
i t  uas argued, re ly in g  on the LIVERSIDGE case, th a t other fa c ts  need not be 
disclosed fo r  "security  reasons". The court re lie d  on the decision in  the 
GREENE case to say th a t the "causes and grounds" of detention could be 
inqu ired  in to  by po in ting  out the fa c t  th a t s .3 (1 ) had adopted the language 
o f Reg.188 o f the Defence Regulations, 1939, of England. I t  was also 
pointed out th a t u n lik e  the State Security  (D etention of Persons) Decrees, 
the Decree in  the in s ta n t case in te r fe re d  n e ith e r with the "c o n s titu tio n a l 
r ig h ts "  nor with the r ig h t  to the w r it  of habeas corpus and th a t the r ig h t
of being informed of the reasons guaranteed by s .21(2) of the C o n stitu tio n  
was v io la te d .
8.58 On the general scope of ju d ic ia l  review we may summarise the
views expressed in  three decisions of the Supreme Court. In  the f i r s t
148case, UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN v ADEMQLEKUN. the v a l id ity  o f E d ict No. 15
o f 1967 of the M il i ta r y  Governor o f Western N ig e ria , uas challenged. A new
Court of Appeal was set up fo r  the S tate uhich was interposed between the
High Court and the Supreme Court. For the f i r s t  time s .6 o f Decree No. 1
of 1966 came to be in te rp re te d  and the court held th a t i t  was "not to  be
read in  is o la t io n "  and th a t the Decree had to  be "read as a whole". By
reading ss. 3 and 6 together the court held th a t i t  could enquire whether
an Edict was void to any exten t under s .3(4) or th a t the impugned
E dict was void as being in co n sis ten t w ith the C o n s titu tio n . In  the  
149LAKANMI case the court went a step fu r th e r  and held th a t the impugned 
Decree, Decree No. 45 of 1968 was in v a lid  on the ground, among o thers , ^  
th a t the Federal M i l i ta r y  Government was an "in te rim  c o n s titu tio n a l 
government" and th a t in  making laws fo r  "peace, order and good government" 
under s .3, i t  could derogate from the provisions of the C o nstitu tio n  to the  
extent necessary under the doctrine o f n ecessity . I t  was indeed a bold 
decision in  th a t i t  n u l l i f ie d  the e f fe c t  o f the proviso added by the 
Decree No. 1 to  s.1 o f the C onstitu tio n  to provide th a t the "C onstitu tion  
s h a ll not p re v a il over a Decree". I t  uas held th a t the 1966 -  No. 1 
Decree im p lied ly  provided fo r  separation of powers and, as the impugned 
Decree of 1968 impinged upon the sphere of the ju d ic ia ry , i t  was vo id .
8.59 We have already noted th a t Decree No. 28 of 1970 came as a
150sequel to the decision in  the LAKANMI case and although i t  purported  
to  n u l l i f y  the e f fe c t  of the decision i t  has to be noted th a t i t  
enacted the law declared in  th e A)AM0LEKUN case. I t  re -asserted  th a t a' 
Decree s h a ll p re v a il over the unsuspended provisions of the C onstitu tio n  
but i t  did not make an Edict equally  supreme. F u rth er, i t  reasserted th a t
a Decree as u e ll  as an Edict could not be challenged on the ground th a t  
there  uas no "v a lid  le g is la t iv e  au th o rity "  to make the same, as held! in  the  
ADAMQLEKUN case u h ile  exp la in ing  the scope of s .6 of Decree No. 1 . The la s t -  
mentioned decision uas there fo re  fo llo u ed  in  the more recent case o f
B.C . ONYIUKE v EASTERN STATES INTERIM ASSETS & L I/B IL IT Y  AGENCY151 in  
uhich The Detention of Persons Edict No. 11 of 1966 of Eastern N ig e r ia  and 
a l l  subsequent amendments thereof uere held u l t r a  v ire s  s .3 o f Decree No. 1 
and also ss. 22 and 31 of the C o n s titu tio n . Edict No. 11 empouered the 
M il i ta r y  Governor to  detain c e rta in  classes of persons fo r  reasons o f  
"s ta te  secu rity"  uhich uas a Federal subject and i t s  amendment E d ic t No. 32 
empouered him to confiscate the deta inee*s property uhich under the 
C o nstitu tio n  could be done e ith e r  in  consequence of acq u is itio n  by c iv i l  
process ( f o r  consideration) or on conviction of a crime in  a court o f  la u .
The court re ite ra te d  th a t the doctrine of separation of pouer continued to  
p re v a il and as the tuo Edicts constitu ted  a " le g is la t iv e  judgment" they  
must be struck doun.
8.60 Lie thus f in d  th a t the ju d ic ia ry  in  N ig e ria  consisten tly  t r ie d  to
uphold the basic p rin c ip le s  of Rule of Lau in  uhich, in  normal circumstances, 
i t  had to be aided by the le g is la tu re .  For, the usual notion of Rule of 
Lau postulated government o f the s ta te  by ju s t ,  f a i r  and equ itab le  laws 
escheuing the a rb itra ry  exercise o f pouer. By in v it in g  i t s e l f  to perform 
the task single-handed i t  assumed a dual ro le  uhich, by im p lic a tio n , 
uarranted the pouer o f ju d ic ia l  rev ieu  to  be exercised in  a more 
im aginative uay u ith  a g reater anxiety to  contro l the mounting complaints 
of excesses and abuses re s u ltin g  from the merger o f the le g is la tu re  and the 
executive under the neu set-u p . A neu balance uas thus struck by the  
"Neu Rule o f Lsu" betueen the d if fe re n t  organs of government on the one 
hand and betueen the s ta te  and the in d iv id u a l on the other hand.
h \ 2 i i
8.61 Lie now turn to  Ghana and examine f i r s t  the decisions rendered
152under m il ita ry  ru le  during the f i r s t  coup. In  ExP« BRAIMAH, the
Court of Appeal allowed the appeal by the General O ffic e r  Commanding
of Ghana Army against the judgment o f Accra High Court which had granted a
w r it  of  habeas corpus. The ap p lic a n t, a N igerian  n a tio n a l, uas arrested
by army a u th o ritie s  on suspicion of having committed th e f t ,  in  exercise
153of pouers under N .L .C .D . 109. Houever, i t  uas the in te rp re ta t io n  of 
the  C rim inal Procedure Code (Amendment) Decree 1966 (N .L .C .D .93) uhich 
uas the main point a t iss u e . The Decree amended s .1 5 of the Code by 
adding a neu s u b -s .(5 ) uhich uas in  fa c t a re-enactment o f the proviso to  
su b -s .(2 ) uhich the Decree repealed . Any person summarily arrested  could 
be detained with the consent o f the Attorney General fo r  "a period of 
tu e n ty -e ig h t days or such other period" as he might determ ine, w ithout the 
provision of b a i l .  In the in s ta n t case the  Attorney General issued another 
"consent in  w ritin g "  as required  a f te r  the expiry o f 28 days, uhich uas 
challenged as being i l l e g a l .
8.62 The court re jec ted  the contention, re ly in g  on s .32(1) of the  
English In te rp re ta t io n  Act uhich, the court sa id , corresponded to s im ila r  
provision in  the Ghana Act, and uhich provided th a t a s ta tu to ry  pouer 
could be exercised "from time to tim e" as occasion req u ired . No importance 
uas attached to the r id e r  "unless the contrary in te n tio n  appears". I t  uas 
possible to  construe the words "or such other period" of s u b -s .(5 ) of the 
Decree as a m anifestation  of "contrary in te n tio n " . I t  could be argued 
th a t the Attorney General could give consent fo r  detention even fo r  a 
longer period than 28 days but he could give consent only once a fte r  he 
had ' ma!de up h is  mind to do so. This construction could be supported by 
the a d d itio n a l reasons th a t the provision of b a i l  uas excluded and the 
provision being r e s t r ic t iv e  of l ib e r ty  had to  be s t r ic t ly  construed.
Houever, the court held th a t under s .2 of the Hebeas Corpus Act 1964 i t  
could in q u ire  in to  the fa c ts  ju s t ify in g  the "consent"; i t  would not there fo re
s u ffic e  to merely e x h ib it the "consent" in  the re tu rn . On the fa c ts  
i t  uas held th a t the "consent" uas ju s t i f ie d  but i t  uas observed th a t the 
provision constitu ted  a "very uide departure from the accepted p rin c ip le s  
of the adm in istration  of the  c rim in a l la u " . The court also expressed 
the hope th a t "early  consideration" uould be given to the "removal" of 
the provision from the S tatute Book.
8.63 The s in g le  reported decision on preventive detention uas the case
of REPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS. EXPARTE SALIFA. 15*  I t  had an im portant 
and in te re s tin g  sequel in  th a t a f te r  the prisoner uas restored  to  h is  
l ib e r ty  by A n terk i, 3 . ,  he uas re -a rre s te d  next day but th is  time he uas 
not equally  fo rtunate  and Crabbe, 3 . ,  dismissed h is  ap p lica tio n  fo r  a u r i t
o f habeas corpus by h is  judgment in  REPUBLIC v DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL BRANCH.
155EXPARTE 5ALIFA. Even the f i r s t  ap p lica tio n  appears to  have been made 
a fte r  the prisoner uas in  detention fo r  more than a year and A n terky i, 3 . 
held th a t the document exh ib ited  in  the case as a Decree au thoris ing  the  
detention uas not a Decree in  the eye o f the lau  in  th a t i t  did not meet 
the requirement o f paragraph 3 (1 ) of the Proclam ation. I t  uas held th a t 
although a Decree can be given re tro sp ective  operatio n , "p u b lica tio n  of i t  
in  the G azette, numbering th ereo f in  accordance u ith  the order in  uhich 
decrees are published, p r in tin g  and pu b lica tio n  thereof by the Government 
P r in te r ,  together u ith  i t s  consequent purport th a t i t  uas signed by the  
Chairman o f the N ationa l L ib eratio n  Council, cannot be resp e c tive ly  
le g a lly  dispensed u ith  in  the making and issu ing of a decree having the  
force of la u " . I t  uas held th a t the uord "and" connecting the uords "make" 
and "issue" uas used unequivocally in  the conjunctive sense and th a t the  
uord "issue" meant, according to  the D ic tio n a ry , "pub lish , put in to  
c irc u la t io n " . Reliance uas placed by the State on paragraph 2 (2 ) 
of the Courts Decree 1966 (N .L .C .D . 84) to  suggest th a t the m atter 
should be re fe rre d  to the Court of Appeal to  decide "whether [ th e ]  enactment 
uas made in  excess of the powers conferred on the a u th o r it ie s  fo r  making
h  y  ^
such enactment". I t  uas held th a t the provision did not apply as the fa c t  
th a t the impugned decree uas an enactment uas i t s e l f  denied. The court also  
re je c te d  the contention th a t the N a tio n a l L ib eratio n  Council had u n lim ited  
powers by re fe rr in g  to the preamble of the Proclamation th a t i t  uas 
estab lished  "in  the in te re s t  of the  People of Ghana" and fo r  "proper 
ad m in is tra tion" and "maintenance of lau  and o rd er".
8 .64  Crabbe, 3 . ,  on the o ther hand ( in  the second case) held th a t "a
decree issued by the N atio n a l L ib era tio n  Council cannot be said to  be 
in e ffe c t iv e  unless i t  has been published in  the Gazette and a number 
assigned to i t "  by re ly in g  on the expression "as soon as p ra c tic a b le "  in  
paragraph 3 (6 ) o f the Proclamation uhich prescribed fo r  the p u b lica tio n  of 
the Decrees in  the Gazette and on the expression "unless otherwise provided  
in  th a t Decree" o f sub-paragraph (7 ) uhich, subject to the r id e r  ju s t 
mentioned, provided th a t a Decree s h a ll come in to  force from the date of 
p u b lica tio n  in  the G azette. The impugned Decree, in  fa c t ,  expressly  
provided fo r  re tro sp ective  operation and had dispensed u ith  the fu lf i lm e n t  
of the  requirement of Gazette p u b lica tio n  fo r  th a t purpose. Houever, the 
court sau the d i f f ic u l t y  in  holding the Decree v a lid  according to sub- 
paragraph ( 1 ) ,  uhich spoke o f the "issue" o f the Decree a fte r  i t  uas made. 
Therefore , instead  of g iv ing  i t  i t s  p la in  and n a tu ra l meaning, as done by 
A nterky i, 3 . ,  the court imputed to  i t  the meaning -  "operation", in  the  
context, upon ho ld ing , s u rp ris in g ly , th a t use o f the word "p u b lica tio n "  
would be tantamount to g iv ing  i t  sp ec ia l meaning. There s t i l l  remained the 
la s t  hurdle as there uas no p rin te d  copy in  the in s ta n t case. Th is  
objection  uas summarily dismissed as "not p e rtin en t to the present exerc ise". 
The la s t ob jection  th a t the Decree did not bear any s e r ia l  number uas met 
by holding th a t i t  had a short t i t l e  and th a t the two requirements were
a lte rn a tiv e s  whose purpose uas to  id e n t ify  the Decree and fu r th e r  th a t the
re le v an t provision  did not say th a t "every" Decree but merely said th a t
Decrees s h a ll be numbered. At the end the court even went so fa r  as to  record
q r- cr 
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a d e f in ite  fin d in g  th a t "there is  no evidence before me th a t i t  is  not 
intended th a t i t  s h a ll not be published” . For, the court could not ignore  
the c a rd in a l p r in c ip le  o f Rule of Lau uhich made "prom ulgation” an 
e s s e n tia l condition fo r  the v a l id i ty  o f any la u .
8 .65  The laboured exercise uas a c la s s ic  example of ju d ic ia l  re s tra in t
of an extreme degree not uarranted by the ro le  of the ju d ic ia ry  envisaged 
under the  neu "grundnorm". The reason fo r  the  d e lib e ra te  departure from 
the normal ru les  of construction by re fus ing  to invest the procedural 
safeguards u ith  mandatory character could only be explained by an 
unexpressed concern on the part of the court to  avoid a d ire c t confrontation  
u ith  the neu executive au th o rity  of the State uhich might re s u lt in  the loss 
of p restig e  by the ju d ic ia ry . Although there uas a s tr ik in g  s im ila r ity  in  
the approach displayed in  th is  case u ith  th a t of the decision in
Exp. BRAIMAH (supra) the court expressed i t s  helplessness in  a m ild er  
term by ending i t s  judgment u ith  a quotation from Lord MacDermott's Hamlyn 
Lecture, "Protection from Pouer" to  uhich, as i t  sa id , i t  desired "to drau 
the a tte n tio n "  of the counsel. The approach also appears to be in fluenced , 
erroneously, ue submit, by the fa c t  th a t the app licant did not deny in  h is  
ap p lica tio n  the charge of subversion.
8.66 We may nou examine the feu  re levan t reported decisions rendered
under m il ita ry  ru le  during the second coup. As ue have seen, e a r l ie r  the
pouer of detention pending in v e s tig a tio n  uas exercised by a combined
operation under tuo decrees of uhich one uas merely an amendment o f the
C rim inal Procedure Code. This uas nou provided in  a s in g le  decree, The
156Armed Forces (S p ec ia l Pouers) Decree 1973, but i t  appeared nou in  a 
neu forms
s .3 ( 1 )  Where he is  s a t is f ie d  th a t such action is  in  the pub lic  
in te re s t ,  a Regional Commissioner may a rre s t, or order 
any member of the Armed Forces to  a rres t -
( a ) .  • .{ (b ) • • ( c) . • • •{ (d ) . •
(2 ) Any person arrested  under th is  section s h a ll be 
detained in  m il ita r y  custody u n t i l  such tim e as 
the Rsqional Commissioner or the N a tio n a l Redemption 
Council may otherwise d ire c t .  [ emphaais addedj
The o ffen s ive  a c t iv i t ie s  uhich rendered a person l ia b le  to  a rre s t and 
detention uere sp ec ified  in  clauses (a ) to (d ) o f sub-s. ( 1 ) ,  u n lik e  the 
1966 provision (N .L .C .D . 109 and 93) uhich uas app licab le  to  "crim e" genera lly  
aid to  offences against "pub lic  o rd er" . Only c l . ( d )  uas in  general term s, 
namely, "p ractices  by means o f uhich members of the pu b lic  are l ik e ly  
to be cheated or deceived;" the other clauses spoke o f s p e c if ic  acts  
a ffe c tin g  the in te re s t of the "government". The doubt about the tim e­
l im it  of detention and even the l im i t  i t s e l f  uas removed and at the same 
time the decision to detain  uas made a purely executive a f f a i r  by removing 
also the Attorney-General from the p ic tu re .
0.67 The above provisions uere examined by T a y lo r, 3 . ,  of the High
Court at Accra uho alloued the ap p lica tio n s  fo r  habeas corpus i n the tuo
cases -  REPUBLIC against (1 ) I  .G .P . ex p. ANIAGYEI ( I I ) 1 5 7  and
(2 ) GREATER ACCRA REGIONAL COiHIR. ex p. NAAWU ( i l l ) . 1 5 8  In  the f i r s t  case
the prisoner uas arrested by the p o lice  and detained in  a p o lice  c e l l .  The
court held th a t the Regional Commissioner could not delegate h is  a u th o rity
to a rres t to any person and th a t the a rres t uas bad as i t  uas not made
e ith e r  by the Commissioner or by any member of the armed fo rc e s . I t  uas
also held th a t the provision fo r  detention in  " m ilita ry  custody" uas
mandatory and the detention uas th ere fo re  i l l e g a l ,  being in  v io la t io n  of
th is  p ro v is io n . The executive aid  the le g is la t iv e  bodies uere separate
e n t i t ie s  not only as a m atter of pure le g a l theory but as a " p ra c t ic a l
r e a l i t y " ,  the court observed and i t  added th a t i f  a pouer uas not exercised
by any a u th o rity  according to  la u , "the courts in  the exercise of th e ir
ju d ic ia l  functions as guardians of le g a lity "  had to  "remedy the s itu a tio n
159p a r t ic u la r ly  in  cases a ffe c tin g  l ib e r ty  of the su b jec t" . Proceeding 
fu r th e r  the court re c a lle d  Lord A tk in 's  d issent in  the LIVERSIDGE case and 
also re fe rre d  to s .4(1 ) of the Habeas Corpus Act 1964 saying th a t i t  had 
a duty to fin d  out the reasons fo r  detention in  any p a r t ic u la r  case and i f
no "s a tis fa c to ry  le g a l reasons" usre shoun by the deta in ing  au thority  the  
prisoner had to  be re leased.
8 . 6 8  In  the second case the scope of s .4 (1 ) had to be examined in
g reater d e ta i l .  The a rres t and detention uere under orders o f the
Regional Commissioner but he did not f i l e  any re tu rn . Instead h is  Deputy
f i l e d  an a f f id a v i t  s ta tin g  th a t the Regional Commissioner had ordered the
a rres t and detention of the prisoner upon h is  being s a t is f ie d  in  accordance
u ith  s .3 (1 ) (d )  of the Decree th a t the app licant indulged in  practices  by
means of uhich the members of the pub lic  uere l ik e ly  to be deceived. The
court observed ; 1 5 8
Quite apart from the fa c t  th a t the nature of the p ractices  
uas not in d ica ted  in  the a f f id a v i t ,  the a lle g a tio n  th a t the 
Regional Commissioner uas s a t is f ie d  is  a m atter th a t the
deponent cannot possibly knou or prove unless he uas to ld  by
the Regional Commissioner in  uhich case the m atter becomes 
hearsay.
The court granted an adjournment to  enable the Regional Commissioner to
submit the "report in  u r it in g "  contemplated by s .2 of the Act but i t  uas not
submitted and at the resumed hearing i t  uas contended th a t the m atters
contained in  clauses (a ) to (d ) of s .3 (1 ) o f the Decree need not be
estab lished  in  a court. Analysing the provision the court held th a t "the
Regional Commissioner has a duty to s a t is fy  h im self uhether i t  is  in  the
pub lic  in te re s t to a rres t such a person" and th a t the subjective
161s a tis fa c tio n  could not be s tretched fu rth e r  to  any other issu e . The
court approved Lord A tk in 's  "vigorous" dissent and observed th a t even in
England, "the Liversidge ra t io  has never been applied to my knouledge to  a
fa c tu a l s itu a tio n  e lab o ra te ly  and exten s ive ly  set doun in  considerable
d e ta i l  in  an enactment a id  made a condition-precedent fo r  the exercise of
162a d iscre tio n ary  pouer". R e fe rrin g  to the Habeas Corpus Act the court
observed th a t the r ig h t  to the u r i t  dated back to the establishm ent o f the
Supreme Court in  Ghana in  1876 and by saving the duties  and pouers of the
163courts the neu regime uas anxious to "ensure the ru le  o f la u " .
8.69 In  a subsequent decision the sane High Court, houever, struck a
discordant note u h ile  dealing u ith  a case o f detention under an "Executive
164Instrum ent" made under the Preventive Custody Decree 1972. The
applicant uas at f i r s t  arrested  by the po lice  on 2nd December 1975 but he
uas le t  o f f  on b a i l  although he uas not informed o f the reasons fo r  h is
a r re s t. On 5th December he uas again a rres ted . An app lica tio n  fo r
habeas corpus uas f i le d  on the n in th  but on the e leven th , during the
pendency of the ap p lica tion  the impugned Executive Instrum ent No. 156 of
197 5 uas made by the Supreme M il i ta r y  Council authoris ing  the detention of
the prisoner re tro s p e c tiv e ly  from 2nd December. The court held th a t although
the detention from 5th to 11th December uas "u n lau fu l" , the instrument had
re tro s p e c tiv e ly  " le g a lis ed "  i t ,  being " v ir tu a lly  an Act o f Indem nity". I t
uas fu r th e r  held th a t exercise of d iscre tio n ary  pouer o f a " le g is la t iv e
nature" could not be questioned and uent so fa r  as to  say th a t "the Supreme
M il i ta r y  Council has acquired plenary sovereign pouer more absolute than the
165le g is la tu re  and other pouers enjoyed by the regime uhich i t  superseded."
I t  is  unfortunate th a t the court did not at a l l  re fe r  to  the 1972
166Proclamation but speaking in  vague and general terms i t  uent on to say 
th a t "liie in  th is  country u ith  our c o lo n ia l past and as h e irs  of English 
Common Lau are no strangers to  th is  type of sovereignty". I t  is  submitted 
th a t the court fa i le d  to appreciate the subtle  nature of the ro le  of 
"Rule of Lau" in  what i t  c a lled  "the sovereignty o f Westminster typ e".
8 .70 In  other uords in  th is  case the court refused to  uphold the
"Neu Rule of Lau". Instead of assuming a dominant ro le  in  the neu p o lity
i t  t r ie d  to play a subservient ro le  by unequivocally dec laring  th a t "the 
High Court is  acting  as a sort of an agent but more c o rrec tly  as a servant 
of the Supreme M il i ta r y  Council and can hardly question the Decree."
This  approach uas p a ten tly  lacking not only in  ju d ic ia l  valour but also
i n  im a g in a t io n .  The c o u r t  h e ld  th a t  th e  impugned " in s t r u m e n t"  co u ld  o n ly
be tes ted  u ith  reference to the parent Decree but even then i t  fa i le d  to  
construe the tuo documents to hold th a t n e ith e r the Habeas Corpus Act 1964 
nor the general p rin c ip le s  of common lau uere expressly repealed by e ith e r  
of them. As the grounds of the detention uere not examined tuo  
s u b s tan tia l contentions uere re je c te d , namely, i t  uas a case of mistaken 
id e n t ity  and th a t the detention uas fo r  a lleged c rim in a l offences uhich 
had nothing to do u ith  "n a tio n a l s e c u rity " .
6.71 Ue thus see th a t u n lik e  N ig e ria , the Ghana court displayed an
in co n sis ten t and ambivalent approach, o s c il la t in g  betueen the tuo e x trem ities
of the tuo concepts of ju d ic ia l  re s tra in t  and ju d ic ia l  v a lo u r. In  one
respect houever the courts uere by and large  co nsis ten t. Whenever the 1964
Habeas Corpus Act came up fo r  exam ination, the courts in te rp re te d  i t s
provisions in  such a manner as to re ta in  the Common Lau r ig h t to  the
u r i t  in  an almost unaltered  form despite the strenuous e f fo r t  o f the
167le g is la tu re  to a lte r  i t  s u b s ta n t ia lly . The inconsistency in  the 
approach o f courts in  both ju r is d ic t io n s  touards the English uartim e  
cases uas, houever, a uelcome fe a tu re . I t  proved th a t there uas a genuine 
e f fo r t  to make a proper eva luation  of the underlying p r in c ip le s  o f those 
cases and generally  there uas a tendency to discard the v ieu  th a t these 
cases had erected the supposed impregnable sh ie ld  against ju d ic ia l  re v ie u .
Conclusion
B.72 I t  is  true th a t the laus enacted by the m il ita ry  ru le rs
asserted themselves "vigorously" as happened during the c o lo n ia l period  
but the c o lo n ia l ru le rs  did not go so fa r  as to  enact re tro s p ec tiv e  
penal laus v io la t in g  at once the ru le  against the B i l l  of A tta in d er and 
the maxim n u lla  poena sine le g e . The c o lo n ia l ru le rs  uere anxious to  
claim "leg itim acy" fo r  th e ir  ru le  by m aintain ing th e ir  scrupulous regard fo r  
" le g a l i ty " .  The m il ita r y  ru le rs  uere, houever, faced u ith  a d if fe re n t  yet 
more d i f f i c u l t  task . When they assumed pouer they claimed th a t the important
in s t itu t io n s  of the old machinery had fa i ls d  and they had come to re p a ir  
them and put the machinery in  good order. So they could not d iscard the old  
in s t itu t io n s  a ltogether yet they could claim "le?gitimacy" only when they had 
f u l f i l l e d  th e ir  goal. This required p o l i t ic a l  s t a b i l i t y ,  to  which the  
l ib e r ty  of the in d iv id u a l had to be subordinated. A new balance was to be 
struck betueen the in te re s t of the State and o f the in d iv id u a l.  This task  
they did not deny to the ju d ic ia ry . The goalsy and more so the means to  
achieve them/ necessarily  d iffe re d  under a c iv i l  and a m il ita r y  government. 
Neu norms and also a neu "Grundnorm" came in to  existence and only the  
ju d ic ia l  te s t could in ves t them u ith  " le g a l i ty " .  The courts in  A fr ic a  uere 
b e tte r  placed than those of Pakistan in  accepting "necessity" as a r e lia b le  
guide in  promoting the "Neu Rule of Lau" as ths basis of the neu "grundnorm" 
because the m il ita ry  ru le rs  of A fric a  did not declare th a t "M a rtia l Lau" 
formed the basis of the neu jurisprudence. On the other hand the ju d ic ia ry  
in  Bangladesh could possibly fin d  i t s  e f fo r ts  to  uphold the "Neu Rule of 
Lau" s t u l t i f ie d  by the p e cu lia r stance of " le g a lity "  adopted by the  
m ilita r y  ru le rs  there by allow ing the C onstitu tion  "to continue to  
operate" a lb e it  amended in  such a uay (by in s e rtin g  the neu clause 3A in  
the Fourth Schedule) as to n e u tra lis e  the force and e f fe c t  of the " s e l f -  
a c tiv a tin g "  ro le  of the ju d ic ia ry  contemplated under the neu "grundnorm". 
Indeed Bangladesh, a neu s ta te , and also the la s t  in  the Commonwealth to  
succumb to m il ita ry  r u le , could v e r ily  claim the unique d is tin c t io n  of 
launching an unique experiment to f u l f i l  in  a novel uay the tu in  te s t of 
" le g a lity "  and " le g itim a c y" .
Chapter 9
THE PROSPECTS FOR PERSONAL LIBERTY: CONCLUSIONS
I . Personal L ib erty  as a "value" concept
(1 ) The key-note o f the "value-pro cess"
9.1 We in d ica ted  in  the In tro d u ctio n  th a t the key-note of the "value-
process" is  the tr ia n g le  which is  formed by the value-concepts of
"human r ig h ts " , " s o c ia l-s e c u r ity " and " s ta te -s e c u r ity " . I f  a t any 
time any of the arms of the tr ia n g le  is  overstretched, the s ta te  of 
eq u ilib rium  in  any society and p o lity  is  l ik e ly  to  be d is tu rb ed . Revolutions  
are l ik e ly  to  occur and new norms of so c ia l and p o l i t ic a l  values are l ik e ly  
to  be es tab lish ed . We have seen th a t ideas concerning "s ta te "  and 
"socie ty" and also " l ib e r ty "  and "secu rity"  in  re la tio n  to the "[human] 
person" have undergone changes at d if fe re n t  times in  d if fe re n t  clim es.
These ideas have acquired d if fe re n t  values from time to time and i t  is  also 
a fa c t th a t these values have been h ie ra rc h ic a lly  graded.
9 .2  U n fo rtu n a te ly , although a man (th e  "[human] person") is  born
fre e , freedom of movement as w e ll as l ib e r ty  and secu rity  of the "[human]
person", have not always been accorded the highest place in  the hierarchy
of values in  every society and p o l i ty .  The "value-process" has woven a
weird pattern  as homo sapiens has progressively  marched from the darkest
ages to the in creas in g ly  b rig h te r ages of c iv i l is a t io n .  The Greeks and
Romans of the "b rig h t age" used the words e le u th e r ia  and l ib e r ta s  to
convey the idea of being unimpeded in  the exercise of movement but th e ir
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slaves and bondsmen could not move f r e e ly .  I t  may be in te re s tin g  to  
re -c a p itu la te  b r ie f ly  the operation of the "value-process" in  those 
t e r r i t o r ie s  with which th is  study is  p rim a rily  concerned. They may, in  
terms of "value-process" be ap p ro p ria te ly  described as common law 
ju r is d ic t io n s , because of the d is t in c t iv e  common fea tu re  of th e ir  le g a l 
systems under which the judges even tu a lly  operate the lev e r by which the
arms o f  th e  t r ia n g le  are m a n ip u la te d  to  keep p ro p e r m easure, th ro u g h
a n o th e r v a lu e -c o n c e p t, "R u le  o f  Law ".
(2 )  The o p e ra t io n  o f  th e  " v a lu e -p ro c e s s "
(A ) The U n ite d  Kingdom
9 .3  We have seen th a t  in  Greece and Rome, th e  c ra d le s  o f  W estern
c i v i l i s a t i o n s ,  th e  concep t o f  " N a tu ra l Law" had a trem endous in f lu e n c e
in  e v o lv in g  th e  d i f f e r e n t  "v a lu e -c o n c e p ts "  r e le v a n t  to  p e rs o n a l l i b e r t y
and th a t  th e  C h r is t ia n  Church became th e  v e h ic le  to  c a r ry  th e  concep t to
th e  A nglo-Saxon w o r ld .  H e re , in  E ng land , i t  cane to  be b le n d e d  w ith  th e
T e u to n ic  concep t o f  l i b e r t y  and, in  due c o u rse , embodied in  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n
o f " p o s i t iv e  la w "  which i s  com pend ious ly  d e s c r ib e d  as "Common Law ". In
o th e r  w ords , n a tu r a l  law  was tra n s fo rm e d  in t o  th e  m o ra l c o n te n t o f
p o s i t iv e  la w . B u t ,  a t t im e s , when th e  m ach ine ry  th a t  made th e  p o s i t iv e
law  behaved e r r a t i c a l l y ,  th e  appea l to  n a tu r a l  law  was re v iv e d  u n t i l  a t
la s t  " p u b l ic  o p in io n "  (p rom o ted  in  th e  tw e n t ie th  c e n tu ry  to  a g re a t
e x te n t  by th e  "m e d ia ")  s ta r te d  to  a s s e r t  i t s e l f  v ig o r o u s ly  and became
an in t e g r a l  p a r t  o f  th e  v a lu e  p ro c e s s . Common Law, which engendered v a lu e s
th a t  fou n d  e x p re s s io n  in  Magna C a r ta , was a ls o  re s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  la t e r
c o n s t i t u t io n a l  documents such as th e  P e t i t io n  o f  R ig h t,  the  B i l l  o f  R ig h t
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and th e  A ct o f  S e tt le m e n t.  In d e e d , th e  same v a lu e s  em brac ing  th e  e th o s  
o f  l i b e r t y  were re s p o n s ib le  f o r  r a is in g  th e  s ta tu s  o f  th e  p ro c e d u ra l w r i t  
o f  habeas co rpus  s u b jic ie n d u m  ad respondendum in t o  t h a t  o f  a c o n s t i t u t io n a l
4
w r i t .  A g a in , th e  same v a lu e s  f i n a l l y  e s ta b lis h e d  th e  p o s i t io n ,  a lb e i t  
b u i l t  upon th e  fo u n d a t io n  o f  habeas c o rp u s , t h a t  under E n g lis h  law  any
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r e s t r a in t  on th e  l i b e r t y  o f  th e  person  i s  p rim  a f a c ie  i l l e g a l .
However, th e  c e n t r a l  id e a  o f  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  Common Law re s p o n s ib le  f o r  
p ro m o tin g  and p r o l i f e r a t i n g  new i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  law  was, in d e e d , th e  
independence o f  th e  ju d ic ia r y  w h ich was sough t to  be e s ta b l is h e d  f i r m ly  by 
th e  A ct o f  S e tt le m e n t.  In  in t e r p r e t in g  s ta tu te s  and expound ing common law  
th e  ju d g e s  t r i e d  to  u p h o ld  what has come to  be known as th e  "R u le  o f  Law",
Q *  9
which could claim a precursor in  the "due process clause" o f Magna C arta .^
9 .4  The content o f the concept of Rule of Law has, however, v a rie d
from time to time re f le c t in g  the corresponding change in  s o c ia l and 
p o l i t ic a l  va lues. Nevertheless the judges have generally  t r ie d  to  p ro tec t  
and re ta in  the basic elements of the concept, of which the c e n tra l theme 
was contro l of both executive and le g is la t iv e  arms of the S ta te . The 
b iz a rre  operation of the "value-process", however, became evident when 
England acquired colonies, in  th a t an e ffe c t iv e  implementation of 
c o lo n ia l po licy  (w ith  the dominant fea tu re  aiming at the entrenchment o f 
c o lo n ia l ru le ) needed a concerted e f fo r t  at home and also abroad. In
the dependencies the "[human] person" was seen in  d if fe re n t  colours -
" B ritis h  European sub jects", "native subjects", ( in  Ire la n d , as P rotestants
( lo y a l and superior) and Catholics (d is lo y a l aid in fe r io r )  and "B ritis h
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protected persons" in  p ro te c to ra te s . Much la t e r ,  in  the tw entie th  
century, at home, during the two world wars, the "value-process" operated  
s t i l l  d i f fe r e n t ly :  even a subject could be marked out fo r  h is  "h o s tile
g
o r ig in  or assoc iation". Not only the le g is la to rs  but the judges also 
in  e ith e r  context leaned in  favour of the "S tate" and enforced the  
"Rule of Law" to the detrim ent of the "[human] person".
9 .5  The notable fa i lu r e  of the English ju d ic ia ry  in  the co lon ia l
context was seen in  the evolution of the so -ca lled  "doctrine of m a rtia l 
g
law ". S im ila r ly , the e xp a tria te  judges in  A fric a  not only acted with a
10s ig n a l lack of im agination in  dealing with "w itc h cra ft cases", but
also contributed , in  some measure at le a s t, to the evo lu tion  of what may
11be ca lled  the African brand o f "c o lo n ia l co n s titu tio n a lis m ". This double
standard o f B r it is h  ju s tic e  was apparently the re s u lt of the b iza rre
operation of the "value-process" which may w e ll be included in  the term
"contrad ic tions" of the B r it is h  ru le , as noticed by Indian and African  
12p o l i t ic a l  leaders. Indeed, the absence of moral content in  some of 
the c o lo n ia l laws and executive acts was as great a "co n trad ic tio n " of the
bB r it is h  value of ju s t ic e , and a f o r t i o r i , of the Rule of Law, as was the  
fa c t th a t the ju d ic ia ry  often  fa i le d  to con tro l the executive and the 
le g is la tu re  in  dependencies.
9 .6  However, the prominent fea tu re  of operation of the "value-
process" in  the dependencies may be more appropriate ly  described by the 
terms ’’le g a lity "  and "legalism ", which came to be accepted as va lu e - 
concepts in  the p a r t ic u la r  context of the dependencies. Indeed, the 
c o lo n ia l ru le  was g e n era lly , a p r io r i , i l le g it im a te  and appropriate  
s u b s titu te s  had to be found fo r  the concept of " le g itim a c y" . I t  became 
possib le to re je c t the appeal to  "m orality*' by invoking these concepts.
A mere form al compliance with the norms of p o s itive  law enacted in  the 
dependencies was considered s u ff ic ie n t  to  sustain the claim to  
" le g itim a c y" , no m atter how the norms were evolved or how and by what 
machinery the law was enacted, administered and enforced. There was
no question then of in te rn a t io n a l acco u n tab ility  and these concepts 
proved to be of immense va lu e . Indeed, in  the dependencies the e n tire  
framework of emergency le g is la t io n , i t s  enforcement and adm in is tra tion , 
was founded upon thB concepts of " le g a lity "  and " leg a lism ".
9 .7  I t  was perhaps in  the f ie ld  of "preventive ju s tic e "  th a t the
operation of the "value-process" proved to be ra ther in tra c ta b le
because of the emphasis on the choice o f values. Laws fo r  "s o c ia l-
s ecu rity"  have been enacted in  England on the p r in c ip le  of "preventive
ju s tic e "  to deal with such ancient e v i ls  as vagrancy and rec id iv ism , as
also the modern menace of drunken d r iv in g . In  each case, the law was a
response to  a contemporary so c ia l problem of deviant behaviour
n ecess ita tin g  the use of d ra s tic  measures but in  each case the ro le  of
the executive in  the adm in is tra tion  of the law was subjected to
ju d ic ia l  superintendence. The ju d ic ia ry  too reacted p o s itiv e ly  to  the
change in  emphasis on choice o f va lues, and leaned in  favour of society
13v is -a -v is  the in d iv id u a l. This is  understandable, as the ju d ic ia ry  was 
not denied i t s  t r a d it io n a l  ro le , but i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to understand why the
h
ju d ic ia ry  reacted  in  a s im ila r  way when i t  was a question o f th e  p ro te c tio n
of the s ta te , and not so c ie ty , from the a c t iv i t ie s  of an in d iv id u a l, by
g iv ing  primacy to the in te re s ts  of the s ta te  despite the fa c t th a t the
laws enacted fo r  "the defence of the realm" purported to deny the ju d ic ia ry
14i t s  t r a d it io n a l  ro le .
9 .8  These laws to o , as Lord Atkinson observed in  HALLIDAY, were
founded upon the p rin c ip le  of preventive ju s tic e  -  a common law concept
(founded on the " ju r is d ic t io n  of suspicion") which was also re fle c te d  in
15the Justice of the Peace Act, 1360. Uhat the ju d ic ia ry  did was to evolve  
an ad hoc le g a l norm to  deal with an ad hoc s itu a t io n . Indeed, the ju d ic ia l
response to a s itu a tio n  req u irin g  a choice of values is  a d is tin g u ish in g
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fea tu re  of the Common Law i t s e l f ,  as re fle c te d  in  the doctrine of necessity , 
but what d is tingu ishes the English ju d ic ia ry  from i t s  counterparts in  the  
New Commonwealth is  th a t i t  considers the ro le  of choice of values in  the  
operation of the "value-process" as a subordinate, yet d e lic a te  but not 
dominant, aspect of the process, in  th a t a choice adversely a ffe c tin g  the 
"[human] person" is  made on only excep tio n a lly  strong and s u b stan tia l 
grounds. In  other words i t  accepts the position  th a t certa in  values  
have a transcendental character, fo r  which the "value process", operating  
through a strong and rep resen ta tive  "public  opinion" is  to a large extent 
responsib le.
(B) The New Commonwealth; Asia and A fric a
9 .9  The p a r t ic u la r  aspect o f the operation of the "value-process"
in  Commonwealth Asia and A fr ic a  th a t m erits  spec ia l a tten tio n  in  th is  study 
is  the e ffe c t o f the new a ttitu d e s  in  the emergent s ta tes  on the question 
of the choice o f va lues. Th is  is  because although a ttitu d e s  d i f f e r  in  the  
new s ta tes  in  so fa r  as t r a d it io n a l  ideas and in s t itu t io n s  are concerned, 
there is  a s ig n if ic a n t unanimity in  so fa r  as a tt itu d e s  towards s itu a tio n s  of 
"emergency" are concerned. I t  is  the common a tt itu d e  th a t has come to be 
known as th a t o f the "Third Uorld a tt itu d e " . The new s ta tes  are not only
unduly concerned about the fa c t th a t the new p o l i t ie s  are by necessity and 
also by choice, g o a l-o rien ted , but they are also perhaps unduly
17apprehensive of what has come to be known as "neo-co lonialism ".
The new a ttitu d e s  have by aid large swemped the t r a d it io n a l values as the  
l a t t e r  are l ik e ly  to impede achievement of new goals.
9 .10  On the other hand the c o lo n ia l ru le  i t s e l f  may be said to
have m odified t r a d it io n a l values to a great e x te n t, so th a t the neu
p o li t ie s  in h e rite d  these m odified values as a c o lo n ia l legacy. This is
p a r t ic u la r ly  tru e  of the A frican s ta tes  o f the Commonuealth and of In d ia .
The la t t e r  had the " v illa g e  assembly" ( penchavat) as the frameuork of the
18t r a d it io n a l  p o l i ty .  Not only the absence of a strong c en tra l Pan-
Indian government but the concept of dh arm a also ensured th a t in  the scale
19of t r a d it io n a l values the "[humanJ person" had h is  due share. The Mughal 
ru le  in  In d ia  did not a lte r  the position  as i t  could not break down the 
t r a d it io n a l  s tructu re  of Indian s o c ie ty . On the other hand, the super­
im position on the indigenous s o c ie tie s  of western values during B r it is h  
ru le , which saw the emergence of e l i t e  groups in  a l l  dependencies, was 
accompanied in  the case of A fr ic a  by a d e lib e ra te  attempt to "modernise"l
the t r a d it io n a l ins tu titions  and in  the case of In d ia  by a wholesale
replacement thereof by Anglo-Saxon Laws and in s t itu t io n s . So, even the
m o d ification  of values in  the two te r r i to r ie s  took d if fe re n t  form s.
9.11 In  both A frica  and In d ia , the t r a d it io n a l s o c ie tie s  attached
great importance to  the concept of "duty" and to those of "discussion" 
and "consensus" in  a l l  processes of decision-making and d is p u te -s e ttlem e n t. 
I t  is  tru e  th a t in  West A fr ic a , in  p a r t ic u la r ,  in  some "c h ie fly  
s o c ie tie s"  and also in  Uganda in  East A fr ic a , the t ra d it io n a l ru le r  had 
the "power of l i f e  and death" over h is  subjects, but in  a l l  cases the
o ff ic e  o f the ru le r  was exposed to the te s t of leg itim acy with in b u i l t
in s t itu t io n s  providing checks aid balances. In other words, "A frican  
despotism" was la r g e ly  a myth. On the other hand the Anglo-Saxon laws
and in s t itu t io n s  contemplated an ad versaria l con text. Moreover, the 
c o lo n ia l p o lity  uias an "unlim ited  government1' which conformed n e ith e r  
to the Westminster pattern  nor to  the t r a d it io n a l  A frican p a tte rn .
9 .12  In Pakistan and M alaysia the new a ttitu d e s  have to conform
apparently to the p r in c ip le s  of Islam , which has been accepted as the  
sta te  re lig io n  in  both these s ta te s , as is  Buddhism in  S ri Lanka. But 
we have also seen th a t in  every new s ta te  of the Indian sub-continent, 
inc lud ing  Bangladesh, the "v illa g e  assemblies" have re ta ined  th e ir  
appeal in  some form or o th er, due possibly more to the p ra c t ic a l reason 
th a t so c ie ties  in  a l l  these s ta tes  are preponderantely ag rarian . Even 
Is lam ic  p r in c ip le s , as embodied in  the Pakistan C o n s titu tio n , deny 
absolute power to a temporal sovereign aid contain p o s itive  in ju n ctio n s  
against the abuse of a u th o r ity . Thus we f in d  th a t although the Asian 
and African s o c ie ties  are s t i l l  agrarian and although they have not 
absorbed western values at the grass roots , the t r a d it io n a l base is  
conducive to p o l i t ic a l  accu ltu ra tio n  attuned to democratic ru le  obtain ing  
in  the in d u s tr ia lis e d  s o c ie tie s  of the western world.
9 .13  I t  cannot be gainsaid th a t in  a d iv ided end less l i t e r a t e
so c ie ty , western democratic values fin d  d i f f ic u l t y  in  s tr ik in g  roots and
un fo rtu n ate ly  the A frican and Asian so c ie tie s  are n e ith e r homogeneous nor
20have they a tta in ed  the appropriate le v e l of l i t e r a c y .  However, i t  is
in te re s tin g  to note th a t ,  although re lig io u s  d iffe ren ces  in  Northern
Ire la n d  have made i t  d i f f i c u l t  fo r  democracy to function  th e re , in  Asia,
w ith  th 8  soI b exception of Pakistan , s t r a t i f ic a t io n  of so c ie tie s  in  terms
of e ith e r  re lig io u s  or l in g u is t ic  or e th n ic  or economic or p o l i t ic a l  le v e ls ,
21has not proved to be a handicap to the same e x ten t. I t  is  tru e  th a t ,  
although there have been re g u la r e le c tio n s  in  In d ia , u n t i l  re ce n tly , the 
Congress Party has always been returned to power, but at no tim e has any 
p o l i t ic a l  leader of In d ia  (even Mrs In d ira  Gandhi before her la s t  defeat)
2 2ever thought of abandoning the m u lti-p a rty  democracy of the western model.
S ri Lanka's record is  s t i l l  b e tte r :  opposing p o l i t ic a l  p a rtie s  have
been returned to power a lte rn a te ly  in  successive e le c tio n s . On the other
hand, although the ju d ic ia ry  in  every s ta te  represents an e l i t e  group
which has absorbed western values extens ive ly  in  a l l  s ta tes  the record
of the Pakistan ju d ic ia ry  is  outstanding in  so fa r  as m atters re la t in g
23to  personal l ib e r ty  are concerned.
9 .1 4  However, the p o l i t ic a l  leaders -  the executive and the
le g is la tu re  -  another e l i t e  group, in  a l l  s ta te s , share in  common the
" th ird  world a tt itu d e " . The leaders of the developing world loudly
proclaim th a t th e ir  s ta tes  have to be in  a "perpetual s ta te  of emergency"
to  f ig h t  poverty, ignorance and disease fo r  which colonialism  and
24im perialism  is  blamed. Indeed, a l l  Asian s ta tes  and even most of the
African s ta tes  provide in  th e ir  C onstitu tions fo r  "declara tions  of
emergencies" generally  against actual or threatened e x te rn a l aggression and
in te rn a l disturbance. Indeed, In d ia  and Pakistan were twice involved in
h o s t i l  i t i e s  but even in  S ri Lanka and M alaysia there have been long
periods of un in terrupted  "emergencies" during which s trin g en t measures
c u r ta ilin g  personal l ib e r ty  fo r  the purpose o f " in te rn a l s ecu rity"  have 
25been in  fo rc e . Such measures are req u ired , i t  is  claimed, to  ensure
" p o l i t ic a l  s ta b i l i ty "  and economic progress, which are considered necessary
26fo r  achieving the declared goals. In  A fr ic a , on the other hand, the 
problems of " in te rn a l secu rity" assumed such acute forms and proportions  
th a t democratic regimes in  Ghana, N ig e ria  and Uganda s t i l l  remain 
"suspended". There can be no doubt th a t the "value-process" did not 
operate s a t is fa c to r i ly  in  these s ta te s : the leaders abandoned the
27democratic values, and in s t itu t io n s  without values could hardly surv ive .
(3 ) The ro le  of the "value-process" in  s tan d ard -se ttin g  in  the f i e ld  of 
Human Rights
9.15 I t  is  thus apparent th a t the "value-process" has an im portant
ro le  to play in  the f ie ld  of s tan d ard -se ttin g  in  the f ie ld  of human r ig h ts .
The "value-process" has a dual purpose: i t  can act as both a cause and 
an e f fe c t .  An e x is tin g  p o l i t ic a l  o rder, m an ifes tly  democratic in  form, is  
overthrown when the c it iz e n s  are denied the e s s e n tia l c iv i l  and p o l i t ic a l  
r ig h ts  and democratic in s t itu t io n s  are perverted . I t s  successor, the new 
p o l i t ic a l  o rder, is  in v a r ia b ly  undemocratic in  nature and i t  denies these 
r ig h ts  in  a more unabashed manner as the "value-concepts" change. Indeed, 
the importance of the "value-process" has been recognised under the  
in te rn a t io n a l le g a l system and standards have been provided in  a seminal 
form in  the United Nations Charter but more comprehensively in  the U n iversa l 
D eclaration  and in  the In te rn a t io n a l Covenant on C iv i l  and P o l i t ic a l  R ights. 
We have seen th a t ,  in  s tr ik in g  a balance between "s ta te  sec u rity "  and human 
r ig h ts , the in te rn a tio n a l system takes in to  account the in e v i t a b i l i t y  of 
d iv e rs ity  in  the p o l i t ic a l  orders of the world, and more p a r t ic u la r ly  of the  
f r a g i l i t y  of the p o l i t ic a l  systems of the "Third World", by a llow ing  
derogations even from the r ig h t  to personal l ib e r ty  during "emergency".
9.16 However, the common minimum standard contemplated under the
in te rn a t io n a l system as w e ll as under the European Convention envisages 
at le a s t two p o s itiv e ly -s ta te d  in v io la b le  safeguards, namely, there  s h a ll 
be in  a l l  cases provision fo r  e ffe c t iv e  remedy and th a t under no 
circumstances s h a ll any person be subjected to to rtu re  and s im ila r  
trea tm ent, s ig n ify in g  the inherent worth of the "[human] person".
There are good grounds to canvass a s im ila r  i f  not the same status  fo r  
the n e g a tiv e ly -s ta te d  r ig h t of personal l ib e r ty ;  indeed, the same 
phraseology is  used in  the B i l ls  of Rights of the New Commonwealth. The 
only apparent h ia tus  under the in te rn a t io n a l system th a t has been l e f t  
unbridged is  the law re la t in g  to "domestic" te rro rism  although the  
growing th re a t to "sta te  sec u rity "  from " te r r o r is ts " ,  not only in  Northern 
Ire la n d  but elsewhere in Europe (as in  I t a ly  and West Germany), has 
encouraged the evolution of a reg io n al standard on "te rro rism ".
9.17 There is  thus ample evidence of the fa c t  th a t s tan d ard -se ttin g
in  the f ie ld  o f human r ig h ts  under the in te rn a t io n a l le g a l system has 
contributed a great deal to  the increasing recognition  of the r ig h t of 
personal l ib e r ty  (among other human r ig h ts ) as a " le g a l"  concept under 
n a tio n a l le g a l systems. I t  may be added th a t more intense in te rn a t io n a l  
and, p a r t ic u la r ly ,  reg io nal a c t iv ity  in  the f ie ld  of human r ig h ts  is  
necessary so as to  enrich the content of the le g a l concept of these 
r ig h ts  under the n a tio n a l le g a l system, but such a c t iv i t ie s  are also 
d esirab le  fo r  the s a tis fa c to ry  operation of the "value-process" through a 
strong "public  op in ion". As the "value-process", a p r io r i , informs the 
le g a l systems at a l l  le v e ls , i t  is  necessary th a t those who operate the 
"value-process" -  the executive, the le g is la tu re  and the ju d ic ia ry  -  
accept the in te rn a t io n a lly  prescribed standards as respects the worth 
of the "[human] person" as immutable and also the u n iversa l ap p lica tio n  
of those standards.
I I . Personal l ib e r ty  as a " le g a l"  concept 
(1 ) Norms of "pro tection"
(A) Common Law
( a) jft ^genejcaJ. view
9.18  In the unw ritten B r it is h  C onstitu tion  the Common Law s t i l l  provides
the basic framework fo r  the l ib e r t ie s  of the su b ject, in  the form of 
le g a l maxims and decisions of courts . L ib erty  of the person at common law 
is  possibly best protected by the w e ll-es tab lish ed  maxim which postu lates  
th a t every re s tra in t  on the l ib e r ty  of the person is  prima fa c ie  
i l l e g a l .  Indeed, in  th is  study we have contended th a t th is  p r in c ip le  
follow ed from habeas corpus and th a t the great w rit i t s e l f  was of hoary
29a n tiq u ity , preceding (a lb e i t  in  a seminal form) even the Great C h arter.
To contend therefore  th a t personal l ib e r t y ,  under English law, is  
considered as "a g i f t  of the law" is  tantamount to denying w ithout 
a u th o rity  the v a l id ity  of one of the basic postu lates of common law .
Indeed, personal l ib e r ty  may be considered as a "regulated freedom" but i t
cannot be considered as "a g i f t  of the law"; i t  is  not the " g i f t "  
of e ith e r  the Great Charter or o f any o f the la te r  c o n s titu tio n a l 
documents. Indeed, the Great Charter was i t s e l f  founded upon the primacy 
of the "common customs of the realm "; i t  was not a "revo lu tio n ary  document".
9.19 Ue have seen th a t the various norms of p ro tection  of personal
l ib e r ty  l is te d  in  express terms in  the U n iversa l D eclaration  and the
In te rn a tio n a l Covenant of 1966, as w e ll as in  the European Convention,
31are a l l  borrowed from the English common law . These norms also appear
not only as leg a l r ig h ts  ( in  the C rim inal Codes) but many of them also
appear as " c o n s t itu t io n a l r ig h ts "  in  thB n a t io n a l le g a l systems as parts
Gf the several " B il ls  of Rights" o f  the Asian and A frican s ta te s  of the
New Commonwealth. There the common law is  also generally  the  "basic" or
"residuary" law (S r i Lanka excepted), although i t  has a m inimal ro le  now
in  these s ta te s . T h is , notw ithstanding the supremacy o f C o n stitu tio n s ,
has apparently ensured a b e tte r  " le g a l"  pro tection  of personal l ib e r ty  in
these s ta te s . In  England the concept of the supremacy o f Parliam ent
has increasing ly  encroached upon the dominant ro le  of common law and has
possibly come very near to l im it in g  the primacy of common law to  the
operation of the "value-process", operating through norms of in te rp re ta t io n
adopted by the courts -  the ro le  which common law re ta in s  in  the Asian and
African s ta tes  as w e ll.  The English position  is  m anifested by the laws
32enacted to  deal with the Northern Ire la n d  problem and also by the demand 
fo r  a B i l l  of Rights fo r  the United Kingdom notw ithstanding the fa c t  th a t  
the comman-law le g a l p ro tections  appear (under new la b e ls ) in  the
33in te rn a t io n a l and also reg io n a l laws app licab le  to the United Kingdom.
9 .20  I t  is  s t i l l  not possible to say th a t the recent trend in
in te rn a t io n a lis in g  the human r ig h ts  aspect o f the n a tio n a l le g a l  
tra d it io n s  w i l l  gain momentum and w i l l ,  in  the near fu tu re , convert 
i t s e l f  in to  a more p o s itive  process of the u n ific a t io n  of laws a ffe c tin g  
personal l ib e r ty  genera lly ; th is  may w e ll not occur. Therefore the
judges may s t i l l  f in d  scope, not only to enrich the content o f such le g a l 
norms as the ’’Rule of Law” and ’’u l t r a  v ire s ” , b u t, in  a s im ila r  way, 
they may also evolve newer concepts under the pervasive um brella of the 
common law. In the United Kingdom, the problem of Northern Ire la n d ,  
whether or not i t  ends in  a p o l i t ic a l  solu tion  in  the near fu tu re , is  no 
longer the sole problem presenting acute controversy in  so fa r  as 
personal l ib e r ty  is  concerned. In  a wider context, problems of race 
re la t io n s , immigration and also the environment (the  last-m entioned  
p o te n tia lly  more im portant in  view of B r it is h  involvement in  nuclear 
technology and also of the s c ie n t i f ic  advancement o f B r ita in  in  other 
f ie ld s )  are also in creas in g ly  a ttra c t in g  n o tic e . The new d irec tio n s  
predicate a concentration of greater powers in  both executive aid  
le g is la tu re , with the re s u lt th a t there is  a lik e lih o o d  of •  wider 
impingement on the r ig h t of personal l ib e r ty ,  c a llin g  fo r  a more 
im aginative approach by the ju d ic ia ry  to the new problems: re so rt by i t  
to  the common law fo r  the so lution  of these problems is  thus in e v ita b le .
(b ) jiajLl_a£d_Hjabeaj3 Corpus
9.21 Among the various modes of p rotection  evolved in  common law the
r ig h t to b a i l  and habeas corpus are undoubtedly the most im portant ones.
However, as we have seen, there has been a great deal of le g is la t iv e
a c t iv ity  in  England in  re la tio n  to the rights, not only in  the recent past;
34the process s ta rted  in  the remote past. In the Asian and African s ta tes
of the Commonwealth the le g is la t iv e  process can be traced back to the
Indian Crim inal Codes, f i r s t  d ra fted  in  p art in  1837 (Penal Code) but la te r
35m odified and supplemented in  1860 (C rim in a l Procedure Code). Both
these r ig h ts  are also recognised and adopted in  the in te rn a t io n a l and in
36the European reg io n al laws re la t in g  to human r ig h ts .
9 .22  I t  is  in te re s tin g  to note th a t while the recent le g is la t io n  in
England has re s tr ic te d  the scope of the common law r ig h t to the w r it  of 
37habeas corpus, i t s  scope has been expanded in  the successive C onstitu tions
i'
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38of P akistan  (o f  1962, 1972 and 1973) and in  th a t  o f  Bangladesh a ls o .
Even the provision of the Indian Code, embodying what we have ca lle d  the
’’s ta tu to ry  r ig h t” has expanded to some extent the scope o f the w r it  in  the
Asian and African s ta tes  by in troducing the a d d itio n a l concept of
"im propriety” in  th a t the t r a d it io n a l  concept o f the r ig h t was confined
39to te s tin g  merely the " i l l e g a l i t y ” o f the de ten tio n . However, the
"c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t" , a v a ila b le  in  other Asian and African s ta tes  a lso ,
has not received a s im ila r  boost as in  Pakistan . Indeed, the A frican
"c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t" , which was modelled on the European Convention, has
found a r e la t iv e ly  lukewarm response from the l i t ig a n ts  end judges a lik e :
preference has been shown fo r  the concurrent r ig h t a v a ila b le  e ith e r  at
40common law or under the respective  s ta tu te  in  each s ta te .
9 .23  However, the pos ition  in  a l l  s ta tes  is  not the same. In many
s ta te s , the common law r ig h t has been abrogated, expressly or by
im p lic a tio n . In In d ia , ra th e r s u rp ris in g ly , the ju d ic ia ry  has robbed the
41c it iz e n  o f the concurrent common law r ig h t ,  In th is  study we have made
a strong p lea fo r  reconsideration  of the position  by the Indian Supreme
42Court on s u b stan tia l grounds which we have in d ica ted  in  d e ta i l .  We
have also pleaded in  th is  study fo r  more im aginative use of the common law
r ig h t wherever a v a ila b le , in  th a t s u ff ic ie n t  notice has not been taken
43of what we have ca lled  the " a n c illa ry  r ig h ts ” . In  England the p r in c ip a l,
as w e ll as the a n c illa ry  r ig h t  to  the w r it  has been tampered with by
le g is la t io n  but in  the Asian and African s ta tes  generally  there has not
been a s im ila r  le g is la t iv e  e n te rp ris e  and there fo re  there is  no reason
44why these r ig h ts  should not be exercised to th e ir  fu l le s t  e x te n t. I t  is  
tru e  th a t one of the im portant in c id en ts  of the common law w r it  is  i t s  
character o f the command of the sovereign but i t  is  e s s e n tia lly  a 
procedural r ig h t which ought to continue th e re fo re , untrimmed, in  the  
new states  despite the loss of sovereignty over them o f the B r it is h  Crown, 
unless of course the powers and ju r is d ic t io n  of the courts are 
s u b s ta n tia lly  a lte re d  under the new le g a l framework.
9 .24  Indeed, the perverse decision in  the DARNEL case provoked the
B r it is h  Parliam ent to enact le g is la t io n  to f o r t i f y  the r ig h t but in times
45of war the r ig h t was also "suspended” in  England. In  In d ia  the co lo n ia l
p o licy  d ic ta ted  a d if fe re n t  course: the ju r is d ic t io n  of courts to issue
the w rit in  respect of "natives" only was excluded, f i r s t  by
Parliam entary enactments of 1781 and 1784 and la te r  in  1818 by a
"Regulation" made by the Governor General, fo r  "reasons of s ta te "
("s e c u rity  of B r it is h  d o m in io n s").^  S t i l l  la t e r ,  in  England, during the
la s t two world wars, although the r ig h t was not suspended, the measures
enacted adopted a more sophisticated  technique of exclusion of ju r is d ic t io n .
The courts in te rp re te d  re levan t le g is la t io n  by evolving ad hoc norms
48through the "value-process" and re s tr ic te d  the scope of the w r it .
U nfortunate ly  the courts in  the new states  came to hold divergent views in
respect of those decisions as the "value-process" did not operate in  a
s im ila r  way in  a l l  cases on account o f lo c a l cond itions. In the re s u lt
they applied in a p p ro p ria te ly  the sane ad hoc norms of in te rp re ta t io n  to 
49"peacetime laws".
(c ) j^erne_dy_in JTqrt
9 .25  At common law an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment is  considered as
an in c id e n ta l, and not a p r in c ip a l, remedy against i l l e g a l  d e ten tio n . An
action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment does not preclude ap p lica tions  fo r  b a i l  or
habeas corpus by the p l a in t i f f .  Indeed, i t  is  a r ig h t o f a d if fe re n t  type
which was d ire c t ly  re la te d  to the question of reasonable and probable cause
fo r  suspicion fo r  the a rre s t. The question was fo r  the decision of the
50ju ry  under the old law . At common law a person who acts honestly and
51reasonably commits no actionable  wrong. Although the remedy has also 
been adopted in  the In te rn a t io n a l and Regional Human Rights Documents 
by contemplating "enforceable r ig h t to  compensation" fo r  "unlawful a rres t 
or deten tio n ", i t  is  in  addition  to the p r in c ip a l remedy of ju d ic ia l  
scrutiny  of the "lawfulness of detention" and "order of re le a s e " . In 
African and Asian s ta tes  of the Commonwealth, the remedy in  to r t  found
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no appea l in  s p i t s  o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  in  a l l  s ta te s  (e x c e p t S r i  Lanka) 
common law  was in tro d u c e d  a lo n g  tim B  ago.
(B) B i l ls  of Riohts and personal l ib e r ty
( a) £ r^vis^ons_°f, _Afjci_can_ _and _Asi_ajn _Coinst_i_tu_ti_on_s
( i )  Thja Background
9.26 The Asian C onstitu tions (except S ri Lanka’ s Independence 
C o n stitu tio n ) are autochthonous in  the sense of being "home-grown" (not 
necessarily  in  the sense of le g a l autochthony) and among them In d ia ’s is  
the e a r l ie s t  one, enacted in  1949. Long, before independence the Indian  
p o l i t ic a l  leaders had p o s itive  views about a B i l l  of R ights . They had 
suffered  long periods of in carcera tio n  during the s trugg le  fo r  freedom and 
were convinced th a t c iv i l  and p o l i t ic a l  r ig h ts  could best be protected by
a B i l l  of Rights; accordingly they also made a strong p lea fo r  such provisions  
to be included in  any c o n s titu tio n a l settlem ent th a t the B r it is h  might
52
propose. I t  is  true th a t the leaders represented the e l i t e  group and had
absorbed w este rn  p o l i t i c a l  v a lu e s  in  la rg e  m easure, b u t th e  demand f o r  a
B i l l  of Rights did not m il ita te  against t r a d it io n a l values e ith e r .  In d ia
was also a member o f the League of Nations and la te r  one of the o r ig in a l
members of the United N ations. The t o t a l i t y  of circumstances infused
n a tio n a l asp ira tio n  in to  the concept of a B i l l  of Rights cherished by the
Indian leaders . When the process of constitution-m aking s ta rte d  the
provisions of the United Nations* Charter and of the U n iversa l D eclaration
were before them. Notice was also taken of the re levan t provisions of
53the Japanese C onstitu tion  enacted in  1945. There was also the e x is tin g
c o n s titu tio n a l framework of the Government o f In d ia  Act 1935. But above
54a l l  loomed large the r e a l i t ie s  of the p a r t it io n  and i t s  afterm ath .
Thus the B i l l  of Rights th a t f in a l ly  emerged represented, on the one hand, 
the fu lf i lm e n t of a n a tio n a l asp ira tio n  and, on the other hand, a 
d i f f i c u l t  compromise of a pragmatic and id e a l is t ic  approach.
9.27 In Pakistan, the f i r s t  C onstitu tion  fo llow ed In d ia 's  model,
a lb e it  with an Is lam ic  b ias expressed in  the preamble in  a pronounced 
form. The provisions of the C onstitu tions of 1962, 1972 ( in te r im ) and 1973 
were indeed influenced by the in terven in g  M a r t ia l Law regimes. The 
Malaysian C onstitu tion  (1957) also follow ed the Indian model, a lb e it  with 
an Is lam ic  bias which was expressed in  less pronounced form in  th a t i t  did  
not, in  a s im ila r  way, expressly invoke Is lam ic  philosophy. In In d ia  and 
Pakistan (except in  1962) the constitution-m aking process was ca rrie d  out 
by the C onstituent Assembly in  each case but the C onstitu tion  of Malaysia  
was d ra fted  by a Commission consisting of a B r it is h  Chairman and members 
among o thers, from the Indian and Pakistan ju d ic ia ry . In  M alaysia there  
also existed  the t r a d it io n a l p o l i t ic a l  framework which was continued in  the
new C onstitu tion  in  a m odified form. In M alaysia the B i l l  of Rights was
55in fa c t a response to the problem of i t s  e thn ic  m in o r itie s .
9 .28 In  A fric a  B r it is h  decolonisation s ta rted  in  1957 and in  a l l
cases the Independence C onstitu tio ns  were e s s e n tia lly  of ’’Westminster-
make". In the case of Ghana (1957) and also Tanganyika (1 9 61 ), the
C onstitu tions did not contain any B i l l  of Rights but in  N ig e r ia , even
before independence, a comprehensive B i l l  of Rights modelled on the
European Convention was provided in  1959. Thus in  A fric a  there was no
reason fo r  the p o l i t ic a l  leaders to consider the B i l ls  of Rights as the
fu lf i lm e n t of n a tio n a l a s p ira tio n . Indeed the provisions were more
im portant from the standpoint of the co lo n ia l ru le rs , in  th a t they
discharged th e ir  in te rn a t io n a l o b lig a tio n  under A rt. 1 of the European 
57Convention. N evertheless, the provisions generally  survived the 
ra d ic a l change in  the p o l i t ic a l  order th a t took place in  A fric a ; only 
Malawi discarded i t . ^  Although Kenya and Uganda became de fac to  
One-party States and Zambia, de .jure ( la t e r  Uganda a ls o ), the C onstitu tions  
re ta ined  the B i l ls  of R ights. Two other de ju re  One-party s ta te s ,
Tanzania and Malawi, however, adopted a d if fe re n t  approach indeed to
d isplay th e ir  s o lid a r ity  with in te rn a t io n a l concern and respect fo r  human
59r ig h ts . In A fr ic a , th e re fo re , i t  is  the appeal of the in te rn a t io n a l
q o  ^
W fk i I
system and the fe a r  of is o la tio n  th a t generally  provide the  
philosop h ica l base fo r  the in s t i tu t io n a l  and also the u n in s titu tio n a lis e d  
B i l l  of R ights . 6 0
( i i )  Th£ jto^p^er^soria l^ JJLbert^
9.29 Only in  the U n iversa l D eclaration  is  the re levan t provision
p o s it iv e ly  s ta ted : ’’Everyone has the r ig h t to  l i f e ,  l ib e r ty  and security
of person.” In a l l  other human r ig h ts  and c o n s titu tio n a l documents
considered in  th is  study, in te rn a t io n a l, reg io n al and n a tio n a l, the
form ula is  stated  in  negative terms: "No one [person] s h a ll be deprived
of h is  [personal] l ib e r t y ,  except according to [procedure] prescribed
[e s ta b lis h e d ] by la w ,” The only deviation  from th is  general form ula is  to
be noticed in  the emphasis in  some cases on "procedure” and in  other cases
61in  the absence o f such an emphasis. The natu re , scope, o rig in  and 
content o f the r ig h t  have, however, been considered in  d e ta il  by the 
Indian Supreme Court on ly , in  two im portant decisions, in  1950 and 1976 
resp ective ly  in  the GQPALAN and HABEAS CORPUS cases re s p e c tiv e ly . The 
most in te re s tin g  aspect o f the m atte r, however, is  th a t during the course 
of the la s t 26 years the Indian ju d ic ia ry  has not developed a "consensus" 
on m atters re la t in g  to personal l ib e r ty  and the dominant view (a lb e i t  
vario u s ly  s ta ted) s t i l l  considers personal l ib e r ty  as the " g i f t  of the 
law ". Thus the Indian court ignored the fa c t th a t under the in te rn a t io n a l  
system human r ig h ts  jurisprudence has invested the r ig h t  with a spec ia l 
s ta tu s ,6^
9#30 C learly  such a view , and i t s  remarkable consistency and
i n f l e x i b i l i t y ,  ra ises  grave doubts about in s t itu t io n a lis e d  B i l ls  of Rights 
acting as p o s itive  norms of " le g a l"  pro tection  of personal l ib e r t y .  Indeed 
the Indian court did not at a l l  consider the fa c t th a t the B i l l  o f Right 
had a p o s itive  purpose, namely to provide, among other th ings , "b e tte r"  
pro tection  of the e x is tin g  r ig h ts . In  both decisions the "value-process"  
operated in  a b iza rre  fash ion: only one judge (F a z l A l i ,  3 .)  in  1950 
re fe rre d  to the t r a d it io n a l in s t i tu t io n  of panchayat and in  1976
also a s ingle judge (Khanna, 3 .)  re fe rre d  to the U n iversa l D ec lara tion ,
fo r  proper evaluation of the worth o f the "[human] person"; the m ajo rity
64even lacked unanimity of approach in  both decisions. The Indian
Supreme Court is  of the view th a t the C onstitu tion  has "conferred" the r ig h t
of personal l ib e r ty ;  th a t the p re -e x is tin g  r ig h ts  cease to  e x is t when a
B i l l  of Right is  enacted and th a t the scope, nature and extent o f
"pro tections" of p re -e x is tin g  r ig h ts  could th ere fo re  be a lte re d  and also
65scaled down under a B i l l  of R ights. I t  is  submitted th a t the use of 
negative language in  connection with pro tection  of the r ig h t  of personal 
l ib e r ty  in  a l l  human r ig h ts  and c o n s titu tio n a l documents is  in d ic a tiv e
of a p o s itive  in ju n ctio n  against prescrib ing  norms to perm it scaling down
66of e x is tin g  p ro tec tio n s .
9.31 I t  is  true th a t in  the ju d ic ia l  context norms o f in te rp re ta t io n
form the core o f the "value-process" aid the Indian court has, in  many 
decisions (in c lu d in g  GQPALAN and the HABEAS CORPUS case), made an attempt 
to estab lish  the p o s itio n , most ap p ro p ria te ly , th a t in  the in te rp re ta t io n  of 
the c o n s titu tio n a l provisions the American norms are to  be p referred  to  the 
English . But the court has not gone fa r  enough. In  the f i r s t  place even 
on th is  point a consensus is  lacking and secondly the Court has fa i le d  to  
take notice o f the fa c t th a t the American C onstitu tion  does not belong to  
the new world order and there fo re  the American norms have not yet taken 
account o f the in te rn a t io n a l human r ig h ts  jurisprudence. In the 
in te rn a t io n a l and reg io nal human r ig h ts  documents as w e ll as in  African  
B i l ls  of Rights the r ig h t to personal l ib e r ty  is  embellished by the express 
p ro h ib itio n  o f to rtu re  and s im ila r  treatm ent. On the other hand, 
although in  the Indian model there is  no such pro v is io n , the Indian  
B i l l  of Rights conforms to the in te rn a tio n a l and the reg io n al model in  
i t s  emphasis on "procedure". I t  was to avoid the dilemma th a t the American 
judges faced in  dealing with the "due process clause" of the American 
C onstitu tion  th a t the Indian court professedly scaled down the value of the
"[human] parson"; i t  fa i le d  to construe the expression "procedure" in  the  
l ig h t  o f the in te rn a tio n a l human r ig h ts  documents, containing the same 
expression. In fa c t ,  in  GQPALAN, the judges did not consider any of these 
documents at a l l .
9 .32  In  the neo-Indian Model ( in  the Bangladesh and la te r  Pakistan  
C o n s titu tio n s ), on the other hand, there is  an express provision as respects  
the p ro h ib itio n  of to rtu re  and s im ila r  treatm ents, in  addition  to a "due 
process clause". No doubt, these provisions appear there fo llo w in g  
reap p ra isa l of the c o n s titu tio n a l position  on the term ination  of the 
M a rtia l Law regimes. In  Ghana, which did not have a B i l l  o f R ights, the new 
C onstitu tion  enacted a fte r  the f i r s t  M il i ta r y  Rule had ended, also contained  
such a provision in  i t s  B i l l  of R ights. In th is  case also i t  was not a
mere form al incorporation  of the "neo-N igerian" B i l l  of R ights. In  Ghana the
new C onstitu tion  was s h o rt-liv e d  but i t  was possibly the lin g erin g  e ffe c t of
the African brand of "c o lo n ia l-c o n s titu tio n a lis m " which was manifested in
the absence of ju d ic ia l  response th e re . In Pakistan there was a p o s itive
67ju d ic ia l  response in  BEGUM 5HAMIM AFRIDI. Undoubtedly the n a tio n a l
experience was re fle c te d  in  Pakistan in  the operation of the "value-process"
in the "constituent le g is la tu re "  and ju d ic ia ry  a l ik e . 6 6
( i i i )  T_he j?n_f orcemmjb jaf_t]ie_rig[htJL th_e c o n s titu tio n a l remedy
9.33 Lie have already d e a lt with two out of three minimum protections
envisaged under in te rn a tio n a l and reg io n al human r ig h ts  documents. The
th ir d ,  the requirement th a t there must e x is t in  domestic law adequate
provision fo r  the enforcement o f the r ig h t ,  is  indeed the most im portant
protection  in  so fa r  as African and Asian sta tes  are concerned, in  th a t there
is  no scope in  these s ta tes  fo r  a va ilin g  a remedy at any other forum. There
is  no reg io nal forum of any type in  Asia w hile in  A fric a  the OAU possesses
69lim ite d  ju r is d ic t io n . Moreover, there is  no lik e lih o o d  of any A frican
and Asian s ta tes  acceding to the Optional Protocol of the 1966 In te rn a tio n a l
70Covenant; very few have cared even to r a t i f y  the Convenaat.
9 .34  In  th is  m atter, as we have seen, the pattern  o f the r ig h t  
d if fe r s .  Even in  the Indian model, In d ia  stands alone by naming expressly  
the w r it  o f habeas corpus; in M alaysia the w rit is  not named. But in  the 
neo-Indian model, although the w r it  is  not named, the phraseology is  
d if fe r e n t ,  not M alaysian. The N igerian  and neo-Nigerian models also do 
not name the w r it  but fo llo w  generally  the phraseology o f the Indian model; 
Ghana (1969) also named the w r it  b u t, u n like  In d ia , did not provide fo r  
the contingency of "suspension". However, as we have seen, in  a l l  
Commonwealth A frican s ta tes  the r ig h t  to habeas corpus was a v a ila b le  
under the e x is tin g  law which was not superseded by the B i l ls  of R ights.
In some cases i t  appeared in  the form o f thB common law r ig h t ,  in  o th e r
71cases as a s ta tu to ry  r ig h t and also as concurrent r ig h ts  in  many cases.
No doubt such r ig h ts  could be abrogated at any time by ordinary le g is la t io n  
but the C o n s titu to rs  in  A fr ic a  did not expressly provide fo r  "suspension" 
of the r ig h t .  In  th is  respect a l l  Asian s ta tes  were also more or less in  
a s im ila r  po s itio n ; the p e cu lia r fea tu re  of the Indian p o s itio n , however, 
deserves specia l n o tic e .
9 .35  In  In d ia  the Supreme Court has held th a t common law r ig h t to  the
72w rit  has ceased to e x is t long before independence. The s ta tu to ry  r ig h t ,  
which was provided in  the C rim inal Procedure Code, also lapsed when a new 
Code was passed in  1973. Although the c o n s titu tio n a l r ig h t can be 
exercised in  the Supreme Court and also in  the High Courts in  the several 
S tates, the executive (P res id en t) can in d ire c t ly  suspend the r ig h t  even 
without invoking the express provision of A rt. 32(4) which perm itted the  
r ig h t to be suspended in  so fa r  as the Supreme Court is  concerned. The 
C onstitu tion  expressly provides (v id e  A r t .359 (1 )) th a t "the r ig h t to  
move any court" fo r  the enforcement o f any p art of the B i l l  of Rights may 
be "suspended" by a P re s id e n tia l Order during "emergency". The Supreme 
Court has held th a t such an Order contemplates a b lanket ban and habeas 
corpus cannot be issued although an action fo r  fa ls e  imprisonment is  not
f j O  I
73b a rre d . The court d id  not a ttach  any im portance to  A r t . 3 2 (4 ) .  In  our
view habeas corpus in  In d ia  can be suspended e ith e r  by express le g is la t io n
under A r t .32(4) or by specify ing  A r t .32 i t s e l f  in  the Order passed under 
74A r t .3 5 9 (1 ). However, i t  is  doubtfu l i f  the remedy of fa ls e  imprisonment 
can be considered adequate and " e ffe c tiv e "  according to in te rn a t io n a l norms 
of pro tection  of the r ig h t to personal l ib e r t y .  I t  is  patent th a t the 
provision fo r  an "enforceable r ig h t to compensation" fo r  "unlaw ful a rres t 
or detention" has been envisaged as an in c id e n ta l remedy; the provision  
contemplating a ju d ic ia l  scru tiny  of "lawfulness of detention" is
75apparently the p r in c ip a l remedy, according to in te rn a t io n a l norms. The 
Ind ian  court might have come to a d if fe re n t  conclusion i f  i t  had taken in to  
consideration th is  p o s itio n .
( iv )  Th_e ^ni_t£d_Kin^dOTi__Bi_ll o fR jlg h ts  Debate
9.36 I t  cannot be gainsaid th a t the power of ju d ic ia l  review , not only
of executive acts but also of Parliam entary enactments, l ie s  at the heart of 
the provision of B i l ls  of Rights i f  they are to be considered as e ffe c tiv e  
norms of p ro te c tio n . Thus, in  the United Kingdom the deeply entrenched
and pervasive concept of the supremacy o f Parliam ent has stood as a
stumbling block to arguments advanced in  favour of a B i l l  of R ights.
In 1974 Lord Bustice Scarman ( in  the Hamlyn Lectures) le n t h is  support to
the view expressed in  some in f lu e n t ia l  quarters th a t the ancient concept
7 6was open to  challenge. In  opening the debate, he appears to  have
expressed the view th at the common law has o u tliv ed  i t s  u t i l i t y  as an
appropriate norm of pro tection  and there fo re  posed the question -  bJhy
should a curb not be placed on Parliam ent h e rs e lf when the issue was one of 
77human r ig h ts  ?
9.37 In 1975 i t  was acknowledged th a t there was a s h i f t  in  pub lic
opinion in  favour o f a B i l l  of Rights and th a t i t  was founded in  the b e lie f  
th a t ,  although the e x is tin g  system was not u n s a tis fa c to ry , there was room 
fo r  improvement and th a t a B i l l  of Rights provided a "b e tte r p ro tec tio n "
7 8of human r ig h ts . In 1976 th is  view was contested by Lord Lloyd of 
79Hampstead. According to him, under a B i l l  of Rights the judges 
become responsible fo r  ’’determining and d e lim itin g  the operative values  
in  so c ie ty” although they are not equipped fo r  such a task by th e ir
80tra in in g  and background; they lack a su itab ly  im aginative approach.
Indeed the approach of the Indian judges was, as we have seen, in f le x ib le  
and there fo re  Lord L loyd's contention th a t a B i l l  of Rights might prove 
to  be ’’in f le x ib le ” is  to be given due weight. According to  him, the re a l 
question is  whether the e x is tin g  process of " le g is la t iv e  policy-m aking" 
should be abandoned in favour of ju d ic ia l  policy-m aking. B ut, is  i t  
re a lly  tru e , as he appears to suggest, th a t only the le g is la to rs  (and not 
the judges) are responsive to the "value-procBss” in  th a t only le g is la to rs  
are exposed to public  debate on any issue ? For, such debate is ,  in  
s u b s tan tia l p a rt, carried  on through tha "media" and the judges are not 
in su la ted  against the "media” .
9 .38 However, p a r tic ip a tin g  in  the debate, Lord Hailsham, in  the
th ird  Richard O 'S o llivan  Lecture de livered  in  1977, r ig h t ly  pointed
out th a t one should not ignore the fa c t th a t "Parliam ent i t s e l f  can be made
81an instrum ent of tyranny". I t  is  tru e , as Lord Hailsham suggests, th a t
"m a jo ritie s  p a r t ic u la r ly  when influenced by popu list leaders and
demagogues of the l e f t  or r ig h t  can rid s  roughshod" over the r ig h ts  of
82the m in o ritie s  and the in d iv id u a l. Lord Hailsham 's remarks would
obviously be even more appropriate in  the context of the emergent s tates
83of A fric a  and Asia. The debate is  inconclusive and views are s t i l l  
to  c r y s ta l l iz e ,  but one th ing  is  d e f in ite ly  estab lish ed : a basic question 
is  s t i l l  to  be answered -  is  not Parliam ent and also the ju d ic ia ry  
expected to d is tingu ish  between the e s s e n tia l fundamental character and 
re la t iv e  value of the several r ig h ts  recognised as fundamental r ig h ts  
and the in e v ita b ly  f le x ib le  nature  of the norms of p ro tec tion  ? I t  is  
submitted th a t i f  th is  d is tin c t io n  is  recognised by both organs, the
o f>*>
k) tl
"value-process" can operate s a t is fa c to r i ly  and n e ith e r are the judges 
l ik e ly  to adopt an in f le x ib le  a tt itu d e  nor is  a B i l l  of Rights l ik e ly  to  
become in f le x ib le .
( b) Th_e £n£-£a_rty_ jstate a lte rn a tiv e s
9.39 Only Zambia, among the one-party s ta tes  of Commonwealth A fr ic a ,
has an enforceable B i l l  of R ights. But i t  also provides, in  ad d itio n , fo r
an Ombudsman, as in  Tanzania. In  both s ta te s , the preambles of the two
C onstitu tions grant recognition  to the r ig h t of personal l ib e r t y .  In  Malawi,
although the C onstitu tion  contains no preamble at a l l ,  there  is  a
substantive provision which is  capable of being in te rp re te d  as incorporating
r e fe re n t ia l ly  an enforceable B i l l  of Rights as i t  purports to adopt the
84U niversa l D eclaration as a part of the C o n s titu tio n .
9.40 However, in  A fric a  the Ombudsman is  a s ig n if ic a n t novelty  in  so
fa r  as the in s t itu t io n a lis e d  norms of p ro tection  of human r ig h ts  are
concerned. In both s ta tes  the Ombudsman has a wide ju r is d ic t io n  to
in q u ire  in to  complaints of abuse of au th o rity  by the bureaucracy but he
has no power to grant r e l i e f .  Indeed, the new norm is  a p o s itive
m anifestation  of the philosophy of the new p o l i t ic a l  order under which
there is  a continuous search fo r  a new balance to be struck between the
in te re s ts  of the sta te  and the in d iv id u a l as the s tate  is  seen as the
85extension of the A frican tra d it io n  of the extended fam ily  system.
(2 ) Norms of " re s tra in ts "  and "safeguards"
(A) The oeneral ju r is p ru d e n tia l base
9.41 The value-concepts of "s ta te -s e c u rity "  and " s o c ia l-s e c u r ity " 
a p r io r i  postulate the im position and enforcement o f sanctions against 
in d iv id u a ls . The idea is  not fo re ign  to t r a d it io n a l A frican  and Asian 
s o c ie tie s  and p o l i t ie s .  I t  is  also in te re s tin g  to note, as we have seen,
th a t the Anglo-Saxon c la s s if ic a tio n  of sanctions in to  two broad categories,
86preventive and p u n itiv e , was also not unknown to them. The main 
d iffe ren ces  l i e  in  the types and forms as w e ll as in  the m otivations; 
and also in  in s t itu t io n s  of "law" and le g a l system through which the
sanctions were contemplated, administered and enforced. However, the
t r a d it io n a l  ideas and in s t itu t io n s  have lim ite d  relevance now (confined
possibly to p o l i t ic a l  expediency only) although the B r it is h  adapted the
tr a d it io n a l  sanction of banishment in  A fric a  in  a ra th e r strange fash ion,
under the c o lo n ia l la b e l of ”deporta tion” and applied the sanction fo r  
87’’s ta te  s e c u rity ” . And strangely  in  some sta tes  the c o lo n ia l t ra d it io n
88is  m aintained even now. I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to concede th a t e ith e r  the  
c o lo n ia l en terprise  or even i t s  extension are ju s t i f ie d  whether under 
modern penology, or under human r ig h ts  jurisprudence; i t s  operation  
does not conform to the modern concepts of externment and internm ent, 
adopted in  In d ia .^
9 .42  In th is  study we have been p rim arily  concerned with such
re s tra in ts  imposed by the sta te  on personal l ib e r ty  as take the form of
preventive sanctions and we have seen th a t such sanctions have served the
purpose of " s ta te -s e c u r ity ” as w e ll as " s o c ia l-s e c u r ity ” . In  e ith e r
case p u n itive  sanctions are also used in  obvious recognition  of the fa c t
th a t the norms of p ro tections of personal l ib e r ty  have, in e v ita b ly , to be
f le x ib le  in  natu re . In  Northern Ire la n d , p u n itive  sanctions are
increasing ly  used against ’’te rro rism ” fo r  ’’s ta te -s e c u r ity ”; on the other
hand, to f ig h t  recid iv ism  also s im ila r  sanctions are used fo r  ’’s o c ia l-
s e c u rity ” . There is  also a tw il ig h t  zone in  which the d is tin c t io n  is
b lu rred  and both types of sanctions are used, a lb e it  at d if fe re n t  stages,
as in  the case of ’’vagrancy” and ’’drunken d r iv in g ” fo r  ’’s o c ia l-s e c u r ity ” .
Indeed, ju d ic ia l  opinion has taken no tice  of the fa c t  th a t the normative
c la s s if ic a tio n  does not always correspond with the purpose and e ffe c t of
90the sanction and th a t the l in e  between the two is  very th in .
9 .43  However, we submit th a t the th in  l in e  is  not as th in  as i t  is  
supposed to be. The d is tin c tio n  is  m anifested in  the fa c t th a t  
a n tic ip a to ry  sanctions are imposed on "untested suspicion” and not on 
’’p roo f” or "tested suspicion” . The d iffe ren ce  in  the nature of the two
sanctions, however, postu lates the app lica tio n  of d if fe re n t  norms of 
protection  or what are more commonly known as "safeguards". P a r t ic u la r ly  
in  the jurisprudence of "preventive detention" but also generally  in  
re la tio n  to the measures usually  adopted fo r "s ta te -s e c u r ity " , the
question of " leg itim acy" acquires importance in  the context of the norms
of p ro te c tio n . F ra g ile  and inadequate safeguards m anifesting  lack of 
concern fo r  the consensus of the governed exposed the r u le r  to the te s ts  
of " in te rn a tio n a l a cco u n tab ility"  and "domestic leg itim a c y" .
9 .44  At common law the "reasonableness" of suspicion in v a ria b ly
co n stitu tes  the most im portant and indispensable element of the norms
91of pro tection  adopted, against almost a l l  types of re s tra in ts . The
concept, as we have seen, o rig in a ted  in  the norms of p ro tection  evolved
against the power of a rre s t. Indeed, the concept im parts v i t a l i t y  and
e ffic a c y  to  the norm of p ro te c tio n , by eschewing the a rb itra ry  use of
power by means of ju d ic ia l  in te rp o s itio n  fo r  adjudging compliance with the
te s t of "reasonableness". Under certa in  circumstances, the p a r a l le l
concept of "necessity" regu lates  th is  te s t .  The la t t e r  is ,  thus, a
regulatory  measure but i t  is  also s e lf-re g u la to ry  in  the sense th a t
91f l e x i b i l i t y  is  i t s  key-note. The two concepts at common law 
provide the main ju r is p ru d e n tia l base fo r  a l l  norms of " re s tra in ts "  and 
"safeguards".
9.45 Of course the common law has to  concede primacy to le g is la t io n  
even in  the dependencies. The concepts of " le g a lity "  and "legalism " came 
to  p re v a il in  the new m ilie u , to replace the two common law concepts. 
R estrain ts  assumed more s trin g en t forms in  th a t the safeguards lo s t th e ir  
higher value and appeared in  a dimwnitive form. The i l le g it im a te  use
of the power to impose sanctions was sought to be ju s t i f ie d  by the twin 
concepts of " le g a lity "  and " leg a lism ". In the f i r s t  place mere form al 
compliance with the new norms was considered s u ff ic ie n t  to sustain  
" leg itim acy". Secondly, the norms themselves were so erected th a t they
sanctioned the  a r b i t r a r y  use of power. Indeed, the twin concepts are
b a s ic a l ly  "p o w e r-c e n tre d ” . They are p r im a r i ly  concerned w ith  th e  power
to  r u le  r a th e r  than  th e  d u ty  to  p ro v id e  a "good g o ve rn m e n t". These
co n ce p ts  a ls o  fou n d  fa v o u r  w ith  the  new r u le r s  o f th e  em ergent s ta te s .
In  th e  new c o n te x t th e y  se rved  th e  purpose o f  "d o m e s tic  le g i t im a c y "  and
92a ls o  " in t e r n a t io n a l  a c c o u n ta b i l i t y " .
(B ) " S o c ia l - s e c u r i t y "  measures
( a) j^owej: o_f_Arr£s_t
9 .4 6  lie  have seen th a t  th e  common law  power o f  a r r e s t  has been g ra d u a lly
s u p p la n te d  in  England by s ta tu to r y  pow er. Under th e  o ld  law  i t  was 
r e la te d  m a in ly  to  th e  d is t in c t io n  between fe lo n y  and m isdem eanour which
was a b o lis h e d  in  1967. The power has changed com p lex ion  in  i t s  s ta tu to r y
fo rm  in  many ways, o f  which th e  m ost s ig n i f i c a n t  aspec t i s  i t s  d oub le
r o le  o f  p ro v id in g  " s u b s ta n t iv e "  and "p ro c e d u ra l"  norm s. T h is  s ig n i f i e s
i t s  r o le  as an im p o r ta n t in s tru m e n t o f  la w -e n fo rc e m e n t, w hich fo rm s th e
b a s is  o f  " s o c ia l - s e c u r i t y " .  As we have seen, unde r the  "v a g ra n c y "  and
" d ru n k e n -d r iv in g "  la w s , th ro u g h  a wholesome o p e ra t io n  o f  th e  wv a lu e -
p ro c e s s "  a t j u d i c i a l  l e v e l ,  th e  power has been in v e s te d  w ith  a
93" s u b s ta n t iv e "  c o n te n t.  The p e rs o n a l l i b e r t y  o f  an o f fe n d e r  i s  a llo w e d
to  be r e s t r a in e d  to  d is a b le  him from  c o m m itt in g  an a c t o f  " im m in e n t
d a n g e r" to  s o c ie ty .  T h is  supp lem en ts the  "p ro c e d u ra l"  norm which
a u th o r is e s  a r r e s t  s o le ly  f o r  i n i t i a t i n g  p ro ce e d in g s  a g a in s t th e  o f fe n d e r .
At common law  th e  power o f  a r r e s t  to  p re v e n t a breach o f  th e  peace m a in ly
94se rved  a " p re v e n t iv e "  p u rp o se , which has n o t been supe rsede d .
9 .47  I t  i s ,  how ever, im p o r ta n t  to  remember t h a t ,  as an a r r e s t
c o n s t i t u te s  a th re s h o ld  r e s t r a in t  on p e rs o n a l l i b e r t y ,  v a r io u s  o th e r
norms o f  p r o te c t io n  have a ls o  been e v o lv e d  a t common la w . The
o u ts ta n d in g  ones we have a lre a d y  m e n tio n e d , v i z . ,  b a i l ,  habeas co rpus
95and a c t io n  f o r  fa ls e  im p r is o n m e n t. I t  i s  necessa ry  however to  r e i t e r a t e  
th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  some o th e r  r ig h t s  o r norms o f  p r o te c t io n  as these  r ig h t s
have been, from  tim e  to  t im e ,  tem pered w ith  in  a w h o le s a le  manner in  th e
law s e n a c te d  f o r  " s t a t e - s e c u r i t y " ,  d e s c r ib e d  in  th e  s tu d y  as ’’emergency 
96la w s ” . I t  i s  unnecessary  to  re h e a rse  th e  d is c u s s io n  on th e se  r ig h t s
b u t t h e i r  im p o rta n ce  demands th a t  th e  more im p o r ta n t  ones a re  l i s t e d  o r  
97r a th e r  r e - l i s t e d :  a pe rson  a r re s te d  i s  e n t i t l e d :
i )  to  know th e  t r u e  reasons  o f  a r r e s t ;  
i i )  n o t to  be d e ta in e d  f o r  in te r r o g a t io n  w ith o u t  la w fu l  a r r e s t ;
i i i )  n o t to  be d e ta in e d  ’’pend ing  e n q u iry  o r  in v e s t ig a t io n ”
w ith o u t  la w fu l  a r r e s t ;  
i v )  n o t to  be d e ta in e d  on any "p re te n c e ”  o f  a r r e s t ;
v )  to  be ta ke n  to  th e  p o l ic e  s ta t io n  o r  m a g is t ra te  w ith
re a s o n a b le  d is p a tc h  a f t e r  a r r e s t ;  
v i )  to  r e s is t  an u n la w fu l a r r e s t ;  
v i i )  n o t to  be s u b je c te d  to  u n re a so n a b le  use o f  fo r c e  in  th e  
la w fu l  e x e rc is e  o f  th e  pow er.
9 .47  In  Asian and A fr ic a n  s ta te s  th e  re s p e c t iv e  C r im in a l Codes
e x h a u s t iv e ly  la y  down th e  in c id e n ts  o f  th e  power o f  a r r e s t  and a ls o  th e
’’s a fe g u a rd s "  which co rre sp o n d  more o r  le s s  to  th o se  l i s t e d  above. The
c o d i f ic a t io n  o f  c r im in a l  law  was f i r s t  u n d e rta ke n  in  In d ia  and th e  In d ia n
Codes ( p a r t i c u la r l y  th e  C r im in a l P rocedure  Code) became th e  m odel f o r  th e
98o th e r  Commonwealth s ta te s .  One im p o r ta n t d i f fe r e n c e  h a s , how ever, to  be
n o te d . In  th e  In d ia n  Code th e re  i s  no (even  none o r i g i n a l l y )  power o f
a r r e s t  in  case o f  breach  o f  th e  peace b u t in  some o th e r  s ta te s  th e  
99p ro v is io n  e x is t s .  The im p o r ta n t  re q u ire m e n t o f  " re a s o n a b le n e s s ”  o f 
s u s p ic io n  has been re ta in e d  in  a l l  th e  A s ian  and A fr ic a n  Codes. I t  i s  a ls o  
im p o r ta n t to  n o te  t h a t  one o f  th e  common law  s a fe g u a rd s , nam e ly , th e  
o b l ig a t io n  o f  th e  s ta te  to  in fo rm  th e  person  concerned o f  th e  reasons  f o r  
h is  a r r e s t ,  f in d s  a p la ce  in  th e  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts  o f  Commonwealth A fr ic a n  
and Asian s t a t e s . I n d e e d ,  as we have seen , t h i s  s a fe g u a rd  has been 
in  te  rn  a t io n  a l i  se d . ^  ^
(b )  ^r£vjBn^ijje_ju_s_tijcej_ J^r£yenJtijDn_of_ _crime
( i )  £o_we_r _to_bin_d o ve r
9 .4 8  The power to  b in d  o v e r e x is te d  a t common law  to  d e a l w ith  conduct 
and a c t i v i t i e s  co n s id e re d  as c o n tra  bonos m ores and c o n tra  pacem, which 
enab le d  th e  C o n se rva to rs  o f  th e  Peace and t h e i r  s u c c e s s o rs , th e  J u s t ic e s ,
to  ta k e  s e c u r i t y  from  any person  f o r  ke e p in g  th e  peace o r  to  be o f
good b e h a v io u r . The p ro v is io n  was l a t e r  a m p lif ie d  in  th e  J u s t ic e  o f  th e  
102Peace A ct 1361. The p ro v is io n  a p p a re n tly  aims a t a b r id g in g  th e
h ia tu s  between le g a l  and m o ra l norms and e x e m p lif ie s  th e  wholesome
f l e x i b i l i t y  as w e l l  as d iv e r s i t y  o f  the  norms o f  r e s t r a in t s  o f  common la w .
The ju r i s d i c t i o n  em bodies th e  concep t o f  "p re v e n t iv e  j u s t i c e "  w hich p o s tu la te s
th e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  a n t ic ip a to r y  s a n c t io n s  b u t what i s  more s ig n i f i c a n t  i s
th a t  th e  p ro v is io n  re c o g n is e s  th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  o f  im p o s in g , in  re s p e c t o f  a
j u r i s d i c t i o n  based on u n te s te d  s u s p ic io n ,  s a n c t io n s  o f  le s s  r ig o ro u s  b u t
more f l e x i b l e  n a tu re .  The f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  th e  s a n c t io n s  im p a rte d  a
wholesome f l e x i b i l i t y  to  th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n a l  base i t s e l f  p e r m it t in g  th e
ju r i s d i c t i o n  to  be e x e rc is e d  even in  cases co n c e rn in g  " s t a t e - s e c u r i t y " .
The c o u r t  em phasized th e  im p o r ta n t nexus between " v io le n t "  conduct o f  a
103person and th e  breach o f  th e  peace.
9 .49  In  A fr ic a n  and Asian c r im in a l  codes th e  ju r i s d i c t i o n  appears
as s o - c a l le d  " s e c u r i t y  p r o v is io n s " .  As in  E ng land , th e  power can be
e x e rc is e d  by c o u r ts  b u t o n ly  when th e  p re s c r ib e d  s ta tu to r y  c o n d it io n s  -
p re ce d e n t are s a t i s f ie d .  In  England th e  power f lo w e d  from  th re e  sou rces  -
Common la w , Commissions o f  J u s t ic e s  and th e  1361 Act -  im p a r t in g  g re a te r
f l e x i b i l i t y  to  th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  The In d ia n  Code p ro v id e s  th e  g e n e ra l
m odel f o r  Asian and A fr ic a n  Codes. A p ro v is io n  em brac ing  th e  E n g lis h
concep t o f  "v a g ra n c y " which has no re le v a n c e  to  A f r ic a  and A s ia  s t i l l
in India
appears in  a e r ta d n i Codes a l th o u g h  i t  was d is c a rd e d  in  1973. In  many s ta te s ,
exce p t I n d ia ,  a m o d if ie d  v e rs io n  o f  th e  " s e c u r i t y  p r o v is io n "  appears in  th e
"em ergency la w s " a ls o  which g e n e ra lly  p ro v id e d  f o r  more s t r in g e n t
104r e s t r a in t s  such as o f  a r r e s t  and d e te n t io n .
( i i )  .Cpnt^o^l ^^ tJ ie ^ r jB c id i^v ^ is J t
9 .5 0  W h ile  B la c k s to n e  a tta c h e d  more im p o rta n ce  to  th e  power to  b in d
o v e r to  em phasize th e  r o le  o f  "p re v e n t iv e  j u s t i c e " ,  Bentham r e la te d  i t
105more d i r e c t l y  to  p e n o lo g y . There i s  a s tro n g  c u r re n t  o f  o p in io n
s u g g e s tin g  th a t  B en tham 's  re a c t io n  to  th e  " u n c e r ta in "  and "sa va g e " 
c h a ra c te r  o f  th e  o ld  C r im in a l Law o f  England ushe red  in  th®  e ra  o f
106" l ib e r a l is m  and re fo rm "  which made re c id iv is m  a " p r a c t i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y " .
L e g is la t iv e  e f f o r t s  to  f i g h t  the  e v i l  in  England r e s u l te d  in  th e  g ra d u a l
e m b e llis h m e n t o f  th e  concep t o f  " p r o te c t io n  o f  s o c ie t y " ;  m easures were
107f i r s t  e n ac ted  in  1871 and then  in  1908, 1948, 1967 and 1973.
However, o r i g i n a l l y  th e  e v i l  was n o t c o n s id e re d  as a d ise a se  r e q u ir in g
p ro p e r d ia g n o s is  and p ro g n o s is  and i t s  t re a tm e n t was th e re fo re  p ro v id e d
in  th e  " d u a l- t r a c k  system o f  p u n ish m e n t" -  a sen tence  o f  p e n a l s e rv itu d e
108fo llo w e d  by "p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n " .
9 .51  I t  cannot be g a in s a id  t h a t  in  England th e  re fo rm  th e ra p y  has
come to  be a p p lie d  v e ry  la te  b u t i t  i s  d o u b t fu l  i f  th e  th e ra p y  has
e v o lv e d  s a t is fa c to r y  norms o f  p r o te c t io n  o f  p e rs o n a l l i b e r t y .  From a
c lo se  s tu d y  o f  th e  su cce ss ive  re fo rm in g  enactm en ts  one g a in s  th e  im p re s s io n
th a t  th e  le g is la t i v e  e n te rp r is e  i s  m a in ly  an e x e rc is e  in  s e m a n tic s ; th e
104e v o lu t io n  o f  norms do n o t r e f l e c t  any r a d ic a l  change in  app roach .
A lthough  the  la t e s t  enac tm en ts  in c lu d e  th e  a l t e r n a t iv e  concep t o f
" c o r r e c t iv e  t r a in in g " ,  th e  b a s ic  id e a  o f  th e  new norm o f  r e s t r a in t  s t i l l
sa vo u rs  o f  p u n i t iv e  q u a l i t y .  M arc A n c e l's  New S o c ia l Defence Theory
r i g h t l y  la y s  s t re s s  on c o - o r d in a t in g  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  th e  d i f f e r e n t
a genc ie s  and i n s t i t u t i o n s  connected  w ith  th e  e n a c tm e n t, a d m in is t ra t io n
and en fo rcem en t o f  th e  re le v a n t  law  to  im p a r t  " f r e s h  s t re n g th  to  th e
110renew a l o f  th e  p re v e n t iv e  o r  re fo rm a t iv e  a c t i v i t y "  in  th e  f i e l d .
9 .5 2  In  r e f r e s h in g  c o n t r a s t ,  we f in d  th e  re fo rm  th e ra p y ’ s a p p l ic a t io n
to  th e  problem  in  In d ia  n o t o n ly  to  be e a r ly  in  t im e  b u t a ls o  to
p roceed in  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  d i r e c t io n ,  which has g ive n  i t  a p re v e n t iv e  
111b ia s .  The main p ro v is io n  to  d e a l w ith  " h a b i tu a l  o f fe n d e rs "  i s  in  a l l  
Commonwealth Asian and A fr ic a n  C r im in a l Codes in  th e  c h a p te r c o n ta in in g  
" s e c u r i t y  p r o v is io n s " .  In  In d ia ,  p ro v is io n s  w ith  a d i s t i n c t l y  
" re fo rm a to ry "  purpose a id  le s s  severe  norms o f  r e s t r a in t s ,  nam ely ,
112" in ternm ent"  or "externm ent" in s tead  o f "de ten tio n ' '  also e x i s t .  On the
o th e r  hand, in  A f r ic a ,  th e  supp lem en ta ry  p ro v is io n s  ta ke  d i f f e r e n t  fo rm ,
a d o p tin g  th e  E n g lis h  concep t o f  " p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n "  which in  some cases
113appear unde r th e  la b e l  o f  " p re v e n t iv e  c u s to d y " .
9 .5 3  I t  i s  t r u e  th a t  th e  prob lem  o f r e c id iv is m  assumes d i f f e r e n t  
fo rm s , shapes and p ro p o r t io n s ,  depend ing  on the  s o c ia l  m i l ie u ,  and th e  
" v a lu e -p ro c e s s "  a ls o  o p e ra te s  d i f f e r e n t l y  in  d i f f e r e n t  la n d s , b u t th e  b a s ic  
q u e s tio n  to  be c o n s id e re d  in  a l l  cases i s  w he ther th e  r e c i d i v i s t  i s  a
s ic k  pe rson  o r  a s o c ia l  menace ? The q u e s t io n ,  we s u b m it, o u g h t to  be
answered in  a l l  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  w ith  re fe re n c e  to  human r ig h t s  ju r is p ru d e n c e .
There i s  some resem blance between h is  s ic k n e s s  and th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  a
" p o l i t i c a l  o f fe n d e r "  and th e re  i s  a lre a d y  a tendency to  t r e a t  p o l i t i c a l
d e ta in e e s  as s ic k  pe rsons  and to  h o ld  th a t  d e te n t io n  in  t h e i r  case se rves
114as a re fo rm a t iv e  in f lu e n c e .
( C) " S ta te - s e c u r i t y "  m easures
( e) Emer^gencjf; J_u_ri_sp_ru_den_ce_ _and jV ^ ljje ^p jrqce_ss j^
9 .5 4  The grow th  o f  s tro n g  n a t io n - s ta te s  and th e  c o n s o lid a t io n  o f  the  
p ro c e s s , are phenomena p e c u l ia r  to  th e  new w o rld  o rd e r .  England has a 
w e l l- e s ta b l is h e d  t r a d i t i o n  o f  a s ta b le  m onarchy; i t  was f u r t h e r  f o r t i f i e d  
in  th e  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  s e t t le m e n t o f 1688: the  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  wa3 enac ted  
f o r  " d e c la r in g  th e  R ig h ts  and L ib e r t ie s  o f  th e  S u b je c t and S e t t l in g  the 
Success ion  o f  the  C row n". In d e e d , in  a monarchy th e  s ta te  i s  p e r s o n if ie d  
in  the  person  o f  th e  m onarch; p re s e rv in g  th e  o rd e r  o f  su cce ss io n  to  th e  
crown was th e  means o f  a v o id in g  a c o n s t i t u t io n a l  b reakdow n. However, even 
in  t h i s  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  document th e re  i s  no m en tion  o f th e  r i g h t  o f  the  
s ta te  b u t th e  em phasis i s  on th e  r ig h t s  o f  th e  s u b je c ts .  How th e  s ta te  
c o u ld  a c t in  a s i t u a t io n  th re a te n in g  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  breakdown (w h e th e r 
r e s u l t in g  from  an e x te r n a l  a g g re ss io n  o r r e b e l l io n )  was th u s  l e f t  to  be 
d e te rm in e d  by th e  common law  and P a r lia m e n t.  The "v a lu e -p ro c e s s "  i s  th u s  
supposed to  o p e ra te  p r in c ip a l l y  th ro u g h  these  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and in d e e d  i t  
was so o p e ra te d  d u r in g  "em ergency" s i t u a t io n s ,  in  E ng land .
9 .5 5  The ju d g e s , who are th e  p r in c ip a l  o p e ra to rs  o f  th e  " v a lu e -
p ro c e s s "  unde r common la w , e v o lv e d  th e  concep t o f " n e c e s s ity ”  to  d e a l
w ith  "em ergency" s i t u a t io n s  b u t th e y  a ls o  e vo lve d  th e  s o - c a l le d  " d o c t r in e
115o f  m a r t ia l  la w "  to  d e a l w ith  such s i t u a t io n s  in  th e  dep e n d e n c ie s . In
England th e  use o f  m a r t ia l  law  was e x p re s s ly  fo rb id d e n  by th e  P e t i t io n  o f
R ig h ts  and i t  was n e ve r used t h e r e a f t e r .  In  th e  dependencies i t  was used
and th e  ju d g e s  approved th e  e n te r p r is e ,  g iv in g  r is e  to  th e  s o - c a l le d
d o c t r in e  o f  m a r t ia l  la w . In  the  dependencies i t  was n e cessa ry  to  q u e l l
re b e llio n s  to  entrench th e  c o lo n ia l ru lB , which the judges considered as
t h e i r  " le g i t im a t e "  fu n c t io n ,  and th e re fo re  th e y  re s o r te d  to  " le g a l is m "  to
c a r ry  i t  o u t e f f e c t i v e l y .  T h e ir  endorsem ent o f  th e  a c t io n  o f  th e
c o lo n ia l  e x e c u t iv e  c o n fe r re d  " l e g a l i t y "  on th e  e n te r p r is e .  In  th e
d o m e s tic  c o n te x t  in  E ng land , th e  "v a lu e -p ro c e s s "  o p e ra te d  in  a d i f f e r e n t
fa s h io n ,  in  t h a t  h e re  " p u b l ic  o p in io n " ,  which was an im p o r ta n t in g r e d ie n t
o f  th e  p ro c e s s , in f lu e n c e d  in  a d i f f e r e n t  manner th e  ju d g e s * in t e r p r e t a t io n
o f th e  la w . The j u d i c i a l  response  to  "em ergency le g is la t i o n "  o p e ra t in g
th e  same "v a lu e -p ro c e s s "  th ro u g h  a p u b l ic o p in io n  e v o lv e d  ad hoc norms
116o f in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  th e  la w .
9 .56  E lsew here  in  the  Commonwealth, th e  "W e s tm in s te r made"
C o n s t i tu t io n s  d id  n o t c o n ta in  any "em ergency p r o v is io n " .  In  1960, in  s . 6 
o f  i t s  new B i l l  o f  R ig h ts ,  Canada made p r o v is io n  f o r  s i t u a t io n s  o f  "w a r, 
in v a s io n  o r  in s u r r e c t io n ,  r e a l  o r  app rehended". I t  a ls o  to o k  care  to  
p ro v id e  in  s . 5 th a t  th e  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  sh o u ld  n o t be so c o n s tru e d  as to  
"a b ro g a te  o r  a b rid g e  any human r ig h t s  o r  fu n d a m e n ta l freedom  n o t enum erated 
th e re in  t h a t  may have e x is te d  in  Canada a t th e  commencement o f  th e  A c t" .
The u n d e r l in e d  e x p re s s io n , how ever, in tro d u c e d  an e lem en t o f  a m b ig u ity
i f  th e  In d ia n  e x p e r ie n c e  was any gu ide  a lth o u g h  th e re  can be no doub t th a t
the  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  was meant to  g iv e  " b e t t e r "  p ro te c t io n  n o t o n ly  to  th e
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enum erated b u t a ls o  to  th e  unenum erated e x is t in g  r i g h t s .  In  th e  
C o n s t i tu t io n s  o f  a l l  Commonwealth Asian and A fr ic a n  s ta te s  c o n ta in in g  B i l l s  
o f  R ig h ts  ( a l b e i t  sadd led  by "em ergency p r o v is io n s "  b e s id e s  " d e r o g a t io n " ) ,
0  *  <3>
fd '£
th e  absence o f  a p ro v is io n  s im i la r  to  s . 5 o f  th e  Canadian B i l l  o f  
R ig h ts ) ,  a p p a re n tly  e n fe e b le d  g r e a t ly  th e  norm s o f  p r o te c t io n  o f  p e rs o n a l 
l i b e r t y  in  v ie w  o f  th e  d e b i l i t a t i o n  co n te m p la te d  th ro u g h  th e  d o u b le ­
f i l t e r  o f  th e  ’’emergency p r o v is io n s ”  and ’’d e ro g a t io n s ” .
9 .57  I t  i s  t r u e  th a t  th e re  i s  no l i k e l ih o o d  o f  ’’p u b l ic  o p in io n ”  in  th e
Asian and A fr ic a n  s td te s  c o n fo rm in g  to  a s in g le  common p a t te r n .  T h is  i s
m a n ife s te d  in  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  ju d g e s  in  M a la y s ia  e xp re sse d  t h e i r
p re fe re n c e  f o r  E n g lis h  d e c is io n s  w h ile  ju d g e s  in  some A fr ic a n  s ta te s
( p a r t i c u la r l y  Zambia) n o t o n ly  p re fe r r e d  to  f o l lo w  th e  In d ia n  d e c is io n s
118b u t th e y  went a s te p  f u r t h e r .  W h ile  th e  In d ia n  c o u r t  was d iv id e d  in  i t s
approach to  th e  "E n g lis h  w a rtim e  c a s e s ", th e  Zambia C o u rt deve lop ed  a
p o s i t iv e  approach and a c te d  w ith  g re a te r  im a g in a t io n  and in s ig h t  to  d is c e rn
119th e  in a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  th e  ad hoc norm e v o lv e d  in  those  cases .
U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  th e  most b iz a r r e  o p e ra t io n  o f  th e  "v a lu e -p ro c e s s ”  by th e
A fr ic a n  ju d ic ia r y  was to  be n o t ic e d  in  e v o lv in g  th e  emergency ju r is p ru d e n c e
120under m i l i t a r y  r u le  in  some o f  these  s ta te s .
9.5B  As we have seen, th e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  fram ew ork  o f  m i l i t a r y
governm ent made th e  no rm a l f u n c t io n in g  o f  th e  Rule o f  Law d i f f i c u l t .  A new
"v a lu e -c o n c e p t”  had to  ta k e  i t s  p la c e . The o n ly  i n s t i t u t i o n  th a t  co u ld
e v o lv e  o r  r a th e r  re c o g n is e  th e  new concep t was th e  j u d ic ia r y ,  liie have
121c a l le d  th e  concep t th e  "New R u le  o f  Law ". Under i t  th e  ju d ic ia r y  had
122to  assume a ’’ s e l f - a c t i v l a t i n g "  and " s e l f - r e g u la t o r y "  r o le .  In  o th e r  
w ords, w ith  th e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d  norms o f  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  governm ent h a v in g  
been "a b ro g a te d "  o r  "suspended" and " p u b l ic  o p in io n "  a ls o  h a v in g  been 
s t i f l e d ,  i t  was incum bent upon i t  to  re c o g n is e  i t s  new r o le  as th e  o n ly  
" in d e p e n d e n t"  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  s t a b i l i t y  and a u th o r i t y  and to  s te p  up 
a c c o rd in g ly  " j u d i c i a l  a c t iv is m "  and a ls o  to  m o n ito r  i t s e l f  i t s  new r o le .
I t  i s  an a p r i o r i  p r o p o s i t io n  which fo l lo w s  from  th e  common law  p rim acy  
a tta c h e d  to  th e  "independence  o f  th e  j u d i c i a r y " .  Under new c o n d it io n s  
o f m i l i t a r y  r u le ,  th e  " v a lu e -p ro c e s s "  c o u ld  fu n c t io n  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  o n ly  
th ro u g h  th e  new norms o f  p r o te c t io n ,  nam e ly , th e  " s e l f - r e g u la t o r y "  and
" s e l f - a c t i v a t in g "  ro le  of the j u d ic ia r y .  The Pakistan ju d ic ia r y  adopted
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th e  new norm b u t in  A f r ic a  th e  ju d ic ia r y  d is p la y e d  an a m b iv a le n t app roach .
(b )  j3Qine_in_sjLqhfr_infcjj j*ernejcqenjcy__pjroy_is^i^ns"
( i )  £ommjDn_Lawj_ ^e_cej3sitj£ jand P la r t i  a_l _Law
9 .5 9  The te s t  o f  n e c e s s ity  was w ro n g ly  propounded in  th e  SHI PHONEY
case and th e  d e c is io n  was n u l l i f i e d  by a p a r lia m e n ta ry  e n a c tm e n t. The
d e c is io n  in  SHIPMONEY e xc lu d e d  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  and tu rn e d  th e  concep t in t o  
1 24a r i g i d  one. The t ru e  t e s t  o f  n e c e s s ity  co n te m p la te s  a " s e l f - r e g u la to r y
and f l e x i b l e  r o le  f o r  th e  concep t m a n ife s te d  in  i t s  s e v e ra l a s p e c ts ,
la b e l le d  as " c i v i l " ,  " s t a t e "  and " m i l i t a r y "  a p a r t from  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e
concept has a ls o  ga ined  ground in  c r im in a l  law  in  d i f f e r e n t  j u r i s d i c t i o n s .
In  A m erica t h i s  t e s t  o f  n e c e s s ity ,  upon which th e  s o - c a l le d  d o c t r in e  o f
126m a r t ia l  law  was j u s t i f i e d ,  was re je c te d  in  MILLIGAN. In  bo th  E n g lis h
and Am erican ju r i s d i c t i o n s  th e  concep t o f  " m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s ity "  has been
c o n s id e re d  by th e  c o u r ts  and i t  has been h e ld  th a t  th e  concep t does n o t
127e xc lu d e  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w . In  "H u m a n ita r ia n  Law" th e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f
128m i l i t a r y  n e c e s s ity  has been ex tended to  in t e r n a l  c o n f l i c t s .  As
h u m a n ita r ia n  c o n s id e ra t io n s  im p o r t  th e  concept o f  re a s o n a b le n e s s , j u d i c i a l
re v ie w  i s  a p r i o r i  in c lu d e d  u nde r a l l  c irc u m s ta n c e s , in c lu d in g  th o se  o f  
129"e m e rg e n cy". In d e e d , in  P a k is ta n  and N ig e r ia  and u nde r s l i g h t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  c ircu m s ta n ce s  in  R hodesia  and Cyprus t h i s  p o s i t io n  has been 
accep ted  in  substance by th e  c o u r ts .
9 .5 0  I t  i s  t ru e  th a t  th e re  i s  no re c e n t d e c is io n  o f  any E n g lis h  c o u r t
on th e  s o - c a l le d  d o c tr in e  o f  m a r t ia l  la w , b u t in  a l l  le a d in g  te x t -b o o k s  on
E n g lis h  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  law  an e f f o r t ,  indeed  a la b o u re d  e f f o r t ,  i s  s t i l l
made to  m a in ta in  i t  as a v a l i d  le g a l  d o c t r in e  by t r y in g  d e s p e ra te ly  to
131c le a r  th e  te r m in o lo g ic a l  c o n fu s io n  in  which i t  i s  w rapped. The d o c t r in e
in  substance  p o s tu la te s  th e  e x e rc is e  by the  m i l i t a r y  o f  e x e c u t iv e ,
le g is la t i v e  as w e l l  as j u d i c i a l  pow ers : i t  can e n a c t " m a r t ia l  law  
r e g u la t io n s "  to  p re s c r ib e  o f fe n c e s  and p e n a lt ie s ,  s e t up m i l i t a r y  c o u r ts
Q  *  J
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to  t r y  o f fe n d e rs  ( in c lu d in g  c i v i l i a n s )  and p re c lu d e  the  s u p e r io r  c o u r ts
from  e x e rc is in g  i t s  power o f  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w  d u ra n te  b e l lo  in  re s p e c t o f
132th e  a c ts  o f  th e  m i l i t a r y  a u t h o r i t ie s .  T ha t i s  how th e  m i l i t a r y  ac ted
on many o c c a s io n s  in  th e  depen denc ies , s t a t in g  th a t  " m a r t ia l  la w "  was
"d e c la re d "  in  th e  p a r t i c u la r  a re a . T h is  was c h a lle n g e d  in  th e  c o u r ts  in
133E ng land , b u t w ith o u t  success . The c o u r t  knew th a t  " m a r t ia l  la w " as
known to  Common Law was p ro s c r ib e d  by th e  P e t i t io n  o f  R ig h ts  so th e  c o u r ts
gave a new meaning to  th e  a n c ie n t e x p re s s io n  o f  " t im e  o f  w a r" , extended
th e  common law  concept o f  "m e e tin g  fo rc e  w ith  fo r c e "  and even a t tim e s
134drew upon th e  concep t o f  the  p re ro g a t iv e .  T h is  was n o th in g  b u t an
e x e rc is e  in  " le g a l is m "  because th e  d e c is io n s ,  as we have seen, co u ld  n o t
be s t r i c t l y  s u p p o rte d  a c c o rd in g  to  accepted  p r in c ip le s  o f  common la w . More
p r e c is e ly  i t  was an o b i t e r  in  P .P . MARfllS t h a t  became d i r e c t l y  re s p o n s ib le  
135f o r  the  d o c t r in e .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  th e  j u r i s t s  and te x tb o o k  w r i t e r s
e n d o rs in g  th e  d e c is io n s  and th e  d o c t r in e  expounded th e r e in  have n o t
136in v e s t ig a te d  th e  m a tte r  in  d e p th . The d o c t r in e  th u s  ga ined  c u rre n c y
and go t i t s e l f  f i r m ly  e s ta b lis h e d  in  due c o u rse . The m ost u n fo r tu n a te  r e s u l t
th a t  f lo w e d  from  i t  m a n ife s te d  i t s e l f  in  th e  m i l i t a r y  r u le  in  P a k is ta n
and Bangladesh where th e  m i l i t a r y  r u le r s  based t h e i r  c la im  to  "d o m e s tic
137le g i t im a c y "  by in v o k in g  th e  d o c t r in e .  However, th e  P a k is ta n  c o u r t
ac ted  w ith  im a g in a t io n  and courage and found  o u t th e  in s e c u re  le g a l
138fo u n d a tio n  o f  th e  d o c t r in e .  The p ro ce ss  o f  e v o lu t io n  as w e l l  as 
r e je c t io n  o f  th e  d o c t r in e  and i t s  consequences and o p e ra t io n  p ro v id e  
some in t e r e s t in g  in s ig h t  in t o  "em ergency p r o v is io n s "  o f  th e  Commonwealth.
( i i )  jA fjrijean _and _Asj.an Co lo n i  a l  _Con s t  i  tu  t io n s  an d Emergency Le q i s la t  io n
9 .61 The A fr ic a n  b rand  o f  " c o lo n ia l  c o n s t i t u t io n a l is m "  and th e  two 
phases o f  th e  " u n l im ite d "  and " d i r e c t "  governm ent in  In d ia  had d i f f e r e n t  
fe a tu re s  as th e  c o lo n ia l  p o l ic y  fo l lo w e d  in  th e  d i f f e r e n t  t e r r i t o r i e s  
d id  n o t conform  to  a s in g le  u n ifo rm  p a t te rn  e xce p t in  re s p e c t o f  th e  b a s ic  
norm which e nv isage d  en trenchm e n t o f  th e  c o lo n ia l  r u le  e ve ryw h e re . In  many
245
t e r r i t o r i e s  (such  os B r i t i s h  In d ia  and C ey lon , b u t n o t A f r ic a )  such
s t r in g e n t  m easures as ’’m a r t ia l  la w ” was used by th e  c o lo n ia l  e x e c u tiv e
on many o cca s io n s  to  e n fo rc e  th e  p o l ic y  o f  en trenchm e n t b u t le g is la t i v e
m easures, lo c a l  and ’’U e s tm in s te r-m a ke ”  were a ls o  u se d . These measures had
one common fe a tu r e .  They r e s u lte d  in  th e  Rule o f  Law b e in g  p e rv e r te d  on
many o cca s io n s  in  th a t  e q u a l i t y  b e fo re  law  and e q u a l p r o te c t io n  o f  law
was den ied  to  ’ ’n a t iv e  s u b je c ts ” ; th e  law s were p a te n t ly  d is c r im in a to r y .
P a r t ic u la r  m e n tio n , in  t h i s  c o n n e c tio n  may be made o f th e  ’’ d e p o r ta t io n ”
laws o f  A f r ic a  and in  re s p e c t o f  I n d ia ,  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  A c ts  o f  1781 and
1391784 and th e  B enga l R e g u la tio n  o f  1818. L a te r ,  p e rh a p s , i t  was 
d is c o v e re d  th a t  r e s o r t  to  ’’ le g a l is m ”  d id  n o t a lw ays succeed in  a c h ie v in g  
’’ l e g a l i t y ”  as we have seen th a t  th e  v i r e s  o f some measures were c h a lle n g e a b le  
and indeed  in  some cases th e  c h a lle n g e s  were made and a ls o  s u c c e s s fu l ly
u u  140 u p h e ld .
9 .6 2  In  s p ite  o f  d i f fe r e n c e s  re s p e c t in g  d e ta i ls  o f  s t r u c tu r e  and o th e r
m a tte rs ,  th e  c o lo n ia l  c o n s t i t u t io n s  had one th in g  in  common: th e
i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  c o lo n ia l  governm ents everyw here  were s u b je c t  to  th e
o v e r a l l  c o n t r o l  o f W h ite h a ll and W e s tm in s te r. Thus, a l l  s u b je c ts  in  th e
dependencies had to  e v e n tu a l ly  lo o k  to  th e  B r i t i s h  P a r lia m e n t f o r
e f f e c t iv e  p ro te c t io n  o f  p e rs o n a l l i b e r t y .  N e v e r th e le s s , th e re  was an
im p o r ta n t d i f fe re n c e  in  th e  In d ia n  and A fr ic a n  p o s i t io n s :  In d ia n s  b e in g
a s s o c ia te d  from  th e  v e ry  b e g in n in g  w ith  the  c o lo n ia l  l e g i s la t i v e  p rocess
c o u ld  p o s s ib ly  (a s  in  th e  case o f  the  R o w la tt A c t) e x e rc is e  some c o n t r o l
o ve r th e  c o lo n ia l  e x e c u t iv e  w h ile  A fr ic a n  re p re s e n ta t io n  in  the  c o lo n ia l
l e g is la t i v e  assem b lies  h a v in g  come v e ry  la te  and in  r e la t i v e l y  meagre
p ro p o r t io n ,  th e  p rocess  o f  lo c a l  c o n t r o l  d id  n o t p o s s ib ly  o b ta in  th e re
1 41u n t i l  th e  eve o f  indepe ndence . T h is  p o s i t io n  appears to  have some 
r e la t io n  to  th e  f a c t  t h a t  The Emergency Powers O rder in  C o u n c il 1939, which 
p ro v id e d  th e  b a s ic  fram ew ork o f  the  l a t e r  emergency law s o f  o th e r  
t e r r i t o r i e s ,  was n o t made a p p lic a b le  to  I n d ia .  As we have seen, th e  pace 
o f  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  deve lopm ent was qu ickene d  in  In d ia  c lu m in a t in g  in  the
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1935 C o n s t i tu t io n  and the  c o lo n ia l  le g is la t u r e  a c t in g  th e re u n d e r enac ted  
th e  Defence o f  In d ia  A ct 1939 as a s u b s t i t u te  f o r  th e  O rd e r.
9 .6 3  In  In d ia  ’’r u le s "  were fram ed by th e  e x e c u tiv e  u nde r th e  A ct
1 42w h ile  e lsew he re  " r e g u la t io n s "  were made unde r th e  O rd e r. The s u b s id ia ry
le g is la t io n s  in  b o th  cases had s im i la r  fe a tu re s  which c o u ld  be d is t in g u is h e d
from  t h e i r  p a r a l le l  U n ite d  Kingdom le g is la t io n  in  re s p e c t o f  two im p o r ta n t
p r o v is io n s  in  th a t  th e  law s o f  th e  dependencies p ro v id e s  f o r  a v e ry  w ide
143d e le g a t io n  o f  power and a ls o  p u rp o r te d  to  e xc lu d e  j u d i c i a l  re v ie w . I t  i s
a ls o  to  be n o te d  th a t  in  a lm ost a l l  cases " r e g u la t io n s "  made u n d e r the
O rder co n te m p la te d  th e  in t e r p o s i t io n  o f  armed fo rc e s  and r e s t r a in t s  o f a
more severe  ty p e ,  a lb e i t  o f  v a ry in g  deg ree , in  th e  d i f f e r e n t  t e r r i t o r i e s :
in  A f r ic a ,  g e n e ra lly  th e  r e g u la t io n s  o f  West A f r ic a  were o f  th e  ex trem e
ty p e  b u t o b v io u s ly  s t i l l  s t r in g e n t  measures wore co n te m p la te d  u nde r th e  Kenya
re g u la t io n s  made f o r  th e  s p e c ia l s i t u a t io n  a r is in g  from  th e  Mau Mau 
144r e b e l l io n .  The r e s t r a in t s  o f  more g e n e ra l typ e  in c lu d e d  a r r e s t ,
d e te n t io n  pend ing  e n q u ir y ,  d e te n t io n  f o r  s p e c i f ie d  o r  u n s p e c if ie d  p e r io d
(w ith o u t  t r i a l )  and a ls o  le s s  severe  ty p e  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on movements
and a c t i v i t i e s .  The In d ia n  " r u le s "  co n te m p la te d  more o r  le s s  s im i la r
r e s t r a in t s  and th u s , in  common w ith  th e  A fr ic a n  r e g u la t io n s ,  d i f f e r e d
from  th e  p ro v is io n s  made in  E ngland where " in te rn m e n t"  (u n d e r Reg. 148 o f
1914) and " d e te n t io n "  (u n d e r Reg.18B o f  1939) co u ld  be made o n ly  under
o rd e rs  o f  th e  S e c re ta ry  o f  S ta te .  I t  i s  a ls o  to  be n o te d  th a t  th e  E n g lis h
re g u la t io n s  co n te m p la te d  th e  sa fe g u a rd  o f  c o n s id e ra t io n  by an "a d v is o ry
co m m itte e " o f  any " r e p r e s e n ta t io n "  made by th e  d e ta in e e  w hich th e  Defence
145o f  In d ia  Rule 1939 d id  n o t p ro v id e .
( i i i )  T_he .E n g lish  J l^ r t im e ^ c a s e s J ^
9 .6 4  We have a lre a d y  p o in te d  o u t th a t  thB  ju d g e s  in  England had 
e v o lv e d  an ad hoc norm in  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  above cases and th a t  in  many 
ju r i s d i c t i o n s  in  th e  New Commonwealth t h i s  s ig n i f i c a n t  aspect o f  th e  
"v a lu e -p ro c e s s "  was o v e r lo o k e d  by some o f  th e  ju d g e s  o f  th e  independence e ra .
There are c e r ta in  p o in ts  to  be n o te d  in  t h i s  c o n n e c tio n  to  o b ta in  a
deeper and c le a re r  in s ig h t  in t o  the  emergency ju r is p ru d e n c e  o f  th e  New
Commonwealth. In  th e  above cases th e  ju d g e s  in  England e x e rc is e d  j u d i c i a l
r e s t r a in t  o n ly  to  c u r t a i l  and n o t to  nega te  t h e i r  own power o f  j u d i c i a l  
1 46re v ie w . The c o u r ts  d id  n o t h o ld  t h a t  a habeas co rpus co u ld  n o t be
is s u e d  in  any case and unde r any c irc u m s ta n c e s . The c o u r ts  had made i t
c le a r  in  e v o lv in g  what came to  be known as th e  " s u b je c t iv e  s a t is f a c t io n
1 47th e o ry "  th a t  th e  th e o ry  o p e ra te d  in  th e  c o n te x t of. "w a r"  o n ly .  I t  i s  
a ls o  necessa ry  to  n o te  th a t  even in  e v o lv in g  th e  new norm th e  ju d g e s  d id  
n o t speak w ith  th e  sane v o ic e .  In d e e d , in  th e  two le a d in g  cases, th e re  
were p o w e r fu l d is s e n ts  and Lo rd  A tk in 's  v ie w  in  th e  l a t t e r  case 
( LIV/ER5IDGE) has , as we have seen, come to  p r e v a i l  even in  E ngland as 
la y in g  th e  c o r re c t  p o s i t io n  in  l a w . ^ ^
9 .6 5  However, th e  most im p o r ta n t aspect o f  th e  cases w hich appears to
have been o v e r lo o k e d  so f a r  i s  th a t  Lord  A tk in 's  d is s e n t has a p p a re n t ly
p ro v id e d  th e  b a s ic  fram ew ork o f  th e  p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n  ju r is p ru d e n c e  o f 
149In d ia .  H is  em phasis on "g ro u n d s "  and " p a r t i c u la r s "  to  be p ro v id e d
to  th e  d e ta in e e  f o r  m aking th e  s a fe g u a rd  e f f e c t iv e  was re c o g n is e d  in  th e
1 50In d ia n  C o n s t i t u t io n .  The In d ia n  ju d ic ia r y  has n o t acknow ledged t h i s
b u t has adopted ( a lb e i t  c o v e r t ly )  h is  e x p re s s io n s : th e  c o u r ts  have used
th e  words "g ro u n d s " and " p a r t i c u la r s "  a lth o u g h  in  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n
( in  e ls .  (4 )  and (5 )  o f  A r t .  2 2 ) ,  th e  words are "g ro u n d s " and " f a c t " ,
r e s p e c t iv e ly .  In  t h i s  c o n n e c tio n  i t  i s  a ls o  to  be n o te d  th a t  th e
C o n s t itu t io n -m a k e rs  were a ls o  p o s s ib ly  in f lu e n c e d  by th e  In d ia n  c o u r t 's
151d e c is io n ,  in  which p re fe re n c e  was expressed  f o r  Lo rd  A t k in 's  d is s e n t .
( i v )  _Em_ergen_ci_e_s,_P£ev_entivo_ J3ej^ention_ jand C ons ititu tion ja1_5a fe_quairdIs 
i n_Ind£p£njjejit_Aj3i j 3 and A fr ica
9 .66  W ith  th e  t r a n s fe r  o f  power to  " le g i t im a t e "  r u le r s  th e re  was no 
reason to  th in k  th a t  th e  p ro s p e c t o f  p e rs o n a l l i b e r t y  would n o t im prove  
a f t e r  Independence. B u t th e  h ig h  in c id e n c e  o f  d e te n t io n  w ith o u t  t r i a l
and lo n g  p e r io d s  o f s im u la te d  em ergencies in  many s ta te s  have a lre a d y  ga ined  
152a h ig h  n o t o r ie t y .  Indeed a l l  s ta te s  h a v in g  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts  a ls o
had c o n s t i t u t io n a l  p ro v is io n s  f o r  p ro c la m a tio n s  o f  e m e rg e n c ie s . There
was o b v io u s ly  ready and im m ed ia te  c o lo n ia l  p re ce d e n t f o r  such p ro v is io n  as
was a ls o  in  th e  case o f  "p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n " .  However, th e re  i s  an
im p o r ta n t d if fe re n c e  in  the  p ro v is io n s  o f  A fr ic a n  and Asian  c o n s t i t u t io n s  :
in  A f r ic a ,  th e  p ro v is io n  f o r  d e ro g a tio n  from  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts  d u r in g
153em ergenc ies  p e rm it law s f o r  p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n  to  be e n a c te d .
In  th e  In d ia n  C o n s t i tu t io n  le g is la t io n  f o r  p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n  i s
1 54p e rm is s ib le  even w ith o u t  th e  d e c la ra t io n  o f  em ergency. In  P a k is ta n ,
B ang lad esh , M a la y s ia  and S ingapore a ls o  th e  p o s i t io n  i s  th e  same as in  
155In d ia .  S r i Lanka has no ju s t i c ia b le  B i l l  o f  R ig h ts  b u t th e re  n o t o n ly  i s
law  f o r  p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n  p e rm is s ib le  in  no rm a l t im e s  unde r the
c o n s t i t u t io n ,  b u t the  l a t t e r  does n o t even p re s c r ib e  any " l im i t a t i o n s "
156in  re s p e c t o f  such la w s .
9 .67  The im p o r ta n t change in  a l l  t e r r i t o r i e s  r e s u l t in g  from
independence i s  r e f le c te d  in  th e  p ro v is io n  th a t  th e  d e c la ra t io n  o f  an
emergency by th e  e x e c u tiv e  r e q u ire s  P a r lia m e n ta ry  endorsem ent in  each 
157case . In  I n d ia ,  th e  c o n s t i tu t io n -m a k e rs  d id  n o t d e l ib e r a te ly  p ro v id e
f o r  "p e a ce tim e  la w "  f o r  p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n  b u t in  a c c e p tin g  th e  i n f r a ­
s t r u c tu r e  o f  th e  e x is t in g  c o n s t i t u t io n a l  fram ew ork th e y  a ls o  accep ted  th e
e x is t in g  p ro v is io n  as a necessa ry  e v i l  and then  im posed c o n s t i t u t io n a l
158l im i t a t io n s  on i t  to  c u r t a i l  i t s  p o s s ib le  e v i l  consequences.
U n fo r tu n a te ly  t h i s  f a c tu a l  p o s i t io n ,  which we may d e s c r ib e  as th e
" C o n s t i t u t io n a l - l im i t a t io n  T h e o ry " ,  has n o t been b ro u g h t to  th e  n o t ic e
o f  th e  c o u r ts  and as a r e s u l t  th e  In d ia n  ju d ic ia r y  has c o n s tru e d  th e
re le v a n t  p ro v is io n  ( A r t .  22) by co n fo rm in g  to  the  r u le s  o f  l i t e r a l  and
1 59g ra m m a tica l i n t e r p r e t a t io n .  The P a k is ta n , Bangladesh and M a la ys ia n  
p ro v is io n s  were m o d e lle d  on th e  In d ia n  p ro v is io n  and th u s  dehors th e  
le g is la t i v e  h is t o r y ,  which was p e c u l ia r  to  In d ia ,  th e  same th e o ry  ough t to
ap p ly  a ls o  in  t h e i r  case on th e  g e n e ra l th e o ry  o f  c o n s t r u c t iv e  and l i b e r a l
160in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  R epub lica n  C o n s t i t u t io n s .
9 .6 8  However, in  a l l  cases th e  am b it o f  th e  " c o n s t i t u t io n a l -  
l im i t a t i o n s "  was n o t th e  same. The o n ly  common p ro v is io n  in  re s p e c t o f  th e  
r i g h t  o f  " r e p re s e n ta t io n "  o f  th e  d e ta in e e  was a ls o  p ro v id e d  in  a l l  cases 
w ith  th e  a d d i t io n a l  s a fe g u a rd  th a t  such re p re s e n ta t io n  s h a l l  be 
" c o n s id e re d "  by an " a d v is o r y "  body -  " t r i b u n a l "  o r  "a d v is o ry  b o a rd " .
In  a l l  cases , how ever, th e  independence o f  th e  body was n o t e q u a lly  o r  
a d e q u a te ly  se cu re d . The p ro v is io n  o f  a t im e - l im i t  on d e te n t io n s  
appeared in  d i f f e r e n t  C o n s t i tu t io n s  in  v a r io u s  fo rm s  b u t in  a l l  Asian 
s ta te s  i t  was l in k e d  to  th e  p ro v is io n  o f  th e  " c o n s id e r a t io n "  o f  th e  
re p re s e n ta t io n  by th e  a d v is o ry  b o a rd , whose o p in io n  had b in d in g  fo rc e  in  
I n d ia ,  P a k is ta n  and B ang lad esh . In  v ie w  o f  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  te rm  
" p re v e n t iv e  d e te n t io n "  was used b u t n o t d e f in e d  in  eve ry  Commonwealth 
Asian C o n s t i tu t io n  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  con tend  th a t  th e  in t e r p o s i t io n  o f  
th e  a d v is o ry  boa rd  was a ls o  meant to  v e s t th e  " u l t im a te  s u b je c t iv e  
s a t is f a c t io n "  in  i t ;  t h i s  was meant to  c u r t a i l  th e  scope o f  th e  "p r im a ry  
s u b je c t iv e  s a t is f a c t io n "  o f th e  e x e c u t iv e ,  which v e s te d  in  th e  l a t t e r
161a c c o rd in g  to  " s u b je c t iv e  s a t is f a c t io n  th e o ry "  accepted  in  c o lo n ia l  la w .
L ik e  th e  " C o n s t i t u t io n a l - l im i t a t io n  th e o ry "  t h i s  aspect o f  th e  
c o n s t i t u t io n a l  s a fe g u a rd , which was common, a c c o rd in g  to  u s , to  a l l  
Asian C o n s t i t u t io n a l  B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts ,  has a ls o  n o t been n o t ic e d  in  any 
j u r i s d i c t i o n .  As a r e s u l t  th e  ju d ic ia r y  in  M a la y s ia  re fu s e d  to  f o l lo w  
In d ia n  c a se -la w  by m a g n ify in g  th e  im p o rta n ce  o f  d i f fe r e n c e  in  c e r ta in  
p r o v is io n s  o f  th e  two B i l l s  o f  R ig h ts ,  nam e ly , th e  " a d v is o r y "  n a tu re  o f
th e  B o a rd ’ s o p in io n  and th e  o m iss io n  o f  th e  word "p ro c e d u re "  in  the
162p ro v is io n  d e fin in g  personal l ib e r t y ,  in  M a la y s ia .
9 .6 9  The le g is la t i v e  measures enac ted  in  a l l  s ta te s  d e l ib e r a te ly  used 
th e  language o f  E n g lis h  w a rtim e  measures ( a ls o  a p p e a rin g  in  th e  lo c a l  
C o lo n ia l le g is la t io n  e ve ryw h e re ) to  in v o k e  th e  w e l l - e s ta b l is h e d  " s u b je c t iv e
s a t is fa c t io n  theory". Although there was scope to construe the provision
163to exclude i t s  operation in some cases th is  was not done. In A fr ic a ,
in Tanganyika and Ghana, preventive detention was provided by Parliamentary
enactments as in In d ia  and also carr ied  the same t i t l e ,  Preventive
Detention Acts. However, in Ghana and also in  Pakistan (under the
Security of Pakistan Act) there were a lte rn a t iv e  provisions fo r  " re s t r ic t io n  
164orders" a lso. In Sri Lanka, "detention" could be
provided by subsidiary le g is la t io n .^ ^ [n  A fr ica ,  in other s ta tes ,
a lte rn a t iv e  re s t ra in ts  of " re s t r ic t io n "  and "detention" were provided,
a lb e i t  under subsidiary le g is la t io n ,  the "regulations" ( in  Kenya, Zambia
166and Malawi, made under the Preservation of Public Security Ordinance).
There were also enacted The Emergency Powers Acts in  Ghana, N ig e r ia ,  Uganda
and Zambia which contemplated the making of "regulations" and in a l l  cases
these regulations provided, in te r  a l i a , fo r  "deportation" which, as we have
167e a r l i e r  pointed out, was an unfortunate co lon ia l legacy.
9 .70 Although the provision o f preventive detention in  a l l  cases, 
whether under Parliamentary enactment or subsidiary le g is la t io n ,  was 
saddled with the co n s t itu t io n a l safeguard o f the r ig h t  of representation  
fo r  the detainee, the v i t a l i t y  o f the safeguard was undoubtedly affected
by the status of the instruments in each case. I t  i s ,  however, in te re s t in g  
to note th a t  in  In d ia  in 1975 a l l  normal c o n s t i tu t io n a l  safeguards were 
"tem porarily" removed ("suspended") by amending the Maintenance of In te rn a l  
Security Act 1971 but th is  process was ju s t i f i a b le  only as a resu lt  of
the amendment of the Constitution i t s e l f  to enable such temporary
• • u  • ^  168provision being made.
(v ) £errorisrn _and J_aui
9.71 In Northern Ire la n d ,  the problem o f terrorism  s t i l l  poses a serious 
th rea t to "s ta te -s e c u r ity " ;  in  Malaysia also the th rea t has not completely 
vanished. In A fr ica ,  p a r t ic u la r ly ,  the Mau Mau re b e l l io n  in  Kenya posed
a serious th rea t to the co lon ia l ru le  th ere . In  a l l  t e r r i t o r i e s  almost 
s im ila r  types of measures were enacted but in Northern Ire lan d  there is  now
o r  a
U -1
i
a s h i f t  in  emphasis on the aspect of "s o c ia l-s e c u rity "  and, in  preference
to  "preventive d e ten tio n ", measures are taken now fo r  the  c rim in a l
169prosecution of those involved in  acts of te rro ris m . However, the
basic problem of d en ia l o f human r ig h ts  comes to the surface when action
is  taken , of necessity , not only in  id e n tify in g  and is o la t in g  the suspect
but in  "hunting" him and other suspects a lso . Powers of a rres t and
detention fo r  "questioning" and " in te rro g a tin g "  such suspects are not only
170provided in  ample measure but are often  misused. The in te rp o s it io n
of the m il ita r y  in  the law-enforcement process accentuates fu r th e r  the
s e v e rity  o f the measures. Moreover, a f a i r  t r i a l  according to  the
estab lished  common law norms (p o p u la rly  c a lle d  the B r it is h  standard of
171ju s tic e ) in  " te r r o r is t  offences" is  d i f f i c u l t  to  obtain in  a l l  cases.
In  other words i t  is  again the c o lo n ia l stance of " le g a lity "  th a t is
adopted, by modifying the ru le s  of evidence and t r i a l  procedure. The
la rg e r question, whether a " te r r o r is t"  is  a "c rim in a l"  under in te rn a t io n a l
law, does not admit of a simple and unequivocal answer in  view of recent
172developments o f the law in  th is  f i e ld .  So, a l l  th a t can possibly be 
said em phatically is  th a t a le g a l so lu tion  of a p o l i t ic a l  problem is  not 
easy and s a tis fa c to ry .
I l l . Conclusion? a p lea fo r  in fus ion  of "humanitarianism" 
in to  n a tio n a l le o a l systems -  in te g ra tio n  of "value" and " le o a l"
concepts
(1 ) General prospects
9 .72  I f  the present p o s ition  in  respect o f " p o l i t ic a l  detentions" is  a
tru e  in d ic a to r  o f fu tu re  prospects fo r  personal l ib e r ty  in  the New
Commonwealth then i t  must be admitted th a t they are not b r ig h t . Ue have
already quoted at some length re le v an t s ta t is t ic s  in  connection w ith the
s itu a tio n  obtain ing in  Northern Ire la n d  which has a sp ec ia l dimension of 
173" te rro rism ". However, i t  i s  in te re s tin g  to  note th a t the f u t i l i t y  of 
the p e rs is ten t end in te n s iv e  experim entation in  " le g a lity "  and "legalism ", 
coupled with B r ita in 's  accession to  the European Convention, is
c o n tr ib u tin g  to  th e  growing r e a l is a t io n  o f th e  need to  in te g ra te  the
" le g a l concept" with the value-concept" o f personal l ib e r t y .  This is
m anifested in  the recommendations of the Gardiner Committee which have
174u n fo rtu n ate ly  not been accepted in  to to . They inc lude measures such
as a "re -se ttlem en t scheme" fo r  the detainees and also payment o f money
175to  persons released or about to be re leased . These measures apparently
aimed at th e ir  m a te ria l r e h a b il ita t io n  and, a lb e it  r ig h t ly ,  drew a
d is t in c t io n  between a te r r o r is t  and other " p o l i t ic a l  o ffen d ers". But,
the use of v io lence is  as much a menace to  "s o c ia l-s e c u rity "  as i t  is  to
" s ta te -s e c u r ity " . There is  thus a prim a fa c ie  case to pay p a r t ic u la r
a tte n tio n  to the " te r r o r is t"  also to  see i f  he is  to  be considered as a
s ick  person, needing re fo im -th erap y . Obviously such an approach postulated
th a t not only was p o s t - t r ia l  treatm ent in  respect o f a t e r r o r is t  to  be
given a "hum anitarian" b ia s , but the le g a l norms involved in  the process of
"hunting" him -  a rre s t, questioning , in te rro g a tio n  and t r i a l ,  also requ ire
to  be s im ila r ly  tre a te d . Indeed, i t  has been r ig h t ly  observed th a t the
176le g a l norms now employed are only a step short o f m a rt ia l law .
9 .7  3 Turning now to  the A frican and Asian panorama revealed in  the
Amnesty In te rn a t io n a l Report o f 1977, we fin d  a d if fe re n t  pattern  of 
177events . The incidence o f p o l i t ic a l  detentions has not assumed any 
importance under m il ita r y  r u le ,  except in  Bangladesh. In  Duly 1976 a 
delegation of the Amnesty In te rn a t io n a l which v is ite d  the country 
expressed concern about the conditions of p o l i t ic a l  detainees estim ated  
between 10,000 and 15 ,000 . In  the lo c a l press i t  was reported on 19th 
February 1977 th a t out of 36,685 in  d eten tion , only o n e -f i f th  had been 
t r ie d  and convicted by Special T ribunals  set up under M a r t ia l Law 
R egulation. Objection has also been taken to the t r i a l  procedure and 
sentences of execution. In  1976-77 "a la rg e  number of people" were 
sentenced by m il ita ry  tr ib u n a ls  and executed, but they were charged with 
"armed robbery". In  Ghana e ig h t persons were t r ie d  by m il ita r y
tr ib u n a l in  May 1976, of whom f iv e  were sentenced to death. In  Uganda,
i t  is  a lleged th a t "several thousands" were k i l le d  by the secu rity  forces
during 1976-77; th a t the problem is  one of "government-sanctioned k i l l in g s "
and " to rtu re "  and not o f d e ten tio n s . In  Kenya there mere less than ten
p o l i t ic a l  deta inees. In  Malawi in  August 1976 and also in  e arly  1977,
more than 1000 persons were deta ined, on each occasion, fo r  varying
periods; i t  i s  alleged th a t several persons have been held fo r  more
than 10 years . In  Zambia 15 u n iv e rs ity  students were arrested  in  1976
but they were re leased w ith in  a few months. In  Dune 1977, in  Pakistan , i t
was alleged th a t 50,000 persons had been arrested  under orders o f the
c iv i l ia n  government and th a t although 13,000 persons were "detained" a l l
o f them except a "few hundred" had been re leased . I t  i s  claimed th a t in
M alaysia "several hundreds" are s t i l l  in  d eten tio n , some fo r  the la s t  13
years . In  Singapore, there  are 40 " p o l i t ic a l  prisoners" some of whom
have been held fo r  10 years . In  both s ta tes  widespread use by the p o lice
of "public  confessions" has created a serious problem. The Communist
Party is  i l l e g a l  in  these two s ta tes  and the law operates harshly against
" p o l i t ic a l  suspects" who are also la b e lle d  as "communist suspects".
In  S ri Lanka i t  is  a lleged th a t in  May 1977 there were 2000 p o l i t ic a l
deta inees. In  October 1976, 18,000 persons were arrested  a f te r  an
in s u rre c tio n  but out of these 11,500 persons were released and 3,872 were
charged and t r ie d  by a s p ec ia l "Commission". In  In d ia  an emergency was
declared in  Dune 1975. In  the general e le c tio n s  in  March 1977 the ru lin g
Congress Party was replaced by the Danata Party a t the Centre and in  Duly
1977 the new Home M in is te r announced in  Parliam ent th a t 34,630 persons
178had been detained during the emergency.
(2 ) Some suggestions? "Humanitarian" C o n s titu tio n a l Safeguards and 
Commonwealth Habeas Corpus Court
9 .7 4  The events in  In d ia  provide a key to  the so lu tion  of the problem 
in  the New Commonwealth. The svents bear out our assertion th a t i t  is  
wrong to  assume th a t in  the scale o f t r a d it io n a l  values , in  Asia and
A fr ic a , personal l ib e r ty  is  not ra ted  h ig h ly . The t r a d it io n a l  s o c ie tie s
may not have absorbed western values but in  the Asian and A frican
so c ie tie s  and p o l i t ie s  the a rb itra ry  use of power has not been to le ra te d .
In  the west the humanitarian law is  based on C h ris tian  p ie ty ; in  In d ia
the  concept of dharma in fuses "hum anitarianism ". Indeed modern Indian
leaders have themselves advised the world to  fo llo w  dharma so th a t peace
179might re ign  in  the w orld. trthen they fa i le d  to fo llo w  the precept
themselves they lo s t peace at home. The new leaders have re a lis e d  the
need, in  e f fe c t ,  to  in te g ra te  the "value-concept" with the " le g a l concept"
of personal l ib e r ty  and have proposed amendment o f the C o n s titu tio n . In
the Amendment B i l l  i t  i s  in te r  a l ia  proposed th a t there  cannot be any
proclamation of emergency unless the in te rn a l disturbance amounts to
armed re b e llio n ; the r ig h t  to  move the court fo r  the enforcement o f the
r ig h t  to personal l ib e r ty  cannot be suspended during emergency and th a t
there cannot be preventive detention in  any case fo r  more than two months
without the opinion of the Advisory Board which, i t  is  proposed, w i l l  now
I SO
be headed by a s i t t in g  judge of the appropriate High Court.
9 .75  I t  i s  submitted th a t thess provisions adequately s u it  the other 
Asian and A frican s ta tes  but In d ia  can borrow the wholesome safeguards 
a va ilab le  under the e x is tin g  C o n s titu tio n a l provisions in  some other s ta te s . 
The tr ia n g le  of "value-process" is  common to  a l l  p o l i t ic a l  systems. The 
th ree  "value-concepts" o f " s ta te -s e c u r ity " , "s o c ia l-s e c u rity "  and 
"human r ig h ts "  have to  be properly balanced, fo r  which i t  is  necessary to  
ensure th a t a proper order o f alignment obtains between the e x is tin g  
in s t i tu t io n s .  A common model of norms of " re s tra in ts "  and "safeguards" is  
necessary fo r  a l l  s ta te s . The model should r e f le c t  "hum anitarian"  
values and, besides inc lu d in g  the provisions in d ica ted  above (proposed 
in  In d ia ) ,  i t  should also inc lude the fo llo w in g  as C o n s titu tio n a l  
safeguards:
a) There should be no "peacetime law" fo r  preventive detention end 
even in  the "emergency law" norms o f re s tra in ts  should be 
f le x ib le ,  p e rm ittin g  use of le n ie n t measures l ik e  " re s tr ic t io n s "  
in  s u itab le  cases.
b) Provision fo r  detention should eschew eny wide delegation of 
power.
c) A maximum period (ap p lica b le  in  a l l  cases) should be prescribed .
d) There should be, in  the case o f d e ten tio n , a p o s itiv e  in ju n c tio n  
against the to rtu re  o f p o l i t ic a l  deta inees, and also provision  
fo r  wholesome conditions of detentions being ensured, by 
appropriate means (such as reg u lar v is i t s  by independent 
"Inspection Committees" and implementation of th e ir  
recommendations)•
e) There should be express p ro h ib itio n  against detention  
incommunicado. A ll  cases of detentions, w ith necessary 
p a rt ic u la rs , should be published in  o f f ic i a l  g azettes .
f )  During the period of d e ten tio n , appropriate f in a n c ia l assistance  
should be provided to  the fam ily  of the detainee fo r  i t s  
maintenance.
g) There should be provision fo r  adequate compensation to  be paid  
to  the deta inee, which may be in  the form of liq u id a te d  damages.
9 .76  There may be some d i f f ic u l t y  about habeas corpus: opinions may
d i f f e r  on the question whether suspension of the  w r it  should be to t a l ly
p ro h ib ited  or whether the r ig h t  o f suspension may be confined to the
le g is la tu re . Indeed, the r ig h t  to "reg u la te" the c iv i l  and p o l i t ic a l
r ig h ts  o f i t s  c it iz e n s  end even a lie n s , and also the  r ig h t to  adm inister law
aid  ju s tic e  against any person w ith in  the te r r i to r y  o f any S ta te , are the
two ch ie f a ttr ib u te s  o f sovereignty which vests in  the S ta te . I t  w i l l  be
ju r is p ru d e n tia lly  unsound to  contemplate a to t a l  d e n ia l of the r ig h t  of
the State to "reg u la te" personal l ib e r t y .  I t  is  necessary, however, to
ensure th a t the power o f review  by the courts is  not excluded in  any casB
e ith e r  expressly or by the use of the s o -ca lled  "sub jective  s a tis fa c tio n
clauses". The ju d ic ia ry  in  common law ju r is d ic t io n s  is  the u ltim a te
le v e l of operation of the "value-process". I t  is  tru e  th a t ,  u n like  the
English judges, in  the New Commonwealth the judges, being la rg e ly
unaided by "public  op in ion", f in d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  operate the "value-
process" in  a s im ila r  manner, but fo r  th a t other measures are necessary,
such as, fo r t i f y in g  and expanding the base of the "media", encouraging
the development of pressure groups and also e s tab lis h in g  reg io n a l 
in s t itu t io n s  comparable to  the European Convention in  Asia and A fr ic a .  
However, i t  is  not suggested th a t there is  no scope in  any ju r is d ic t io n ,  
to  improve the " le g a l” in s t itu t io n s  to  secure in  a "b e tte r"  way the  
"independence of the ju d ic ia ry " . I t  is  also not suggested th a t by and 
large the  ju d ic ia ry  has not f u l f i l l e d  i t s  t r a d it io n a l  ro le  o b je c tiv e ly  
as in  many cases i t  has ordered the re lease of p o l i t ic a l  detainees  
p a r t ic u la r ly  when i t  could avoid a confrontation with the le g is la tu r e .  
Rather, i t  is  enigm atic th a t th is  obvious ju d ic ia l  concern fo r  " s ta te -  
s ecu rity"  went unnoticed by the executive and the le g is la tu re  and concern 
at both these le v e ls  to  c u r ta i l  ju d ic ia l  review remained unabated in  a l l  
sta tes  even a f te r  independence. P ossib ly, the ju d ic ia ry  is  considered 
as a "western" in s t i tu t io n ,  and th e re fo re , not tru s te d .
9.77 The idea  o f "world habeas corpus" as the " le g a l u ltim a te  fo r  the
181u n ity  of mankind" has indeed much to  commend i t s e l f .  I t  is  tru e  th a t  
the growth o f the in te rn a t io n a l system under the new world order has 
made i t  possible fo r  the Common Law tra d it io n  to  p re v a il over the C iv i l  
Law tra d it io n  but a beginning may perhaps be made with g reater success i f  
the idea  is  pursued f i r s t  w ith the in s t itu t io n  of the Commonwealth 
Habeas Corpus Court and, to  s ta r t  w ith , A frican and Asian c irc u its  may be 
allowed to  function  as independent u n its  co n stitu ted  under re g io n a l 
t r e a t ie s  between the respective  s ta te s . Such an e n te rp ris e  w i l l  
obviously make eas ier the blending of western and t r a d it io n a l  values of 
the respective  regions leading to  the re a lis a t io n  of the innate  "worth 
of the  [human] person" and to  a b rig h te r prospect fo r  personal l ib e r ty  
in  those reg ions.
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V isu a l P u b lic ity , New D elh i (Veerendra P r in te rs , New D e lh i) .
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63. Ordinance No. 25 o f 1947, cap. of the Legal Enactments o f Ceylon, 
1956.
64. See in f r a , . S A
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p a r a l le l  to c l (7 ) of A rt. 22 o f the Indian C o n s titu tio n .
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Notes of vol. II
CHAPTER 6  (paras 6.1 to 6 . 8 8 : pages 1 to 56 ) .
1 . The p o l i t i c a l  h is to ry  of the peninsula could be traced with some
c erta in ty  as fa r  back as 600-700 B.C. when the beginnings of the Indian  
in fluence could be seen. However, there is  no doubt tha t Singapore 
(o r ig in a l ly  known as Tumasek) was founded in  1200-1300 A.D. by an 
Indian Prince from Sumatra, whose descendant Prince Parameswara, l a t e r  
moved to the mainland and founded Malacca in  1402 A.D. The continu ity  
was maintained when the B r i t is h  came to In d ia  but the connection with 
B r i t is h  Ind ia  was snapped by s.1 of the S t ra i ts  Settlements Act 1866 by
v ir tu e  o f which B r it is h  Malaya ceased to be a part of B r it is h  India, 
(see, genera lly , L.A. Sheridan (e d .)  Malay and Singapore, the Borneo 
T e r r ito r ie s :  Development of th e ir  laws and C o n s titu tio n s , pp.xv and 3 ,4  
( v o l .9 , Br.C.ld. s e r ie s ) .
2. The im portant provisions of M alaysia C onstitu tion  which were adopted 
in  Singapore were -  A rts . 5-12, P art I I  (Fundamental L ib e rtie s ) and 
A rts . 149-151, Parts XI (S p ec ia l powers against subversion and 
emergency powers). However, in  Singapore a l l  these provisions could 
be amended by the Singapore le g is la tu re  l ik e  ord inary law by v ir tu e  
of s .6 (2 ) o f the Singapore Independence Act.
3. See in f r a , o r . ^ ^ e t seq.
4. Richard C lutterbuck, Riot and Revolution in  Singapore and Malaya, p .33.
5. Harry M i l le r ,  Ounqle War in  Malaya, p .27.
6 . Ib id . , pp .27-28.
7 . Richard C lutterbuck, o p .c i t . , p .37.
8. Harry M i l le r ,  o p .c it . .  p .30.
9 . I b i d . . p p .18-19, 37.
10. I b i d . , p .194.
Ib id . . p .48.
12. Richard C lutterbuck, o p .c i t . , p . 274.
13. See in f r a  p r .6.67 ( ASSA SINGH) .
14. See Crl.Proc.Codes (Amendment) Ordinance 1955 (No. 217 o f 1955 of 
Fedn. of M alaya).
15. See, Report of the Federation of Malaya C o n s titu tio n a l Commission, p r.23  
(HMSO, London, 1957).
16. Ib id . , p .34.
16a. Notwithstanding the wide powers ava ilab le  under the 1948 OIC and also
the Agreement, in  the long t i t l e  of the Ordinance i t  was s ta ted  th a t the  
power to make regulations was conferred on the High Commissioner fo r  
"emergency or public  danger" . (The last-m entioned underlined  
expressions, i t  is  to be noted, were not used in  the 1939 O IC ).
Indeed in  substantive provision ( s . 3) also the same expressions used 
in  the Ordinance, possibly to  ju s t i fy  the wide amplitude o f the power.
17. C f. UK, Emergency Powers Act 1920 (s s . 1 and 2) and Emergency Powers 
Order in  Council 1939 ( s #6 (1 ) ) ;  see also A rt. 149, C o n stitu tio n  of 
M alaysia.
18. See supra, p r .4 J ° -5*X
19. Richard C lutterbuck, o p .c i t . , p .175.
20. See in f r a ,  p r .8 . ^
21. See supra, pr.gj. / j
22. In  1950, by Amendment No. 13, c l . ( 3 )  of Reg.17 was amended to  make 
i t  the"duty" of the Chairman of the advisory board to  inform the  
ob jector of the "grounds" and such other "p a rtic u la rs "  as he 
considered s u ff ic ie n t  to enable the objector to "present" h is  case; 
see also n .2 3 , below, fo r  procedure under the new Reg.17 of the 1951 
R egulations.
23. In  i t s  new form in  the 1951 Regulations, Reg.17 appeared as a crude 
amalgam of o ld  and new provis ions. Some of the new fea tu res  deserve 
to  be noticed:
( i )  clause (1 ) (a )  was saddled with a new proviso which authorised the 
Chief Secretary to make a " fu rth e r  order" fo r  a " fu rth e r  period  
not exceeding two years";
( i i )  under new clause ( 1 ) ( c) the detainee could, a f te r  expiry o f 18 
months, "request" th a t h is  case be "reviewed by the Chief 
S ecretary". The la t t e r  could, i f  he thought f i t ,  re fe r  any 
case to a "Committee o f Review" fo r  "consideration and advice" , 
( i i i )  The bad draftsmanship of the new Reg.17 was re fle c te d  in  the
provision of clause ( 3 ) .  In  apparent c o n flic t  with clause (1 ) (c )  
i t  empowered the Committee to "consider and decide" and fu rth e r  
said th a t i t s  "decision" should be " f in a l" .  Clause (4A) also  
added to the confusion by e lab o ra tin g  the scope of the "decis ion". 
Clause (3 A) was saddled with a proviso which authorised the 
Committee Chairman to re fe r  "any p a r t ic u la r  case" to  a Commission 
fo r  "consideration and decis ion".
( i v )  The new Reg.17A added a proviso th a t the Chief Secretary could
allow  the detainee to have h is  ob jection  heard by the appropriate  
Committee in  the Colony (S ingapore). Apart from i t s  e x tra ­
t e r r i t o r i a l  operation which was favourable to the detainee and 
was not l ik e ly  to  be challenged, i t  also su ffered  from the  
defect of a s im ila r  " c o n flic t"  in  th a t the new clause (1 ) (c )  had 
abrogated the r ig h t  to make "o b jectio n ".
24. See supra. pr.4« \ o S"
25. See ib id . ,  p r .4 -  1^9
26. Harry M i l le r ,  o p .c i t . .  p p .49-50.
27. Cmnd. 5847, p r.7 0 ; see also supra, p r. 4- 6*
28. In f r a , pr.6-4^1
29.  I b i d . , p r . 6 . i " /
30. A grossly extended notion of v ica rio u s  c rim in a l l i a b i l i t y  was 
introduced making the in h ab itan ts  o f any area l ia b le  as a body fo r  
certa in  offences committed w ith in  the area. In  a democratic form 
of government the "fundamental l ib e r t ie s "  of the c it iz e n s  as a body 
could not n a tu ra lly  be tampered w ith in  a despotic manner with such 
wide power of punishment derogating from the basic p r in c ip le s  of 
Rule of Law. In  1951, the scope of the punishment which, u n t i l  
then, could be e ith e r  f in e  or closure of one or more shops in  the  
area, was widened by the new Reg.17D(2). I t  provided fo r  "detention  
in  custody" and expressly barred "appeal". The only safeguard  
being non-app lication  of the provision to fe d e ra l c it iz e n s  and 
B r it is h  subjects with a fu r th e r  provision th a t the Chief Secretary  
could suspend, on cond itions, the operation of the order at h is  
d is c re tio n .
31. See supra, pr.1.5"^
32. I b i d . . p r .1 . - ^
33. Sheridan, o p .c i t . (supra, n .1 ) ,  p .11.
34 and 35. [1875] L.R . 6 P .C .381, 392-94.
36. See supra, p r .1 .7  3
37. See, ss.9 and 10, Courts Ordinance 1907.
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39. See supra, p r . 1 . 9 3
40. Sheridan, o p .c i t . ,  p .20.
41. I b i d . . p .19.
42. See Courts Enactment, (Ordinance No. 14 of 1918; Cap.27 Laws of 
Federated Malaya States 1935 }  s s .3 ( i ) ( a )  and s .50^
43. Cap.113 of Singapore S tatutes 1970 (c a p .21 of Laws o f S tra its  
Settlements 1936) .
44. Cap. 6 of 1935 Laws of the Federated Malaya S ta tes , 1935.
45. See M a l la l ’ s C rim inal Procedure, p .526; s .317 did not expressly  
sta te  th a t the common law r ig h t to the w rit was abrogated.
46. ss.317 and 325 o f 1970 ed itio n  re-enacted the provisions of
ss.386 and 396 of 1936 e d it io n .
47. C f . s . 491, Indian C rim inal Procedure Code 1898; see supra, p r. 5~-SZT
48. See supra, p r .5 .
48a. By 1976 C o n s titu tio n a l amendment ( in  M alaysia) the safeguard
guaranteed by A r t .5 was denied, with re tro sp ective  e f fe c t ,  to a 
person "arrested  or detained or placed under re s tr ic te d  
residence under any law re la t in g  to  the safety of the Federation".
(see, Amnesty In te rn a tio n a l Report 1977, p .1 98 ).
49. See, Report of the C o n s titu tio n a l Commission, o p .c i t . ( supra, n .1 5 ) ,  
p r.161 : "These r ig h ts  which we recommend should be defined and 
guaranteed are a l l  f irm ly  estab lished now throughout Malaya and i t  
may seem unnecessary to give them a sp ec ia l p ro te c tio n " . The 
u nd erlin in g  is  meant to in d ica te  the im precision -  c f .  supra,
p r. 6 .3 9 .
50. L.A . Sheridan, "C o n s titu tio n a l Problems of M alaysia" [1964^ 13 I .C .L .Q . 
1349, 57; we do not agree with h is  in te rp re ta t io n  of the word "may" -  
c f . p r. 6 .43 ; see also , h is  Malaya and Singapore. . .Laws and 
C o n stitu tio n s , o p .c i t . ( supra, n .1 ) ,  p .48.
51. CHIA KHIN SZE, see in f r a , p r .6 .6 5 , n .63; see however, SURINDER SINGH 
( in f r a , p r .6 .6 9 , n .72) and ASSA SINGH ( in f r a , p r .6 .6 7 , n .6 7 ) .
52. See, Report o f C o n s titu tio n a l Commission, o p .c i t . , supra, p r.172 :
’The h is to ry  and continued existence of the present emergency show
th a t organised attempts to subvert c o n s titu tio n a l government by
violence or other unlawful means may have to be met at an ea r ly  stage 
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76. Decree No. 13 was made on 15th March 1971 and la t e r  re-enacted on 
4th October 1972 as Decree No. 26 but i t  was repealed by Decree No.
21 of 1973.
7 7 .  Decree No. 19 o f  1973 made on 24 th  August 1973.
78.
79.
80.
81 .
82.
83.
84.
85.
8 6 .
87.
8 8 .
89.
90. 
91 .
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
' 3G8
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See i b i d . . dated 14 .6 .76  (M a r t ia l  Law Regn. No. XVI  of 1976).
Decree No. 12 of 1973, made on 25th Dune, 1973.
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of the Decree and in  the case of "any member of the armed forces", ss.117, 
183, 212, 213, 235, 236, 272 and 279 of the Code, according to s . 3.
By Decree No. 5 of 1971 (The Constitution (M o d if ica tio n ) Decree) made 
on 12th March 1971, i t  was provided th a t  the designation of the  
" M i l i ta ry  Head of the State" be1, changed to "President" and th a t  
the President should be the Head of the State as w e ll  as of the 
Government and also the  C-in-C of the armed fo rces .
For ju d ic ia l  response to " M i l i ta ry  Tribuna ls"  in  Pakistan, see ft)JR.
(V f 3 .U 3 , 8-4Q
See supra, p r .8 .1 3 .
See, fo r  example, Decree No. 7 of 1971, s .1 ,  discussed below, c f .  n .99 .  
Decree No. 7 of 1971, made on 12th March, 1971.
I b i d . , see preamble and also s.1 which spoke of "detention as a re s u lt
of m i l i t a r y  operations consequent upon or in c id e n ta l  to the take-over  
of the power of the Government on the 25th day of January, 1971".
By s . 1(1) of Decree No. 31 of 1971, made on 11th September 1971 the
"six months1 t im e - l im i t "  was substitu ted  by "up to the 12th day of
December 1971 ."
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103. The persons detained under the various Decrees made from time to time
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as authorised under s . 3 ( f ) .  This inference fo llows from the fa c t  th a t  
both State Security (Detention of Persons) (R es tr ic ted  Revocation)
Decree (Decree No. 53 of 1966) and the State Security (Detention of 
Persons)( Revocation)(No.2) Decree (Decree No. 54) were made almost s ix  
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109. No. N.L.C.D. 161; i t  was made on 22nd September 1967 but by s . 3 
"deemed to have come in to  e f fe c t  on 17th day of A p r i l  1967", the
Decree was a c lassic  example of the extensive misuse of the power of
re tro a c t iv e  le g is la t io n  by the m i l i t a r y  r u le rs .
110. No. N .L.C .D . 386; s .1 (a )  provided th a t  a l l  persons held in  custody
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution under any of the
Decrees repealed by i t  and specified  in  i t s  schedule.
111. See N .L .C .D . 30; The Preventive Detention Act 1964 was repealed on 
5th A p r i l ,  1966.
112. No.N.R.C.D. 2, made on 17th January 1972 and signed by the Chairman of the 
N ationa l Redemption Council; s. 1 stated th a t each of the persons 
spec if ied  in  the schedule should be taken in to  "Preventive Custody".
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STATUTES AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS
United Kingdom
(a) General
Assize of Clarendon 
Magna Carta
Statutes of the Westminster the First (3 Edw I, c. 15)
Statute of Winchester
Magna Carta (confirmation, 25 Edw. I)
Statute of Westminster of the Liberties of London (28 Edw. Ill, c. 3)
The Justice of the Peace Act
Statute of Treason (1 & 2 Phil & Mar., c. 10)
Petition of Rights
The Habeas Corpus Act (16 Car I, c. 10)
The Habeas Corpus Act (31 Car II, c. 2)
Bill of Rights
7 & 8 Will III, c. 11 (sub. nom Habeas Corpus Suspension Act)
Act of Settlement 
Riot Act
39 Geo. Ill, c. 11.
39 & *+0 Geo. Ill, c. 20.
The Habeas Corpus Act (43 Geo. Ill, c. 140)
The Habeas Corpus Act (44 Geo. Ill, c. 102)
The Habeas Corpus Act (56 Geo. Ill, c. 100)
The Vagrancy Act
The Metropolitan Police Act
The Insurrection Act
The Metropolitan Police Act
The City of London Police Act
The Town Police Clauses Act
11 & 12 Viet., c. 20.
The Habeas Corpus Act (25 8c 26 Viet., c. 20)
The Colonial Laws Validity Act
The Extradition Act
The Prevention of Crimes Act
o  o  o
tl 0 0
1872 The Licensing Act
1879 The Army Discipline & Regulation Act
1887 The British Settlement Act
I89O The Foreign Jurisdiction Act
1908 The Prevention of Crime Act
1913 The Foreign Jurisdiction Act
1914 The Defence of the Realm Act (4 8c 5 Geo. V, c. 29)
1914 The Defence of the Realm (No.2) Act (4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 63)
1914 The Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act (5 Geo. V, c. 8)
1915 The Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) (Amendment) Act (5 Geo. V, c. 34]
1920 The liner gency Powers Act
1920 The Restoration of Order in Ireland Act 
1920 The Government of Ireland Act
1922 The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland)
1936 The Public Order Act
1939 The Emergency Powers Order in Council
1939 The Emergency Powers (Colonial Defence) Order in Council
1939 The Prevention of Violence (Temp. Provisions) Act
1939 The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act (2 8c 3 Geo. VI, c. 62)
1940 The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act (3 & 4 Geo. VI, c. 20)
1940 The Emergency Powers (Defence)(No.2) Act (3 & 4 Geo. VI, c. 45)
(1939-40) The Defence Regulation, No. l8B.
1945 The British Settlement Act
1948 The Criminal Justice Act
1952 The Magistrates' Courts Act
1956 The Magistrates' Courts (Appeals from Binding over order) Act
I960 The Administration of Justice Act
1964 The Police Act
1965 The Race Relations Act
1967 The Criminal Law Act
1967 The Fugitive Offenders Act
1967 The Criminal Justice Act
1968 The Justice of the Peace Act
1971 The Courts Act
1972 The Road Traffic Act
1972 The Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order
1973 The Criminal Courts Act;
1973 The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
t) o . i
197*+ The Prevention of Terrorism (Temp. Provisions) Act
197*+ The Prevention of Terrorism (Supplementary Temp. Provisions) Act
1975 The Northern Ireland (Emerg. Provns.) (Amendment) Act
1976 The Prevention of Terrorism (Temp. Provns.) Act
(b) Relating to Africa
Royal Charters
Patent Rolls, 12 Car II, part xxi 
2k Car II, part iii 
Africa Order in Council 1889 
British Central Africa Order in Council 1902 
East Africa Order in Council 1897
(c) Relating to India
Royal Charters
1600, 1609, l66l, 1668, 1698 Charters granted to the East India Company 
1726 Charter establishing Mayor's Courts in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras 
177*+ Charter establishing the first "Supreme Courts" in India (at Calcutta)
Acts
1772 The East India Company Act
1780 11 n 11 ti 11
178*+ 11 ti it ti 11
1797 The East India Act
1800 The Govt, of India Act
1813 The East India Company Act
1833 The Govt, of India Act
1853 The Govt, of India Act
1838 The Govt, of India Act
1861 The Indian Councils Act
1861 The Indian High Courts Act
1892 The Indian Councils Act
1909 The Indian Councils Act
1913 The Govt, of India Act
1916 it ii
1919 ti it
1935 ti 11
19*+7 The Indiem Independence Act
13 Geo. Ill, c.63 (sub.nom. The
Regulating Act)
21 Geo. Ill, c.70 (sub.nom. The
Settlement Act)
2k Geo. Ill, c.25 
37 Geo. Ill, c.l*+2 
39 8e kO Geo. Ill, c. 79 
k7 Geo. Ill, sess.2, c .58 
33 Geo. Ill, c. 155 
3 9c k Will. IV, c. 83 
16 & 17 Viet., c. 93 
21 8e 22 Viet., C.106 
2k & 25 Viet., c. 67 
" " c.lO*+
33 & 56 Viet., c. 1*+
9 Edw. VII, c. *+.
3 & 6 Geo. V, c. 6l 
6 8c 7 Geo. V, c. 37 
9 8c 10 Geo. V, c.101 
26 Geo. V 8c 1 Edw. VIII, c. 2.
India 
(a) Colonial era
Regulations
1793 Bengal Regulation No. XXII
iSok Bengal Regulation No. X
1818 Bengal Regulation No. III
1819 Madras Regulation No. II
1827 Bombay Regulation No. II
1827 ti " No. XXV
Ordinances
1919 Martial Law Ordinance 
19^3 Ordinance No. XIV
19^3 Martial Law. (Indemnity) Ordinance No. XVIII 
Central Acts
1850 State Prisoners Act (No. 3^)
1858 State Prisoners Act (No. 3)
1860 Indian Penal Code (Act No. ^5)
1861 Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 25 1*25)
1865 High Courts Criminal Procedure Amendment Act (No. 13)
1871 Criminal Tribes Act (No. 27)
1872 Code of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 10)
187^ Criminal Procedure Amendment Act (No.
1882 Criminal Procedure Code (Act No. 10)
1898 Criminal Procedure Code (Act No. 5)
1915 Defence of India Act
1915 Defence of India (Criminal Law Amendment) Act
1915 Defence of India (Consolidation) Rules 1915
1919 The Anarchial and Revolutionary Crimes Act 1919
1939 Defence of India Act
1939 Defence of India Rules 1939
19^6 Indian (Proclamation of Emergency) Act
Provincial Acts
1923 Goonda Act (Bengal)
1932 ” (United Provinces)
19^3 Habitual Offenders Act (Madras)
(b) Independence Era
Central
I9V 7 Bengal State Prisoners Regulation (Adaptation) Order 19^7 made by 
the Governor General under the Indian Independence Act 19^7)
1949 The Constitution of India
1950 Preventive Detention Act (No. IV)
1950 Ordinance No. 19
1950 Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act (No. 50)
1951 Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act (No. 4)
1951 The Constitution (First Amendment) Act
1952 The Repealing & Amending Act (No. 48)
1971 The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act 1971
1971 The Maintenance of Internal Security Act (No. 26)
1971 The Defence of India Act (No. 42) - renamed as The Defence and Internal
Security of India Act 1971 by Act No. 32 of 1975
1974 The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act (No.
1975 Ordinances No. 4, 7i 16
1975 The Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Act
1975 The Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendmdnt) Act
1975 The Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling 
Activities (Amendment) Act (No. 35)
1975 The Maintenance of Internal Security (Amendment) Act (No. 39)
1976 The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act
State (up to 19501 Provincial11) enactments
1947 Bombay Habitual Offenders Restriction Act
1948 Madras Habitual Offenders Act
1951 Bombay Police Act
Malaysia (Federated Malaya States/Federation of Malaya/Malay Union)
1935 - Laws of Federated Malaya States:
cap.2, Courts Enactment (Ordinance No. 14 of 1918) 
cap.6, Code of Criminal Procedure 
cap.39* Restricted Residence Enactment 
cap.45, Penal Code 
1937 Civil Law Enactment
1946 Malayan Union Order in Council
1947 Public Order Ordinance (No. l4)
1948 The Federation of Malaya Order in Council (UK,S.I.1948 No. 108)
1948 Fedn. of Malaya Agreement 1948
1948 Ordinance No. 4
The Bnergency Regulations Ordinance (No. 10)
Ordinance No. 13)
1948 The Emergency Regulations (made under Ordn. No. 10 of 1948) 
and amendments of 1949 and 1950
1948
1951
1955
1956
1956
I960
1964
1964
1964
1964
1969
1969
1952
1954
1956
1958
1958
1958
1958
1958
i960
1958
1958
1959
i960
I960
1962
1969
1969
1969
1969
1969
1971
1972
1973
1977
1977
The Emergency Regulation (Detention Order) Rules
The Emergency Regulations (re-enactment of 1948 Regulations)
Criminal Procedure Codes (Amendment) Ordinance (No. 21)
Civil Law Ordinance
Ordinance No. 4l
The Internal Security Act
Courts of Judicature Act
The Emergency (Essential Powers) Act
The Energency (Internal Security and Detention Order) Regulations 1964 
The Internal Security (Detained Persons Advisory Board) Rules 1964 
Th^ilmergency (public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance 
Ordinance No. 13.
Pakistan
The Security of Pakistan Act (No. XXXV)
Govt of India (Amendment) Act 
Constitution of Pakistan (First Republic)
East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance (No. LXXVIII)
The Security of Pakistan (Amendment) Act (No. XIII)
The Security of Pakistan (Second Amendment) Act (No. XLVI)
"Proclamation” by President Iskandar Mirza, dated 7th October
"Proclamation of Martial Law" by General Ayub Khan, dated 7th October
West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order
Laws (Continuation in Force) Order
Martial Law Regulation No. 1-A, 2 and 18
Ordinance No. XXXIX
Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order 
West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order 
Constitution of Pakistan (Second Republic)
"Proclamations of Martial Law" by General Yahya Khan, dated 31*3*69 
The Provisional Constitution Order 
Martial Law Regulations Nos. 2, 5 
Martial Law Orders, No. 8
The Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order 
"Proclamation" by President Yahya Khan, dated 20th December 
Interim Constitution of Pakistan 
Constitution of Pakistan (Third Republic)
The Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act (No. X)
"Proclamation of Martial Law" by General Zia-ul-Huq, dated 5th July
1977 Laws (Continuance in Force) Order (C.M.L.A.'s Order No. 1)
1977 Chief Martial Law Administrator’s Order Nos. 4, 5
1977 The Pakistan Array-
1977 Chief Martial Law Administrator’s Order No. 10(a)
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
1799 North Proclamations 
1801 Royal Charter of Justice
1810 " "
1811 " ’»
1830 Order in Council dated 11th November
1833 Royal Charter of Justice
1832 Ordinance No. 3
1883 Ordinances, Nos. 2 and 3
1889 Ordinance No. 1
1896 Order in Council
1947 Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 
1947 Ceylon Independence Act
1947 Ceylon (Independence) Order in Council
1956 Revised Edition of Legal Enactments of Ceylon:
Cap 6 - Courts Ordinance 
Cap 19- Penal Code 
Cap 20- Criminal Procedure Code 
Cap 40- Public Security Ordinance 
Cap 79- Civil Law Ordinance 
1959 The Public Security (Amendment) Act (No. 8)
1972 Constitution of Sri Lanka
1972 The Interpretation (Amendment) Act (No. l8)
Singapore (Straits Settlement)
Royal Charters of 1807, 1826 and 1853
1866 Straits Settlement Act
1868 Ordinance no. 5-
1878 Courts Ordinance
1907 Courts Ordinance (No. 30)
1948 The Bnergency Regulations Ordinance (No. 17)
1965 Singapore Independence Act
1955 The Preservation of Public Safety Ordinance (No. 25)
1970 Singapore Statutes :
Cap.113, Code of Criminal Procedure (cap. 21 of Laws of
St.Settlements 1936)
Cap.103, Penal Code
1972
1973
1973
1975
1975
1975
1976
1976
1977
1977
1876
1878
1883
1904
1927
1927
1932
1935
1935
1951
1957
1957
1958
I960
I960
I960
1963
1964
1964
1966
1966
1966
1966
1966
1966
1966
9 r
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Bangladesh 
Constitution of Bangladesh
The Constitution (Second Amendment) Act (No. XXIV)
"Proclamation” by President Khondkar M. Ahmed, dated 20th August 
Martial Law Regulations No. 1 of 1975 (dated 22nd August)
"Proclamation" by President A.M. Sayem, dated 8th November 
The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act (No. XI)
The Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order 
"Proclamation" by President A.M. Sayem, dated 29th November 
Martial Law Regulation, No. XXXIV 
The Proclamations (Amendment) Order
Ghana (Gold Coast)
The Supreme Courts Ordinance (No. 4)
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance (No. 8)
(No. 5)» cap.82, Laws of Gold Coast, 1920 
Chief's Ordinance (No.4), cap. 80, Laws of Gold Coast, 1920
Native Administration (colony) Ordinance (No.l8), cap 76, Laws of
,T . . , j... ~ Gold Coast 1936Native Jurisdiction Ordinance
Native Authority Ordinance (No. 2) (Northern Territories)
Native Authority Ordinance (No. 1)(Ashanti)
Native Courts Ordinance (No. 2)(Ashanti)
Laws of Gold Coast: 
cap.4, Courts Ordinance
The Emergency Powers Act (Act No.28)
The Preventive Detention Act
The Preventive Detention Act (No. 17)
Penal Code (Act No. 29)
Criminal Procedure Code (Act No. 30)
Courts Act
Punishment of Habitual Criminals Act 
The Preventive Detention Act (No. 240)
The Habeas Corpus Act (No. 244)
"Proclamation" dated 26th February by the National Liberation Council 
The Courts Decree (No. N.L.C.D. 84)
The Criminal Procedure Code (Araentment) Decree 1966 (No.N.L.C.D. 93)
The Law Enforcement (Powers of the Army) Decree (N.L.C.D.109)
The National Liberation Council (Protective Custody) Decree (N.L.C.D. 2)
The National Liberation Council (Protective Custody) (Amendment) Decree
(N.L.C.D.37 and 4l)
The National Liberation Council (Protective Custody) (Amendment) (No.8)
Decree- (N.L.C.D. 8l)
1966
1966
1967
1967
1969
1969
1972
1973
1975
1969
1969
1972
1901
1907
1914
1916
1937
1943
19^+8
1955
1955
1955
1958
1958
1958
1959
1959
I960
I960
1961
1961
The National Liberation Council (Protective Custody) (Consolidation
Decree (N.L.C.D. Ill)
The National Liberation Council (Protective Custody) (Consolidation)
(Amendment) Decree (N.L.C.D. 144)
Decree No. 24, dated 21st June
The National Liberation Council (Protective Custody) Decree (N.L.C.D.l6l)
The Constitution (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Decree
(N.L.C.D.406)
The Constitution of Ghana (Second Republic)
The National Redemption Council (Establishment) Proclamation 1972 
The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Decree (N.R.C.D.236)
Executive Instrument No. 155
The Constituent Assembly (Amendment) Decree (N.L.C.D.38O)
The Release of Persons from Custody Decree (N.L.C.D.386)
The Preventive Custody Decree (N.R.C.D. 2)
Nigeria
Proclamations Nos. 15» 25 and 26 of the Southern Protectorate 
Proclamation No. 2 of the Northern Protectorate 
The Native Courts Ordinance (No. 8)
The Native Authority Ordinance (No. l4)
The Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance CNo. 37)
The Native Authority Ordinance (No.17)» cap.l40, Laws of Nigeria 1948.
Laws of Federation and Lagos:
cap. 211, Supreme Courts Ordinance
High Court Law (Act No. 8 of Northern Region)
High Court Law (Act No. 27 of Eastern Region)
Magistrates Courts Law (Act No. 10 of Eastern Region)
Laws of Federation and Lagos,
cap. 42, Penal Code
cap. 43, Criminal Procedure Code
Habeas Corpus Law (Act No. 24, cap. 42, Laws of Western Region, 1959)
The Children and Young Persons Law (Act No. Northern Region)
Law of England (Application) Law (Act No. Western Region, cap.60)
The Nigeria-(Constitution)(Amendment No.3) Order in Council (UK, S.1.1959
No, 1772)
The Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council (U.K.,S.I. I960, No.1652) 
District Court Law (Act No. 15; Northern Region)
The Emergency Powers Act (Federal Act No. 1)
The Administration of Justice (Habeas Corpus) Act (Act No. 49 of
Federation)
1962 The Emergency Powers (Jurisdiction) Act
1962 The Emergency Powers (General) Regulations, Legal Notice no. 54 of 1962
1962 The Emergency Powers (Detention of Persons) Regulations, ” 64 of 1962
1962 The Emergency Powers (Restriction Orders) Regulations, ” 65 of 1962
1963 Constitution of Nigeria (Republican)
1963 Laws of North Nigeria
cap.30, Criminal Procedure Code 
cap.89, Penal Code
1966 The Detention of Persons Edict No. 11
1967 Edict No. 15 of the Military Governor of the Western Nigeria
1967 The Armed Forces and Police (Special Powers) Decree 1967
1968 Decree No. 45 of Federal Military Government
1966 Decree No. 1, dated 17th January (Constitution (Suspension and
Modification) Decree)
1966 Decree No. 3* dated 8th February (The State-Security (Detention of
Persons) Decree)
1966 Decree No. 34, dated 24th May
1970 Decree No. 28, dated (Federal Military Government (Supremacy
smd Enforcement of Powers) Decree)
1966 Decree No. 53 (The State-Security (Detention of Persons) (Restricted
Revocation) Decree)
1966 Decree No. 54 (The State-Security (Detention of Persons) (Revocation No.2
Decree)
1967 Special Powers Decree
Kenya
1930 The Native Tribunal Ordinance (No. 29)
1937 Ordinance No. 2
1958 Kenya (Constitution) Order in Council (U.K., S.I. 1958 no. 600)
I960 The Preservation of Public Security Act (Ordinance No. 2 of i960)
1963 The Kenya Independence Order in Council (U.K., S.I.1963 No. 1968)
1966 The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) (No. 3) Act (Act No. l8)
1966 The Public Security (Detained and Restricted) Persons Regulations
1967/1968 Revised Laws: cap. 75, Criminal Procedure Code
cap. 57, The Preservation of Public Security Act
1969 Constitution of Kenya (Act No. 5 of 1969)
1970 Revised Laws, cap. 30, Penal Code
Uganda
1902 Uganda Order in Council
1919 Ordinance No. 17
1951 Revised Laws:
cap.24, Criminal Procedure Code (Ordinance Nos. 13 and 43) 
cap.60, Habitual Criminal (Preventive Detention) Act
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1962 The Judicature Ordinance (No. 62 of 1962)
1963 The Uganda (Independence) Order in Council (U.K., S.I. 1963 No. 2175)
1963 The Constitution (Amendment) Act (No. 61)
1964 Revised Laws: cap. 106, Penal Code
cap. 107, Criminal Procedure Code 
cap. 307, The Emergency Powers Act
1967 The Constitution of Uganda (Republican)
1971 "Proclamation” dated 2nd February by General Idi Amin Dada
1971 Decree No. 7 dated 12th March (The Detention (Prescription of Time
Limit) Decree)
1971 Decree No. 15 dated 7th May (The Detention (Prescription of Time Limit)
(Amendment) Decree)
1971 Decree No. 31» dated 11th September 
1971 The Armed Forces (Powers of Arrest) Decree
1971 The Constitutions (Modification) Decree (No. 5* dated 12th March)
1973 The Trial by Military Tribunals Decree (No. 12, dated 25th June)
1973 The Military Police (Powers of Arrest) Decree 1973
Tanzania (Tanganyika)
1920 Tanganyika Order in Council
1929 Ordinance No. 5
i960 Tanganyika Order in Council
1962 The Preventive Detention Act (Act No. 60), cap.490, supp. 62, Laws of
Tanganyika
1963 The Regional and Area Commissioners (Amendment Act, cap.461, supp. 63,
Laws of Tanzania
1965 Interim Constilution Tanzania (One party state), Act No.
1966 The Permanent Commission of Enquiry Act (No. 25)
1975 Interim Constitution of Tanzania (Amendment) Act (No. 8), cap. 596.
1975 The People*s Militia (Power of Arrest) Act (No. 75)
Laws of Tanganyika
supp. 60, cap. 30, Criminal Procedure Code 
supp. 64, cap. 16, Penal Code
Zambia (Northern Rhodesia)
1936 Ordnance No. 9
I960 The Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (No. 5)
1963 The English Law (Extent of Application) Ordinance (No. 4 of 1963)
1964 The Zambia Independence Order (U.K., S.I. 1964 No. 1652)
1965 Laws of Zambia: cap. 6, Penal Code
cap. 7, Criminal Procedure Code
cap. 265, The Preservation of Public Security Act
cap. 268, The Emergency Powers Act
ti 0
1965 The Preservation of Public Security (Detained Persons) Regulations
1969 The Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act (No. 33 of 1969)
1973 Constitution of Zambia (One party state) Act (No. 2? of 1973)
197^ The Commission of Investigation Act (No. 23)
Malawi (Nyasaland)
19^ -6 Revised Laws of Nyasaland, cap. 29, Criminal Procedure Code
i960 The Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (No. 1)
196^ Malawi Independence Order (U.K., S.I. 196^ No. 916)
1963 The Preservation of Public Security Regulations
1966 Constitution of Malawi (Republican, One-party state), Act No. 23 of 1966
1967 The Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Act No. 27, cap. 5:01 of
Laws of Malawi 1973)
1973 Laws of Malawi: cap. 7:01, Penal Code
cap. 8:01, Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code 
cap. 14:02, The Preservation of Public Security Act 
cap. 1^:03, The Restriction and Security Order Act
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TABLE A (Some 
COUNTRY
s t a t i s t i c s )  
AREA ( s q . m ls . ) POPULATION LITER­
ACY (%)
£G5
DIVISIVE FACTORS (D .F .
BANGLADESH 55,126 78 m i l l i o n  
(1975 e s t im a te )
22 D F. n e g a t iv e s  80$ M us lim s ; 
and u n i l i n g u a l
GHANA 91 ,843 8,545,561 
(1970 census)
65 D.F p o s i t i v e s  75 d i f f e r e n t  
t r i b a l  g ro u p s ;  m u l t i l i n g u a l ;  
42$ C h r i s t i a n s ,  38$ A n im is ts  
12$ M us lim s
INDIA 1 ,2 69 ,3 46 548 m i l l i o n  
(1971 census) 
610 m i l l i o n s  
(1976 e s t im a te )
30 D .F . p o s i t i v e s  m u l t i l i n g u a l  
(15  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  re co g ­
n is e d  languages)  . A lthough  
H indus  fo rm  80$ o f  th e  pop­
u l a t i o n  t h e r e  i s  a n o t ic e a b ]  
c u l t u r a l  d iv e rg e n c e  r e g io n ­
a l l y  .
KENYA 224,960 10,956 ,501 
(1969 census)
13 .85  m i l l i o n  
(1975 e s t im a te )
D .F . p o s i t i v e s  70 d i f f e r e n t  
t r i b a l  g ro u p s ;  m u l t i l i n g u a l ;  
m u l t i r a c i a l  ( A f r ic a n s ,A s ia n s  
A rabs , Europeans) .
MALAYSIA 129,308 10 ,439 ,530  
(1970 census)
39 D .F . p o s i t i v e s  m u l t i r a c i a l  - 
M alays (M u s l im s )  4 6 .8 $ ,  
Chinese (B u d d h is ts )  3 4 .1$ , 
I n d ia n s ,  9$ .
MALAWI 45,747 4 ,0 3 9 ,5 8 3  
(1966 census) 
5 ,1 75 ,0 00  
(1976 e s t im a te )
78 D .F . p o s i t i v e s  9 main t r i b a l  
g roups ; 20 C h r i s t i a n s ,  r e s t  
A n im is ts ;  r a c i a l  m in o r i t y  
g roups -  As ians  & Europeans
NIGERIA 356,669 55 ,654 ,000  
(1963 census)
70 m i l l i o n s  
(1977 e s t im a te )
20 D .F . p o s i t i v e s  h a l f  th e  
p o p u la t io n  M us l im s , concen­
t r a t e d  i n  th e  N o r th  and West 
main e t h n i c  groups ares 
H a u s a /F u la n i  , Yoruba and 
Ebo.
NORTHERN
IRELAND
5,462 1 ,5 3 6 ,0 6 5  
(1971 census)
- D .F . p o s i t i v e s  35$ Roman 
C a th o l i c s  and r e s t  o f  o th e r  
d e n o m in a t io n s .
PAKISTAN 310,403 6 4 ,9 7 9 ,7 3 2  
(1972 census) 
7 2 ,3 6 8 ,0 0 0  
(1976 e s t im a te )
15 D .F . n e g a t iv e s  97$ M us lim s ; 
m u l t i l i n g u a l  b u t  d i f f e r e n c e s  
n o t  p ronounced .
SINGAPORE 230 2 ,2 9 4 ,0 0 0 31 D .F . p o s i t i v e s  m u l t i r a c i a l  - 
C h inese , M a lays  and In d ia n s  
i n  th e  r a t i o  o f  5s3s2
SRI LANKA 25,332 12.7  m i l l i o n s  
(1971 census) 
13 .6  m i l l i o n s  
(1975 e s t im a te )
87 D .F . p o s i t i v e s  S in h a le s e ,7 
( o f  whom 67$ B u d d h is ts ;  
T a m i ls  (C ey lonese  and 
I n d ia n s ) ,  2 0 .5$  ( o f  whom 17.( 
Hinduss C h r i s t i a n s ,  7 .7 $
TANZANIA 363,708 12 ,313 ,469  
(1967 census)
- D .F . p o s i t i v e :  120 d i f f e r e n t  
t r i b a l  g ro u p s :  M us lim s and 
C h r i s t i a n s  31$ each.
UGANDA 91,076 1 1 .5  m i l l i o n s  
(1975 e s t im a te )
D .F . p o s i t i v e :  m u l t i l i n g u a l  
24 t r i b a l  g roups ; 66$ 
C h r i s t i a n s ,  16$ M u s l im s .
/ c o n t in u e d .
,-*! p  
^ 0
TABLE A (Some s ta t is t ic s )  continued
COUNTRY AREA (sq .m ls .)  POPULATION LITER­
ACY (’ 50
DIVISIVE FACTORS (D .F . )
ZAMBIA 290,586 4,054,000
(1969 census) 
5,138,000  
(1978 estimate)
52 D.F. p o s it iv e :  73 t r ib e s :  
75 Animists, 25 Chris tians;  
other r a c ia l  m inority  
groups -  Europeans and 
Asians.
NOTE: For detention f ig u re s ,  please see te x t ,  paras 4.185 and 9 .73)
SOURCES: A Year Book of the Commonwealth (1977)
B r ita n n ica  Encyclopaedia (Macropaedia, 1977) 
The Europa Year Book (1978)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABRAHAM, W.E.
ADUiS, Henry
ADE-AJAYI, J.F.
(and M. Crowder)
ABEGBITE, L.O.
AERIEA, A.A.
AGUDA, A.
(and 0. Aguda)
AHMAD, M.3.
AIHE, D.O.
AI YAH GAR, S.K.
AKPOJARO, J.D.
alexandrowi cz-Alexander , c. h .
ALLEN, Sir Charieton K.
The Mind of Africa
(Weidenfield & Nicolson, London, 1962)
"Anglo-Saxon Procedure" in Essays on 
Anglo-Saxon Law, ed.
(Boston 1905 / N e w  Jersey 1972)
History of West Africa
(Longmans, London, 1971)
Concept of Rule of Law in African 
Societies
(Unpublished PhD Thesis, London 
University, 1966)
The Ghana Coup
(Frank Cass & Co., London, 1966)
"Judicial Protection of Some Fundamental 
Rights in Nigeria and n  the Sudan 
Before and During Military Rule", (1972) 
(1972) 16 J.A.L. 130
Administration of Justice in Mediavel India 
(Manager of Publications, Govt, of 
Pakistan, Karachi, 1950
"Fundamental Human Rights and the Military 
Regimes in Nigeria", (1971) 15 J.A.L. 211+.
Some Contributions of South India to Indian 
Culture
(Calcutta University, India, 1923)
The Control of Delinquency by Social 
Political and Legal Institutions in 
Nigeria
(Unpublished PhD thesis, London Univ. 1969)
"The Supreme Court of India as a Habeas 
Corpus Bench" in ( ) 22 Mad. Univ.
L.J.« part 2, p.71
Law and Order
(Stevens, London, 1965)
The Queen's Peace (Hamlyn Lectures, 1953)* 
(Stevens, London, 1953)
"Reg. 18B & Reasonable Cause" in (19^2) 58 
L.Q.R. 232
ALLOTT, A.N.
ALTEKAR, A.S.
ANCEL, Marc 
ANDERSON, J.N.D.(ed.) 
APTER, D.E.(ed.) 
ARCHBOLD
ARCHROLD, W.A.J.
BARKER, Sir Ernest
BARKER, Peter
BARNETT, Donald L. 
(and Karari Njama)
BARROS, .Tames (ed.) 
BASU, D.R.
BEBLER, Anton(ed.)
BENTHAM, Jeremy
New Essays in African Law
(Butterworth, London, 1970)
Judicial & Legal Systems in Africa 
(Butterworth, London, 1970)
Essays in African Law
(Butterwroth, London, 1960)
A History of Village Communities in 
Western India
(University of Bombay, 1929)
Social Defence (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, 1965)
Changing Law in Developing Countries 
(George Allen & Unwin, London, 1963)
Ideology and Discontent
(Free Press, New York, 1961+)
Pleading, Evidence & Practice in Criminal 
Cases, 38th edition 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1973)
Outlines of Indian Constitutional History 
(P.S. King & Son, London 1926)
Political Thought in England, 181+8 to 191U 
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1950)
Operation Cold Chop
(Ghana Pub. Corpn., Accra, 19^9)
Mau Mau From Within
(Monthly Press Review, New York, 1966)
The United Nations: Past, Present and 
Future (Free Press, New York, 1972)
Commentary on the Constitution of India 
5th edn. in 8 vols. (S.C. Sarkar &
Sons Calcutta, 1965)
Military Rule in Africa
(Praeger Publishers, New York, London,
1973)
An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation
BERLIN, Sir Isaiah 
3LACKST0NE, Sir William 
BOHANNM, Paul 
BOSE, Vivian
BOWLE, John
BOYLE, K.
(and T. Hadden, P. Hillyard)
BRECHER, Michael
BRETT
(And McLEAH )
Pour Essays on Liberty
(Oxford University Press, London, 1975)
Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(Beacon Press, Boston, 1962)
Justice and Judgement among the Tiv
(Oxford, University Press, London, 1968)
"Preventive Detention in India" in (1961)
3 Jrl, of Internl, Commn, of Jur, 82
"The Migration of the Common Law" in
(1960) 76 L.Q..R.
Western Political Thought
(Jonathan Cape, London, 19^ +8)
Politics and Public Opinion in the 19th 
Century (Jonathan Cape, London, 1966)
Law and State
(Martin Robertson, London 1975)
The New States of Asia
(Oxford University Press, 19&3)
The Criminal Law and Procedure of the 
six southern states of Nigeria, 2nd 
edn, by C.O. Madarikan and T.A. Aguda 
(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 197U)
BRIDGE, J.W.
(and D. Lasok, D.L. Perrott 
and R.O. Plender) (eds)
BROWNLIE, Ian
BRYCE, Viscount 
BUCKLEY, W.P. (Jr.)
Fundamental Rights
(Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1973)
Basic Documents on Human Rights 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971)
The Law Relating to Public Order 
(Butterworth, London, 1968)
Preface to Magna Carta Commemoration 
Essays, H.E. Malden, (ed,) q.v.
United Nations Journal
(Michael Joseph, London, 1975)
BURN, Richard 
BURNS, Air Alan 
BUSIA, K.A.
CALLAGHAN, James 
CALVERT, Harry
CARD, Richard 
CAREY, John
CARLSTON, K.S.
CARR, C.T. (ed.)
CARR, C.T. (ed.)
CASELEY-HAYFORD, J.E. 
CHAMBLISS, W.J.
CHITTICK, H.N. (ed.} 
(and R.I. Rotbarg)
CHOY, Loke Kit
The Justice of the Peace
(Sweet, Maxwell & Stevens, London, 1869)
History of Nigeria
(George Allen & Unwin, London, 1969)
The Position of Chiefs in the M o dem 
Political Systems of Ashanti 
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1950
A House Divided
(Collins, London, 1973)
Constitutional Law in Northern Ireland 
(Stevens' & Son and Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly, London, 1968)
"Breath Tests - Driving, Suspicion and 
Requirement", (1972) New L.J. 9b&
United Nations Protection of Civil and 
Political Rights
(Syracuse Univ. Press, New York, 1970)
Social Theory and African Tribal Organization 
(University of Illinois Press, Chicago 
and London, 1958)
Seldon Society’s Select Charters of 
Trading Companies 
(Bernard Quaritch, London, 1913)
Select Charters of Trading Companies,
Seldon Society
(Bernard Quaritch, London, 1913)
Gold Coast Native Institutions
(Frank Cess & Co., London, 1970)
"The Law of Vagrancy" in Crime and Legal 
Process, ed. (McGraw Hills,
New York, 1969)
East Africa and t he Orient
(Africana Pub. Co., New York, 1975)
"Fundamental Rights of Arrested Persons",
(1958) Mai. L. Rev. 113
"Constitutional Supremacy in Malaysia in 
the light of two recent decisions",
(1959) Mai. L. Rev. 260
CICERO
CLUTTERBUCK, Richard 
COHEN, Maxwell
COKE, Sir Edward
COOPER, J.D.O.
(with E.A. Ayandale, R. 
and A.E. Afigo)
COORAY, L.J.H.
CORPIELD, F.D.
CORWIN, E.S.
COWELL, Herbert
CRANSTON, Maurice
(ed.)
CRITCHLEY, T.A.
CROWDER, Michael 
DALE, William 
DALTON, Michael
De Republica
Riot & Revolution in Singapore & Malaya 
(Faber & Faber, London, 1973)
"Habeas Corpus Cum Causa" in (19I1O) 18 
Can, Bar Rev, 10
"Some Considerations on the origins of 
Habeas Corpus" in (1938) 16 Can, Bar 
Rev, 92
Institutions of the Laws of England 
(London, 1832)
The Growth of African Civilisations 
J. Gavin (Longmans, London, 1972)
An Introduction to the Legal System of 
Ceylon
(Lake House Investments Ltd,, Colombo, 1972)
History of the Origin & Growth of Mau Mau 
(Cmnd 1030, H.M.S.O., London, i960)
The Constitution and What it Means Today 
(Princeton Univ, Press, U.S.A., 197 )
History and Constitution of the Courts 
and Legislative Authorities in India 
(Thacker, Spink & Co., Calcutta, 193&)
What are Human Rights?
(Bodley Head, London, 1973)
Western Political Philosophers 
(Bodley Head, London, 1966)
A History of Police in England and Wales 
(Constable, London, 19^7)
The Story of Nigeria
(Faber & Faber, London, 1966)
"Human Rights in United Kingdom" in 
(1976) 25 I.C.L.Q. 292 ;
The Countrey Justice 
(London, 1666)
|a«t 
\
DANIELS, W.C.E.
DAVIDSON, Basil
DAW, Rowena
DEMBITZ, Nanatte
MINING, Sir Alfred 
DERRETT, J.D.M.
de SILVA, C.R. 
de SMITH, S.A,
DHAVAN, Rajeev
DICEY, A.V.
DINSTEIN, Yoram
DOUGLAS, Mary
(and P.M. Kaberry) (eds.)
DRAKE, W.St.Clair
The Connnon Law in West Africa 
(Butterworth, London, 196I4.)
Which way Africa?
(Penguin, 1973)
The Africans
(Longmans, London, 1969)
"Preventive Detention, in Singapore -
A comment on the case of Lee Mau Seng", 
(1972) Mai. L. Rev. 276
"Racial Discrimination and Military 
Judgements" in (l9k$) Colum. L.
Rev. 17!?
Preedom Under the Law (Hamlyn Lectures,
1st series), (Stevens, London, J\3b9)
Pactum Valet : The Adentures of a Maxim" 
(1958) 7 I.C.L.Q, 280
"Indian Tradition and the Rule of Law 
among Nations", (1962) 11 I.C.L.Q, 266
Ceylon -under the British Occupation
(Colombo Apothecaries, Colombo, 1953)
Constitutional and Administrative Law 
(Penguin Education, London, 1973)
The New Commonwe,alth and its Constitution 
(Stevens, London, 1962+)
The Supreme Court of India and Parliamentary 
Sovereignty
(Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1976)
An Introduction to the Study of the Law 
of Constitution
"Collective Human Rights of Peoples and 
Minorities" in (1976) 25 ICLQ, 102
Man in Africa
(Tavistock Publn., London, 1969)
"Traditional Authority and Social Action 
in Former Br. West Africa" in M o d e m  
Africa, ed. McEWAN (q*v.)
DROST, Pieter N. 
BONHAM (Jr) W.H.
EWARDS, J.L1.J ■
EL-AYOUTY, Yassin
el-ERIAN, Abdulla
ELIAS, T.O.
ERMACORA, Pelic
EVANS, J.M.
EVANS-PRITCHARD, E.E. 
EWELUKWA, D.I.O.
EZEJIOPOR, G.
Human Rights as Legal Rights
"Magna Carta & British Constitutionalism" 
in The Great Charter, ed.
"Special Powers in Northern Ireland", 
(19^6) Crim L. Rev. 7
The United Nations and Decolonisation 
(Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 1971)
"International Law and the Developing 
Countires" in Trasitional Law in a 
Changing Society, ed. W. Priedmann 
(& ors), q.v.
Nigeria : The Development of its Laws 
and Constitution, vol. 1I4 in British 
Commonwealth series 
(Stevens, London, 19^7)
Ghana and Sierra Leone : The Developments 
of their Laws and Constitutions vol.
10 in British Commonwealth series 
(Stevens, London, 1967)
British Colonial Law
(Stevens, London, 1962)
"The Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction" 
in Recueil Des Cours, 1968 II. Academie 
De Droit International, Terme 12l| de la 
collection (A.W. Sijthoff, Ledge, 1969)
"Police Powers & Road Traffic Offences" 
in (1973) 36 Mod.L.R.260
Witchcraft Among the Azande
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1972)
"The Constitutional Aspect of Military 
Take-over in Nigeria", (19&7) 2 Nig.
L.J. 1U-15
"Judicial Interpretation of Constitution:
The Nigerian Experience", (19&7) 2 
Nig. L.J. 70
FAGS, F.D.
FALK, R.A. (ed.)
FAUL, Denis, Fr.
FAWCETT, Sir Charles
FAWCETT, J.E.S.
FERKIN, Y.C.
FINER, S.E.
FIRST, Ruth
FITCH, Bob.
(and Mary Oppenheimer
FORSYTH, W.
FORTES, M.
(and E.E. Evans-Pritchard)
FOSTER, Sir Michael
FRIEDMANN, W.
(and L. Henkin, (eds) 
0. Lissitzyn)
GANDHI, M.K.
GEERTZ, C.
GHAI, Y.P.
(and J.P.W.B. McAuslan)
A History of West Africa
(Camb. University Press, 1969)
The International Law of ‘Civil War
(The American Society of International 
Law, Baltimore, 1971)
The Shame of Merlyn Rees
(Fr. Raymond Murray, Dunagannon, 1975)
The First Century of British Justice in 
India
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 193^ -)
"United Nations and Intemationsl Law" 
in the Evolving United Nations, ed. 
Twitchett, K.J, (q.v.)
Africa's Search for Identity
(George Braziller, New York, 1966)
The Man on Horseback
(Penguin, London 1975)
The Barrel of a Gun
(Allen Lane, Penguin Press, London, 1970)
Ghana: End of an Illusion
(Monthly Review Press, New York, 1966)
Cases and Opinions on Constitutional Law 
(Stevens & Hayes, London, 1869)
African Political System 
(eds.) (Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1961)
Discourse upon a few branches of the 
Common Law (London, 1792)
Transitional Law in Changing Society
(Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1972)
Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule
(Navjivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad)
"Ideology as a Cultural System" in Ideology 
and Discontent, Apter, q.v. ed.
Public Law and Political Change in Kenya 
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1970)
GHAI, Y.P,
GHOSHAL, U.N.
GLEDHILL, Alan
GLUCKMAN, Max
GODDARD, Lora 
GOODHART, A.L.
GOODWIN, G.L.
GORDON, D.M.
GREEN, L•C•
GRIFFITHS, Sir Percival 
GUTTERIDGE, W.F.
GYANDOH, S.O.
"Constitutions and the Political Order in 
East Africa", (1972) 21 I.C.L.Q. 1+03
A History of Hindu Political Theories 
(Oxford University Press, Madras 1927)
The Republic of India : The Development 
of its Laws and Constitution, British 
Commonwealth series, vol. 6 
(Stevens, London, 1962+)
Pakistan : The Development of its Laws
and Constitutions, Br. C.W. series, vol.5 
(Stevens, London, 1967)
Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa 
(Cohen & West, London, 19^3)
The Judicial Process among the Barotse 
of Northern Rhodesia 
(Manchester University Press, 1955)
Politics, Law & Ritual in Tribal Society 
(Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1971)
" A Note on Habeas Corpus in 
65 L.Q.R. 30
"Notes" and "A Short Replication" (on 
Liversidge case) in (191+2) 58 L.Q.R.
3 and 21+3
"The United Nations : Expectations and 
Experience" in The Evolving United 
Nations, Twitchett, K.J. ed, (q.v.)
"Habeas Corpus - Civil or Criminal Remedy?" 
in (191+3) 23 Can Bar Rev. 595
"International Law and the Suppression of 
Terrorism" in Malaya Law Review Legal 
Essays (Singapore, 1975)
Modem India
(Earnest Benn, London, 1965)
Military Institutions and Power in the 
New States (F.A. Praeger, New York, 
London, 1965)
"Liberty and Courts" in Essays in Ghana 
Law, (University of Ghana, Faculty of 
Law, Lagos, 1976)
HALE, Sir Mathew
HALSBURY1S 
HALSBURY'S 
HATCH, John
HAVELL, E.B. 
HAWKINS,
HEARNSHAW, E.C.J.
HEDGES, R.Y. 
HEUSTON, R.F.V.
KOLDSWORTH, Sir W.S.
The History of the pleas of the Crown 
(London, 1736)
Laws of England (3rd and 1+th Edn.)
Statutes (2nd and 3r<i Edns*)
Nigeria : A History
(Secher & Warburg, London, 1971)
Two African Statesmen
(Secher & Warburg, London, 1976)
Africa Emergent
(Secher & Warburg, London, 197U)
Two African Statesmen
(Secher & Warburg, London, 1976)
The History of Aryan Rule in India 
(George Harrap, London, 1918)
A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 
(London, 1795)
The Social & Political Ideas of some 
Great Political Thinkers of the Six­
teenth and Seventeenth Centuries 
(Dawsons of Pall Mall, London, 1967)
"Liability under Nigerian Criminal Codes" 
in Changing Law in Developing Countries, 
ed. J.N.D. Anderson, q.v.
"Liversidge v Anderson" in Retrospect" in
(1970) 86 L.Q.R. 33
"L. v A. : Two footnotes", in (1971)
87 L.Q.R. 161
Habeas Corpus Procedure" in (1950)
66 L.Q.R. 79
Essays in Constitutional Law 
(Stevens, London, 1961+)
A History of English Law 
(Metheun, London, 1926)
"Martial Law Historically considered" 
in (1902)18 L.Q.R. 177
"Notes" (on Liversidge case) in (19I+2)
58 L.Q.R. 1
HOLLAND, D.C.
HOWARD, A.E.D.
HUGGIHS, W.N.
(and J. Jackson)
HULL, H.W.
HYA-IS, Edward
ILBERT, Sir Courtenay
International Commn. of 
(Staff study)
IYER, T.K.K.
JAIN, M.P.
JA1ES, R.W.
(and F.M. Kassam, Eds,
JAYASWAL, K.P.
JENKS, Edward
JENNIES, Sir Ivor
and H.W. Tambiah 
J O U I T T ' s
"Emergency Legislation in the Commonwealth"
(1960) 13 Cur. Leg. Prob. 11;0
Magna Carta Text & Commentary
(Virgina University, U.S.A., 1961*)
An Introduction to African Civilisations 
(Negro Univ. Press, New York, 1969)
Munyakare : African Civilisations before 
the Batuuree
(John Wiley, New York-London, 1972)
Terrorists & Terrorism
(j.M. Dent, London, 1975)
The Government of India
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1898)
Jurists "Ghana’s Preventive Detention Act",
(1961) 3 Jrl. of Intenl. Commn. 
of Jur.(No.2), 65
"Constitutional Law in Pakistan: Kelsen 
in Court" in (1973) 21 AK. J. Comp.
L. 759 :
Outlines of Indian Legal History 
(N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1972)
Law and its Administration in One-party 
•) State : Selected Speeches of the Chief
Justice Telford George 
(East African Literature Bureau,
Nairobi, 1 9 7 3 )
Hindu Polity
(Butterworth, Calcutta, 192i|)
"Story of Habeas Corpus" in Select Essays 
in Anglo-American Legal History, ed. 
Association of American Law Schools 
(Little Brown Co., Boston, 1908);
Problems of the New Commonwealth 
(Camb. Univ. Press, London, 1958)
"Magna Carta & Constitutionalism" in The 
Great Charter : Pour Essays on Magna 
Carta & History of our Liberty 
(Pantheon Books, New York, 1965)
The Dominion of Ceylon: The Development 
of its La3s and Constitution, Br. 
Commonwealth series, vol. 7 
(Stevens, London, 1952)
^ b-v - o f
( ^  to  ^  ^ £ . c r '^ J h -w  .
KADISH, S.H.
(and PAULSEN, M.G.)
KANE, P.V.
KARANJIA, R.K.
KARIUKI, J.M.
KAUNDA, K.
KAYE, Sir John William 
KEETON, G.W.
KEITH, A.B.
KELSEN, Hans
KENNY
(ed., J.W.C. Turner)
KENYATA,
KENYON, J.P.
KHAN, M.R.A.
Criminal Law and Its Process
(Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1969)
History of Dharmasastra
(Bhandarkar Oriental Research Inst­
itute, Poona, 19 1+6)
The Mind of Mr. Nehru
(George Allen & Unwin, London, 1960)
Mau Mau Detainee
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1963)
Humanism : A Guide to the Nation 
(Govt. Printer, Lusaka, 1967)
The Administration of the East India
Company (Richard Bentley, London, 1853)
Liversidge v Anderson" in (1 9I+2 ) 5 
Mod. L. Rev. 162
The Constitutional History of India
(Indian Reprint by Central Book Depot, 
Allahabad, 1961)
Pure Theory of Law
(Wisconson Univ. Press, U.S.A. 191+5)
General Theory of Law and State
(Harvard Univ. Press, U.S.A. 19U9)
Principles of International Law
(Rolt, Rinehart & Winston Inc., New 
York, 1966)
Outlines of Criminal Law
(1 9th ed., Camb. Univ. Press, 1 9 6 6 )
Pacing Mount Kenya
(Seeker & Warburg, London, 1938)
The Stuart Constitution
(Camb. Univ. Press, 1966)
Sociological Aspects of ss. 109-10 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code", in 
(1963) 5 J .I.L .I.  1+98
KIMBLE, David 
KIWANUKA, M.S.M.
KIWANUKA, S.
LAMBERT, J •L •
LANHAM, David 
LASKI, Harold J.
LAUTERPACHT, H. (ed.) 
LEAKEY, L.S.B.
LEGUM, Colin
(ed.)
LEIGH, L.H.
Le PELLEY, P.
LINGAT, Robert 
LLOYD, Lord of Hampstead 
LUARD, Evan 
LUDOWYKE, E.F.C.
A Political History of Ghana
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1963)
The Empire of Bunyoro-Kitara-Myth or 
Reality
(Longsmans of Uganda, 1968)
From Colonialism to Independence 
(East African Literature Bureau, 
Nairobi, 1913)
"Reasonable cause to arres", (1973)
Public Law 285
"Arrest, Detention and Compulsion" in 
(197U) Crl. L.R. 288
The Dangers of Obedience and Other Essays 
(Johnson Reprint Corporation New 
York, 1968)
International Law
(Longmans, London, 1965)
Defeating the Mau Mau
(Metheun, London, 1951+)
Zambia, Independence and Beyond 
(Nelson, London, 1966)
Africa Contemporary Records 
(Rex Hollings, London)
Police Power in England and Wales 
(Butterworth, London, 1971+)
"Vagrancy and Lav/ in Kenya", in (19^9) 
E.A.L.J. 195
The Classical Law of India
(Univ. of California Press, USA, 1973)
"Do We Need a Bill of Rights", (1976) 
M.L.R. 121
The International Regulation of Civil Wars 
(Thames & Hudson, London, 1972)
The Story of Ceylon
(Faber & Faber, London, 1967)
MACFARLANE, Leslie 
MACHIN, G.I.T.
MACULAY, T.B. 
MAGEE, John
MAINE, Sir Henry
MAIR, Lucy
MAITLAND, F.W. 
MAJDELENARY, P. 
MAJUMDAR, D.N.
MA JUMDAR, R.C. 
MAJUMDER, N. 
MALDEN,H.E. (ed.) 
MALLAL, B.A.
MANN AT, M.A.
Violence and the State
(Thomas Nelson, London, 1971+)
The Catholic Question in English Politics, 
1820 to I83O (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1961+)
Essays
Northern Ireland : Crisis A Conflict
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1971+)
Village Communities in the East and West 
(John Murray, London, 1887)
Primitive Government
(Pelican, London, 1962)
African Societies
(Camb. Univ. Press, 1971+)
Native Policies in Africa
(George Routledge, London, 1936)
Anthropology and Social Change
(Athlone Press, London Univ. 1969)
The Constitutional History of England 
(Camb. Univ. Press, 1926)
State of Emergency
(Longmans, London, 1962)
Caste and Communication in An Indian 
Village
(Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1958)
Corporate Life in Ancient India
(Calcutta University, India, 1922)
Justice and Police in Bengal
(Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1960)
Magna Carta Commemoration Essays
(Royal Historical Society, London, 1917)
Mallal's Criminal Procedure
(Malayan Law Journal, Singapore, 1957)
The Superior Courts of Pakistan
(Zafar Law Associaties, Lahore, 1973)
MAQUET, J.
MARTIN, Robert
MATTHAI, John
MAX-MULLER, Frederick
STAYER, Philip (ed.)
MeDONALD, L •C•
MeDERMOTT, Lord
McEV/AN, P.J.M.
(and R.B. Sutcliffe)
McILWAILT, C.H.
McKECHNIE, W.S.
MEADOR, D.H.
MEMDIS, G.C.
MERRYMAN, J.H.
MILL, John Stuart
MILLER, Harry 
MILLER, J.D.B.
Civilisations of Africa
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1972)
"The Ombudsman in Zambia", (1977) 15 
Jml. of Mod. Afr. Studies, 239
Village Government in British India 
(Fisher Unwin, London, 1915)
India - What it can Teach us?
( )
Socialization, the approach from social
Anthropology (Tavistock PubIn. London, 1970)
Western Political Theory
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1968)
"Law and Order in Times of Emergency"in (1972) 
Juridical Review 1
Modern Africa 
(eds.) (Thomas, Crowel Co. New York, 19^5)
Magna Carta & Common Law" in Magna Carta
Commemeration Essays, ed. H.E. Malden (q.v.)
Magna Carta (James McGhose, Glasgow, 191U)
Habeas Corpus and Magna Carta : The 
Dualism of Power and Liberty,
(Univ. Press, Charlottesvilla, USA, 1966)
The Colebrook-Cameron Papers 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1956)
The Civil Law Tradition
(Stanford University Press, California,
1969)
On Liberty
Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform
Considerations on Representative Government
Jungle War in Malaya
(Arthur Barker, London, 1972)
The Commonwealth in the World
(Gerald Duckworth, London 1962)
MILNER, Alan
MITINATUR, Joseph
MIROGUE, Martin
(and Judith Molloy(eds.)
MONRO, Hector 
HOOKERJI, R.K.
HORALL, J.B.
MORRIS, Christopher
MORRIS, H.F.
(and READ, J,S.)
MORRIS, Norval
HORTON, T.C.
MOSS, Robert 
MURDOCK, G.P.
HUHTY, K.S.
IIAMRAJA, T.
r<} %
"The Santions of Customary Criminal Law :
A Study in Social Control," in (1965-65)
1 Nig. L.J. 173
"Martial Law and the State of Seige" in
(1 9 6 9 (1 ) S.C.J .  1*3 ;
African Aims and Attitudes
(Camb. Univ. Press, London, 197^)
"Claims for violations of Human Rights 
II" (1976) 126 New J.L, 305
Local Government in Ancient India 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1920)
Political Thought in Medieval Times
(Hutchinson Univ. Library, London, 1971)
Western Political Thought 
(Longmans, London, 19&7)
Political Thought in England
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 19^5)
Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972)
The Habitual Criminal (London School of 
Economic & Longmans Green & Co.,
London, 1951)
Decisions of the Supreme Court of
Judicature at Ft. V/illiam in Bengal
Urban Guerillas
(Temple Smith, London, 1972)
Africa: its people and their culture 
history
(McGraw Hill, New York, 1959)
Readings in Indian History, Politics 
and Philosophy
(George Allen & Unwin, London, 19^7)
The Legal System of Ceylon in its 
Historical Setting (E.J. Brill,
Leiden, 1972)
^ 1 Q 'W 'K «.»>>.
(  ^ 1  K C . /C c . '^ r x t  / s T .J '„t.U+.JL I 9 ^ S ’ )
NADEL, S.P.
NEHRU, Jawahar1al
NKRUMAH, Kwame 
NOORANI, A.G.
HORTON, P.M.
NWABUEZE, B.O.
NYERERS, J.K.
OGILIVE, Sir Charles
0J0, Abiola
OLIVER, Roland
(and Antony Atmore)
OLUYEDE, Peter 
ONG, D.S.K.
OTTENBERG,
A Black Byzantium
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 19^6)
Glimpses of World History
(Lindsay Dummond, London, 19^ -9)
The Discovery of India
(Meridan Books, London, 19^1)
I Speak of Preedom
(Heinemann, London, 1961)
Indian Political Trials
(Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1976)
"The Tanzanian Ombudsman”, (1973)
22 I.C.L.Q, 603
The Constitutional Law of Nigerian Republic 
(Butterworth, London, 1961-1-)
Constitutionalism in Emergent States 
(C. Hurst & Co., London, 1973)
Preedom and Development
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1973)
Preedom and Unity
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 19^7 
and 1970)
Preedom and Socialism
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1 9 6 8 )
The King’s Government and the Common Law 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1958)
’’The Search for a Grundnorm in Nigeria",
(1971) I.C.L.Q. 117
Africa since 1800
(Camb. Univ. Press, 1972)
Administrative Law in East Africa 
(East African Literature Bureau,
Nairobi, 1973)
Legal Aspects of Constitutional Breakdown 
in the Commonwealth 
(Unpublished London Univ. PhD(Law) 
Thesis, 1972)
Cultures and Societies of Africa 
(Ransom House, New York, 19^3)
PAL, R.B.
PALING, Dennis 
PALLEY, Claire
PA1TDEY, A.3.
PANDEY, B.N.
PANIKKAR, K.M.
PAOR, Liam de 
PARK, A.E.W.
PAUL, James C.N.
PiRKIN, R.M.
PIGGOT, Stuart 
PILLAI, K.S.
PLUCKNETT, T.P.T. 
POLLOCK, Sir Frederick
The History of Hindu Law in Vedic and 
Post-Vedic Times
(Calcutta University, India, 1958)
"Christie v Leachinsky Revisited" in 
(1971+) 118 Sol. Jrl. 320
'Rethinking the Judicial Role", (19^9)
1 Zamb. L.J. 1
"The Evolution, Disintegration & Possible 
Reconstruction of Northern Ireland 
Constitution" in (1972) 1 Anglo-Amer.
L. Rev. 368
Society and Government in Mediavel India 
(Central Book Depot, Allahabad, 1965)
The Introduction of English Law into India 
(Asia Publishing House, London, 1^67)
The State and the Citizen
(Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1956)
Divided Ulster
(penguin, London, 1970)
The Sources of Nigerian Law
(Sweet A Maxwell, London, 1963)
"Some observations on Constitutionalism, 
Judicial Review and Rule of Law in 
Africa" (197U) 35 Ohio St. L.J. 851
Perkin's Criminal Law,
(Foundation Press, Brooklyn, 1957)
Pre-historic India to 1000 B.C.
(Cassell, London, 1962)
Principles of Criminology (Tagore Law 
Lectures, 1920) (Madras, 1921+);
A Concise History of Common Law 
(Butterworth, London, 1956)
"What is Martial Law?" in (1902)
18 L.Q.R. 152
The Expansion of Common Law 
(Stevens, London, 1901+)
POLLOCK, II.C.
POUND, Roscoe
POWICKE, P.M.
PRATT, Cranford 
RALZIIJOV/CZ, Sir Leon
RANKIIT, Sir George 
RATTRAY, R.S.
READ, J.S.
(and Morris, N.P., q.v.)
RENTON,
(and PIIILLIMORS, (eds)
RICKARDS, A.I.
Studies in Emerging Africa 
(Butterworth, London, 1971)
The Development of Constitutional
Guarantees of Liberty (Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1957)
"Per iudicum parium vel er legem terrae" 
in Magna Carta Commemoration Essays, 
ed. H.E. Malden (q.v.)
The Critical Phase in Tanzania
(Camb. Univ. Press, London, 1966)
Sir Fritzjames Stephen and His Contribution 
to the Development of Criminal Law 
(Bernard Quaritch, London, 1957)
Background to Indian Law
(Cambridge University Press, 9^h&)
Ashanti Law and Constitution
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1956)
"Bills and Rights in the "third world" : 
Some Commonwealth Experiences", (1973)
6 Verfassung Und Recht In Uberesse 
(Hamburg) 21.
"Judicial Power and the Constitution of 
Ghana", (1971) 3 Rev. of Ghana Law 107
"Crime & Punishment in East Africa" in 
196U How. L.J., Pall, I6I4.
"Criminal Law in Africa Today & Tommorow", 
in (1963) 7 J.A.L. 5
"Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda" in African 
Penal Systems
(Routledge and Keegan Pack, London)
Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice
Colonial Laws and Courts
(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1907)
"Socialization and Contemporary British 
Anthropology" in Socialization etc., 
ed, Mayer, P., q.v.
East African Chiefs
(Paber L Faber, London, i960
ROBERTS ON, A. II. (ed.) 
ROBERTS-WAY, Sir Kenneth
ROSCOE, J,
ROSE, Richard 
ROYDIIOUSE, E.
RUSSELL,
SALETORE, 3.A.
SARKAR, Sir Jadunath
SCARMAN, Sir Leslie
SCI-IAPSRA, I
SCKEUNER, Ulrich
SCHWARTZ, Bernard 
(and il.W.R. Wade
SEIDMAN, R.B.
SEL30URI3E, David
Human Rights in National and International 
Law
The Commonwealth and Colonial Law 
(Stevens, London, 1966)
"Human Rights in the Commonwealth",
(1968) 17 I.C.L.Q. 908
The Baganda
(Macmillan, London, 1911)
Governing without Consensus
(Paber & Paber, London, 1971)
The Criminal Law & Criminal Justice
Acts 1967 (Butterworth, London, 1968)
Russell on Crime 
edn. by
(Stevens, London, I96I4)
Ancient Indian Political Thought and 
Institutions
(Asia Publishing House, London, 1963)
Mughal Administration
(Patna University, India, 1925)
English Law : The new Dimension 
(Stevens, London, 197U)
Government and Politics in Tribal Societies 
(C.A. Watts, London, 1956)
"Parliamentary Govt, in Modern Democracies"
(1969) 1 Rev. of Ghana Law 105
Legal Control of Government
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972)
"Law & Economic Development in Independent 
English-speaking Sub-Saharan Africa", 
(1966) Wis. L. Rev. 998
"Constitutions in Independent, Anglophonic 
Sub-Saharan Africa : Form Sc Legitimacy", 
(1969) Wise. L.R. 83
An Eye to India
(Penguin, U.K., 1977)
SELIGKAN, C.G.
SEN, P.IT.
SEN-GUPTA, N.C.
SHARMA, Jagdish Saran (ed.) 
SHERIDA1I, L.A. (ed.)
SHIVA-RAO, P. (ed.)
SIIJGII, Chanan 
SINGH, Kedar 
SMITH, M.G.
STEINBERG
STEPHEN, Sir James Fitzjames
STEPHEN, Sir James Fitzjames 
(and Herbert Stephen)
STOKES, Sir Whitley
"Witchcraft Among the Azande"
(Preface), cf. Evans-Pritchard.
Races of Africa
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1Q66)
The General Principles of Hindu 
Jurisprudence
(Calcutta University, India, 1918)
Sources of Law and Society in Ancient 
India
(Art Press, Calcutta, 1911+)
India’s Struggle for Freedom (Select 
Documents)
(S. Chand & Co., Delhi, 1962)
Malaya Si Singapore, The Borneo Territories: 
development of their laws & constitutions, 
vol. 9 of Br. Commonwealth series 
(Stevens, London, 1961)
"Constitutional Problems of Malaysia",
(19&0 13 I.C.L.Q. 131+9
Framing India’s Constitution Select 
Documents
(Indian Institute of Public Admin­
istration, New Delhi, 1968)
"The Republican Constitution of Kenya",
(1965) 12+ I.C.L.Q. 878
Rural Democrat is at ion X-Rayed
(Vimal Prakashan, Ghaziabad, 197U)
The Economy of the Hausa Communities of 
Zaria (lI.M.S.O., London, 1955)
Dictionary of British History
History of Criminal Law of England 
Reprint by Burt Franklin, New York 
^•Tacmillan, London, 1883)
A Digest of the Law of Criminal Procedure 
in Indication offences 
(Macmillan, London, 1883)
The Anglo-Indian Codes
(Clarendon Press, London, 1887)
STONE
(eds. John Tichman -A.T 
STRAHGS, Sir Thomas
STREET, H a rry
STUBBS, William (Bishop)
TAHU1IE, T.N. 
TANAKA, Kotaro
TAN13ER, J.R. (ed.) 
THOI'IPSO!I, Sir R.G. 
TRIPATHI, P.K.
TULY, r .w .
1/IiIING, W.L.
TWITCHETT, K.J. (ed.)
ULIMANN, Walter
Justice Manual 
.Braycott) (Butterworth, London, 1978)
Motes on Cases in the Court of the Recorder 
and Supreme Court at Madras
(1975 Crim L. Rev. 192
Select Charters
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1900)
The Constituitional History of England 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1883)
The Evolution of the Nigerian State 
(Longmans, London, 1972)
"Some Observations on Peace, Law and 
Human Rights" in Trasitional Law in 
Changing Society, Eriendmann, W. ed. (q.v.)
Constitutional Documents of the Reign of 
James I (Camb. Univ. Press, 1930)
Revolutionary War in World Strategy 
(Seeker & Warburg, London, 1970)
"Judicial and Legislative Control over 
the Executive during Martial Law" 
in AIR 19^4 Jour 82
"Martial Law in India" in AIR 1963 
Jour. 66
A History of the African People 
(Faber & Faber, London, 1970)
"Emergency Powers and Criminal Process:
The Diplock Report", (1973)
Crim. L. Rev. I4.O6
The Evolving United Nations
(Europa Publications, London, 1971)
"The International Drama : The United 
Nationa on the World Stage", (see 
supra, ibid.)
The Individual and Society in the Middle 
Ages (Metheun, London, 1967)
VALLAT, Sir Francis (ed.) 
VARADACHARIAR, Sir Srinivasa 
VINOGRADOFF, Sir Paul
WALKER, R.J.
WEL30URNE, F.B.
WIGHT, Martin 
W ILK ms OH, Paul 
WILLIAIiS, Glanville
WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ TORT
ZANDER, Michael
An Introduction to the Study of Human 
Rights (En-v'crpo- Liv^ U-v,, I V'l'h)
The Hindu Judicial System
(Lucknow University, India, 19U6)
Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence 
(Oxford University Press, American 
Branch, 1920)
Essay on Chapter 39 in Magna Carta
Commemoration Essays ed. H.E. Malden (q.v.)
"Abolition of Felony" in (19^8) 118 
New L.J. 19
East African Rebels
(Scoen Press, London, 1961)
British Colonial Constitutions
(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1952)
Political Terrorism
(Macmillan, London, 197W
Criminal Law, The General Part 
(Stevens, London, 19&1)
"Arrest for Breach of the Peace" in 
(195I|.) Crim L.Rev578
"Police Control of Intending Criminals" 
in (1955) Crim L.Rev66
"The Courts & Persistent Offenders" 
in (1963) Crim L.Rev. 730
"Arrest for felony at Common Law" in 
(195U) Crim. L. Rev. ij.08
"Statutory Power of Arrest" in (1958)
Crin L.Rev. 73 J
"Defence of Necessity", in (1953)
6 Cur. Leg. Prob. 216
(Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1975)
A Bill of Right?
(Br. Institute of Human Rights, London,
1975)
